DEC 2 = 1965

 

OFFICE OF THE DEAN SCHOOL OF SCIENCE CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139

December 8, 1965

Dr. Joshua Lederberg

Department of Genetics

Stanford University School of Medicine
Palo Alto, California 94304

Dear Josh:

Thanks for your note. I guess I could argue on either
side of the issue of whether ABM's were good or bad for us and
in the end, it all boils down to the question of what one thinks
the reactions on the other side would be to a deployment either
by the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. My best judgment is that if the
U.S.S.R. were found to be deploying an ABM system, we would
not only deploy one of our own, but we would immediately begin
to buy lots more ballistic missiles and to make penetration aids
in order to overcome the ABM system. As always. we would think
that the Soviet ABM system was a hell of a lot better than it
was. We would frighten ourselves into buying many more ballistic
missiles than we needed; the Soviet Union would probably do the
same thing, and so I would suspect that the uncertainties and
fear would generate a violent new cycle of the arms race.

In addition. it would be necessary to have a major
fallout shelter program as an adjunct to an ABM system to make
it really effective. As I recall our efforts to sell fallout
shelters to the American public, I am really skeptical about the
willingness of the country to accept them. We are quite prepared
to buy protection through military systems that only cost money,
but we are not prepared to accept any disorientation or physical
inconvenience for that protection. I also find it hard to believe
that one could deploy a system primarily for protection against
Chinese missiles because the state of mutual confidence between
the United States and the Soviet Union is not such that the Soviet
Union could really accept a defensive system which appeared to be
effective against the Soviet force even if we said over and over
that it was really meant to protect us from the Chinese, and they
needn't worry about it.

VANsalN\
SCHOOL OF SCIENCE
OFFICE OF THE DEAN

Dr. Joshua Lederberg -2- December 8. 1965

I also have severe doubts about how effective a system
of this kind could be in the face of decoys and other counter-
measures which easily could be taken, particularly when one
considers the state of maintenance and readiness that we are
likely to have in the system after a year or two of standby.

On the other side of the coin. it would be very nice.
as you point out, to have such a system to protect against
accidental firing of rockets. or in the event of major dis-
armament agreements, to protect against a few clandestine rockets
which are the bugaboo today of any major arms reduction scheme.
It is hard to believe that we could persuade the nation to spend
twenty billion dollars in order to make it possible to get rid
of our ballistic missile force. In any event. these are compli-
cated problems for which technical and political interactions are
so important that they cannot really be separated and in which
the intent of a decision is almost as important as the decision
itself.

With very best regards,

sinctrely yours,

a

tr

Jerome B. /Wiesner