-r:-- c- r-^V-'. ARMY MEDICAL LIBRARY FOUNDED 1836 WASHINGTON, D.C. y / 7<3 13 \/29 .^*** 9 J 4£~f..... % ^: 74 ?£ '7J76/ 72 x^isiL y- \ * \ *70 1(> 11 1J : tf ! ! «*" .J ' nology. It was necessary to modify that manner of considering Phrenol- ogy ; I undertook to specify the nature of the fundamental mani- festations of the mind, and to name the powers independently of any action, or application ; and I established a new division of the 126 PHRENOLOGY. mental operations, according to the nature of the special powers, and modes of action, separating in the talents and characters of individuals, that which belongs to each power itself from what de- pends on its combination with other faculties. All the functions of man which take place with consciousness, are ascribed to the mind, and constitute animal life. They may be divided into two orders, a division admitted from the remotest antiquity, and known under the names Soul and Spirit; moral and intellectual faculties ; understanding and will; heart and head. I shall designate them by feelings and intellect, or by affective and intellectual faculties. Both orders of the cerebral functions may be subdivided into several genera, and each genus into several species. Some affec- tive powers produce only desires, inclinations or instincts ; I de- nominate them by the general title propensities. The name pro- pensities, then, is only applied to indicate internal impulses which invite to certain actions. They correspond with the instincts, or instinctive powers of animals. There are other affective faculties which are not confined to inclination alone, but have something superadded that may be styled sentiment. Self-esteem, for in- stance, produces a certain propensity to act; but, at the same time, feels another emotion or affection which is not merely propensity. All the faculties which I call propensities are common to man and animals, but those of which I now speak, and which I shall name sentiments, are partly common to man and animals, and partly proper to man. The second order of mental powers is destined to make us ac- quainted with the existence of the external world, with the quali- ties of the bodies that surround us, and, also, with their relations ; I call them intellectual. They may be subdivided into four gen- era. The first includes the functions of the external senses and of voluntary motion ; the second, those faculties, which make man and animals acquainted with external objects, and their physical qualities ; and the third, the functions connected with the know- ledge of relation between objects or their qualities ; these three gen- CRANIOLOGY. 127 era, I name perceptive faculties; the fourth genus comprises the faculties which act on all the other sensations and notions, and these I style reflective faculties. Each genus of faculties, both affective and intellectual, consists of several species, and each species offers several modifications, or varieties, even idiosyncrasies, or monstrosities. The essential, however, of the faculties always remains, and is even unaltered by disease. The essential nature of the faculties is that which must be determined, and the result of this proceeding is a new philoso- phy of the mind. In speaking of positive actions, it is highly ne- cessary to indicate the special faculties which produce them, for the mutual influence of the special powers, is so great, that the inactiv- ity of one faculty sometimes becomes a cause that certain others act in a determinate manner, which would not have happened, had all been duly balanced and equally active. In explaining Gall's proceeding, and the spirit which conducted him in his observations, I stated that he named the organs accord- ing to the talents and characters he observed. There are mecha- nicians, musicians, mathematicians, metaphysicians, poets, &c; some persons, also, are known for their cunning, ambition, pride, quarrelsomeness, benevolence, or religious feelings ; and it is cer- tain that persons highly endowed with such talents, and guided by such feelings, have the organs which Gall speaks of, under the titles, organs of cunning, religion, pride, ambition, poetry, music, mechanics, mathematics, &c, largely developed. But in consid- ering the fundamental powers, I was obliged to change the nomen- clature, though I admit that the organs, as they are named by Gall, are much developed in persons, distinguished by peculiar charac- ters, or individual talents. In my opinion there is no organ of cunning, of religion, of poetry, mathematics, mechanics, &c. I consider these mental operations, as compound, and think that their elements must be determined. I consequently do not give names to the organs according to actions, but solely according to the nature of faculties. I shall elucidate my meaning by means of the external senses. There is a power of seeing, and an organ 123 PHRENOLOGY. of sight, but there is no organ of seeing red, blue, yellow, or squares, triangles, or other colors, or forms. We speak of a sense of hearing, and not of a sense of hearing the song of birds, the music of man, or the noise of a cannon, &c. In the same way, there is an organ of the propensity to conceal, but none of hypoc- risy ; an organ of the desire of applause, but none of emulation, or glory ; a sense of reverence, but none of this or that mode of worship, and so on. This distinction between the faculty itself and its application, explains how the same organization, in different individuals, may be accompanied by good or bad actions, for the essence of the faculty is preserved, and its application alone differs, and is good or bad. The feeling of reverence, being directed to the God of Christians, to saints, -angels, or to natural objects, or being satisfied by all sorts of actions, by singing of psalms, by fastings, burning candles, or by charity and peacefulness, &c. is always one and the same. The nomenclature of Phrenology, therefore, is to be established according to the fundamental powers themselves, and by no means according to their application. I am aware that neither English philologists, nor the English public, like to admit new words, and I must apologize for having introduced several. The English lan- guage presents very few single words, which express my concep- tions of the peculiar faculties of the mind. Hence, I had to choose between speaking by circumlocution, and adopting new names. Now, I think with Locke, that we have still the same rights as our predecessors, and I, therefore, proposed new single names, formed as much as possible, in conformity with the spirit of the language. Having established different propensities, as peculiar faculties of the mind, in order to designate propensity, I have taken the termi- nation ive, which shows the quality of producing, and ness, which indicates the abstract state ; iveness is therefore joined to different roots; the preference being always given to English words gener- ally admitted ; but when such were not to be found, to Latin par- ticiples, so commonly used in English to express meanings simi CRANIOLOGY. 129 ar to those I was in search of, as destructiveness, productiveness, &c. The termination ous, indicates a sentiment, as anxious, cautious, pious, conscientious, &c. and I should have been very glad to have found similar adjectives for every primitive sentiment of the mind ; when they occurred, I have added ness, in order to express the ab- stract state, as cautiousness, conscientiousness, marvellousness, &c. The names of the intellectual faculties are easily understood, and do not require particular explanation. If under any head of the nomenclature, there be a better name than I employ, or one which indicates more exactly any determin- ate faculty, but no determinate action or effect of the faculty, I shall be glad to use it; for I am always disposed to acknowledge truth, and obey real improvement. I cannot insist too much on the importance of not confounding the fundamental powers with their applications ; and of not con- founding protuberances with general developement. Gall was particularly attached to the idea of protuberances, viz. to the prin- cipal means of making the first phrenological discoveries. All his writings, and particularly the three last plates of the large work confirm me in this opinion. It would be difficult to look at these plates without thinking of protuberances. The reader naturally asks, what is in the intervals between the elevations ? Such elevations, however, occur but rarely, and the habit of looking for isolated organs thus acquired by beginners, has, undoubtedly, retarded the progress of Phrenology. Adversaries also support their objections by supposed exceptions ; for they imagine that an organ is large only when it presents a protuberance. This, however, is not the' case, and it is better to consider the size of the head in general, to divide it into various regions, and to observe which and what parts of each, are most developed. The medulla oblongata, or the occipital hole, or the external opening of the ear, will serve as a central point from whence various radii may be drawn toward the surface in all directions. I farther divide the head into two regions in its height, by drawing a horizontal line, which begins in the 17 130 PHRENOLOGY. middle of the forehead, and ends above the occipital bone. The region below this, I call basilar, and that above it sincipital. In its length from forehead to occiput, I divide the head into three regions. From the mastoid process behind the ear, backwards, is the sincipital region, from the mastoid process to the temples, or constructiveness, is the middle, and from constructiveness for- wards, the frontal region. The occipital region corresponds with the posterior lobes ; the middle regions with the middle lobes, and the frontal with the anterior lobes of the brain. Heads, again, are narrow or wide laterally, and the lateral regions are therefore to be examined in relation to the height of the head. These various re- gions are different even when the whole surface is smooth, which may happen in heads of all sizes. The analysis of the greater number of the fundamental powers of the mind, their divisions into orders, genera, and species, the new nomenclature, according to the nature of the special powers, and the division of the head into regions, is my work. SECTION VIII. Order in ichich the Organs may be treated. From the preceding section it results that a certain order may be established amongst the organs of the mind. Gall never adopt- ed any philosophical principle in his arrangements of the organs. He frequently changed the order in which he considered them, being, however, always guided by their localities. In his latest publication he begins at the basis and ends at the top of the head. Not allowing any essential difference in the modes of action of the primary powers, he deems it sufficient to take the mere situation of the organs to regulate the order of his descriptions. I, on the contrary, admitting different modes of action in the special faculties of the mind, conceive the possibility to classify CRANIOLOGY. 131 tnem according to the nature of the mental operations. I first speak of the organs of the affective powers or feelings, and then of those of the intellectual faculties, viz. in the same order as I divide and subdivide the fundamental functions of the mind. In the two editions of ' the Physiognomical System,' in 1815, I fol- lowed this principle in arranging the organs, and adopted a certain order, which was allowed by the phrenologists in Edinburgh. I changed that order in my successive French and English publica- tions. Mr. Daville adopted for his marked bust that in my work 'Phrenology' of 1825. Mr. Combe does the same in his last edition of Phrenology. It is impossible to arrive at a correct classification, until all the organs and all the special faculties of the mind are ascertained; and then new modifications may appear preferable to those who teach Phrenology. Let it therefore be understood, that, though marked busts or plates may be numbered differently, the plates of the respective organs, once considered as established, have never been altered ; the place of secretiveness, for instance, has been invariably the same, whether it be marked and referred to as the 7th or 9th organ of the brain. I now treat of the organ of secretiveness, before acquisitiveness and construc- tiveness, since it belongs to the middle lobes of the brain, whilst the organs of acquisitiveness and constructiveness lie above the Fissura Sylvii. Hence, anatomy indicated this rectification, and reasoning is not against the change, because secretiveness assists the preceding propensities as well as those which follow. Thus, the numbers of the marked busts or plates indicated merely the order in which the organs are treated or described by phrenologists. This order has been changed at different periods by Gall, as well as myself, and different arrangements may be pro- posed by other phrenologists. It is immaterial in Phrenology whether a teacher speaks of combativeness in the 5th or 7th place, and so with respect to every other organ. It is therefore wrong in my opinion to commit to memory the numbers of the organs, and to go so far as to take phrenological notes in numbers, cr to use them in conversation and private correspondence, instead of 132 PHRENOLOGY. the names, as without abandoning the numbers in descriptions, confusion and perplexity will be unavoidable. Before I enter into details upon the organs of the mind, I shall answer a question which may be put in regard to every organ, viz. : Why do you admit a particular organ of this, and not of another function ? When actions alone are spoken of, it is certainly diffi- cult to conceive the necessity of particular organs ; yet the answer is decisive when we can say: experience demonstrates it. More- over as I look for fundamental powers and not merely for their or- gans, the necessity of every one may be proved even by reasoning, that is, by the general proofs which confirm the plurality of the powers and organs. In considering these proofs, in relation to every faculty, we may be sure in our proceeding. Every faculty is fundamental, aud a particular organ must be pointed out for it: 1. Which exists in one kind of animal and not in another ; 2. Which varies in the sexes of the same species ; 3. Which is not proportionate to the other faculties of the same individual; 4. Which does not manifest itself simultaneously with the other faculties, that is, which appears or disappears earlier or later than they ; 5. Which may act or repose singly ; 6. Which individually is propagated in a distinct manner from parents to children ; and 7. Which singly may preserve its proper state of health, or be affected by disease. Gall did not determine any of the organs in conformity with these views. He followed an empirical method only, looking for organs according to the actions of man. But I have no hesitation to main' tain that in pointing out the special or fundamental powers of the mind, my proceeding is philosophical, founded on principles, and adequate to refute the following objections made against the object of our investigations. Some adversaries say that too many, others that too few, organs are acknowledged, and that they might be multiplied infinitely. DIVISION OF THE MENTAL POWERS. 133 The former should know, however, that each is admitted by the same proofs which demonstrate their plurality generally, and that it is verified by experience. The independent existence of one organ is neither more nor less certain than that of any other; and if similar proofs be admitted confirmatory of one, they must be agreed to in regard to every other. On the other hand the oppo- nents who think that enough organs are not admitted, should consider, that every faculty may be applied to an infinite number of objects. Seeing is always seeing, but to what an infinity of objects may the power be directed ! Hearing is always hearing, but how various the impressions perceived by this sense ! It is the same with the in- ternal faculties. Constructing is always constructing, but how infinite in number and variety the objects that may be produced! Moreover, it is to be observed, that a great number of actions result from combinations of different powers ; and, therefore, it is not surprising to see so many effects produced by a small number of primitive faculties. Are not twenty-four letters of the alphabet sufficient to compose all imaginable words ? The muscles of the face are not very numerous, yet almost every individual of the human kind has a different physiognomy. There are few primitive sounds; few primitive colors ; only ten primitive signs of numbers ; but what an infinity of combinations do not each of these furnish ? Let us suppose from thirty to forty primitive faculties of the mind, and then consider all possible combinations, with their modifications ; and we shall not feel surprised that we observe such a number of mod- ified functions. I repeat that the organs are not multiplied unne- cessarily, but that determinate principles are followed in establish- ing each of them, such only as nature presents being recognised. Some opponents have a peculiar turn of mind. They rely on their saying that Phrenology is not complete, as if this imperfect state could refute that which is discovered and confirmed. The physical analysis of matter is not yet complete; shall therefore all discoveries of modern chemists be denied : such a conclusion would be evidently erroneous. In the same way this incomplete state of Phrenology does not refute that which is certain in it. 134 PHRENOLOGY. Some metaphysical speculators imagine that several powers, which in Phrenology are considered as special, might be ranged as constituents of other powers ; for instance, that combativeness and destructiveness might be reduced to one and the same power; in the same way secretiveness and cautiousness ; self-esteem and love of approbation. We prove our assertions by reasoning and facts, nor shall our constant observations deserve less confidence than mere a priori reasoning, particularly since we find in practical life that nature is not so simple in her means as many metaphysicians fancy. Why different nerves for different sensations, and again others for vol- untary motion ? why so many different glands for the individual secretions, &c. Other metaphysicians indulge in their fancy, and speak of dis- crepancies of Phrenology, supposing that there are special facul- ties of the mind, for which they find no organs in the map of the phrenological bust. Let me admit, for the sake of argument, such powers to exist, why do those who find them necessary not look for the respective organs ? why should we do all ? or shall the organs which we have discovered, not be true, because we do not know those or- gans which some metaphysicians suppose to exist. Some, for in- stance, think it necessary to admit an organ of the love of parents, since there is one for the love of children. Let those who want an organ of the love of parents, find it out and prove it, as we do in regard to the organ of philoprogenitiveness ; or shall the organ of philoprogenitiveness not exist because that of the love of pa- rents is unknown ? I for my part, do not think it necessary to look for an organ of that kind, since I do not think that the love of parents is a special faculty. Nature has distributed powers for necessary phenomena. The preservation of the species depends on the care which parents take of their offspring, and it is obtained by a special power. Parents are supposed to be independent of their children, and if in old age they should want their assistance, other feelings, as attachment, consciousness, reverence and benev- DIVISION OF THE MENTAL POWERS. 135 olence are sufficient to explain gratitude and any other help they give to their parents. Others want an organ of self-love. I might reply, look for it, and prove it! I see necessity for doing so. Self-love seems to me attached to the whole of Self, and an attribute of every faculty which when active wishes to be satisfied. Many consider it as a discrepancy of Phrenology that I admit an organ of coloring, and another of tune, and none of taste, and none of smell. There is, however, a great difference between these mental phenomena. In treating of the external senses, I shall speak of their immediate and mediate functions. The imme- diate functions are independent of cerebral organs, only as far as they are referred to special objects they are the result of internal mental operations. The sense of smell, perceives odors; that of taste, savors ; that of hearing, sounds ; and that of sight, different shades of light. When these different perceptions or sensations are referred to external objects, individuality and eventuality are active. This is common to all the external senses ; but the mind operates on sounds and the shades and modified impressions of light in a peculiar manner, in which it does not operate on odors and savors. It transforms sounds into tones, melody and harmony, and the impressions of light into coloring, and for these peculiar operations of the mind, there are special organs in the brain. I shall now begin to treat of the special faculties, which I admit in Phrenology, and in the order which seems to me in the mean- time as the most philosophical. An invariable order cannot be adopted till Phrenology is complete. In discussing the fundamen- tal powers of the mind, I shall always follow the same procedure : I shall first consider the individual actions which lead us to think of a special faculty ; then give the history of the discovery of the or- gan ; I shall add my remarks where Gall, myself, or other phrenol- ogists happen to differ in opinion ; and afterwards describe the seat of each organ, and name it according to its essential nature ; finally I shall examine its influence on the other faculties and the effects of its inactivity. It is my intention rather to make known the philosophical spirit of these inquiries, and the manner in which 136 PHRENOLOGY. I conceive they ought to be conducted, confirmed or amended, than to quote the numerous facts observed in support of our opin- ions. Gall was fond of quoting individual facts ; these, however, be they ever so numerous, can never produce conviction. I have neither the wish nor the intention to persuade, but invite every one to convince himself by personal examination, since there can be no self-conviction without self-observation. I think, however, that by our unabated inquiries during so many years, we have acquired the right to demand that no conclusion be formed until our observa- tions have been repeated. Is it not painful then to see that this is not done in Phrenology as it is in all other new discoveries? I cannot but regret that physiologists and philosophers do not exam- ine with sufficient zeal and care the doctrine of Phrenology, which undoubtedly one day will become the basis of all philosophical, moral, and political sciences. SECTION VIII. ORDER I.—Feelings, or Affective Faculties. The affective faculties have their origin from within, and are not acquired by any external circumstances. They cannot be taught and must be felt to be understood ; in themselves they are blind and act without understanding; finally they are partly com- mon to man and animals, partly proper to man. Genus I.—Propensities. There are several species of propensities ; each species has a particular nature, and they all exist in animals and man. Organ of the Desire to Live. It is highly probable that there is a peculiar instinct to live, or love of life, and I look for its organ at the basis of the brain, be- tween the posterior and middle lobes, inwardly of combativeness. ALIMENTIVENESS. 137 Organ of the Propensity to Feed. Alimentiveness. The common opinion of physiologists is, that hunger, or the desire to take food, depends on the nerves of the stomach alone. Gall and myself, placing all other instincts into the brain, thought it probable that the instinct to feed, depends on a cerebral portion, though we did not know its situation in the head. Mr. Crook, lecturer on Mnemonics, seems to have been the first who observed the developement of a peculiar part of the brain, in relation to the instinct in question, though the view he took is probably too limited. He observed several individuals who were exceedingly fond of good living, and he found their heads anterior to the organ of destructiveness very large. He thought that this organ produces a fine exquisite taste, and called it the organ of gustativeness. Dr. Hoppe, of Copenhagen, as stated in two communications published in the Phrenological Journal, No. V. and VII., looked for an organ of the appetite for food, at the same spot of the head where Mr. Crook admits the organ of gustativeness, viz. before that of destructiveness: 'we observe,' says he, 'that the chicken is no sooner out of the egg, than it picks the grain that lies on the ground, and the new-born babe sucks the nipple. Is this to be ex- plained without the supposition of an organ analogous to that which makes the duckling immediately plunge into the water. Neither am I able otherwise to conceive how the new-born animal can dis- criminate what is useful for its nutrition ; that, for instance, the chicken, never mistakes gravel for grain, and that the wild beasts always avoid poisonous plants without ever tasting them.' I agree with the idea that the propensity or instinct to feed, is fundamental, and attached to a portion of the brain situated before the organ of destructiveness, and under that of acquisitiveness, em- bracing the anterior circonvolutions of the middle lobes in man, and the corresponding cerebral parts in animals. But I neither 18 138 PHRENOLOGY. ful for nutrhro., - - *£»£ ower £ the mere desire ^;1;re si w^'as the e^ to physical love, or to fed, m the s * ^ ^ other prope„smes as srd;;rad:fLnee,, ::=:- tive, partly instinctive, and P^J^ mentioned portion ot desire to feed. It exists not only in carnivorous, but also in ro alal, The Soose, tnrkey, ostrich, k^^ horse, &c. ^. ^earnhldle^e^e ^ ; ^M tiveness in addition to that of the instinct to feed The functions of the anterior circonvolutions of ^m~6 in man were unknown before the observations of Mr. Crook and Dr Hoppe It is, however, remarkable that they are developed ^heTarliest ag'e, sooner than many other parts an^ propor- tionablvlareer in children and young, than in adult persons ana S This instinct acts in cornermity, from die «a, ance of young beings in this world and is generally -x tive in early life. In treating of destructiveness, I shall mention rrLnTwhich induce me to think that it does not determine the food of carnivorous animals, or the taste for animal food, tto be ng the result of the sense of taste, or of the *"**^ This latter sense too, in my opinion, explains that which Mr. Crook calls gustativeness, and ascribes to the organ in question, that which I confine to the instinct to feed. This propensity is particularly assisted by the smell, and tne ' olfactory nerve is in all animals in the most intimate commune* tion with the middle lobes, so much so, that in the ox, sheep horse, dog, fox, hare, rabbit, &c the internal part of the middle ORGAN OF DESTRUCTIVENESS. 139 iobes, seems to be almost a mere continuation of the olfactory nerve. In man also, the external and greater root of the olfactory nerve, is in connexion with the anterior convolutions of the middle lobes. Farther, the middle lobes are in particular communication with the nervous bundles, which constitute the anterior lobes, and the anterior external portion of the crura, in other words, the organs of the intellectual faculties; and the propensity to feed puts into action many of the perceptive powers, and the voluntary motion of many parts, before the food is transmitted to the stomach for digestion. This organ, though indicated by reason and comparative anato- my, is merely probable, and can be confirmed or rejected like every other, according to direct observations alone, in comparing cerebral developement, in relation to the special propensity. I possess many facts in confirmation. I. Organ of the Propensity to Destroy, or of Destructiveness. A difference in the skulls of carnivorous and herbivorous ani- mals, gave the first idea of the existence of an organ of destruc- tiveness. If we place the skull of a carnivorous animal horizontally, and trace a vertical line through the external meatus auditorius, a good portion of the cerebral mass will be found situated behind it, whilst in herbivorous animals, the corresponding portion of the brain will be observed to be very small. Every one agrees that there are carnivorous animals, but all have not the same opinion regarding the cause of this. Some say it is useless to search in the brain for a particular organ of destruction, which determines the kind of food nature destined for man and an- imals, because she has given to carnivorous animals the feeling of hunger, the taste, teeth, and such instruments as are necessary for seizing and killing their prey. These instruments, however, prove only the harmony that subsists between the internal faculties and the corporeal structure. Man employs his hands in taking aliments, 140 PHRENOLOGY. but some interior sensation advertises him of the necessity of taking, food. The tiger, lion, cat, &c. have teeth and claws, but an in- ternal power excites these animals to use them. A sheep could not employ such instruments, any more than does an idiot his hands to perform offices for which they are adapted. The propensity to kill, exists beyond doubt in the world, and it is more or less energetic in animals of different species, and even in individuals of the same kind. There are some species which kill no more than they require for their nourishment, while others, as the wolf, tiger, polecat, &c. kill all living beings around them, seemingly for the mere pleasure of destroying. It is readily granted that many animals have the propensity to kill. But let us see whether man is also endowed with a like dis- position. Carnivorous animals confine themselves to the destruc- tion of a certain number of species for food ; but man kills, from the insect to the elephant and whale, to apply them to his purpo- ses ; he almost alone is truly omnivorous, and he sheds the blood even of his fellow-creatures. I find it superfluous to combat those who say that man eats flesh only from depravity or vicious habit; because his teeth evidently partake of the structure of those of both carnivorous and herbivorous animals ; his stomach rather resembles that of carnivorous, than of frugivorous tribes ; and finally, because he thrives upon flesh, and, in some regions, it constitutes all his subsistence. In man this feeling presents different degrees of activity, from mere indifference to the pain of animals, to the pleasure of seeing them killed, or even to the most irresistible desire of killing. This doctrine may shock sensibility, but it is not the less true, and who- ever would study nature, and judge sanely of its phenomena, must be ready to admit the existence of things as they are. It may be observed that among children, as well as adults, among the uncul- tivated as well as the polite and well-bred classes of society, cer- tain individuals are very sensible, and others very indifferent to the sufferings of other beings. Some persons feel a pleasure in tor- menting animals, and in seeing them tortured or killed, even when ORGAN OF DESTRUCTIVENESS. 141 it is impossible to ascribe this disposition to bad habit, or neg- lected education. There are even individuals who choose such a profession as will gratify this propensity, if it be very energetic. Thus a journeyman apothecary at Vienna became an execution- er ; the son of a rich merchant of the same city, renounced com- merce and became a butcher; and a rich Dutchman paid the butchers, who furnished the navy with beef, for permission to kill the oxen. We may also determine the existence of this propensity and its diversities, by the impressions made upon different spectators by public executions; these are insupportable to some, and afford great delight to others. George Selwin sought eagerly for such spectacles, and always endeavored to stand near the executioner. It is also reported of La Condamine that, being fond of executions, and endeavoring to pass through the crowd upon a certain occasion, as the soldiers pushed him back, the executioner said to them, ' Let that gentleman pass, he is an amateur.' Professor Bruggmans, of Leyden, told us of a Dutch priest, whose desire to kill, and to see killed, was so great, that he became chaplain of a regiment, solely to have an opportunity of seeing men destroyed in battle. To gratify the same propensity still farther, he kept in his house a number of domestic animals, as dogs, cats, &c to have the pleas- ure of killing their young with his own hand. He also slaughter ed the animals for his kitchen, and was acquainted with all the hangmen of the country, who sent him regular notice of each ex- ecution, and he did not grudge to travel on foot for several days to witness the scene. In the field of battle the propensity to de- stroy is active in very different degrees : one soldier is overjoyed at sight of the blood which he sheds, while another, moved by compassion, spares the vanquished, and stops of his own accord, whenever victory is secure. Highwaymen are frequently not contented with robbing, but manifest the most sanguinary inclination to torment and murder, without necessity. John Rosbeck not only maltreated his victims, to make them show their concealed treasures, but invented and 142 PHRENOLOGY. employed the most outrageous cruelties, merely to witness then sufferings; neither fear nor torture could break him of this horrible habit • after his first apprehension, he was confined for eighteen months in a small subterraneous dungeon, his feet loaded with chains, standing in muddy water up to his ancles; in addition to all this, he was tortured most cruelly ; nevertheless, he confessed nothing. On being enlarged, his first act was to steal in full day- light, and having committed new murders, he was finally executed.* At the beginning of the last century, several murders were com- mitted in Holland, on the frontiers of the province of Cleves.' For a long time the murderer escaped detection, but at last suspi- cion fell on an old man, who gained his livelihood by playing on the violin at country weddings, in consequence of some expres- sions of his children; led before the justice, he confessed thirty- four murders, and said that he had committed them without any cause of enmity, and without any intention of robbing, but only because he was extremely delighted with bloodshed. At Stras- burg two keepers of the cathedral having been assassinated, all ef- forts to discover the murderer for a long time were ineffectual; at last a postilion was shot by a clergyman, called Frick. This monster had hired a post-chaise for the express purpose of satisfy- ing his horrible propensity to destroy. Arrested, he confessed himself the murderer of both keepers of the cathedral. This wretch was rich, and had never stolen. For his crimes he was condemned to be burned at Strasburg. ' Louis XV.' says M. de Lacretelle,f ' felt a rooted aversion against a brother of the Duke Bourbon-Conde, Count of Charolois, who would have renewed all the crimes of Nero, had he ever mounted a throne. While a child he betrayed a cruelty of disposition, which excited horror. He delighted in shedding the blood of those he had debauched, and in exercising various barbarities on the courtezans who were brought to him. Popular tradition, as well as history, accuses him of different homicides, and it is added that these were com- * History of Schinderhannes, t. ii. p. 8. t Historie de la France, t. ii. p. 59 ORGAN OF DESTRUCTIVENESS. 143 initted without cause, and when unmoved by anger ; for he shot at slaters, merely to have the barbarous pleasure of seeing them fall from the tops of the houses.' These latter facts, which fortunately for humanity are very rare, prove that this terrible propensity is sometimes quite independent of education, of example, or of habit, and that it depends on innate constitution alone. Many crimes indeed are so detestable, and are accompanied with such repugnant and horrible circumstances, that it would be impossible to explain them in any other way. Prochasca relates, * that a woman of Milan caressed little children, led them home, killed them, salted their flesh, and ate of it every day. He quotes also the case of a person whom this passion ex- cited, and who killed a traveller and a young girl to eat them. Gaubius f speaks of a girl whose father was incited by a violent impulse to eat human flesh, and who, to gratify his singular desire, committed several murders. This girl, though separated from her father for a long time, and educated carefully among respectable persons not related to her family, was overcome by the same hor- rible desire to eat human flesh. Many idiots are mischievous, and manifest the propensity to kill. Numerous facts are recorded in books, and several have fallen un- der my own observation. Individuals are occasionally alienated only in the propensity to destroy. At Berlin, Mr. Mayer showed us a soldier whose gen- eral health was bad; he was very irritable, and much weakened by grief for the loss of his wife ; he had every month a fit of violent convulsions, the approach of which he felt, accompanied with an immoderate propensity to kill; he then begged to be chained; but at the end of a few days the fit left him, the fatal propensity disap- peared, and he himself fixed the period when he might be safely delivered. At Haina we met with a man who at certain periods felt an irresistible desire to maltreat others; he also knew his un- fortunate propensity, and begged to be confined till his fit was * Opera minora, torn. ii. p. 98. t Oratio prima de regimine mentis quod medicorum est. 144 PHRENOLOGY. over. A person, of a melancholy turn of mind, having seen a criminal executed, was so much upset by the spectacle, that he suddenly became possessed with a propensity to kill, although he felt the strongest aversion to commit the act; he spoke of his de- plorable situation, weeping bitterly, struck his head, wrung his hands, exhorted himself, and admonished his friends to take care and to fly; he even thanked them if they restrained him. Pinel has also frequently observed the fierce impulse to destroy, and speaks of one man who showed no mark of alienation in mem- ory, imagination, or judgment, but who confessed that his propen- sity to murder was so involuntary and irresistible, that his wife, notwithstanding the love he bore her, was near being immolated, he having only time to warn her to fly. In his lucid intervals he made the most melancholy reflections, expressed horror at himself, and was disgusted with life to such a degree, that he several times attempted to put an end to his existence. ' What reason,' said he, ' have I to cut the throat of the overseer of the hospital, who treats us with so much humanity ? Yet in the moments of my fury I feel the same desire to attack him as others, and to thrust a dagge? into his breast.' Another madman, who, during six months in the year, suffered periodical fits of fury, felt the decrease of the symp- toms, pointed out the periods when the danger was over, and beg- ged those about him not to set him free when he felt incapable of governing his blind impulse to destroy. In his calm intervals, he confessed, that during his fits, it would be impossible for him to restrain it; he said, that if he met any one then, he saw, as it were, the blood circulating in their veins, and felt an irresistible desire to suck it, and to tear their limbs with his teeth, to do so more commodiously. Pinel also relates the history of a young female, who every morning had a fit of mania, during which she tore all that fell under her hands, and committed every sort of violence against those who came near her, so that they were obliged to restrain her by a straight-jacket; yet in the afternoon she repented of the actions of the morning, and asked pardon, which she always despaired of obtaining. Pinel quotes another ORGAN OF DESTRUCTIVENESS. 145 example of a monk alienated by devotion, who thought he had one night seen the Virgin Mary surrounded by a choir of angels and happy spirits, and received an express order to kill a certain person whom he considered as an infidel; he would have executed this commission, had not his actions and manner betrayed him. The same author speaks of a credulous vine-dresser, who was so violently shaken by the sermon of a missionary, that he thought himself and his family damned to everlasting pains, if he did not save them by the baptism of blood, or martyrdom. He therefore first en- deavored to murder his wife, who escaped with difficulty; he then killed two of his children, to procure them eternal life; and when confined to prison before trial, he cut the throat of a criminal in the same room with him, still with the intention of doing some ex- piatory act. His insanity being proved, he was ordered to be shut up in the Bicetre for life. Long solitary confinement exalted his imagination, and because he had not been executed, he fancied himself the Almighty; or, according to his own expression, the fourth person of the Trinity, sent to save the world by the bap- tism of blood. Having been confined for ten years, he became tranquil, and was permitted to converse with the other convales- cents in the court of the hospital. He passed four years in this way, and his health seemed restored, but he was again suddenly seized with his former superstitious and sanguinary ideas. The day before Christmas he conceived the project of offering up an expiatory sacrifice by killing all who might fall under his hands; he consequently got possession of a shoemaker's knife, with which he gave the keeper a thrust from behind, which fortunately slipped over the ribs ; he then cut the throats of two other lunatics, and would have continued his homicides, had he not been overpower- ed and prevented. These and many similar examples, which occur in the state of health and disease, prove that the propensity to kill and destroy is innate, in man as well as in animals. Does not the whole history of mankind indeed confirm this position ? In all ages the earth has been drenched with blood. The God of Israel was fond of blood-shedding; and without it there was no remis- 19 146 PHRENOLOGY. sion of sin. With what view then has this propensity been created ? We cannot imagine that the propensity to destroy is given to man that he may murder his fellow-creatures. Carnivorous animals, though endowed with the propensity, do not kill individuals of their own kind; they only use it in slaying, that they themselves may live. What then is the natural food of man ? To a great extent, the flesh of other animals, and this he can only procure by inflict- ing death. Does this propensity then determine the sort of food proper for those possessed of it ? Gall thinks it does: I am not of his opinion. It is certain that the propensities of animals are in relation to their whole nature, and that the disposition to kill is in relation to the sort of food they use; but an impulse to kill is not the same as an impulse to choose flesh as aliment. One special faculty produces the propensity to kill, another makes choice of flesh. There is consequently no proportion between the propensi- ty to kill, and the want of food. Some animals destroy more than is necessary for their support. Some of the human kind like meat, but cannot slay an animal; others have no reluctance to kill, and yet prefer vegetables for nourishment. Children, in general, have the propensity to destroy more energetic than grown up persons, yet they prefer fruits and vegetables to meat. We have still to inquire into the essential nature of this faculty. I think that its sphere of activity is wider than the mere disposition which it generates to take away life. It seems to produce the propensity to destroy in general, without distinction of object, or manner of destroying. It may wreak itself upon inanimate things, animals, or man, and in this signification may then be perceived a necessary and consistent power in the plan of creation. Through- out nature one being lives upon another, and violent death is con- sequently a law in the system of the world. Had nature indeed created animals and destined them to live upon the flesh of others, without giving them at the same time the means of obtaining the;- object, and inclination to inflict death, there would have been con- tradiction. Nature has even taught carnivorous animals to put ORGAN OF AMATIVENESS. 147 others to death in the most speedy way possible, by wounding their neck opposite the place where the spinal chord decussates. Sometimes also there is a necessity for destroying what is useless, before its place can be supplied by what is useful; and many things relatively hurtful provoke us to destroy them. In this sense it is lawful to destroy others to preserve ourselves ; nay, the act is even rewarded, and looked on as virtuous, in every war of defence. On the contrary, whenever the faculty leads us to destroy what ought to be preserved, it is abused. This faculty then is gratified by destroying in general, and its manifestations are perceived in those who like to pinch, scratch, bite, break, tear, cut, stab, strangle, demolish, devastate, burn, drown, kill, poison, murder, or assassinate. It prompts us to ex- terminate noxious objects, and the causes of dangerous situations. Gall formerly called its organ that of murder, because he dis- covered it of large size in the heads of two murderers; but no fac- ulty can be named from its abuse. The error Gall committed, however, was natural, for the functions of all the organs are most easily discovered in their state of extreme developement, when they are very apt to produce abuses. Such then was the origin of this erroneous name of a faculty, whose well regulated employ- ment is, like that of every other, essential to life. I think the name, organ of the propensity to destroy, or of destructiveness, is the most general and the most conformable to its sphere of activity. At the beginning Gall placed the seat of this organ too far be- hind the ear, but a great number of observations convinced us that its seat is immediately above the ear. (PI. VI. and VIII. fig. I and 2, VI.) II. Organ of Amativeness. Physical love is commonly considered as a peculiar sort of sensation ; but physiologists and philosophers are not agreed as to its origin. It is certain, that none of the causes which are gener- ally admitted suffice to explain its existence, for it is manifested 148 PHRENOLOGY. without these, and its energy is not proportionate to them.* It is therefore necessary to find other conditions adequate to account for the phenomenon of this desire. Gall did not think there was an organ of this propensity in the brain, but discovered it by accident. Being physician to a widow who was subject to violent hysterical fits, during which her head was drawn backwards with great force, he sometimes supported it with his hand, and was astonished by the great thickness and heat of her neck. Acquainted with her peculiar character, he asked himself, whether the size of her neck, and consequent developement of her cerebellum, might not have some relation to her inordinate passion ? Continuing observations began from this hint, he soon establish- ed the point to his own satisfaction ; and it is now impossible to unite a greater number of proofs in demonstration of any natural truth, than may be presented to determine the function of the ce- rebellum. It would be interesting as well as important to show, that those animals which have a nervous mass corresponding to the cerebel- lum, reproduce by sexual union. This alone, if it could be verified through all classes of beings, would be sufficient to prove the pe- culiar function of this portion of the brain. The minuteness of the smaller animals, however, prevents demonstration by dissection, and at the present we may say the undertaking is impracticable. In new-born children, the cerebellum is to the brain as one to nine, ten, thirteen, twenty, or more ; and in adults, as one to five, * Partes genitales, sive testes hominibus ,et fceminis uterus, propensionem ad venerem excitare nequeunt. Nam in pueris veneris stimulus seminis secretioni ssepe antecedit. Plures eunuchi, quanquam testibus piavati, hanc inclinationem conservant. Sunt etiam foeminae quae sine utero natae, hunc stimulum rnanifes- tant. Hinc quidam ex doctrines nostras inimicis, harum rerum minime inscii, seminis preesentiam in sanguine contendunt, et hanc causam sufficientem existi- mant. Attamen argumenta hujus generis vera physiologia longe absunt et vix citatione digna videntur. Nonnulli etiam hujus inclinationis causam in liquore prostatico quaerunt; sed in senibus aliquando fluidi prostatici secretio, sine ulla veneris inclinatione, copiosissima est. ORGAN OF AMATIVENESS. 149 six, or seven. Professor Ackermann maintained that the cerebel- lum was perfectly developed at the end of the second year. Gall and I have compared the heads and skulls of children from two till sixteen years old, and have always found that at these ages it is still imperfectly developed. But in proportion as the cerebellum in- creases, its function appears. It has been said that the cerebellum grows in proportion as the sexual propensity becomes active ; but other proofs show evidently that the developement of the cerebel- lum always precedes this desire. In adults, the cerebellum having attained its full size, the amative propensity is most energetic, and then there is a constant relation between its developement and the goadings of the inclination.. It is well known that men feel in very different degrees the impulses of the sexual passion : some individuals are almost or wholly de- prived of it; others experience it moderately; whilst others again feel its ungovernable violence. In the first, the cerebellum is very small, (PI. III. fig. 2,) in the second, it is of a middling size ; and in the third class, it is very large and prominent.* (PI. III. fig. 1.) * Plures viros hacce appetentia abusos, eamque ob causam carceratos vidimus, quibus, e magnitudine cerebelli, collum quam maximum fuit. Equos, tauros. arietesque, quibus profusius collum, majore propagandi vi donatos esse, agricolee et armentarii a longinquitate temporum animadverterunt. Notum est etiam co- lumbas, quae in hac re aliis excellunt, a majore magnitudine colli distingui. Virum et mares majorem quam fceminas copulandi cupidinen sentire certum est. ' In venere exercenda,' ait Hippocrates de Genitura,' longe minorem quam vir volaptatem mulier percipit, vir vero etiam diuturniorem.' Plurima apud ani- malia mos est unum marem pluribus cum fceminis vivere ; sed in paucis specie- bus una foemina pluribus cum maribusconjunctaest. In multis speciebus, mares per totum annum veneris stimulum sentiunt, dum foeminae certis solum anni tem- poribus a maribus suis amari volunt. Im6, in animalibus matrimonioconjunctis, mares fceminis multo salaciores sunt. In omni animalium specie, cerebelli configuratio ad veneris appetentiam referre videtur. Nam mares fceminis, et foeminae maribus, ejusdem specie imprimis, dediti sunt. A nimia hujus organi activitate perturbatio oritur. In erotomania cerebellum grande plerumque observatur. Asseri tamen non potest, omnibus erotomania laborantibus magnum esse cerebellum. Hoc organon enim, sicut omnia alia, sine ulla praecipua magnitudine, morbida activitate aegrotare potest. 150 PHRENOLOGY. Besides it is indubitable that men, (PI. V. fig. 1 and 2,) and male animals in general, have a larger cerebellum than women, Actio reciproca, quae existit inter cerebellum et partes genitales, etiam cerebelli functiones probat. Sic castratio cerebelli incrementum imminuit, nam in hom- inibus atque animalibus castratis cerebellum crescere desinit. Quam ob rem ennuchis atque animalibus, in prima aetate castratis, est collum valde exiguum, et copulandi cupido nulla. Contra, homines caeteraque animalia, post plenos annos castrati, quanquam testium expertes, sensum tamen eroticum et copulandi stimulum conservant. Hinc testes cupidinem non producere patet. Pubertatis tempore, mutua colli genitaliumque organorum actio est prrecipue insignis. Turn crescit barba, turn crescit larynx, turn vox mutatur, itemque testes et alia organa genitalia officiis suis fungi in cipiunt. Eodem tempore cres- cit cerebellum. Dum animalia catuliunt, eorum colla insolito cum tepore tum- escunt, vox etiam raucissima evenit. ' Non illam nutrix orienti luce revisens, Hesterno collum potuit circumdare file' Quae facta veteribus plane nata fuere, sed causa usque ad nostram aetatem latuit. Castratio, eadem de causa, craniorum figuras necnon armentorum atque aliorum animalium cornua mutat. Bobus castratis longiora, quam tauris, sunt cornua. Cervorum, testibus injuriam passis, cornua male crescunt; cornubus defalcatis paulo ante rugitum, multo minus certa est eorum propagatio. Cerebello vulnerato partes genitales in sympathiam trahuntur. Gall, Vindo- bonae Austriacorum, duos milites, e vulnerato occipite, impotentes fieri observa- vit, quorum unus, duobus post annis, veneris appetentiam et copulandi potestatem iterum recepit, puerosque genuit. Formey Berolinensis narravit nobis historian] cujusdam qui, occipite vulnerato, primum priapismo, dein impotentia, vexatus est. Veruntamen sex post mensibus virilitatem recuperavit. Baronius Larrey, Parisiis, plures milites, occipite vulneratos, quorum partes genitales decreverant, nobis monstravit. Unus, dum septemdecim annos natus, occipite vulneratus est. Postea penis et testes magnitudine propria defecerunt; vox fceminea per- mansit, etbarba per vitam fuit nulla. Veteres semen in cerebello secerni ac per spinam descendere putabant. Sic Hippocrates, de Genitura, III, sub fine: ' Quibuscunque juxta aures venae sectas sunt, hi coeunt quidem et genituram emittunt, verum modicam et debilem ac infeecundam; nam plurima genitura pars a capite juxta aures in spinalem medullam procedit.' Alio loco (Lib. de Aeirbus, Aquis, et Locis, Sect. I.) ' Atque mihi, inquit, sane videntur ea medi- catione seipsos perdere. Venae enim retro aures sunt, quas si quia secet, sterili- tatem inferet his quibus secantur; quare id etiam ipsis ex earum incisione acci- dere certum est. Quand6 igitur postea uxores adeunt, impotentesque se factos vident, cum illis coire primum quidem nihil molestius cogitantes quiescunt (Scythae.') Apollonius Rhodius, de Medea? amore erga Jasona loquens, illam ardore con ORGAN OF AMATIVENESS. 151 (PL IV. fig. 1 and 2,) and females. This, however, is by no means an invariable law ; there are exceptions, and these occur sumi et capite usque ad infimum nervum dolore cruciari, asserit. Professor Reinhold, Lipsioe, cervici cujusdam pueri, ad diminuendam opthalmiam, setatium posuit. Evenit priapismus continuus, et irritationis causam amoveri oportuit. In morbis glanduloe parotis, partes genitales variis modis affliciuntur. Laqueo suspensi et strangulati plerumque erectionem et seminis emissionem habent. Menstruationis suppressse a vesicatione cervicis restitutae exempla dantur Cervicis frictiones cum spirituosis in histeriam remedium prasclare dicuntur. In erotomania, partes genitales soepe inflammatae sunt, sed haec inflammatio non est idiopathica sed sympathica. Eroticus furor hominis necnon et equorum a castra- tione sanatus est; melius tamen sit morbum frangere per remedia in inflamma- tionem cerebelli: nam iifrlammatione sanata, priapismus sedatur. Omnes similes observationes ad actionem reciprocam colli ac partium genitalium pertinentes, cerebelli functionem probant. Plurimi fatui sunt qui, quanquam mentis et rationis inopes, tamen veneris Btimulum vehementem sentiunt, eorumque amentia masturbationi, cui dediti sunt, vulgo tribuitur. Veneris abusu et nimium seminis efiusione intellectu debiltari minime negandum est; tamen in hoc casu fatuorum, masturbatio non est causa, sed effectus amentias. His miseris frons et superior cerebri pars ad- modum exigua, collum vero et pars capitis posterior grandia sunt. Hinc ratione carentes, ut alia animalia, voluptati indulgent. Idem observatur in quibusdam Cretini appellatis. Hi scepe paulum cerebri cum grandi cerebello habent. Non tamen verum est, illorum organa genitalia semper grandiora, eosque admodum lascivos esse. Sic est in multis, sed non in omnibus. In pluribus fatuis atque hydrocephalis valde lascivis cerebelli et partium genitalium magnitudo non est exigua. Hoc ver6 facile explanari potest. Cerebellum speciale et distinctum syslema comprehendit, et hinc functiones cerebri turbatae atque oppressae esse possunt, dum cerebellum, per tentorium a cerebro separatum, suis officiis fungi continuatur. Quoniam honor, pudor et ratiocinium desunt, hi miseri veneris ap- petentiam sequuntur. Demum gesticulationes, seu lingua naturalis, hujus propensionis sedem indi- cant. Alibi hanc materiem plenius explicabo. Regulum profitebor ex qua ges- ticulationes congruunt cum organorum sedibus. Quum copulandi amor nos agit, caput totumque corpus supina sunt; manus in posteriorem colli partem feruntur. Quas amoris gesticulationes pictores et statuarii saepe sunt imitati. In avibus atque mammalibus, ante co'itum, mares, ut in faeminis copulandi appe- tentiam incitet, earum colla saepenumero titillant. Hinc, quum de omnibus hisce exemplis et argumentis cogitamus, cerebellum amoris seu veneris appetentiae or- ganum esse admittere debemus. Nonnulli contendunt, copulandi appetentiam organum proprium habere non posse, quia plurima animalia tantum certis anni temporibus catuliunt. Haec objectio eandem vim haberit, si contra aliam, quaecumque sit, amoris causam 152 PHRENOLOGY. more frequently among mankind than among animals ; yet there is a constant relation between the developement of the cerebellum and the propensity in question. It has been objected, that the brain in general is larger in men than in women, and that consequently it is not astonishing that the cerebella of men should also be larger than those of women. Many individuals, however, have large brains and small cerebella, and opponeretur; exempli gratia si sanguinem, aut partes genitales, hujus appeten- tiae causam acciperemus. Porro plurima organa non omni tempore officiis suis fungi notum est: mammae non semper lac secernunt. Idem igitur cerebello accidere potest. DifEcilis quidem est qusestio, utrum animalium cerebella, du rante rugitu, magnitudine crescant, an magis excitentur; experimenta desunt, scimus tamen, dum catuliunt, colla insolito modo calescere. Alii opponunt, vegetabilia sine cerebello propagari: hinc idem in animalibus fieri posse,vtque partes genitales sufficientes esse dicunt. Partes genitales hujus appetentiae causam sufficientem non esse, jam supra demonstravi. In animalium ac plantarum propagatione comparata, propagatio ipsa cum ejus appetentia con- funditur. In vegetabilibus propagatio est simplex fructificatio, actus organicus, in animalibus autem, praeter actum organicum, ejus appetentia quoque existit. In plantis atque animalibus, procreatio aeque se habet ac nutritus. Plantae nu- trimentum capiunt, sed neque esuriunt nee sitiunt, id est, neque famem nee sitim sentiunt, sicut animalibus res est. Praeterea, animalia nutrimenti saporis quoque conscia sunt, plantae vero hoc sensu carent. Hinc in plantis, nutritus est simplex; in animalibus, tribus functionem speciebus constat: digestione scilicet seu assi-milatione, famis et sitis sensatione et gustu. Procreationis eadem est ratio. In plantis est solummodo actus organicus; in animalibus, prater testiura et uteri actionem organicam, hujus rei appetentia existit, et e coitu animalia aeli- cias capiunt. Atque hujus appetentiae organum est cerebellum. Organa, ad eandem functionem pertinentia, sese invicem incitare notum est; sic fames incitat gustum, gustus famem, et ambo incitant digestionem. Sic quo- que copulandi appetentia seminis secretionem, et haec istam incitat. Attamen, licet variarum partium incitatio sit mutua, earum ratio non est directa. Digestio appetitui non semper respondet, nee appetitus digestioni: itemque nee veneris appetentia seminis secretionem, nee haec functio illam propensionem semper adaequat. Ex hisce considerationibus hujus appetentiae abusus facillime concipiuntur. Oriuntur enim eodem modo quo abusus famis et sitis. Corporis regenerandi causa nutrimenta sumenda sunt; sed quum nutrimenta, aut e nimia quantitate, aut e mala ipsorum qualitate, saluti obnoxia sunt, evenit abusus. Famem sitim- que e quadem organisatione pendere certum est, sed voracitatis ac ebrietatis or- ganum non datur: Res item se habet cum veneris appetentia; pendet a cerebello, nimia autem cerebelli incitatio aut ejus conditio vitiosa abusum produnit ORGAN OF AMATIVENESS. 153 vice versa. There is consequently no proportion between the brain and the Cerebellum. The sexual propensity, moreover, is never in proportion to the size of the brain; but caeteris paribus, always to that of the cerebellum. This organ, like all others, may be confirmed from observing uations as well as individuals who feel this propensity in a high de- gree. Various pathological facts in confirmation of the functions of the cerebellum are mentioned in the Memoires de Chirurgie, by Baron Larrey, in the Elements of Physiology, by Richerand, in the work on Apoplexy, by Serres, &c. Gall and myself have ob- served several facts of this kind. We may even take the position of the cerebellum as confirmato- ry of its destination. The desire destined to preserve the species, is the most common in animals, and the cerebellum accordingly is the most inferior portion of the brain. From all that has been said, and from the infinite number of ob- servations made on man and animals, we conclude that the special function of the cerebellum is fairly established, and think that the mutilations practised by M. Flourens, and Mr. Magendie, at Paris, do not invalidate our conclusions drawn from the healthy state. The former infers from his experiments, that the cerebellum serves for the regulation of muscular motion; whilst similar experiments made by Magendie, occasioned an irresistible tendency in the ani- mals to run or swim back. The only point we have still to examine, is the name which will best express the primitive faculty. Gall calls it the instinct of prop- agation. It certainly is essential to that end, but it often acts without there being any intention to continue the species, and is also satisfied in various ways incompatible with such a purpose. We do not usually speak of the nerves of the instinct of nutrition, but of those of hunger and thirst. The same language should be used when speaking of the organ in question. Gall's name does not express the whole sphere of activity of the faculty. Now I constantly insist on the importance of adopting titles which do not designate determinate actions. Physical love indicates a more 20 154 PHRENOLOGY. general application than the love or instinct of propagation, but this instinct or desire is no more physical than the love of offspring, or self-love, or the love of glory, &c ; I therefore prefer the name of Amativeness. To observe accurately and to substantiate the organs in general, it is necessary to know their situations. The organ of amativeness is situated at the top of the neck, and its size may be known by considering the space between the mastoid process immediately be- hind the ear, and the protuberance called occipital spine in the mid- dle of the hind head, in all its dimensions. Those who would make observations on the cerebellum of the lower animals, should know the variety of structure it presents among them. In birds it is al- most single ; in the mammalia it has lateral parts or lobes added to its fundamental or middle portion (processus vermiformis.) More details of the structure of the cerebellum are given in my work on the Anatomy of the Brain. Practical Reflections. The reader must bear in mind that the cerebellum is only the organ of the amative impulse, and not of the generative power. Its influence in society is immense. It may excite various feelings, such as combativeness, adhesiveness, and destructiveness, inspire timid persons with great moral courage, and at other times and un- der different circumstances, mitigates Our nature, and increases the mutual regards of the sexes towards each other. The cock shows benevolence to hens ; in general the males are milder to females than to individuals of their own sex, and so are men more kind and generous towards women, than towards other men. Fathers are commonly more attached to daughters, than to sons, and mothers are often prepossessed in favor of their sons. Female servants frequently show greater attention to young boys than to girls. The attraction of sexes towards each other is involuntary, and society improves, if both sexes meet, &c. On the other hand, this propensity has caused great disorder ORGAN OF PHILOPROGEN1 ivENESS. 155 as well in civil as in other peculiar, especially, religious institutions, where its activity has not been duly considered. Can it be reason- able to admit every youth to a profession, the members of which are compelled to swear chastity for life ? If such a vow be neces- sary, would it not be better to destine to the profession of religion those only who are born eunuchs, or those in whom the cerebellum is very little active ? The disorderly satisfaction of the amative propensity undermines the health of individuals, and even of the species ; and I think that as soon as young persons understand the difference and the dis- tinction of the sexual functions, they should be taught the laws of propagation, and not be kept in a state of ignorance that may pro- voke a fatal curiosity, compromising in the end their own and their descendants bodily and mental constitution. This work be- ing devoted to physiological inquiries alone, it would be out of place to say more on the influence of the organ of amativeness here. Important reflections might be made since we see seduc- tion encouraged, and have daily opportunities of witnessing the disastrous consequences of neglecting its proper direction. I wish every one were convinced how nearly legislators, moralists, teach- ers, physicians, and all friends of humanity are concerned in regu- lating the sexual propensity. In this respect I refer the reader, to my philosophical principles, in the chapter, where I treat on the happiness of man, and to the first section of my work on Education. III. Organ of Philoprogenitiveness. I shall consider, in the first place, whether it be necessary or not to admit a particular feeling which watches over and provides for the wants of a helpless offspring, and then state the circum- stances which led to the discovery of its organ. Neither males nor females of certain tribes of animals take any care of their progeny. Their eggs are resigned to chance, or rather to the influence of some external agent. This happens amongst insects, fishes, and reptiles. Among birds, too, the cue- 156 PHRENOLOGY. koo is a striking example of absence of parental solicitude. Its propensity to physical love is great, but it neither builds a nest nor hatches its eggs. These are deposited in the nests of small birds which live on insects, and they hatch and rear the young cuckoo, with particular attachment. The females of other kinds of animals alone take care of their progeny; bulls, stallions, dogs, cocks, &c, are indifferent about their young, while the cow, mare, bitch, hen, &c, are extremely attached to them. The males and females of other tribes, again, form an attach- ment for life, and both sexes tend their offspring. The instinct of parental love is, however, more energetic in the females. The fox, which resembles in so many points, differs from the dog in so far as he is attached to his female for life, shares in all her cares, and if she happens to be killed, continues to provide for the young ones. Parental love, nevertheless, is stronger in the female than in the male ; for if both be pursued, the male leaves the young sooner than the female. Many kinds of birds also live in pairs, and are jointly solicitous in satisfying the wants of the young. These differences are constant; does not each of them, even on the slightest consideration, seem to require peculiar organization ? In the human race this propensity is generally stronger in women than in men. This truth is proclaimed not only by the difference between fathers and mothers, but also by that between the sexes universally. We never hire male servants to take care of our children. Girls show the predominance of philoprogenitiveness ear- ly in life, by their choice of play-things. They attach themselves to dolls and cradles, whilst boys prefer drums, horses, whips, &c Among all kinds of animals which take care of their progeny, there are always some females who feel little or none of the pro- pensity, and certain males who manifest the inclination strongly. There are even women who look on children as a heavy burden, though the majority deem them their chief treasure and greatest source of happiness; and this not only in the miserable portion of society, but indiscriminately among rich and poor. Cases of insan- ORGAN OF PHILOPROGENITIVENESS. 157 ity are by no means unfrequent in which the function of parental love is deranged. All the general arguments, in fine, adduced to prove the plural- ity of the organs, may be applied to the organ of philoprogenitive- ness in particular. To answer the objections made against love of offspring, as a fundamental power, will be an easy task. This feeling is certain- ly not the result of reason, since it acts sometimes in opposition to reason in spoiling children. It acts like an instinct, or as a pro- pensity. It has been said, that it is the result of self-love, of the desire of suckling, and of the moral sentiments, and not of a pecu- liar propensity. These causes, though commonly admitted, are, however, inadequate to produce the love of offspring, since in many animals strongly attached to their progeny, they do not ex- ist. Birds, and the males of mammiferous animals, do not give suck, yet many of them love their young. Mothers very frequently do not suckle their children, they are, nevertheless, exceedingly attached to them. No animal, lower in the scale than man, has any idea of duty, or moral responsibility ; and the tenderness of mothers, of the human species, is never in proportion to the moral and religious sentiments with which they are endowed. On the other hand, this feeling cannot be the result of benevolence in gen- eral, since it exists often in a high degree in the most brutal tribes, as in the Caribs, and in ferocious animals. Others again have said, this propensity cannot be fundamental, because it is not always active. The same objection may, with equal propriety, be made against every instinct of animals, and against all the desires of man. No fundamental power seems ca- pable of acting continually ; each demands repose from time to time, and its intermissions of activity are shorter or longer, where- ever the cause of activity resides, whether in the blood, in the vis- cera, or in the cerebral parts. It is further objected, that mothers are not alike fond of every individual of their family, that they sometimes prefer one to anoth- er, nay, that they even hate one, and remain attached to the rest 158 PHRENOLOGY. This observation holds good, not only in mankind, but also among animals ; still it is wrong to infer from it, that philoprogeni- tiveness is no fundamental faculty. The external senses are not equally nor always agreeably affected by all kinds of impressions, nevertheless they have their particular functions. The stomach digests one sort of food more easily than another, and, notwith- standing, it remains the organ of digestion. The sense of taste cannot be denied, since certain savors are unpleasant. Moreover, philoprogenitiveness is not the only feeling that acts and requires satisfaction ; a mother will naturally prefer that child who pleases the greatest number of her faculties, and whose dispositions most nearly resemble her own ; and she may be less kind to another who is differently constituted, or who disturbs her happiness. The love of offspring, then, must be considered as a fundamental power, and a peculiar organ for its manifestations admitted. Let us now see how this was discovered. At an early period of his observations, Gall was attracted by a peculiar and very regularly occurring protuberance on the back part of the heads of females. (PL IV. fig. 1.) He also found a similar projection in the skulls of children and of monkeys. Con- vinced that the large mass of brain in this situation must perform some important function in the animal economy, all his efforts, during a period of five years, to detect its office, were notwith- standing unsuccessful. At first he fancied it might indicate the greater nervous irritability and sensibility of women and children; but he soon saw that irritability was a common quality of every organ, and therefore abandoned this supposition. In his courses of lectures delivered from time to time, he was in the habit of mentioning his difficulties relative to this protuberance, when at last a clergyman remarked, that monkeys were very much attached to their young ones. Reflecting on this suggestion, viewing the situation of the cerebral part, Immediately above the organ of ama- tiveness, and appealing to observation, Gall soon established its proper function. The developement of the organ he found con- , stantly to coincide with the energy of the propensity, which prompts ORGAN OF PHILOPROGENITIVENESS. 159 to protect and succor the young. Species, sexes, and individuals, powerfully endowed with the love of offspring, have the organ greatly developed. Women and females have it commonly larger than men and males. Gall possesses the skull of a woman who became diseased, and had the notion of being pregnant with five children ; the corresponding organ in this skull is exceedingly large. Several nations are remarkable for this propensity. The attachment of negroes and Indoos to their offspring is known ; and they have the organization on which the feeling depends prominent. As the English language possesses no single word that indicates love of offspring, I have employed two Greek roots, which, in conjunction, define accurately the primitive propensity. The title that results is long ; but I could not say philogenitiveness, because that would indicate the love of producing offspring. As, however, progeny is synonymous with offspring, and philoprogeny means the love of offspring, I adopt the term philoprogenitiveness for the fac- ulty of producing the love of offspring. Practical Reflections. The faculty of philoprogenitiveness is obviously destined to the preservation of the tender and weak offspring, and its intensity is the strongest in a mother during the first months after birth, when it is the most necessary to the tender and helpless progeny. Some- times it is too active, and produces many disorders, principally by spoiling children. Parents might often spare themselves a great deal of pain and much uneasiness, did they maintain this propensity in harmony with the other primitive faculties. A mother may behave unjustly to others for the sake of her children. On the other hand, the small size of the organ, or its inactivity, renders her indifferent to children. (PL IV. fig. 2.) This condition ought to be considered as one of the indirect causes prompting to infanti- cide. Gall and I have examined the heads of twenty-nine women guilty of infanticide, and in twenty-five of them the organ of philo progenitiveoess was very srrw.11 The small size of this organ, 160 PHRENOLOGY. however, does not excite a mother to destroy her child ; but she who is destitute of the love of offspring is less able to combat those external circumstances which provoke a commission of the crime. Such a mother will not resist as she would have done, had she been influenced by the powerful sway which philoprogenitiveness exerts over the female mind. I have already pointed out the place of philoprogenitiveness. Although the protuberance, which indicates its great developement, be commonly single, the organ itself is always double, that is, there is one on each side of the middle line of the head. It ap- pears single when the posterior lobes of the brain are very near to each other, and double when they are somewhat separated. This difference of form is common to all the cerebral organs situated on each side of the mesial plane. This organ is often large, rather in breadth than in length. By means of this and the preceding organ, it is very easy to dis- tinguish the skulls of males from those of females of the same kind; and it is peculiarly worthy of notice that throughout all animals there is a striking similarity preserved in the form of the skulls of each sex. The skulls of men and males are generally shorter and wider, those of women and females longer and narrower. Some phrenologists in Scotland think that a softness of manner, and a sympathy for whatever is weak and helpless, generally ac- company, and are connected with large philoprogenitiveness. I have already mentioned, that Gall entertained a similar idea at the beginning, but gave it up, and that the love of offspring may be very active in individuals of rough and brutal manners. The Carib race, endowed with great ferocity, are much attached to their young, and submit to all the inconveniences of bringing them up, amidst privations and hardships of every kind. The New Zealanders are the same. In the Library of Entertaining Knowledge, vol. i. p. 359, we read, ' The New Zealanders, both parents, are in general fondly attached to their children, and treat them with great kind- ness and indulgence. Mr. Ellis, during the short time he spent at the Bay of Islands in 1816, went one day to the residence of the ORGAN OF ADHESIVENESS. 161 chief Telora to request him to accompany himself on a short ex- cursion, which the chief immediately agreed to. But, says Mr. Ellis, before we sat out, an incident occurred which greatly raised my estimation of his character. In the front of the hut sat his wife, and round her playing two or three children. In passing from the hut to the boat, Teloro struck one of the little ones with his foot. The child cried, and though the chief had his mat on, and his gun in his hand, and was in the act of stepping into the boat, where we were waiting for him, he no sooner heard the cries than he turned back, took the child up in his arms, stroked its little head, dried its tears, and giving it to the mother, hastened to join us.' The tiger, hyena, and the most ferocious tribes of animals, show a fondness for their young, not inferior to that of the gentlest and most docile. Philoprogenitiveness produces only sympathy for young beings, but not tenderness in general. It may be combin- ed with other tender feelings, and increase their activity towards children. IV. Organ of Adhesiveness. Friendship is commonly considered as the result of reflection, the consequence of some analogy between the faculties of individ- uals or as an effect of mutual interest. Some particular instinct, however, producing various attachments, must be admitted amongst animals in whom no moral consideration nor any idea of interest can be supposed to have weight. This seems to be evident from numerous examples among animals. I have been assured by good authority that a female fox, brought up with a male fox and left loose and free, carried to him hares, rabbits, and one morning a guinea fowl, though there were none of the latter tribe within the reach of seven miles. All dogs are not susceptible of the same degree of attachment, though the treatment they receive ought to excite it; some, on the contrary, are attached in opposition to their interest, and though abused and maltreated, still remain faith- ful to their masters, and die on their graves. Moreover, there is 21 162 PHRENOLOGY. something involuntary in attachment, and its manifestations are too early and too sudden to result from reflection. It is evidently a feeling, and a feeling of the animal nature. Even criminals have frequently displayed great attachment to their associates ; and in- stances are not wanting in which they have preferred self-destruc- tion to denunciation of their companions. Thus, a highwayman, confined in the prison of Lichtenstien, near Vienna, hanged him- self, that he might not be forced to betray his accomplices. ' Mary Macinnes, executed in Edinburgh for murder, had gained the af- fections of a person, whose name need not be mentioned, and her attachment to him continued strong in death, and assumed even a romantic appearance in the last moments of her mortal career. He had sent her a pocket handkerchief, having his name written in one corner, and also half an orange, with a desire that she should eat the latter on the scaffold, in token of their mutual affection; he having eaten the other half, the preceding morning, at the corres- ponding hour. She held the corner of the napkin in her mouth, almost all the night preceding her execution, and even on the scaffold. When seated on the drop, the turnkey gave her the half orange, she took it out of his hand without the least fear—she seemed to have forgot eternity in the ardor of her attachment.' Phrenol. Transact, p. 376. Though the necessity of some organ of attachment was evident, it was difficult, however, to point out its seat in man ; his actions being sometimes embellished by the appearance of friendship, whilst but little of the feeling subsists in reality. Gall examined the head of a woman, at Vienna, who was looked upon as a model of friendship; she had suffered many changes of fortune, had been alternately rich and poor, but was always attached to her former friends. He found the cerebral part situated upward and outward from the organ of philoprogenitiveness, very prominent, and called it the organ of friendship. He neglected, during a long time, to make farther observations on this organ, but many facts have sub- sequently been gathered, and its seat is now ascertained. (PL V. fig. 1 and 2. IV.) ORGAN OF ADHESIVENESS. 163 The strength of attachment is very different in different species of animals, and even in individuals of the same kind; it is greater in women than in men, and greater in one nation than in another. This faculty induces individuals of the same kinds to congregate, and live in society. In several species, too, the males and females "are attached for life, and dwell domestically together. The fox and many birds are examples of this. The two sexes would leave each other as soon as the amative propensity is satisfied, did not nature, by a peculiar instinct, prevent this. Yet it is to be observ- ed that the instinct of attachment for life, and that of society, are not mere degrees of energy of the faculty of attachment. For there are animals which live in society without being attached for life, as the bull, dog, cock, &c; others which live in society and in fami- lies, as starlings, ravens, crows, &c ; and others again which are attached for life without living in society, as the fox, magpie, &c. The instinct, therefore, of living in society, and that of living in family, are modifications proper and peculiar in their nature, in the same way as the relish for vegetables or flesh is a modification of smell and taste in carnivorous and herbivorous animals. Man belongs to the class of animals which is social and attached for life ; society and marriage are consequently not effects of human reflec- tion, but of an original decree of the Creator. Gall does not coincide in the opinion that attachment for life in man and animals results from this feeling. He thinks that mar- riage exists in animals, since both the male and female concur in taking care of their progeny. I grant that this feeling may assist the love of offspring, and may be influenced by amativeness and philoprogenitiveness, but it seems to me, that if attachment of sexes were the result of philoprogenitiveness, both sexes would only re- main together as long as their love of offspring lasts, and is neces- sary to the preservation of their young. On the other hand, men and women may be attached to each other for life, without the least desire of offspring. It seems to me, that the special faculty now under consideration extends its sphere of activity still farther, and that it attaches us to our parents, brothers, sisters, and friends, 164 PHRENOLOGY. and to all beings around us, to plants, animals and things; in short, to all we possess, whether animate or inanimate. It produces also the feeling of habit or custom. Friendship consequently is only one of the modifications of the faculty. If attachment for life belong to some portion of its organ, it must be to that which is nearest the organ of philoprogenitiveness. In conformity with the preceding considerations, the name Ad- hesiveness seems to me capable of denoting this special faculty, whose objects are friendship, marriage, society and attachment in general. The term adhesiveness has been used hitherto merely in a physical sense; but many other words, which now bear a mental signification, were in the like case originally. Attachment would indicate only the effect of this faculty, and I require a name which expresses the faculty of producing such an effect. Abuse results from its too great energy, in regretting over-much the loss of a friend, &c. Without attachment men become anchorites and hermits. V. Organ of Inhabitiveness. When we examine the habits and manners of animals, we see that different kinds are attached to particular regions and countries. Nature having intended that every region and every country should be inhabited, has assigned to all animals their dwellings, and given to every species a propensity to live in some particular local situa- tion. If we place an animal in any region other than that destined for it, it feels ill or uneasy, and seeks to return to its natural dwel- ling. Some seek the water from the first moment of their exist- ence. Turtles and ducks, as soon as they are hatched, run to- wards it. Other young animals again, stay upon dry land ; some of these prefer elevated and mountainous regions ; some the level country; and others the marshes. Among the feathered tribes, some live in the higher, others in the lower regions; for the power of flying does not produce the instinct that prompts the eagle to soar into the highest regions of air ; other birds, though their power of ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS. 165 flying is very great, have not this propensity. Some birds build on the tops, some in the middle, and others in holes of trees ; some on the earth, some in the banks of rivers, &c. Now what is the cause of this modified instinct ? It is often said that animals choose their particular dwellings ac- cording to their general organization. Birds are organized to fly, fishes to swim, and the chamois and wild-goat to climb upon mountains. It is true, that the external and internal organization of animals is adapted to their manner of living ; fishes cannot exist in the air, nor birds under water. Moreover, animals commonly find their food in the places which they inhabit. This alone, however, is not the only condition that determines their particular dwellings. Some love situations where there is no food ; the chamois and wild- goat dwell upon rocks which are entirely barren, and are obliged to descend into the middle regions to find their sustenance. Again, there are kinds which like the higher regions of the air, and which yet seek their food upon the earth. Eagles and hawks hover very high, but catch their prey upon the ground. Does the lark require to ascend into the air to sing ? In the philosophical part, where I treat of the innateness of the faculties, I show that it is impossible to attribute the origin of any faculty of man or animals to ex- ternal circumstances. Parrots, eagles, pigeons, and swallows live upon very different substances, and are very differently organized, yet they are all fond of flying high in the air. In conformity, then, with these consid- erations, we must admit the existence of a particular faculty with its special organ, which determines animals in the selection of a habitation. Let us now say a few words on the opinion of Gall upon this subject. After having paid great attention to the organ of pride in man, he examined such animals as are generally esteemed proud, the cock, peacock, &c, but could distinguish no analogy between the cerebral organs of these animals and those of proud persons. He, however, observed in tribes which have a great propensity to 166 PHRENOLOGY. elevated stations, as in the chamois and wild-goat, a protuberance which he identified with the organ that produces pride and haugh- tiness in man. It is certain, and must be conceded, that animals which live on mountains, or which are fond of high regions, have one part of their brain more developed than the species of the same genus which live in flat and low countries. This difference is very sen- sible in roes, hares, rats, cats, &c. Yet it appears to me that this circumstance by no means authorizes the conclusion, that the fac- ulty which leads animals to seek elevated situations is essentially the same as that which makes man proud and haughty. Gall thinks that the situation of the organ of pride in man cor- responds with that of the organ of the instinct which prompts ani- mals to seek physical elevation. I, on the other hand, maintain, that the place of an organ can prove nothing, when animals of dif- ferent kinds are spoken of. For if different animals be endowed with dissimilar faculties, their organs may still occupy correspond- ing places of the head. We have, I suppose, three sorts, whose faculties are quite different. The organs of these fill, in each, the skull ; of course, it is here evidently impossible to maintain thai the faculties of the three are the same, because corresponding pla- ces of the head are well developed. It is true, that when an ani- mal possesses a faculty in common with man, the organ of that fac- ulty is situated in both in the same part of the head. Now it ap- pears to me that the place of the protuberance which indicates the instinct of animals for physical height, does not correspond with that which in man produces self-esteem and pride. In animals it is immediately above the organ of philoprogenitiveness ; but the corresponding cerebral part in man was unobserved by, and un- known to Gall. Certainly, it is not the organ of self-esteem ; this lies much higher. Hence, a comparison of the situations of the organs of both faculties is rather against than in favor of Gall's as- sertion. He also supports his opinion by saying, that different faculties which are merely physical in animals, become mor^l in man, and ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS. 167 quotes physical love as an example. Now I think that all physi- cal faculties common to man and animals preserve their nature in man, and that the faculty of physical love is in itself always the same. It is obvious, however, that this propensity may be ac- companied by other sentiments, especially by attachment. The bull is sometimes particularly attached to one amongst a herd of cows ; and I have seen Canary birds which would not mate with certain individuals. Though separated, they still remained attach- ed to their former partners. Moreover, if the organ of amative- ness be singly active in man, it is always without morality; in some hydrocephalic persons and idiots from birth, physical love resem- bles that of animals entirely. Hence, whatever is moral in ama- tiveness depends on other faculties which accompany it; it is also observed that man and animals modify the manifestations of the propensity, in proportion as they are endowed with other disposi- tions. If a man or an animal be prone to attachment and physical love at the same time, these faculties will act conjointly ; physical love will be modified by attachment, and attachment by physical love. Platonic love, it is replied, ordinarily finishes in physical love. I agree with this; but can we therefore conclude that platonic is the same as physical love ? I am not hungry because I have taste or smell; but if the sense of smell be stimulated by any savory odor, and that of taste and the feeling of hunger be thereby excit- ed, and notwithstanding my first intention not to eat I eat, will it be maintained that smell and the desire to eat are the same? If we examine platonic or moral love, we find that all the sentiments which are felt at the same time with the propensity to physical love, may be attributed to other special faculties and their respect- ive organs. In the same manner it seems to me impossible to confound the instinct of physical height with the sentiment of self- love and pride : I believe it possible to have a great opinion of one's self in all regions, and in all countries. Gall adds that mountaineers are proud, and particularly attach- ed to their independence and moral liberty. Being attached to 168 PHRENOLOGY. mountains does not exclude self-esteem and firmness, which lead to independency. Moreover, I do not think that the inhabitants of Switzerland have more natural pride than the Hungarians. The former, however, struggled for independence, while the latter could not endure the civil liberties which the Emperor Joseph the Second allowed them. The Spaniards are notoriously proud, but show little inclination to be free. Gall quotes several examples of proud persons being particularly fond of climbing upon mountains, and to great elevations. My experience has shown me both proud and humble persons, who felt a peculiar pleasure in going upon towers and other elevated places ; but they did so to see the scenery of the surrounding country. This inclination then belongs to the organ of locality, as I shall afterwards explain. Finally, Gall particularly insists on those natural expressions, or actions, by which the sentiment of pride is manifested. Proud children, says he, mount upon chairs, in order to be on a level with grown-up persons ; and adults, of small stature, often do the same to gratify their self-love ; proud persons keep their body erect, and have a haughty gait. In general, all expressions of pride and superiority are combined with physical elevation: thus, kings and emperors sit upon elevated thrones ; they receive their power from above, &c. &c. All external manifestations of proud persons may be explained upon the pathognomical principle of the motions of the body in general, and the motions of the head in particular, being in the direction of the organ which is active. Now the organ of pride is situated upwards and backwards, and all the motions of pride are in these directions. Thus, I separate the instinct which carries animals to physical elevation, from the sentiment which produces self-love and pride ; and I consider the first as a modification of the feeling which deter- mines the dwelling-places of animals. The cerebral part above the organ of philoprogenitiveness in man, is more or less developed, independently of the neighboring ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS. 169 parts, and must be considered as endowed with some peculiar function. On the other hand, the instinct of animals to choose a peculiar dwelling-place is special, in no proportion to any other instinct, hence, it must be attached to a particular organ. This being modified, its modified functions are explained in the same way as those of the senses of taste and smell in herbivorous and carnivorous animals ; the organ, however, cannot be pointed out by comparing animals which live in different elements ; our obser- vations must be confined to such as inhabit the same element or the same country, and chiefly to individuals remarkable for a higher degree of the peculiar dispositions. This propensity being com- mon to many animals, its organ must be deeply seated in the brain, and must be looked for in the region of the other propensities. I consider in animals the cerebral part immediately above the organ of philoprogenitiveness, as the organ of the instinct that prompts them to select a peculiar dwelling, and call it the organ of inhabit- iveness. It is known that cats are more attached to places, and dogs to persons. The former remain in the house which is sold, while the latter follows his master. My attention has been, and is still directed to such individuals of the human kind, as show a par- ticular disposition in regard to their dwelling-place. I have many facts in confirmation. I saw a clergyman in Manchester, known to his friends as particularly attached to his dwelling-place, so that he should be unhappy if obliged to sleep elsewhere. I examined his head in company of several gentlemen, some of whom were opponents, but every one was obliged to admit that the spot of the head where No. V. is situated, was warmer than the rest of the head. I merely asked what part was the warmest, and all agreed at the same place. Some nations are extremely attached to their country, while others are readily induced to migrate. Some tribes of the American Indians and Tartars, wander about without fixed habitations, while other savages have a settled home. Mountain- eers are commonly much attached to their native soil, and those of them who visit capitals or foreign countries, seem chiefly led by the hope of gaining money enough to return home and buy a little 22 170 PHRENOLOGY. property, even though the land should be dearer there than else- where. I therefore invite the phrenologists who have an opportu- nity of visiting various nations particularly fond of their country, to examine the developement of the organ marked No. V., and situat- ed immediately above philoprogenitiveness. Some persons think that inhabitiveness may give the delight to see foreign countries, and to travel, but it is quite the reverse ; the former delight depends on locality. Those who have inhabitive- ness large and locality small, do not like to leave home ; those who have both organs large, like to travel, but to return home, and to settle at last. In all civilized nations, some individuals have a great predilec- tion for residing in the country. If professional pursuits oblige them to live in town, their endeavor is to collect a fortune as speedily as possible, that they may indulge their leading propensity. I have examined the heads of several individuals of this descrip- tion, and found the parts in question much developed. A friend of mine, M. de Tremmon, of Paris, suggested the idea to look for an organ of which agriculture is a result, since there are organs which dispose man to hunt, to build, to collect food, and to cultivate arts and sciences. This remark is undoubtedly philosophical, since nature attaches pleasure to every occupation on which the preservation of the species depends. Now, agricul- ture contributes greatly to the general welfare, and it is not prob- able that nature was negligent in this point. Hence, I have also examined the organ marked No. V., in relation to this peculiar dis- position, and have found it large in several who are fond of living in the country, and of agricultural pursuits. I mention these ideas only to excite investigation, not by any means as being certain and established. Once confirmed, inhabitiveness will be considered as presenting modifications in the same way as every other special power does. Mr. Combe, and several members of the Phrenological Society of Edinburgh, think that the function of the cerebral part we are discussing,c is to maintain ttoo or more powers in simultaneous ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS. 171 and combined activity, so that they may be directed towards one object,' and name it the organ of concentrativeness. 'The first step,' says Mr. Combe,* 'in the discovery of this function, was the observation that certain individuals are naturally prone to sedentary habits, and find it painful to stir abroad without a special motive, and this too of considerable urgency. Other persons experience equal difficulty in settling; their strongest de- sire is to engage in some active employment, in which their atten- tion shall be carried as it were out of themselves, and occupied in external objects and occurrences. The former were perceived to possess this organ large, the latter small.' ' The next step was the observation that some persons possess a natural tendency to live, as it were, within themselves, whose minds seem habitually occupied with internal meditation, and of supporting a close and vigorous attention ; who, in short, have a natural facility of concentrating their thoughts, without the tendency to be distracted by the intrusion of feelings or ideas foreign to the main point under consideration. Such persons possess a com- mand over their intellectual powers, so as to be able to apply them in their whole vigor to the pursuit which forms the object of their study for the time ; and hence they produce the greatest pos- sible results from the intellectual endowment which nature has be- stowed on them. Other individuals, on the other hand, have been observed, who find their thoughts lost in dissipation, who are unable to keep the leading idea in its situation of becoming prominence, are distracted by accessaries, and, in short, experience great diffi- culty in combining their whole powers to a single object. These persons, even with considerable reflecting talents, fail to produce a corresponding general effect, and their mental productions are characterized by the intrusion of irrelevant ideas, and the unper- ceived omission of important particulars, arising from the disjoint- ed action of their several faculties. The organ was perceived to be large in the former, and small in the latter. ' Probably it is by the exercise of a power resembling concen- * Elements of Phrenology, 3d Edition, p. 328. 172 PHRENOLOGY. trativeness, that animals, such as the chamois, who are fond of heights, are enabled to maintain in action all those faculties which are necessary to preserve their position, while they browse in dif- ficult or dangerous situations ; and, at the same time, avoid the aim of the hunter. There appears, therefore, nothing in the limit- ed observations of Dr. Spurzheim inconsistent with the more ex- tensive views now taken of the functions of the faculty.' As the analysis of the fundamental powers of the mind is an es- sential object of Phrenology; and as every suggestion which comes from Mr. Combe deserves my full attention, since he is undoubt- edly one of the most able and successful defenders of Phrenology, I shall examine all his arguments which make him admit an organ of concentrativeness. His actual ideas on this faculty seem to be modified from his former conception. I examine them as they are stated in the third and last edition of his System of Phrenology. But if I do not agree with him on this subject, it is not from want of esteem for his opinions, but merely, because I am not convinced of their correctness. Farther investigation and observation must decide who of us is in the right and who in the wrong. ' Some persons,' says Mr. Combe, 1. i. p. 135, ' possess a nat- ural consciousness of every thing that goes on in their own minds, in which power others seem remarkably deficient. The former can detain their feelings and ideas, and deliberately examine their character and consistency; the latter cannot do this ; their minds are like the surface of a mirror, on which each feeling and thought appears like the shadow of a moving object, making a momentary impression and passing away. They experience great difficulty in detaining their emotions and ideas, so as to examine and com- pare them ; and in consequence are little capable of taking sys- tematic views of any subject, and of concentrating their powers to bear on one point. I have observed this organ to be large in the former, and small in the latter. ' It is difficult to describe in words the manner of a man's mind; but the difference in manifestation is so great between those in whom this organ is small and those in whom it is large, that if ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS. 173 once comprehended, it will always be recognised. In conversing with some individuals, we find them fall naturally into a connected train of thinking, till they have placed it clearly before the mind, or passing naturally and gracefully to a connected topic. Such persons uniformly have this organ large ; we meet with others who, in similar circumstances, never pursue one idea for two consecutive seconds ; who shift from topic to topic without regard to natural connexion, and leave no distinct impression on the mind of the listener, and this happens even with individuals in whom reflection is not deficient; but this organ is in such persons uniformly small.' Mr. Combe quotes largely from a letter on this subject in the Phrenological Journal, vol. iii. p. 193. I copy the following pas- sage : ' In Mr. Combe's work lately published, second edition, 1825, the primitive feeling which gives rise to the phenomena of concentrativeness, is said to be, the tendency to concentrate the mind within itself, and to direct its power in a combined effort to one object. This however may be considered rather as a descrip- tion of the operation of the power, than a statement of the primary element to which its phenomena may be traced. If we attend to what passes in our minds, when we endeavor to concentrate our thoughts upon a subject, we shall find that we do not attempt any direct coercion on our different faculties, but simply endeavor to seize upon the object of thought and keep it steadily before the mind. We are all occasionally conscious of ineffectual efforts of attention ; if we examine what we do on such occasions, we shall find that it consists in an attempt to think of some subject, which is for the moment less attractive than some other objects, which are the causes of distraction. An affective concentration of the faculties take place only when the original leading conceptions are of themselves powerful and permanent, and the concentration will be found, consequently, to be most perfect when there is least effort to produce it. We are sensible of this on occasions which may be either painful or pleasant, when a subject associated with strong emotion has taken possession of the mind, and when we find ourselves incapable of banishing from our thoughts, even 174 PHRENOLOGY. though very desirous of doing so, the train of conceptions which has so strongly concentrated our powers upon itself, and continues to keep them in a state of sustained and perhaps distressing activity. We speak of our minds having the command of our ideas. This may be correct enough in popular language, but philosophically speaking our ideas command our mind, and even in those cases which appear most like exceptions to this principle, it will be found on examination that it is merely one class of ideas assuming the predominance over another. When we voluntarily change our train of thoughts, or endeavor to concentrate our minds upon one subject, the process is one in which, under an impression of neces- sity or expediency of attending to the particular subject, we pass from the train of irrelevant ideas, and endeavor to reach by the aid of our associations the subject which we wish to study; almost every individual is capable of this single effort, and he may repeat it again. But that uninterrupted sustaining of the attention so given, which constitutes concentrativeness, depends on a quality distinct from efforts of attention ; a quality most strongly marked where least effort is necessary, and that is simply the property which this mental power possesses of giving continuance to thoughts and feelings when they have sprung up in the mind. This prop- erty appears to exist in different degrees in different minds, to which of course, the diversity in the manifestations, with which we are so often presented, is to be mainly attributed. ' Its deficiency,' states the latter in another passage, ' in the more ordinary degrees, discovers itself in different ways according to its combination with other faculties. In some individuals it produces an indisposition to settle into any regular plan of life, or if this has been controlled by circumstances and other faculties, there may still be seen a want of method, forethought and contin- uity, in the various concerns of intercourse or business. The in- dividual does not appear like one driving constantly towards a particular object; his mind takes its direction from shifting circum- stances, and if other faculties conspire, he may be characterized by a sort of careless facility or vivacity of disposition. Mr. ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS. 175 Combe, 3d edition, p. 196, adds ; ' When comparison and causal- ity are large in combination with large concentrativeness, there is a tendency to systematic knowledge ; when the latter is deficient this is not felt, and I regard one element in a systematic mind to be the power of giving continuousness to feelings and ideas, there- by enabling the intellect to contemplate the relations subsisting among them. Where he treats of the modes of the intellectual faculties, art. Attention, p. 531, he says : ' Concentrativeness gives continuity to the impressions of the faculties. Individuality and Eventuality direct them to their objects, and firmness maintains them in a state of application, and their faculties greatly aid atten- tion.' The organ No. V. is small in my head, and when I objected against the former definition of concentrativeness : ' the tendency to maintain two or more powers in simultaneous, and combined ac- tivity so that they may be directed towards one object,' consider- ing such an operation of the mind rather as intellectual than affective, I was told that I could not easily conceive this primitive power, since the organ is small in my brain. I confess that this answer never satisfied my mind. I allow that several feelings and their respective organs are small in my head; but this did not prevent me to conceive their existence in others, being guided by reason- ing and by facts. It is a fundamental principle of my philosophy, that no individual can be taken as a standard of mankind, and I can assure that I have this principle present in all my philosophical disquisitions. I always make abstraction of myself. I admit a faculty as fundamental, if I can concentrate all the reasons, which prove the plurality of organs, as stated above, and its special organ, if it be confirmed by all the means which we employ to establish the organs. It seems to me that intellect forms what is called conception, and I can assure that I conceive the definition which Mr. Combe actually (3d edition) gives of concentrativeness, viz. a primitive faculty, which gives continuity to the impressions of other faculties, to feelings and ideas. The former definition seemed to me in- 176 PHRENOLOGY. eluding intellect, and I could not conceive how a directing faculty should be situated among the former propensities. But from the new definition I conceive that such a faculty, if it exist, is not in- ellectual but affective, since it does not imply knowledge, concep- tion and direction ; but then if it be confirmed as a special power, another name must be given adapted to its essential nature and actual definition, viz. Continuity of impressions, be they feelings or ideas. I shall first examine whether such a primitive faculty is necessary to explain the mental phenomena. 2d. If it be admitted, whether it is the same as inhabitiveness ; and whether there are sufficient observations to decide about its organ. Nature never multiplies the means of producing effects without necessity. Now I acknowledge that certain persons have more concentration of mind than others. I even find that certain persons are concentrated in their feelings, are susceptible of concentra- ted grief, attachment, or any other feeling, whilst they have no concentration of intellect, though their intellectual powers are not wanting ; on the other hand, some persons are concentrated in intellect, and have very little continuity of their feelings. If con- centrativeness be a primitive power, it should be applicable to feelings as well as intellect in the same person. Farther, the contin- uity of impressions seems to me to depend, first on the more or less developement of the special organs. Every predominant organ becomes, so to say, the centre of all others, or concentrates the activity of all others around its own. He who has cautiousness extremely large, and hope small, feels anxiety combined with every other power. He who has acquisitiveness, or love of approbation, predominant, employs all his intellect and feelings to gratify acquis- itiveness or love of approbation ; very large marvellousness lies in every event of providence ; very large ideality looks every where for perfection ; a mother with predominant philoprogenitiveness may be concentrated in the love of her children; destructiveness concentrates in carnivorous animals their external and internal senses in order to catch their prey. 2d. If individual organs, when ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS 177 single but predominant, concentrate all mental activity, it may be still more easily done, when several large organs are combined to- gether. Predominant benevolence, reverence, prudence, marvel- lousness. and conscientiousness combined together, will find con- centrated enjoyment in the contemplation of Christian principles, whilst predominant destructiveness, secretiveness, combativeness and firmness, concentrate all powers to do mischief. Those who have certain feelings very strong, and individuality and eventuality very small, will be absorbed by their active feelings in the midst of large companies. Eventuality which knows the activity of the other powers, and all knowledge expressed by verbs, is essential to intellectual concentration. Those who have individuality, event- uality, comparison and language in an eminent degree, will always attract the attention of their hearers and readers, and their intellect- ual continuity and concentration will increase, by causality, mirth- fulness, courage, cautiousness, love of approbation, self-esteem and firmness. There will be no systematic mind without large comparison, whatever the developement of No. V. may be. Since the combination of powers gives continuity to their activ- ity, their association seems to be of greater influence than a single primitive feeling. I admit association to exist as well as concen- tration, but I deny them to be fundamental powers, and consider them as effects or modes of action in the same way as attention, pleasure, and desire. 3d. The continuity of impressions, of feelings, and ideas, will also depend on the temperament, or bodily consti- tution of the organs. Certain constitutions receive the impressions quickly, but lose them soon again, others receive them slowly and keep them long, others again are quick in perceptions and tenacious in keeping them. This is particularly striking in reference to under- standing and memory. But it is the same with the feelings. But there is no necessity of a peculiar organ for the phenomenon. Mr. Combe compares his concentrativeness with firmness, the former giving continuity of impressions, and the latter maintaining them in their application. Maintaining, however, a power in its application seems to me rather special than giving continuity to its activity, 23 178 PHRENOLOGY. since the former operation is not replaced by another power ; for m stance if I feel reverence, and individuality directs this feeling to the Supreme Being, a peculiar feeling, firmness, maintains it in this ap- plication and reverence and firmness may continue to act, that is revere God without the aid of any other faculty. Acquisitiveness collects property, conscientiousness requires that it is done with justice, and firmness maintains the possession of just property. Main- tenance depends on a special feeling, acquisitiveness itself may con- tinue to collect, but it is not the power that keeps and maintains. The anatomical connexion, too, of the organ of firmness with the other organs is of a peculiar appearance, and different from that of No. V. with the other cerebral organs. The organ of firmness is situated in the midst of the feelings, so to say, to give them perseverance in this application. It is for this reason that firmness is so often and so easily confounded with will. Thus, in the first place, I do not think it necessary nor probable that there is a special feeling, which gives continuity to the impres- sions of the other faculties. In the next place, if there be such a particular feeling, it cannot be the same as that of inhabitiveness. With all possible deference to Mr. Combe's acuteness of mind, and to his greater developement of No. V. I take the liberty of stating, that I cannot agree with him when he says, p. 146, that ' at the same time there appears to be nothing in the notions of Dr. Spurzheim, concerning inhabitiveness, inconsistent with the more extensive views now taken of the functions of this faculty.' I apprehend that Mr. Combe commits a similar error as Gall, who confounded inhabitiveness with self-esteem, and considered them as functions of the same organ. In my opinion if there be an organ of concentrativeness it must be different from that of in- habitiveness. Persons may be concentrated or not, in the same way as proud or humble, in all situations, by water and by land, in low and in mountainous countries. ' I conceive,' says Mr. Combe, p. 149, «that concentration of mind is favorable to inhabitiveness, and that men and animals whose faculties are more concentrated, have the greatest inclination to re- ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS. 179 main in one place.' I also conceive that persons with concen- trated powers may remain in one place, if it be necessary to do so in order to gratify the continued activity of their powers, whilst the local situation has not the least influence on their mental deter- . mination, nay, whilst ihey may feel an aversion to the place itself, but the stronger feelings prevail and keep them where they are. Concentration and inhabitiveness then are neither the same, nor proportionate to each other. Mr. Combe adds ; ' animals which browse on rocks, and which place their nests in high and difficult situations, or by the banks of rapid rivers, would require for their well-being and comfort just such a faculty as this, which should enable them to maintain their position with ease, and at the same time to provide for their food and safety.' Food and safety are necessary to the preservation of animals, and the Creator has not abandoned them to chance, but I do not find that animals have a determinate instinct of inhabitiveness in proportion as they are, exposed to danger. The hare and mouse in the fields, in order to escape their enemy, stand in need of con- centrativeness, as well as the eagle that hovers in the air and poun- ces upon his prey. Cautiousness and secretiveness are surer safe- guards than the continuity of other impressions. In my opinion, then, if there be an organ of concentrativeness, it is sui generis and different from that of inhabitiveness. Moreover Mr. Combe speaks, p. 147, of the disease of concen- trativeness. ' This organ appears to suffer in those lunatics whose attention is immovably fixed on some internal impression, and who remain absorbed in silent and profound meditation, insensible alike to the threats or caresses of those around them, and to the effects of external objects. Mr. Combe is right in adding that ' this state now attributed to diseased concentrativeness must be distinguished from dementia approaching to idiocy, in which a fixed look and silent calmness appear not from internal meditation, but from utter insensibility to stimuli. In disease of concentrativeness the patient possesses intense consciousness, and when cured is able to give an account of all that passed in his mind during the malady ; in de- 180 PHRENOLOGY. raentia the period of the disease forms a blank in existence, the individual recollecting nothing.' This argumentation is not clear to me. How can concentra- tiveness be diseased, since internal impressions continue whilst external impressions are without effect! I have been attentive to patients of that description, and observed in them the organs of individuality and eventuality, particularly the latter, very small.' Their inactivity is sufficient to explain the inadvertency of such lunatics to external impressions. Whenever these two organs are small, there will be little attention paid to external objects and events, however active the feelings may be. From the preceding remarks it follows, that I do not think it necessary to look for an organ of concentrativeness, but phrenolo- gy, being founded on facts, and Mr. Combe appealing to facts, it was and still is my duty to repeat his observations. This I have done and continue to do in order to see whether a cerebral part in the neighborhood of inhabitiveness coincides with the continuous- ness of the various mental phenomena. It is necessary to proceed according to our general method of pointing out the organs : viz. in making observations on individuals in the positive and negative manner ; on both sexes ; on nations, &c. Mr. Combe began with comparing a large developement in the region of No. V. with a peculiar tendency of mind. ' The first idea,' says he, p. 136, ' that led me to the conclusion, that it is the tendency to concentrate the mind within itself, and to direct its powers in a combined effort to one object, was suggested by a lady, who had remarked this quality in individuals in whom the or- gan was large. The Rev. David Welsh, and Dr. Hoppe of Co- penhagen having been informed of these views unknown to each other, communicated to me the inference that the faculty gives a tendency to dwell in a place, or on feelings and ideas, for a length of time, till all or the majority of the other faculties are satisfied in regard to them.' From what I have said above it follows, that Mr. Combe now defines concentrativeness, the power of giving continuity to the ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS. 181 other faculties. As far as such differences of mental phenomena exist, we agree perfectly, we only differ in this explanation. He brings in a special power, which I consider as superfluous, I do not doubt that he has observed the region of No. V. large in individ- uals who dwelt on their ideas or feelings, I only say that the facts which have come under my observation, do not allow me for the present to adopt his conclusion. I know individuals of great men- tal concentration, either in feelings or in intellect, or in both, where the region of No. V. is large or small. I know individuals who do not like to change their occupation, who are quite absorb- ed with an object for a time, but whose heads are very depressed at No. V. Mr. Deville in London, who has collected many facts to this very purpose, also found that great concentration of mind, does not always coincide with large No. V. I know individuals greatly disposed to sedentary life and to men- tal contemplation, who have the part of the head above philopro genitiveness very small. I know two gentlemen, both constantly occupied with external objects and occurrences, one possesses that portion of the head small, and the other has it large, &c. From individuals we extend our observations over sexes. In the former edition I said, ' This organ is also commonly larger in women than in men, and I leave every one to decide upon the sex which supports the more close and vigorous attention.' Mr. Combe replies, ' in Scotland, and I may almost say in England, al- though my observations there have been less extensive, this is not the case; the developement being larger in men than in women.' There are two ideas to be examined, 1st. Whether women in general have No. V. larger or smaller than men. 2nd. Whether they have more concentrativeness. 3d. It seems to me certain, that the posterior lobes are more elongated backwards in women, in general, than in men. Any callipers may give this conviction.' No. V. is commonly less in women than philoprogenitiveness, ad- hesiveness, and love of approbation. And this is probably the cause, that Mr. Combe considers No. V. larger in men than in women, viz. in relation to the three other neighboring organs, 182 PHRENOLOGY. which are much smaller in men, and make in them No. V. appea/ larger, but the distance from the meatus, and auditorius externus to No. V. in itself, is the longest in women in general. Now in con- sidering No. V. as the organ of the power, which gives continuity to the impressions of the other faculties, its greater developement should be expected in women, if the feelings, particularly the re- ligious sentiments, love of approbation, adhesiveness and philopro- senitiveness, are concerned. It is almost an axiom that women are guided by feelings, whilst men are superior in intellectual con- centration. Hence there is great concentrativeness in the feelings of women, and there is none in other respects. How can this be combined with Mr. Combe's statement that women have the organ smaller than men ? The preceding facts seem to confirm my opinion, about inhabi- tiveness. It is conceivable that women, who by nature are in- trusted with maternal care, and domestic concerns, are particular- ly endowed with inhabitiveness. They remain at home, whilst their husbands go out for food, in hunting, fishing, or laboring in the fields. Yet inhabitiveness is still less than the neighboring organs mentioned above, which require greater activity. In order to point out organs we have also recourse to nation- al heads. The region of No. V. is more developed in Malays, New Zealanders, Esquimaux, Negroes and all Celtic tribes, than in the Teutonic and Tartar races, and the difference of the poste- rior lobes in men and women, of the two latter sorts of races, is greater than in both sexes of the former tribes. In the French, of Celtic extraction, No. V. is larger than in the Teutonic Germans. Mr. Combe explains thereby, why 'the French, though their intellectual reach is limited, attain the greatest perfection within the sphere which their faculties are calculated to reach, and why they write the best elementary works on science of any people of Europe, since they bring their powers to bear in a regulated man- ner on the point under consideration, and presented clearly and definitely, to the understanding. The Germans, on the other hand, though they have more powerful reflecting faculties than the French, ORGAN OF INHABITIVENESS. 183 and also greater perseverance, appear inferior to them in concen- trativeness. They introduce more frequently extraneous ideas and feelings, and do not arrive at so neat and complete a whole in their compositions.' This mental difference is perceptible in the study of natural sci- ences, and indicated by the spirit of the languages of both nations. It is true the French language is positive, easy and clear, when- ever a sentence finishes, whilst the German speaks out various ideas, and links them together at the end of the sentence. It seems to me that the German language requires more concentrated attention than the French, which rather invites to take isolated views of a thing. Mr. Combe ascribes the spirit of systematizing to concentrativeness; now this spirit is really too strong in the Ger- mans, yet their No. V. is smaller than the same region in the head of the Celtic French. The French bon ton of conversation is to shift from topic to topic, and not to fatigue too much the attention of others. They are particularly fond of natural history, anecdotes and details. They leave nothing to the auditor or reader to guess. But on what mental operations does this clearness of elocution and style depend ? In my opinion whenever individuality and even- tuality come into play. In that line alone they write the best ele- mentary works. Their philosophical language, on the other hand, which expresses the intuitive operations of the mind, and the moral nature of man, betrays very little concentrativeness, whether I take this term in its old or new signification. There remains still an excellent means of pointing out the organs to be considered. It is one principle of the natural language, and according to which the head is moved in a direction, which corresponds with the sit- uation of an organ in action. ' Preachers and advocates,' says Mr. Combe, p. 148, 'in whom No. V. is large, while speaking with animation, move the head, in the line of concentrativeness and individuality, or straight backwards and forwards. When com- bativeness predominates over concentrativeness, in a pleader, he draws his head backwards and to the side in the line of comba- tiveness, and advances it in a corresponding direction.' 184 PHRENOLOGY. I beg to remark, that drawing the head forwards, alone proves that there is some activity going on in the forehead. Combative- ness alone keeps the head backwards and sidewards, and every single organ in the occipital region, draws and maintains the head backwards, as long as the organ is active. Mr. Combe will not contest that those who prepare themselves to make a powerful and combined reply, want the assistance of their intellect, or presence of mind, or individuality, eventuality, comparison, causality, and language; an individual in that state will carry his head and his look forward, he may even put a single finger, commonly the in- dex, between the eyebrows, but at the same time his various feel- ings may be excited, particularly love of approbation, self-esteem, firmness or combativeness. I was particularly attentive to the nat- ural language of the improvisatory Sgricci in private society, and whilst publicly engaged in composing a five act tragedy. It evi- dently indicated great activity in the forehead. The common sense will never be found in the region of No. V. Finally, there is a longitudinal convolution of the brain, lying above the corpus callosum, which Mr. Combe brings in as con- firming his opinion about concentrativeness, since it extends from the bottom of No. V. to the organs of the intellectual faculties. But this convolution does not begin at the bottom of No. V., but runs all "along the middle lobe at its internal border, and communi- cates with philoprogenitiveness, combativeness, destructiveness, and alimentiveness; and extends in the musical line, above the corpus callosum, in connexion not only with No. V. but also with love of approbation, self-esteem, firmness, reverence, and benevo- lence. It continues into the organs of the intellectual faculties, particularly into those of language, individuality, and eventuality. This apparatus or structure, seems to be destined to establish a communication between the feelings and intellectual faculties, par- ticularly to produce mental cognizance of the feelings (eventuali- ty,) to conceive each as a unity, or fundamental power, (individ- uality) and to design their activity by artificial signs (language.) In concluding, I cannot help thinking that Mr. Combe lays too ORGAN OF COMBATIVENESS. 1S5 much stress on No. V. This organ is in the region of the animal propensities, and smaller than any other of the animal propensities. Its sphere of activity in giving an instinct for a local habitation, appears to me extensive enough. Yet as Mr. Combe and myself have only truth in view, the function of No. V. stands open to farther observation. If it give continuity to the impressions of the other faculties, feelings as well as ideas, it must be confirmed by multiplied observations, but then the name concentrativeness must be changed. VI. Organ of Combativeness. The disposition to quarrel and fight is unfortunately but too apparent in the world. Gall, to discover the cause, called togeth- er boys from the streets, coach-drivers, servants, &c. and made them fight. There were some who were quarrelsome and fond of fighting, and others who were peaceable and timid. In those who came willingly to blows, that part of the head which corresponds to the posterior inferior angle of the parietal bone above the mas- toid process, was prominent; (PL V. fig. 1. V.) in those who de- clined the combat the same place was flat or depressed. (PI. IV. fig. 2. V.) Similar configurations were found in the heads of brave and valiant officers, of quarrelsome students, of duellists, of those whose greatest pleasure consisted in fighting and making them- selves feared ; and of the inoffensive and peacefully disposed. This organ is generally more developed in men and males than in women and females, though there are several examples on record of women, even delicate ladies, who followed the war. More- over, the propensity to fight is stronger in some nations than in oth- ers, and is sometimes very active in lunatics. Hence it must be considered as fundamental. Gall at first named ' organ of courage' the part in the situation indicated. Considering, however, that it is possible for a man to be courageous in various ways, to have courage to do any thing of which-he thinks himself capable, to play on an instrument or sing 24 186 PHRENOLOGY. before company, though he may have no propensity to fight, he changed this name for that of quarrelsomeness, and then for that of self-defence, which last he retains. These modified applica- tions are easily explained by the combination of the propensity in point with other feelings. I, however, do not think that this pro- pensity is given merely for self-defence, many other propensities requiring its assistance in the natural order of things. The propensity to fight is active in different degrees, not only in man, but also among the various species of animals; some never fight, others are fond of fighting. Even individuals of the same kind differ in their manifestations of this disposition. One dog incessantly looks for an opportunity to give battle, and never shrinks from an opponent; another passes peaceably along and flies on the approach of an adversary. The heads of courageous animals, between and behind the ears, are wide, (PL VII. fig. 1. and 3. V.) those of timid and shy ones, on the contrary, are narrow at the same spot. (PL VII. fig. 2. and 4. V.) The different organization of game and dunghill fowls is very marked in the situation indicated. Horse jockies, and those who are fond of fighting cocks, have long been familiar with the fact. An animal may evince an unwillingness to approach a place or object, which he associates with some former suffering. Imperfect vision is another cause of shyness. A horse whose sight is defect- ive, is apt to mistake one object for another, and may not be able to make the distinction until he has approached very close to the object, or he has put his nose to it; either the object really is or he fancies it is strange to him, he is afraid of it, and consequently shuns it; many horses too grow shy as they grow old. More- over, violence and punishment are not the most suitable means to impel an animal to do that which he is unwilling to do, whilst lenient usage and coaxing is more likely to succeed. Yet there is an innate feeling of courage, which must not be overlooked. It is said that the propensity to fight results from bodily strength. There are, however, several species which though weak are fbnd of ORGAN OF COMBATIVENESS. 127 fighting, while others, though large and strong, avoid it. We may find striking examples of this among dogs. The fighting cock is also smaller than the dunghill bird, and hares -are stronger than rabbits, yet less courageous. Some men, and even women, though very weak and delicate, are nevertheless intrepid and courageous, while tall and robust individuals are oftentimes cowardly and complying. Physical courage and the capacity to meet and to repel attack is necessary to animals as soon as they are attached to females, to progeny, to dwellings or to friends ; for, according to the arrange- ment of nature, it is necessary to fight in order to defend. Such a propensity must therefore exist for purposes of defence ; but it seems to me that it is, like all others, of general application, and not limited to self-defence ; I, therefore, call the cerebral part in which it inheres, the organ of the propensity to fight, or of com- bativeness. Sometimes it acts with greater energy than is proper, is delighted with combats, and then produces disputes, quarrel- someness and attack, which are abuses. It is useful to all great characters, to religious and civil reformers. Luther and Knox, I am sure, possessed it in a great degree. The ancient artists seem to have known the configuration indi- cative of a high degree of this propensity; for they have given it to the heads of their gladiators and wrestlers. It may be asked, if the absence or inactivity of this organ pro- duces fear ? Gall thinks it does, but it appears to me that the ab- sence of no organ can originate a positive sentiment such as fear. It is certainly conceivable that the absence of an organ may pro- duce modifications in the manner of thinking and feeling; that the absence of this, for instance, may render a character peacefully disposed, but I think that a positive action can alone produce fear. It seems to me that Gall generally erred when he spoke of nega- tive qualities. If fear did result from the absence of courage, how should it be possible to be at the same time courageous and fearful. Yet this happens among animals and mankind. In my opinion the sensations of fear and anxiety, are ascribable to the organ of cau- tiousness. 188 PHRENOLOGY. VII. Organ of the Propensity to Conceal, (Secretiveness.) Cunning is so active amongst mankind, that Gall soon conceived the idea of looking for its organ in the brain, and observation very soon led him to its seat. He complained, however, of not being able to determine the sphere of its activity. He ascribes to the same organ, cunning, prudence, the savoir faire, the capacity of finding means necessary to insure secrecy, hypocrisy, lying, in- trigue, dissimulation, duplicity and falsehood. In poets, the talent of inventing, or conceiving interesting plots, for romances and dra- matic pieces ; and finally, he attributes to it slyness in animals. In all individuals remarkable for such actions, a considerable or large developement of the organ, situated in the middle of the line of the head, above the organ of destructiveness, is to be observed. (PL VI. fig. 1. and 2. VII.) What then is the fundamental power of this organ ; Gall first observed it in cunning persons, particularly in one who was deeply involved in debt, but who had the address to conceal his real situa- tion from all his creditors, and cheated all his acquaintances, and even his mother, of considerable sums of money. He died of phthisis, and Gall got his head, which is very large in the midst of the lateral regions. Cunning being an obvious ingredient, in many appearances of social life, Gall considered it as fundamental, and continued to do so. I grant that this power too often acts as cun- ning, but I do not think that this name indicates the special pro- pensity itself. This was to be determined without considering the objects upon which, and the manner in which, it acts ; and in con- sidering the proceeding of sly animals and cunning men, and all the functions depending on this power, I conceived it to be the propensity to conceal, to be secret in thoughts, words, things or projects. This instinctive tendency seems to be active throughout the animal kingdom, and concealment is necessary in many cases where strength is wanting, either in behalf of defence or attack. Sly animals, if pursued, hide themselves dexterously. The fox, ORGAN OF SECRETIVENESS. 189 in approaching the poultry, is careful not to be observed; a cat watching a mouse moves no limb ; a dog secretes his bone; child- ren play hide and seek; prudent or cunning persons conceal their intentions, and sometimes profess opinions opposite to those they really entertain. Some are particularly delighted in knowing se- crets, or in making a secret of things publicly known. The uses and abuses of this faculty are various, but concealment is the essence of all its manifestations. Every stratagem in war, and every kind of deception, results from it. There is no great politician, and no great commander, without large secretiveness. Those in whom it is deficient, are not atten- tive enough to circumstances, time and place, they commonly are deficient in tact, and follow their instantaneous emotions. Secrecy, hitherto, was a large play-ground for civil and religious governments, but it is a pleasant feeling for philanthropists to think, that the liberty of parliamentary transactions, and of the press, de- tects the tortuous ways and selfish views of deceitful governors, and that honesty will become the best policy in state concerns and court affairs, as it is in social intercourse. Persons in whom secretiveness predominates, judging others by themselves, never see the conduct of others in a plain and simple point of view, but conceive that every one endeavors to deceive his neighbor. They try to attain all their purposes by indirect means. Some of them are delighted in the most trifling mysteries, in concealing all their transactions. No one shall know when they go out or when they go in. Many insane are cunning in conceal- ing their state of mind. One in Bedlam, at London, constantly tries to conceal himself in his bed or in any corner of a room he is in. ' How polite,' says Mr. Combe, (System of Phren. p. 146,) ' acquiescent and deferential are some persons in their manners to all who are present, and how severe in their vituperations when the same individuals are gone. This conduct results from secretiveness addressing itself to the love of approbation in others, and endeavor- ing to please them by the profession of feigned respect.' I add, 190 PHRENOLOGY. that in such conduct the inactivity of conscientiousness is not to be overlooked. Mr. William Scott, of Edinburgh, thinks that secretiveness is essential to actors and all great artists, and ' that it confers the positive power of calling up at will the natural language of such faculties as they wish to exhibit for the time :' Mr. Combe objects to this view. I am also of opinion that secretiveness is necessary to artists, only as far as they wish to express or represent manifest- ations of that kind. The same principle holds good with secre- tiveness as with self-esteem, cautiousness, benevolence, or any other feeling. The actor, painter, or sculptor, will succeed bet- ter in the expressions of those feelings he possesses. The one for instance will play Iago in an original and masterly way, without the natural disposition of secretiveness, but an actor might succeed in performing the part of a noble, candid, and benevolent charac- ter, without secretiveness. Da Viney could without secretiveness compose the Lord's Supper, the character and expression of Judas excepted. Good humor in playing tricks, or in detecting concealed pur- poses, and every kind of disguise, depend on secretiveness, but the ludicrousness of such actions, or the tendency to show humor, results from the feeling of mirthfulness. Secretiveness is frequently combined with acquisitiveness, and acts as cunning in thieves and other criminals. It prompts them to think that they can conceal their deeds. It is large in beggars who deceive pious and charitable persons by feigned complaints. This propensity is very active in mankind, and its organ com- monly large. VIII. Organ of the Propensity to Acquire, or of Acquisitiveness. It is a fact that many individuals have a particular propensity to steal. History informs us that Victor Amadeus I. king of Sardi- nia was, upon all occasions, in the habit of pilfering objects of little value. I have the history of a well-bred individual, who, from in- ORGAN OF ACQUISITIVENESS. 191 fancy, was given to thieving. He entered the military service, hoping that the severity of its discipline might prevent him from indulging his propensity. However, as he continued to steal, he narrowly escaped hanging. Still struggling against and anxious to overcome his inclination, he studied theology, and became a cap- uchin. But the disposition followed him into the convent, and he could not resist gratifying it by stealing such articles as candlesticks, snuffers, scissors, drinking cups and glasses ; but he did not conceal his stolen goods; he said that he had takeu them away, that the owners might have the trouble of carrying them home again. There was a person employed by the government of Austria, settled at Presburgh, who filled two rooms with stolen articles, of which he never dared to make any use. The wife of Gaubius, the famous physician at Leyden, felt such a strong propensity to steal, that she always endeavored to take something away from the shops in which she made purchases. Her husband ordered a servant to follow her, to prevent, or at least to compensate, her thefts. The coun- tess M***, at Wesel, and J***, at Frankfort, manifested a similar thievish disposition. Madame de N*** had been educated with great care, her understanding and talents entitled her to a distin- guished place in society, but all would not secure her against an overwhelming propensity to steal. Lavater speaks of a physician, who never left the rooms of his patients without putting something into his pocket, as keys, scissors, knives, spoons, thimbles, buck- les, &c. but who sent them back again to their owners. Moritz, in his Treatise on the Human Mind, details the history of a cer- tain thief, whose propensity to steal was so energetic, that even when dying he stretched out his hand with the intention of stealing his confessor's snuff-box. Dr. Benard, physician to the king of Bavaria, related to us the history of an Alsatian, who was rich and not at all avaricious, but who had a great propensity to steal. He had been educated with much care, and sometimes severely pun- ished on account of his unhappy disposition ; his father made him a soldier, and as he continued to rob in the army, he was hanged. We have the history of a very learned man's son, who excelled 192 PHRENOLOGY. his comrades at school, but who from his earliest infancy robbed his parents and all those around him. Every kind of correction was useless ; the military service was tried, but though he several times suffered severe punishment, nothing could restrain his pro- pensity to steal. The chaplain of a regiment in Prussia, a man of great intelligence and ability, could not help stealing from the officers. The commander esteemed him much, but as soon as the chaplain made his appearance, desks, presses, and cupboards were shut up, for nothing on which he could lay his hands was safe : he seemed almost to act without a motive, for he restored with pleasure, the things he had stolen. At Copenhagen Gall and I saw an incorrigible thief in prison, who sometimes distributed what he had filched among the poor. There was another who had been shut up for the seventh time ; he observed that it seemed impossible to alter his behavior ; and therefore begged earnestly to be kept in prison, and provided with the means of earning a liveli- hood A young Calmuck, brought to Vienna by Count Stahren- berg, Ambassador of Austria at the Court of St. Petersburg*!, became melancholic, and fell into a nostalgia, because his confes- sor, who instructed him in religion and morality, forbade him to steal. The confessor, a man of understanding, discovered the cause of his disease, and gave him permission to steal, on condi- tion that he would give back the articles he pilfered. The young Calmuck profited by this license, and having stolen his confessor's watch during the consecration of the mass, he, leaping with joy, restored it after the service was over. Moreover, the propensity to steal is proved by the state of dis- ease. We know several cases in which women felt it in a high degree only during pregnancy; and certain individuals manifest it only when alienated. Hence it is obvious that this propensity must be innate. We might multiply examples of this kind almost to infinity; they prove that the inclination to steal is not always the effect of bad education, of poverty, idleness, or of the want of religious and moral sentiments. This truth is so generally felt that every one ORGAN OF ACQUISITIVENESS. 193 winks at a little theft committed by rich persons, who in other re- spects conduct themselves well. These thefts are said to be the consequences of mental abstraction. Gall in assembling boys, coach-drivers and persons of the com- mon classes, and inquiring into their characters, learned that some had a peculiar tendency to pilfer, and that others showed a horror of theft, and he was obliged to think, as to the cause, of an orig- inal difference of mental constitution. Being physician to the Deaf and Dumb Institution, he had it in his power to make obser- vations on the primitive condition of those children who were received without any previous education. Some of them were re- markable for a decided propensity for stealing, whilst others did not show the least inclination to it. Some of them were easily re- formed, but others were quite incorrigible. The severest punish- ments were inflicted upon one without any effect. On examining the heads of all these boys, Gall found the region anterior to the organ of secretiveness uniformly developed in relation to the pro- pensity to steal. During our travels, we have examined the heads of a very great number of thieves ; and it is unquestionable, that those who have a great propensity to steal, have a particular part of the brain greatly developed. However, to consider stealing a natural propensity, is so con- tradictory to common opinion, that the idea has excited much opposition. On the other hand not every one who has this organ large is a thief, though according to Christian morality many are thieves, who according to the civil laws enjoy distinction in soci- ety. Let us, however, examine each objection. It has been said that stealing supposes the pre-existence of property, and that, as property is the result of social convention, stealing cannot be ow- ing to any natural propensity; consequently, that it is absurd to admit an organ of theft. In this objection there are two things to be considered; and first, whether property itself be not grounded upon some natural and particular instinct ? In my work on the philosophical principles, where I treat of the innateness of the fac- ulties, I show that many actions which are considered as the effect 25 194 PHRENOLOGY. of society, or as factitious, result from particular innate faculties We have already seen that society itself is the consequence of a particular propensity, with which all other faculties in their mani- festations are necessarily combined. It is also easy to demon- strate, that the sentiment of property is natural and not factitious; even animals possess it: birds have their own nests, quadrupeds their burrows, and all defend their habitations against foreign ag- gression. Tame animals have also their stalls in the stable, and on entering every one takes its own. Nightingales, red-breasts, &c. have their districts, and drive away all others of their kind, even their young, when they are grown up. The constancy of storks and swallows to those nesting-places of which they have once taken possession is well known. Bees and many insects fight even till death in defence of their hives or nests against intruders. Every one is aware that a dog defends his bone more courageously in his master's than in a stranger's house. Sportsmen and game- keepers observe, that of some species of animals a certain number only inhabit the same district, and do not permit others of their kind to approach or take possession of their territories. Each herd of chamois drives away all others from the tract it occupies. Man does the same. Suppose two persons living together in a state of nature, as it is called ; if the one gather fruit, and the other endeavor to eat it, will not the gatherer feel that the fruit is his pe- culiar property ? Examples might be greatly multiplied in illus- tration ; those already cited prove clearly that the propensity to appropriate or the feeling of property is natural to animals and man, and anterior to and independent of legislation. In animals this sentiment submits only to force, but man, susceptible of moral feelings and obedient to justice, determines the conditions under which objects become property. The sentiment, therefore, must have preceded and produced laws of property. Laws of them- selves cannot give birth to any feeling. Now we may inquire, whether stealing is natural; and if so, the effect of a special propensity ? To answer in the affirmative is both irrational and dangerous : irrational because the Creator ORGAN OF ACQUISITIVENESS 195 could not bestow any faculty absolutely hurtful on man; danger- ous, because it would apologize for acts punished as crimes by the law. To this objection Gall used to answer : No one can deny that theft occurs in the world ; and as it exists, it was not against the will of the Creator ; the propensity to steal is also more or less energetic, and there are very few who have never stolen any thing ; finally, the organ is very considerable in inveterate thieves. It is however impossible to think that God has created any fac- ulty purely injurious to mankind, which would be the conclusion, were there an organ whose sole function was theft. On the other hand, it is certain that there is no action without a faculty, and no manifestation of a faculty without organization. Theft, therefore, must depend upon a certain faculty, and this must be manifested by means of an organ; but theft, being injurious, can only be an abuse of that faculty. This point may be made clearer by analo- gical reasoning. Gluttony and drunkenness are effects of a certain power, but there is no faculty solely destined to these actions : they are abuses of the special propensity to feed. Adultery and incest are not peculiar faculties, they are abuses of the amative propensity. Quarrelsomeness is likewise an abuse of the propen- sity to fight. Moreover the organ under consideration cannot be that of theft, because various persons who have it much developed never steal; they cannot, however, be destitute of that which is its fundamental function. To this Gall replies, that he cannot de- termine whether any person he meets in society, with this organ large, has stolen or not, that he knows only the disposition. This answer does not, however, remove the force of the objection; the faculty would still be the same, viz. the disposition to steal. Hence let us examine into the nature of the propensity which pro- duces theft. Gall at last called the organ, that of property. But some thieves steal without intending to retain the articfe, and both men and ani- mals occasionally filch things entirely useless to them : magpies and ravens, for instance, carry away money, spoons, stones, and similar things, of which they can make no use : certain thieves also 196 PHRENOLOGY. restore, or suffer to be restored, whatever they have taken away. Consequently, the faculty which steals is not essentially that which keeps possession ; it precedes this, and is rather the propensity to take possession. The name possession, therefore, does not char- acterize the special faculty. Yet this faculty prompts to say ' mine.' From all I have observed in animals and man relative to the functions of this faculty, it seems to me that its essence is a propen- sity to acquire, without determining either the object or manner of acquiring, and a desire for hoarding up and collecting : it also pro- duces selfishness, for those largely endowed with it never forget themselves, and in every thing look for its usefulness ; the objects they desire, however, and the means they take to acquire, whether gaming, trade, industry, or theft, result from the influence of all the other faculties. In ancient times the statistical knowledge was confined to that of battles and victories, to the number of captives and to booty. Now-a-days industry replaces war. Watt was a conqueror of a different kind from the ancient heroes, and his dis- coveries and inventions prodigiously favor acquisitiveness. This faculty is essentially necessary to man and animals, as their subsistence often depends on it. It is acquisitiveness which prompts to make provision for the future. As some carnivorous animals kill more than is necessary for their maintenance, in the same way animals and man not only gather what is immediately necessary, but hoard up stores, sometimes take what belongs to others, and collect articles of which they can make no use. The abuses of the faculty have different names according to circumstances, as usury, plagiarism, fraud, theft, piracy, pillage. Its essence is not the desire to steal, nor that of property, but the propensity to ac- quire and to hoard. Having thus determined the special faculty of this organ, and explained the nature of its abuses, its admission can no longer be said to be dangerous. The organ of the propensity is situated beneath the anterior inferior angle of the parietal bone, (PL VIII. fig. 2. VIII.) above secretiveness, and the name acquisitiveness designates the sphere of its activity. ORGAN OF CONSTRUCTIVENESS. 197 IX. Organ of Constructiveness. Gall observed, that those who displayed a peculiar disposition to mechanical arts had a face of a somewhat parallel form, as large at the temples as at the cheeks ; from thence he inferred that the dis- position to mechanical arts was indicated when the brain at the temples is prominent or large. Farther observations on mechani- cians, architects, sculptors, and painters, in whom this organ is large, soon pointed out its precise situation. In animals the ability to construct is not in proportion to their understanding. The beaver, with less intellect, surpasses the dog in constructiveness. The skulls of animals which build and make burrows,, and of others which do not, present a remarkable difference at the place of this organ, as is seen in the heads of rabbits and of hares. The beaver, marmot, hamster, &c. have it distinctly expressed. In a certain skull preserved at Rome, said to be that of Raphael, and casts of which are seen in phrenological collections, the organ of which I speak is exceedingly large. Gall possesses the skull of a milliner of Vienna, who was very dexterous in changing the forms of her wares, and in it also the organ in question is promi- nent. This organ is larger in some nations than in others, larger in the Italians and French than in the English, larger in the Es- quimaux than in the New Hollanders. Adversaries of Phrenology may ridicule a comparison between Raphael, a milliner, and a field-mouse. They may laugh at a doctrine which, as they conclude, attributes to a similar organ the sublime conceptions of Raphael, the petty productions of a mil- liner, and the inartificial habitation of a field-mouse. But does not the sloth creep by means of organs similar to those by which the horse gallops, and the roe bounds with the swiftness of the wind ? Does not the ass bray by means of organs similar to those by which a Catalani sings ? The faculty I now consider did not alone give rise to the sublime conceptions of Raphael; it was however essential to their execution ; for it seems to me to produce every thing that may be called construction. By its means birds build 198 PHRENOLOGY. nests, rabbits make burrows, the beaver its hut, and man constructs, from the hovel to the palaces of kings and the temples of God. It produces fortifications, ships, the engines of war, the implements of manufactures, instruments of all kinds, furniture, clothes, and toys; it is essential not only in every mechanical profession, but in all that in any way require manual nicety, as in the arts of drawing, engraving, writing, carving, and sculpture. Locksmiths, watchmakers, joiners, turners, and all those who use tools, are di- rected by it. The propensity to construct generally, or construct- iveness, seems to me the special faculty of its organ; it, therefore, constitutes only one part of the mechanical arts, giving manual dexterity, and being destined to execute mechanical conceptions of whatever nature. For the same reason it is necessary to those who excel by their ability in musical performances, to clever ex- perimenters in physical doctrines, to good operative surgeons; some insane as well as some idiots possess it in a considerable de- gree. Fodere in his work on Cretinism remarks, that he has known several Cretins who understood, without even having had a master, the repairing of watches and the construction of some pieces of mechanism. On the other hand, persons of great intel- lectual endowments can never acquire manual dexterity. Too large a developement of this organ, and its activity not being guided by the higher sentiments, produces abuses. A man for in- stance may ruin his family by building, or peril his life by con- structing dies for coining false money, &c. Genus II. Sentiments. After mere propensities, follow another kind of faculties, which I call sentiments. Each of these joins to a propensity an emotion, or feeling, of a specific kind. Several of these are common to man and animals, others are proper to man I shall first consider those which I entitle the inferior sentiments. ORGAN OF CAUTIOUSNESS. 199 X. Organ of Cautiousness. We often meet with individuals who are naturally timid, fearful, undecided in their opinions, and incapable of taking a resolution ; while we see others who act without hesitation, and instantly obey every internal impulse without timidity or fear. Many children are very timorous, and easily affrighted by the presence of stran- gers. Women and females in general are more timid and careful than men and males. Whole nations also are remarkable for wari- ness and circumspection, whilst others are noted for their levity and carelessness of disposition. The Scotch and Irish offer ex- cellent instances of this difference of character. Insane persons are sometimes exceedingly timid, and are terrified without any assignable reason. Finally, whole species, and individuals of the same species of animals differ in degrees of shyness and circum- spection. Such a peculiar feeling then must be considered as fun- damental. Now what is the special faculty ? Gall says, that ' man and animals were necessarily endowed with a faculty which should induce them to look forward to coming events and avoid danger. Without such a disposition, they would have been incapable of taking any measure for the future.' He calls the faculty that prompts these actions foresight. Now I do not believe that it foresees ; it is, in my opinion, blind and without reflection, though it may excite the reflective faculties. It incites us to take pre- cautions, it doubts, says but, and continually exclaims, take care. When too active, it causes such abuses as uncertainty, inquietude, anxiety, irresolution, melancholy, and hypochondriasis. The organ of this sentiment is established, and its place is in- dicated on the upper, lateral and posterior part of the head, towards the middle of the parietal bones. (PL V. fig. 2. XII.) Two per- sons at Vienna, remarkable for their irresolute characters, were one day in a public place; Gall stood behind them and observed the shape of their heads ; he found them extremely prominent and .arge at the place I have just indicated. This observation gave 200 PHRENOLOGY. him the first idea of this organ, which was soon afterwards establish- ed in men and animals. The form of the heads of circumspect persons, and of those who are rash and incautious, is very different. Shy and circumspect animals also, as the stag, roe, pole-cat, otter, mole, and those which place sentinels, as the chamois, crane, starling, and bustard, have the cerebral parts just mentioned great- ly developed. These animals certainly have not understanding enough to induce us to think, that their habit of placing sentinels is the result of reflection. We should rather say, that such an act may be commanded by nature by means of some peculiar or- ganic arrangement. Moreover, animals which see in daylight, but which do not dare to seek their food except during the night, have the upper and posterior lateral parts of their heads more developed than those which go out during the day. The skull of the eagle is very different, in the above-named situation, from that of the horned owl, which sees curing both the day and night. When treating of the organ of combativeness, I mentioned that anxiety and fear could not arise from a want of courage, but must be positive affections of some primitive feeling. They result, in my opinion, from a modified state of circumspection. We may suppose, nevertheless, that any one destitute of com- bativeness will be overcome by cautiousness sooner than another who feels a great propensity to fight. Deficiency of cautiousness, on the contrary, modifies the action of the other faculties in so far as they are allowed to act according to their own natures without restraint from any feeling of timidity. The diseased state of the organ of cautiousness is very common, and predisposes to suicide. Many considerations on this point may be found in my work of Insanity. At the end of the article on the organ of cautiousness, Gall speaks, as he expresses himself, of negative qualities. He examines and endeavors to refute my manner of explaining fear. Let us see his arguments : he begins by defining what he calls negative quali- ties, viz., qualities which are results not of the action, but of the insufficient action or total inactivity of any fundamental porer ORGAN OF CAUTIOUSNESS. 201 Amongst other things he says, ' if fear be not the result of the want of courage, what are the faculties which may inspire aversion and even horror for women, if not the want of physical love ; aver- sion for music, if not the want of the musical talent; erroneous judgment, if not the defect of intellect; aversion for food, if not the defect of appetite ?' ' How can Mr. Spurzheim,' he asks, 'con- ceive hatred, calumny, cruelty, or imbecility, since there is no fun- damental power for either hatred, calumny, cruelty or imbecility ?' Gall, in this essay on negative qualities, takes no notice of my ideas on the affections of the fundamental powers ; he then con- founds ideas which are common, with ideas which are peculiar to each of us ; moreover he does not separate the phenomena from their explanation ; this, however, is necessary, since we often ad- mit the same fact and differ in its explanation. To refute my opinion on fear, he recurs to analogies, but evidently confounds the result of certain faculties being inactive, with some of their positive affections, with their imperfect and deranged actions, and with sensations which arise from exhaustion of the powers. These notions then must be separated, and the mutual influence of the spe- cial faculties considered, in order to clear up the point at issue. After having stated that there is no fundamental power for hatred, calumny, cruelty or imbecility, Gall continues to say: 'I myself easily conceive these phenomena. External objects pro- cure us pleasure only in so far as there exist points of contact between them and the cerebral organization. If this contact ceas es to exist, the external objects are no longer in harmony with our faculties ; disinclination and aversion succeed. Who has not felt that a surfeit of certain enjoyments produces indifference, or even real disgust for what had before been desired most ardently ? In the same way, if our limbs are exhausted by fatigue, we feel aver- sion for walking.' I admit, with him and many others, the relations between the internal faculties and external objects, and I take up these consid- erations in the philosophical part. There I explain my opinion on pleasure and pain, considering them as general affections: for 26 202 PHRENOLOGY. every faculty being active desires, and being satisfied or agreeably affected, procures pleasure; not being satisfied or disagreeably affected, it gives pain. Thus each fundamental faculty can excite pleasure or pain, and both in different degrees. Gall merely states that there is no organ for hatred, calumny, cruelty or imbecility, and does not indicate the cerebral organs on which these phenomena depend. Before I explain my ideas upon this particular, I shall examine our opinions on fear, as they have occasioned this discussion. I consider fear as an affection of the sense of circumspection. Gall replies, that 'cowardice (poltronerie) is always passive, but fear sometimes negative and sometimes positive, and that the most courageous person feels fear, if he finds himself exposed to a dan- ger above his powers. If we say,' continues be, ' that a man or an animal is afraid, we do not always mean to say, that they are affected with fear in the same way as one is affected with anger. The expression often means, that a man or an animal is a poltroon or coward. And in this case they are possessed with fear more easily than if they were courageous. Numerous armies,' says he, at the end of the article, 'composed of men remarkable for their courage, have had fits of fear. Did not the intrepid Roman sacri- fice to Fear ?' Let us suppose that the two expressions, to be a coward, and to feel fear, are synonymous, still I neither see that we can there- fore infer, that fear is negative, nor that the knowledge of danger and the sensation of fear take place in the same faculty. I, how- ever, conceive that the knowledge of any danger may affect the sense of circumspection in a manner to which the name fear is appli- ed, just as it may excite courage and make a person fight with fury Neither courage nor circumspection know the danger nor reflect on 't. Sometimes the most innocent and harmless things inspire fear. 'If circumspection,' says Gall, 'were the source of fear, care- less beings ought always to "be free from this feeling ; and one should be the more fearful, the more circumspect one is ; circum- stances which we do not find confirmed by experience.' ORGAN OF CAUTIOUSNESS. 203 Even the most careless of beings is not entirely destitute of cir- cumspection ; and other faculties, such as adhesiveness, love of ap- probation, self-love and reflection, may excite the little dose of circumspection that exists in such a manner as to produce fear. Moreover, any one endowed with courage, self-esteem, acquisi- tiveness and firmness, even if his circumspection be considerable, will feel less fear than another with smaller circumspection, and deficient courage, self-love and firmness. The reader must also bear in mind the meaning which I attach to the term affection, and remember that affections do not depend only on the different de- grees of activity of the faculties ; that the sense of touch, for in- stance, though obtuse, produces the sensation of itching ; and that, in the same way, fear is an affection or quality of circumspection. Moreover, the intrepid Roman who sacrificed to Fear was not, could not be, entirely deprived of circumspection ; and in person- ifying Fear, the ancients brought sacrifices to its shrine, in order to secure themselves from its dangerous influence, and to turn the divinity against their enemies. I said, that if fear resulted from the absence of courage, I could not understand how the same person or animal might feel fear and courage at the same time. Gall replied, by asking, why I here neglect the principle upon which, on other occasions, I insist strongly, viz. that the actions are seldom the result of a single or- gan? This question, however, is inconceivable to me, since I explain by means of the simultaneous action of circumspection and courage, the possibility of feeling fear and courage at the same time. The same principle readily explains several phenomena which Gall merely mentions. Let us still examine whether the analogies, quoted by Gall, refute my opinion on the origin of fear. He compares fear with fatigue, disgust, and other sensations, which result from the satis- faction and exhaustion of certain faculties. Will he then maintain that fear is ever the result of courage when exhausted? He com- pares it also with the inactivity of faculties, with imbecility, and with the imperfect functions of the intellectual faculties or false 204 PHRENOLOGY. judgments. None of these comparisons, except that with im- becility, is conformable to the definition given by Gall of nega- tive qualities, among which he includes fear, hatred, calumny and cruelty. Several persons are fond of reasoning, but their conclu- sions are false; others are fond of singing, and of making melodies, but cannot produce harmony. Erroneous reasoning, however, is by no means an effect of the inactive state of the intellectual faculties. Hatred does not seem to me the consequence of the inactive or exhausted state of any faculty. He who has little benevolence and the other moral feelings inactive, whilst his self- esteem, his desire to acquire, and feelings of an inferior order, act with energy, will hate all who oppose his personal views. Even he who has attachment, justice, and benevolence, and at the same time self-esteem, may hate a person who forgets his duties to oth- ers, and is guided by selfishness alone. Justice and attachment when offended may increase or excite indignation and hatred ; but these affections always reside in feelings of an inferior order. It is the same with calumny. No one will speak ill of others because he is fatigued with praising them. But selfishness, self-love, and the love of approbation, when offended and not guided by justice, may feel pleasure in calumniating. Finally, cruelty never results from the inactivity, or exhaustion, or fatigue of benevolence. Benevolence, when active, always prevents cruelty; but when inactive, other feelings, destructiveness for instance, encouraged by self-love, firmness and selfish motives generally, may act in a cruel manner. Thus, all Gall's statements in refutation of mine, and in support of his own opinion in regard to the origin of fear, are rather for, than against me. I, therefore, continue to think that fear is an affection of the feeling of circumspection, and not a result of the inactivity of courage, or of courage satisfied or exhausted. In the fourth volume of the octavo edition, published in 1823, Gall has once more taken up our discussion on fear. He replies to my opinion, and to that of Dr. Demangeon. I shall here an- swer him, only however in as far as my own is concerned. ORGAN OF THE LOVE OF APPROBATION. 205 Gall first states, that I am wrong in supposing that the expres- sions avoir paur and etre poltron are synonymous. He however had used them as synonymous,* and instead of reproaching him with his incorrect French, I merely said, in supposing that these two expressions were synonymous, I intended to discuss ideas only, and not words, particularly as the French was a foreign language to myself as to him. This short explanation may suffice to rectify Gall's accusation. Moreover, he retracts the analogies and his reasoning on them, declares fear to be an affection of courage, and says that he em- ployed analogy only to make himself clearer in his ideas on nega- tive qualities. I allow this to be, but I still continue to oppose him in admitting that fear is sometimes negative. To the notion of this sort of fear my answer remains the same. I therefore only examine whence positive fear arises. Gall considers it as an affec- tion of the organ of courage, and not as the result of circumspec- tion. He supports his opinion, by asserting that fear is not in proportion to circumspection. Why has he not attended to my answer to this argument, viz. that I do not consider fear as an affec- tion of quantity, but of quality of circumspection ? According to his manner of arguing, fear increases in proportion as courage dimin- ishes, and is evidently always a negative quality. Thus Gall has elicited no new argument which obliges me to change my opinion, and our discussion on fear remains exactly where it was before his last publication. XL Organ of the Love of Approbation. Vanity is natural to mankind, and in comparison with its frequen- cy, Gall thinks pride a scarcity. Children even when very young are fond of approbation ; emulation stimulates the youth to exertion ; *' Quand on dit,' says be, torn. iii. of the editions in folio and quarto ' qu'un homme ou un animal a peur, on ne veut pas toujours dire par la que, dans ce moment, il est affect6 de la peur, comme on est affecte de la eolere ou de la frayeur. On entend dire par cette expression que c'est un homme ou animal peureux, poltron.' 206 PHRENOLOGY. few adults are insensible to the voice of applause; and multitudes, governed by the feeling of ambition, sacrifice to it quiet, sleep, health, and even life. Observation proves that this sentiment is more powerfully felt by women than by men ; the earliest infancy betrays the difference. To many women a new gown is an object of admiration, and every article of dress an object of display. Many of them are extremely anxious to please and satisfy others. Certain nations also are governed by it more than others. Mon- tesquieu considered it as the true pivot of the French government. Its derangement is a frequent symptom of insanity. Finally, it exists in many animals, as in the horse, dog, cat, &c. for they are fond of being caressed and flattered. Gall discovered the organ of this sentiment whilst engaged in examining that of pride. Having met with an insane woman, who thought herself queen of France, he was disappointed in his ex- pectation of finding a large organ of pride. He, therefore, turned his attention to the rest of the head, and saw that the parts on each side of it were very prominent. He then reflected on the behavior of the insane from pride and from vanity : the former, imperious, arrogant, and fond of commanding ; the latter, polite, affable, and courteous, comporting themselves in a manner evidently indicating a wish to please; and soon learnt to separate the action and indica- tion of each of these sentiments. Having afterwards examined the heads of several individuals, known for their ambition, and found a configuration similar to that of the insane woman, he began to speak of an organ of ambition and of vanity. Is this its fundamental faculty? ' The sentiment of self-esteem, vanity, and ambition,' says Gall,* ' is fundamental.' He quotes and admits the opinion of Count Segur, according to which there is no nation without vanity, which is the cause of the mutual hatred of nations. Thus he evidently confounds pride with vanity. So does Dr. Brown in his Philosophy. I regard self-esteem as the basis of pride, a sentiment manifest- ed by the organ last spoken of, while the faculty I now consider * T. iii. p. 326 and 328. ORGAN OF THE LOVE OF APPROBATION. 207 looks for the approbation of others, whether deserved or not, wheth- er in a good or in a bad cause. It makes us attentive to the opin- ion entertained of us, and induces the question, what will the world or the people say ? It is fond of approbation in general, without attending to the manner of acquiring it, and may therefore be di- rected to objects of the highest importance, as well as to such as are of no moment, or even hurtful. Its sphere of activity is very extensive ; for it is sensible to caresses and flattery, to compli- ments, to applause and to glory ; it wishes to be distinguished and honored, and men endowed with it make use of many and various means to attract attention. They dress fashionably, and resort to ostentation and showy things of all kinds ; they look for decorations, titles and other worldly distinctions. Ambition is the distinguish- ing epithet of its agency, if the object aspired to be of great impor- tance ; vanity, if claim be laid to distinction on the score of trifles. Its activity extends through all ranks of society. The general who leads back a victorious army is elated with the applause of his countrymen, and the slave is delighted if the manner in which he has performed his task be approved. Combined with the lower feelings it may be pleased by the reputation of being the greatest eater and drinker, the best fighter. Some would do every thing to gain fame. It is one of the most powerful motives in society. This fundamental power though essential to society, by its too great activity causes many abuses. It favors industry, but also in- troduces luxury, it produces polite manners, but makes us slaves of fashion and is the mortal enemy of personal liberty. Nations who possess it in an eminent degree are scarcely fit for a free gov- ernment. The number of those who wish to distinguish themselves only by talent and virtue is small. The organ of the love of approbation is established. Being much developed, it generally elongates the posterior, upper, and lateral part of the head. (PL V. fig. 1. and 2. XI.) Sometimes, however, it is more spread out on either side, and then the head is widened rather than elongated. I propose the name, love of appro- bation, for this special faculty. 208 PHRENOLOGY. XII. Organ of Self-esteem. Self-esteem is one of the faculties generally attributed to exter- nal circumstances; but its activity is so very great and universal, that I am astonished it has not been at all times considered as a special feeling. The fall of man is ascribed to pride. Haughti- ness is observed in individuals who have no pretensions to influence over others, either by birth, fortune, or personal talents ; whilst many who enjoy these advantages are remarkable for the modesty and humility of their deportment. Poor, ignorant and pitiful crea- tures have sometimes the greatest opinion of their own personal importance ; and children may frequently be found who are fond of showing superiority. In every community we find leaders and followers ; no profession has ever been free from the influence of pride ; even teachers of humility have too often shown it in all their actions. Proud persons constantly use the pronoun of the first person, viz. I say, I think, I do ; I, and always I. Whole nations in whom self-esteem is active think themselves superior to all the world besides ; they know every thing best, and their sanc- tion seems to them of the utmost importance. Self-esteem is more common in men than in women; boys fre- quently place their judgment above that of others, while girls always look for the approbation of those who surround them. It is strong- er in some nations than in others. Moreover this sentiment is of- ten deranged, and many lunatics think themselves ministers, kings, and emperors, or even the Supreme Being ; and there are a great- er number of men than of women alienated by pride. A feeling similar to the pride of man seems to exist in certain animals, as in the turkey-cock, peacock, and horse. Gall thinks that the organ of self-esteem is the same as that of the faculty which makes animals dwell upon mountains and elevat- ed places; hence he calls it the organ of haughtiness; meaning to designate at once physical and moral height. In speaking of the organ of inhabitiveness, I have given the reasons which induce me ORGAN OF SELF-ESTEEM. 209 to differ from him, and have in a former page said, that I conceive one faculty necessary to produce the propensity to determinate in- habitation, and another to cause the sentiment of which I now treat. Gall's attention was first drawn to the sentiment of pride, from having examined the head of a beggar, the middle of the upper and back part of which presented an elevation he had not observed be- fore. Having asked the man the cause of his mendicity, he was astonished to hear him accuse his pride as the origin of his miser- able condition. He had conceived such a high notion of his own importance as to believe himself infinitely above learning a trade or profession. Thus incapable of earning a livelihood, begging was his only resource to save himself from starvation. We have such a number of observations confirmatory of this or- gan, in individuals in both sexes, in whole nations, and in disease, that we consider it as established. What then is its fundamental power ? The word pride, although the sentiment commonly manifests itself in a way that would war- rant the name, is still too harsh, and would indicate a degree of activity which produces many disorders. Christian morality warns us against pride and presumptuous conduct, and inculcates humility and meekness. It would, therefore, be improper to adopt the characteristic sign of an abuse as the title of a primitive power. This sentiment seems to give us a great opinion of ourselves, con- stituting self-love or self-esteem. Too active, it produces pride, haughtiness, disdain, contempt, presumption, arrogance, and inso lence. A moderate degree of it gives dignity and nobleness to the character, and secures against low-mindedness ; but I do not believe Gall is right when be says,* modesty and lowness of mind result from insufficient developement of this organ. I think a person may be proud and basely-minded at the same time. Real lowness of mind supposes a deficiency of the sentiments of justice and ideality, for a person who is proud, just, and inclined to improvement, will never be guilty of a mean action. Modesty also does not result ' Edition in 4to. t, iii. p. 322. 27 210 PHRENOLOGY. solely from the absence of pride ; this condition only permits the moral sentiments and cautiousness to act in a certain way, to which the title ' modesty' is applied. Self-esteem contributes to person- al and national independency, though it is not sufficient to secure liberty. It is an essential ingredient of the love of dominion. These ideas, however, can only be clear to those who are acquaint- ed with the fundamental powers of the mind, and the effects of their mutual influence. On the other hand, nobleness of character is not the result ot self-esteem alone. Noble or notable primitively meant the being remarkable in any way. I heartily desire to see this name given only to those who excel by their superior qualities. The signifi- cation, however, of that which is superior, both as regards qualities and actions, varies exceedingly. Among warlike nations personal courage is one of the first and most valuable qualities, and con- querors and those who contend for absolute power, accord to their soldiers and companions in arms all the principal distinctions. They are praised and called nobles, they form a congregation, and their nobleness consists in qualities which favor the personal views of their leader. History shows us that this spirit prevailed more or less among ancient nations, and that it has always had a principal influence during ages of barbarism. Among the Romans many occupations, although indispensable to life, were considered as ignoble and un- becoming in a soldier. Many lazy and idle persons think them- selves above others, who are obliged to earn their daily bread. Warriors have generally understood better than the members of any other profession how to secure the first rank in society, they have always been the most powerful, and have used their strength to further their own advantage. The priesthood also succeeded at an early period in acquiring distinction and nobility, as dispen- sators of eternal happbess, and as administrators of the divine legislation. Wealth, though it gives great influence in society, has never been considered as sufficient of itself to confer nobility on its possessor, but the rich have been permitted to purchase titles ORGAN OF SELF-ESTEEM. 211 of nobility. Self-esteem with acquisitiveness, whilst benevolence and justice remain inactive, contend for privileges. Ideas upon nobleness having gradually become sounder and sounder, we can now say, that the nature of all men is essentially the same ; that each individual differs from his fellow only in the degree of talents and feelings he possesses, that it is a duty incum- bent on every one to contribute to the general welfare and common happiness, and that talent and virtue constitute the essence of nobil- ity. Individuals are in reality noble in proportion as they possess the superior faculties of mind. Now since distinctions should be conferred on the score of superior qualities alone, it follows that they are to be personal, and not attached as hereditary rights to certain families. If it be unjust to punish children for the crimes of their parents, I see no reason why unworthy children should be rewarded for the merits of their ancestors. Let every one reap the fruits of his own labor, and enjoy as far as he is deserving. To confer any hereditary privilege is to do an injustice to posterity. I admit, it is true, mental dispositions, under certain conditions, to be hereditary; as these conditions, however, have hitherto been neg- lected, and are not likely to be observed for some time to come, I cannot help saying, that it is improper to permit degenerate child- ren to enjoy privileges, which parents received as rewards of talent or virtue. In the actual state of society, I do not find it reasonable to con- fer similar marks of distinction upon soldiers, clergymen, artists, legislators, and every modification of characters and talents, since the services rendered by each to mankind, are not equal. The merits of a moral teacher, and of a soldier who aids a conqueror in his views, are in my opinion very different. Jesus constantly admonished his disciples against greediness of superiority ; greediness with them was to consist in humility. 212 PHRENOLOGY. Superior Sentiments. I have hitherto gone over the affective faculties which are com- mon to man and animals ; and even here, in this purely animal portion of his nature, man is the most perfect of all terrestrial beings. He alone possesses all the faculties which are but spar- ingly distributed through different tribes of animals. Besides every faculty is susceptible of many more modifications and of greater energy in man than in animals. So far however man is merely an animal. His pride, vanity, selfishness, and other inferior feelings, we have seen, are the causes of innumerable disorders ; the addi- tion of certain superior faculties was therefore necessary to regulate the actions of the inferior feelings, and to establish his moral char- acter. Now here it is important to recollect, that no superior feeling any more than those of an inferior nature results from intel- lect. It is also important to specify each kind of these feelings, and to inquire how far they operate amongst animals. One of them cannot be entirely denied to brutes ; for this reason I shall begin with it. XIII. Organ of Benevolence. Philosophers frequently ask, is man by nature good or bad 5 Both opinions find supporters, and both have opponents. The an- swer is not so very difficult as has been imagined. Men are not born alike in this respect. Many children are good-hearted, be- nevolent, and sensible to the sufferings of others. Common peo- ple, without education, often display a great deal of benevolence and sympathy. Some individuals find their chief source of delight in doing acts of charity. St. Vincent de Paul offered to bear the chains of a criminal, in order to restore him to his wife and child- ren, who suffered the extreme of misery and distress. Individuals who devote their lives to the relief and consolation of the wretch- ed, are to be found in great numbers. On the other hand, we see children complete egotists, and en- ORGAN OF BENEVOLENCE. 213 tirely thoughtless of others ; many arrived at mature age think of themselves alone, and benevolence towards their fellows is known to them merely by the name. Some tribes, and even whole na- tions, are mild and peaceable, whilst others are warlike and cruel. The Hindoos and Caribs are remarkable and well known instances of the extremes of goodness and cruelty. Derangement of benevolence is occasionally a symptom in in- sanity. It is sometimes too active, and in other cases not active enough. Benevolence, as an innate feeling, may also be proved by a reference to animals, and by comparing the natural dispositions either of various kinds, or of different individuals of the same species. Several kinds are naturally meek, as the roe and sheep ; others are wild and mischievous, as the chamois and tiger. Some dogs, horses, cows, monkeys, &c. are meek and familiar, while others are fierce and bad tempered. There are examples on record where animals have shown high degrees of benevolence to others and even to man. A respecta- ble family of Paris told me that they had a horse and a cow living together in the same stable ; that the horse several times got untied, went to the corner where the sack of oats stood and drew it in his teeth near the cow, probably to make her partake of the good cheer. Many dogs also exhibit the same feeling. Dupont de Nemours saw a swallow caught by one foot in the noose of a pack- thread attached to the roof of the French Institute at Paris ; the prisoner screamed, and attracted all the swallows of the neighbor- hood ; after a long and tumultuous consultation, a great number formed a line, one after another darted at the packthread with their bills, and in half an hour delivered the captive. From the preceding observations it restdts, that benevolence is an innate and particular faculty, and by no means the effect of ex- ternal circumstances, as some have supposed, still less of the de- ficiency of courage ; since it is certain that many quarrelsome persons are good-hearted, and timid and cowardly individuals often mischievous and cruel. 214 PHRENOLOGY. It was some time before GaU thought of looking for goodness of heart in the brain. The servant of a certain family at Vienna, with which the doctor was intimate, having been frequently praised for benevolent and kind dispositions, he at last moulded the man's head in plaster. Observing a considerable protuberance on the superior and middle part of the frontal bone, just where the hair begins to grow, he set down the occurrence as worthy of farther attention, and having subsequently examined the heads of a great number of benevolent and kind people, the function of the cere- bral part in the above situation was speedily confirmed. It is interesting to remark, that among the antiques, the head of Seneca, in the seat of the organ of benevolence, is much higher than that of Nero. The same striking difference may be seen by comparing good portraits of Malsherbe and Danton. Good-natured animals have also the part corresponding to the organ of benevolence in man elevated and prominent. (PL VIII. fig. 1 and 3, XIII.) Such as are vicious and bad tempered have, on the contrary, the same place flat or hollow. (PL VII. fig. 2 and 4, XU1.) Gall considers benevolence, justice, the sense of morality and of conscience, as belonging to one and the same fundamental pow- er. He first makes some general reflections, and then comparing the moral sense with benevolence, thinks himself authorized to conclude that benevolence is only a higher degree of its activity. He also considers conscience as a modification of benevolence. He shows that that feeling does not depend on social intercourse ; and allows it necessary to determine by laws what shall be just and what shall be unjust, that is, to establish an arbitrary con- science. ' Man,' says he, ' nevertheless, being destined to live in society, requires the sense of morality; without it no association, no family, no nation, can be united.' * Hume in his inquiry con- cerning the principles of morals, also admits an instinctive princi- ple of humanity and disinterested benevolence implanted by nature in the human heart, which takes delight in whatever tends to the * T. iv. of the editions in folio and quarto ORGAN OF BENEVOLENCE. 215 nappiness of mankind, which renders virtue an object of regard on account of its utility, and vice an object of abhorrence on ac- count of its pernicious tendency. According to this hypothesis, all social animals, as the sheep, duck, cow, horse, &c. ought to possess the moral sense. This, however, is not the case. Yet there is no proportion between the moral sense and benevolence. Many, who have the organ of benevolence much developed, possess very little of the feeling of justice. I agree with Gall, and many other philosophers, upon the innateness of the moral sense; but I do not think that the sentiment of justice is the same as that of benevolence. I sup- port my opinion by the arguments, which prove the plurality of the faculties ; I also acknowledge the necessity of positive laws, but cannot assent to the explanation given by Gall of conscience ; for we see many animals endowed with benevolence which never demonstrate the feeling of repentance. Such are the considerations which induce me to admit a sense of morality, independent of reason and different from benevolence. This latter is itself a fundamental power, producing mildness and goodness, and a long catalogue of modified actions variously styled; benignity, clemency, mercifulness, compassion, kindness, human- y, cordiality, urbanity, hospitality, philanthropy, the love of our leighbor, and charity. Cruelty, being a positive sensation, cannot be the consequence of the want of benevolence, as Gall supposes. Goodness of heart cannot exist in a high degree in those cruel beings who de- light in tormenting others, and in cold-blooded criminals ; but ac- tive cruelty belongs to the organ of destructiveness, unrestrained by the superior powers. Another opinion of Gall, of which I can- not approve is, that benevolence may degenerate into bad temper, and into the propensity to rejoice in the evil that happens to others ; in the same way as the sense of taste may degenerate into disgust at food, physical love into aversion to the other sex, and the sense of melody to aversion to music. The inactivity of benevolence, or its exhausted state, may produce indifference to its functions. 216 PHRENOLOGY. and make us avoid any opportunity of doing beneficent actions , but active wickedness, and pleasure in the pains of others, like cruelty, depend on inferior feelings, unaccompanied by superior sentiments. Benevolence though admirable in its nature must be combined with the sentiments proper to man and with intellect, otherwise it produces abuses. Indulged for itself it may encourage idleness, careless conduct and profligacy, and produce great disorders in society and the worst consequences. Sentiments proper to Man. Gall formerly considered morality and religion as one power, but later he assigned benevolence and morality to one organ, and the knowledge of God and religion to another. The points to be examined here are : 1st. Whether man is a moral and religious being by nature ; 2nd. whether morality and religion may be sep- arated from each other as to their essence ; 3d. whether morality and religion are single powers, or whether they depend each on several fundamental feelings ; and 4th. whether the manifestations of the moral and religious feelings depend on the instrumentality of the brain. Let us first examine whether mankind is morally religious by nature. Some churchmen would persuade the credulous, that preaching and religious instruction alone produce sentiments of religion and morality. The ancient philosophers, on the contrary, believed and taught that man was religious by nature. Plutarch observed that there was neither town nor village in the world with- out a god. Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and many others have made the same remark, and the fathers of the Christian church themselves have commented on this truth, in order to prove that the belief in a God was innate. The innateness of religion is not only proved by its universality among mankind, but also by the sameness of the ideas which pre- vail on all essential points of belief. It is with religion as with the ORGAN OF BENEVOLENCE. 217 principles of all the fundamental powers; they are the same at all times and under every variety of circumstance.. The laws of mu- sic and of painting are universally and invariably the same, and in every religion there is something venerated, whether it be a log, a stone, or a star; the jealous and vindictive God of the Jews, or the meek and benevolent Deity of the Christians. To this it is objected, that the Supreme Being has revealed his will from time to time, and that religious ideas have been preserv- ed by tradition. But religion existed before the time of the Jews, and even since they appeared as a distinct people, their revelation has been limited to themselves, and other nations have not ceased to have creeds entirely different. There are many nations who never received the revelation either of the Jews or the Christians, and who still manifest religious sentiments and have peculiar forms of worship. It must even be granted that as man was destined to have a revelation, he was also necessarily made capable of receiv- ing it. Who would attempt to make any animal, inferior to man, acquainted with revelation ? It is a general law that neither man nor animals can be instructed unless endowed with the individual faculty which appreciates the peculiar sort of knowledge conveyed. Dogs do not learn religion any more than music. Revelation, then, can only have regulated the religious sentiments which exist- ed previously to its annunciation, and I think with Bishop Butler,* that Christianity is a republication of natural religion in its gen- uine simplicity. Phrenology does not examine the superiority of any religious creed, or in what the true religion consists; it does not decide how long mankind may still be abused by religious errors, or whether it is right or wrong to make it a trade. It merely admits innate dispositions to take up religious considerations. It teaches only that sentiments of religion are inherent in the nature of man, that they are part of the plan of creation, and that the human race will never exist without them. The next point to be considered is, whether morality and reli * Analogy of Religion, p. 180. 28 218 PHRENOLOGY. gion result from the same fundamental power. It seems to me of the highest importance to specify the difference between religion and morality. I call religious each power which brings man in re- lation to supernatural beings, particularly to God: and moral, those on which the actions of man, concerning the beings around him, depend. Christianity is at once religious and moral; reli- gious in as far as it teaches the existence of God and his revealed will and doctrine; moral in as far as it commands the works of charity and justice. There are persons who fancy themselves very pious and religious when they say that they believe in reve- lation and in the doctrines of faith ; when they go to church regu- larly, sing psalms, and follow up all the rites and ceremonies pre- scribed ; though at the same time they are very selfish, and cheat their neighbors whenever they can. Nay there are some who hope for eternal salvation through belief in the doctrines alone, without doing any good works, and in leaving this part of religion to the care of their Heavenly Father himself. Now, in this sense, an atheist may be moral, and a believer in divine revelation im- moral. There is certainly a difference between the belief in reve- lation and that in the revealed precepts intended to produce works of charity and righteousness. Sterne, T. Shandy, vol. i. c. 140, says, 'that there is nothing more common than to see a man who has no sense at all of reli- gion, and indeed has so much honesty as to pretend to none, who would take it as the bitterest affront, should you but hint at a sus- picion on his moral character, or imagine he was not conscien- tiously just and scrupulous to the uttermost mite.' Sterne, how- ever, thought that we have no dependence upon morality without religion, but adds, 'that, on the other hand too, there is nothing better to be expected from religion without morality,' and he al- lows that ' it is no prodigy to see a man whose real moral charac- ter stands very low, who yet entertains the highest notions of him- self in the light of a religious man.' Our moral and religious natures are joined together, but they ire not the result of, or their strength proportionate to each other. ORGAN OF REVERENCE. 219 In Phrenology they are examined separately as to their existence and nature. Farther, there are several moral and several religious feelings, and all their manifestations depend on cerebral organs. Many re- ligious persons find it difficult to admit 4he latter point. Yet its certainty is proved by incontestable facts, and phrenologists instead of apprehending this truth, consider it as the best means of putting an end to all discussion as to the necessity of religion. Indeed, if religious manifestations depend on the brain, the necessity of religion is established, and the certainty that it can,never be neg- lected as one of the natural institutions of society, proclaimed. This innateness does not exclude the idea of revelation, and phre- nologists rely on the principle, that the Creator of the world and the revealer of true religion is the same God, who could not be in contradiction with himself at different periods, nor give any com- mands in opposition to the primitive laws of nature; they rather think that he prepared the brain in relation to his revealed will. The first moral quality is benevolence, styled in Christianity the love of our neighbor. It.has been considered in the preceding pages. The following is also moral on many occasions, though its influence is still greater on religious manifestations. XIV. Organ of Reverence. Gall, viewing the actions of man, and considering the vast vari- ety of characters in the world, observed a great difference upon the point of religion. Some are eminently devout, and pray with great fervor ; others pay very little attention to acts and forms of religion. In examining the head, in relation to this difference among individuals, he found that the very pious were frequently bald ; it was evident, however, that baldness could not cause de- votion ; for every bald man is not pious, and women, though they do not grow bald, are in general devout. He then saw that the heads of pious people were very elevated. (PI. VIII. fig. 1. XIV.) Lavater had already made the same observation. 220 PHRENOLOGY. Priests who have chosen the ecclesiastical state from natural incli- nation, and those who have entered it influenced by circumstan- ces or peculiar motives, as well as religious and irreligious persons, present very different configurations of the upper part of the head. The best artists would seem to have felt the influence of an ele- vated head, for they have always given this form to their pictures of saints, of holy personages, and particularly of Jesus. We can- not flatter ourselves with having the true portrait of Jesus, but it would be interesting to inquire whether painters have composed such representations as we possess, guided by an internal impulse, or from having observed devout and benevolent men; in the same way as the ancient artists sculptured Jupiter with the forehead of a mighty genius. Observation, then, shows that persons naturally devout have very elevated heads, and Gall assigns the feeling to the cerebral part immediately behind the organ of benevolence ; this he formerly called the organ of theosophy. He adopted that name from Lava- ter, who speaks of a configuration of theosophy; but it is certainly incorrect, since we cannot flatter ourselves that we know God; we can only form notions of the Deity according to our own na- ture ; we anthropomorphise and attribute to him all the supe- rior faculties of man in their highest state of perfection ; but who would venture to say, that the Supreme Being does not possess many other faculties of which we have not the slightest notion ? We can speak only of a Supreme Being without determining the whole of his nature. To understand his nature we ought to be his equals. History also shows that the sentiment of devotion has neither revealed the nature of God, nor the number of divinities. The ancients adored many gods and goddesses ; and since the unity of God was believed, he has been represented as endowed with very different qualities. Gall finally called the organ of that sentiment manifested in de- votion, the organ of God and religion. He thought that it proves the existence of God, and said, ' as every other faculty of man and animals has an object which it may accomplish, it is not possible ORGAN OF REVERENCE. 221 that while there is an organ of religion, God should not exist; hence, God exists.' This faculty, however, is a sentiment; it is blind, and does not reveal the existence of any object. Farther,-though devout per- sons have elevated heads, yet not every one who possesses the cerebral part in question large is devout and religious. In all the busts and portraits of Voltaire it is represented as much developed ; and certainly he was not religious. I have also found the organ very considerable in an individual, who assured me that he did not believe in the existence of God. Man, in my opinion, arrived at the belief in a Supreme Being by means of his reflective faculties, since that is an effect without cause. Gall first observed this or- gan in individuals in the act of adoring God, and saints in the ex- ercise of devotion. My observations induce me to consider its special faculty as the sentiment of reverence in general, without determining either the object to be revered, or the manner of rev- erence to be bestowed. By its agency man adores God, venerates saints, and respects persons and things. What indeed can be more natural than to venerate in any way the Being who is con- sidered as the Cause of all things ? I have already appealed to the history of the ancients, who admitted a greater or less num- ber of gods, and venerated them in various ways. Without going so far back, we may take at the present time nations and individ- uals, who have all different ideas of God, according to their creeds and intellectual faculties, in proof of my position that this faculty does not determine the object to be venerated, nor the manner ot venerating. Its application to religion is very noble, but it finds also many other objects in society. It produces deference and re- spect towards parents, tutors, and superiors in general. . I therefore prefer the name of reverence to that of veneration, since the latter disposes to think of religious veneration and adoration. The sentiment of reverence, though essential to religion, does not include the whole of the ideas comprised in that name ; it only occasions the part called worshipping. Its determinate actions depend on its combinations with other faculties, and on the direction 222 PHRENOLOGY. it has received from education. By far the greater number of per- sons do what they are taught to believe agreeable to God. One sings psalms, another repeats ten or twenty or more times the same form of prayer ; one eats vegetables, another burns candles, &c. and all this to the glory of God. The functions of this sentiment are at one time moral and at another religious; combined with benevolence and justice, it re- spects truth and contributes to the happiness of others ; separated from these feelings, however, and united with selfishness, self- esteem, destructiveness, and the religious sentiments which I shall examine hereafter, it may do great harm to humanity, though its tendency be eminently religious. Let us respect truth, talent, and virtue, but not falsehood, stupidity, or immorality; true merit, but not mere appearance and external show, liberty but not oppression. Let us adore the God of true Christianity in spirit and in truth, by moral actions, but not by superstitious ceremonies, and childish amusements. XV. Organ of Firmness. A peculiar natural sentiment that varies in individuals and nations, is frequently exhibited in our intercourse with mankind. Some children yield readily, others are obstinate and stubborn. Some grown-up persons, also, can scarcely be said to have a will of their own ; they follow the last impulse they receive, and without strength to resist, are the easy instruments of all whom they meet. Others are of an immovable character, firm in their resolutions, and constant in their principles ; they do not attend to exhortations nor to examples ; their conduct is uniform, and their exertions may be calculated on in various situations of life. Lavater observed, that persons endowed with perseverance and firmness, had the top of their heads very much developed. Gall made the same remark, and so many facts bearing on this point have been collected, that we consider the organ of this sentiment as established. (PL v. and PL vi fig. 2. yv,) ORGAN OF FIRMNESS. 223 It is not easy to define the feeling accurately, which inheres in the part just pointed out. Its effects are often called will; but will, in the true sense, is rather the result of reflection than of any of the propensities or sentiments. It is true, that persons endowed with this feeling in a high degree, constantly say, / will, but they employ / will in the same way and with the same signification as is expressed by the words, I want, I desire, I insist upon, I com- mand. The faculty here spoken of gives constancy and persever- ance to the other powers, contributing to maintain their activity. It is another ingredient of the love of dominion. Its applications bear different names as they emanate from its combination with other faculties, and relate to the situation of the individuals in whom it is active. He who has firmness combined with pride, ambition and selfishness, does no* willingly obey others, but is himself fond of commanding ; whilst he who is firm in his decision, but just and benevolent at the same time, seeks for independence, claims equal rights with every member of the community, and re quires the same duties of all. The influence of the faculty is always great, as well when the individual is well as when he is ill disposed, that is, according as it is combined with the superior or inferior feelings. Being too active, it produces many disorders, such as infatua- tion, stubbornness, obstinacy, and disobedience ; it is also one of the causes of mutiny and sedition ; its insufficiency leaves the other faculties to take the lead, and renders men inconstant, changeable, and yielding to circumstances. It is however to be remarked that perseverance in the gratification of predominant dis- positions may be observed in persons whose organ of firmness is small. An individual with large acquisitiveness, and small firmness, may make great and constant efforts to become rich, but he will be unsteady in the means he employs; whilst another, with large firmness, steadily pursues the plan he adopts. The seat of the organ has already been indicated ; it is in the midst of the other feelings, and seems to strengthen their general activity. 224 PHRENOLOGY. XVI. Organ of Conscientiousness. The manifestations of a feeling of justice and conscientiousness, or the love of truth and duty, are eminently deserving of attention in the study of mankind. Many jurisconsults and other persons connected with the law, think that positive legislation is the source of justice, whilst the sentiment of justice, in reality, precedes leg- islation and is its cause. Those are also wrong who maintain that revealed religion has produced the feeling of justice or righteous- ness ; whilst the feeling of conscience is innate and indirect only in its application by revelation. But before proceeding farther, let us distinguish two significations of the word justice. It means the innate faculty which views all actions in the point of right or wrong, and it indicates determinate actions as being just or unjust. Revealed religion and civil legislation determine that which is posi- tively just or unjust, but it must be ascertained whether there is a fundamental sentiment which disposes mankind to look and to wish for justice, and which receives the positive, civil, or religious leg- islation. I use the term justice in conscientiousness in the first signification. In speaking of benevolence, I have shown that Gall confounds this primitive sentiment with that of justice. We therefore differ in our explanations of the phenomena of morality, he ascribing them all to a single faculty, and I admitting two different senti- ments, one of benevolence and another of conscientiousness. In the same manner he considers the notions of man on the existence of God and of religion as the result of one faculty, whilst I think that several feelings, each dependent on a special organ, are con- cerned in producing religious ideas. It is certain that the feeling of duty or conscientiousness is not equally strong in all men. Children, before they have received any education, are very different in this respect. Some pay no attention to representations on the point of justice, others listen to them with pleasure. Children, however, in general seem to pos ORGAN OF CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. 225 sess the feeling of justice in a higher degree than adult persons. Among the latter some have an internal monitor which constantly advises them of their duties, and without having the law they do that which the law prescribes. But those who think that this in- ternal monitor or primitive feeling is the best guide of innocence, and the sure punisher of those who act in opposition to its dictates, are greatly mistaken ; for it is quite obvious that the natural feel- ing of conscientiousness is very weak in many individuals, and that the law or the regulations of a watchful police are indispensably necessary to keep them in order. Very few look always and only for truth, and receive it from whatever source it comes. It is, for instance, not predominant in those who may say of the assassi- nation of a prince, 'it is more than a crime, it is a fault.' Nor can it be considerable in an author, who writes, Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing. The doer of ill must be de- stroyed not punished, the doer of good is lucky not virtuous ; this is the first step of wisdom. Plutarch, in the life of Flaminius, re- marks, that of all virtues the rarest is justice. It is also certain, that he who is dragged into criminal acts by very strong internal propensities unbalanced by the feeling of justice, rarely feels com- punction for his misdeeds, or repents sincerely. The brute incli- nations constitute, if I may so express myself, his principal charac- ter, and all the actions which result from them are in harmony with his inclinations. This fatal truth, though it may displease those who dream of nothing but the dignity of human nature, is nevertheless proved by observation, and is conformable to Christianity. ' A good tree,' said Jesus,* ' cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.' ' The natural man,' says the Apostle Paul,f ' receives not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.' Cardinal Polignac J speaks of men who are born wicked, and to whom crime is delightful. ' Why should a criminal,' he asks, ' who does not consider himself wicked, re- * Rom. vii. 18. 11 Cor. ii. 14. { Antilucrece, t. i. p. 164 29 226 PHRENOLOGY. pent?' Indeed the greatest criminals do not commonly think themselves guilty, and therefore cannot repent. Some of them with incredible stubbornness deny the most satisfactory proofs of their guilt, and audaciously insult those who bear witness against them ; others, with impudent sincerity, relate a series of horrible trespasses, and find a subject of merriment in such crimes as make humanity shudder. Mr. Bruggmanns, at Leyden, showed us the skull of a robber chief, who had precipitated different persons into the canals, only to have the pleasure of seeing them struggling in the agonies of death. On his trial, this wretch said : ' What will you do with me—am I not an honest man ?' We saw a girl at Munster who had assisted her mother to kill her father, and who did not manifest the slightest repentance. If her crime was spo- ken of, she only shrugged her shoulders. In short, the reports of the trials of almost all inveterate criminals justify the observation, that there are certain guilty persons who are never guided by con- science, and who neVer feel either remorse or repentance. Such Deings are even proud of their power of doing evil, and relate with pleasure the most remarkable stratagems and- actions of their criminal lives. Sterne, (in Tristam Shandy, vol. i. p. 140,) has a remarkable passage to this effect. ' Whenever a man's conscience does ac- cuse him, (as it seldom errs on that side) he is guilty ; and, unless in melancholy and hypochondriac cases, we may safely pronounce upon it that there is always sufficient grounds for the accusation. But the converse of the proposition will not hold true, viz. that whenever there is guilt, the conscience must accuse, and if it does not, that a man is therefore innocent. This is not fact; so that the common consolation, which some good Christian or other, is hourly administering to himself,—that he thanks God his mind does not misgive him, and that consequently he has a good con- science, because he hath a quiet one, is fallacious ; and as current as the inference is, and as infallible as the rule appears, at first sight, yet when you look nearer to it, and try the truth of this rule upon plain facts, you see it liable to so much error, from a false ORGAN OF CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. 227 application, the principle upon which it goes so often perverted, the whole force of it lost, and sometimes so vilely cast away, that it is painful to oroduce the common examples of human life, which confirm the account. ' A man shall be vicious, and utterly debauched in his principles, exceptionable in his conduct to the world, shall live shameless in the open commission of a sin, which no reason or pretence can justify ; a sin by which, contrary to all the workings of humanity, he shall ruin forever the deluded partner of his guilt, rob her of her best dowry, and not only cover her own head with dishonor, but involve a whole virtuous family in shame and dishonor for her sake. Surely you will think conscience must lead such a man a troublesome life; he can have no rest night or day from its re- proaches. ' Alas ! conscience had something else to do all this time, than break in upon him. Perhaps he was gone out, in company with honor, to fight a duel, to pay off some debt at" play, or dirty annu- ity, the bargain of his lust; perhaps conscience all this time was engaged at home, talking aloud against petty larceny and executing vengeance upon some such puny crimes as his fortune and rank of life secured him against all temptation of committing; so that he lives as merrily, sleeps as soundly in his bed, and at last meets death as unconcernedly, perhaps much more so, than a much bet- ter man. ' Another is sordid, unmerciful, a strait-hearted selfish wretch, incapable either of private friendship, or public spirit. Take no- tice how he passes by the widow and orphan, in their distress and sees all the miseries incident to human life, without a sigh or a prayer. Shall not conscience rise up and sting him, on such occasions ? No, thank God, there is no occasion. I pay every man his own ; I have debauched no man's wife or child ; I have no faithless vows or promises to make up. Thank God, I am not as other men, adulterers, unjust, or even as this libertine, who stands before me. ' A third is crafty and designing in his nature. View his whole 228 PHRENOLOGY. life. It is nothing but a cunning contexture of dark arts, and un- equitable subterfuges, basely to defeat the true intent of all laws, plain dealing and the safe enjoyment of our several properties. You will see such an one working out a frame of little designs upon the ignorance and perplexities of the poor and needy man ; shall raise a fortune upon the inexperience of a youth, or the unsuspect- ing temper of his friend, who would have trusted him with his life. When old age comes on, and repentance calls him to look back upon his black account, and state it over again with his conscience; conscience looks into the statutes at large, finds no express law broken by what he has done, perceives no penalty or forfeiture of goods, sees no scourge waving over his head, or prison opening its gates upon him. What is there to affright his conscience. Con- science has got safely entrenched behind the letter of the law, sits there invulnerable, fortified with cases and reports so strongly on all sides, that it is not preaching that can dispossess it of its hold. ' A fourth man shall even want this refuge, shall break through all the ceremony of slow chicane, scorns the doubtful workings of secret plots, and cautious trains, to bring about his purpose; see the barefaced villian, how he cheats, lies, perjures, robs, murders ; horrid! but indeed much better was not to be expected in the present case. The poor man, was in the dark, his priest had got the keeping of his conscience, and all he would let him know of it was, that he must believe in the Pope, go to mass, cross him- self, tell his beads, be a good catholic ; and that this in all con- science was enough to carry him to heaven. ' Thus, conscience, placed on high as a judge within us, and intended by our Maker as a just and equitable one too, by an un- happy train of causes and impediments, takes often much imperfect cognizance of what passes, does its office so negligently, often so corruptly, that it is not to be trusted alone, and therefore we find there is a necessity, an absolute necessity, of joining another prin- ciple with it, to aid if not to govern its determinations.' My only intention is to prove that there is a fundamental power which seeks for justice, which is more or less active in different ORGAN OF CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. 229 individuals, being so weak in some as to be by no means sufficient to restrain or to direct the inferior propensities. Weakness of the feeling of justice is a lamentable cause of disorder in the world, and is the true source of almost all moral and political vices. This deficiency makes man break engagements of all kinds ; makes it necessary to declare royalty inviolable, and to make the ministers of kings answerable; it is this deficiency also that renders positive laws indispensable to keep the individual propensities in order. The feeling of justice is the attribute of a noble mind, and is an essential condition of union and general happiness. Dr. Guillie, of Paris, in his work on the instruction of the blind, maintains that these unfortunates are naturally deprived of sensibil- ity, shame and conscience. Mr. John Joach Roques has answered and refuted this extraordinary accusation in the fifth volume of the Revue Encyclopedique.* Conscience is certainly independent of sight. The blind, the deaf, and the dumb, follow their natural in- clinations, before they have received a moral education. The lower feelings are predominant in the greater number of them, as well as of other persons, and their actions, therefore, mostly resem- ble those of animals. Yet the want of sight or of hearing, does not exclude either justice or benevolence. These faculties exist, and may act independently of each other. Convinced then that there is in mankind a sentiment which seeks for justice, and that its ener- gy is very different in different individuals, and even in nations, I shall now consider its origin. I have already explained and proved that the sentiment of be- nevolence is not the same as that of conscientiousness. Benev- olence may even be contrary to justice. I may find it my interest to be very benevolent to certain persons. This behavior, however, cannot easily be called just. Moreover, the morality of our ac- tions cannot be founded on religious faith and hope ; and still less on selfishness ; such virtue would degrade those who practice it. Hobbes, however, taught, in the middle of the seventeenth centu- ry, that we approve of virtuous actions from self-love, knowing * Page 610. 230 PHRENOLOGY. that whatever promotes the interest of society has on that very ac- count an indirect tendency to promote our own. Mandeville too, at the beginning of the last century, maintained that man is utterly selfish, that he has a strong appetite for praise, and purchases this praise by moral virtue. Moreover, Hume thought utility the con- stituent or means of virtue. Even Dr. Paley is an adherent of the selfish system under a modified form. He makes virtue consist in the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness. According to him the will of God is our rule, but private happiness our motive. On the other hand, Cudworth, Dr. Hutcheson, Dr. Reid, Dr. Price, Day, and Stewart maintain the existence of a moral sense, which produces the sentiment of right and wrong independently of any other consideration. Adam Smith (Theory of Moral Sentiments) admits an instinctive principle of sympathy, which leads us to trans- form ourselves in imagination into the situation of others, and com- pels us to approve or blame their conduct, according as we find ourselves disposed or averse to participate in the feelings from which it springs. Sympathy is an innate principle, but morality an after-thought, derived from mature reflection. Thus, he derives mediately conscientiousness from reason ; but the desire to be just in one's actions is no science to be taught, and by no means in proportion to the intellectual faculties. Do we not see daily that the moral conduct of many does not answer their intellectual capacities ? I wish every critic of Phrenology had shown as much love of truth and moral excellency as mental cleverness. It is said that Socrates invented morality at Athens ; but Aristides was just before Socrates lived, and Leonidas had died for his country before Socrates taught, that to love our native land was a duty. I admit a fundamental sentiment of the desire to be just, which, in my opinion, also produces remorse or repentance, and constitutes the essential part of moral conscience. This feeling, however, does not determine what is just or unjust, right or wrong, true or false. These particular determinations depend on the other faculties with which the sentiment is combined; thus, a person ORGAN OF CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. 231 endowed with conscientiousness and some of the lower propensities will call that just, which another, who possesses conscientiousness combined with benevolence or reverence, will call unjust.* A criminal in stealing from the rich and in giving to the poor, may sometimes consider his actions as just. The combination of con- scientiousness with other faculties, also, explains why various legis- lators have taken such different moral principles as the basis ol their regulations. These latter considerations teach us, that we cannot trust to the natural conscience of man to perform that which is right and ad- vantageous for all; first, because few examine their actions accord- ing to justice ; and secondly, because those who do so are easily misled, and, influenced by their individual faculties, often arrive at erroneous conclusions ; hence follows the necessity of establishing a determinate justice, or the law. The widow in Europe desires to have a good settlement made by a deceased husband : in India she desires to be burnt on his funeral pile. Now, a question of much importance arises : Is the law or posi- tive justice arbitrary ? or is there a natural law which ought to be universally acknowledged and admitted as obligatory in all countries? Hitherto masters have commanded, and the law has made sin; but is there then no morality that is universal ? Chemistry never va- ries, geometry and arithmetic ever remain the same ; may it not be so with morality likewise ? These considerations are philosophi- cal and practical, they, therefore, belong to the philosophical part of Phrenology, where they are examined in detail. Here I con- fine my inquiries to the fundamental powers of the mind and their respective organs. Gall and I differ widely in our opinions upon justice. Accord- ing to him, there is no particular organ of conscientiousness ; he formerly considered what is called conscience as resulting from the dominant character of an individual, being opposed to his partic- " ' AL the ways of man are clean in his own eyes, but the Lord weigheth the spints;' Prov. xvi. 2. ' Every way of a man is right in his own eyes, but the Lord pondereth the hearts;' Prov. xxi. 2. 232 PHRENOLOGY. ular actions. In this view there were consequently as many con- sciences as faculties ; he even spoke of a good and of a bad con- science,__the first being the opposition of the good, and the second the opposition of the bad faculties to a particular action. Thus, if a good-natured man commit a fault or offend any one, he repents, and his conscience torments him because he has acted in opposition to lis dominant character. On the other hand, a usurer and a libertine are sorry for having neglected a good opportunity, the first of deceiving, the second of seducing, some unsuspecting and innocent person. Gall called this opposition of the dominant character to any line of conduct, the natural conscience ; but he said that we cannot trust to this, and that it is necessary to estab- lish some positive conscience ; that is, to determine what is to be done and what is to be let alone, without the individual desires of any one being considered. In consequence : Thou shalt adore one God, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not kill, &c. It is certain that good-natured persons repent when they have committed a fault. A mother, for instance, who has been dishon- ored and consigned to the most unfortunate of situations, may in a moment of despair and confusion deprive her new-born child of life; but the fatal concourse of circumstances being past, and the natural sentiments of benevolence and justice beginning again to act, she will feel the contradiction between her dominant character and her action. At Spandau, in Prussia, we saw a man who, although always looked upon as good-natured, had assassinated his wife in a paroxysm of rage. Existence ever afterwards hung upon him as a heavy burden. Yet if must be remarked that the opposition of the natural character alone to any action does not constitute con- science ; a criminal will not feel repentance for having acted in a way which may be good in itself and not hurtful to him. A thief who voluntarily gives a part of his booty to the poor will not repent having done so, unless the act betrays him. Gall, in saying that usurers repent having neglected a good opportunity of deceiving others, confounds repentance or remorse with the being sorry for, or being displeased. It seems to me that every organ not being ORGAN OF HOPE. 233 satisfied, or being disagreeably affected, produces pain or sorrow; but I cannot conceive that every faculty produces repentance or remorse. This as I have said before, is a peculiar affection of conscientiousness. The preceding considerations farther induce me to disapprove of Gall's division of the conscience into natural, good or bad, ar- tificial or positive. I divide it, first, into natural or absolute, the effect of conscientiousness combined with all the other faculties proper to man, those which are common to man and animals being held in subordination ; secondly, into individual, particalar, or relative, which results from the conscientiousness of every one combined with his other faculties ; thirdly, into positive, which is fixed by legislation whether divine or civil, as by the commands. Thou shalt not eat meat on Fridays or Saturdays ; Thou shalt go to church every Sunday, &c Thus the sentiment of conscientious- ness is the basis of morality ; it raises our mind to consider be- tween wrong and right; desires to be just; thinks of duty and moral obligation, and loves truth without determining justice on truth. This feeling in itself, like all others, is liable to aberrations and mistakes. Ravaillac, the murderer of Henry IV. king of France, and Louvel, the assassin of the Duke of Berry, and In- quisitors speak of justice. This sentiment may excuse every cruelty in religious fanaticism. The organ of conscientiousness is situated between firmness and cautiousness. More details of this kind are given in the volume on the Philosophical Principles of Phrenology. XVII. Organ of Hope. I shall now examine the affective powers, which besides benevo- lence are essential to religion, and principally give faith or belief in the miraculous part of religion ; or, as some express it, in the doc- trines of religion, as if the moral part were not also a doctrine of Christianity. 30 234 PHRENOLOGY. Gall considers hope as belonging to, or as a part of the func- tion of every faculty ; but I think that he confounds this peculiar feeling with desire, or want. Every faculty being active, desires, therefore even animals desire ; but there is something more than this in man—a peculiar feeling which is by no means proportionate to the activity of any other faculty. We may desire ardently, and yet be without hope. The sentiment of hope is indeed necessary to the happiness of mankind in almost every situation. It often produces more satis- faction than even the success of our projects. Its activity, how- ever, varies greatly in different individuals ; whilst some easily des- pair, others are always elated and find every thing for the best; constant hope sustains them in the midst of difficulties; the first plan for accomplishing any object having failed, only stimulates them to form new ones, which they confidently expect will suc- ceed. Those who are everlastingly scheming, or building castles in the air, possess this faculty in a high degree. It seems to in- duce a belief in the possibility of whatever the other faculties de- sire, without producing conviction ; for this results from reflection. This sentiment is not confined to the business of this life; but passing the limits of present existence, it inspires hopes of a future state, and belief in the immortality of the soul, which is promised by Christianity. Hope, like any other faculty, may be too strong or too weak. In the former case it induces us to expect things which are un- reasonable, not founded on probability, or altogether impossible. When its energy is too feeble, on the contrary, and circumspec- tion predominates, this is apt to produce despair, melancholy, lowness of spirits, &c. The organ of hope is situated laterally on each side of that of veneration. The organs of conscientiousness and hope, are intimately con- nected on one side with firmness, and on the other with acquisi- tiveness. ORGAN OF MARVELLOUSNESS. 235 XVIII. Organ of Marvellousness. There is still a sentiment which exerts a very great influence over religious conceptions, and which, in my opinion, contributes more than veneration to religious faith. Some find all things nat- ural and regulated by the laws of creation ; many others are amus- ed with fictions, tales of wonders, and miraculous occurrences. They find in every passing event extraordinary and wonderful cir- cumstances, and are constantly searching after whatever can excite admiration and astonishment. This sentiment is to be observed among mankind at large, both among savages and civilized nations. In every age, and under every sky, man has been guided and led by his credulity and superstition. The founders of all nations have had a fabulous origin ascribed to them, and in all countries miraculous traditions and marvellous stories occur in ample abun- dance. Almost all histories, until within the two last centuries, reported seriously supernatural facts. Hercules in his cradle suf- focated serpents ; Romulus was nourished by a she-wolf. There are many disposed to believe in dreams, sorcery, amulets, magic, astrology, in the mystic influence of spirits and angels, in the pow- er of the devil, in second sight, and in miracles and incomprehen- sible representations of all sorts. Some also are disposed to have visions, and to see ghosts, demons, and phantoms. This senti- ment gains credence to the true and also to the false prophet, aids superstition, but is also essential to the belief in the doctrines of refined religion. It is more or less active, not only in different individuals, but also in whole nations; its functions are often dis- ordered, constituting one form of insanity, called demonomania. The legislators of antiquity, aware of the great influence of this faculty, made frequent use of it to enforce and to confirm their laws. They spoke in the name of God, of angels, or of supernat- ural powers. The angel Gabriel purified the heart of Mahomet when a child. Mahomet visited at night the different mansions in heaven, and being introduced by Gabriel, he was welcome every 236 PHRENOLOGY. where, and saluted as the greatest prophet. Whatever Mahomet did is represented as miraculous, and no pious Mahometan doubts of its truth. In our own days, the religious sects of Swedenbor- gians, Methodists, Quakers, and many others, particularly demon- strate its influence and presence. Men at large have a strong pro- pensity to believe in miracles; but the fact that accounts of super- natural agency prove so generally false, is a reason for looking upon them with distrust. Miracles indeed ought on this account to be sifted more than common facts. In dramatic representations, the introduction of ghosts, angels, transformations, and supernatural events, proclaims its activity both in the author and in the public, by whom such exhibitions are relished and sought after. The existence of this feeling is certain. This disposition is in- herent, or part of our mental constitution, like the disposition to trace effects to adequate causes. Its organ is situated anterior to hope, and a great developement of the convolutions on which it depends enlarges and elevates the superior and lateral parts of the frontal bone. It is remarkably prominent in the head of Socrates, of Torquato Tasso, Dr. Price, Young, Stilling, Wesley, &c. My observations on it are extremely numerous, and I consider it as established. The preceding facts determined me formerly to designate this feeling by the name of supernaturality; and it is certain that it is principally manifested by a belief in miraculous and supernatural circumstances, in the foundation of religion by supernatural means, and in its points called doctrines. As, however, the feeling may be applied both to natural and supernatural events, and in every case fills the mind with amazement and surprise, I do not hesitate to change the name of supernaturality into that of marvellousness. This name I prefer to that of wonder, adopted by Mr. Combe, because, according to Dr. Johnson's dictionary, wonder is appli- cable only to surprise excited by natural objects, whilst marvellous- ness embraces both kinds of astonishment caused by natural and supernatural circumstances. ORGAN OF IDEALITY. 237 XIX. Organ of Ideality. That 'a poet must be born,' has passed into a proverb, and education is generally acknowledged inadequate to produce poetic talents. Children sometimes exhibit such powers previous to any instruction, and there is the greatest difference among adults in the capacity. Pope says of himself, ' I lisped in numbers for the num- bers came.' Those who study the phenomena of insanity, know that the talent of poetry is often excited and developed by this dis- eased condition. ' Several facts,' says Pinel, 'seems so extraor- dinary, that they stand in need of the most respectable testimonies, in order to be admitted. I speak of the poetical enthusiasm which characterizes certain fits of mania when verses are recited, which are by no means the result of reminiscence alone.'* Pinel men- tions several of his own observations, and quotes the case of a girl from Van Swieten, who, during her fits of mania, showed a rare facility in making verses, though previous to her illness she had been employed in manual labor, and had never had her understand- ing cultivated by education. Before we left Vienna, Gall had looked for an organ of poetry, and even observed that the neads of great poets were enlarged above the temples, in a direction backward and upward ; (PL IX. fig. 2 XIX.) but he spoke guardedly on this point at that time. Since we commenced our journey, however, we have multiplied observations and accumulated facts to such an amount, that Gall admits an organ of poetry as quite certain. It is true, that great poets, both of ancient and modern times, Homer, Pindar, Euripides, Sophocles, Terence, Ovid, Horace, Ariosto, Torquato, Tasso, Shakspeare, Milton, Lord Byron, Schil- ler, Goethe, Wieland, Racine, Corneille,- Voltaire, &c &c. have the cerebral part, indicated above, much developed. It seems to me, however, that there is no peculiar or single faculty of poetry in the widest acceptation of that term. We must therefore deter- mine the essential of every kind of poetry, which I am inclined to * Second edition, p. 111. 238 PHRENOLOGY. attribute to this organ as its special faculty, whilst the species of poetry produced, depends on the combination of this with the other faculties of the individual poet. It cannot be the faculty of versification ; for some authors, J. J. Rousseau, Buffon, and many others, write in prose, and yet their expressions are highly poetic- al ; while others make verses which contain no tinge of poetic feel- ing. Still less is it the faculty of rhyming, since among the an- cients rhyme was entirely unknown, and among the moderns poetry is not always in rhyme. Now all great poets have this part of the brain much developed, but all who have it large are not necessarily great poets, though they may be fond of poetical conceptions. Women illustrate this point; they often possess the organ much developed, are fond of poetry, but seldom excel in its composition. I think that the poetic turn of mind results from a peculiar mode of feeling, a certain manner of viewing the world and events. A plain, unadorned description of things as they are, cannot be called poetry; vividness, glow, exaltation, imagination, inspiration, rap- ture, and warmth in the expressions, are requisite to constitute compositions worthy of the name; all is represented in exagge- rated terms, in a state of perfection, such as it ought to be. Po- ets picture forth a factitious and imaginary world. Thus I admit a sentiment which vivifies the other faculties, and impresses a pecu- liar character called poetical or ideal. It may be combined with both the affective and intellectual faculties, and aspires to imagina- ry perfection or completion in every thing. It produces the sub- lime in the arts, makes enthusiasts of us in friendship, virtue, paint- ing, music, or any other direction which our natural feelings or talents take. Combined with attachment, it produces sentimental- ity ; with the higher sentiments it leads to nobleness and delicacy of character ; with self-esteem and love of approbation it causes susceptibility. The organ of this sentiment is placed by the side of marvellous- ness, and the two frequently act together, particularly in mythol- ogy. Poetry is often embellished by the addition of the myste- ORGAN OF MIRTHFULNESS. 239 rious and supernatural. I have collected many facts on this organ, and am quite certain that its function corresponds to the manner of feeling just now described. The degree of exaltation experienced by poets varies according to its greater or smaller developement. Too great activity of the sentiment is a frequent cause of unhap- piness, since it makes us look for a state of things, which, as it does not exist, we cannot find. I call its organ that of Ideality. It is small in criminals. XX. Organ of Mirthfulness. There is something peculiar in the human mind, called Witz by the Germans, and Wit by the English, terms which have no exact equivalent among the French, though the mental operation they express is very active in France. I explain this peculiarity by the combinations of the faculty, producing wit, with others, being dif- ferent in Germany, England, and France. The French, eminent- ly endowed with love of approbation, search constantly after dis- tinction ; they are consequently fond of merry sayings and showy expressions, delight in what are called bon mots, esteem the esprit de saillie et de repartie, and designate facility in these particulars by the name bel esprit. The Germans and English, on the other hand, frequently combine the faculty in question with that of re- flection, and call it Witz and Wit. Those who write like Voltaire, Rabelais, Piron, Sterne, Rabe- ner, Wieland, and all who are fond of jest, raillery, ridicule, irony and comical conceptions, have the upper and outer parts of the forehead, immediately before the organ of ideality, of considerable size. It is difficult to define the primitive faculty whose exhibition accompanies this organization. Gall considers it as an intellectual power, and calls it in French, esprit de saillie, or esprit caustique, though he allows that this name does not indicate Witz or Wit. I repeat that, in my opinion, these words denote compound opera- tions of the mind. Wit is commonly said to consist in facility of 240 PHRENOLOGY. comparing objects, in order to discover their similarity or dissim- ilarity. But one may have the greatest talent for comparing ideas or objects, without possessing wit. The mode of comparing phi- losophically also differs very widely from that of comparing witti- ly ; a comparison may be witty, but philosophically erroneous at the same time. I do not consider the faculty as intellectual, but as affective ; as a sentiment which disposes men to view every thing in a gay, joy- ful and mirthful manner. It may be applied to words, to things, to ideas, to arts, and to every mental manifestation. Hence the different names it receives from its modified functions, such as wit, good-humor, caricature, mockery and irony. The poet, painter, sculptor, draughtsman, musician, orator, &c often proclaim its ac- tivity in their productions. Combined with inferior feelings, and not restrained by benevolence, reverence and justice, it is apt to offend by sarcasms, epigrams, and satires. The faculty, it seems to me, was given to man to render him merry and gay,—feelings not to be confounded with satisfaction or contentment; these are affections of every faculty, whilst gaiety and mirthfulness belong to that which now occupies our attention. Its organ is situated, as I have said, in the upper and lateral part of the forehead, before the organ of ideality. (PL IX. fig. 1. XX) Mr. William Scott, of Edinburgh, has taken a particular view of this faculty. He believes that its primitive function is to distin- guish differences. According to him, the faculty of comparison perceives resemblance, the one we speak of in particular, differ- ences, and causality, situated between the two, necessary connex- ion : the three combined, therefore, form the truly philosophic understanding. Mr. G. Combe formerly thought well of this view, and there- fore preserved the number and name of this organ, as they stand in the two first editions of my Physiognomical System. In my French publication I changed these, as I considered the name wit insufficient, and the faculty so styled, a feeling. I continue to do so, being more and more convinced that the alteration is proper. ORGAN OF MIRTHFULNESS. 241 Mr. Combe, in his third edition, both of his Elements and of his System of Phrenology, has adopted my new order of numbering the organs, and seems disposed to adopt my view of this special faculty. As to the view taken by Mr. William Scott, I reply, that in my opinion the same power which perceives resemblances, per- ceiv.es differences also. I see no reason for adopting two faculties for the act of discrimination. The same power perceives the har- mony and disharmony of tones ; there is only one power of color- ing ; and the proportion and disproportion in dimensions are felt by the same faculty of size ; in the same way, I think that compar- ison alone distinguishes similitudes and dissimilitudes, differences, analogies or identities. But even granting Mr. William Scott's supposition of one power for perceiving resemblances, and another for perceiving differences, I still think it necessary to admit a special feeling of mirthfulness. We may excite mirthfulness, it is true, by making comparisons of things which differ, but we may do so also by comparing things which resemble each other. If amidst incongruity and difference we seek for analogies, the faculty of comparison is active, and combined with mirthfulness it will undoubtedly make us laugh. But we may laugh heartily at a single object, without allusion to any difference. Those who are the most disposed to laugh and to be merry, are not always the most intelligent and the most skilful in distinguishing either analogies or differences. The feeling of mirthfulness, therefore, seems to be special. It may be excited by pointing out differences or resemblances, by the agency of various feelings, by playing tricks, or by inspiring fear. The fundamental power then cannot be wit. Thjs is only one of its applications, and results from its combination with intellect. Mr. William Scott, in his well elaborated article of wit and the feeling of the ludicrous (Phrenological Journal, No. xiv. p. 195.) thinks that the view I formerly took of this faculty is more correct than that which I now entertain ; and that it is an intellectual power which compares for the purpose of discovering contrasts, and of bringing together incongruous, disproportionate and opposite ideas. I grant that wit requires comparison and a contrast, be it incongruity, or 31 242 PHRENOLOGY. even absurdity; in mean, burlesque or dignified objects ; be it in travesting, exaggerating or diminishing reality; but I see no proof that these mental operations result from the faculty in question alone, and therefore from an intellectual faculty. Religion becomes reasonable by the influence of the reflective powers ; religion, however, depends primitively on feelings. Why then should not a peculiar feeling excite comparison, in a way that its functions are ludicrous or laughable; dignity or meanness; exaggeration or dimi- nution, are neither the effect of comparison, nor of the peculiar feeling now under examination, but of other feelings. Hence, if the power we wish to determine appears under various modifica- tions, this happens on account of its combination with other affec- tive or intellectual faculties ; the ludicrous, mirthful, or comical alone remains essential, but it becomes wit by contrasting, or by a peculiar mode of acting in comparison, and absurdity by con- trasting in opposition to the laws of reason. The comic tendency of this power is constant, but the perception of differences does not seem to be its essence ; since persons may easily feel differen- ces or even see the contrast, without wishing to amuse or without being amused. I therefore propose for this faculty the name of mirthfulness. Its organ is before the organ of ideality, and above that of tune. It is remarkable that the anterior, lateral, and upper region of the brain contains the organs of such powers as seem to be given particularly for amusements and theatrical performances. The next also belongs to them. XXI. Organ of Imitation. Gall would not probably have thought of searching for the organ of a faculty for imitating, had not one of his acquaintances, Mr. Hannibal, at Vienna, who possessed this power in great perfection, and was an excellent actor, desired him to examine a transverse furrow in the middle of his head. The hollow Gall found, but he was more struck with a considerable elevation of a semi-globular form before it. Shortly after this, in the Institute for Deaf and ORGAN OF IMITATION. 243 Dumb, he perceived a configuration of the upper and fore part of the head exactly resembling that of his friend's, in an individual, who, having for the first time put on a mask at the carnival, imitat- ed perfectly all those who frequented the institution. These two cases furnished a basis for further observation, and after much re- search both in Vienna, and during our travels, and finding a regular coincidence between the developement of the cerebral part in the situation described and the faculty of imitation, we admit its func- tion as demonstrated. Those who have it highly developed are fond of acting and of dramatic representation ; they also often imi- tate the gestures, voice, manners, and in general all the manifesta- tions of man and animals. (PL ix. fig. 2. xxi.) The existence of the faculty of imitation is proved in the same way as every other primitive power. It is in general more active in children than in adults ; and it is known that children learn a great deal by imitation : they do what they see done by others : they repeat what they hear told. It differs much in adults, and is not at all proportionate to the other faculties. Those who have it large speak not with words only, they accompany all they say with appropriate and descriptive gestures, and imitate the voice, air and behavior of those who form the subjects of their conversation. Sometimes idiots from birth imitate much of what they see and hear. Cabanis* mentions the case of one whose desire to imitate the attitudes and movements of others was irresistible. Pinel f relates the case of an idiot female who imitated all that was done in her presence, repeated automatically what she heard told, and imitated with great correctness the gestures and gait of the insane in the hospital. Finally, the correspondence between this natural capacity and the state of a certain organic apparatus, proves beyond doubt the existence of such a power. Its sphere of activity is very great, especially during infancy. Some, throughout life, manifest it in an eminent degree, and feel a peculiar pleasure in theatrical performances. Though indispensa- * Du Rapport entre le Physique et le Moral de l'homme, t. 1. t Second Edition, De l'alienation Mentale, p. 99. 244 PHRENOLOGY. ble to actors, it, however, of itself neither constitutes the come- dian nor the tragedian. Its combinations with other mental facul- ties show how far individual actors are fitted to play particular characters. Alone, the faculty does nothing but imitate, and any actor may copy the manner of playing of others, without being ca- pable of conceiving the expressions or natural language of a given character. To do this, the individual faculties, which constitute that character, must be combined with imitation. This view ex- plains why an actor may be perfect in one line and scarcely middling in another. The possession of the faculty of imitation is essential to success in the arts of drawing, sculpture, and painting; it gives what is called expression and life. Without it the pro- ductions of artists are stiff and inanimate. It gives the facility of feeling and performing dramatic music, and of acquiring the accent of foreign languages. It aids orafors essentially, by regulating their declamation and gesticulation. It is the basis of the talent of ventriloquism. The three faculties last discussed are essential to theatrical per- formances. They most generally act in combination with the in- tellectual faculties, but their nature seems nevertheless to be rather affective than intellectual. It is difficult to say, to what extent animals possess this faculty. Monkeys do various things like man; but is this in consequence of mere imitation, or of their having certain powers in common with man ? The latter part of the question would seem to be well answered, in many cases, in the affirmative. On the same prin- ciple, the imitation of singing-birds may be explained, rather by the faculty of tune, than by imitation alone. The power of tune perceives, recollects and repeats the song of other birds, or of man; yet I admit that the primitive power of imitation exists among many tribes of the animal kingdom. Parrots not only re- peat harmonious tones, but all sorts even of harsh and discordant noises. Gall attributes to imitation the pleasure which some persons feel in being masked. For my part, I think that the love of imitating ORGAN OF IMITATION. 245 costumes, actions and gestures, and the desire of concealing the face with a mask or domino for the sake of intrigue, cannot be confounded together. Whenever concealment interferes, the or- gan of secretiveness is active, and plays a principal part. General Reflections on the Affective Faculties. Reasoning will never refute the idea of peculiar organs being necessary for the affective manifestations of the mind. The mind in itself may be simple, but observation shows, that each sort of affective operation is attached to a particular part of the brain. Another essential point is, that the affective faculties depend on internal sources, that they are often active spontaneously, and not from the excitation of external causes; moreover, their functions are always involuntary ; and, finally, they exist independently of understanding, for they are blind impulses, and are only enlightened by the addition of reason. They are almost the sole causes of the variety of action that degrades or exalts the human character. It is a just idea to represent ignorance as an evil spirit. Love, too, is well figured with bandaged eyes. Emblematic portraitures of all feelings might be similarly circumstanced ; for the very highest sentiments of human nature, without the guidance of intelligence, err incessantly. How necessary then to cultivate the powers which point out the sources of our errors, and how blasphemous and irreverent towards the great Creator every attempt to repress the exercise of intelligence ! The friends of humanity cannot stig- matize sufficiently, nor expose in too strong a light to the execra- tion of mankind, that abomination, religious despotism, which in- terdicts reason, and requires of those who would obtain eternal happiness, blind faith and unenlightened obedience. Such a tyran- ny can be exerted only to continue errors of every description, and with these to inflict every kind of evil upon the world ; it even renders the possibility of avoiding or correcting falsehood unattain- able. In treating of the preceding organs, I mentioned the discoveries 246 PHRENOLOGY. of Gall, and added the analysis as 1 found it out, with respect to the greater number of their respective faculties, particularly of the moral and religious feelings. Gall always derived the preceding powers from within, but did not admit their nature to be merely affective. SECTION IX. Of Understanding, or the Intellectual Faculties. I call intellectual every faculty which procures to man or ani- mals any kind of knowledge, cognition of any impression, be it of hunger or thirst, of the sensation of fatigue, of pain, of the affective functions, of the existence of external objects, their qualities or relations. Knowledge, then, is the essential object of the intellec- tual faculties. I divide the order of intellectual faculties into four genera, which I shall investigate separately in as many chapters. In the first, I shall speak of the external senses ; in the second, of the faculties which know external objects and their physical qualities ; in the third, of the faculties which procure notions of relations ; and in the fourth, of those which reason or reflection the operations of all the other mental powers. CHAPTER I. Genus I.—Of the Intellectual Faculties. External Senses. The external senses permit man and animals to communicate with the beings around them; it is by their medium that deter- minate consciousness of the external world is acquired ; without them, man, animals would only have an internal existence, but and EXTERNAL SENSES. 247 not, as Richerand says, a mere vegetative existence. What then can be more interesting to man than his senses, to which he owes so many sensations, so many enjoyments ? Hence, the assiduous study of their functions and structure by philosophers, physiologists and anatomists, who nevertheless made little progress, and left many essential points in darkness. On the other hand, various extravagant and contradictory opinions have been the fruit of their labors. Of a few of these I shall take a brief notice. I do not remember that the affective powers have ever been derived from the external senses ; but this is not the case in res- pect to the intellectual faculties. According to many ancient philosophers all ideas are innate, and are only excited by the ex- ternal senses. Since the time of Bacon and Locke, the greater number of philosophical systems rest upon the axiom of Aristotle, that all ideas of the mind begin with impressions furnished by means of the external senses. Dr. T. Brown says,* ' In the ex- ternal senses we find the rude elements of all our knowledge, the material on which the mind is ever operating, and without which it seems to us almost impossible to conceive that it could ever have operated at all; and could even see its absolute activity, or have been conscious of its own internal existence.' According to this principle, the perfection of the intellectual faculties must de- pend on that of the external senses. Now if the ideas and sensa- tions of man and animals are either produced or excited solely or specially by one or other of the five senses, they ought to manifest capacities according to external circumstances and accidental im- pressions ; their faculties ought to bear relation to the state of the five senses, and to the education these have received ; and individ- uals ought to be susceptible of change and modification at pleasure. Daily experience, however, contradicts this hypothesis with all its conclusions. Another class of philosophers maintain that the mind acts inde- pendently of all organization, and that the senses are rather an impediment to, than instruments in, its action. They complain * Lectures, stereotype edit. p. 109. 248 PHRENOLOGY. much of the illusions of sense, and despise all testimony and every conclusion grounded upon sensation. According to them, that only is truth which may be conceived by the understanding alone. If the influence of external objects, of social institutions, of educa tion in general, be denied, it would be to contradict the history of all times and of every individual. If truth resulted from reflection alone, it would be easy to establish general laws, and it would be unnecessary painfully to collect a great number of facts, and to per- form a great number of experiments in order to deduce general principles. But history proves the insufficiency of reflection alone, that is, of reflection unguided by experiment. Finally, another sect of philosophers admits two sources of in- tellectual manifestations, an external and an internal, on one or other of which all are dependent. I shall first consider some generalities of the external senses ; afterwards show that many faculties, attributed to them, cannot re suit as effects of their activity, and, in fine, examine the special functions of each external sense. Generalities as to the Five External Senses I. Doubleness of the Organs. The organs of every external sense, as of the functions of ani- mal life in general, are double : there are two eyes, two ears, two nerves of smell, of taste and of touch. Some authors have denied the doubleness of the cerebral organs, but the denial was founded on their mistaking doubleness for symmetry. It is true that both sides of the brain are seldom symmetrical, the right hemisphere is generally larger than the left, but is this want of symmetry not the case with the eyes, ears, and other double parts ? Thus the want of symmetry does not prove that they are not double. Indeed the nerves generally are larger on the right side of the body, which is also larger and stronger than the left. It is commonly maintained, that the right hand and foot are larger in the generality of cases, EXTERNAL SENSES. 249 because they are more used and exercised than the left. But this may be answered by the fact of the plurality of infants being right- handed. Of ten children born, there are perhaps seven who from birth employ the right hand without any teaching, and though the remaining three be taught to use it, they nevertheless feel greater strength in the left. But the superior power of the right hand is not the result of exercise, for, as I have said, all parts of the right side are stronger than of the left, even to the hemisphere of the brain. Disease, too, most frequently attacks the left side. The organs of animal life, then, are double, while those of veg- etative life are mostly single. II. The Consciousness of every Sense is Single. Another generality of the five senses is, that while each has two sentient apparatuses, and accordingly receives double impressions, consciousness is still only single. Various theories have been of- fered of this phenomenon, and sight has generally been examined in its discussion. The explanation has been given by 1. Touch. Many suppose single consciousness to be a consequence of the information communicated by the sens^ of touch. At first, say they, objects are seen double, but touch rectifies the error. This was Buffon's opinion. He supported it by the following experi- ment : If we look with both eyes towards two objects in the same direction, and fix our eyes upon the nearer, we see it single, but at the same time the farther double ; if, on the contrary, we fix upon the farther object, we see it single, and the nearer double. This experiment, according to Buffon, proves evidently, that ob- jects are seen double, but judged single by the rectification of the touch. As the same object, however, appears at one time double, and at another single, how is it possible to infer that touch has cor- 32 250 PHRENOLOGY. rected sight ? why is the correction only relative, referring now to the nearer, then to the farther object ? It seems to me, that a very different conclusion may be drawn from the experiment, viz. that touch has nothing to do with sight. Sight, and all its modifications and allusions, depend on the organization and position of the eyes and on the laws of the refraction of light. Moreover, no one recollects ever having seen objects double during his infancy. None of those born blind who have recovered their sight by a surgical operation, ever saw objects double. Nei- ther have we observed nor heard that animals take single objects for double ones. The butterfly does not confound a flower, nor the lamb its mother, with their shadows. Even animals which live during so short a time, that they can never rectify their vision by touch, are not deceived by the multiplicity of objects. Some- times, moreover, in morbid affections of the eyes, and from squint- ing, man sees double, notwithstanding all his preceding experience. It is consequently evident that the cause of single vision is not to be found in the sense of the touch. 2. Corresponding Points. Others explain single vision by saying, that if the image of any object fall upon points of the retina, which are commonly affected simultaneously, the object appears single ; but if the image fall up- on different parts of the retina, which, in general, are not affected at the same time, the object appears double. This explanation is very commonly received. Cuvier and Richerand admit it. It is rare, however, that the same corresponding parts of the retina in both eyes are affected at the same time. 3. Inequality of the Eyes. Several again maintain that inequality of the eyes causes the sin- gle consciousness of sight. According to them, the impression on the stronger is alone perceived. It is indeed true that very few EXTERNAL SENSES. 251 have both eyes equally strong, consequently the impression upon each eye is of unequal force. But if only a single impression were perceived, why should we see better with both eyes, and hear better with both ears, than with one ? 4. Decussation of the Optic Nerves. Ackermanns find an explanation of single vision in the decussa- tion of the optic nerves. Such an arrangement, however, does not exist in the auditory nerves. And the single consciousness of sight, hearing, smell and taste, must all necessarily be explained in the same manner. 5. Active State. Gall ventured to give another and a different explanation. He distinguishes two states of activity in organs of the senses, calling one active, the other passive. The functions are passive if per- formed independently of the will; the eye, for instance, necessa- rily perceives the light which falls upon it, and the ear the vibra tions propagated to it. Now, we perceive passively with both organs, says he ; we see with both eyes, hear with both ears, but the active state is confined to one organ, and commonly to the strongest. We see with both eyes at the same time, but we look with one only; we hear with both ears, we listen only with one; we feel with both hands, we touch with but one, &c. There is no doubt that we look with one eye only. In placing a pencil or any other thin body between us and a light, keeping both eyes open and throwing the axis of vision, the stick, and the light into a right line, did we look with both eyes, the pencil should occupy the diagonal and its shadow fall on the nose. But this always falls on one eye, on that which the person, who makes the experiment, ordinarily uses in looking with attention. If the pencil be kept in the same position, and the eye not employed in looking be shut, the relative direction of the objects will seem to 252 PHRENOLOGY. remain the same; but if he shut the eye with which he looked, it will be altered, and the pencil will appear removed far from its for- mer place. Again, let any one look at a point but little way dis- tant both eyes will seem directed towards it; let him then shut his eyes alternately. If he close the one with which he did not look, the other remains motionless ; but if he shut that with which he looked, the other turns immediately a little inwards, in order to fix the point. Moreover, the eyes of many animals are placed laterally, and cannot both be directed at once to the same object. Finally, the gestures of man and animals prove that they look with one eye, and listen with one ear; for they direct one eye or one ear towards the object to be seen or heard. To this Walther and Ackermann have opposed an erroneous conclusion from a certain experiment. Knowing green to be a compound of yellow and blue, they inferred that this color would be produced by looking through spectacles of which one glass was blue and the other yellow. Gall and I often tried this experiment, but never with any such result. Both glasses of the spectacles being equally thick, we found objects tinted with the color of that before the eye habitually used. When they were of different thick- nesses, the color of the thinner was perceived. It may be asked, which eye is most ordinarily employed in look- ing. Le Cat thought it was changed every day. Borelli believed the left eye to be strongest; but Le Cat asserted that some- times the right, sometimes the left, had greatest power. We have observed that, as in general the whole right side of the body is stronger than the left, so the greater number of persons look with the right eye. All do not, however, look with their strongest eye. Notwithstanding what has been said, Gall's explanation seems to me little satisfactory. Indeed it is very remarkable that passively, we perceive at the same time the impressions of both organs of any sense, not only if one, but also if different objects impress the two. Even different impressions of different objects may be perceived by both organs of two senses at once. We may, for instance, with both eyes see different objects at the moment that with both EXTERNAL SENSES. 253 ears we hear different sounds. As soon as we are attentive, how- ever, as soon as we look or listen, we perceive but one impression. It is impossible, therefore, to attend to two different discourses at once. The leader of an orchestra hears passively all the instru- ments, but he cannot be attentive except to one. The rapidity of mental action deceives several, and makes them think it possible to attend to different objects at the same moment. It follows that there is a difference between the active and passive state of the senses ; but whether this difference suffices to explain the single con- sciousness of every sense is another question ; I think it does not. First, this explanation would only apply to functions in their ac- tive, not at all in their passive state ; and the cause of single con- sciousness must be the same in both. Farther, the active state is not produced by the external senses themselves, any more than voluntary motion by the mere muscles. Some internal power ren- ders the senses active ; they themselves are always passive, and merely propagate external impressions ; they appear active only when something internal employs them to receive and to transmit impressions to the brain. It is therefore probable that the internal cause which excites only a single organ of the external senses to activity, is also the cause of the single consciousness of different impressions. Gall's explanation of single consciousness is conse- quently not only grounded upon an inaccurate notion, but would be far from satisfactory, were the supposition even true. 6. Commissures. Another explanation of single consciousness may be found in the commissures, or uniting fibres of both organs. For though every organ of sense be double, similar parts on each side are united by a peculiar apparatus. The impressions of both organs may possi- bly be combined by this arrangement. In admitting that this would explain single consciousness in the case of any given sense, it would not, however, explain single consciousness of impressions received by different senses. 254 PHRENOLOGY. 7. Central Point. The explanation having the old idea of a central point for its basis, will no longer be listened to, as anatomy proves that no such point exists in the brain. From all that has been said, it is evi- dent that no fact either in anatomy or physiology explains the sin- gle consciousness. 8. Singleness of Mind. It seems more probable that the singleness of mind explains its single consciousness. But from what I have said, it follows that consciousness is not always single. Single consciousness therefore must be distinguished from personal identity. This latter seems to depend on the special power which I name Individuality. III. Every Sense has its own peculiar Nature. A third generality of the five senses is, that its own power suffi ces to each to perform its function. Although much has been said of the mutual rectification of the senses, and o( their habits, it is a general principle, that the power or capacity of every sense is inherent in the sense itself. Farther, the relation of the senses to external impressions is determinate and subject to positive laws. As soon as odoriferous particles impress the olfactory nerve, the impression is at once either found to be agreeable or otherwise, and according to this relation between external impressions and external senses, the manner of acting of man and animals varies. No preceding exercise or habit furnishes each sense with its special power; this depends on its peculiar organization alone. If the organization be perfect, the functions are, in like manner ; and if it be imperfect or diseased, these are defective or deranged notwith- standing all preceding exercise. If the optic apparatus be perfect in birds, when they break the shell, their sight is perfect; on the EXTERNAL SENSES. 255 contrary, if the organization of the eye and ear in new-born ani- mals be imperfect, seeing and hearing are the same ; and if the eyes of adults be diseased, vision is deranged. In the aged the functions of the senses lose their energy, because the vital power of the organs decreases. It is, indeed, absurd to suppose, that the Creator should have produced any sense incapable of performing its functions without support from another and a different one; for example, that the eye should not see without the aid of touch, or the ear not hear without assistance from sight. In Phrenology, the following positions are of prime importance : none of the senses acquire their faculties from any of the others ; every sense produces special sensations ; all senses may procure the idea of existing objects, and one sense is fitter than another to acquaint us with particular bodies and their qualities. Touch, proves that a straight rod, which, half plunged into wa- ter appears crooked, is straight, and this is a kind of rectification ; but this must not be confounded with the idea, according to which one sense acquires its faculty by the rectification of another. Touch shows that the rod plunged in water, which looks crooked, is straight; but the eyes will always see it crooked, since the laws of sight are determinate, and we see according to the laws of the refraction of light. Such rectification of the senses is mutual and general, not the prerogative of any one in particular. The eyes may rectify the sense of touch: if, without our knowledge, a piece of thin paper be placed between our thumb and fore-finger, we may not feel but see it. Even smell and taste may rectify the senses of sight and of touch. Many fluids feel like water, but smell and taste proclaim them different. Thus every sense has 3ts peculiar and independent faculty, is subject to constant laws, and depends on the state of its appropriate organ for its capacity to perform its office; but every sense also recognises impressions im- perceptible to another, and in this way are the senses mutually aidant in coming to exact notions; for instance, in the study of nat- ural history. 256 PHRENOLOGY. IV. Every Sense may be exercised. Another observation generally applicable is, that though no sense acquires its faculty by exercise, yet the function of every one is strengthened by it. The sense of feeling, long and carefully exer- cised, acquires a very high degree of perfection. Thus the blind know the proximity of external objects by the impression of the air upon their faces. Le Cat speaks of one born blind at Pois- caux, who distinguished the distance of the fire by the degree of its .heat. Saunderson, though blind, in handling a series of med- als, discerned the false from the true more exactly than many con- noisseurs. Le Cat mentions a blind sculptor, Ganibasius of Vol- terra, who traced the living face with his fingers, and modelled it in potter's clay. The deaf and dumb, in the institution of Mr. Eschke, at Berlin, knew perfectly what was written on their backs, though covered with clothes. Boyle and others relate histories of the blind, whose touch was so acute, as even to enable them to distinguish colors and their shades. The same thing is stated of the blind Weissenbourg, of Manheim. This man had about thirty pieces of different-colored cloths, and could indicate with precision the hue of each ; but he often made mistakes in the color of stran- gers' clothes. The cards with which he played were marked; he did not distinguish them by their colors, as those who were not acquainted with this imagined. Many blind persons have assured me of their incapacity to distinguish colors. A few, however, discern white from black, because white surfaces are in general smoother than black. When the blind pretend to distinguish col- ors, they do no more than determine surfaces of greater or less degrees of smoothness, without acquiring any idea of color in itself. The sense of taste as well as every other is strengthened by exercise. Certain articles are tasteless or unpleasant at first; for instance, oysters and truffles; but having been eaten several times, their particular savor is distinguished. A common opinion is, that the sense of taste is blunted by spiced dishes and refined cookery. EXTERNAL SENSES. 257 But who will maintain that our cooks and dainty-mouthed gour- mands have a more obtuse taste than savages, who distinguish the flavor of some roots insipid to a civilized palate ? Do not the fre- quent accidents from poisonous vegetables, hemlock, belladonna, and improper mushrooms, prove that the taste of the sober coun- tryman is no surer guide than that of the voluptuous citizen ? We must, however, admit in regard to taste what happens universally; too strong impressions blunt its sensibility; the functions grow more energetic only by a due quantity of exercise. The sense of smell may also be exercised. Many physicians, on entering a sick room, distinguish the kind and state of certain diseases. It is related that some negro tribes follow others by the scent, as dogs do, and even distinguish between a negro and a Eu- ropean. Smell is blunted by the application of very strong and penetrating odors; conformable exercise alone strengthens its functions. The sense of hearing, like the senses already spoken of, is cul- tivated by exercise. The blind Weissenbourg, of Manheim, judg- ed exactly of the distance and stature of persons who spoke to him standing. The blind Schoenberger, of Weide, in the Upper Pal- atinate, had the sense of hearing so acute, that it was sufficient by tapping to indicate the place where the nine pins were set up, or the situation of the target to be shot at, to enable him often to throw or shoot successfully. Blind persons indeed often find a pin or piece of money which makes a noise in falling. Finally, the eyes acquire a very high degree of acuteness by exercise. Le Cat mentions a deaf woman of Amiens, who distin- guished what other persons said from the mere motion of their lips. When a foreign language was spoken, she discovered it immedi- ately. Gall and I observed similar cases at Berlin and elsewhere; nay, we conversed with several who understood us, even when we concealed the mouth; the motions of the face were sufficient. It follows, then, that though exercise produce not the faculties of the external senses, the functions of each may still be rendered more energetic by exercise. 33 258 PHRENOLOGY. V. The Function of every Sense is modified. A fifth general consideration of the external senses is, that their functions are modified not only in different kinds of animals, but even in different individuals of the same kind. The taste and smell of carnivorous and herbivorous animals undoubtedly differ. The ox and horse find hay to be savory, while the dog and wolf find flesh to be well-tasted. The senses are also modified by dif- ferent ages according to peculiar habits or circumstances, and even participate in the various states of health. This fact explains the longings felt during pregnancy, or experienced by hypochondriacal and hysterical people, and also why we are sometimes disgusted with what we formerly liked. Moreover, several substances, in- odorous to man, make a strong impression on the olfactory nerves of certain animals. Some animals, too, are much excited by odors, to which others are indifferent. One odor is agreeable to one individual, and disagreeable to another. In the same way, the eye and ear must differ in animals living under water, from those of creatures which inhabit the air; the eyes even differ in those animals which see in the night from those which see during the day. One individual likes a color or a sound displeasing to another. Thus the functions of the external senses are universally modified. functions to be denied to the five senses. I. Most of the Perceptive, and all the Affective and Reflective Faculties. To specify the functions of the external and internal senses is an essential point in Phrenology, however difficult the task may b3. Physiology in this department is but little advanced, and whether the external senses have consciousness or not is still a matter of dispute. The considerations on sensibility in the first section of this work, and those contained in this chapter, leave the EXTERNAL SENSES. 259 point still undecided. I shall, therefore, confine myself here to such points as may be proved by experience. The axiom of Aristotle,* that all activity of the mind begins with the external senses, is not less erroneous than is the assertion that the sense of touch is cause of the instinctive labors of animals and of the mechanical arts of man. It is easy to show, in a general way, that the notions of external objects acquired by man and animals, are not merely dependent on the external senses, and in particular cases that such and such a talent is not tne effect of this or that individual sense. Let us begin with the general refuta- tion. That the cognition acquired by animals and men of the external world, and the superiority of the human understanding cannot be attributed to the external senses, appears to me in this, that there is no proportion between intellectual operations and the senses, either in different species of animals, or in different individuals of the same species. Many animals surpass man in acuteness and strength of external sense, yet none approaches man in understand- ing. Moreover, idiots frequently possess very perfect senses, while the most intelligent have them occasionally very weak. A fact mentioned by Darwin f also proves that the five senses are mere intermedia, and that the import of their impressions must be judged of by something internal. An old man, who had had a paralytic stroke, preserved the senses of hearing and of vision un- touched ; he, however, could only receive ideas by means of the latter ; when he was told that it was nine o'clock and breakfast- time, he repeated the words distinctly, yet without gaining any information from them; but if his servant put a watch into his hand, and showed him the hour gone by, he said, ' Why, William, have I not my breakfast ?' On almost every occasion, his servant could only converse with him by means of visible objects, althon-h his hearing was perfect. The case of James Mitchel, in Scotland, furnishes evident proof * Nihil est intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu. f Zoonomia, third edition, vol. iv. p. 295. 260 PHRENOLOGY. of the external senses not producing the affective and intellectual faculties but of their being mere intermedia between the external world and the internal mental powers. As this case is of the ut most importance, I shall state it with some details, drawing upon the accounts published by the late Dr. Gordon, Dugald Stewart, and James Wardrop, as well as all I learnt from his sister on a visit I paid to Nairn. He was born on the llth of November, 1795, deaf and blind, of intelligent parents. It may be supposed that he is not without some internal sense of hearing, since he takes great pleasure in striking hard bodies upon his fore teeth, which he sometimes con tinues to do for hours together. ' When a bunch of keys,' says Dr. Gordon, ' was given to him, he seized them with great avidity, and tried each separately by suspending it loosely between two of his fingers, so as to allow it to vibrate freely, and after tingling all of them amongst his teeth in this manner, he generally selected one from the others, the sound of which seemed to please him most. This was one of his most favorite amusements, and it was sur- prising how long it would arrest his attention, and with what eager- ness he would on all occasions renew it. Mr. Brougham, having observed this circumstance, brought to him a musical snuff-box, and placed it between his teeth. This seemed not only to excite his wonder, but to afford him exquisite delight; and his father and his sister, who were present, remarked that they had never seen him so much interested on any former occasion. While the in- strument continued to play he kept it closely between his teeth, and when the airs were ended, he continued to hold the box to his mouth, and to examine it minutely with his fingers, expressing by his gestures and by his countenance great curiosity.' He was always possessed of so much of the sense of sight as to be able to distinguish day from night, and to perceive bright colors, particularly white and red. He was fond of shutting the house- door or window-shutters, and remaining for a considerable time with his eyes fixed on some small hole or chink through which the sun's rays penetrate. He, however, seemed to derive no informa EXTERNAL SENSES. 261 tion from sight, as he always turned away his head while examining the bodies presented to him. His senses of touch and smell were very acute, and by their assistance he was soon able to distinguish things and persons, stran- gers and those of his family. 'When a stranger approached him,' says Mr. Wardrop, ' he eagerly began to touch some part of his body, commonly taking hold of his arm, which he held near his nose, and after two or three strong inspirations through his nostrils, appeared decided in his opinion. If it happened to be unfavorable, he suddenly went to a distance with the appearance of disgust; if favorable, he showed a disposition to become more intimate, and expressed by his countenance more or less satisfaction.' When I visited him in 1816, his sister told me that of late years he had made less use of his smell than formerly, in making himself ac- quainted with external objects, and no fact has shown that he ever distinguished the presence of any one by the smell alone. In the year 1808, the drums of both ears were pierced, the one by Sir Astley Cooper, the other by the late Mr. Saunders. In 1810, when fourteen years of age, Mr. Wardrop performed an operation on his right eye, which enabled him to see surrounding objects, if not very minute. He nevertheless continued to examine every- thing with his other senses, as if he had been totally blind and deaf. He is most attracted by red, and looks longer at it than at any other color; then comes white, and after that yellow. He gathers together in the field flowers of the same kind. He cannot measure exactly the distance of the objects from him, but he puts out his hand in their direction, and examines them in the mode already stated. This young man, though deprived of the two prin- cipal senses of relation, was from infancy anxious to acquire know- ledge of external objects. He also manifested the different feelings without having been able to observe them in other persons. He was always fond of young children ; he took them affection- ately in his arms, but never associated with, nor joined in the amuse- ments of boys of his own age. He, however, liked the company of the boy who attended him in his excursions, in order to keep 262 PHRENOLOGY. him from dangerous situations. Early in life he was uneasy when his attenaants were changed ; later he was less sensible to it. He was very much attached to his relations. Dr. Gordon had men- tioned, that Mitchel was not sorrowful at his father's funeral; that he moved rapidly among the crowd, touching almost every body, and examining some very minutely. The Rev. Thomas Macfarlane, on the contrary, in a letter to Mr. Glennie, of Aberdeen, dated the 7th of May, 1812, positively says, ' When the coffin which enclosed his father's corpse was brought from the house, and placed upon chairs in the court before the manse, previous to the inter- ment, I approached to the coffin, and soon after saw James Mitch- el come from the house in considerable agitation. He turned about rapidly, and snuffed very much, evidently guiding himself by the smell. He directly approached the coffin, smefled it most eagerly for several seconds, then laid himself down upon the lid on his face, and embraced the coffin, while his countenance discovered marks of the most lively sorrow. I stood close by him ; and after a short time patted his head once or twice ; upon which he rose, and re- turned into the house. This occurred immediately upon the cof- fin being brought out, and about twenty minutes before it was lift- ed in order to be carried to the churchyard. As the accuracy on this subject has been doubted, I purposely delayed writing to you, till I should have an opportunity of conversing with the Rev. Pryce Campbell, minister of Ardensien, brother-in-law to Mrs. Mitchel, who was present at the funeral, and by whose direction every thing was conducted. I fell in with this gentleman. I took an oppor- tunity of asking him if he observed any marks of sorrow about James Mitchel on the day of his father's funeral. He replied, that he observed the most unequivocal marks of grief in bis countenance, and added a circumstance which escaped my notice, that when the coffin was about to be lifted, in order to be carried to the church- yard, James Mitchel clung to it, endeavoring to prevent its being carried away, and he, (Mr. Campbell,) was obliged to remove him from it by force.' Both these gentlemen remark, that the circum- stances mentioned by Dr. Gordon, of Mitchel's running through EXTERNAL SENSES. 263 the crowd, and touching every person, do not amount to a proof that he was insensible to the loss he had sustained. In acting thus, Mitchel was merely examining the assemblage of people around him, and in this instance his curiosity overcame his grief. He went several mornings to visit the grave, patted gently the turf which had been laid over it, and at last, as if hopeless of his fa- ther's return, became sorrowful even to tears. Shortly after his father's death, his mother being unwell and confined to bed, he was observed to weep. Afterwards, the mother left Ardelach and went to Nairn. James Mitchel returned three times to visit his former habitation. On his first visit, he went through the different apart- ments of the manse, examined the furniture, and having done so, betrayed an anxiety to be gone, and returned directly to Nairn. On the other visit, several workmen were employed taking down the kitchen. He stood some time evidently very much displeased at what was going forward, and then went away without having been prevailed on to enter the house. On his third visit, the manse was repaired, and he came home in good-humor, and to communicate what he had observed to his sister, he lifted his hands, one after the other, in succession, from the floor towards the ceiling of the room. In the year 1814 he had a severe illness, during the course of which he took a particular fancy to his aunt, his father's sister, who was at that time living with his mother, and insisted on her sitting constantly by him. It happened, that his sister was taken unwell before his own perfect recovery, and he would not now allow this aunt to sit down near him, but always made signs that she should go up stairs, where his sister was, nor did he rest till he had made good his point. He showed a wish to get up stairs himself, and upon being brought up seemed quite satis- fied when his sister patted him, and shook hands with him. Thus there can be no doubt of his affection and consideration for others. He is generally placid, and of a mild temper, but if too much teased, or if interrupted in his amusements, he is irritated, and sometimes gets into paroxysms of violent rage, when he tears his clothes. He is now grown up, and no longer under the control ot 264 PHRENOLOGY. his mother and sister. He is cautious, but not timid. He would formerly take food from no one but his parents and sister. From infancy he has been fond of retiring to a dark corner, and kindling a light. He continues to dislike darkness ; after nightfall he seems happy in reaching a room where there is a candle or a fire. Means have been used to teach him to make baskets ; but he wants appli- cation to finish any thing, and throws the materials into the fire; yet he knows from experience the danger of fire, water, and sharp instruments. He has frequently amused himself with a dead fowl in the kitchen, placing it repeatedly on its legs, and laughing when it fell. He was allowed to touch his father's corpse ; as soon as he felt it he shrunk away. This was the first time he had ever touched a dead body. Several years later, a neighbor who had fre- quently indulged him with a pipe and tobacco, died. His sister brought him to the room where the body lay, and allowed him to feel it. This he did very readily, not shrinking away as formerly when he touched his father. He even seemed rather anxious to examine it; when he had so done, he stood for a few seconds rather thoughtfully, and then smiled. He now retired willingly ; but not before he showed that he recognised the person, and was sensible of what had happened. This he did by making his usual sign for smok- ing, and by putting his hand to the ground, his sign for interment. He seems now apprehensive of dying. When, in 1814, he was so much reduced as to be incapable of walking without sup- port, he could not be prevailed on to lie a single day in bed. He watched the first appearance of dawn, and insisted on being dress- ed immediately ; thinking probably that he would not die out of bed. He could bear to see nothing white near his bed, or even in the room with him, when unwell. Several times something white being by accident thrown across the foot of his bed, he ap- peared most unhappy till it was removed, and even when linen was put to the fire to air, he was in the greatest possible distress. This dislike was explained from his having always seen dead bodies laid out in white. He always took pleasure in making prisoners of other persons EXTERNAL SENSES. 265 by locking them in the stable, or in a room, laughing and jumping about all the while. His sister sent him one day with a half-penny to buy two pipes. He understood the signs, went out to a shoe- maker's house, where they were to be had, and returned with one in his hand. They suspected that he had another about him, and giving him to understand that he ought to have brought two, his sister insisted on his going to fetch the second. He then unbut- toned his coat, and laughing heartily produced the second pipe. The Sunday after this, when his sister gave him a half-penny, as usual, in church, to put into the poor's box, he placed it between his teeth like a pipe and- laughed, but she having given him a shake, he dropped it into the box. When I saw him, he was al- lowed four pipes of tobacco a-day. His love of smoking being well known, several persons in Nairn gave him tobacco, when they met him in the street, but this he never produced until he had had his daily allowance at home. He used formerly to break his pipe as soon as it was smoked out; he now makes each serve twice before he breaks it. When he has received tobacco from stran- gers, however, it serves much oftener, as he is aware that two a-day are his allowance. They once gave him a more durable pipe, but he threw it away. He did the same with old shoes, in order not to be forced by his parents to put them on any more. It is quite certain that he has ideas of property. He once, at no great distance from the manse, met a person riding a horse which had been purchased a few weeks before from his mother. On feeling the animal, he seemed instantly to recognise it. The rider dis- mounted, to see how Mitchel would behave, and was much amused to find that he led the horse to his mother's stable, took off the saddle and bridle, put corn before him and then withdrew, locking the door and putting the key in his pocket. He is extremely fond of walking and running about, of riding, and of bodily exercise in general. Since his sight has improved, he makes long excursions, but he always returns to his meals. When yet a child, he attempted to build small houses with turf, leaving little openings resembling windows. For hours he employ- 34 266 PHRENOLOGY. ed himself in the bed of the river which runs within a few yards of the house, selecting stones of a round shape, nearly of the same weight and having a certain degree of smoothness. These he placed in a circular form on the bank, and then seated himself in the middle. He often floated pieces of wood on the water. He always liked smooth bodies. He often endeavored to smooth sticks or rods with his teeth, or caused the boy who attended him to smooth them with a knife. He early showed a great partiality to new clothes, after the measure is taken, nothing else seems to occupy his mind. He literally persecutes the tailor and shoemaker, until his coat or shoes are finished ; he is their guest morning, noon, and night. He pre- fers persons well-dressed to those who are not. He never liked to take his regular meals in the kitchen, yet in coming home before dinner time, he will take a potato from the servant. He partic- ularly courts the good opinion of his sister, and if made aware that he has done wrong or offended her or his mother, he shows evi- dent sorrow. In the following anecdote a peculiar proof of his kindness will be found. He had once received a severe wound in his foot, during the cure of which he usually sat by the fire, his foot resting on a low stool. More than a year afterwards a servant boy with whom he used to play, happened to be confined from a similar cause. Young Mitchel perceiving that his companion remained longer in one situation than usual, examined him attentively, and seemed quickly to discover, by the bandages on his foot, the reason of his confinement. He immediately went up to a garret, sought from amidst several other pieces of furniture the little foot- stool, which had formerly supported his own wounded limb, brought it down in his hand to the kitchen, and placed the servant-boy's foot gently upon it. It is difficult to say whether he has any notion of religion. He accompanies his relations to church, behaves quietly, and kneels at family prayers. Three months after his father's death, a clergy- man being in the house, on a Sunday evening, he pointed to his EXTERNAL SENSES. 267 father's bible, and then made a sign that the family should kneel. Did he so by habit alone ? James Mitchel has always shown an inquisitive turn of mind, great memory, and an eminent degree of judgment and reflection. Dr. Gordon said: ' The knowledge which he has derived from the senses of touch, taste, and smell, seems fully as extensive as what any person of the most perfect faculties might be supposed to acquire, if he could by any contrivance be prevented from using his eyes and ears for the same period of time, from the moment of birth, and in the same retired situation of country. The train of his thoughts seems to be regulated by the same principles as that of the soundest minds. His actions neither indicate inco herence nor fatuity ; but every thing he does appears capable of being easily traced to rational motives.' And I might add : why not, since his brain is very well organized! Indeed he always felt an internal desire to acquire knowledge. He every day explored ground where he had not been before. He wished to become acquainted with every thing that fell into his hands. He amused himself in visiting the carpenter's, or other tradesmen's shops, handling their implements, and trying to discover what they were engaged about. He knows the uses to which all common things are put, and is pleased when the use of any thing with which hv is* not acquainted is communicated to him. Once when still young, he was caught creeping on his hands and knees along a narrow wooden bridge, which crossed the river at a point where the stream is rather deep and rapid. His father wish ing to discourage him from such a perilous attempt again, ordered a servant to push him off and plunge him once or twice into the river. This measure had the desired effect. But several years later, having got angry with the servant boy as they were playing together in a boat, he took him, plunged him into the water and drew him out, just as he had been served himself on the former occasion. He was soon aware of the advantages which other persons enjoyed. He sometimes proceeded alone in his excur- sions ; but finding any obstacle, he waited till his boy arrived and 268 PHRENOLOGY. assisted him. He now goes alone to great distances, for instance, from Nairn to Fort George. He easily learnt to measure time. On one occasion his mother went from home, and he seeming anxious about her, his sister bent his head gently, as laying it on a pillow, and shutting his eyes, once for each night the mother was to be absent, in order to show him that he would sleep so many times before her return. In this way too it was signified to him how many days were to pass before his new clothes would be made. His ready interpre- tation of signs showed a considerable share of reflection. He used natural signs, all addressed to the sight of those with whom he conversed. When hungry, he approaches his mother or sister, touches them in an expressive manner, carries his hand to his mouth, and points towards the apartment or cupboard where the eatables are usually kept. He is quite alive to proper and regular behavior ; his sister expresses her satisfaction or displeasure by different manners of touching his head or shoulder. Gentle tap- ping is a sign of satisfaction ; a quick slap, of displeasure. He indicates riding on horseback by raising his foot and bringing the fingers of each hand together under the sole, in imitation of a stir- rup. When he wants to go to bed, he inclines his head sidewise, as if to lay it on a pillow. He indicates a shoemaker by imitating with his arms a shoemaker's motions in pulling his thread ; so also a tailor by the motions made in sewing. From the preceding facts it follows, that Mitchel's mind displays a great share of native strength, and is destitute only of the vehi- cles of its exhibition, the eyes and the ears. It is certainly a great pity that he received no education, since none of his powers are dormant. By means of touch he might have been taught many artificial signs ; but the internal activity of his mind is lost to those around him, and consequently to the study of mankind. A similar case of a girl exists in Cambridge. She became blind and deaf at the age of three years, is now about ten years old, and shows various feelings and intellectual faculties in a high degree. EXTERNAL SENSES. 269 I saw another case of this nature in the institution for deaf and dumb at Paris. It was a female, and at first only deaf and dumb. She received the usual instruction of the deaf and dumb, and learn- ed to write before she lost her sight. She then continued to con- verse with her other companions by signs adapted to the touch. She could indicate her mental activity by the signs she had learnt, or in writing into the hands of those with whom she conversed, or others would take her hand and make therein the signs she under- stood. A fourth of these remarkable cases which deserves the attention of philosophers, exists in the American Asylum, at Hartford, in Connecticut. Her name is Julia Brace. I shall first extract from the American Annals of Education, published by Mr. Woodbridge, Vol. I. Oct. and Nov. 1831, the following notice, and then add some interesting facts, which were related to me when I saw her in August, 1832. ' She is the eldest of seven children, and born at Hartford, June 13, 1807. At four years of age she was seized with the typhus fever, on Monday, November 29, 1811, and on the Sat- urday following she became blind and deaf. She remained dan- gerously ill for four or five weeks. During the following summer, she was again twice sick, but her health became established, and has continued excellent ever since. 'Before her illness, she had not only learned to speak, but to repeat her letters, and to spell words of three or four syllables, and for some time after the loss of her sight and hearing, she was fond of taking a book, and spelling words and the names of her acquaintances. She retained her speech pretty well for about a year, but gradually lost it. For three years she could still utter a few words. One of the last of these was mother. ' Julia was at first unconscious of her misfortune. She seemed to imagine that a long night had come upon the world, and often said, it will never be day. She would call upon the family to light the lamp, and was impatient at their seeming neglect even to give her an answer. 270 PHRENOLOGY. ' One day, in passing a window, she felt the sun shining warm upon her hand ; she immediately held out her hand, and pointed with delight to indicate that the sun shone. From the January after her illness until the following August she would sleep during the day, and be awake through the night, and it was not until autumn, by taking great pains to keep her awake during the day, that she was set right. She was afterwards as regular in this res- pect as other persons. ' At first, after her recovery, she was not inclined to walk, but after leading her with a stick, the apprehension which might have deterred her, gradually vanished, and she began to grope her way unassisted, like other blind persons. She gradually returned to the previous habits and occupations of her childhood. ' From the period of her recovery, she seemed to perceive the return of the Sabbath, and on Sunday morning would get her own clean clothes and those of the other children. The intervention of a day of fasting or thanksgiving confused her reckoning, and does so even now, and some time elapses before she gets right. If her mother was reading, she would find a book and endeavor to do so. ' During the first winter after her recovery she was irritable almost to madness. She would exhibit the most violent passion, and use the most profane language. The next summer she be- came calmer, and her mother could govern her to some extent, by shaking her and stamping on the floor in sign of disapprobation, and by patting her head when she conducted well. She is now habitually mild, obedient, and affectionate ' She has a strong feeling of propriety. After her illness she was unwilling to wear clothes, and would pull them off violently. At length her mother took one of her frocks and tried it on her sister, with a view of altering it for her. Julia took the frock and put it on herself. Later she cried for new clothes, and became very fond of dress. ' Since the summer after her illness, she would take care of her little sisters, she would wander with them in the field, gather EXTERNAL SENSES. 271 whortleberries, knock down apples from the trees, pick flowers, and make them into nosegays for the infant. ' She would take care of her sisters, and hold and attend them while they were infants, but when young she refused to take care of either of her twin-brothers. Later she was kind to her brothers and sisters, and when she received a present, was always fond of sharing it with them. If it was an orange, it was divided very exactly into equal portions ; if an apple, which she knew to be more common, she used less care. ' The poverty of her mother often obliged her to go out and work for the whole day, and the children were left in charge of Julia on such occasions. If they went to the cupboard or drawers when her mother was absent, she would stamp on the floor (the method which necessity had taught her mother to use in restrain- ing her) shake them, and if possible keep them away. When any mischief was done, she would often administer immediate punish ment. At one time, while giving the children their bread and milk, the bowl was broken : in imitation of what she supposed would have been done by her mother, she whipped the little of- fender. But feeling of her eyes immediately, and finding that she was crying, she took her into her arms and endeavored to soothe her with kindness and caresses. ' Her ideas of the right of property were very strong. When any thing is presented to her, she will not retain it until she has given it back, and by its being returned, or by some sign of prop- erty, she is convinced that it is given to her. Her countenance then exhibits marks of pleasure ; she remembers it for months, and will bring forth the present whenever the giver somes. It has been remarked, that, notwithstanding the state of poverty in which she passed her childhood, when she was subsequently brought • into houses where tempting articles of food and dress were con- stantly thrown in her way, she has never been known to take the most trifling object without leave. She was equally tenacious of her own property, and felt deeply any invasion of her rights. ' Once in her childhood, one of her three little brothers had 272 PHRENOLOGY. disturbed her toys in the drawer. She arraigned them before the opened drawer, as a tribunal, pointing them to the mischief they had done, and was determined to find out the rogue, but not one of them would either confess or expose the offender. After feeling of each of them awhile, in order to find which trembled, without success, being satisfied that they intended to deceive her, and that one of them at least was guilty, she adopted what seemed design- ed as a stratagem to disappoint them. She gave each one a box on the ear, and in order that the offender should not escape, she then felt of the mouths of all three of them. She found two of them crying: this she seemed to,think a proof of innocence, and in order to assuage their grief, she gave them sugar, and showed them kindness, as tokens of their acquittal of the charge; but the third, who gave no signs of sorrow, received an additional portion of cuffs. ' While the inmate of a school, observing that a great part of their time was occupied with books, she often held one before her sightless eyes, with great patience, as if to wait for some influence upon her. In reference to this point, the spirit of government was even extended to her favorite kitten. She would spread a news- paper before it, then putting her finger on its mouth, and perceiv- ing that it did not move like those of the scholars when reading, would shake the animal, to express displeasure at its indolence and obstinacy. ' From a child, she entertained the idea that the tallest ought to rule; and when shorter persons than herself in the houses where she has lived, bade her to do, or not to do any thing, she would respectfully let them know that she was the tallest. This idea, it is supposed, she entertained till she was grown taller than her • mother; but she has now given up this childish notion. ' It is obvious that her only means of perceiving external objects are the smell, the taste, and the touch. The touch is her chief reliance, and enables her to distinguish every object with which she has been familiar, sometimes by means of her fingers, and sometimes by her lips and tongue. But her smell also is surpris- EXTERNAL SENSES. 273 ingly acute, and often enables her to ascertain facts which seem beyond her reach. ' She has now been a resident for several years in the American Asylum, at Hartford, where she is supported in part by the volun- tary contributions of visiters, and in part by her own labors in sew- ing and knitting. A language of palpable signs was early establish- ed, as a means of communication with her friends. This has been much improved by her intercourse with the deaf and dumb, and is now sufficient for all necessary purposes. Her countenance as she sits at work, exhibits the strongest evidence of an active mind and a feeling heart within, and thoughts and feelings seem to flit across it like the clouds in a summer sky. A shade of pensiveness will be followed by a cloud of anxiety or gloom; a peaceful look will perhaps succeed, and not unfrequently, a smile lights up her countenance, which seems to make one forget her misfortunes.' I observed the same appearances in her countenance when I saw her; and she was on that day, I was told, in good spirits. Her whole history shows spontaneous activity of mind, and the manifes- tations of the special powers, as admitted in Phrenology. From the above-mentioned facts we perceive her love and care of chil- dren, her combativeness in punishing her brothers and sisters; her love of approbation, her cautiousness, her acquisitiveness, conscien- tiousness, reverence, benevolence, order, time, and reflection. She knows the inmates of the institution, and has chosen one girl for her particular friend. She was always fond of childish sports, and of playing tricks to others, in concealing things, or in shutting them up in rooms. When fatigued of being exhibited to strangers, she endeavors to get out of the way. She delights in order, clean- liness and dress. At the day of my visit her head-dress was most carefully arranged, and it was her own doing. She examines with her hands the hair-dress of other ladies she meets with, and imitates the fashion. Since she has been in the American Institution, only once she was disobedient to the superintendent, the Rev. Mr Weld, but being placed into a narrow room she was completely cor- rected. She possesses great manual dexterity, and like other blind 35 274 PHRENOLOGY. persons she threads her needle with her tongue and lips. She knows many more palpable signs than James Mitchel, yet I think that both might have been taught to converse with others by the touch, or written signs, on a more extensive scale. At all events, these unhappy individuals furnish an evident proof that there are in- nate dispositions, and that the external senses are not the laws of the affective and intellectual faculties. II. The external Senses do not produce the means of their own gratification. The five external senses receive and propagate impressions which affect them agreeably or disagreeably; but they cannot pro- duce the means of their own satisfaction. Animals, therefore, are confined to the enjoyment of those impressions presented to them by nature. They prefer the taste of one thing to that of another; they prefer particular, odors, colors, sounds, but they cannot, at will, command or excite impressions calculated to gratify the sen- ses of smell, sight, or hearing. Man alone is capable of this; he alone, in order to procure pleasure by the medium of his senses, cultivates gardens, and establishes manufactories of perfume; he alone plants flowers to gratify his smell, and to delight his eye. Man, however, has not conceived these acts by means of smell; for this sense is much more acute in the ox, horse and dog, which cultivate no flower-gardens, and which have no rose-water. In the same way, animals have no cookery, and no musical instruments; they cannot voluntarily charm their palate or their ears; for the same reason, they have no artificial language, and no tradition. We shall afterwards see that man possesses superior intellectual facul- ties, which produce the artificial enjoyments of the external senses and internal nerceDtive Dowers. EXTERNAL SENSES 275 III. Individual Faculties, which are erroneously attributed to the external Senses. To the Sense of Feeling or Touch. I. The consciousness we have of the existence of the external world is considered as a prerogative of touch. It is said, that man by moving finds limits or resistance to his progress, and is thereby advised of external existences. Our vision however finds limits as well as our motions, and, consequently, we should perceive the ex- ternal world by sight, even though we did not by touch. More- over, the sentient power resides not in the external organs, but in the mind. I cannot, therefore, conceive why the sentient being should not recognise impressions made on it in every way, mediately as well as immediately, by an obstacle to farther vision, as well as by an impediment to its endeavors to act* In either case there is only an external impression. For what reason, too, does the sentient being, assumed unconscious of the external world, make any motion whatever ? Why do insects and many animals act as soon as they are born ? The tortoise and duck, scarcely hatched, run towards the water which they have never touched. How do they distinguish water from solid bodies ? How can young birds be acquainted by touch with those branches upon which they perch for the first time on leaving their nests ? Farther, all nature opposes this hypothetical opinion of the schools. Man and animals are naturally much more disposed to transfer their internal sensations, aroused by external objects, to the outward world, than to concentrate external nature within them- selves. We see and hear from without, at least it seems so to us. The infant, without being instructed, turns his head towards the side whence come the sound and light which impress his ears and eyes. An afflux of blood to the optic nerves makes us see flashes of light, and to the auditory nerves tingling or other peculiar sounds. In our dreams we see landscapes, persons and objects, with which 276 PHRENOLOGY. we are familiar; we hear music, we walk in peculiar places, and have a thousand different sensations. The insane hear heavenly choirs, see angels ; and many looked on as sane consider their in- ternal sensations as realities, they distinguish the figures of their genii, see spirits, &c. These and similar phenomena take place inwardly, but are, by the mind, transferred to the external world. The faculty of separating impressions from without and the ex- ternal world, from the internal sentient power, cannot be attribu- ted to any external sense ; this faculty is of a much higher nature, and exists internally as well as the one which says, ' I feel hence I am.' Perceptions of impressions, recognition of the faculty which perceives, and reflections upon this acquired knowledge, are very different things. The internal faculty which knows the ex- istence of external objects, acts by means of all the external sen- ses ; the sense of touch has no preference, no monopoly. De Tra- cy* has demonstrated, in a very excellent manner, that the sense of touch has not the prerogative of producing the notion of the ex- ternal world. He says the nerves are merely agitated by various impressions ; the auditory, optic and olfactory, as well as the tan- gent nerves. For what reason, then, should these last alone excite the idea of an external cause or existence ? 2. The second prerogative attributed by Buffon, Condillac, Cu- vier, Dumas, and others, to the sense of touch is, that it alone pro- duces the ideas of space, dimensions, extent, distance, figure, num- ber, motion and rest. But we have only to examine the functions of animals in a cursory manner, to prove this assertion quite incor- rect. Animals which acquire no, or very imperfect, information from touch, still judge of distance, figure, and plurality. If the swal- low and bat catch insects on the wing, while flying with very great swiftness, do they not measure distance ? When young birds leave their nests for the first time, do they fly against houses and trees, instead of sitting down upon a branch ? Do we observe young an- imals which have never yet left their native place, run away indif- *Ideoligie, torn. i. p. 114 EXTERNAL SENSES. 277 ferently, whether they perceive an enemy afar off or near at hand ? Animals born with imperfect eyes, or altogether blind, can neither see external objects nor measure distance; but those which are born with perfect eyes see immediately, and measure distance, figure, motion and plurality exactly. The partridge, quail and duck avoid from birth every object which lies in their way. It is, therefore, evident that the sense of touch has not the prerogative of producing ideas of extent, distance, form, and motion. Locke, indeed, de- monstrated this truth long ago ; and it is certain that not only touch and vision, but also hearing and smell, may excite ideas of distance, direction, motion and plurality. Animals turn towards the wind, and judge of the direction in which impressions come. Ideas of extent, form, distance, motion and plurality, thus excit- ed by different senses, is to me an evident proof that none of them belongs immediately to any external sense; for I consider it as an axiom in the philosophy of mind, that no special faculty manifests itself by means of two or several organs. Every special faculty is attached to some one particular organ. My conclusion is con firmed by facts and direct proofs. The faculties of knowing and measuring space in general, and of distinguishing distance, forms, number, motion and rest, bear no proportion to the external sen- ses to which they are attributed, either in animals or in man ; these faculties are internal, and produce their respective sensations with- out being excited by the senses of seeing or touch ; birds migrate: dogs and pigeons find the places to which they are attached again, without being acquainted with the interjacent country or objects ; and birds build nests like those of their kind without instruction ; these acts follow from internal faculties, and without any external excitation from touch or sight. Finally, the physiology of the brain shows that there exists particular organs of powers, the manifesta ions of which are in proportion to their respective apparatuses. These faculties, therefore, must be separated from the functions of the external senses, and attributed to particular internal organs. 3. The third supposed prerogative of touch is, that it is the surest of all, and the rectifier and correcter of the other senses. In 278 PHRENOLOGY. treating of the external senses in general, I have demonstrated that no sense acquires its faculty by means of another, but that each has it from nature independently ; that all are subject to particular laws ; and that their functions are perfect or imperfect according to *he organization of their proper apparatus. Thus, from this con- sideration it follows, that touch neither produces the faculties of the other senses, nor rectifies their errors. Indeed, it is easy to prove, both by the healthy and the diseased state, that touch is not surer than any other sense, and that it does not rectify the other senses, any more than it is rectified by them. If we cross two fingers, and touch a round body, a pebble, for instance, or a pea, we seem to feel two bodies. A thin and flex- ible piece of paper between the fore-finger and thumb is not felt. In various diseases individuals fancy they receive impressions from without; they feel warm or cold, tickling, creeping, and other sen- sations ; just as they hear voices, which have no external existence, and are produced by an internal cause. Whoever will reflect on these considerations, combined with those exposed when speaking of the mutual rectification of the senses, may perceive that touch has no superiority over any other sense. 4. I have already said, that some physiologists and philosophers believe that the sense of touch produces many of the instinctive labors observed among animals, and the mechanical arts among men. But neither are the instinctive labors of animals, nor the mechanical arts of man, in any proportion to the acuteness of touch, or to the perfection of the external instruments. A great number of insects exhibit peculiar instincts before their antennae or instruments of touch are developed. Many animals have those instruments to which peculiar faculties are attributed, without being possessed of the corresponding functions. Would it not be more natural to suppose that apes and monkeys should possess the pow- er of constructing, because they have hands, than that the beaver should build because it has a tail ? Monkeys, indeed, haye hands, they can put wood on a fire, they also are very sensible to cold and warmth, but have they understanding enough to keep up the EXTERNAL SENSES. 279 fire ? According to the opinion announced, insects, crawfish, lob- sters, and especially cuttlefish, ought to have exact ideas of exten- sion, of size and of geometry, in consequence of their numerous and perfect organs of touch. The external instruments, moreover, are often similar, while the functions are quite different. There is a great variety in the form and texture of the cobwebs, which different species of spi- ders make to catch flies. What diversity of structure in the nests of birds whose bills are similar ? Animals of the same genus vary much in their food, and in their manner of living. The large tit- mouse builds its nests in hollow-trees ; the long-tailed titmouse in clefts of branches; the bearded titmouse among reeds ; the tit- mouse of Poland suspends its delicate and curious dwelling from a slender bough ; the cuckoo again, though endowed with all the re- quisites for building, constructs no nest whatever. The hare and rabbit have feet exceedingly alike, yet the hare lies in the open fields, while the rabbit makes a burrow. On the contrary, similar acts are performed by animals with a variety of dissimilar instruments. The proboscis is to the elephant what the hand is to man and to the monkey. It is by means of the bill that the swallow attaches her nest to the wall, and that the thrush cements the interior of her's, while it is by means of his tail that the beaver covers his hut with mud. The hands of monkeys, and the feet of parrots and squirrels, are certainly different; yet all hold up their food when they eat; the hog ploughs the earth with his snout, and the dog scratches it with his feet, in digging up truf- fles. In the same way similar internal faculties produce similar effects by means of perfectly different instruments. Again, man and animals exhibit many faculties which cannot be considered as effects of external instruments. Who, for example, can show, from any external organ, that crows should live in soci- ety, and magpies in pairs ? that the cuckoo and chamois should be wild by nature, and the pigeon and goat tameable ? that bustards and cranes should place sentinels ? that ants should gather prov sions. Stc? 230 PHRENOLOGY. Finally, even in the human kind, there is no proportion between manifestations of faculties and perfection of external instruments. If man owe his arts to his.hands, why do not idiots invent ? Why do painters drop the pencil, sculptors the chisel, and architects the rule and compass, as soon as their understanding is fatigued ? and why do many bring forth stupendous works by the assistance of crippled hands or of stumps ? Who can measure the architectural talent from the conformation of the hands ? These considerations prove that the external instruments do not produce the faculties. I do not however deny their importance ; I should even admit some relation between internal faculties ana external instruments. Without instruments the internal faculties could not manifest them- selves ; without muscles, the will could not move a limb; without hands, or some equivalent, we could not seize any object; carniv- orous animals could not destroy without claws and teeth ; without these instruments, therefore, they could not subsist. Moreover, as the instruments are more perfect, the manifestations of internal faculties are also more perfect. Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that the propensities and intellectual faculties which make use of the external instruments, must be derived from within. We have still to consider whether or not acuteness of feeling produces the instinctive labors of animals and the mechanical arts of man. Experience proves that it does not. There is no pro- portion between fineness of skin or acuteness of feeling, and man- ifestation of the faculties of the mind. Some individuals have rough hands and an obtuse feeling, and yet produce surprising works. No artist ever judged of the capacity of his pupils from this acute- ness of touch. It is even still a question whether man's sense of touch is more acute than that of animals. It is generally believed to be so, because his skin is destitute of hair and covered with a very thin epidermis only, while the lower animals are clothed with hair or feathers. There are some tribes, however, which have no hair, as the elephant, the Turkish dog, snails, &c; and whose sense ' of feeling is very acute. Other animals, though covered with hair, immediately feel the smallest insects which alight on their bodies. EXTERNAL SENSES. 281 Finally, it is even impossible to conclude that because the skin is covered with hair, feeling is less acute. Sometimes in diseases the hairy scalp of man grows extremely sensible, and the least movement of the hair gives excessive pain; the epidermis is thick- est at the points of our fingers, yet there feeling is considered as the most acute. Consequently, the nerves of touch, though cov- ered with hair, may be even more sensible than when destitute of such a covering, and it is by no means obvious that the feeling of man is more acute than that of animals. The wisdom then of Solon, Socrates, and Plato, and the master- ly productions of Homer, Euclid, Raphael, and others, were not the result of their mere hands; nor are the surprising instincts ot an- imals the effects of their antennae, feet, teeth, proboscis, or tails. I, however, repeat, that it must be allowed that the external instru- ments, though they are not in proportion to the internal faculties, cannot be in contradiction to them; and that the internal facul- ties perform their functions with greater facility and more accu- racy as the external instruments are more perfect. Therefore, the hand of man, which is composed of so many movable parts, ca- pable at every moment of changing their direction, and of grasping external bodies, is fitter for appreciating tactile qualities than the feet of birds invested with scales, or of quadrupeds covered with a horny substance. Yet it is nevertheless certain, that the external instruments are never the cause of the internal faculties. 5. It may be asked, whether feeling produces ideas of consisten- cy, of hardness, of softness, of solidity and fluidity, of weight and resistance ? I think it does not. For the mind, to examine these qualities of bodies, employs the muscular system, rather than the sense of feeling properly so called. There is also no proportion between the faculty of measuring such qualities, and the sense of feeling, or the muscular system. Moreover, the sense of feeling being lost, if the muscular power remain, we may perceive weight and consistency. Now the muscles are excited by internal causes- and therefore ideas of weight, resistance and consistency are, in my opinion, the result of some internal faculty. I once for all 36 282 PHRENOLOGY. observe generally, that when any function results from the active state of an external sense, the faculty which conceives the idea is internal. We have seen above, that the faculties which take cog- nizance of extent and size, form and number, are internal. In this manner we may also conceive how internal faculties employ differ ent external senses, if that be possible, and how sometimes they can make use only of a single sense. The mind, for instance, wishes to move the body from one place to another, and this can be done only by means of the muscular system ; the mind wishes to perceive music, and this also can be done only by means of the auditory nerve; but the mind wishes to perceive the size or form of a body, and this may then be done either by the sense of sight or by that of feeling. Notwithstanding these modifications, it re- mains always certain that every reaction of the mind upon ex- ternal bodies has its cause in some internal faculty, while the sensations, which result from the passive state of the five external senses, constitute their immediate sphere of activity. Taste. No feeling and no intellectual faculty having been supposed to be derived from the sense of taste, there is no occasion to speak of this sense here. Smell. A great number of physiologists ascribe to the sense of smell the surprising faculty by means of which many animals discover and return to their dwellings from very great distances; but there are many facts of this kind which cannot be explained by smell alone. A dog, for example, at the end of several months, and from a distance of more than a hundred leagues, finds his former dwelling and master, though he has been carried away in a coach; though it has rained repeatedly during this interval of time ; though he has gone by water and comes back by land ; though he is obli- EXTERNAL SENSES. 283 ged to make circuits instead of taking the nearest way; and though the wind has changed in all directions. Pigeons, likewise, though transported to a distance of twenty or fifty leagues, and shut up for several weeks, return to their former cotes; the falcon of Iceland, confined for many months, often flies away in the first moment of its liberation : these, and similar phenomena, cannot be explained by the sense of smell. It is necessary to admit another superior faculty, sometimes called the sixth sense. Hearing. A very common opinion is, that music and language are results of the sense of hearing. But this is not the case. I shall first show that this sense cannot produce music. Le Cat, Ackermann and others, think that the cochlea is the most important part of the ear, and the principal instrument of the musical faculty. The latter has accordingly maintained that man alone had the cochlea. Different quadrupeds, however, possess this part even more perfect than man, as sheep, cats, dogs and hogs, and these animals certain- ly are not fond of music. Hence, the opinion of Ackermann and of Le Cat is erroneous. Besides, birds, whose ear is almost des- titute of this part, sing. Le Cat, aware of this contradiction, an- swered, that the whole skull in birds is more sonorous than in quadrupeds, because it is less covered with muscles; he thinks that if nature had joined a cochlea in addition, they would have been still more sensible to melodious sounds, and as passionately fond ot" music as almost all animals are of food ; but, continues he, as birds are destitute of the cochlea, their musical talent depends more on their throat. Le Cat is mistaken : there is a great number of singing birds whose skulls are covered proportionately with more muscles than those of some quadrupeds, the ant-eater, for instance. The heads of the goldfinch, bulfinch, chaffinch, linnet, &c., are covered with considerable muscles, while that of the green wood- pecker, which certainly is not a melodious bird, is almost destitute of them. The heads of the hoarse March thrush, of the monoto- 284 PHRENOLOGY. nous cuckoo, of the miserable chatterer of Bohemia, &c, are not covered with more muscles than the skull of the sweet mocking bird, of the melodious black bird, arid of the vineyard thrush, with its delightful song. If we suppose that the whole skull of birds is sonorous, the only consequence to be drawn from it would be, that a weak sound is greatly strengthened in them ; but why certain birds are so fond of singing, and why some nightingales continue their song till they die from exhaustion, would be quite inexplica- ble. Hearing in general cannot produce music, because there is no proportion either in animals or in man between it and musical talents. Many hear very acutely, and are yet insensible to music. Among birds, the female hears as well as the male ; if hearing then produce music, why does not she also sing ? Among men there are some whose hearing is very obtuse, and whose talent for music is very considerable. Finally, hearing cannot produce music, be- cause hearing perceives only tones which are already produced. The first musician produced music from an internal impulse, and that music of course he had never previously heard. Singing birds, moreover, which have been hatched by strange females, sing natu- rally and without any instruction the song of their species, as soon as the internal organ of the faculty is active. Hence the males of every species preserve their natural song though they have been brought up in the society of individuals of different kinds ; hence, also, musicians who have lost their hearing continue to compose ; hence likewise the deaf and dumb have an innate feeling of meas- ure and cadence. Le Cat confounds the crying of dogs at the sound of a hunting horn, and the stamping and neighing of horses at the blast of a trumpet, with the faculty of music. If it were, we must allow that fishes, reptiles, and even spiders which are allured by sound, are sensible to music. Buffon, Dumas, Bichat, and others, think that the talent of music depends" on the equality of the power of hearing with both ears. If, however, inequality of power in the ears sufficed to destroy the perfection of the musical ear, a good EXTERNAL SENSES. 285 musician would be extremely rare; for by far the greatest number of men hear better with one ear than with the other. Dr. T. Brown compares the pleasure of music in the ear, with tickling in the nerves of touch. Now some persons are ticklish, others are not. So some persons have a musical ear, others have not. This is mere assertion ; and refuted by observations already mentioned. We therefore maintain that hearing does not produce music. It is, however, necessary to perceive and to execute it; but this con- sideration belongs to the chapter on the sphere of activity of each faculty, and here I intend only to prove that hearing cannot pro- duce music. Some authors derive music and the vocal powers of birds from the larynx. But if the larynx gives the instinct to sing, why do not all animals endowed with this part manifest the faculty ? Cu- vier has also found that the larynx of many birds which sing, and of others which do not, is similar in structure. What difference is there between the throats of the females and males of the same species ? Is there even in man any proportion between the agree- ableness of the voice and musical talents ? Nay, have not many individuals great musical talent and little voice ; and do not others sing very agreeably without excelling in music ? Music, therefore, is neither the result of hearing nor of the voice. It is also a very common opinion that hearing alone, or hearing and voice conjointly, produce the faculty of speech. The best way of refuting this error is to inquire in what language consists, and how it is produced ? Language in general is the medium by which sensations and ideas are communicated, and this may be effected by sounds, gestures, or other signs. Language, farther, may be divided into two kinds : natural and artificial, or conven- tional. It is a natural law that the internal faculties of man and animals, as soon as they are active, manifest themselves by the media be- tween them and the external world,—the five external senses, and muscular motion. These external manifestations take place accord- ing to determinate laws, and though modified in every species of 286 PHRENOLOGY. animal, they are always conformable to certain kinds of sensations or ideas ; they constitute the natural language. The horse neighs, the lamb bleats, the cow lows, the child cries, &c. according to their wants. This natural language is general, because all animals require to communicate their sensations, were it only for sexual purposes. Animals have only natural language, which consists partly of sounds and partly of gestures, like the natural language of man. But man has, besides his natural language, the faculty of produc- ing arbitrary signs, whether sounds or gestures. Animals, on the contrary, are destitute of the power of producing arbitrary signs, though they have also that of learning those of man. I shall, here- after, consider the faculty which produces arbitrary signs, and that which learns them. I here intend only to prove that neither hear- ing nor voice produces the faculty of speech, and that both stand in the same relation to language as they do to music, that is, that they are only certain intermedia or means of manifestation. There are animals which can pronounce words, imitate various sounds, and hear very well, but which, nevertheless, have no arbitrary language. Some imperfect idiots also hear and pronounce with facility the words taught them, but cannot maintain a conversation Their mode of communication or their language becomes consistent in proportion to their internal faculties. Moreover, if orators and poets become insane, their eloquence is changed into incoherent raving. It is therefore evident that the faculty of speech does not result primitively from the voice and hearing. Besides the faculties of speech and music, there are others still which act upon the external world by means of hearing, and which are commonly attributed to this sense. Here I must mention an error which was once very common, and into which even Kant and Herder have fallen ; namely, that it is impossible to commu- nicate any abstract notion to the deaf and dumb. Le Cat says, that the deaf are more unfortunate than the blind, because many truths are heard and very few are seen. Herder even thought that the deaf and dumb imitate all they see done, whether good or evil EXTERNAL SENSES. 287 These and similar erroneous opinions result partly from the com- mon mistake, that our sensations and notions are produced by the external senses, that nothing exists in the mind except what passes by them, and partly also from supposing that arbitrary vocal lan- guage produces sensations and ideas. It is, however, certain, that all the internal faculties may exist without hearing ; and, conse- quently, that deaf persons in whom this sense alone is wanting may manifest all the other faculties; they are destitute only of the means of communication which hearing supplies, and are, therefore, obliged to make use of others. Hence they impart their sensations and ideas, that is, they speak by gestures. 'Sight. We have still to examine whether sight produces any intellectual faculty. It is commonly supposed that the art of painting is de- rived from the sense of sight; and it is certainly true that eyes are necessary to perceive colors, as are ears to perceive sounds ; but the art of painting no more consists in the perception of colors, than music in the apprehension of sounds. Sight, therefore, and the faculty of painting bear no proportion to each other. The sight of many animals is more perfect than that of man, yet they do not paint; and even among mankind, the talent of painting cannot be measured by the acuteness of sight. Great painters never at- tribute their power to their eyes. They say, it is not the eye, but the understanding which perceives the harmony of colors. From all these considerations it follows, that many intellectual faculties, which have been attributed to the five external senses, do not belong to them. 288 PHRENOLOGY. On the Sphere of Activity of the External Senses. The external senses destined to bring man and animals into com- munication with the external world may be divided into two sorts. By means of the first two in number, we are acquainted with ex- ternal bodies when they touch the sentient organs immediately. These are touch and taste. The second, including the remaining senses, perceives remote bodies. I do not say that perception or sensation can take place in a sense which is not affected by some immediate impression: this is an indispensable condition; but to say that we are acquainted with remote bodies and their qualities, is not to say that we perceive without impressions. This latter phrase would be contradictory and absurd. We perceive remote bodies either by particles detached from them, and carried to a sentient organ, as to the olfactory nerve, or we perceive them by intermedia, as light and air. In both cases it is certain that man and animals become acquainted with remote bodies and their qual- ities. In general only five external senses are spoken of, but it is ne- cessary to speak wTjth greater precision. I therefore first separate the general expression, sensation, from the determinate sensation of hunger and thirst; secondly, from voluntary motion, to which voice belongs ; and in the third place, from the sense of feeling as well as from touch. I consider the word sensation as an expres- sion altogether general. Every act of consciousness, or every perception of an impression, whether external or internal, is sen- sation. Hunger and thirst, then, constitute a particular class of sensations attached to particular nerves ; and voluntary motion ought not to be confounded with the sense of feeling as is generally done. For many years I have been convinced, by anatomical, physiological and pathological proofs, that the nerves of motion and feeling are quite different. This difference is spoken of by Herophilus, who believed that it must exist, as voluntary motion EXTERNAL SENSES. 289 is sometimes impossible, while feeling remains or is even increased in acuteness, and as feeling is oftentimes lost while voluntary mo- tion continues. In modern days, Reil has stated that the medulla of the nerves produces sensation, and their investment motion ; but entire nerves—nerves consisting of both these parts—are distrib- uted to the muscles in which there is motion, and to the skin in which there is sensation. Besides the pathological proof of the difference between the nerves of motion and of feeling, consider- ed in all my publications, since 1815, the physiological and anato- mical reasons made me believe in the existence of these two sorts of nerves. As to the details of this discussion and of my claims to priority of this doctrine, I refer the reader to the third section of my work on the Anatomy of the Brain. Thus, the func- tions of the muscles exist independently of the five external senses, and are only combined with these that they may be aided in ac- complishing their offices. From the preceding considerations it results, that the greater number of functions, commonly attributed to the senses, do not belong to them, but depend on the existence of internal faculties. The external senses as intermedia of the ex- hibition of mental powers, which they are, in fact, have certain functions that may be called mediate, while those which the senses themselves suffice to perform, may be styled immediate. In other words, the immediate perceptions depend on the external senses, while the mediate functions permit the acquisition of determinate ideas conceived by internal faculties. According to the observations in the first section of this work, on sensibility, the brain seems to be necessary to every kind of perception, even to that of the immediate functions of the exter- nal senses ; but it is not yet ascertained, though it is probable, that one fundamental power, inherent in a particular part of the brain, knows and conceives, as sensations, all the varied impressions made on the external senses. Some phrenologists think that each exter- nal sense has a peculiar portion of brain for this end, and that the combined action of its nerve and of this cerebral part is necessary to the accomplishment of its functions. That the nerve of taste 37 290 PHRENOLOGY. and a portion of brain, for instance, are necessary to perceive savors; the olfactory nerve and a cerebral part to distinguish odors, &c. I do not believe that consciousness happens without brain, but I see no reason to surmise that the immediate functions of each external sense require a particular portion of the brain in order to be recognised as determinate sensations. Let us now consider the immediate functions of each individual sense Immediate Functions of the Sense of Feeling. Feeling is the most extensive of all the senses ; it is continued not only over the whole external surface of the body, but even over the intestinal canal. It produces the most general percep- tions of pain and pleasure, sensations of temperature, of dryness and moisture. All its other functions which procure notions of existing objects and their relations, are only mediate. In my opinion, even the ideas of roughness and smoothness belong to an internal facul- ty, namely, configuration. The mediate function of the sense of feeling may be called touch, of which the sphere of activity is very considerable and important: it is particularly combined with the nerves of voluntary motion, and the two kinds together may assist the functions of all internal faculties, as well affective as intellectual. Hence the reason why nerves of feeling and motion are most inti- mately connected with the organs of the affective and intellectual faculties. The five external senses, it may, indeed, be readily con- ceived, should be in connexion with those cerebral organs which they particularly assist; and farther, as the nerves of motion and of feeling may aid all internal faculties, that they should be in connex- ion with all the internal organs, just as the nerves of feeling and motion, mutually aidant, are connected with each other. EXTERNAL SENSES. 291 Taste. Taste is the second sense by means of which man and animals are made acquainted with external bodies, when these touch the sentient organ immediately. After feeling, this sense seems to be the most general and the most indispensable of all to living beings which consciously take food. It seems also that it is active early in life. The fifth pair of nerves, branches of which are distributed to the membrane covering the palate, the velum pendulum, the pharynx, and chiefly to the tongue, is of great size in new-born children, as are the nerves of motion and feeling also. An opinion commonly prevails that the acuteness of taste de- pends not only on the nervous papillae of the tongue, but also on its flexibility, softness and moisture. Ackermann, who derives the perfection of the humarl mind from the acuteness of the five senses, asserts that the nerves of taste are proportionally more considerable in man than in animals ; that the tongue of man is the most flexi- ble and soft, and that its nervous papillae are covered with the finest skin. In many animals, however, as in the dog, monkey, &c. the skin of the tongue is as thin and fine, and its structure as flexible as in man. The mobility of the tongue has, indeed, less relation to the taste than to the function of speech. The principal condition to an acute taste is certainly large gustatory nerves spread over a considerable surface ; but in this point many animals surpass man. In some, the lingual nerve as well as the whole fifth pair, is much larger than in the human kind; the nervous papillae of the tongue are also more numerous and their apices more extensive. Though the tongue of several species is covered with a very rough skin, they distinguish and select certain plants conformable to their taste, and reject others which are contrary to it. Moreover, when we see that eating is to animals the most exquisite and permanent pleasure, and that great numbers pass almost their entire existence in eating or ruminating, we shall with difficulty deny them a taste more perfect than that of man. 292 PHRENOLOGY. I cannot agree with those naturalists, who maintain that the taste of birds is very obtuse. Blumenbach has shown that the organ of taste is large, and the sense very exquisite in the duck. A great number of birds do not swallow their food suddenly; the titmouse, for example, laps it. The greater number of birds which live upon insects, seeds, and berries, crush and bruise them. If we present the canary bird, the bulfinch, or nightingale with different sorts of food, each of them will choose that which is most agree- able. If we give ants' eggs to young nightingales, many rather die of hunger than eat, because unacquainted with that sort of food; and if we even put them into their bill, they commonly drop them; the eggs, if crushed, however, are swallowed with the greatest avid- idity ; it is evident from this that their taste is very acute. Even the birds which swallow their food suddenly, as fowls, pigeons and others, distinguish different berries and seeds with the extremity of their bill. If we mix the seed of vetches with that of robinia caragana, pigeons and fowls will pick them up indiscriminately, but will always throw away the latter. These birds therefore like oth- ers, prefer one sort of food. Tame storks, accustomed to catch rats and mice thrown towards them, jerk these several times into the air and catch them again in their bill, in order to crush before swallowing them. If we cast a toad to them, however, they will catch still, but immediately drop it. They also eat bees and large flies greedily ; kbut regularly reject any other insect which does not please their palate. Such also is the case with swallows and other birds which live on insects. These observations render it improbable that every insoluble body is insipid, or that every substance to affect the organ of taste must be dissolved in the mucus which covers the tongue. In ma- ny physiological writings, the axiom of chemistry, corpora non agunt nisi soluta, is applied to the organ of taste. ' The tongue,' says Richerand, ' is covered by a mucous, whitish yellow, or bilious slime. This covering, more or less thick, prevents the immediate contact of sapid particles, and we have only a false idea of tastes. All aliments seem bitter if a bilious disposition exist, or insipid if EXTERNAL SENSES. 293 there be a superabundance of mucus.' The tongue, however, it appears, may perceive many spirituous, oleaginous, or other im- pressions produced by seeds and insects, without their being dis- solved and mixed with the mucus which covers it. M. Dumeril, Professor of Physiology at Paris, maintains (in an essay on the smell of fishes) that fishes are destitute of taste ; this sense, according to him, being supplied by that of smell. Fishes, says he, have not the hypoglossal nerve, and the continual pressure of the water must blunt the sensibility of the lingual nerve. Now supposing that fishes were destitute of the hypoglossal nerve, it would not follow that they had no taste ; for the hypoglossal serves only for the motion of the tongue, while a branch of the fifth pair which exists in fishes, is the sole organ of taste. The tongues of many fishes are covered with numerous nervous papillae, and at the point are even moveable, flexible, and soft. Hence there is not only no anatomical reason to deny taste to fishes, but it is even from their possessing this sense that they may be taken with a bait. Again, if the pressure of water blunt their taste, why should it not blunt their smell also ? But pressure produces no such effect; the sole of the foot does not lose its sensibility, though pressed on during a long life. In short, this opinion of Dumeril seems more remarkable for its singularity than for its correctness. The very lowest tribes of the animal world must also have nerves of taste. Insects prefer different kinds of food, though their gusta- tory nerves have not yet been discovered. Neither in man nor in animals can taste be considered as an in- fallible guide to the wholesomeness of the body tasted. Unsavory articles may be wholesome, while substances which please the pal- ate may act as poisons. The taste of the sick often affords an indication in distinguishing, or in aiding nature in the cure of disease; no good physician, how- ever, will have unbounded confidence in it. The sense of taste is necessarily in most intimate relationship with the whole digestive system. I have already mentioned that this sense is modified in different kinds of animals, and in different individuals of the same 294 PHRENOLOGY kind, even in different ages, and in the healthy or diseased state. As the organ of taste is the first developed, so it seems to lose its activity last. Old persons commonly love good cheer, which is also necessary for them. When sight has failed, when the ear no longer does its office, when the skin has become stiff and almost insensible, the aged may often be seen eating and drinking as heart- ily and with as much pleasure as their grand-children. The sphere of activity of this sense is confined to sensations of taste; that is, it perceives only impressions of savor. Mediately, it assists nutrition. The nerves of taste have the most intimate connexion with those necessary to the motion of the jaws, with those of the organ of voice, and with the glossopharyngeal nerve. Accordingly the organs on which these nerves are expanded exert the greatest mutual influence. Smell. By means of smell the external world begins to act upon man and animals from a distance. Odorous particles detached, inform them of the existence of particular bodies. Several physiologists regard smell as a completion or a finer and higher degree of taste. But the system of the olfactory nerve is particular. It is, as it were, the explorer and the guide of the sense of taste, and must exist very low in the scale; insects are attracted by odors, but their olfactory nerve has not been discovered. Dumeril, supposing fishes to have no taste, regards smell as its substitute; and in support of his opinion maintains, that odoriferous particles cannot be transmitted by water. We have already seen that the organ of taste exists in fishes, and it is not probable that nature has produced any organic apparatus without an appropriate object. It is besides strange to maintain that odoriferous particles are not transmitted by water, as fish of various sorts, lobsters, &c are taken by bait. It is remarkable that this sense does not exist in cetaceous animals, which occupy so high a place in the scale of being. Dumeril thinks also that their taste supplies the place of smell. EXTERNAL SENSES. 295 It is admitted that many animals excel man in acuteness of smell; their olfactory apparatus being much larger. But this occurs in- differently among the most stupid and the most intelligent animals —in.oxen and hogs, in dogs and horses. Cuvier maintains that the olfactory nerve is larger in carnivorous than in herbivorous animals; but there is no relation between the acuteness of smell, and the instinct to eat flesh or vegetables. Man, who is omnivorous, and the sea-calf which lives only on fish, have both very small olfactory nerves. The turtle, mole, sheep, ox, horse, &c. however different their food is, have an olfactory nerve proportionally larger than the wolf, dog, tiger, &c. Comparative anatomy, therefore, as also comparative physiology, oppose Cu- vier's opinion. Many hundreds of plants supply herbivorous animals with food, while the carnivora live commonly upon a small- er variety of flesh; to distinguish their food, therefore, the organ of smell in herbivorous should be larger than in carnivorous animals. Moreover, if nature endowed carnivorous animals with a very acute smell for the purpose of discovering their prey, it is improbable that she refused the weak victim an equal advantage to enable it to detect and escape its enemies. Odors act powerfully upon the brain; we, therefore, apply stimuli to the olfactory nerves, which often revive sensibility in cases of suspended animation. The smell in its immediate functions perceives odorous particles emanating from external bodies, without any reference to the ob- ject. All functions besides are mediate. It assists the faculty which conceives the existence of the world, and informs man and animals of the existence of food; it assists farther individual pro- pensities, as amativenes, alimentiveness, adhesiveness, philogene- tiveness, &c. To that effect the olfactory nerve seems to have a particular connexion with the anterior lobes, and convolutions of tne brain situated sideways, outwards, and backwards. The nose is near the mouth, taste and smell bearing close relations one to another. 296 PHRENOLOGY. Hearing. Hearing is the second sense which makes man and animals ac- quainted with remote existences, and is the first which perceives external objects by an intermedium, the air. The auditory nerve is found from man down to the cuttle-fish; farther it has not been distinguished, though several animals, lower in the scale, are not destitute of hearing. The auditory apparatus is more complex as animals are more perfect, and this is the case both with the ex- ternal and internal ear. Except Ackermann, all physiologists allow that many animals surpass man in the faculty of hearing. That physiologist, however, deriving human intellectual superiority solely from the external senses, asserts that the hearing of man is the most perfect, on account of the cochlea of his ear, which according to him is the most essential part, and is wanting in animals. But this assertion may be refuted both anatomically and physiologically. First, it is certain that the organ of hearing is more perfect in many animals than in man ; that their external ear is larger, more moveable, and capable of being turned in all directions and oppos ed to soniferous undulations. Moreover, the auditory apparatus of many animals has large cavities which increase the sonorous vibrations, and which cannot be confounded with the mastoid pro- cess of man; in some, these are empty ; in others they are divi- ded into compartments; and in the ox are composed of many con centric partitions. The auditory nerve is also much larger in many animals, as the ox, horse, stag, sheep, &c. than in man; and the cochlea not only exists among them, but is in many even more perfect than in the human kind. Hence, it is anatomically proved, that the organ of hearing is in many animals larger and more per- fect than in man. The same may be demonstrated physiologically. In observing the functions of animals, we may convince ourselves that many of them perceive sounds which are imperceptible to man. The sense of hearing is not active in new-born children, but it EXTERNAL SENSES. 297 improves by degrees, and in proportion as its apparatus is devel- oped. In the same way the auditory power declines in propor- tion as the vigor of the organ decreases. Several authors maintain that the deafness of old persons depends on the blunted sensibility of the auditory nerve ; they think that repeated impressions exhaust sensibility. It is, indeed, true, that sensibility is blunted and ex- hausted by too great exercise ; but I think that, in the ordinary state of health, dulness of hearing in old persons depends on the decrease of the auditory apparatus. In the young and healthy, the auditory nerve is expanded in a humor which occupies the cavities of the internal ear; this in the aged diminishes at the same time that the nerve itself decreases. Hence, when Pinel, during the severe winter of 1798, caused the skulls of several old women who had lost their hearing to be frozen and then opened, he found the cavities of the internal ear perfectly empty, while they were filled with ice in younger persons who had died with this sense unim- paired. The immediate functions of the sense of hearing are confined to the perception of sounds ; yet it assists a great number of internal faculties which are commonly attributed to it. It potently aids the affective, as well as the intellectual faculties of space, individuality, tune, speech, and through the instrumentality of these, all the other powers of the mind. The auditory nerve, indeed, has a nearer connexion with the organs of the feelings than of the intellectual faculties ; it embraces the nervous bundle of the cerebellum, and is connected with the vocal nerves ; the voice called forth by com- mand of the feelings, as well as the natural language of their activ- ity, is more energetic than when summoned by the intellectual faculties to aid them in the expression of their desires. We may conceive that the sense of hearing bears relation to the internal faculties which act by its means; precisely as even exter- nal objects are in harmony with internal faculties, or internal facul- ties with external objects ; as the laws of vibrations, for instance, though they exist in external vibrating objects, are conformable to the laws of the internal faculty of tune ; or as size, number, and 38 298 PHRENOLOGY. succession, which exist in the external world, are in relation to certain internal faculties. Yet this sense, like all others, presents infinite modifications in different beings, even of the same species. Sight. Sight is the second sense which informs man and animals of re mote objects by means of an intermedium, light. Those who attribute the excellence of man's intellectual faculties to the per- fection of his senses, maintain that his sight is better than that of animals. They consider this superiority as a result of the greater distinctness with which they say objects are seen by man ; to the transparency of the diaphanous parts of his eye ; to the irritability of his iris, and to the position of his crystalline lens. Richerand even believes that the pigmentum nigrum impedes and disturbs the distinctness of vision ; and that perhaps on this account animals have false and exaggerated ideas of the power of man. Experi- ence answers these errors. The iris of many animals is very moveable, and they see during both the day and night, and to greater distances than man. The falcon perceives the heron, still invisible- to man ; the eagle, beyond the reach of human sight, sees a hare upon the ground; the turkey and fowl recognise the far dis- tant bird of prey, and warn their surrounding broods, when it is impossible for man to distinguish the enemy. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the sense of sight is more acute in many animals than in man. None of the senses has occupied physiologists and philosophers more than sight and touch ; but these have also been the subjects of the greatest number of errors. Many false notions have been and are still current, in regard to vision. Dr. T. Brown repro- duces various misconceptions of his predecessors. This sense has been said to acquire its faculty either by touch or by habit. But I have already proved, in speaking of the gen- eralities of the external senses, that no one acquires its faculty from any other or from habit. Vision depends on the organization EXTERNAL SENSES. 299 of the eye ; and, according to this, it is weak, energetic, good or bad. Some animals enter the world with perfect eyes, and they see accurately from the first. The butterfly and honey-bee fly on the first attempt through the fields, from flower to flower ; and the partridge and chicken as soon as they have left the shell, run through stubbles and corn, while other animals born blind distinguish size, shape, and distance of bodies, only by slow degrees. This is the case in the human kind. I cannot insist too forcibly on this truth ; every sense has its own laws, and its functions depend on the state of its organization. In the looking-glass we must see ourselves and other objects enlarged, diminished, lengthened, shortened, multiplied, near, distant, and so forth, according to the laws of the reflection of light. Some also maintain, that without the sense of touch our eyes would represent all objects reversed and double : and that the ex- ternal world would seem to be in the eyes, because it is painted on the retina. Objects are actually reversed in the eyes ; but, as Berkeley and Condillac have elucidated, they are not painted on the retina, that nervous expansion is only impinged on by the rays of light. How or why we see objects upright, is not, however, explained. An internal faculty makes animals acquainted with the external world, and they are more disposed to transfer all internal sensations and ideas of external bodies to the outward world, than to concentrate impressions of these inwardly. According to a law of nature, the impressions of our senses are not merely transferred into the external world, but are even carried to the places whence they come. We deem the sonorous body to be in the direction from whence come vibrations of the air. And if animals take wind, they do not look for the impressions received in a direction opposite to that whence they proceed. Impressions of light are also referred to the place whence they emanate ; and, consequently, such as arrive from above are referred upwards, those from below downwards, and the object is thus seen in its right position. No one recollects having in his infancy seen any object reversed, and natural history presents no such example in animals. Accord- 300 PHRENOLOGY. ing to the absurdities into which speculators have run, young birds ought to take the root of a tree for its top. It is unfortunate that natural philosophers and physiologists in examining the functions of the senses, have confined their reasonings to man alone, thus ex- cluding animals entirely. I have now spoken of vision being single, although the impressions are double ; of the eye's capacity to dis- tinguish distance; and shown that animals' inability to measure distances exactly between themselves and external bodies only oc- curs when their eyes are imperfect. Thus the organ of vision has its peculiar faculty, whose manifestations depend on the state of the eye's organization; and vision, like every other sense, is subject to invariable laws of its own. A straight stick, half plunged in water, must needs appear crooked. In a vessel filled with water, we see a stone or other body at the bottom, which is invisible, circumstan- ces remaining the same, with the exception of the vessel being empty. The most learned men, notwithstanding all conviction to the contrary, see images behind the looking-glass, as do parrots and monkeys. We see our persons reversed in the concavity of a spoon, our right hand on the left side, and our left on the right; but in a conic mirror, convex in the circumference and concave from the basis to the apex, we see our persons also reversed, but the right side opposite the right, and the left opposite the left, as in a common looking-glass. We know that the last two in an avenue of trees are as distant from each other as the nearest, yet the distance appears to decrease as they are more remote. A square tower from afar off appears round ; and mighty trees, in the distance, seem no larger than small bushes at hand. All these and similar conceptions are necessary, and in accordance with the laws of optics. Those who reproach the sense of sight with committing the errors I have refuted, call to their aid the experiment of Cheselden on a person born blind. As in Cheselden's own account of the experiment, there is no mention of double or reversed vision after the operation, Le Cat therefore said, that these persons were ac- quainted with the situation of objects by touch, and consequently EXTERNAL SENSES 301 could not easily be misled by their sight when it was acquired. I, however, ask why they were not acquainted with the size and shape of objects ? and why, though feeling informed them that ob- jects touched not the surface of their bodies, they still seemed to touch their eyes ? This even happened in Cheselden's case of the blind-born individual who underwent the second operation twelve months after the first; and who, consequently, was already acquaint- ed by the one eye with external bodies, and with their size and shape ; yet the testimony neither of his touch nor of his sound eye was sufficient to persuade his other eye that portraits were not elevated objects. Diderot has very well answered this reproach made against sight. Pictures, says he, produced the same effect upon savages when they saw them for the first time. They took portraits for living persons; they spoke to them, and were much astonished at receiv- ing no answer. We ought to consider, continues Diderot, that vision cannot be perfect before the organization is perfect. The hu- mors of the eye must have become clear, the iris must be conveni- ently dilatable, the retina neither too little nor too highly sensible, and the whole eye-ball fit for exerting all the particulars necessary to distinct vision. He also said very well; sight is not necessary in order to be sure by touch that any substance exists ; why should touch be necessary to sight in order to be sure by sight that the same thing exists ? Mr. Wardrop's case* of a lady who was blind from the earliest age, and received sight by the operation of an artificial pupil, when she had reached her 46th year, confirms every one of my ideas on * I remain thankful to Mr. Wardrop, though I cannot help being surprised by his omitting my name in his paper, read before the Royal Society of London, on the 15th June, 1826, and inserted in their philosophical transactions. He, however knew that I indicated the few experiments which were made in order to ascertain what notions the lady had of size, form, position, color, distance and motion. Meet- ing me before the house where she lived, he spoke to me of the case, and kindly offered to bring me to the patient. No one who knows my anxiety about the knowledge of men, will doubt that I immediately availed myself of his kind of- fer. It was on the third of March, 1826, and, as I was told, fourteen days after the last operation. 302 PHRENOLOGY. the functions of sight. As Miss D**** could only see with one eye it was superfluous to ask her about double vision. She per- ceived external objects, but stated to be in moving about more un- easy than she was before the operation, from fear of hurting her- self against the objects. She never fancied that she saw them in her eye, though she saw their distance very imperfectly. She at once distinguished large bodies from small ones ; but when I saw her the first time, she seemed unable to discern well their forms. Variously colored, viz. yellow, red, white, blue, and greenish wa- fers were shown to her, the different colors produced different sen- sations in her mind ; and that of yellow was the most agreeable. It did not seem prudent to fatigue the eye too much, and we con- fined our experiments to one more with respect to motion. I placed a glass of water on the table, requesting her to take it. On approaching her hand towards and near it, I moved it to a greater distance ; upon which she immediately said, ' you move it, you take it away.' Mr. Wardrop and the patient allowed me to see her again on the 8th of March. Meanwhile I had marked with ink on paper several figures of different forms, some of the same form with dif- ferent size, such as a small and large circle, a small and large square, &c. She easily perceived the different sizes, and after having been desired to draw with the finger on her other hand, the forms she drew under the names long, round, square, similar forms were shown to her, and she pointed to them exactly. She was sensible of number. In order to ascertain that she saw the objects in their natural and not in a reversed position, nor the right side to the left, and vice versa, I had prepared a figure larger on one end and pointed on the other, and as she distinguished the size of both ends, I bent now the thinner end upward and then downward, and she indicated each time as the position shown to her was in reality. Another figure with a thinner end communicated with the pointed end of the former figure, and she never confounded the left and right side with each other. Several differently colored ribbons were presented to her eye; she perceived different impressions, EXTERNAL SENSES. 303 and gave a decided preference to some of them, to yellow for in- stance, and then to pale pink. She called the two latter shades pretty. I relate merely the particulars as I observed them in con- nexion with phrenology ; the rest of this highly interesting case, which claims the attention both of physiologists and philosophers, may be seen in Mr. Wardrop's paper. The immediate function of sight is confined to the perception of light. All its other offices are mediate. The eyes may assist all the external senses, all the affective powers, and all the intellectual faculties. The connexion of the optic nerve with the brain also shows that sight chiefly assists its posterior, lateral, and anterior part. Thus, the spheres of immediate activity of the five senses are very limited : feeling perceives only dryness, moisture, and tem- perature ; taste savors ; smell odors ; the ears sound; and the eyes light: all their other functions are only mediate, that is, inter nal faculties by means of the external senses perceive various im- pressions, conceive peculiar ideas, recognise the existence of bodies and their qualities, and again act upon the external world, by means of the senses and voluntary motion. The chapter on the external senses as it is published in the first volume of the large work, entitled Anatomical Physiologic du Systeme, fyc. has been elaborated by the joined exertions of Gall and myself, during the first years of our stay in Paris. The read- er will perceive that since that time I have limited the functions of the external senses, and divided them into immediate and mediate. 304 PHRENOLOGY. CHAPTER II. Genus II. of the Intellectual Powers. Perceptive Faculties. Br this name I distinguish certain faculties necessary to acquire those notions of the external world, which the five senses cannot produce. I shall in the first place make some general remarks upon the forehead, or frontal region of the brain, in which their organs are placed. In comparing one kind of animal with another, and with man, we find that the forehead is developed in relation to the intellect- ual functions. Animals are still commonly said to act by instinct; there is no doubt, however, that many of them know the objects which surround them, remember events which have happened, and modify their actions according to these. An old fox having escap- ed many snares, and knowing that he is watched, is more cautious, and far slyer than a young one, in his approaches to the poultry- yard. A bird, which has had its nest once destroyed, conceives the necessity of secreting its second more carefully, even of con- structing it with greater nicety than the first. A dog resists its in- stinct to pursue a hare, because it recollects the lashing received on a former occasion for having followed its inclination. Similar facts might be infinitely multiplied. Those cited prove, that ani- mals are not subjected to an absolute necessity in their actions, but that they are in a certain degree intellectual and susceptible of edu- cation. Now the size of their foreheads coincides with the degree of their understanding. The brain in animals, low down in the scale, instead of rising and forming a forehead, is even inclined downwards. • By degrees it becomes horizontal, then elevated, and forms a forehead of greater or less capacity ; finally, in man, it is the most largely developed, and expands into a forehead which, in some cases, even projects beyond the plane of the face. Phys- EXTERNAL SENSES. 305 iognomists have universally given much attention to the develope- ment of the forehead. Lavater has composed a scale of foreheads from the frog to the Apollo Belvidere, with a view to prove the relation between the front lobes of the brain, and the intellectual operations. It is a curious fact, that domestic animals have the forehead more developed than wild ones, and that animals are tameable in propor- tion as their forehead is developed. The cause of the tameableness of animals has long been sought after; and it nas been asked, whether they are tame by nature, or subdued and made subservient to man by means of his understanding ? It was long believed, and many philosophers and physiologists still think, that the state of domesticity among animals is solely the work of man. But this opinion is erroneous; otherwise why should we find it impossible to tame every species, though we be better acquainted with their manners now than were the men of two thousand years ago, and consequently better able to adapt external circumstances to effect this end ? It is indeed possible to tame individual wild animals, a single chamois, one tiger, and so on, but never the whole race of chamois or tigers. The hunting tigers of Tippoo Saib, which were brought to the tower of London after the fall of Seringapatam, seemed tame only to their Indian keeper, and to the persons they had been long accustomed to see ; but they were with difficulty retained so, and ultimately became fierce and untractable. The young of undomesticated animals, kept in confinement, are always wild, and fly into solitude ; whilst certain creatures are domestic against our wishes ; mice every where infest the abodes of man ; and dogs, in Egypt, regarded as impure and having no master, nevertheless haunt villages and towns ; never stray far from hu- man dwellings, and consequently are originally tame and domestic. Gall speaks of a peculiar organ of educability and tameableness in animals ; he shows a scale to prove them more tameable in pro- portion as their foreheads are higher. The latter fact in itself is true ; but Gall's explanation seems to be a mistake. The forehead is certainly not occupied by a single organ. I think that all the ii- 39 306 PHRENOLOGY. tellectual faculties, as also the feeling of benevolence, contribute to render animals tameable. Gall himself, in speaking of the organ of benevolence, says, that animals endowed with it are more docile and more serviceable than others. I consider all such general observations on, and comparisons of the foreheads of different ani- mals, as a striking manner of showing, that the state of develope- ment of the front region of the brain coincides with the degree of the understanding. All philosophers have made the analysis of the intellectual fac- ulties an object of their disquisitions, and all physiognomists have laid great stress on the influence of the forehead. Yet the analysis of the intellectual powers, however various, even that given by Gall is still very defective, and the determination and description of their organs are very inaccurate. I have discovered five organs in the forehead, in addition to those mentioned by Gall, and have introduced a more accurate delineation of the forehead in general, and of the greater number of its organs in particular. The common observer attaches himself to the perpendicular or retreating state of the forehead, in order to decide about its greater or smaller developement, and it is a common objection to Phrenol- ogy that such and such persons have retreating foreheads, and yet are very clever. The forehead will always appear retreating when the lower portion is more developed than the upper; yet the whole forehead may be small, large, or of various sizes. The same may be said of perpendicular foreheads, which happens when the upper portion is as prominent as the lower. Some perpendic- ular foreheads are exceedingly small and shallow, and their mental dispositions very limited. Hence a perpendicular or retreating forehead is no fixed indication of talent or its defect. In order to judge of the size of the forehead, or of the anterior lobes of the brain, it is not sufficient to look at persons in a front view, but it is necessary to view them in profile, since the anterior lobes, or the organs of the intellectual faculties, begin with con- structiveness, where the frontal bone meets the sphenoidal. The portion from constructiveness forward is the forehead. Now, in a EXTERNAL SENSES. 307 retreating forehead it may be very long or deep at the lower por- tion, and a perpendicular forehead may be very short or shallow; so that the moral and physical appearances correspond with each other. What I have said of the frontal sinus, in the section on Craniol- ogy, must be remembered here, as far as the frontal sinuses impede the examination of several organs of perceptive faculties. It is a remarkable fact, that the forehead increases very early, and continues, when exercised, to grow very late in life. I had positive observations that after the age of thirty-six and forty years, the forehead has increased an inch in size. I begin with considering the perceptive faculties, and I take the following view. Several make us acquainted with the existence of individual objects and their physical qualities, others perceive the different conditions and relations concerning place, time, number and order. Locke and Reid made a distinction between primary and sec- ondary qualities of matter, Locke called primary qualities exten- sion, divisibility, figure, motion, solidity, hardness, softness and fluidity; and secondary qualities, sound, color, taste, smell, heat or cold. Dr. Reid adds, that our senses give us a direct and dis- tinct notion of the primary qualities in themselves, but only a rela- tive and obscure notion of the secondary qualities. Dr. T. Brown is against this distribution of primary and secon- dary qualities altogether, and admits with Kant, and other philoso- phers, that all sensations are only relative, and that we never know the things, or their qualities in themselves. I also consider all knowledge of man, as mere phenomenal; but give a new analysis of the powers of sensations and perceptions. I greatly limit the immediate functions of the external senses, and adopt various internal powers of perception. i 308 PHRENOLOGY. intellectual faculties, which perceive the existence of external objects and their physical qualities. XXII. Organ of Individuality. The first conception our understanding must have of external objects is their existence; to acquire such knowledge, the external senses are not of themselves sufficient, although without an impres- sion on them this conception cannot be determinate. The organ of the faculty which procures knowledge of external objects must therefore be considered the first in respect to the order in which the intellectual faculties operate accordingly. I speak, under the name Individuality, of the faculty which re- cognises the existence of individual beings, which embodies several elements into one being or object, as tree, house, man, army, navy, &c. whose activity and presence are denoted by substantives, or abstract terms in language, and which in all probability consti- tutes the personal identity. I acknowledge that objects are insep- arable from their qualities, and that these constitute objects, but I think it possible to conceive an existence or entity without know- ing its qualities, as God, the mind. Individuality produces what Dr. Reid called perception, as dif- ferent from sensation, but coextensive with it; that is, he under- stood by sensation merely the feeling of the mind, which immedi- ately follows the impression from without, on any of our organs of sense; and by perception the reference of the sensation to its ex- ternal corporeal cause. Certain particles of adverse matter, for instance, act on the olfactory nerve, and produce a peculiar smell; this is sensation, according to Dr. Reid, but when the peculiar sensation is referred to an object, for instance, a rose, then there is perception. This is the effect of individuality. This faculty takes cognizance of all existences, objects, things, and beings. Aristotle introduced the images, ideas or phantoms in the mind, in order to explain the action of sensual organs on the ORGAN OF INDIVIDUALITY. 309 mind. This conception is exploded. Impressions alone are ad- mitted, since sounds and odors can give no images. The figura- tive and metaphorical language has done harm in philosophy as well as in theology. This faculty prompts those who have it strong, to use their senses with reference to what is around them. It makes them fit for and inclined to observation; it enables them to see and know the particularities or individualities. This faculty, there- fore, is indispensable in every practical line; it prompts to the study of natural history, geology, mineralogy, botany, &c. It is strong in persons, who cultivate any branch of natural science with success, it predominates in those who are satisfied with individual notions of objects without aiming or arriving at principles. It is a fundamental quality of good servants, and good card-players. It assists artists in the knowledge of the particulars of their art; for instance, musicians in the knowledge of the individual notes and keys; an architect in having the particulars of a building present; a mathematician to remember the parts of his calculations. In short, it gives presence of mind of individualities, and reality to our con- ceptions. When it is excessively active, it is like all other powers, liable to be abused, and originates great errors in philosophy, in person- ifying phenomena and abstract ideas, as motion, life, ignorance, wisdom, attention, memory, judgment, &c. &c. When it is small,' the individual fails to observe external objects. He may visit a house, and come away, without knowing what objects were in the room. Such a person walks in the streets, or through the coun- try, and observes nothing. His external senses may be in perfect health, but they are not called into activity; when this observing power is feeble, when this faculty is inactive, persons may be dis- posed to deny the existence of external objects, and not to see objects before them. The skeptical philosophy of Pyrrho and Bishop Berkeley is ac- counted for by the defect of this faculty. It is impossible to those who have it strong to deny existence, in the same way as a person en- dowed with great causality cannot imagine an effect without a cause 310 PHRENOLOGY. The cerebral portion, on which this faculty depends, is situated immediately above the root of the nose between the eyebrows; its greater developement enlarges the forehead at this spot; its elon- gation contributes to the beautiful form of nose called Grecian This organ is developed in early age, and gives to young chil- dren the great tendency to observe the external world, and to be- come acquainted with it. It is therefore advisable to follow this indication of nature, and to make them acquainted with external objects. Some nations have this organ stronger than others ; the English have it larger than the Scots in general, and the French again have it larger than the English. Dr. T. Brown (Lect. xxv. and xxvi.) says, that by smell, taste, sound or sight alone, we could not become acquainted with the existence of corporeal substances ; and that to touch, which pro- cures us the ideas of extension and resistance, we are indebted to refer our sensations to a bodily cause. ' If we had,' says he, ' no sense but that of smell, no sense but that of taste, no sense but that of sound, no sense but that of sight, we could not have known the existence of extended resisting substances, and therefore could not have referred the pleasant or painful sensations of those classes to such external causes, any more than we refer directly to an ex- ternal cause any painful, or pleasing emotion, or other internal affection of the mind.' Dr. Brown had no idea of individuality, nor of the other per- ceptive powers as detailed in Phrenology. XXIII. Organ of Configuration. Gall was desired at Vienna to examine the head of a little girl, who had extreme facility in recollecting persons ; he only found that her eyes were pushed laterally outwards, and that she had a certain squinting look. He then spoke of the organ, whose large size is indicated by distance between the eyes, as that of the sense or memory of persons. Some individuals have indeed an eminent ORGAN OF CONFIGURATION. 311 power of recollecting those persons they have once seen, while others possess such talent in a very slight degree. This difference is perceptible in very early life, and is very remarkable in many tribes of animals. Insects recognise individuals of their own kind and of their peculiar family. Honey-bees distinguish those of their own hive from those of others. In a flock of sheep all lambs know their mothers ; elephants and dogs have occasionally display- ed very striking powers of recognising masters and keepers after having been separated from them for a long time. I consider the faculty under discussion in the following manner : to me there seems to exist an essential and fundamental power, which takes cognizance of configuration generally, and one of whose peculiar applications or offices is recollection of persons ; for persons are known by their forms. I separate the faculty which appreciates configuration from that of individuality, since we may admit the existence of a being without taking its figure into consideration. Individuality may be excited by every one of the external senses, by smell and hearing as well as by feeling and sight, while the two latter senses alone assist the faculty of config- uration. It is this power which disposes us to give a figure to every being and conception of our minds ; that of an old man, to God ; to death, that of a skeleton, and so on. The knowledge of configuration, or form, is essential to animals and men, with respect to their connexion with external objects. This power is active from the earliest age. Children are delighted with pictures, and at the age of maturity, pictures, dioramas, panoramas, cosmoramas, are still objects of delight. Nature, therefore, is always the best book to read. The organ of configuration is situated in the internal angle of the orbit; if large, it pushes the eye-ball towards the external angle a little outwards and downwards. (PI x. fig. 2. xxiii.) It varies in size in whole nations. Many of the Chinese I have seen in London had it much developed. It is commonly large in the French, and contributes to bestow their skill in producing certain articles of industry. Combined with constructiveness, it invents the 312 PHRENOLOGY patterns of dress-makers and milliners. It leads poets to describe portraits and configurations, and if in a high degree of developement, it induces those who make collections of pictures and engravings to prefer portraits. It is essential to portrait-painters. Crystallogra- phy also depends on it; and to me it appears, that conceptions of smoothness and roughness are acquired by its means. Dr. T. Brown thought that the notion of figure belongs to that of extension, and at the same time that we cannot separate length and breadth from color. XXIV. Organ of Size. Notions of the dimensions or size of external objects seem to me peculiar. There is no relation between such conceptions, and the senses of touch, or sight, or any internal faculty of the mind. On the other hand, the idea of dimension cannot be confounded with that of configuration, for bodies of similar forms may be of very dif- ferent sizes, and vice versa; and these two sorts of ideas are not acquired with like facility. Some easily judge of form and cannot distinguish the proportions of size. The power of size is important to geometricians, architects, carpenters, mechanicians, portrait painters, and to every one who measures dimensions. It measures the size of the heavenly bodies and of terrestrial objects. In union with locality it procures the conceptions of perspective. Its organ is placed at the internal corner of the superciliary arch on both sides of individuality. Dr. Brown ascribed the notions of length in different directions to the remembered succession of muscular feeling. XXV. Organ of Weight and Resistance. Treating of the sense of feeling, I mentioned that it could not excite ideas of consistency, density, softness, and hardness, nor of weight, lightness, heaviness or resistance. These notions de- pend on an internal operation of the mind and require a particular ORGAN OF WEIGHT AND RESISTANCE. 313 organ. This faculty, then, procures the knowledge of the specific gravity of objects, and is of use whenever weight or resistance are worked upon with the hands, or by means of tools ; in sculpturing, carving, turning, polishing; in lifting up any weight by the lever, or any machine ; in resisting the pressure of the opponent in box- ing ; in calculating the resistance of a current, the tide, or pressure of the wind ; to direct a ship in certain directions; in using the bow with dexterity ; in keeping the hands, arms, and body, steady in shooting ; in touching the strings or cords of any musical instru- ment with accuracy ; it is therefore necessary to musical perform- ers, be it on the harp, violin, violincello, pianoforte, organ, &c; to eminent engineers, as far as the knowledge of momentum and of statics is concerned; to able printers, particularly of copper and lithographic plates ; to clever workmen in mosaic, &c. Mr. Simp- son, in an essay, published in the Phrenological Journal, vol. ii. p. 410, proposes the name equilibrium for that of weight, considering that it was essential to our animal existence that we should have an instinctive perception of gravitation, operating constantly and inde- pendently of reason. That state of rest, says he, which the law of gravitation constitutes the natural state of all bodies, solid, fluid, and aeriform, is called their equilibrium. The simplest animal motions, what are they but alternate disturbance and restoration of equilibrium ? The land animal walks and runs, and avails itself of the resistance of the earth ; the bird flies by its instinctive percep- tion of the resistance of the air ; the fish, using its fins and tail, instinctively perceiving the resistance of the water. Some degree therefore of the power of adapting motions to the law of gravitation, some power over equilibrium must be possessed by the whole ani- mated creation, for without it it is plain they must perish. In my opinion the essence of the intellectual faculties is knowing, and not instinctive action, and the lower animals do without know- ledge many things which man knows in doing them. An ant may find an object too heavy, and calls upon others of its tribe for assist- ance, in order to move the object to the common abode, without any notion of weight; in the same way as a squirrel may sit down 40 314 PHRENOLOGY. on its hind legs and tail whilst eating, without any perception of equilibrium. I find throughout nature a difference between regular actions and the powers of knowing them. Accordingly I consider the power in question as destined only to procure notions of gravity and resistance, and of equilibrium ; farther, such notions may in- fluence various actions, and give greater dexterity to perform them ; for instance, to keep the equilibrium in standing, walking, and gymnastic exercises ; but the impulse to swim, fly, or stand upright, seems to me different from the knowledge of doing so in conse- quence of the laws of gravitation. The perception of the equili- brium belongs to this faculty, and its disturbed or diseased state seems to produce giddiness, and even seasickness, as Mr. Simpson first observed. Moreover, this faculty may enable us to be easy in looking over precipices and from high situations, and the effect of intoxication may be attributed in a great measure to its,deranged functions ; its sphere of activity, however, appears to reach beyond the meaning of the word equilibrium, and I still prefer the term weight. The organ is small, and situated externally of that of size, above the orbit towards the superciliary ridge. XXVI. Organ of Coloring. The qualities of bodies already examined are the most essential, and the knowledge of them is also more important to man and ani- mals than of the quality of color. In speaking of vision, I have shown that it is insufficient to bestow excellence in coloring upon the painter. The eyes, it is true, perceive the rays of light, and are affected agreeably or disagreeably by their different modifica- tions or colors, but they do not conceive the relations of colors, their harmony or discord, and have no memory of tints. To prove this, we have only to compare, in man and animals, the faculty of perceiving light vision with the faculty of conceiving colors. I am not certain that animals are destitute of the faculty which dis- tinguishes color, though they do not paint; for there is a great difference between producing, and being capable of perceiving. ORGAN OF COLORING. 315 Animals have the senses of smell and taste, but cannot furnish them with enjoyments, and they may possibly perceive different colors, their harmony or discord, and yet be incapable of painting. Certain persons are almost destitute of the power of perceiving colors. I know a family, all the individuals of which distinguish only black and white ; Dr. Unzer, of Altona, could not perceive green and blue ; and at Vienna I saw a boy who was obliged to give up his trade of a tailor, because he could not distinguisn dif- ferent colors. I have observed similar instances at Paris, Dub- lin, Edinburgh, and London. Those who do not perceive colors have sometimes a very acute sight, and readily appreciate the other qualities of external bodies, as their size and form. There is nothing more common than that a painter should be an admirable draughtsman and a vile colorist. Thus, as the faculty of perceiv- ing and employing color is not in proportion to the sense of sight, nor to the understanding in general, on the other hand, sight may be entirely lost, and the memory and judgment of colors preserved. The blind traveller, Mr. Holman, does not feel the least impres- sion of the strongest light, but he recollects the various colors he has formerly seen, and judges of their harmony and discord. Hence there must be some particular faculty which cognizes, re- collects, and judges of the relations of color. It is necessary to painters, dyers, enamellers, and to all who are occupied with col- ors. It is this faculty that is charmed with the flower-garden and the enamelled meadow, and sometimes shows an extraordinary energy and correctness. Goethe relates, that the workmen in mosaic at Rome, employ fifteen thousand varieties of colors, and fifty shades of each variety, from the lightest to the darkest, hence in all 750,000 shades. He adds, that this profusion of colors is sometimes insufficient. The faculty which takes cognizance of colors, is more active in women than in men, generally speaking, and in certain nations more than in others. Those of the East seem to possess it in a high degree. It is, however, necessary to distinguish in this fac- ulty, as in every other, great activity from perfect action or good 316 PHRENOLOGY. taste. Moreover, it is to be remarked that this faculty perceives the harmony of colors, but does not understand how to adapt color- ing to the subject of a picture. This depends on superior intellec- tual powers. In the first acceptation, many women are good col- orists, and have attained eminence ; but in the second, as in all other departments of the arts, they have been surpassed by men. The organ of coloring is situated in the middle of the arch of the eye-brow. Its greater developement is proclaimed by a full and much arched eye-brow ; this external sign, however, is less certain than when the arch is drawn outwards and upwards, so that its outer part is more elevated than the inner. (PL xi. fig. 1. xxvi.) intellectual faculties which perceive the relations of external objects. XXVII. Organ of Locality. Though Gall's eyesight was very good, yet he could not always discover or recognise the places where he had been before. One of his fellow students, called Scheidler, on the contrary, had a surprising facility in recollecting localities, and never forgot the ex- act place where he had in his rambles discovered a bird's nest, and this without making any mark to guide him. As Gall, at a later period, began to collect busts in plaster, he moulded his fellow- student Scheidler, remarkable for his excellent local memory, and distinguished above the eyebrows, on either side of the mesial line of the head, a protuberance strongly marked. He then made ob- servations on every person endowed with a similar faculty. He one day met a woman in Vienna, who had the protuberances cor- responding to those presented by Schiedler's forehead, so extremely developed, as almost to amount to a deformity; on speaking to her he learned that she had the greatest propensity to travel ; that she had left her parents at Munich, solely to see foreign countries ; that she never lived long in the same house, because she liked change of place ; and that her greatest pleasure consisted in travelling. ORGAN OF LOCALITY. 317 The pictures and busts of great astronomers, navigators, and ge- ographers, as of Newton, Cooke, Columbus, &c. present a great developement in the situation indicated. (Pi. xi. fig. 2. xxvii.) This is the faculty which prompted Columbus to seek a new con- tinent, and which makes and stimulates every zealous traveller. Bloede, of Dresden, speaks of one Augustus, of Schneeberg, who had at one time been a miner, and who with a kind of ridiculous eagerness which prevents him from staying longer than one or two days at the same place, runs every year over the greatest part of Saxony, Lusatia, and Silesia ; he has a fixed station for every day, like migrating birds, and brings the various landlords, who assist him, compliments and salutations from all their friends; he then gives the details of his last journey, with the greatest volubility, keeping his body fixed, and his eyes shut. Bloede assured us, that this odd personage has really two large protuberances in the situation mentioned. At Torgau, in Saxony, we saw a blind man in whom the same part was much developed, and who told us that he liked to hear geography and travels spoken of, and that he had often dreamed of foreign countries. Mr. Holman, the blind traveller, has this organ very large, and he told me that he knows London better than the servant who accompanies him, in order to avoid carriages and unknown obstacles. In going through the streets of a town, he con- ceives and forms in his mind a geographical plan of it. The seat of the organ of locality has been proved in man by many thousand facts. Animals must also be endowed with it, otherwise they could find neither their progeny nor their dwellings, after they had been oblig- ed to leave them in quest of food. The faculty indeed is very active in certain animals, while others are almost destitute of it. This dissimilarity is not only perceptible in different kinds, but also in different individuals of the same kind. One dog loses him- self almost immediately after going out; another finds its usual abode and master from an enormous distance. There was a dog transported in a carriage from Vienna to Petersburg, which six months afterwards returned to Vienna. Another transported from Vienna to London, still found means to come back, by attaching 318 PHRENOLOGY. himself to a traveller in the packet-boat, and going with him to Mentz, whence he set off by himself for Vienna. Another carried from Lyons to Marseilles, and shipped to Naples, nevertheless, came back to Lyons by land. Another found his former master in Suabia, after having left his new master in Hungary. These, and many other similar facts, prove that they are wrong who de- rive such a power from the sense of smell; for smell could aid none of the dogs whose history I have given. Besides, these creatures do not always return by the nearest way. Moreover, the sense of smell cannot lead back pigeons to their cotes from which they had been transported to the distance of twenty leagues and more, shut up in a bag. The falcon of Iceland, though long confined, the first time it is flown at a heron, often mounts verti- cally into the air, seems to distinguish its native regions, and takes the direction of the north. It is equally impossible to maintain that such a faculty is an attribute of the eyes, because there is no proportion between its energy and the excellence of vision. It must therefore be the appanage of an internal organ. This faculty of locality being innate and active by internal excite- ment, explains a phenomenon observed among animals, many spe- cies of which, chiefly birds, as swallows, storks, starlings, quails, nightingales, and others, migrate at certain periods of the year. These creatures also return, not only to the same climate and to the same country, but to the same spot, to the same window, chimney, or tree. The migrations do not result from scarcity of food alone, for though it is true that the faculties are excited by external wants, and that certain birds leave one country in quest of food in another, yet the faculties must exist before they can be stimulated. Besides, every faculty may be active without excite- ment from external want, and this is rendered evident by the cir- cumstance that certain birds migrate before food is wanting, and come back before it is to be found. Moreover, if migratory birds be confined in a cage and fed abundantly, they become unquiet at the periods of their flight. Finally, why do not all birds leave their ordinary dwelling when food is scarce or wanting? These ORGAN OF LOCALITY. 319 considerations show the necessity of admitting an internal and in- nate power as a cause of all the phenomena. The special faculty of its organ and the sphere of its activity re- main to be determined. It makes the traveller, geographer, and landscape-painter, recollect localities, and in union with the faculty of size, gives notions of perspective, space and distances. It seems to me, that it is the faculty of locality in general. As soon as we have conceived the existence of an object and its qualities, it must necessarily occupy a place, and this is the faculty that con- ceives the places occupied by the objects that surround us. It not only procures this kind of knowledge, but it is also fond of it; and as their cause, explains all the phenomena of which I have spoken. Notions of localities and places are not the same as those of size or dimensions ; these latter concern each individual object, while the former implicate the various situations wherein individual objects are placed in relation to each other. Dr. Brown ascribes the notions of distance to a compound op- eration of touch and sight. Gall ascribed the coup d'asil as to space and the capability of measuring a given ground to locality alone ; it seems to me the joined effect of locality and size. Lo- cality, size, and form, are essential to the practical knowledge of Phrenology, and those who have these powers weak, and their or- gans small, are wrong in stating their own inability as an objection against Phrenology. The modified application of the special fac- ulties may induce beginners in Phrenology to doubt of their reality, if they do not find in every individual who shows an organ larger the same manifestations of the mind. Amongst several persons who have the organ of locality large, one may pay particular atten- tion to local situations of external objects; another may be indif- ferent about them and not know how to find his way round his abode, but may be delighted in seeing cascades, high mountains, and romantic scenery; in the same way as one is gratified with noisy songs, and another is pleased only with music of the great masters, or, as one is satisfied to live upon potatoes and beef, and another is gratified by truffles and game. 320 PHRENOLOGY. Space does not seem to me a mere form of our understanding, as Kant has maintained. It is true the conception of space cannot be attributed to any of the five senses, but space certainly does ex- ist in the external world. The conception of causality or necessary consequence also, cannot be attributed to the five external senses; but the relations and succession of phenomena called cause and ef- fect, exist in nature. The same truth applies to all the categories established by Kant, which relate to external objects; internal fac- ulties constitute them, and they are adapted or in relation to the external world ; in other words, all conceptions of external objects are results of internal faculties calculated by creation to apply to the external world. XXVIII. Organ of Order. The idea of order supposes plurality, but this may exist without order. The mind, acquainted with external objects, their physi- cal qualities, the places they occupy and their number, may still consider the order in which they are ranged with regard to each other. There are individuals, even children, who like to see every piece of furniture, at table every dish, and in their business every article, in its place, and who are displeased and unhappy when things are in disorder around them. The Sauvage de l'Aveyron, at Paris, though almost a perfect idiot, could not bear to see a chair or any other article out of its place. As soon as any thing was disarranged, he went of his own accord and put it right. This dis- position to arrange, however, differs from that philosophical meth- od which results from consistency of ideas. The faculty of which I speak in this place, gives method and order to objects only as they are physically related ; but philosophic or logical inferences, conceptions of system or generalization, and ideas of classification are formed by the reflecting faculties. The faculty here discussed is merely fond of putting particulars in order according to physical considerations : as in a library, books according to their size and form, and in natural history, animals according to their configura- ORGAN OF CALCULATION. 321 tions. In general, order may be applied to form, size, color, things, words, &c. Its organ is situated between those of color- ing and calculation. Cleanliness or tidiness appears to depend on it. It seems also that it produces the pleasure of seeing things complete. Order is impossible, while the subject of arrangement, as a collection, is imperfect. ^ XXIX. Organ of Calculation. Some individuals remarkable for great arithmetical talent attract- ed Gall's attention. Even children are found who excel in this power. There was a child seven years old, called Devaux, who took extreme delight in running about the fairs of his native town, and making calculations for the merchants. A boy of thirteen years of age, born at St. Poelten, not far from Vienna, surpassed all his school fellows surprisingly at figures. He learnt with ease an immense quantity of numbers by heart, went through the most complicated arithmetical problems mentally, and very soon solved them. Mr. Mantelli, a counsellor of the Court of Appeals at Vi- enna, took a particular pleasure in solving questions in arithmetic • and his son, of five years of age, did little but calculate during the whole day. In individuals so inclined and endowed, the external angle of the eye-brow is either much pressed downwards or eleva- ted. (PL xii. fig. 1. xxix.) This configuration results, from a greater developement of the cerebral part situated behind the outer angle of the orbit. The portraits and busts of great calcula- tors, as of Newton, Euler, Kaestner, Jedidiah Buxton, Hutton, &c. present this external sign. The organ is established by an immense number of observations. Certain races of negroes make five the extent of their enumera- tion, that is, they count only as far as five by simple terms ; all their numbers after five are compound, whereas, ours are not so till we have passed the number ten ; while our terms, six, seven, &c, are simple, they say, five-one, five-two, five-three, &c— Negroes in general do not excel in arithmetic and numbers. Ac* 41 322 PHRENOLOGY. cordingly their heads are very narrow in the seat of the organ of number. Individuals among them, however, have considerable powers of computation, and the organ larger and more energetic than many Europeans. I am not certain whether this faculty exists in animals. Bitches are said to perceive if onf of their puppies be taken away ; but this does not prove that they count their young ones : they may perceive by the faculties of individuality and configuration thai there is one wanting. George Le Roi has observed, that magpies count three ; for if there be a hut in the neighborhood of a tree, upon which a magpie has built its nest, and if three persons enter it, the magpie will not visit its nest before the three have gone away; if, however, more than three enter, it can no longer keep count, or compare the number of those who went in with that of those who come out. Dupont de Nemours thought that magpies could count nine. Whatever concerns unity and plurality—number, belongs to thiar faculty. Hence its end is calculation in general. The recollec tion of numbers of houses, or of pages where we have read inter esting passages, depends on this faculty. Gall called the organ of the power under consideration the organ of mathematics ; but J think it only calculates; and whilst arithmetic, algebra, and log arithms belong to it, the other branches of the mathematics and geometry are not products of its activity alone, but of its union with size and locality. It may be applied to size, but also to form, color, and melody. XXX. Organ of Eventuality. Gall admits, both in man and animals, a peculiar organ of educa- bility, or of the memory of things and of events. Individualsare met with every day who have a general knowledge of the arts and sciences, and who, without being profound, know enough to be capable of speaking on them with facility,—individuals who are deemed brilliant or clever in society. The middle part of their ORGAN OF EVENTUALITY. 323 foreheads, Gall found was very regularly prominent. (PL x. fig, 1. xxx.) At first, he called the cerebral part in the above situation the organ of the memory of things, because those largely endowed with it were commonly well informed, and knew a great deal; he afterwards named it the sense of things. In comparing animals with men, and one kind of animal with another, he found that tame have fuller foreheads than wild animals, and that animals are gen- erally tameable as the forehead is more largely developed ; he therefore called it the organ of educability. But I conceive that Gall in this attributes to a single faculty manifestations which de- pend on intellect generally. The title educability is evidently bad, seeing that every faculty may be educated, in other words, exercis- ed and directed. Moreover, animals and men vary their actions according to motives given by the whole of the faculties whose organs lie in the forehead, and also according to various feelings. The peculiar cerebral part, which I have already indicated, is largely developed in children. It varies in size among adults, is larger in boys than in girls, and differs in magnitude among entire nations. Individuals who have it large are attentive to all that hap- pens around them, to phenomena or events, to facts ; they are fond of history, of anecdotes; are inquisitive, and desire information on every branch of natural knowledge. Moreover, it seems to me that this faculty recognises the activi- ty of every other, whether external or internal, and acts in its turn upon all of them. It desires to know every thing by experience, and consequently excites all the other organs to activity; it would hear, see, smell, taste, and touch; is fond of general instruction, and inclines to the pursuit of practical knowledge, and is often styled good sense m our proceedings. It is essential to editors, secreta- ries, h.stonans, and teachers. By knowing the functions of the other powers, this faculty and individuality contribute essentially to the unity of consciousness, and to the recognition of the entity myself ,n philosophy. Eventuality seems to perceive the impres- sions which are the immediate functions of the external senses, to change these into notions, conceptions, or ideas, and to be essen- 324 PHRENOLOGY. tial to attention in general. Its sphere of activity is very great, and expressed by the verbs in their infinitive mood. Every philo- sophic system has taken account of some operations of this faculty. XXXI. Organ of Time. Conceptions of time are evidently peculiar in their nature ; they may exist even without order and number. Yesterday, to-day, to- morrow, the day after to-morrow, &c. form a succession, having no regard to the number of days. There is more connexion be- tween time and order, and also more between order and number, than between time and number. Order relates more peculiarly to objects, time to facts or events. The conception of time is of a higher character than order or num- ber. Accordingly, the organ of time occupies a higher place in the brain than that of order, which is in a middle situation, or of number, which is the lowest and most external of the three. The natural language of time and of number proves indeed that the or- gans of these faculties occupy different places ; in thinking of time the eyes are turned upwards, and in calculating they are cast down- wards and outwards. The faculty of time conceives the duration of phenomena, their simultaneousness, or succession. Its application to chronology re- quires the assistance of number, in order to recollect the dates. It is one of the essential constituents of music, and some musicians have great facility, and others great difficulty, to play in time. Its organ is situated between eventuality, locality, order, melody, and causality, and often acts in their connexion. According to Dr. T. Brown, the power of time enters in the conception of extension. XXXII. Organ of Tune. The organ of tune bears to the ears the same relation as that of color does to the eyes. The ear hears sounds, and is agreeably ORGAN OF TUNE. 325 or disagreeably affected by them ; but it has no recollection of tones, and does not judge of their relations. It does not perceive harmonious combinations of sound, but separate tones only; and sounds as well as colors may be separately pleasing, though disa- greeable in combination. In treating of the sense of hearing I have already demonstrated, that music has not originated from its exist- ence. Besides the proofs there adduced that the ear is not the instrument of musical perception, there exists direct evidence of an internal organ being necessary to this ; for sometimes in epileptic fits and in delirium, individuals do not hear, but sing with great precision, and then this organ is active, while the functions of all the others are suspended or deranged. A greater developement of the organ on which musical perception depends enlarges the lateral parts of the forehead, (PL xii. fig. 2. xxxii.) but its form varies according to the direction and form of the convolutions com- posing it. In Gluck, Haydn, and others, it had a pyramidal form; in Mozart, Viotti, Zumsteg, Dussek, Crescenti, and others, the external corners of the forehead were only enlarged and rounded. It lies higher and is more apparent in individuals whose brains are narrow at the basis, whilst its appearance is less visible in those who have the cheek bones much elevated. The surest indication of its developement is, if it be more prominent than the external angle of the eye. The heads of birds which sing, of those which do not, and of the individuals of the same kind which have a greater or less dis- position to music, differ conspicuously at the place of this organ. The heads of male singing birds are easily distinguished from those of females of the same kind by the different developement of the organ of tune in each. There is a striking analogy between colors and tones and their respective organs: colors being perceived by the eyes, and sounds by the ears; there being primitive colors and primitive tones; there being an agreeable succession of colors as there is of tones, that is, there being colors and tones which agree with one another, and others which do not; colors must harmonize, and tones must be 326 PHRENOLOGY. concordant; lastly, the concordance both of colors and of tones may be considered by the faculties of order and number. In this manner, indeed, colors and tones are calculated, and the principles of painting and music established. Mr. W. Scott has published in the Phrenological Journal, vol. ii. two essays on music, and the different faculties which concur in producing it. One of his propositions is singular,' there seems,' says he, ' to be a correspondence in all cases between the voices of men and women and their cerebral developement.' I know the most positive observations to the contrary. Persons with small heads who have a bass voice. It is true the voice is modified by the activity of the feelings according to the laws of the natural language, since all movements of the soft parts are concordant among them- selves, and indicate the nature of the active powers. In com- bativeness, for instance, there is muscular contraction, and therefore the voice is pitched low and sharp ; but generally speaking, the voice is neither in proportion to the head nor to the developement of the organ of tune, it is modified only by the activity of the spe- cial feelings. Mr. W. Scott considers, also, imitation as necessary to practical musicians, particularly to vocal performers. I think {his proposi- tion too general. Imitation invites to imitate, and gives the power to do so, but it may imitate a good or a bad execution. It is, how- ever, necessary both to the composition and performance of dramatic music; but not to musical expression in general. Every dramatic expression but this alone, depends on it. Music is composed ac- cording to the combination of the fundamental powers with tune and time, and the different compositions will be well executed by performers who possess combinations of powers similar to those of the composers. If manual dexterity be indispensable to the per- formance, the powers which give it are additional requisites. The consideration of this kind, however, belongs to the treatise on the combinations and modifications of the special powers, whilst this volume is destined to the examination and analysis of the special faculties of the mind and their nature. ORGAN OF LANGUAGE. 327 XXXIII. Organ of Arbitrary Language. Dr. Gall, in his youth, noticed that several of his school-fellows learned even things which they did not understand with great facil- ity by heart, whilst he, with the utmost difficulty, engraved in his memory a very small number of words; and he observed that all the boys who excelled in verbal memory had prominent eyes. He afterwards spoke of an organ of words, the great degree of whose developement is denoted by prominent eyes. Sometimes the eyes not only project but are also depressed, and then the un- der eye-lid presents a sort of roll, or appears swollen. (PL xiii. fig. 2. xxxiii.) Those who have such a physiognomical sign are fond of philology ; they like to study the spirit of languages. Dr. Gall speaks of the two configurations as the signs of two different organs, under the titles, organ of words, and organ of languages. It is quite true that some easily learn the spirit of different lan- guages without having a great memory for words, and that others readily acquire its words without catching the spirit of a language; yet it seems to me, that the memory of words and philology in general, depend on the same special faculty. In the philosophical part of Phrenology, I show that judgment and memory are not diffeient degrees of activity of any faculty, but general modes of activity of several; and that each may exist independent of the other. It seems also to me, that the organ of words must have its laws as well as those of color, of melody, or any other faculty; now the law of words constitutes the spirit of language. I am sat- isfied that this opinion is correct, because the spirit of every lan- guage is the same, just as the essence of all kinds of music is alike; that is, the laws or principles of music and of language rule univer sally, and are constant; they are only modified in different nations by modifications in their organs, and dissimilar combinations of these in each. I, therefore, admit only one organ of language. Before the special faculty of this organ can be understood, we must examine the question so often treated by different authors; 328 PHRENOLOGY. what is the influence of signs upon ideas? According to many philosophers and to common opinion, signs may produce ideas. Accuracy of language is said to be necessary to accuracy of thought. This, however, is to christen the child before it is born. I think with St. Martin, that it is more reasonable to put the question in an opposite way: what is the influence of ideas upon signs?—though the Institute of France gave its prize to him who developed the influence of signs upon ideas. In speaking of the influence of signs upon ideas or the contrary, the question ought to be more distinctly stated, and it should be asked, whether artificial signs can produce ideas? Now, I am convinced that no arbitrary sign can produce any idea; I am satisfied that ideas precede, and that arbitrary signs follow ; that without ideas there would be no arbi- trary sign; and that without having first had the idea, its arbitrary sign is without meaning. We have an evident proof of this in persons blind from birth. The words red, green, blue, white, give them no conception of color. Here I must explain what is meant by an idea. Some philos- ophers, after the etymology of the word, call every sensation which presents an image, idea. In this sense, however, there are very few ideas; even the sensations of the external senses would not all deserve the name; for savors, odors, tones, and colors, do not present any image. Other philosophers style sensations pro- duced by means of the external senses, ideas. Others again un- derstand by the expression, every sensation produced by activity, both of the external and internal senses. Moreover, ideas are spoken of as of two kinds, simple and compound ; the first being acquired by the external senses, the second being the result of re- flection—abstract and general ideas. I propose to confine the term idea to the conceptions of the perceptive faculties, and to call the functions of the reflective faculties reflection. The organic ap- paratus of all the internal faculties may be active, and a being may consequently have an inclination, a sentiment, an idea, or reflection. without manifesting it by any sign whatever. Man and animals, however, are destined for society; it is consequently necessary that ORGAN OF LANGUAGE. 329 they should communicate and understand their sensations, ideas and reflections, and this communication can take place only by means of signs. These signs are either natural, or arbitrary and artificial. Nat- ural signs conform universally to every faculty. Every being endowed with a given faculty manifests its activity essentially in the same manner, and understands its natural manifestations in others ; whilst beings endowed with different faculties can neither communicate their own sensations so as to be understood, nor understand those expressed by others. This law is common to man and animals. Animals which have certain faculties in common with man, understand their natural manifestations in the human kind. The dog, for instance, understands signs of anger in his master perfectly, because possessed of the faculty which produces anger ; but he will never understand the natural signs of adoration. From this it must be evident that individuals of the same kind understand the natural signs of peculiar faculties better, if the faculties which speak in others are of equal strength in themselves. The natural language is also known under the name of pathognomy, and deserves to be treated of separately. The second sort of signs are arbitrary and artificial. Natural lan- guage, I have said, is common to animals and man ; artificial lan- guage is a prerogative of the human kind, and is a result of certain superior intellectual faculties, which contrive means of gratifying all the others. To communicate his sensations and ideas, man gener- ally uses the artificial rather than the natural language, though this last regularly and involuntarily accompanies the first. As natural language is principally expressed by the voice and various motions, so the same means are the readiest and most natural for producing artificial signs ; but if the voice do not serve, as in addressing the deaf or persons at a distance, we then recur to gestures and to writ- ten signs. How absolutely artificial vocal signs are without mean- ing in themselves, is evident from untutored man's universal igno- rance of any other than his mother tongue. If, moreover, we would communicate certain sensations or ideas to an individual only, 42 330 PHRENOLOGY we must choose arbitrary and secret signs—signs which he alone understands. Hence, it is certain that artificial signs do not by themselves produce any idea. The superior intellectual faculties form the conception of pro ducing artificial signs for mental acts generally; and, therefore, sensations, ideas, and reflections, must exist, before there can be arbitrary signs invented to indicate them. It follows, moreover, that signs must be multiplied and modified according to the sensa- tions and conceptions of the mind; hence there are as many sorts of signs as of faculties. There are words or signs to indicate individ ual objects,—nouns. Others to denote the qualitities of substan- tives,—adjectives, which in certain languages agree with the sub- stantives ; and which are also susceptible of different degrees. As there are different sexes among living beings, the signs admit of genders. The number of objects is also considered ; sometimes number alone, sometimes number combined with order, and some- times with order and time ; one, two, three, &c. ; or first, sec- ond, third, &c. ; or first time, second time, third time, &c. There are other words again which may be used instead of substantives, ■—pronouns ; and these are either personal, possessive, demonstra- tive, or relative. Other signs,—verbs, denote the state of the subject spoken of, whether a person or thing, and this state may be active, passive, or neuter ; it may be affirmed or denied by cer- tain terms in a positive (indicative); conditional (conjunctive 01 subjunctive) ; or imperative manner ; it may, moreover, be con sidered in relation to time, whether present, past, or future. Othei signs explain the verbs,—adverbs, many of which being analogous to those indicating qualities of substantives, denote places, times, numbers, quantities, &c. There are also particles which indicate different operations of the mind : some causes, some connexion or conjunction ; qthers, condition ; and others again, time, order, sud- den mental emotions,—(interjections). There are artificial signs then for every operation of the mind, and if all signs may be re- duced, etymolgically considered, to nouns and verbs, their significa- tions are .still different and their terminations are therefore changed. ORGAN OF LANGUAGE. 331 Now there is a particular faculty whose office it is to learn signs, which are, as we have seen, produced in conformity with the ac- tivity of all others, by superior intellectual faculties. It differs from those which produce artificial signs, and also from those which produce the sensations and ideas these are assumed to ex- press. There is, indeed, no proportion between these different kinds of faculties. Among mankind, some excel in one of them and not in the other. It is very possible to have many ideas with- out great powers of learning the arbitrary signs which express them ; and also to know many words without having many ideas. By this faculty of arbitrary language then, we perceive the connex- ion of audible and visible signs with things signified. To converse however by means of audible signs, besides the inclinations, sentiments, ideas or reflections, and the words or vo- cal signs invented to express them, we must possess the organs of voice and the sense of hearing. I have already said, that arbi- trary language is more necessary to the manifestations of the intel- lectual faculties than of the propensities and sentiments. The organ of language accordingly occupies a transverse situation in the midst of the perceptive faculties. This, like all other organs, seems composed of different parts. Some persons are apt to forget proper names, while they recollect words denoting qualities of external bodies. Disease or accident has entailed this peculiarity in several instances. One Lereard, of Marseilles, having received a blow from a foil on the eye-brow, lost the memory of proper names entirely; he sometimes forgot the names of his intimate friends, and even of his father, as he stated in a letter written to Gall, for advice. Cuvier, in his His- torical Eulogium on Brousonnet, delivered in the Institute of France, in 1808, relates that this famous botanist after an apoplec- tic fit, could never recollect either proper names or substantives, though he recovered his prodigious memory of other matters. He knew the forms, leaves, and color of plants, and recollected their epithets, but could not recall their names. Gall thinks that in consequence of being destitute of this faculty, 332 PHRENOLOGY. monkeys, ourang-outangs, and other animals, want the power of speech. It seems to me, however, that animals have it in some degree ; for they learn to repeat arbitrary signs, and understand them as far as they have the sensations expressed ; and I am of opinion that animals want speech for the same reason that they have no clothes, make no fire, and do not produce food. It is certain that deficiency in vocal organs is not the cause of animals having no artificial language ; for some of them pronounce words, even sentences, nay, and understand what they say, but yet pro- duce no artificial sign whatever. Half idiot children there are who never speak, though they do many things like reasonable persons ; and then parents, relations, and even physicians, cannot conceive their partial imbecility. Now, though such children be not deaf, though they pronounce various words, yet they never go on to speak, and the cause of this is often looked for in the organs connected with the production of voice, the tongue, amygdaloid glands, palate, &c.; but the state of these parts is never the reason of the want of language. The organs of voice, it is true, produce sounds, but they do not origi- nate or cause vocal language : persons deprived of several, as of the tongue, the palate, have yet continued to speak.* Their pro- nunciation of course was not so distinct as that of other persons, but they felt the necessity of communicating their sensations and ideas, and therefore contrived to speak. On the contrary, these half idiots pronounce single words very well, but cannot keep up a conversation, nor fix their attention, nor combine their expres- sions. They are consequently destitute of the power of learning, as well as of the intellectual faculty of inventing arbitrary signs. There are two occasional causes of such partial imbecility, a slight hydrocephalus, distending the brain and pushing the eyes forward precisely as a very considerable developement of the cere- * Bartholin speaks of this in a boy who lost his tongue by suppuration from small pox: Huxham saw the same in a girl: Schenk, Tulpius, Richter, &c. speak of similar facts. There is also a dissertation by Aurran, De Feminte Elinguis Loquela. Argentor. 1766. REFLECTIVE FACULTIES. 333 bral parts behind the orbits does. These children may therefore present the external mark which in a healthy state of the brain de- notes great strength of the faculty of arbitrary language. This circumstance, however, does not prove the impossibility of discov- ering the state of the organ on which it depends, as certain adver- saries of Phrenology have maintained : it presents only a difficulty which must be removed. The state of the organization generally must guide our judgment. The second cause of this partial im- becility is some real defect of organization : the cerebral part, whose function is arbitrary language, may be either wanting or very slightly developed, and then individuals so constituted never speak. Their eyes, instead of projecting, lie deeply sunk in the orbits, the roofs of which, instead of being plane, are quite concave.* I therefore admit only one organ of language, which produces similar phenomena in regard to language or arbitrary signs, as the other intellectual faculties do in regard to external impressions. It makes us acquainted with arbitrary signs, remembers them, judges of their relations, and gives a disposition to indulge in all exercises connected with words. CHAPTER III. Reflective Faculties. The intellectual faculties, hitherto considered, give knowledge of objects, their physical qualities and relations. I now come to those which reflect on all the others, affective as well as intellect- ual, and constitute what is called reason, or reflection. * What is to be done with such children ? Those affected in the first way ought to be sedulously strengthened by a good physical education, and by avoiding too incessant exercise of their feelings and intellectual faculties. The fibres of the brain with age occasionally become stronger, and resist the pressure of the water accumulated in its cavities. Too early instruction is under all circum- stances hurtful, but it is especially so to these children. The disease springing from the second cause, or deficiency of organization, is of course irremediable. 334 PHRENOLOGY. A wide range of sciences falls under tha scope of individuality, eventuality, and the perceptive faculties in general, such as all branches of natural history, anatomy, chemistry, and all sciences the substance of which consists in a knowledge of the existence, appearances, and properties of natural objects. Farther, the de- tails of history, statistics, geography and trade, all belong to the department of simple knowledge. The knowing powers, with an active constitution, and some propelling feelings, as love of appro- bation, acquisitiveness, and others, are sufficient to explain the eminence of some professors in those branches of knowledge, without great reasoning powers. But then such persons are never distinguished by profound and comprehensive views of abstract principles. These are conceived by the reflective faculties. XXXIV. Organ of Comparison, and General Harmony. The greater number of persons are satisfied with individual knowledge, and the principal charm of popular speakers consists in a clear statement of facts, and copiousness of illustrations. Close reasoning and rigid induction is always disagreeable to the public, because the reasoning powers are less developed, and less exercised. Phrenology alone explains why reason is so rare. Many persons, however, are delighted with comparisons. It is a rule in teaching to proceed from known, to unknown ideas, and to establish analogies. Gall often conversed on philosophical matters with a friend of his who possessed much vivacity of mind: whenever the latter was put to difficulty in proving rigorously his positions, he had always recourse to a comparison. By this means he painted his ideas, and his opponents were defeated, and carried along with him. Gall, perceiving this characteristic trait of mind, examined his head and found an eminence, of the form of a reversed pyramid, in the upper and middle portion of the forehead. (PL xiv. fig. i. xxxiv.) He confirmed this observation in many subsequent in- ORGAN OF COMPARISON. 335 stances. He possessed the skulls of two Jesuits, who had this faculty and its organ in a high degree. He names it perspicacity, sagacite comparative, esprit de comparison. This organ is developed in all popular preachers, who very regularly speak by parables, and choose their similitudes from facts generally known. To succeed in persuading a popular audience an orator must always speak in examples and by analogy; he must bring spiritual things near to terrestrial objects, by comparing them with each other, and imitate the manner of preaching of Jesus, who very frequently spoke in parables. This faculty attaches us to comparison, without determining its kinds ; for every one chooses his analogies from his knowledge, or from the sphere of activity of his other faculties. He who has the organ of locality in a high degree derives thence his examples, another from forms, astronomy, mechanics, &c. The operations of this faculty are often called reasoning, but it is very different from the inductive reasoning of a sound logic. It proves by analogy and is prone to convert an illustration into an argument. Those who possess this faculty in a higher degree, feel differ- ences and analogies which escape others, in whom it is smaller though very active. This faculty compares the sensations and notions excited by all the other faculties, points out their similitudes, analogies, dif- ferences, or identity, comprehends their relations, harmony, or dis- cord. Its tendency and activity are perceived in language which abounds in figurative expressions, viz. the external sensations are compared with the internal, and the same vocal signs are used to express both kinds of functions. Comparison is the origin of proverbs, which convey instruction under figurative expressions. The Scotch phrenologists were for some time disposed to con- fine the power of comparison, to the perception of analogies and resemblances; and to ascribe, with William Scott, the perception of differences, to wit or mirthfulness, as already mentioned above 336 PHRENOLOGY. when I treated of that feeling. In my opinion this faculty perceives the differences as well as resemblances, analogies, and identities. The faculty of tune perceives the discord, and the harmony of tones, and coloring perceives disagreeable and agreeable, or incon- gruous and congruous impressions of colors. In the same way, I attribute to comparison, the perception of differences and analogies, and as a higher degree of musical talent distinguishes the slightest differences of tones, so a greater developement of comparison seems necessary to feel the nicer differences in arguments, and constantly to discriminate in philosophical reasoning. The great aim of this faculty seems to be to form abstract ideas, generalizations, and to establish harmony among the operations of the other faculties. Coloring compares colors with each other, and feels their harmony; but comparison adapts the colors to the object which is represented ; it will reject lively colors, to present a gloomy scene. The laws of music are particular, and tune com- pares tones ; but comparison chooses the music according to the situations where it is executed. It blames dancing music in a church, it is opposed to walking with fine clothes in the dirt, to su perb furniture aside common things, it feels the relation between the inferior and superior feelings, and gives the preference to the latter. Its influence, however, presupposes the activity of the other faculties, and it cannot act upon them if they are inactive. This explains why some persons have taste and good judgment in one respect and not in another. He who is deprived of reverence, may not be careful enough about its application. He may deride what others respect. But if another possess it in a high degree, and at the same time comparison, he will wish to bring his rever- ence in harmony with his other powers. Mr. Combe, in his System of Phrenology, p. 470, mentions a new view, suggested by Mr. H. Watson. I am delighted to know that this gentleman is engaged in the pursuit of Phrenology ; he is destined to render great service to its cause, but my compar- ison makes me differ from him as to the essential function of this faculty. He conceives, that its simple function probably is a per ORGAN OF CAUSALITY. 337 option of conditions, and he proposes the term conditionality as the name. I copy a few illustrations. ' When we utter the word man, we address individuality alone, we speak of a being which exists, without specifying his form size color, or weight, without mentioning his actions, and without inti- mating his condition. When we say, the man walks, we add a new idea, that of walking. In this proposition we call in the aid of eventuality, which perceives action or events. If we say, the tall man walks, we address size, individuality, and eventuality'; or if we say, the black man rides, then color, individuality, and even- tuality combine in uttering and in understanding the proposition • but suppose that we are told, that the miserable man runs along the road, here we have first, the man; second, his condition, misera- ble; third, his action, running ; now what organ takes cognizance of his condition.' Before I answer I copy another example; 'suppose that we are told, that Mr. A. and Miss B. were married last week, at the altar of their parish church. Individuality takes cognizance of Mr. A. and Miss B. as individuals, and of the altar and church, as things which exist; locality will inform us of the place of the marriage, and time of the date of it, but in all this nothing is said of the condition of the parties, their married state.' In my opinion, the cognizance of these different conditions is tested by eventuality. This faculty not only shows the active, but also the passive and neutral verbs. It perceives a man walking, but also a man being carried, a man asleep, two persons being married , To be young, or old, good, just, or the contrary, are physical or moral events, which are made known to eventuality. Hence there >s no necessity of a new organ of conditionalitv. XXXV. Organ of Causality. Gall observed that those who were attached to the study of metaphysics, presented such a hemispherical developement of the superior part of the forehead, as is seen in Mendelssohn, Kant, (PL XIV. fig. 2. XXXV.) Fichte, Locke, and others. 43 338 PHRENOLOGY. It is remarkable that the ancient artists should always have given to their busts of philosophers a large forehead, and represented Jupiter Capitolinus with a forehead in the middle part more promi- nent than is ever seen in nature ; they seem to have observed that developement of the forehead has a relation to great understanding. It is farther remarkable, that this larger developement does not ex- tend to the lateral upper portion of the forehead. The organ of mirthfulness, which the Edinburgh phrenologists are inclined to consider as that of perceiving differences, is small in the busts of Demosthenes, Cicero, and other great men ; it is particularly de- fective in Jupiter. In this respect, therefore, the observations of the ancient artists coincide with mine, to prove that the organ of mirthfulness is not necessary to a philosophical mind. Gall ascribes to the hemispherical configuration of the upper part of the forehead the love of metaphysics, or profound reasoning. To this I must, however, object, first, that in the configuration decribed, both the middle and lateral parts of the front cerebral lobes are involved ; and that the special faculty of both is not the same. It happens indeed that sometimes the middle, sometimes the lateral parts are most developed. Moreover, the name met- aphysics does not designate a special power of the mind. And I therefore ask, what is the special faculty of the lateral parts ? Let us examine the most active faculty in metaphysicians. Their ob- ject is to investigate the nature of all things, even the nature of God, and of the immortal soul. Though, with Kant and others, I think that it is impossible by reasoning to penetrate these sub- jects, it may still be asked, what faculty endeavors to do so ? Metaphysicians, in their attempts to explain phenomena, neces- sarily examine the relations between cause and effect. Philoso- phers in their explanations of natural phenomena by reasoning, always suppose or admit some cause, and then develope their sub- ject by mental induction according to it. It seems to me, there- fore, that the special faculty of the cerebral parts on either side of comparison, examines causes, considers the relations between cause and effect, and prompts men to ask, Why ? ORGAN OF CAUSALITY. 339 The effects of causality are immense : the cultivation of fields, plantation of trees, all the artificial enjoyments of the external and internal senses, the invention of instruments of all kinds, in short all which man produces by art, depends on this faculty. It is the fountain of resources. It knows the conditions under which events happen, brings these to bear, and produces effects; for man cannot create, he can only imitate nature; he cannot attain final causes, which nevertheless must exist; all he can know is the suc- cession of phenomena, and if one uniformly succeed another, the preceding is considered as the cause and the succeeding as' the effect. This succession of events may take place without being per- ceived. To this end a special faculty is given to man. Animals do many things instinctively according to laws, but they do not know them or their cause; whilst man by this power, has the ir- resistible conviction that every phenomenon of nature has its cause, and is led by successive steps to the first cause. Farther, in con- sidering the actions of man, we must admit motives or moving causes from which they proceed. The law of causation cannot be too much recommended and attended to. The application of this faculty to metaphysics appears to me an abuse, since that study is beyond the reach of human nature and capacities. In consequence, investigations of that kind have re- tarded the progress of true, practical, and useful knowledge. Comparison and causality combined constitute reason, which has its laws, and depends on the acivity of the other faculties. With- out causality, no argumentative reasoning ; without great compar- ison, no comprehensive views, and no nice distinction. If a per- son with small reflective faculties write a book, he may shine in narratives, provided individuality, eventuality and language, be amply developed, but when he endeavors to reason, he will be feeble and confused. Reason, however, or the reflective faculties, are no sure guide for themselves alone, though they are the most impor- tant powers of the mind. They themselves decide, but the ob- ject to be judged must be furnished. In intellect, sound judgment 340 PHRENOLOGY. requires strong reflective faculties and sound knowledge, and to jud°-e soundly of the feelings, as of the moral and religious nature of man, great reflective faculties and the activity of the special feelings are necessary. Reason determines the relations and right employ- ment of the feelings, but does not produce them. Thus the faculty of individuality makes us acquainted with ob- jects, that of eventuality with events ; comparison points out their identity, analogy, or difference, and finds out their harmony ; final- ly, causality desires to know the causes of all occurrences. Con- sequently these faculties together, pointing out general principles and laws, and drawing conclusions, inductions, or corollaries, con- stitute the truly philosophic understanding. General Reflections on the Perceptive or Knowing Faculties. The conception of organs for the perceptive powers and their subdivision is mine. Gall, neither admitted the division of the mental powers into feelings and intellect, nor their subdivisions. He treated of an organ of educability, or the memory of facts ; of another for the recollection of persons; of the special organs of colors, localities, numbers, and music ; and of two more, one for learning languages, and another for their spirit ; whilst I speak, first of faculties which perceive the existence and physical qualities of external objects, and then of those which procure notions of relations. To the former belong individuality, configuration, size, weight, and coloring. The latter alone has been pointed out by Gall. According to him, music depends on one organ, and lan- guage on two; whilst I admit the organs of tune and time as essen- tial to music, and only one organ of language. I also limit his or- gan of educability to eventuality, and consider order as a funda- mental power. CONCLUSION. 341 General Reflections and Conclusion. I now bring this volume to a close, hoping to have accomplish- ed the aim I had in view : the determination of the physiology of the brain, the specification of the primitive faculties of the mind, and the discovery of their respective organs. The fundamental powers of the mind, as demonstrated in Phrenology, are evidently very different from those admitted in any of the systems of Philoso- phy hitherto promulgated. The relations between Phrenology and the schools of Philosophy are discussed in a separate volume. The special organs of the mental functions, except those of feeling and of voluntary motion, are all contained in the head. Those of the faculties most commonly possessed by animals are at the basis of the brain, and the others, as their functions rank higher, occupy superior situations ; those, consequently, of the powers peculiar to man compose the entire upper and fore parts of the cerebral mass. The organs of the faculties, too, which have something analogous in their nature, as of the propensities, of the sentiments, of the perceptive and of the reflective powers, are regularly found together; and those of the faculties which more especially aid each other are also in each other's vicinity. We can, therefore, speak of the organs under rubrics : amativeness, philoprogenitive- ness, adhesiveness, and inhabitiveness, are all in one neighborhood; combativeness is surrounded by amativeness, philoprogenitiveness, adhesiveness and destructiveness ; secretiveness is between alimen- tiveness, destructiveness, acquisitiveness, and cautiousness; self- esteem and firmness go together ; so do adhesiveness and love of approbation ; so also benevolence, reverence, hope, and marvel- lousness ; individuality and the powers which perceive the physi- cal qualities of external objects are vicinant; individuality, event- uality, comparison, and causality, run into each other, and so of the rest. Organs are, farther, placed nearer the mesial line of the head, as their functions are more important. Finally, the organs of the affective powers comprise by far the greatest mass of the 342 PHRENOLOGY. brain • those of the intellectual powers, though very numerous, are extremely small. The whole of the organs, common to man and animals, are generally larger than those which are proper to man. The primitive powers of the mind and their respective organs, having been proved by observation and induction, cannot be at- tacked by reasoning alone ; supported by invariable facts, they must be admitted as existing by the will of the Great and Supreme Cause of the universe. ' Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven,' is the great and leading commandment; Phrenology en- forces it upon new grounds, and may be shown to furnish the most effectual means of rendering man better and happier than he is. This, indeed, must be the ultimate result of Phrenology. Explanation of the Figures representing various Portraits, and of the Numbers referring to the various Organs marked in the Plates. PI. I. fig. I. Hydrocephalus : idiotic child. Fig. 2. Hydroce- phalus : adult and intelligent. PI. II. fig. I. Idiot, 25 years old. Fig. 2. Lord Bacon. PI. III. fig. I. J. M * * *, historian, has II. large. Fig. 2. A French abbe, full of vanity but feeble in amativeness ; II. is small. PI. IV. Two female heads. Fig. 1. has the organ of philopro- genitiveness large. Fig. 2. has it small. PI. V. Two views of heads from behind. Fig. 1. has vi. i. and xii. large, x. and xv. small. Fig. 2. on the contrary, has vi. i. and xii. small, and x. and xv. strongly marked. PI. VI. fig. 1. has vii. and xiii. large ; vi. i. x. and xv. small. Fig. 2. has vi. i. x. and xv. large, but vii. and xiii. small. PI. VII. fig. 1. and 2. Heads of bull-dogs. Fig. 3. and 4. Heads of horses. In fig. 1. and 3. vi. and xiii. are large; the same organs in fig. 2. and 4. are small. PI. VIII. fig. 1. with a large developement of xiii. and xiv., whilst vi. and i. are very small. Fig. 2. has vi. i. viii. and xv. large, and the anterior and upper part of the head small. PI IX. fig. 1. Sterne: xx. is very considerable. Fig. 2. Shaks- peare, has xix. and xxi. much developed. PI X. fig. 1. has the middle part of the forehead, marked xxx. very prominent; in fig. 2. ix. xxii. and xxiii. are very strong. PI. XI. fig. 1. P. P. Reubens; xxvi. very large. Fig. 2. Cap- tain Cook : xxvii. much developed. PI. XII. fig. 1. Jedidiah Buxton: xxix. very large. Fig. 2. Handel : xxxii. very strongly indicated. PI. XIII. fig. 1. has eventuality and language strong. Fig. 2. Home Tooke : language particularly indicated. PI. XIV. fig. 1. J. Abernethy, D. D., with large comparison. Fig. 2. Kant: the upper part of the forehead is very promi- nent. NAMES OF THE ORGANS.* No. I. Organ II. u III. u IV. u V. u VI. u VII. u VIII. a IX. u X. u XI. i< XII. t< XIII. a XIV. u XV. u XVI. u XVII. cc XVIII. u XIX. cc XX. a XXI. cc XXII. cc XXIII. cc XXIV. cc XXV. u XXVI. cc XXVII. u XXVIII. cc XXIX. cc XXX. u XXXI. a XXXII. it XXXIII. u XXXIV. C( XXXV. u of Destructiveness. Amativeness. Philoprogenitiveness. Adhesiveness. Inhabitiveness. Combativeness. Secretiveness. Acquisitiveness. Constructiveness. Cautiousness. Love of approbation. Self-esteem. Benevolence. Reverence. Firmness. Conscientiousness. Hope. Marvellousness. Ideality. Mirthfulness or gayness. Imitation. Individuality. Configuration. Size. Weight and resistance. Coloring. Locality. Order. Calculation. Eventuality. Time. Tune. Language. Comparison. Causality. * The numeration of the organs being in this edition different from that in the former edi- tions, does by no means indicate that the situations of the individual organs have been alter- ed. The place of amativeness, for instance, formerly numbered i., and now marked ii., is always the same, and so it is with several other organs. Their numbers are changed merely because I now treat of the organs in another order. PHRENOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA. BV J. G. SPURZHEIM, M.D., OF THE UNIVERSITIES OF VIENNA AND PARIS, AND LICENTIATE OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON. TWO VOLUMES BOUND IN ONE. VOL. II. PHILOSOPHICAL PART. FIFTH AMERICAN EDITION, FROM THE THIRD LONDON EDITION, GREATLY IMPROVED BY THE AUTHOR. HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, 88 CLIFF STREET, NEW YORK. 184 6. Entered, according to Act of Congresr, in tde year 1832 by Ma«.,C.fb ! Lto... in fhe Clerk's Office of the District Court of Massachusetts. PREFACE. Whoever wishes for truth is a philosopher; and of philosophers there are as many varieties as there are departments of knowledge, as well physical as meta physical. The title, however, is more particularly given to him who looks for exact notions and positive know- ledge, founded on principles dependent on the relations between cause and effect. It is unfortunate for humanity, that those who assume distinctive titles do not act up to them. From this cause it is that the most noble appellations fall into dis- credit. Pretended patriots have sometimes been more dangerous than declared enemies—pretended Christians worse than heathens. Who would not be styled a phi- losopher, or friend, or lover of wisdom ? Yet this name is often applied to decry individuals and their manner of thinking. Let us only observe, that all who call them- selves philosophers deserve not the title, any more than those who are called noble do their titles. The ancient philosophers were, in general, metaphy- sicians, that is, they examined objects without the reach of observation ; for instance, the primitive cause of the universe, the origin of beings, the cause of life, the nature of the soul, its immortality, &c. I incessantly repeat, that the aim of Phrenology is never to attempt iv PREFACE pointing out what the mind is in itself, or its manner of acting, or its final destination. Phrenologists are ob- servers of nature, and as such they examine only the manifestations of the mind and the circumstances under which these take place in this life. To prove Phreno- logy, a great mass of incontestable facts has been collect- ed. This volume contains philosophical reflections, and inferences drawn from phrenological observations. It will be divided into eight sections. In the first I shall make remarks on various systems of mental philosophy: in the second I shall enumerate the fundamental powers of the mind which are ascertained by observation and admitted in Phrenology; state their aim, the disorders which may result from them, and the consequences of their inactivity : in the third, I shall discuss their origin: in»the fourth, the conditions of their manifestations: in the fifth, the religious constitution of man : in the sixth, the moral constitution of man: in the seventh, I shall make some practical reflections; and, in the eighth, ex- plain several philosophical expressions according to the fundamental powers of the mind. CONTENTS. SECTION I. OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS SYSTEMS OP MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. PAGE General view of mental philosophy 9 Particular views of philosophers 27 Instinct, understanding 28 Consciousness and sensation 32 Perception ------ 32 Attention ------ 35 Memory ------ 36 Reminiscence ------ 38 Imagination - . - - - - 38 Judgment ------ 40 Association ____-- 43 Categories ------ 46 Desire and will ------ 47 Affections ------ 50 Passions - - - - - 52 SECTION II. PHRENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. «>4 VI CONTENTS. SECTION III. PAGE 61 65 66 68 68 ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 59 All is innate in man _ - - A few general faculties are innate and produce the particu- lar dispositions The external senses are the cause of mental activity Of accidental circumstances as the cause of mental phenomena Misery Society Climate ......70 Of prepared circumstances or Education - - 71 Innateness of the mental dispositions _ > - 75 SECTION IV. THE BRAIN IS INDISPENSABLE TO THE MENTAL PHENOMENA. 81 SECTION V. RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 88 Atheism ------ 90 God's existence _ _ _ _ - 91 God's attributes ----- 92 God's relationship with man or Religion - - 93 Natural Religion ----- 94 Importance of Revelation _ - - - 98 Aim of Religion - - - - -101 Improvement of Religion - - - - 103 Sublimity of Christianity - 105 Materialism and Immateriality or Spirituality - - 107 CONTENTS. VU SECTION VI. PACE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 114 Fatalism - - - - _ -114 Necessity - - - _ _ -117 Liberty and responsibility - - - - 119 Moral liberty - - - _ _ -119 Origin and nature of morality - - .. - - 124 Extent of morality - - - - - 132 Existence of evil, physical and moral - 138 Origin of evil - - - - _ _ 140 Comparison of natural morality with christian morality - 143 Natural goodness of man - 155 SECTION VII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 159 Modifications of the affective and intellectual phenomena 159 Difficulty of judging others - - - - 167 Necessity of mutual forbearance - - - - 171 Sympathy and antipathy - - - - 172 Happiness of man - - - - - 175 Personal liberty - - - - - -186 SECTION VIII. EXPLANATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 194 Conclusion - - - - - -212 PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PHRENOLOGY. SECTION I. OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. CHAPTER I. GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. It may be indifferent to phrenologists whether the first wise men were among the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Indians or Chinese. As the fundamental powers of the mind are innate and essentially the same in mankind, it is probable that in every nation some individ- uals excelled and took the lead of their countrymen. My object is here to take a very summary view of the most important schools of philosophy. It is known that before the Greek philosophers, learning was hereditary in peculiar tribes or castes, and wisdom the mo'nopoly of certain families, of the priests in Egypt, of the Levites among the Jews, of the magi in Chaldea, Assyria, and Persia, of the brahmins among the Indians, of the druids among the Celtic nations, &c. All knowledge was confined to priesthood, and the vulgar relied on their sayings and interpretations of nature and heaven. The whole tendency of barbaric philosophy, though employed upon important subjects, both divine and human, was mystical. Instead of investigating truth from clear principles, there was every vol. n. 2 10 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. where a public, or vulgar, and a concealed or more philosophical doctrine. The sacerdocy directed the religious and civil concerns, the administration of justice and the education of youth, clothed their dogmas in an allegorical dress, and transmitted them princi- pally by the way of tradition, to which the vulgar gave their simple and easy assent. Ignorance, superstition and impostors prevailed. It is, however, an important fact, that the doctrines of a Supreme Deity and the immortality of the soul were universally received. The founders of the Grecian states introduced the mode of in- struction used in their native countries in a poetical dress, and un der the disguise of fables, mystery, prodigies, and mythological enigmas. The management of the civil and religious affairs were in the same hands during the first period of Greece as well as else- . where. By degrees, however, practical wisdom appeared under the exertions of the seven wise men; and Thales from Miletus, the first of them, introduced the scientific method of philosophising. Theogony and Cosmogony, (God and nature,) were the princi- pal objects of philosophical inquiries in the remotest ages. The chaos, as eternal, was generally admitted, and the creation from nothing was unknown. The sum of the ancient Theogonies and Cosmogonies seems to be: the first matter, containing the seeds of all future beings, existed from eternity with God. At length the Divine Energy upon matter produced a motion among its parts by which those of the same kind were brought together, and those of a different kind were separated, and by which, according to certain wise laws, the various forms of the material world were produced. The same energy of emanation gave existence to animals, to men, and to gods, who inhabit the heavenly bodies and various places of nature. Among men, those who possess a larger portion of the Divine nature than others are hereby impelled to great and benefi- cent actions, and afford illustrious proofs of their Divine Original, on account of which they are after death raised to a place among the gods, and become objects of religious worship. Upon the ba- sis of such notions the whole mythological system and all the relig- ious rites and mysteries of the Greeks may be founded. Blind GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 11 necessity in the motion of the particles of matter, seems to have been admitted as the first principle of nature. Anaxagoras of Clazomena first affirmed that a pure mind, per- fectly free from all material connexions, acted upon matter with intelligence and design in the formation of the universe. Instead of mixing mind with the rest, he conceived it to be a separate, simple, pure, and intelligent being, capable of forming the eternal mass of matter. Like Thales, he believed the sun and stars to be inanimate fiery bodies, and no proper objects of worship. Of course such doctrines offended the Athenians and their priests; Anaxagoras was banished and went to Lampsacus, saying to his friends that he had not lost the Athenians,' but the Athenians had lost him. The Ionic school investigated particularly the origin and nature of things, considered the external objects much more than the na- ture of man, and in men paid little attention to those subjects in which the happiness of human life is immediately concerned. They admired virtue and extolled virtuous actions without taking the pains of establishing the principles and inculcating the precepts of sound morality. No distinction was made between thoughts and objects thought of. Socrates gave a new direction to philosophical investigation. He united with a penetrating judgment, a liberal mind and exalted views, exemplary integrity and purity of manners. Observing with regret that the opinions of the Athenians were misled and their moral principles corrupted, by philosophers who spent all their time in refined speculations upon the origin and nature of things, and by sophists who taught the art of false eloquence and deceitful reasoning, Socrates endeavored to institute a new and more useful method of instruction. He conceived that the true end of philoso- phy is not an ostentatious display of superior learning, neither in- genious conjectures, nor subtle disputations, but the love of truth and virtue. He estimated the value of knowledge by its utility; and recommended the study of astronomy, geometry and other sciences only as far as they admit of a practical application to the purposes 12 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. of human life. His great object was to lead men into an acquaint- ance with themselves, to convince them of their follies and vices, to inspire them with the love of virtue and to furnish them with useful moral instruction. He thought it more reasonable to exam- ine things in relation to man and the principles of his moral con- duct, than such as lie beyond the sphere and reach of human intel- lect, and consequently do not relate to man. His favorite maxim was : whatever is above us, does not concern us. Socrates had many disciples who formed schools or philosophical sects, such as the Cyrenic sect (by Aristippus from Cyrene in Africa ;) the Megaric sect (by Euclid of Megara ;) the Eliac sect; &c. The most important were the Academic sect by Plato, the Cynic by Antisthenes, the Peripatetic by Aristotle, and the Stoic by Zeno from Cyprus. Plato at the age of twenty years attended to the instruction of Socrates, remained eight years with him, and was his most illustri- ous disciple. At the death of Socrates he went to Megara and studied under Euclid ; he then travelled in Magna Graecia and was instructed in the mysteries of the Pythagorean system ; he also vis- ited Theodorus of Cyrene, and became his pupil in mathematical science ; he even went to Egypt to learn from the Egyptian priests astronomy, returned to the Pythagorean school at Tarentum and finally to Athens, where he opened a school in a small garden and spent a long life in the instruction of youth. He mixed the doc- trines of his masters with his own conceptions, and showed a great propensity to speculative refinement: he therefore attached himself to the subtleties of the Pythagorean school, and disdained the sober method of reasoning introduced by Socrates. His discourses on moral topics are more pleasing than when he loses himself with Pythagoras in abstract speculations, expressed in mathematical pro- portions and poetical diction. According to Plato, philosophy as it is employed in the contem- plation of truth is termed theoretical, and as it is conversant in the regulation of actions, is practical. The theoretical philosophy in- quires, besides the contemplation of truth and virtue, the right GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 13 conduct of understanding and the powers of speech in the pursuit of knowledge. Plato remembered the inconveniences which several of his pre^ decessors among the Greeks had brought upon themselves by an und.sguised declaration of their opinions. On the other hand he knew how successfully the Egyptians and Pythagoreans had em- ployed the art of concealment to excite the admiration of the vul- gar, who are always inclined to imagine something more than human in things which they do not understand. Yet he did not, after the example of Pythagoras, demand an oath of secrecy from his disciples, but he purposely threw over his public instruction of various subjects a veil of obscurity, which was only removed for those who were thought worthy of being admitted to his more pri- vate and confidential lectures. Plato divides his theoretical philosophy into three branches : theological, physical and mathematical. He admitted God and matter as eternal, since nothing can proceed from nothing, but he ascribed to God the power of formation ; farther, he speaks of the soul of the world from which God separated inferior souls, and as- signed them down to earth into human bodies as into a sepulchre or prison. From this cause he derived the depravity and misery to which human nature is liable. Life is the conjunction of the soul with the body, death is their separation. The human soul consists of three parts : 1st, Intelligence ; 2d, Passion ; 3d, Appetite.—Passion and appetite depend on matter ; intellect comes from God, and the rational soul alone is immortal. The human understanding is employed, 1st, upon things which it comprehends by itself, and which in their nature are simple and invariable ; or 2d, upon things which are subject to the senses and which are liable to change. Sense is the passive perception of the soul through the medium of the body. In his republic or political doctrine, he wished to subjugate pas- sion and appetite by means of reason or abstract contemplation of ideas, a conception which prevails still now-a-days, and which will be cleared up by Phrenology. 14 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. His notions of morality were exaggerated. He placed the greatest happiness in the contemplation and knowledge of the first good__God ; and the end of knowing God, in endeavoring to render men as like to God as the condition of humt.n nature will permit. This likeness consists in prudence, justice, sanctity and temperance. To attain this state it is necessary to be convinced that the body is a prison, from which the soul must be released before it can arrive at the knowledge of real and immutable things. The virtuous tendency of man is a gift of God, the effect of rea- son alone, and cannot be taught. The followers of Plato introduced in his philosophy various changes and new opinions, and increased thereby its obscurity ;— This happened particularly in Alexandria, where Platonic philoso- phy was mingled with traditionary tenets of Egypt and Eastern nations, and with the sacred principles of the Jews and Christians. Aristotle, from Stagyra, a town in Thrace, at the age of seventeen years went to Athens, devoted himself to the study of philosophy in the school of Plato, and continued in the Academy till Plato's death. Several years later he was chosen as preceptor of Alexander son of Philip, was eight years with Alexander, and when Alexander undertook his Asiatic expedition formed a new school in the Ly- ceum—a grove in the suburb of Athens, which was used for mili- tary exercise. Since he walked in discoursing with his disciples, his sect was called the Peripatetics. He had two classes of dis- ciples. In the morning he instructed the select, in the evening the Lyceum was open to all young men without distinction. His study is rather that of words than of things, and tends more to per- plex the understanding with subtle distinctions than to enlighten it with real knowledge. His logical dissertations are not sufficiently clear ; they contain many subtleties which of course produce obscurity. He was fond of syllogistic reasoning, but did not carefully distinguish between words and ideas. He reduced the general terms to ten classes— or categories. Plato had learnt the arrangement of categories from the Pythagorean school, who considered ten as a perfect number GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. Aristotle's categories are, 1st, substance;—2d, quantity ;—3d, re- lation ;—4th, quality ;—5th, action ;—6th, passion ;—7th, when or time ;—8th, where or place;—9th, situation or local relation ;__ 10th, habit. Later, five other general heads were added, viz. opposi- tion, priority, coincidence, motion, and possession. In his phys- ics, the explanation of the natural appearances is tedious.—In his metaphysical doctrine of the Deity and soul, he divests God of the glory of creation, connects him with a world already formed by the chain of necessity, but makes him the first spring and cause of all motion. God is constantly occupied with the contemplation of his own nature, and so removed from the inferior parts of the universe that he is not even a spectator of what is passing among the inhabitants of the earth, and therefore cannot be a proper ob- ject of worship, prayers and sacrifices.—The human soul has three faculties: nutritive, sensitive and rational. By the nutritive facul- ty life is produced and preserved ;—by the sensitive we perceive and feel. He nowhere says whether the soul is mortal or immor- tal. He placed moral felicity neither in the pleasures of the body, not in riches, civil glory, power, rank, nor in the contemplation of truth, but in the exercise of virtue, which is in itself a source of delight. Virtue is either theoretical—the exercise of the under- standing, or practical—the pursuit of what is right and good.— Practical virtue is acquired by habit. Aristotle, by his metaphysical doctrines offended the priesthood. Apprehensive of meeting with the fate of Socrates, he left Athens, saying : I am not willing to give the Athenians an opportunity of committing a second offence against philosophy. He had contin- ued his school twelve years, and appointed Theophrastus, one of his favorite pupils, as his successor. The Cynic sect, founded by Antisthenes, an Athenian, was not so much a school of philosophy as an institution of manners. Soc- rates perceiving the great tendency of the Athenians for futile spec- ulations, extreme effeminacy, luxury and vanity, recommended practical wisdom. The Cynics fell into the other extreme.—They taught simplicity of manners, but passed beyond the limits of de- corum, and at last became ridiculous and disgusting. 16 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Zeno admired the general principle of the Cynic school, but could not reconcile himself to their peculiar manners, nor could he adopt their indifference about every scientific inquiry. He attended the different masters of philosophy, and then became a founder of a new sect, called Stoic from Stoa—porch, viz. the place of their school. There were great contests between Zeno and the academy on one side, and between Zeno and Epicurus on the oth- er. Zeno borrowed his doctrine on physics from Pythagoras and Plato ; he excels more by his strict system of moral discipline. Whilst Epicurus taught his followers to seek happiness in tranquil- lity and freedom from labor and pain, Zeno imagined his wise man not only free from all sense of pleasure, but void of all passions and emotions, without fear and hope, and capable of being happy in the midst of torture. Epicurus believed in the fortuitous con- course of atoms ; whilst Zeno admitted fate, or an eternal and immu- table series of causes and effects. According to the Stoics, wis- dom consists in the knowledge of things divine or human. Virtue is the only true wisdom ; and the mind of man is originally like a blank sheet, wholly without character but capable of receiving any. The conformity to nature is the great end of existence Virtue is to be sought for not through the fear of punishment, or the hope of reward, but for its own sake. Virtue, being in conformity to nature, is in itself happiness. Man has duties towards God, towards himself, and towards his neighbors. God is the author of all that is good, and the Supreme director of all human affairs. The pious man reveres God in all events; is in every thing resigned to God's will; considers whaterer befalls him as right, and the will of God; and cheerfully followi wherever divine providence leads him, even to suffering or death Piety, in short, is nothing but a quiet submission to irresistible fate. Man's duty with respect to himself is to subdue his passions ol joy and sorrow, hope and fear, and even pity. It is virtuous self- denial and self-command. Man may withdraw from life because life and death are indifferent things, and death may be more con- sistent with nature than life GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 17 Our duty towards others is to love all men, even our enemies. A wise man will injure no one, will feel pleasure in protecting and serving others. He will not think himself born for himself alone, but for the common good of mankind. He is rewarded for his good by itself without applause or recompense. The wise man will disdain sorrow from sympathy as well as from personal suffer- ing. He is ready to exercise lenity and benignity, and to attend to the welfare of others and to the general interest of mankind, but pity towards a criminal is weakness. Another great branch of Greek philosophy sprung from Pytha- goras and sprouted out into the Eleatic, Heraclitean, Epicurean, and Skeptic sects. Pythagoras, probably from Samos, went to Egypt, spent there twenty-two years, underwent at Thebes many severe and troublesome ceremonies in order to gain the confidence of the priests and to be instructed in their most concealed doctrines. His method of teaching was mysterious and after the example of the Egyptian priests. He even boasted to be capable of doing miracles, and to have received his doctrine from heaven. He had public and private disciples. The oath of secrecy was given by the initated concerning the doctrine of God and nature. He taught theoretical and practical philosophy. The former contemplates things of an immutable, eternal and incorruptible nature, the other teaches things necessary for the purposes of life. Theoretical or contemplative wisdom could not be obtained without a total ab- straction from the ordinary affairs of life and a perfect tranquillity of mind; hence the necessity of a society separated from the world for the purpose of contemplation. Man was composed of body and soul, the soul of a rational principle, seated in the brain, and of an irrational part including the passions and seated in the heart. The rational part (cpQvv) ls immortal, the irrational part perishes. The rational soul after suffering successive purgations by transmi- gration, and sufficiently purified, is received among the gods and re- turns to the eternal source from which it first proceeded. The Py- thagoreans, therefore, abstained from animal food and from animal sacrifices. The object of all their moral precepts was to lead VOL. II. 3 18 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MLND. man to the imitation of God. They supposed, like the Egyptians, the air full of spirits and demons, who caused health or sickness among men and beasts. Among the Eleatic sect was Democritus, the derider who laughed at the follies of mankind, whilst Heraclitus of Ephesus, another follower of Pythagoras, was perpetually shedding tears on account of the vices of mankind and particularly of his country- men, the Ephesians. Epicurus, an Athenian, was of opinion that nothing deserved the name of learning which was not conducive to the happiness of life. He excelled by urbanity and captivating manners, made pleasure the end of his philosophy and wisdom a guide to it. He treated vulgar superstitions with contempt, dismissed the gods from the care of the world, admitted nothing but material atoms, was opposed to the austerity of the Stoics, and rejected providence and fate, doctrines so strongly maintained by the Stoics. He considered the regulation of manners (Ethics) as more important than the knowledge of physics. He was an enemy of the third part of philosophical doctrines—dialectics, as only productive of idle quibbles and fruitless cavilling.—He placed truth above any other consideration, and the end of living in happiness. Philoso- phy ought to be employed in search of felicity: bodily ease and mental tranquillity through temperance, moderation, fortitude, jus- tice, benevolence and friendship. Among the philosophers who regarded the testimony of the ex- ternal senses as illusive, Pyrrho, from Elea, the founder of the Pyr- rhonic sect, carried his doubts to the extreme. This school reject- ed every inference drawn from sensations, and admitted as a funda- mental principle that to every argument an argument of equal weight might in all cases be opposed. The Pyrrhonic philosophers had the tendency rather to demolish every other philosophical structure than to erect one of their own. If it be true that Pyrrho carried his skepticism to such a ridiculous degree that his friends were oblig- ed to accompany him whenever he went out that he might not be run over by carriages or fall down precipices, his mind was deranged. GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 19 The Romans conquered the Greeks by arms, but submitted to their understanding and manners. They found among them philo- sophical systems for all tastes. The gloomy and contemplative adopted the Pythagorean and Platonic creeds. Brutus was favor- able to the union of the Platonic and Stoic philosophy. Cicero was rather a warm admirer and an elegant memorialist of philoso- phy than a practical philosopher himself. He held Plato in high respect, especially for his philosophy of nature; he also was an admirer of the Stoic system concerning natural equity and civil law; he praised their ideas concerning morals, but he was continually fluctuating between hope and fear, averse to contention, and inca- pable of vigorous resolutions, and full of vanity. Cato of Utica was a true Stoic;—Lucretius and Horace were of the Epicurean sect;—Plutarch, like Cicero, rather an interpreter of philosophers than an eminent philosopher himself. Epictetus taught the purest morals, and his life was an admirable pattern of sobriety, magna- nimity and the most rigid virtue. Marcus Aurelius was the last ornament of the Stoic school. About the close of the second century arose at Alexandria the Eclectic system: a mixture of the different tenets of philosophy and religion, to the detriment of both. Pagan ideas were mixed with Christianity, and the different sects of philosophy were arbi- trarily interpreted. Subtle distinctions, airy suppositions and vague terms were introduced; and innumerable trifles were pro- posed under the appearance of profound philosophy.—Pagans became Christians and associated their ideas and language with Christianity, and the fathers of the Christian church studied the ancient philosophers to furnish themselves with weapons against their adversaries, to show the superiority of the christian doctrine, and to adorn themselves with the embellishment of erudition. Many did not distinguish between the light of revelation and that of reason. Nothing could be expected for philosophy from those who were busily occupied in disputes with infidels and heretics. From the beginning of the seventh century to the twelfth the Scholastic and Mystic theology sprung up. The irruptions of 20 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Barbarians had confined philosophy and learning to monastic insti- tutions, whilst the people were ignorant and superstitious. During the dark ages up to the fourteenth century philosophy resembles a barren wilderness; it was the handmaid of theology ; and though the Scholastics paid to Aristotle almost religious reverence, their minds were darkened by Aristotle's dialectics and logic, and their idle contests continued to disturb the world. The syllogistic form of reasoning became general, and the forms of technical phraseology were infinite. I copy only one example from Dr. Th. Brown's lectures on philosophy, (sterotype edition, p. 327) where he quotes how a scholastic logican proves by a long technical argumentation that the impossible differs from what is possible : ' whatever of it- self and in itself includes things contradictory, differs in itself from that which of itself and in itself does not imply any thing contra- dictory.. But what is impossible of itself and in itself involves things contradictory, for example, an irrational human being, a round square. But what is possible of itself and in itself, includes no contradiction. Therefore what is impossible in itself differs from what is possible.' Various sects, as the Nominalists, Realists, Verbalists, Formal- ists, Thomists, Scothists, and Occamists, were at open war with each other. The Aristotelian philosophy was kept up, since it was the com- mon opinion that the ancient Greeks had attained the summit of science, so that after all the question was what Aristotle, Plato, or Pythagoras had taught, rather than what was true. Philosophy and religion were so mixed together that some called themselves Scrip- tural philosophers, not to show that the general principles of reason and the natural law of morality agree with the doctrine of Scrip- ture, but to designate that all philosophy, even of physical and metaphysical science, is derived from divine revelation. Others called themselves Theosophists, and professed to derive their knowledge from divine illumination or inspiration. Fraud and hy- pocrisy were encouraged, to secure the credit of the church among the vulgar and ignorant. Nay, it became a rule: abroad, with the people ; at home as you please. GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 21 At last in the fourteenth and fifteenth century, the taste for po- lite literature revived in Italy, and the bold reformers in Germany endeavored to correct the errors and corruption of religion. Lu- ther perceived the connexion of philosophy and religion, and de- clared, that it would be impossible to reform the church without entirely abolishing the canons and decretals, and with them the scholastic theology, philosophy and logic, and without instituting others in their stead. Luther, Paracelsus, Ramus and Gassendi were eminent demolishers of the Aristotelian philosophy. After the revival of letters and restoration of sciences, Bacon, Descartes and Leibnitz were eminent in philosophy. Bacon be- came the great reformer and founder of true philosophy. He established observation and induction as the basis of knowledge, whilst the essentials of Descartes' philosophy, like those of many predecessors, were thought, and the knowledge obtained by thought. Leibnitz, like Plato, never arranged his philosophy methodically, yet he admitted two kinds of perceptions: one without and the other with consciousness ; farther, he considered the knowledge procured by the senses as individual, accidental and changeable, but that obtained by thinking and reasoning as general, necessary and positive. According to Leibnitz the reasoning power is en- dowed with principles, all phenomena are intellectual, and there is a harmony pre-established between the knowledge a priori and ex- ternal sensations. The latter only quicken the former. Phrenol- ogy denies the established harmony of Leibnitz between innate ideas and external sensations; it considers sensations and ideas as acquired, and admits only innate dispositions to acquire sensations and ideas. Yet it admits also a kind of pre-established harmony, concerning existence, between the special powers and the object of their satisfaction. Wherever there is a power, it finds an object. This has been the cause, that many philosophers have derived the powers from their objects of satisfaction. There are objects to be perceived; these were said to be the cause of the perceptive power, whilst the power of perceiving and the object of being perceived exist separately and are only calculated for each other. 22 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. There may, however, be many objectivities which man cannot percieve for want of special powers. Hobbes was persecuted for his theological and political here- sies, and therefore his views of philosophy were neglected, though Locke borrowed from him some of his most important observations on the association of ideas. According to Malebranche, God is wherever there is mind, and God is the medium of sensation. Malebranche furnishes to Locke his notions on habits and genius, to Hartley his theory on vibrations, and to Berkley the ancient theory of Pyrrho, viz. that the material objects have no other ex- istence than in the mind. Locke's philosophy became the basis of the greater number of , philosophical opinions in England and France. He denied the innate ideas and innate principles of morality, and maintained with Aristotle* that all knowledge begins with experience, or that all primary notions begin with sensation. According to him, the mind begins with external sensations, and then by means of its perception, retention, contemplation, comparison, reflection, or by its faculties of composing and abstracting, it executes all the particular operations of thinking and volition. In his system even the feelings and moral principles result mediately from the under- standing. Locke has some merit; he is a great lover of truth, and his work contains many judicious remarks brought together from various quarters, and he has greatly contributed to do away the rubbish of a learned jargon about the innate ideas and Platonic mysticism. But there is a want of originality, consistency and precision in his work. He is a wordy commentator of Bacon, Hobbes and Malebranche. The besetting sin of all his compositions is diffuse- ness and indistinctness.—Hobbes had compared the mind with a slate, Locke compared it with a white paper. This prepared the errors of Condillac, who gave all to the senses ; and to those of Dr. Hartley who explained the operations of the mind by vibrations, and who thought ' that all the most complex ideas arise from sen- * Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 23 sation, and that reflection is not a distinct source, as Mr. Locke makes it.' I think with Dugald Stewart that the work of Locke has been more applauded than studied. The French writers, particularly Voltaire, have most contributed to his celebrity. Voltaire said that Locke alone had developed the human understanding, and he calls him the Hercules of metaphysicians ; yet the French did not understand the basis of Locke's philosophy, when they maintained that he denied the innate dispositions of the mind, and when they confounded Condillac's philosophy with that of Locke. Among the Scotch philosophers the most remarkable are, Hume, who not only confined all knowledge to mere experience, but also denied the necessity of causation ;—Dr. Reid, who speaks of intel- lectual and active powers of man ;—Dugald Stewart, who deserves more credit for his style than for his ideas ;—and Dr. Th. Brown. The principal modern schools of philosophy in Germany, are the critical philosophy, the transcendental idealism, and the philos- ophy of nature. Kant, the founder of the critical philosophy, distinguished two kinds of knowledge, one experimental (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,) and another founded on belief (Kritik der practischen Vernunft.) He maintained that the first kind is only relative, subjective, or phenomenal, or that we know only the rela- tion of the subject to the object; that we do not know either the sub- ject or the object in itself, but both in their mutual relations only, and that this relation constitutes their reality to us. The subject ie conceived endowed with particular categories which are applied to the object; whatever is general and necessary in knowledge belonged to the subject, while the particular and variable is the attribute of the object. Hence all experimental knowledge is founded upon dualism ; upon the union of the subject and object; for, even the categories, though inherent in the subject, and con ceived by the mind from within, acquire objective reality only by their application to the object. Kant, though he considered both subject and object, had, however, the subject more in mind than the object. He reduced all categories or forms, according to 24 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. which the mind acquires experimental knowledge, to four kinds— to quantity, quality, relation, and modality; of these the two first concern objects in general, and the two last the relations of objects to each other and to our understanding. Thus Kant admits notions independent of experience, as conceptions of space, time, cause, and others; and considers these conceptions, not as the result of external impressions, but of the faculties of the subject: they exist from within, and by their means we are acquainted with the objects. Our notions of morality, of God, and of immortality, are not experi- mental, but belong to the practical understanding, and originate a priori. Liberty is a postulatum. Fichte went farther, and taught the system of transcendental idealism, according to which all certainty and reality is confined to the subject, who has knowledge only of his own modifications, and by means of abstraction and reflection, arrives at intellectual in- tuition. The philosophy of nature of Schelling rejects subject and object, makes no abstraction or reflection, but begins with intellectual in- tuition, and professes to know objects immediately in themselves. It does not consider the objects as existing but as originating; it constructs them speculatively a priori. Absolute liberty and ex- istence without qualities, are the basis of this system. As the philosophy of Locke has hitherto prevailed in England, as it has given occasion to that of Condillac, and as the system of Dr. Th. Brown admits more fundamental powers of the mind than any former philosophy, I shall compare them with phrenology. I agree with both authors in placing truth above any other con- sideration, and in maintaining that we cannot examine the mind in itself, but are confined to the contemplation of the mental phe- nomena. Locke and Brown consider the functions of the external senses as dependent on the nervous system, but the other mental opera- tions as independent of organization; whilst phrenology proves that every mental phenomenon depends on some bodily condition or organ, after the example of the external senses. GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 25 Locke admits in the mind understanding and will;—Dr. Brown, intellect and emotions. The subdivision of understanding by Locke is into perception, retention or memory, contemplation or judgment and imagination; and that of will into various degrees, from simple desire to passion. The subdivision of intellect by Th. Brown is, 1st, into simple suggestions, including every association of ideas, conception, memory, imagination, habit, and all concep- tions and feelings of the past; and 2d, into relative suggestions of coexistence or of succession ; the former of which include the sug- gestions of resemblance or difference, of position, of degree, of proportion, and of the relation which the whole bears to its parts ; and of which the second comprehends judgment, reason and ab- straction. His subdivision of emotions is into immediate, retro- spective and prospective. He admits a greater number of primi- tive emotions independent of intellect, and in this respect he comes nearer phrenology than any other philosopher; he also calls the division of Locke into understanding and will, illogical. Thus in the great division of the mental phenomena he agrees with phrenol- ogy, which positively has the priority over him. But Dr. Brown's subdivisions of the mental phenomena are very different from the phrenological analysis and classification. Farther, Dr. Brown con- siders the various emotions of the mind independently of brain. His philosophy therefore coincides with phrenology only in the first principle, viz. in admitting mental phenomena different from the intellectual states of mind; but his philosophy can never be confounded with phrenology. Locke denied the innate ideas and the innate moral principles. I agree with him in that respect, but he admits only innate disposi- tions for ideas, and derives the moral principles from them, whilst I admit also innate moral dispositions, which are as essential to the conception of moral principles as the innate intellectual dispositions to the formation of ideas. The reason why Locke denied the innate maxims of morality, viz. because certain children or adults and certain nations are with- out them or possess them variously modified, is not at all valuable, VOL. n. 4 26 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. since innate faculties may be inactive on account of the defective developement of their respective organs, and their functions may be modified by their combined operation with other faculties. Locke derives the primitive activity of the mind, from external impressions on the senses ; phrenology on the contrary, in admit- ting external senses and two orders of internal faculties, maintains that the internal dispositions, though they may be excited by ex- ternal impressions, are often active by their own inherent power alone. According to Locke, moral principles must be proved. I think they must be felt. It is to be remarked that according to phrenology, there is an internal and spontaneous or instinctive ac- tivity, independent of external impressions, as far as the feelings are concerned, but also as the intellectual faculties and experimen- tal knowledge are implicated. The abstract conceptions or intui- tive notions are furnished by the intellectual faculties themselves. The notion of identity, for instance, or that the same is the same; that the whole is greater than the half; that two and two are four, that nothing can exist except in space ; that nothing can happen except in time ; and that there is nothing without a cause, &c, are internal operations of mind as well as the instincts, propensities, and sentiments. Another essential difference between Locke, Dr. Brown and all other philosophers on one side, and phrenology on the other, is that the former think that we perceive the existence of external ob- jects and their original qualities, such as size, figure, mobility, num- ber, color, &c, by means of the five senses and their impressions alone ; whilst I treat of the immediate and mediate functions of the senses (See Vol. I. Art. external senses,) and ascribe very few ideas to the external senses, but the greater number, as those of size, figure, weight, color, order and number, to internal faculties. Thus I admit in the mind external senses by which the mind and the external world are brought into communication, and made mu- tually influential. The internal faculties are feelings and intellect. Both sorts may act by their internal power, or may be excited by appropriate impressions from without. The knowledge of our RECTIFICATION. 27 feelings is as positive as the experimental from without. Every determinate action of any faculty depends on two conditions the faculty and the object. The intellectual faculties are perceptive and reflective. The feelings and perceptive faculties are in relation and adapted to the external world, whilst the reflective faculties are applied to the feelings and experimental knowledge and are destined to bring all the particular feelings and notions into harmony. From this summary view of philosophy it follows, that the an- cient philosophers were principally occupied with theogony cos- mogony, physics, logic, dialectics, ethics and politics, and that in reference to man they examined his intellectual operations, moral actions and social relations, rather than his nature. Though this important object—the basis of all political sciences -has been investigated by later philosophers, its study will be newly modelled and its principles established by phrenology, in showing a posteriori the nature, number and origin of the human faculties, the conditions of their operations, their mutual influence, their modes of acting, and the natural laws by which their manifes- tations are regulated. I conclude this chapter with D 'Alembert, in saying, that hitherto there has been a great deal of philosophizing in which there is but little philosophy. CHAPTER II. RECTIFICATION OF PARTICULAR VIEWS OF PHILOSOPHERS. In order to prosecute advantageously the study of the mental functions, a capital error must be avoided,—an error which pre- vails in the systems of all philosophers, and which consists in their having been satisfied with general ideas, and not, like naturalists, having admitted three sorts of notions: general, common, and spe- cial. This distinction is essential to the classification of beings into kingdoms, classes, orders, genera, and species. In knowing the 28 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. general qualities of inanimate objects, such as extension, configur- ation, consistency, color,—even in knowing the common qualities of metals, earths, or acids ; we are not yet made acquainted with iron, copper, chalk, or vinegar. To indicate a determinate body, its specific qualities must be exposed. In natural history it is not sufficient to say that we possess a stone, a plant, an animal, a bird, &c, it is indispensable to mention the species of each possessed, and if varieties exist, to stale even their distinctive characters. In the study of the human body, general and common notions are also distinguished and separated from those which are partic- ular ; the body is divided into several systems, such as the muscu- lar, osseous, nervous, glandular, &c. ; determinate functions, too, are specified, as the secretion of saliva, of bile, tears, &c. But this distinction between general, common, and special notions is entirely neglected in the study of the mind, and even in that of the functions which in animals take place with consciousness. Instinct. Zoologists divide and subdivide the organization of the beings they study, and determine the structure of each particularly, but they consider their animal life in a manner quite general. Whatever is done with consciousness is explained by means of the word in- stinct. Animals eat and drink, and construct habitations by instinct; the nightingale sings, the swallow migrates, the hamster makes provision for the winter, the chamois places sentinels, sheep live in society, &c, and all by instinct. This is certainly a very easy manner of explaining facts; instinct is the talisman which produces every variety in the actions of animals. The knowledge convey- ed, however, is general, and therefore completely vague. What is instinct ? Is it a personified being, an entity, a principle ? or does the word, according to its Latin etymology, signify only an internal impulse to act in a certain way in ignorance of the cause? I take it in the latter signification ; thus the word instinct denotes every inclination to act arising from within. RECTIFICATION. 29 Instincts, moreover, are merely effects, and do not express .pe- culiar causes producing determinate inclinations. In stating that one animal sings and that another migrates, we specify some sorts of instincts, but leave their individual causes undetermined. The term instinct may be compared with that of motion. Planets re- volve round the sun ; the moon round the earth; the magnetic needle points towards the north ; rivers fall into the ocean; animals walk, run, or fly; the blood circulates; and all these phenomena are conjoined with the idea of motion. Motion certainly attends on all, just as the actions of animals are always joined with instinct, but the causes of the various motions and of the different instincts are not alike, and must, therefore, be looked for and specified. Finally, it is an error to say that animals act solely by instinct. It is true that some of their doings, such as the labors of insects, are the result of mere instinctive powers, but many animals modi- fy their actions according to external circumstances; they even select one among different motives, and often resist their internal impulsions or instincts. A dog may be hungry, but with the op- portunity he will not eat, because he remembers the blows which he has received for having done so under similar circumstances. If, in following his master, he is separated from him by a carriage, he does not throw himself under the feet of the horses or its wheels, but waits till it has passed, and then by increasing his speed he overtakes his master. This shows that some animals act with understanding. On the other hand, though new-born children cry, and suck the finger, they certainly do not act from understanding. And, if men of great ge- nius manifest talents without knowing that such faculties exist; if they calculate, sing, or draw, without any previous education, do they not so by some internal impulse or instinct, as well as the animals which sing, build, migrate, and gather provisions ? Instinct, then, is not confined to animals, and understanding is not a prerogative of mankind. The above reflections on instinct elucidate the ideas entertained by philosophers generally in regard to the mind and its faculties 30 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Many of them reduce all the mind's operations to sensation, and all its faculties to sensibility; others call this general faculty under- standing, or intellect. Understanding. We must make reflections on understanding similar to those already made on instinct. There are, in the first place, different sorts of understanding, which may exist independent of each other. Great painters cannot always become great musicians ; profound mathematicians may be without any talent for poetry ; and excellent generals may be miserable legislators. Hence, in the study of man, it is necessary to specify the different kinds of understanding or sensation. For, if we say, with Destut de Tracy, that memory, judgment, and imagination, are only modifications of sensation and the effects of unknown causes, it is still necessary to specify the kinds of sensation; since sensations of hunger, friendship, hatred, anger, or compassion, and knowledge of forms, colors, localities, &c, cannot be of one and the same sort, any more than the senses of feeling, smelling, tasting, hearing, and seeing. Thus, then, it is necessary to specify the various internal, as well as the external senses. Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of understanding must also be pointed out, and new observations in consequence become necessary. Finally, I repeat, that man does not always act with understanding. Suddenly threatened by any danger, the limbs are drawn back before there has been time to think of the means of escape. All the gestures and peculiar sounds which ac- company the rather energetic expression of the sentiments, are as involuntary as the feelings themselves, and by no means the effect of understanding. Who can say that he always acts with under- standing ? We too often choose the worse even in knowing the better. The greater number of philosophers explain the actions of man upon the supposition of two fundamental powers : understanding RECTIFICATION. 31 and will. They, however, merit the same reproach as the zoolo- gists who consider the actions of animals as effects of instinct, and those of man as effects of understanding alone. They attach themselves to generalities, and neglect particulars; they ought, however, to specify the kinds of will as well as those of under- standing. For it cannot be the same faculty which makes us love ourselves and our neighbors, which is fond of destroying and of preserving, which feels self-esteem or seeks others' approbation. Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of love and of will, which are taken at one time in a good, at another in a bad accept- ation, must be laid open. Many philosophers who consider understanding and will as the fundamental powers of the mind, have conceived particular modes of action in each of them. In understanding they admit percep- tion, conception, memory, judgment, imagination, and attention, —one of the most important of these modified operations ; to the will they ascribe sensuality, selfishness, vanity, ambition, and the love of arts and sciences, in proportion as understanding is enlight- ened and external circumstances modified. All philosophical considerations on the mind hitherto entertained have been general ; and whilst the study of the understanding has especially engaged one class of thinkers, another has devoted it- self to that of the will, principally as embracing the doctrine of our duties. The proceeding of either was fallacious. They have always taken effects for causes, and confounded modes of action, in quantity or quality, with fundamental faculties. They have also overlooked one of the most important conditions to the exhi- bition of affective and intellectual powers, viz. the organization of the brain. They considered the functions of the external senses in connexion with organization, but were not aware that all phe nomena of mind are subject to the same condition. The first of these classes of philosophers is styled Idealogists, the second Moralists. This separation, and the consequent de- struction of that harmony which ought to reign between the two, are to be lamented. Idealogists and moralists differ not only in 32 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. their pursuits, but each criminates the other, and endeavors to con- fine him within certain limits. Idealogists deride the studies of Moralists, and these often decry Idealogists as the greatest ene- mies of mankind. Many ponderous volumes are filled with their several opinions. I shall only consider, in a summary way, the most striking of their particular views, and begin with those of Idealogists. I. Consciousness and Sensation. Speculative philosophers incessantly speak of single conscious- ness and of there being nothing but consciousness and sensation in animal life. Dr. Reid and others consider consciousness as a separate faculty, and Condillac reduced all phenomena of mind to sensation, so that his philosophy is to mind what alchymy was to matter. Now though it be true, in a general way, that all op- erations of the mind are accompanied with consciousness, it by no means follows that consciousness of the impressions is one of its fundamental faculties. Consciousness is a general term, and is an effect of the activity of one or several mental faculties. It is iden- tic with mind and exists in all its operations : in perception, atten- tion, memory, judgment, imagination, association, sympathy, an- tipathy, pleasure, pain, in affections and passions. Mind cannot be thought of without consciousness. There are various kinds of consciousness, which are the special faculties of the mind, which may be possessed separately or conjointly, and which must be specified by philosophy. II. Perception. Two important questions present themselves : first, whether all the impressions which produce consciousness or sensation, come from without, through the external senses ; and secondly, whether all fundamental powers of the mind are perceptive, or have con- sciousness of their peculiar and respective impressions, or whether RECTIFICATION. 33 some of them procure impressions, the consciousness of which is only obtained by the medium of other faculties ? The majority of modern philosophers have investigated the per- ceptions of external impressions only, which they consider as the first and single cause of every varied mental function. The mind, say they, is excited by external impressions, and then performs various intellectual or voluntary acts. Some thinkers, however, have recognised many perceptions as dependent on merely inter- nal impressions. Of this kind are the instinctive dispositions of animals, and all the affective powers of man. Those who wrould consider this subject in detail, may examine, in the first volume of Phrenology, my ideas on the external senses and on the affective faculties. There it will be seen that I admit two sources of men- tal activity; one external and the other internal. An answer to the second question is given with more difficulty than to the first. Dr. Reid with some of his predecessors, dis- tinguished between sensation and perception. He understood by the former the consciousness of the mind which immediately fol- lows the impression of an external body on any of our senses; and by perception the reference of the sensation to its external corporeal cause. Certain particles of odorous matter act on the olfactory nerve and produce a peculiar sensation. When this pe- culiar sensation is referred to an object, for instance a rose, then it is perception. Gall thinks that each external sense and each in- ternal faculty has its peculiar consciousness, perception, memory, judgment, and imagination; in short, that the modes of action are alike in each external sense and in each organ of the brain. To me, however, the individual faculties of the mind do not seem to have the same modes of action ; I conceive that the functions of several faculties are confined to the procuring of impressions which are perceived by other faculties. The instinct of alimentativeness and all the fundamental faculties, which I call affective, seem des- tined only to produce impressions, which accompanied with con- sciousness are called inclinations, wants, or sentiments. The affective functions are blind and involuntary, and have no know- VOL. n. 5 34 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. ledge of the objects respectively suited to satisfy their activity; the nerves of hunger do not know aliments ; nor circumspection, the object of fear ; nor veneration, the object deserving its application, he. &c. Even supposing the affective powers had an obscure consciousness of their own existence, a point which, by-the-bye, is not proved, it is still certain that the intellectual faculties alone procure clear consciousness. The internal senses of individuality and eventuality, combined with those of comparison and cau- sality, determine the species of both internal and external percep- tions. As it is, however, much more difficult to specify the inter- nal than the external sensations, the species of the former have remained almost entirely unknown to philosophers. Thus, perception is an essential constituent in the nature of the intellectual faculties generally, and one of their particular modes of activity; yet it is no special faculty of the mind; it is a mere effect of activity in the perceptive powers. From the preceding considerations, it follows that in my opinion every fundamental faculty of the mind is not perceptive, consequent- ly I make a distinction between perceptive powers and kinds of m perception. There are as many sorts of perceptions as fundamen- tal functions, but the intellectual faculties alone seem to be per- ceptive. It is remarkable that consciousness and perception are not always single, that in the same person they may be healthy with respect to some faculties and diseased with respect to others. There are also cases on record, where persons subject to nervous fits, com- pletely forget what occurs during the paroxysms, when these are over; and remember perfectly during subsequent paroxysms, what has happened during preceding fits. The same phenomenon is re- lated of the state of persons under the influence of animal magnet- ism. Mr. Combe mentions the fact observed by Dr. Abel in an Irish porter to a warehouse, who forgot when sober, what he had done when drunk, but who, being drunk again, recollected the transactions of his former state of intoxication. On one occasion, oeing drunk, he had lost a parcel of some value, and in his sober RECTIFICATION. 35 moments could give no account of it. Next time he was intoxi- cated he recollected that he had left the parcel at a certain house, and there being no address on it, it had remained there safely and was got on his calling for it. It seems that, before recollection can exist, the organs require to be in the same state they were in when the impression was first received. III. Attention. Almost all philosophers speak of attention as a primitive power of the mind, active throughout all its operations, and the basis on which observation and reflection repose. < It is attention,' says Helvetius,* «more or less active, which fixes objects more or less in the memory.' According to Vicq d'Azyr, apes and monkeys are turbulent, because they have no attention. Dr. Reid f makes a distinction between attention and consciousness, calling the first a voluntary, the second an involuntary act; whilst other philoso- phers, with Locke, confound these two mental phenomena. Dr. Brown confounds attention with desire; he thinks that without desire there can be no attention. To all that has been said upon attention as a faculty of the mind, I reply, that attention, in none of its acceptations, is a single facul- ty; for if it were, he who possesses it in a particular sense should be able to apply it universally. But how does it happen that an individual, animal or man, pays great attention to one object, and very little or none to another ? Sheep never attend to philosophy or theology; and while the squirrel and ringdove see a hare pass with indifference, the fox and eagle eye it with attention. The instinct to live on plants or flesh produces unlike sorts of attention. In the human kind, individuals are influenced in their attention to different objects, even by sex and age : little girls prefer dolls, ribands, &c, as playthings; boys like horses, whips, and drums. One man is pleased with philosophic discussion, another with witty * De l'esprit, ch. de l'inegole capacite de l'attention. t Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 60. 36 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. conversation ; one with the recital of events which touch the heart and another with accounts of sanguinary battles, and so on. The word attention denotes no more than the active state of any intellectual faculty; or, in other terms, attention is the effect of the intellectual faculties, acting either from their proper force, or from being excited by external impressions, or by one or sev- eral affective faculties. Hence there are as many species of atten- tion as fundamental faculties of the mind. He who has an active faculty of configuration, of locality, or of coloring, pays attention to the objects respectively suited to gratify it. In this manner we conceive why attention is so different, and also why it is impossi- ble to succeed in any pursuit or undertaking without attention. It is, indeed, absurd to expect success in an art or science, when the individual power on which its comprehension depends is inactive. Again, the more active the power is, the more it is attentive. The affective faculties, though they have no clear consciousness, yet excite the intellectual faculties, and thereby produce attention. The love of approbation, for instance, may stimulate the faculty of artificial language ; boys who are fond of applause will be apt to study with more attention and perseverance than those who are without such a motive. Thus, perception and attention, though both modes of activity, may be distinguished from each other, as perception denotes knowledge of the external and internal impressions in a passive manner, or, as perceptivity or passive capability of Kant, whilst at- tention indicates the active state of the intellectual faculties and their application to their respective objects, or spontaniety, in Kant's language. IV. Memory. Memory is another mental operation, which has, at all times, occupied speculative philosophers. Those, too, who have written on education have given it much consideration. It is treated of as a faculty which collects the individual perceptions, and recalls RECTIFICATION. 37 them when wanted ; and is further considered as being assisted by the faculties of attention and association. Memory varies more in its kind than any other of the intellectual faculties recognised by philosophers. It is notorious that some children occasionally learn long passages of books by heart with great facility, who cannot recollect the persons they have seen before, nor the places they have visited. Others, again, remember facts or events, while they cannot recall the dates at which they happened ; and, on the contrary, this latter sort of knowledge gives great pleasure to others. The Jesuits, observing nature, consequently admitted a memory of facts, a local memory, a verbal memory, and so on. Even the causes of these differences in memory were looked for. Malebranche supposed some peculiar and modified state of the cerebral organization to explain the facts, such as softness and flex- ibility of the cerebral fibres in youth, their hardness and stiffness in old age, &c. Is memory, then, a fundamental power of the mind ? Gall thinks not; he considers it as the second degree of activity of every organ and faculty; and therefore admits as many memories as fundamental faculties. My opinion also is, that memory is not a fundamental faculty, but the repetition of some previous perception, and a quantitive mode of action. The question arises whether memory takes place among both the affective and intellectual faculties. It is true the affective powers act without clear consciousness, and the mind can- not call up into fresh existence the perceptions experienced from the propensities and sentiments with the same facility as the per- ceptions of the intellectual powers ; yet it renews them more or less, and consequently, I cannot confine the mode of action under discussion to the intellectual faculties. However, I distinguish between the faculties which have clear memory and the species of notions remembered : the perceptive faculties alone have clear memory, and all kinds of perceptions are remembered. Further, as the intellectual faculties do not all act with the same energy, memory necessarily varies in kind and strength in each and in every 38 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. ndividual. No one therefore has an equally strong memory for every branch of knowledge. Attention too, being another name for activity of the intellectual faculties applied to their respective objects, naturally strengthens memory : viz. it facilitates repetition. Exercise of the faculties, it is further evident, must invigorate memory, that is, repetition is made more easy. Let us now see the difference between memory and V. Reminiscence or remembrance. We have reminiscence, if we remember how certain perceptions have been acquired, while memory consists in the perfect repro- duction of former perceptions. Reminiscence is often taken for a fundamental faculty of the mind ; sometimes, also, it is considered as a modification of memory. I neither consider reminiscence as a fundamental faculty, nor as a modification of memory, but as the peculiar memory or repeti- tion of the functions of eventuality, that faculty which takes cogni- zance of the functions of all the others. This view shows how we may have reminiscence, but no mem- ory of the functions of our affective faculties. And also, how we may remember having had a sensation which we cannot reproduce, and repeat a perception without remembering how it had been acquired. Thus we may recollect that we know the name of a per- son without being able to utter it, and also repeat a song without remembering where we learned it. The special intellectual facul ties, in general, repeat their individual perceptions and produce memory, while that of eventuality, in particular, recollects, or has reminiscence. Reminiscence, then, is to eventuality that which each kind of memory is to the other intellectual faculties. VI. Imagination. This expression has several significations : it is employed to in- dicate at one time a fundamental power, called also the faculty of RECTIFICATION. 39 invention, and in this sense it is said to invent machinery, to com- pose music and poetry, and in general to produce every new con- ception. Imagination, again, is sometimes taken for the faculty of recalling previously-acquired notions of objects. This signification even corresponds to the etymology of the word : the images exist interiorly. At another time imagination indicates a lively manner of feeling and acting. Imagination, in fine, is a title given to facil- ity of combining previous perceptions, and of producing new com- positions. To the preceding considerations I answer, that imagination is in no case a fundamental faculty. There can be no single faculty of invention, or else he who displays it in one ought to show it in all arts and sciences. And it is notorious that powers of invention are very different in the same as well as in different persons. A mechanician who invents machines of stupendous powers, may be almost without musical talent, and a great geometrician may be perfectly insensible to the harmony of tones ; whilst the poet who can describe the most pathetic situations and arouse the feelings powerfully, may be quite incapable of inventing mathematical prob- lems. Man, it is certain, can only invent, or perfect, according to the sphere of activity of the peculiar faculties he possesses ; and therefore there can be no fundamental power of invention. Each primitive faculty has its laws, and he who is particularly endowed in a high degree, often finds effects unknown before ; and this is called invention. Imagination is, consequently, no more than a quantitive mode of action of the primitive faculties, combined par- ticularly with those of causality and comparison. Inventions are, probably, never made by individual faculties ; several commonly act together in establishing the necessary relations between effects and causes. The fundamental faculties sometimes act spontaneously, or by their internal power, and this degree of activity is then called im- agination also. In this sense imagination is as various in its kinds as the primitive faculties. Birds build their nests, or sing, witnout having been taught, and men of great minds do acts which they 40 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. had never either seen or heard of. In calling the degree of activ- ity of the faculties which produces these effects imagination, it is still a mere result of existing individual powers. All that has been said of imagination, as the faculty of recalling impressions, is refer- rible to the mode of action styled memory of the intellectual facul- ties, and is not an effect of any single power. Finally, imagination, used synonymously with exaltation, or poetic fire, results from activity of the fundamental faculty which I call ideality, and to the consideration of which mental power in Vol. I. of Phrenology, I refer my reader for farther information. From the preceding reflections on perception, attention, mem- ory, and imagination, it follows, that they are quantitive modes of action of the fundamental faculties, each of which may act spon- taneously, or be roused by external impressions. The intellectual faculties alone perceive or know impressions, and being directed towards the objects of which respectively they have cognizance, produce attention ; repeating notions already perceived, they exert memory; and being so active as to cause effects as yet unknown, they may be said to elicit imagination. VII. Judgment. Judgment is commonly believed to be a fundamental power of the mind. It is said to have been given to counterbalance imag- ination and the passions, and to rectify the errors of intellect. Memory and judgment are sometimes also maintained to exclude each other, but experience shows this opinion to be erroneous, for some persons possess excellent memory as well as great judgment These two kinds of manifestations, however, may also exist sep- arately ; and the conclusion then follows, that they are neither the same faculty nor the same mode of action. Let us first see wheth- er judgment be a fundamental power or not. Gall, observing that the same person may possess excellent judgment of one kind, and have little or none of another, that a great judge of mathematics, for instance, may have almost no RECTIFICATION. 41 capacity to judge of colors or of tones, considers judgment as the third degree of activity of every fundamental faculty; and admitting as many kinds of judgment as special faculties, denies it the pre- rogative of being looked on as a primitive power. In his opinion, every fundamental faculty has four degrees of activity: the first is perception ; the second, memory; the third, judgment; and the fourth, imagination. I, myself, neither consider judgment as a fundamental faculty, nor with Gall, as a degree of activity, or as a mode of action to every faculty. Judgment cannot be a quantitive mode, and cer- tainly not the third in degree, for some individuals judge very ac- curately of impressions as soon as perceived, without possessing the memory of them to a great extent; and others, with an excel- lent memory of particular kinds of impressions, judge very indiffer- ently of the same. It even happens that certain faculties are in the highest degree, or spontaneously, active, while the judgment in relation to these very powers is bad. In other cases, the faculties are exceedingly active, and also judge with perfect propriety. Moreover, judgment cannot be an attribute of every fundamental faculty of the mind, since the affective powers, being blind, neither recollect nor judge their actions. What judgments have physical love, pride, circumspection, and all the other feelings ? They re- quire to be enlightened by the understanding, or intellectual facul- ties ; and on this account it is, that when left to themselves they occasion so many disorders. And not only does this remark apply to the inferior but also to the superior affective powers ; to hope and veneration, as well as to the love of approbation and circum- spection ; we may fear things innocent or noxious, and venerate idols as well as the God of the true Christian. I conceive, then, that judgment is a mode of action of the intel- lectual faculties only; and not a mode of quantity but of quality. The better to understand my meaning, let us observe, that there is a relation between external objects themselves, and also between external objects and the affective and intellectual faculties of man and animals. These relations are even determinate, and in their vol. ii. * rj 42 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. essence invariable ; they admit modifications only. Hunger and aliment, this and digestion have a mutual relation. Now, if these relations are seen to be perfect and to exist as they are usually found, we say the function is good or healthy. If the sense of taste approve of aliments which man commonly employs and di- gests, the taste is good and perfect; but there is disorder or aber- ration whenever the functions depart from their ordinary modes of manifesting themselves ; if, for instance, the taste select articles generally esteemed filthy or unfit for food, such as chalk, charcoal, tallow, &c. it is disordered or bad. The intellectual faculties are in relation with the affective pow- ers and with external objects, and their functions are subject to determinate laws. The faculties of coloring and of melody cannot arbitrarily be pleased, the one with every disposition of colors, and the other with every combination of tones. Now, the functions of the intellectual faculties may be perfect or imperfect, that is, be in harmony, or the contrary, with their innate laws, and the product of these two states announced is judgment; for the intellectual fac- ulties alone know their own and the relations of the affective pow- ers with the external world. The expression judgment, however, it must be observed, is used to indicate as well the power of per- ceiving the relations that subsist between impressions themselves, as the manner in which this power is affected by these. We dis- tinguish different savors from each other, and we feel the different impressions they make. In both these operations we judge. The same thing holds in regard to all the perceptive faculties : they perceive the relations of their appropriate and peculiar impressions, and recognise the effect this act of perception produces. The faculty of coloring, for instance, perceives several colors, and is then affected agreeably or disagreeably ; in consequence, it ap- proves or disapproves of their arrangement. The perception of any relation whatever is the essence of judgment. The judgment of the faculties which perceives the physical qual- ities of external objects, even of tones or melody, is also called taste. We are said to have a good or a bad taste, or judgment, in RECTIFICATION. 43 coloring, drawing, and music, in speaking of forms, propor- tions, &c. Each perceptive faculty feels impressions and relations of one kind only ; that of configuration knows forms ; that of coloring col- ors ; and that of tune tones. The judgment, or the more or less healthy action of each, is in like manner confined to its special function. There are consequently as many kinds of judgment as perceptive faculties, and one kind must not be confounded with another. The regular and perfect manifestation of the functions of the two reflective powers, however, examining the relations of all the intellectual and affective faculties to their respective objects, and the relations of the various powers among themselves, partic- ularly deserves the name judgment; it essentially constitutes the philosophic judgment, which is applicable to every sort of notion. It is synonymous with reasoning. Comparison and causality being the highest intellectual powers, and an essential and necessary part of a reasonable being ; their perfect action or good judgment con- sequently ranks above all other kinds of judgment. However, reason or the reflective faculties in themselves are not infallible; they may be deceived by the erroneous notions and feelings on which they operate. Sound and true reasoning requires two things; first, sound reflective faculties ; and second, exact notions and just feelings, viz. sound premises. VIII. Association. Several philosophers in Great Britain, and especially Dugald Stewart, have lately spoken much of a peculiar faculty of associa- tion. They have examined the laws of its activity, and ascribed to it a great influence on our manner of thinking and feeling; they have even considered it as the cause of the sublime and beautiful. These propositions I conceive are erroneous ; association, in my opinion, being only an effect of the mutual influence of the fun- damental faculties. One being active, excites another, or several, and the phenomenon is association ; which occurs not only among 44 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. the intellectual faculties, when what is called association of ideas results, but also among the affective and intellectual together ; and, indeed, among all the fundamental faculties. The sight of a rose may recall one we love ; ambition may excite courage, or an in- tellectual faculty ; artificial signs may arouse the perceptive facul- ties ; and these, in their turn, make us remember arbitrary signs Association is a phenomenon of some importance in the practical part of anthropology; and when I come to speak of the modifica- tions of the mental functions, I shall enter into its consideration at some length. The principles of association are the same as those of sympathy. Faculties whose organs are situated near each other, or which act at the same time, will readily excite one another. Faculties also, which contribute to the same peculiar function, will be apt to exert a mutual influence. The strongest of the faculties will further ex- cite and overwhelm the weaker with ease. The mutual influence or association of the fundamental faculties explains the principles of Mnemonics, or the science of artificial memory, and shows its importance. To enable us to recall ideas or words, we may call in any of our other faculties, which acts with great energy, to assist. If that of locality, for instance, be vigorous, ideas will be easily recollected through the assistance of localities ; that is, by associating ideas with localities. Local memory will remember the peculiar ideas associated with particu- lar places. The same means or faculties, however, it must be understood, will not serve in every case. Individuals must sever- ally make use of their strongest to excite their weakest powers ; one will employ form, a second color, a third places, and others numbers, analogies of sounds, causes, and so on, with success. This consideration in its whole extent may be kept in view with advantage in education. No intellectual faculty is ever to be tutored singly, but all which are necessary to the perfect under- standing of a subject are to be exercised together. Geography will aid the memory of events, and the reverse; and so on with the rest. RECTIFICATION. 45 Association also elucidates the common saying, We think in our mother tongue. The meaning of this phrase is not determined; if language be supposed primitively to produce thought, a grave error is committed ; for we think in no language ; the feelings and ideas existed before the signs which express them, and we may have feelings and thoughts without a term to make them known. Language is only associated with the feelings and thoughts ; but as this is done very frequently and with extreme rapidity, even in conformity with the succession of thoughts, we are said to think in our native language. The fact, however, is interesting in itself, and proves the importance of the mutual influence of the faculties. Several of the modern languages, it is true, have a determinate structure, and do not admit of inversions, and ideas consequently follow regularly in a certain order; but ideas are not therefore results of the signs by which they are expressed. It is obvious, however, that the structure of a language must give a peculiar direction to the mental operations; and again, that the prevailing spiiit or general mental constitution of every nation may be known by its language. The French directs the mind especially to indi- vidual objects and their qualities; the German, on the contrary, forces it to combine, at once, all particular notions. Notwithstand- ing these admitted effects of language, signs must never be con- founded with ideas, nor simultaneous action mistaken for identity. The second idea which Mr. Alison and others entertain of asso- ciation as the source of the beautiful and of the pleasure that flows from it, is also unsupported by observation. Pleasure does not derive from association only. Every faculty is in relation to cer- tain impressions ; these, being either in harmony with it, or the reverse, produce pleasure or pain. The power of configuration is pleased with certain forms, and displeased with others. The faculty of coloring likes certain colors, and dislikes others. In the same way impressions of tones are immediately pronounced agreea- ble or disagreeable. The perceptive faculties are pleased by their respective harmonious impressions. On the other hand it is, however, certain that association may 46 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. increase or diminish the absolute pleasure or pain. Pleased with a rose in itself, we may call it beautiful; but the pleasure and the beauty may still be heightened by recollections of the person who planted or presented it. Impressions, little agreeable in them- selves, may gain by association. A national air may rank very low as a musical composition, and even offend a scientific ear, and yet delight him, the scenes of whose boyhood, and of whose home, the remembrances of whose relations and friends, it recalls. IX. Categories. Even those who recognise certain laws, or categories, accord- ing to which the mind operates, confine too much their consider- ations to general views. If Kant, in his treatise on Experimental Knowledge, admits a category of quality, his conception is still general. We know, it is true, the qualities of natural objects, but there are various kinds of these, and none of them are either speci- fied in Kant's philosophy, or considered as fundamental faculties of the mind. Idealogists have therefore recognised certain effects and modes of action of the mental powers, and certain laws according to which the mind acts, but few of the fundamental faculties. Among the categories of Aristotle and Kant those of space and time, and that of causality by Kant, are fundamental faculties of Phrenology, but the others are mere modes of action and general conceptions. The various conceptions of philosophers exist in nature, but they are defective, and need rectification, that is, the faculties and their modes of acting must be specified and their existence demonstrated by observation; in this way alone will philosophy become appli- cable to man in his social relations. Moralists. Man must soon have felt that every kind of mental operation could not be called intellectual. Philosophers have accordingly RECTIFICATION. 47 acknowledged a second, and a different sort, which they name Will. Living in society, man is in relation with his parents, his friends, his enemies, with those who are inferior or superior, and by an innate power he examines his actions in a moral point of view. In conceiving supernatural beings, and admitting their influence on his situation, he also contrived means to render himself agreeable to them. Those philosophers, then, who examine the moral conduct of man, and its rules, viz. moralists, are particularly interested in the knowledge, not only of the intellectual faculties and their modes of action, but also of the inclinations and sentiments, of the affections and passions, of the motives of our actions, of the aim of our facul- ties, and of the means of arriving at it. The study of moralists, however, is not more exact than that of idealogists. Like them, ignorant of the fundamental powers of the mind, they confound modes of action with the faculties themselves, disagree about the origin of morality, its nature, and the means of advancing it ; the philosophic doctrines of the will, affections and passions. I there- fore begin with their elucidations. X. Desire and Will. Many philosophers understand by the expression Will, all sorts and all degrees of inclinations, desires, and sentiments. Moralists commonly say that the will alone is the cause of our actions and omis- sions, and even that mankind is degraded by any other explanation than this. The will is considered as an entity and styled weak or strong, good or bad. These terms, however, are vague, and re- quire consideration. In the common acceptation of the word, will is no more a funda- mental power than the instinct of animals, it is only the effect of every primitive faculty of the mind, and synonymous with desire ; each faculty being active produces an inclination, a desire, ov a kind of will; and in this signification there are as many species o1 48 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. will as fundamental faculties; the strength of each, too, is in pro- portion to the activity of the individual faculties, and exists invol- untarily. Such a sweeping and general acceptation of the term Will, then, is evidently defective. That desire which overwhelms the others is also called Will Now, in this sense, every faculty in its turn may become Will. A dog, for instance, is hungry, but having been punished for eating the meat he found upon the table, he, without ceasing to feel appe- tite, for fear of a repetition of the blows, does not indulge ; he de- sires to eat, but he will not. Will, therefore, in this acceptation, cannot be any fundamental power, it is only an effect of the most active powers. Let us here ask, whether man in his healthy state of mind is compelled by nature to consider certain desires as superior and others as inferior ? The answer is affirmative. I shall detail this point later, in speaking of the moral nature of man; meanwhile I adopt it as quite positive, and only add that the preference given is founded on intelligence which knows the different desires, and determines the election which is made. Now by calling will the mental operation which appreciates the value of the desires, and chooses among them, it is evident that it depends on, and is pro- portionate to, intellect; hence, that it is not a fundamental faculty. It is of the utmost importance to be aware that there is no moral will without intelligence, though this does not constitute will, and that will is no fundamental power, but the effect of the reflect- ive faculties applied to the affective and perceptive powers of the mind. Legislation, in general, recognises intelligence as an indispensa- ble condition of will. Idiots, and the insane, therefore, are not answerable for their actions. All the affective faculties, indeed, are blind, and dispose us to act according to pleasure, not accord- ing to will, which may frequently be opposed to pleasure. In conformity, the moral code of Christianity distinguishes between desires and will. Let us for a moment suppose that will is a fundamental power, RECTIFICATION 49 and of a higher order than intellect; but, on this hypothesis, how can will act at one time in this and at another in the opposite di- rection ? How happens it, that in one the will looks only for self- ish gratifications, and in another for general happiness ? Can will take a determinate direction without any cause ? Is it different in itself, or is it influenced by other causes—may it, for instance, be excited by the feelings ? In this case, however, it would become dependent and exposed to aberrations. The Christian law commands the will to resist inferior tempt- ations, and to follow the inspirations of the Spirit. Pious persons, also, in their addresses to the Great Guiding Power, pray that their will may be directed towards certain actions, and turned away from others. This proves that they consider will as suscep- tible of being influenced, and by no means as independent, and acting without any cause. Such an independent will would, in- deed, be a principle, and could have only one, never opposite tendencies. Thus, in the world, will has been separated from mere desires, or from the affective faculties ; and intelligence been considered a condition necessary to its manifestations. Yet intelligence does not constitute will; for a person with an excellent intellect may take very little interest in the welfare of other beings. He may acknowledge the better, and still incline and even yield to his in- clination to pursue the worse. Two conditions then, the feelings and intellect, are necessary to will; in other terms, will consists in the application of reason to the affective and perceptive faculties. The greater number of persons take their individual inclinations and pleasures for will, forgetting that these give motives blindly and involuntarily. We may, indeed, say, that the exhibition of true will is very rare ; it is too generally in opposition to our inclina- tions. This state has been noticed by several moralists. ' The spirit,' it is said, 'is willing, but the flesh is weak.'* 'For that which I do,' says the Apostle Paul, 'I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.'t * Matt. xxvi. 41. t Rom. vii. 15. VOL. II. 7 50 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Here it is sufficient to know that will can neither be confounded with the individual inclinations nor with intellect; and that it is no special faculty, but the application of reason, or the reflective pow- ers, to our desires and notions. I shall afterwards show that in its true signification it is the basis of liberty. XL Affections. There is a great confusion of ideas in the works which treat of the affections. The name affection is sometimes given to funda- mental powers, as to physical love, to self-love, to the love of approbation, and to hope. Affections are also confounded with passions. Moreover, affections are occasionally put for the pathognomical signs, which indicate different states of satisfac- tion or discontent of the fundamental powers ; for instance, smiling, laughing, sighing, yawning, shedding tears, &c. I employ the word in none of the preceding significations, but solely according to its etymology, to indicate the different states of being affected of the fundamental powers. The sense of feel- ing, for instance, may convey tickling, itching, burning, or lancina- ting pain ; its various modes of sensation are affections. In the same way the internal faculties may be differently affected. The affections of the fundamental faculties may be divided into qualitive and quantitive. The former may again be subdivided into five sorts: 1st, general, which exist in each fundamental power; 2d, common, which inhere in several faculties ; 3d, special, which belong to individual powers; 4th, simple or compound; finally, 5th, which are common to man and animals, and which are proper and peculiar to man. The quantitive affections may be subdivided into two sorts : 1st, the fundamental powers and their qualitive affections may be active in very different degrees, from indolence to passion ; and 2d, they may act with more or less quickness and duration. Among the qualitive and quantitive, and among the simple and compound affections, we may also distinguish those which appear RECTIFICATION. 51 in the state of health from those which occur in disease. Let us now quote examples of each kind. A general quantitive mode of action or affection is desire: each faculty being active, desires; hence, there are as many sorts of desire as fundamental faculties. The sensations of pleasure and pain are two sorts of general qualitive affections ; they are effects, and happen, the former if any faculty be satisfied, the latter if its desire be not complied with. There are consequently as many kinds of pleasure and of pain as individual faculties. The mode of being affected, called sentiment, is common to several affective faculties. That known under the name of mem- ory, belongs to the intellectual faculties. Fury is common to com- bativeness and destructiveness. Simple affections take place in individual faculties. Anger, in my opinion, is a special affection of combativeness or destructiveness ; fear, of circumspection; compassion, of benevolence; and repentance or remorse, of con- scientiousness. Compound affections, on the contrary, depend on the combined activity of several faculties ; jealousy, for in- stance, whose essence is egotism, is modified according to the peculiar faculties which desire, as physical love, friendship, love of approbation. Envy is another compound affection : it is jealousy without benevolence; it increases by the want of the superior feelings. An envious person covets for himself alone ; he would possess all enjoyments, to the entire exclusion of others ; while a jealous man desires to enjoy and is especially careful not to lose possession of the pleasure he enjoys. The affections common to man and animals, and ttiose proper to man, depend on the respective faculties. Anger, fear, jealousy, envy, appear in man and animals, as the faculties to which these affections belong inhere in both ; while adoration, repentance, ad- miration, and shame, pertain, like the faculties from which they arise, to man alone. Let us now remark that the fundamental powers and their quali- tive affections may be more or less active or strong. The differ- ent degrees of activity are called velleity, desire, ardent desire. 52 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. passion; of the agreeable affections, pleasure, joy, and ecstasy; and of the disagreeable affections, pain, grief, and misery. The nervous irritability, which is styled sentimentality in friend- ship, irascibility in courage, sensibility in benevolence, indicates only a higher degree of excitability or activity of the 'fundamental powers, and irregularity of application. The affections may, further, be sudden and transitory, or slow and durable. Finally, the difference of the affections in the healthy and diseased state is easily understood. The complete absence of a faculty may be called imbecility, if it never existed, and fatuity, if it have been destroyed by disease. Fury, mel- ancholy, despair, and irresistibility of any inclination, are diseased affections. But this subject is treated of at greater length in my work on Insanity, and I shall not dwell longer on it here. Physicians, as well as moralists, must study the doctrine of the affections, on account of their influence on the vital functions and on man's actions in society. The same may be said in regard to the following article on XII. Passions. This word passion is commonly confounded with affection. What I have stated upon the affections, however, being known, the signification which I attach to the term passion will be easily understood ; I use it to indicate only the highest degree of activity of any faculty. Passions, therefore, are not fundamental powers, but quantitive modes of action, and effects ; there are, consequent- ly, as many sorts of passions as of faculties. Physicians, idealogists, and moralists, incessantly complain of the influence of the passions, since they ruin health and often occasion insanity, disorder judgment, cloud reason, and are causes of many errors and criminal actions. Passions being the highest degree of activity of every faculty, we easily conceive why great results, whether good or bad, follow from them ; why they advance the arts and sciences, and why they RECTIFICATION. 53 maybe excessively dangerous. This depends on the nature of the faculties which act with the utmost degree of energy. The low- er feelings, however, let me remark, are commonly the most ac- tive ; and in speaking of passions, we are apt to think of them. Still, the superior sentiments and the reflecting powers also act with passion in some, that is, they act with the greatest possible energy. Two feelings, selfishness and the love of glory, have been considered by Helvetius as the greatest, or principal pas- sions, and the cause of all our actions. There is no doubt that these two feelings are very active in the majority of individuals, and excite and employ the other faculties to procure their satis- faction. But certain it is, also, that they cannot produce talents. There are ambitious people eager for distinction, who labor hard, and who notwithstanding all, never excel in any one particular. As there reigns a natural harmony among the fundamental pow- ers, those faculties which are too energetic, or which act with passion, must obviously disturb this balance or order. A youth in love, and a fanatic in religion, sacrifice the rest to their passion, and do harm. Yet in complaining of the passions, we do not stig- matize the fundamental powers themselves, but only their too great energy. This remark applies to the religious and moral feelings, as well as to the most brutal propensities. Selfishness, though it undermines morality, is still necessary to self-preservation. The love of approbation, though the main cause of political slavery, has a useful destination in private life. And religion, though the source of incalculable misery, procures the greatest consolation to humanity. I shall make one observation more upon passions : the factitious passions, spoken of in books, do not exist. The primitive pow- ers, on which they depend, are innate; their applications alone may be called factitious. Love of approbation is inherent in human nature ; its satisfaction by external marks, titles, &c. is artificial. I conclude with repeating that the various conceptions of phi- losophers, of idealogists as well as of moralists exist in nature, 54 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. but they are defective and need rectification, that is, the fundamen tal powers of the mind and their modes of acting must be specified, and their existence demonstrated by observation. This great task was reserved to Phrenology, by which alone philosophy will be- come applicable to man in his social relations. SECTION II. The following new classification of the fundamental phenomena of the mind is the result of all physiological inquiries, contained in my work entitled Phrenology, and constitutes a summary of its philosophy. ORDER I. Affective faculties or feelings. The essential nature of the affective faculties is to feel emo- tions. I shall indicate their nature, the aim of their existence, the disorders to which they dispose, and the consequences of their inactivity. Genus I.—Feelings common to man and animals. Hunger and thirst are desires felt and known by means of the brain, and there is a special organ in which these impressions in- here. (Alimentiveness.) Aim : The preservation of the individual. Disorders : Gluttony—Drunkenness. Its inactivity is accompanied by want of appetite. FUNDAMENTAL PHENOMENA OF THE MIND. 55 Destructiveness. Aim : Destruction, and the violent death of animals, for the sake of living on their flesh. Disorders : Murder, cruelty. Its inactivity prevents destruction. Physical love—(Amativeness.) Aim : The propagation of the species. Disorders: Fornication, adultery, incest, and other illegitimate modes of satisfaction. Its inactivity predisposes to passive continency. Love op offspring-—(Philoprogenitiveness.) Aim : The preservation of the offspring. Disorders : Too active ; it spoils children, or causes their loss to be felt as an insupportable calamity. Its inactivity disposes to neglect, or to abandon the progeny. Inhabitiveness. Aim: Animals have peculiar instincts to dwell in determinate localities. Nature destined all places to be inhabited. Disorder : Nostalgia. Attachment—(Adhesiveness.) Aim : Attachment to all around us. It appears variously mod- ified, and produces friendship, marriage, society, habit, and gener - al attachment. Disorders: Inconsolable grief for the loss of a friend. Its inactivity predisposes to carelessness about others. Courage—(Combativeness.) Aim : Intrepidity and defence. Disorders : Quarrelsomeness, disputation, attack, anger. Its inactivity predisposes to cowardice, timidity, and fear. 56 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Secretiveness. Aim : To conceal. Disorders: Cunning, duplicity, falsehood, hypocrisy, dissimula- tion, intriguing, lying. Its inactivity predisposes to be deceived by others. Acquisitiveness. Aim : To acquire that which is necessary to our preservation. Disorders: Theft, fraud, usury, corruptibility. Its inactivity makes one's own interest be neglected. Constructiveness. Aim : Construction in general. Cautiousness. Aim : To be cautious and circumspect. Disorders: Uncertainty, irresolution, anxiety, fear, melancholy. Its inactivity predisposes to levity. Self-esteem. Aim: Self-esteem. Disorders : Pride, haughtiness, disdain, arrogance, insolence. Its inactivity predisposes to humility. Love of approbation. Aim : Love of approbation and distinction. Disorders : Vain glory, vanity, ambition, titles, distinctions. Its inactivity predisposes to indifference about the opinion of others. Genus II.—Affective faculties proper to man.* Benevolence. Aim : Benevolence in general. • The rudiments of some of them exist also in animals; but they are much stronger and more extensive in their sphere of application in man. FUNDAMENTAL PHENOMENA OF THE MIND. 57 Disorders: Benevolence to the undeserving, or at the expense of others. Its inactivity predisposes to selfishness, and not to regard others. Reverence. Aim: To respect what is venerable. Disorders: Idolatry, bigotry. Its inactivity predisposes to irreverence. Firmness. Aim: Firmness. Disorders: Stubbornness, obstinacy, and disobedience. Its inactivity: predisposes to inconstancy and changeableness. Conscientiousness. Aim: Justice, conscientiousness, and duty. Disorders: Remorse for actions which are innocent, or of no importance. lis inactivity predisposes to forgetfulness of duty. Hope. Aim: Hope. Disorders: Love of scheming. Its inactivity predisposes to despair. Marvellousness. Aim: Admiration, and belief in supernaturality. Disorders: Sorcery, astrology, the belief in demons. Its inactivity predisposes to incredulity in revealed ideas. Ideality. Aim: Perfection. Disorders: Too great exaltation, eccentricity. Its inactivity predisposes to taking things as they are. vol. 11. 8 58 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Mirthfulness. Aim : Glee, mirth, laughter. Disorders: Raillery, mockery, irony, satire. Its inactivity predisposes to seriousness. Imitation. Aim: Imitation, expression in the arts. Disorders: Buffoonery, grimaces. Its inactivity hinders expression in the arts, and imitation m general. ORDER II. Intellectual faculties. The essential nature of the intellectual faculties is to procure knowledge. Genus I. External senses. Genus II. Internal senses, or perceptive faculties, which pro- cure knowledge of external objects, their physical qualities, and various relations. Individuality. * 0rder- Configuration. Calculation. Size. Eventuality. Weight and resistance. Time. Coloring. Tune. Locality. Language. Genus III. Reflective faculties. Comparison. Causality. ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 59 SECTION III. Origin of the Mental Dispositions. Not the nature of the mental powers only, but their origin, or the cause of their existence also, has constantly been an object of investigation. Philosophers have never differed in opinion upon the vegetative qualities of man. His digestion,.circulation, respi- ration, and various secretions and excretions, are natural functions, and cannot be acquired by will nor intelligence; but, in regard to the origin of the mental powers, many, and different opinions, have been, and are still, entertained. According to some, man is every thing by nature; to others, there are a few general fundamental faculties which produce all particular manifestations ; whilst others, again, hold that man is born without any determinate disposition, a tabula rasa, or blank sheet, and that his faculties are the result of external impressions both natural and artificial. Let us examine tnese different opinions, and see how far each is exaggerated. CHAPTER I. Man is every thing by Nature, or, all is innate in Man. According to the philosophers of antiquity, we look in vain for qualities in man which are not given to him from birth. This language was used both by profane and religious writers. Plato, in his Republic, considers philosophical and mathematical talents, memory, and the sentiments of pride, ambition, courage, sensuality, &c, as innate. Hippocrates, in treating of the qualities necessary for a physician, speaks of natural and innate dispositions. Aris- totle, in his work on Political Science, adopts the principle, that some are born to govern and others to obey. Quintilian said, ' If precepts could produce eloquence, who would not be eloquent ?' Cicero, Seneca, &c were of opinion that religion is innate; so 60 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. thought Lavater also. Herder * considered man's sociability, his benevolence, his inclination to venerate a superior being, his love of religion, &c. as innate. Condillac f says, < Man does not know what he can do, till experience has shown what he is capable of doing by the force of nature alone ; therefore, he never does any thing purposely till he has once done it instinctively. I think this observation will be found to be permanent and general. I think also that, if it had been duly considered, philosophers would have reasoned better than they have done. Man makes analyses only after having observed that he has analyzed. He makes a language after having observed that he had been understood. In this man- ner poets and orators began before they thought of their peculiar talents. In one word, all that man does he did at first from nature alone. Nature commences, and always commences well. This is a truth that cannot be repeated too frequently.' < When the laws,' says he in another passage,}: ' are conven- tions, they are arbitrary. This may be the case ; and, indeed, there are too many arbitrary laws; but those which determine the morality of our actions cannot be arbitrary. They are our work in as far as they are conventional; but we alone did not make them; nature dictated them to us, and it was not in our power to make them otherwise than they are. The wants and faculties of man being given, laws are given also ; and, though we make them, God, who created us with such wants and such facul- ties, is, in fact, our sole legislator. In following these laws con- formably to nature we obey God; and this is the completion of the morality of our actions.^. The ancient institution of castes, or tribes, in eastern countries, shows that endeavors were made to preserve the purity of the races. The prejudice of nobility in certain families can be explained only by admitting the innateness of dispositions. The religion of Christ also recognises the innateness of the * Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophic der Menschheit. Th. 1. S. 252. t CEuv. Compl. 8vo. t. iii. p. 115. t Loc. cit. p. 55. ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 61 faculties. According to it, all is given from above. ' A man can receive nothing, except it be given to him from Heaven.'* ' No one can come unto me except it were given to him by my Father, 'f 'Who hath ears to hear, let him hear.'J 'All men cannot re- ceive this saying, save they to whom it is given.'§ St. Paul says, When the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves : which show the word of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.' || The doctrine of predestination is also conformable to the opin- ion that every thing is innate. Pious persons implore the influence of God and of various spirits. The doctrine of divine grace also agrees with the principle that man has natural gifts. Thus the principle of innateness is obvious, and has been admit- ted from the remotest antiquity; but what it is that is innate, and how it is so, are points not sufficiently known. Before I examine them, however, I shall rectify the two other notions, already men- tioned, in regard to the origin of the faculties of the mind. CHAPTER II. A few general Faculties produce all particular Dispositions. Philosophers, at all times, have had a great fondness for general conceptions. They have shown the same liking in their explana- tion of the causes of our actions. A certain activity of the mind is commonly admitted as necessary to profit being made of external impressions ; but some general modes of action have seemed suf- ficient to account for all the particulars. * John, iii. 27. t John, vi. 65. t Matt. xiii. 9. § Matt. xix. 11. || Rom. ii. 14.15. 62 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 1. Wants and pleasure produce our Faculties. The expression Want is here taken as synonymous with desire. This general term, however, designates no determinate faculty, but the effect of each power being active; there are as many wants, or desires, as fundamental faculties, and these wants are proportionate to the activity of the faculties. Those, therefore, who speak of wants, in this sense, must specify them, and point out their indi- vidual causes. For it cannot be the same cause which finds plea- sure in construction and in demolition; in benevolence and in cruelty; in righteousness and in sensual enjoyments ; in the study of history and of mathematics ; in poetry and in ascetic contempla- tions, &c. Thus the general proposition of philosophers, that desire of pleasure and aversion to pain produce our actions, must be rectified. The pleasures are different, and effects of individual active faculties ; these then must be made known, and the objects of their satisfaction indicated. 2. Attention is the cause of our Faculties. Attention is very commonly considered as the cause of all inter- nal faculties. Helvetius even said, that each well-organized person might exercise his faculties by means of his attention, with such success as to arrive at the first rank in society. The word attention as I have shown, has two acceptations : it denotes consciousness in general; and consequently, in this sense, accompanies the activity of every faculty ; and it explains why one animal or man pays great attention to one object, and very little or none to another ; why individuals are attentive to different objects, even according to sex and age ; and why attention is proportionate to the activity of the respective faculty, so that, if the senses be not exercised, much stronger impressions are required to arouse their attention. The attention, therefore, of every faculty may be cultivated and improved by its exercise ; but attention, as a general quality, cannot be the appanage of any particular power. ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 63 Moreover, as attention also denotes a distinct consciousness, a reflection on sensations and actions, the aptitudes and instincts of animals cannot certainly be its effect in this signification. No one will maintain, that the rabbit, badger, mole, marmot, or hamster, make burrows, because they have examined with attention the ad- vantages of such dwellings; or that the beaver builds a cottage, because it has studied the laws of mechanics. Among men, geniuses also burst forth quite unconscious of their talents. This kind of attention then may excite, but can never produce, the par- ticular faculties. 3. Understanding is the cause of our Faculties. This proposition is also cleared up by Phrenology. The affec- tive powers must be separated from the intellectual faculties, and there are several sorts of understanding, and each special power, affective or intellectual, is a fundamental gift, in the same way as each external sense. 4. The Will is the cause of our Faculties. This opinion is refuted by daily observation. Who can doubt that every thinker as well as every dreamer in philosophy has occasionally felt the limits of his faculties, and has done things dis- approved of by reason. What had then become of the will ? I do not agree with those who object, that man is degraded by having his actions explained. Those who use such language seem to me to speak without attaching any meaning to their words. Is man degraded by having it said, that he must submit to the laws of the creation ? Can he change the laws of his organization, of his senses, of his understanding, or alter the principles of music, algebra, &c ? Were man degraded by a determinate nature, all beings are so, even God himself, seeing that, by his nature, he cannot will evil, nor do an injustice. Now, if God act according to his nature, man cannot be degraded by laws dictated to him by the Creator, 64 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. or by his will not being absolute. In the same way man is not degraded by our saying, that he cannot produce the talents and feelings he desires. CHAPTER III. Man's Faculties are the result of Education. The doctrine of innate ideas, of innate moral principles and of predestined actions lost its authority by degrees, and it was easy to combat it, as it is not conformable to nature. That so many errors on this point should have prevailed during centuries is almost inconceivable; for every day observation belies the principle. How could philosophers maintain that man is every thing from birth, with the fact before them of the difference in so many par- ticulars between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, occasioned by the dissimilarity of the laws which governed each nation ? And is it not obvious too, that several modern nations neglect the arts and sciences only because their religious creeds interdict such pursuits? And further, is not every one of us aware that his notions and his actions are modified by external circumstances, and by the educa- tion he has received ? The doctrine of universal innateness has been examined and refuted by Locke, Condillac, and others, and I find it superfluous to say more on the subject here. But some of these authors and their followers fell into the opposite extreme, and conceived men and animals born indifferent—tabulce rasa, or blank sheets, and maintained all the instincts of animals, from the insect to the dog and elephant, to be the consequences of instruc- tion. Helvetius,—the great champion of this opinion—maintains that foxes hunt because they have learnt hunting from their parents; birds sing and build nests in consequence of instruction ; and man becomes man by education. The opinion of Helvetius and his school, being still much ac- ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 65 credited, and many institutions being founded on it, deserves a par- ticular examination, but the answer to their positions is, that edu- cation produces no faculty whatever, either in man or animals. According to their hypothesis, arts and sciences ought to improve in proportion as they are taught, and mankind ought to become perfect under the care of moral and religious preachers. Why then is the progress of the arts and sciences so slow ? Why are we forced to allow that men of genius are born ? Why has every one of us certain faculties stronger than others ? Truth lies at nei- ther of the extremes, but between the two, and this is what I shall endeavor to prove. I shall consider, under three separate heads, the ideas according to which man acquires his affective and intel- lectual faculties by education. The first concerns the external senses ; the second fortuitous circumstances ; and the third, in- struction and the external circumstances which are voluntarily prepared. 1. Of the external Senses as cause of the mental faculties. The external senses, it is certain, are indispensable to the acquir- ing of knowledge of the external world, and to the fulfilment of social duties ; it is also certain that they are given by nature. But it is only because they are absolutely necessary to our actions that they have been considered as their cause. This subject has been particularly examined in the first volume of this work, and I shall only repeat that the internal faculties are not in proportion to the external senses, and that these are mere intermedia. The hands may be used to take food, to write to a friend, to draw, to play on a musical instrument, &c; but they do not produce hunger, friendship, drawing, music, &c. Let us ob- serve instead of supposing, and we shall find that the internal fac- ulties are only manifested by means of the external senses and of voluntary motion. vol. ii- 9 66 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 2. Of fortuitous or accidental Circumstances as the cause of our faculties. The following language is very common :—Necessity makes man act and invent; occasions produce talents ; revolutions bring forth great men ; danger gives courage; society causes the pas- sions, and these are the principal motives of our actions; climate and food beget powers, &c; in short, circumstances produce the mental faculties. Whatever has been said of fortuitous circumstances as the cause of faculties, may be reduced to two considerations : they present the faculties with opportunities necessary to the exhibition of their activity ; or they excite the faculties, without, however, originating them. ' Demosthenes,' says Helvetius, 'became eloquent because the eloquence of Callistratus made so deep an impression on„his mind that he aspired only to this talent.' According to the same author, ' Vaucanson became famous in mechanics, because, being left alone in the waiting-room of his mother's confessor, when a child, he chanced to find a clock, and after examining its wheels, endeavor- ing, with a bad knife, to make a similar machine of wood. He succeeded, and therefore constructed his surprising machines, the automatons. Milton would not have written his Paradise Lost, had he not lost his place of secretary to Cromwell. Shakspeare composed his plays because he was an actor ; and he became an actor because he was forced to leave his native country on account of some juvenile errors. Corneille fell in love, and made verses to the object of his passion, and therefore became famous in poet- ry. Newton saw an apple falling, and this revealed to him the law of gravitation, &c.' In this manner of reasoning the origin of the faculties is con- founded either with the opportunity necessary for their manifesta- tion, or with some external excitement. It is evident that external circumstances must permit the internal faculties to act; oppor- ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 67 tunities, however, do not, therefore, produce faculties. Without food I cannot eat; but I am not hungry because food exists. A dog cannot hunt if it be shut up, but its desire of hunting is not produced by leading it into the fields. Many millions are often placed in the same circumstances, and, perhaps, a single individual alone takes advantage of them. Revolutions make great men, not because they produce faculties, but because they offer opportuni- ties necessary to their display. Circumstances often favor the attainment of distinction and the acquisition of celebrity, but every individual does not reach an eminent place. Buonaparte alone knew how to acquire supremacy over all French generals who rose before and with him. The Revolution of Spain is far from having produced the same results as that of France. It is not certainly enough to be an actor in order to compose such plays as those of Shakspeare. Theatrical performers were almost ranked with slaves, at Rome, yet Gilsop and Roscius appeared ; whilst in Greece, where this profession was esteemed, no actor of renown is on record. France has produced a greater number of eminent actors than England; yet in the former country performers were excommunicated and in the latter honored. How many chil- dren are exposed to similar influences without manifesting the same energy of faculties, while, on the contrary, some individuals not only make use of occasions present, but prepare and produce others which permit their faculties a still greater sphere of activity! On the other hand, it is true that our faculties are often excited by events, and that without external excitement they would remain inactive. Yet however useful, the study of excellent models may be in the arts, I am still convinced that the principles of every science, art, and profession, are readily conceived by those who possess the faculties each requires in a high degree. This is the case with moral principles and religion also, which are easily de- veloped if the innate conditions on which they depend be pos- sessed. 68 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Society. Many authors treat of the natural state of man in opposition to his social condition, and consider numerous qualities as the result of society. According to their hypothesis, man is made for soli- tude ; the social state is contrary to his nature ; and many of his virtues and vices would never have existed, had he not abandoned his state of isolation. Excepting certain idiots, however, where, and at what time, has man lived a solitary being ? History, so far as it goes, shows that he has always lived in society ; in families, at least; and fami- lies, though scattered through the woods, form communities. As we find man every where united in societies, then, is it not natural to conclude that he is a social being ? Animals, it is necessary to recollect, in regard to the instinct of sociability, are divided into two classes: several species are destined to live in society, as sheep, monkeys, crows, &c ; others to live solitary, as the fox, hare, magpie, &c. Man belongs to the social class. Now we may easily conceive that the social animals are endowed with fac- ulties destined for society, and that these cannot act without it. And every individual is, in fact, generally calculated for society; all his faculties are in harmony with this aim. Bustards and cranes place sentinels; a flock of wild geese forms a triangle in flying ; a herd of chamois is led by a female ; bees act in concert, &c.; and all these peculiarities inhere in animals along with the social instinct. Consequently society is itself a natural institution ; a law establish- ed by creation; and the faculties of social animals are not the result of society. This proposition is also proved by the fact of social animals having different and often opposite faculties ; which if so- ciety produce any of them could never happen. Misery. Want, that is, some disagreeable sensation, misery, poverty, or painful situation, is often considered as the source of the instir its, ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 69 propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties of man and animals. Want, in this signification, certainly excites the internal facul- ties, but it is not true that it produces them ; or else the same external wants ought to create the same faculties in animals and in man: yet we observe that not merely every kind of animal, but even every individual, acts differently under like impressions from without. The partridge dies of hunger and cold during sharp winters, and the sparrow falls benumbed from the housetop, while the nightingale and quail take wing to temperate climes before the season of want arrives. The cuckoo requires a nest to lay its eggs in as well as the wagtail or the redbreast, and yet builds none. The idiot makes no effort to defend himself from the inclemencies of the weather, while the reasonable man covers himself with clothing. Moreover, the faculties of animals and man are active, without any necessity from external circumstances. The beaver, though shut up and protected against the weather, builds its hut; and the weaver bird, though in a cage, makes its tissue. It con- sequently follows, that external wants excite the activity of the internal faculties, but do not produce them; and in this respect their influence is important. The faculties of the poor, for in- stance, are more active than those of the affluent; when the facul- ties, however, have not been given by nature, external wants cannot excite them. On the other hand, misery exercises innate benevolence and im- proves the softer feelings, whilst riches are prone to excite and encourage lower passions, and in this sense it may be said that the Lord inflicts pain upon those he likes, that is, they grow better ; and Jesus Christ condemned riches, yet it remains certain that misery does not produce benevolence. I have already shown that the expression Want, taken as synony- mous with inclination or desire, is the effect and not the cause of the internal faculties ; that there are as many wants as different facul- ties ; and that wants are proportionate to the activity of these. 70 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Climate and mode of Living. Several philosophers have supposed that climate, mode of living, and even the nurse's milk, might be the cause of man's faculties. In this manner of thinking, the modifications are confounded with the origin of our faculties. The opinion, however, must be considered. The arguments adduced in support of it only prove that manifestation of the faculties depends on the organization ; for climate, eating, drinking, &c. have a powerful influence upon the body. Instead, therefore, of denying the influence of climate, food, air, light, &c. I consider it as of great importance, in as far as the activity of the faculties is concerned. The milk of nurses cer- tainly contributes to the growth and organic constitution of children, and consequently to the manifestation of the affective and intellect- ual faculties, inasmuch as the body is necessary to this. All these external influences, however, cannot, it is evident, produce any faculty. If parents were right in attributing the inferior propensi- ties of their children to the nourishment they had received, why should not grown-up people, who live on beef, veal, mutton, pork, &c, accuse the ox, calf, sheep, and pig, for their want of intelli- gence, and their peculiar character ? The activity of our faculties varies with the modifications of our organization, just as the milk and butter of cows vary according to the food they live on; or as the flesh and fat of animals are modified according to the articles with which they are fattened. The activity of men fed on game differs much from the activity of men living upon potatoes and other vegetables; and it seems possible to show the influence of different aliments upon certain systems in the healthy state, just as it may be shown that some medicines act more upon one than upon another. From the same reason we may also conceive the utility of certain rules of fasting in subduing sensual appetites. Particular degrees of excitement suppress the activity of certain faculties, while they increase that of others. Climate certainly exerts a great influence upon the organization, ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS 71 and it is natural to suppose that one contributes more than another to develope certain faculties. The influence of climate is not, however, so powerful on man as on animals; for man, by means of his intellectual faculties, opposes its effects. The Jews are a proof of this. They are dispersed over the whole world, and though somewhat modified in different countries, their primitive and characteristic organization is still every where the same. The effects of innateness and of the laws of propagation are much more potent than those of any thing external. In saying, therefore, that climate and food influence the activity of the faculties, this is not to be confounded with their primitive origin. 3. Of prepared Circumstances, and Instruction as the cause of our Faculties. Having once considered external circumstances as cause of the mental faculties, men naturally thought that to teach arts and scien- ces, and moral and religious principles, to found academies and schools, to pay large sums to masters, and to study the works of great men, might be sufficient to produce superior talents. This opinion must be opposed, by observing :— i. The Constancy of the Nature of Animals and Man. Were animals susceptible of change from every impression and not endowed with determinate natures, how comes it that every species always preserves the same characters ? Why do not fowls coo when they are reared with pigeons ? Why do not female night- ingales sing like males ? Why do birds of one kind, hatched by those of another, display the habits and instincts of their parents ? Why does the duck, hatched by a hen, run towards the water ? Why does not the cuckoo sing like the bird that reared it ? Why do squirrels, when pursued, climb trees, and rabbits hide them- selves in burrows ? Why are dogs attached in despite of the unkind blows they receive, &c. ? It is true that animals are not confined 72 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. in their actions solely to such as are required for their preservation. They vary their manners according to the circumstances in which they live ; and are susceptible of an education beyond their wants. Horses, monkeys, dogs, &c, maybe taught to play various tricks. This power, however, of modifying their actions is still limited, and is always conformable to their nature. The same reasoning applies to man. If his faculties be the result of external influences, why does he never manifest any other nature but his own ? Children pass most of their time with mothers and nurses ; yet boys and girls, from the earliest infancy, show the dis- tinctive characters which continue and mark them through life. ii. The Occurrence of Geniuses among Animals and Men. Did animals and men learn all from others, why should individ- uals, similarly circumstanced in regard to manner of living and in- struction, excel the rest ? Why should one nightingale sing better than another living in the same wood ? Why, amongst a drove of oxen, or horses, is one individual good-tempered and meek, and another ill-natured and savage ? M. Dupont de Nemours had a cow which singly knew how to open the gates of an enclosure : none of the herd ever learned to imitate its procedure, but waited impatiently near the entrance for their leader. I have the history of a pointer, which, when kept out of a place near the fire by the other dogs of the family, used to go into the yard and bark ; all immediately came and did the same ; meanwhile he ran in, and secured the best place. Though his companions were often de- ceived, none of them ever imitated his stratagem. I also knew of a little dog, which, when eating with large ones, behaved in the same manner, in order to secure his portion, or to catch some good bits. These are instances of genius among animals which are by no means the result of instruction. Children often show particular dispositions and talents before they have received any kind of education. Almost every great man has, in infancy, given earnests oi future eminence. Achilles, ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 73 hidden in Pyrrha's clothes, took the sword from among the pres- ents of Ulysses. Themistocles, when a child, said that he knew how to aggrandize and render a state powerful. Alexander would not dispute any prize at the Olympic games, unless his rivals were kings. At fourteen years of age, Cato of Ufica showed the great- est aversion to tyranny. Nero was cruel from his cradle. Pas- cal, when twelve years old, published his treatise on Conic Sec- tions. Voltaire made verses when only seven years of ace. The number of such instances is very great, and it is unnecessary to mention more here, as they must be within the scope of every one's knowledge. iii. Individualities among Animals and Men. Individual animals of every species have universally something particular in their mental constitution ; every bird of the same brood does not acquire its song with equal facility; one horse is fitter for the race than another ; and sportsmen know very well that there is a great difference among dogs. It is the same with the human kind. Children of the same parents differ in talents and disposition, though their education has been the same. How then should the same education possibly produce the peculiarities of dif- ferent children? Or why have not teachers yet found means to confer understanding, judgment, and all other good qualities ? Why are we not all geniuses ? Why cannot moral and satirical discourses keep us from abusing our faculties ? And why must we lament so many errors and crimes ? To prove that man acquires his affective and intellectual faculties by education, some assert that the savages who have been found in the woods, and destitute of all human faculties, resemble beasts only because they have not received any education. This presumption is refuted as soon as the condition of these unfortunate beings is known. They may be referred to two classes; being ordinarily defective in organization, with large dropsical heads, or brains too small and deformed. They are al- vol. ii. 10 74 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. most always scrofulous, have hanging lips, a thicK tongue, swollen neck, bad general constitution, and an unsteady gait ; they are more or less completely idiots, and have commonly been exposed and left to the care of Providence, having been found burdens by their parents. In some countries, the lower classes consider such unhappily-constituted creatures as bewitched, and take no care of them. Idiots too have sometimes a determinate propen- sity to live alone, and consequently escape to the woods. At Haina, near Marbourg, where there is a great hospital, Dr. Gall and I were told, that on sending people to search for some idiots who had escaped, others were found who had fled from different places. We saw a mad woman near Augsburg, who had been found in a wood. At Brunswick we saw a woman also found in a forest, who was incapable of pronouncing a single word. The pretended savage of Aveyron, kept in the institution of the Deaf and Dumb at Paris, is an idiot in a high degree. His forehead is very small, and much compressed in the superior part; his eyes are small, and lie deep in the orbits, and we could not convince ourselves that he hears ; for he paid no attention to our calls, nor to the sound of a glass struck behind him. He stands and sits decently, but moves his head and body incessantly from side to side. He knows several written signs and words, and points out the objects noted by them. His most remarkable instinct, how- ever, is love of order ; for, as soon as any thing is displaced in the room, he goes and puts it to rights. Such unfortunate beings, then, are idiots, not because they are uneducated, but because their imbecility unfits them to receive education. It is difficult to conceive a well-organized person long wandering about like a savage in our populous countries without being discovered. Were such an individual, however, to escape in infancy, and be afterwards discovered in a forest, though he could not be acquainted with our manners, and the sciences we teach, he would still manifest the essential and characteristic faculties of the human kind, and would soon imitate our customs and receive our instructions. The girl of Champaigne proves this assertion. ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 75 Thus, education produces no faculty either in man or in animals; but let us not conclude that education is superfluous. My ideas on education are published in a separate volume, and I only remark here that it excites, exercises, determines the application, and prevents the abuses of the innate faculties ; and that on this account it is of the highest importance. Mechanics and peasants, confined to their laborious occupations, are frequently ignorant; but many of them, with a good education, might surpass thousands of those who have enjoyed its advantages. From the preceding considerations on external circumstances, it results, that they either present opportunities which favor the activity of the faculties, or excite and guide, but do not in any wise produce them. I shall now consider the share Nature has in originating the powers of man and animals, in the following chapter. CHAPTER IV. On the Innateness of the Mental Dispositions. Let us see now what is innate. The fundamental powers of the mind, as well as the organization on which their manifestations depend, are given to man by the Creator. The constancy of human natqre affords the first proof of this position. The human kind, in as far as its history is known, has ever been the same, not only as regards organic, but also as concerns phrenic life. The skeletons of ancient mummies are the very same as those of the men at the present day ; and all ages have exhibited virtues and vices essentially similar. Thus, the special faculties of man have ever been the same ; the only difference observable at different times, is, that they have been more or less active, and variously modified in individuals. Here one has unjustly seized a piece of 76 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. .round, there a place of distinction; here mistresses have been celebrated on an oaten-reed, there on a harp ; conquerors in one quarter have been decorated with feathers, in another with purple and crowns, and so on; these modifications are, however, all grounded upon primitive faculties essentially the same. And man, though endowed with proper and peculiar faculties, still receives them from creation; the truly human nature is as determmate as the nature of every other being. Though man compares his sensa- tions and ideas, inquires into the causes of phenomena, draws con- sequences, discovers laws and general principles, measures immense distances and times, and circumnavigates the globe ; though he acknowledges culpability and worthiness, bears a monitor in his interior, and raises his mind to conceive and to adore a God,-yet none of the faculties which cause these acts result either from acci- dental external influences or from his own will. How indeed could the Creator abandon and give man up to chance in the noblest and most important of all his doings ? Impossible ! Here, as in all besides, he has prescribed laws to man; and guided his steps in a determinate path. He has secured the continuance of the same es* sential faculties in the human kind,—faculties whose existence we should never have conceived had the Creator not bestowed them upon us. The uniformity of the essential faculties of mankind, notwith- standing the influence of society, climate, modes of living, laws, religion, education, and fortuitous events, affords another great proof that nothing can change the institutions of nature. We every where find the same species; whether man clothe himself or go naked, fight with slings or artillery, stain his skin, or powder his hair, dance to the sound of a drum or the music of a concert, adore the sun, moon, and stars, or in his religion be guided by Christian principles, his special faculties are universally the same. I have also spoken of genius, in order to prove that education does not produce our faculties, and mentioned that children often show peculiar faculties before they have received any kind of in- struction. External circumstances are sometimes very unfavorable ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 77 to the exhibition of genius ; but gifted individuals do not always wait for opportunities, they even make them, and leave parents, professions, and all behind, to be at liberty to follow their natural inclinations. Moses, David, Tamerlane, and Pope Sixtus the Fifth, were shepherds ; Socrates, Pythagoras, Theophrastus, De- mosthenes, Moliere, Rousseau, and a thousand others, who have lived to adorn the world, were the sons of artificers. Geniuses sometimes surmount great difficulties, and vanquish innumerable impediments, before their character prevails and they assume their natural place. Such individuals, prevented by circumstances from following their natural bent, still find their favorite amusement in pursuing it. Hence peasants, shepherds, and artisans, have be- come astronomers, poets, and philosophers ; and, on the other hand, kings, and prime ministers, employed themselves in the mechan- ical arts ; all, indeed, unites to prove the innateness of the primitive mental faculties. Men of genius, however, have been said to form a particular class, and to be incomparable with persons whose faculties are of middling excellence. This, however, is the same as saying that hunger and circulation do not depend on organization, because all have not immoderate appetite and fever ; or that the mole does not see with its eyes, because the stag sees better ; or that man has no smell, since the dog's is superior. But, if we admit that organization causes the highest degree of activity of the different faculties, the lowest de- gree must also depend on it. Moreover, the greatest genius in one particular is often very weak in others. William Crotch, at six years of age, astonished all who heard him by his musical tal- ents ; but in every other respect he was a child. Caesar could never have become a Horace or a Virgil, nor Alexander a Ho- mer. Newton could not have been changed into so great a poet as he was an astronomer; nor Milton into so great an astronomer as he was a poet. Nay, Michael Angelo could not have com- posed the pictures of Raphael, or the contrary ; nor Albano those of Titian, and so on. 78 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. The mental faculties again must be innate, since, although essen- tially the same in both sexes, they present modifications in each. Some are more energetic in women, others in men. The feelings are, in general, stronger in women, the intellectual faculties more active in men. These modifications inhere naturally, and it is im- possible to give to one sex the dispositions of the other. We may add, that in every nation, notwithstanding the unifor- mity of its opinions, customs, professions, arts, sciences, laws, reli- gion, and all its positive institutions, each individual composing it differs from every other by some peculiarity of character. Each has greater capacity and inclination in one than in another direction, and even in childhood manifests his own manner of thinking and feeling. Every one excuses his frailties by saying, It is my nature ; it is stronger than I ; I cannot help it, &c. Even brothers and sisters often differ extremely, though their education is uniform The cause of difference, must, therefore, be internal. The innateness of the faculties must also be admitted, because there is a direct relation between their manifestations and a certain organic apparatus. Finally, if we believe that man is a being of creation, it is only rational to suppose that his faculties are determinate and ordained. I consequently, with all these considerations in view, contend for the innateness of every faculty of the mind. But here it is of impor- tance to notice an observation of Locke upon innateness. He, to show that ideas are not innate, stated that children do not manifest certain qualities, and that different nations have different, nay, op- posite principles of morality. This position, however, in relation to the innateness of ideas and moral principles, must not be con- founded with the innateness of the faculties. No sensation, no idea, no principle, is innate. Sensations and ideas of external objects follow from external impressions, and these being accidental, ideas of them cannot be innate ; but the faculties which perceive impres- sions, and conceive ideas, are innate. Thus the idea of a stone, plant, or animal, is not innate ; but these objects make impressions on the senses, which produce sensations or ideas in the mind, and ORIGIN OF THE MENTAL DISPOSITIONS. 79 both the senses and the mental faculties are innate. In the same manner, sensations and ideas of external and accidental events, and, in general determinate actions of the faculties, are not innate. The propensity to lore, and not the object of love ; the faculty of speaking, not the peculiar language ; the faculty of comparing and judging, not the determinate judgment; the faculty of poetry, not the particular poem, &c, is innate. There is, therefore, a great difference between innate faculties and innate ideas and sensations. It is also true that children do not manifest all the faculties, but we cannot from this conclude that these are not innate. Birds do not make nests, the hamster and marmot do not collect provisions, the swallow does not migrate immediately after birth ; neither do animals propagate, nor females give suck, when they come into the world ; yet all these qualities are innate. This difficulty is easily explained. Every faculty has its own organ, in proportion to whose developement are its manifestations. Now in childhood several organs are very little, and in adult age very greatly developed ; and while some are proportionately larger in children than in the grown-up, others are fully developed in both. The manifestations of the faculties being, as I have stated, always proportionate to the developement and activity,of their organs, it becomes evident why some of them do not appear in infancy. Why moral principles differ in different nations is also obvious. I agree with Locke that they are not innate, but maintain that the faculties which form them are. I shall afterwards show that moral principles depend on several faculties, and vary in nations in con- sequence of different combinations of their organs ; the justice of a libertine without benevolence and veneration must differ entirely from that of a charitable, modest, and continent person. The same fundamental faculties exist every where, but their manifestations are universally modified. Men every where adore a Supreme Being ; they every where have marks of honor and of infamy ; there are every where masters and servants; all nations make war, wheth- er with clubs and arrows, or with muskets and artillery ; and every 80 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. where the dead are lamented, and their remembrance cherished, whether it be by embalming their bodies, by putting their ashes into an urn, or by depositing their remains in the tomb. Hence, though the functions of the faculties in general are modified in different nations, and of those consequently which determine the moral prin- ciples also, the same fundamental powers still appear in the cus- toms, manners, and laws of all. An essential part of the study of man, therefore, is to show that his nature is determinate, that all his faculties are innate, and that nature's first prerogative is to maintain the number and the es- sence of his special powers, whilst she permits many modifications of the functions of all, in the same way precisely as she preserves species, but continually sacrifices individuals. The second right of nature is to allow more or less activity to individual faculties in different persons ; that is, she endows all with the same faculties, but gives them in very different degrees. Some few are geniuses, but the majority are middling in all respects. Nature then produces genius, and the individual dispositions of every one. Finally, nature has stamped a difference upon the sexes : some faculties are more active in women, others in men. Men will nev- er feel like women, and women willl never think like men. These are facts which observation proves. Philosophers, there- fore, can only examine how nature produces such phenomena, and see whether it is possible to. imitate and to assist her. Thus, the principle of Phrenology—that the faculties of the mind are innate—is indubitable. DEPENDENCE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA 81 SECTION IV. The Brain is indispensable to mental phenomena. After having seen what nature does in man, let us inquire into the means by which she effects it. Religious people commonly believe in a mere supernatural dispensation of gifts; but there cannot be a doubt of natural causes also contributing to produce the phenomena of mind. I may follow the example of other natural philosophers, and con- fine myself to proving a relation between the body and the mani- festations of the mind, or, I may endeavor to determine the special powers of the mind and the respective organs. This latter task has been accomplished by Phrenology. Here I shall only show, in a summary way, how reasoning coincides with observation. It is important duly to appreciate my expressions upon this subject: I do not say that the organization produces the affective and intel- lectual faculties of man's mind, as a tree brings forth fruit, or an animal procreates its kind; I only say that organic conditions are necessary to the manifestations of mind. I never venture beyond experience; and therefore consider the faculties of the mind only in as far as they become apparent by the organization. Neither denying nor affirming any thing which can- not be verified by experiment, I make no researches on the lifeless body nor on the soul alone, but on man as a living agent. I never question what the affective and intellectual faculties may be in themselves, do not attempt to explain how the body and soul are united and exercise a mutual influence, nor examine what the soul can effect without the body. The soul may be united to the body at the moment of conception or afterwards ; it may be different in every individual, or be of the same kind in all; it may be an eman- ation from God, or something else. Whatever metaphysicians and theologians may decide in regard to these various points, the posi- tion, that manifestation of the faculties of the mind depend, in this vol. n. 11 82 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. life, on organization, cannot be shaken. Let us then consider the proofs which reasoning affords of this principle of Phrenology. i. Difference of the Sexes. The faculties of the mind are modified in the sexes: some are more enetgetic in men, others in women. Do then the souls of men and women differ, or is it more probable, that the faculties are modified because their organs or instruments vary ? Phrenolo- gy shows that certain parts of the brain are more developed in men, others more in women; and thus renders the peculiarities in the mental manifestations of each, easily explicable. There are, however, many instances in which the intellectual faculties of women resemble those of men, and the contrary. ii. Individuality of every Person. The mental faculties are modified in every individual. Now, is it probable that the soul differs universally, or is it more likely, that as the .whole human kind has descended from an original pair, all modifications of the faculties may be explained by differences in the organs on which each respectively depends ? Like species of animals, and man also, have essentially the same corporeal structure ; there is merely difference of proportion and develope- ment in the various parts of which the body is composed ; and these differences in the organs produce corresponding varieties in the functions attached to them. iii. Ages. Mental manifestations are modified by age. Either the soul, or its instruments, therefore, must produce these modified manifesta- tions. It is ascertained that certain faculties appear early in life, or at a later period, according as the peculiar organs of each are developed. DEPENDENCE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA. 83 The same law holds in both affective and intellectual faculties . the manifestations of all are not simultaneous. Several of both orders appear in infancy, others not before maturer years ; several, too, disappear earlier, whilst others endure till the end of life. Now as we know that manifestations of the mental powers always accord with certain organic conditions, it is impossible to overlook their dependence on organization. iv. Influence of Physical Conditions. All that disorders, weakens, or excites the organization of the nervous system, influences especially the manifestation of the men- tal faculties also. It is generally observed that organs are enfeebled if their growth be very rapid; their functions too, are, in conse- quence, less energetic. This is chiefly remarkable in the climac- teric years, or periods of increase ; a knowledge of which is so very important in practical medicine. Vegetables are known to increase particularly at two periods ; in the spring, and in the mid- dle of summer. The growth of the human body is also more rapid at certain times than at others. Now rapid growth weakens the organs, both of vegetative and animal life, and consequently the functions they perform respectively. Girls who grow too suddenly turn pale, chlorotic, and consumptive, &c. Individuals, therefore, during the periods of growth, are not fit for active business, and ought not to exercise their intellectual faculties much. Rest is necessary till the organs acquire maturity, when all the faculties of the mind and body will resume their energy. Organs of particular faculties are occasionally too soon developed, and are then apt to be exercised overmuch. Incurable exhaustion often results from this, and early genius is nipped in the bud. Adult men and animals are still subjected to variable degrees of excitement from seasons, temperature, food, and especially from particular laws to which the organization is subjected. We see animals resume and abandon at different periods, their instinct to sing, to build, to gather provisions, to live solitarily or in society, 84 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. to migrate, &c.; and the faculties of man do not always act with the same degree of energy. Who can overlook the influence of such evacuations as the catameni, hemorrhoids, &c. ; or of preg- nancy, digestion, fasting, and whatever exhausts the corporeal powers ? Who can deny the effects of disease upon the manifesta- tion of our faculties ; or of external and internal excitements, as of agreeable impressions, fine weather, music, dancing, &c ? Now all these act upon the organization only ; manifestation of the mental faculties consequently depends on the organization. Exceedingly defective mental powers have been known to grow very active when excited by external or internal causes. Haller relates the case of an idiot, who happening to be wounded on the head, manifested great understanding so long as the wound remain- ed open, but who, as soon as this healed up, fell into his former stupidity. He speaks of another patient whose eye being inflamed, saw perfectly during the night whilst the inflammation lasted. Father Mabillan, in his infancy, gave little promise of superior abilities; but, having received a blow on his head, he, from that moment, displayed talents. I have heard of a boy who, at the age of fourteen, seemed incapable of improvement; having fallen down stairs one day, however, and got several wounds in his head, he afterwards began to excel in his studies. I have seen a girl, nine years old, whose right arm grew gradually weak and almost paralyt- ic, in consequence of a blow on the same side of the head; her lower jaw trembled incessantly, and she was often convulsed ; but her intellectual faculties had acquired great energy and perfection ; her whole deportment indeed, was exceedingly imposing. I shall mention only one other case of this kind from the Edinburgh Re- view,* in an article upon the Retreat, an institution near York for insane persons of the Society of Friends : ' A young woman, who was employed as a domestic servant by the father of the relater when he was a boy, became insane, and, at length, sunk into a state of perfect idiocy. In this condition she remained for many years, when she was attacked by a typhus fever ; and my friend, " No. XLV. p. 197. DEPENDENCE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA. 85 having then practised some time, attended her. He was surprised to observe, as the fever advanced, a developement of the mental powers. During that period of the fever when others are delirious, this patient was entirely rational. She recognised, in the face of her medical attendant, the son of her old master, whom she ha known so many years before, and she related many circumstanc respecting his family and others, which had happened to herself in her earlier days. But, alas ! it was only the gleam of reason : as the fever abated, clouds again enveloped the mind ; she sunk into her former deplorable state, and remained in it until her death, which happened a few years afterwards.' These facts are positive, and there can be no doubt of similar causes influencing the faculties of the mind surprisingly ; yet they can only act immediately upon the organization. We must perforce conclude, that when physical and organic causes excite the most impudent lasciviousness, the most arrogant pride, despair which rejects all consolation, and so on, these various manifestations depend on the organization. Sleeping and Dreaming. The states of watching, sleeping, and dreaming, also prove the manifestations of the mind dependent on organization ; for corpo- real organs can alone be fatigued and exhausted. Now it is known that mental operations cannot be continued incessantly, that rest is indispensable, and that a regular recurrence of that inactive state of the mental faculties called sleep, is necessary to enable them to display their perfect energies. If single organs be by any cause excited, and enter into action while the others are inactive, partial sensations and ideas, or dreams, arise. Dreams, then, are almost always the result of certain ma- terial causes, and are conformable to the age and organic constitu- tion of the dreamer. Men and women of an irritable habit of body, find difficulties and endless impediments in their dreams, and generally suffer pain, and feel anxiety and alarm. This constant relation between dreams and bodily frame, which has been verified 86 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. by an infinity of observations, proves further that the mental mani- festations depend on organization. vi. Exercise. The possibility of exercising and of training the faculties of the mind, also shows their dependence on the organization ; for that an immaterial being can be exercised is inconceivable. vii. Relation between the Brain and the manifestations of the Mind. The preceding arguments are founded on reasoning, and prove that all manifestations of the mind depend on organic conditions. In the first volume of this work it is demonstrated, that individual faculties manifest themselves by means of particular cerebral parts, and that the faculties appear, increase in strength, and diminish in vigor, in proportion as the organs on which they depend are devel- oped, increase in size, and shrink again. The brain of the new born child scarcely shows any traces of fibres ; these appear, be- come firmer by degrees, and attain perfection between the twentieth and fortieth year. As years accumulate, its convolutions, which had been plump, become flabby, and are less closely packed together. In conformity with the state of the brain at birth, animal life is confined to spontaneous motions, to the perception of hunger and thirst, to some obscure sensation of pain and pleasure, and to an imperfect state of the external senses. By degrees the number and energy of the affective and intellectual faculties augment, and the child begins to acquire knowledge and determinate ideas of external objects. Through the periods of boyhood and adolescence the faculties gradually gain strength ; and, in manhood, they at length manifest the greatest degree of energy. From this state of perfection, however, they soon begin to decline ; and, in extreme old age, the propensities are blunted, the sentiments weakened, and the intellectual faculties almost or entirely annihilated. DEPENDENCE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA. 87 If the organs of the faculties, however, do not follow the usual order of increase, but be either precocious or tardy, their respec- tive functions are also manifested with corresponding variations. If the intellectual faculties are often more energetic in rickety chil- dren than beseems their age, their brain will also be found extra- ordinarily developed or irritable. Independently of all disease, however, particular portions of the brain are occasionally develop- ed at too early a period, and then their functions likewise appear prematurely. On the other hand, when parts of the brain or its whole mass arrives very late at maturity, the mental imperfections of childhood remain longer than usual, sometimes till about the tenth or twelfth year, so that parents despair of the rationality of their children. After this age, however, the cerebral organs will often take on a particular growth, and the faculties then appear with great vigor. One of the most distinguished physicians at Berlin, when ten years old, could not use his organs of speech, and Gessner, at the same age, had made such slender progress in his studies, that his pre- ceptor declared him half an idiot; yet it is known how famous he became afterwards. If the growth of the cerebral organs be incomplete, the faculties of the mind are equally defective. It is impossible to determine with exactness the degree of organic developement necessary to the due manifestation of the mental powers ; for this depends not on the size of the organs alone, but on their peculiar constitution also. A very small brain, however, is always accompanied with imbecility. Children have sometimes the same organic constitution of brain as their parents, and then manifest precisely similar affective and intellectual faculties. Characteristic forms of head are often trans- mitted from generation to generation ; and thus are mental faculties propagated in families during centuries. It is an acknowledged fact, that children who resemble each other, or their parents, man- ifest similar faculties, making allowances for difference of age and sex. I have seen twin-boys so like each other that it was almost 88 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. impossible to distinguish them; their inclinations and talents were also strikingly similar. Two other twin sisters are very different; the muscular system in the one being most developed, the nervous in the other; and while the first has little understanding, the second is eminently talented. To conclude this point, I say that, as the peculiar organs of the affective and intellectual faculties can positively be demonstrated, it is impossible to deny the dependence of mental phenomena on the organization. The principle of Phrenology, therefore, that the manifestations of the affective and intellectual faculties of the jnind depend on the brain, is also ascertained. SECTION V. ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. General view. The examination of this subject has been opposed at all times and in all countries by all sorts of obstacles. This higher portion of human nature has constantly been injured, and trampled upon by civil and religious establishments. In this respect, in particu- lar, man has been treated as a beast that stands in need of a mas- ter. It may be added that Cicero's sentence—' man desires to be deceived'—finds its special application as far as his religious dispo- sitions are concerned. Those who dare to think for themselves and to instruct others, must still be prepared to struggle for truth. The ancient philosophers commonly took care not to offend the ignorant multitude on the religion of the state, but initiated their chosen disciples with their secret thoughts upon these matters. The religious doctrines in general are involved in numberless contradictions and inconsistencies. The great remedy consists in ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 89 the love of truth and free inquiry. Refined ideas are commonly buried under heaps of rubbish and superstition, so that it is ex- tremely difficult to separate the true from false doctrines. We find sublime precepts at the bottom of all the great religious sys- tems among the Indians, Chinese, Roman Catholics and others, though the chief place is occupied by childish, ridiculous, useless and sometimes mischievous observances. No Christian who has arrived at refined notions of an All-perfect Being will object to the Shastra treating of God in the following expressions ; ' He who considers the Being that is infinite, incomprehensible and pure, as finite, perceptible by the senses, limited by time and place, sub- ject to passion and anger, what crime is such a robber of Divine Majesty not guilty of. Acts and rites that originate in the move- ments of the hands and other members of the body, being perish- able, cannot effect beatitude that is eternal. Those who worship forms under appellations continue subject to form and appellation, for no perishable means can effect the acquisition of an imperisha- ble end.' Yet the religion of the common Indians is disfigured by, and almost reduced to, external ceremonies. Similar remarks are applicable to the other great establishments of religion. The sub- lime principles are too often neglected or even forgotten by the fault of those who teach and of those who are taught. The for- mer commonly lay more stress upon the necessity of belief in the messengers who revealed the doctrine, and upon ceremonious ob- servances, than upon virtuous actions; and the latter find it more easy to follow outward ceremonies than to excel by inward virtue, self-denial and wisdom. On the other hand, men of disinterested, kind and pious feelings, of amiable and charming habits, great goodness, love of truth and sound judgment, are met with in all countries and under every church-establishment, among the Jews and Gentiles, Mahometans, Roman Catholics and Protestants. These individuals, as St. Paul said, have the law written in their heart, and we are wrong in as- cribing their moral perfection to the religious creed in which they are born and brought up. Fenelon, for instance, would have been vol. n. 12 90 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. mild, amiable, innocent, benevolent and useful to his fellow crea- tures under any church-government, because his pure mind inhab- ited a pure body. He therefore preserved his innate goodness and candor in the midst of the selfishness, hypocrisy and intrigue of the French court. However delicate the object of religion may be, I do not hes- itate to examine it, placing truth above any other consideration, relying on the decrees of the all-wise Creator, and being intimately convinced that truth is the corner-stone of human happiness, and that true Christianity will gain by free investigation. The princi- pal points to be considered are, atheism; God's existence ; God's attributes ; God's relationship with man ; the importance of a tem- poral revelation; the aim of religion ; its improvement; and the sublimity of Christianity. On Atheism. Atheism is the doctrine which denies the existence of God, the creator of the universe. It has been an object of discussion among thinkers of ancient and modern days. Many ancient philosophers denied the existence of a Creator and Supreme Being that governs the world; they believed in an essence or ether, commonly styled the soul of the world, which as they said penetrated all beings and produced all phenomena. The soul of man was a portion of it, and at the death of every one united with other bodies. Others went still farther by rejecting such a general cause infused into all beings, and by admitting only a certain number of elements and their combinations : mere mixture and form of matter. This sort of atheism then may be confounded with materialism. According to it there is no God, no creator, no soul, no religion, no immor- tality, no beginning, no end, nothing but matter governed by inva- riable laws. ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 91 2. On God's existence. The number of Atheists has always been, and evei must be very small, but that of Deists seems to be considerable. It appears certain that the heathen philosophy from the remotest times admit- ted a supreme Deity, the fountain of all other divinities. In dis- cussions of this kind, however, Deists are often confounded with Atheists, and the latter denomination is used in order to decry eve- ry new idea unfavorable to any old or accredited belief. In this erroneous sense, to be an Atheist means a mere unbeliever, which may happen with respect to any religious notion or interpretation of individual passages of the revealed law, whilst the person per- secuted under the name of Atheist, may firmly believe in God's existence and his all-wise government. The names of an Atheist, a Deist, and an unbeliever or infidel, therefore,ought to be carefully distinguished from each other, their significations being extremely different. The term Atheist should be applied only to him who rejects the idea of a Creator and of a supreme governor ; that of Deist to him who confines his belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, the creator of all, according to invariable laws; finally, an unbeliever or infidel in any religion is he who disregards the divine revelation given to man since his creation. An unbeliever in that sense among Christians contradicts the divinity of Jesus, among the Mahometans the divine mission of their prophet. Unbeliever or heretic may also be called, he who denies certain interpretations of established churches. The Protestants are heretics in the eyes of the Roman Catholics, and the Quakers in the English church. There is no positive religion or established creed without ac- knowledging the existence of a Supreme and other subordinate heavenly beings. The Jewish dispensation, and Christianity, being proclaimed as God's will and command are inseparable of the belief in God's existence. Even reason alone cannot consider the admirable concatenation of all things in nature and their mutual relations without thinking of a primitive cause ; and it is obliged by its very nature and law,s to admit such a cause—an all-wise Crea- tor—a Supreme understanding—God. 92 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 3. On God's attributes. According to the doctrine of mythology, individual deities were intrusted with particular powers and presided over individual natural phenomena. The believers in one single God ascribed to him various attributes. Even in the Jewish law and in Christian- ity the Supreme Being is represented as endowed with very dif- ferent qualities. The God of Israel is a God of war and partial to the Jews ; that of the Christians, on the contrary, a God of peace and the father of the whole of mankind. I shall not transcribe all particulars of this kind, contained in the Old and New Testa- ment, but the intelligent reader may earn great benefit from com- paring them in detail. Reason is obliged to resign any endeavor to determine the whole of God's nature. Man, in order to be able to conceive it, ought to be God's equal, but an inferior can never understand a superior Being. At all times, therefore, man, confined to his na- tural endowments, anthropomorphises God ; that is, attributes to him such qualities as his intellect can penetrate and as seem the most agreeable and most harmonious with his own inclinations. Savage tribes make their gods glorious warriors, always armed and occupied with battles. Nations who believe in one Supreme Being, ascribe to him the qualities of a tyrant whilst they continue to live in ignorance and barbarism, and they believe in his softer feelings in proportion as their own manners and habits are more refined. Stupid persons are not shocked by inconsistencies in God's commandments, whilst reasonable men think him degraded by such suppositions. The worship varies according to God's attributes. If men fancy God an ill natured Being, armed with infinite power, who takes delight in the misery of his creatures, they fear him, but cannot love him. The doctrine of God's attri- butes is also of great influence on the moral conduct of man, since he feels inclined to imitate his maker. If God indulge in fancies, tricks, and lower passions, why should man not be allowed to fol- low the example of his Great Master. K God be revengeful, ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 93 why may man not become intolerant. But if God be love, for- bearing and forgiving, then man must forbear and forgive as he hopes to be done by, by his Creator. 4. On God's relationship with man. It is natural to think that the Maker is in relation to his work, but with respect to the relationship between God and men innu- merable opinions prevail in different religious systems. In every one there are articles of belief, which may be subdivided into two kinds. 1st, they are relative to the divinities in Paganism, or to the Supreme Being in Judaism, Christendom and various other religious doctrines.—2d, they concern man in his social inter- course. In Paganism, Judaism, Christianism, Mahometism, Buh- daism and all other established churches, the doctrine of ceremo- nious observances and outward performances is blended together with moral precepts, and the whole is founded on religious belief in such doctrines being revealed by supernatural ways and means. Now it is a fact that among all nations, and at all times, ceremo- nious observances made up the principal part of religious duties. Among the Indians and Jews a peculiar cast of people is appointed to preside over the execution of such external performances and to teach this important point of their religion. Even among Christian sects outward forms and ceremonious observances are more or less numerous, and a particular profes- sion, though their service is greatly altered by the New Testa- ment, is kept up and intrusted with teaching religion and with at- tending to the fulfilment of religious duties. But as among all Christian churches some sort or other of service to God, to his praise and glory, is prescribed, and as priesthood too often con- found their personal views with the Supreme Being ; as some even seem to wish to persuade the ignorant that they themselves must live splendidly to the glory of their heavenly Father ; our duties towards God deserve to be well defined. 94 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Natural religion. Gall admits a fundamental faculty of God and religion. In my opinion the religious phenomena are the result of several faculties. Causality searches for a cause of every thing and of every event. Individuality personifies the Supreme cause it arrives at; another faculty inspires admiration and wonder, and believes in some re- lationship between God and man ; a third feeling inspires respect and reverence, and religion exists. It is strengthened by the feelings of hope, conscientiousness and cautiousness. Natural religion implies the belief in a Supreme Being and im- plicit obedience to his will, consisting in the laws of the creation, whilst revealed religions make known to men God's particular de- crees. Natural religion, therefore, distinguishes between the pre- tended ministers of God and their versions, and the Creator and his eternal laws. Phrenology proves not only the innateness of religious feelings, but also their acting without understanding like all other feelings. Their direction1 depends on the use of reason. The reflective faculties ought not to be neglected in any religious consideration any more than in every other knowledge. Nay, natural religion may, like natural morality, become a science. It is commonly believed that there can be no religion without revelation. This however is an error, which will not be committed by those who understand the innate feelings of man. This is rather the language of priestcraft. It is to be regretted that re- ligious people are averse to reason. It may be so since many points of their doctrine do not stand the scrutiny of reason. 1 think with an able writer that ' religion has been wronged by noth- ing more than by being separated from intellect, and by being removed from the province of reason.' I also think with him that ' Christianity was given not to contradict and degrade the rational nature, but to call it forth, to enlarge its range and its powers ; that it admits of endless developement, and is the last truth which should remain stationary.' I farther say with him ; ' Religious and ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 95 moral truth is appointed to carry forward mankind, but not as con- ceived and expounded by narrow minds, not as darkened by the ignorant, not as debased by the superstitious, not subtilized by the visionary, not as thundered out by the intolerant fanatic, not as turned into a drivelling cant by the hypocrite. Like all other truths it requires for its full reception and its powerful communica- tion a free and vigorous intellect.' God gave reason to man, and why should its use be interdicted in the most important subject, religion. Natural religion is entirely guided by reason, and the feelings proper to man. It seems hostile to priesthood to conceive the Supreme Being as reasonable. He is particularly described as having negative qualities, whilst his positive powers are those of the animal nature. Sometimes he is represented as an arbitrary- tyrant, nay, very often he is demonised by fanatics. Atheism, how- ever, would be preferable to demonism. We cannot conceive the whole nature of God. To be able to do so, we ought to be his equal. But to degrade him under the better part of our nature is abom- ination. Let the idea of him be formed at least after the image of a good, noble minded and reasonable man. Theologians and priestcraft have shockingly abused the religious sentiments of man and turned them to their advantage, quite forgetting the sublime lessons of Christianity. They think it sufficient to cover them- selves with the shield of mysteriousness and to demand unbounded belief. But reason tells us that religious belief must work on kind- ness, reverence, justice in practice, and that religion cannot exclude intellect and moral conduct. It also tells us that any religious creed that does not tend to the glory of God and the general good of man is objectionable and may degenerate to demonism. Doc- trines which are contradictory in themselves or contradict common sense must be surrounded with awe and imposed ; this is expedi- ent to selfish or superstitious theologians, but it is not in conformity with reason and pure Christianity. Reason cannot deny the real- ity of revelation ; it even finds in it a great motive of moral con- duct. But human reason does not discover that God is fond of 96 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. perfumes, tabernacles, songs, all sorts of fineries; sacrifices, &c ; such things he must be told by God's messengers. In general no irrational notion of God's attributes, providence and likings can be admitted without being supported by special revelation, but the friends of mankind must lament the mischief priests have inflicted on their fellow creatures and on the good cause of religion, by their nonsensical views of God and his decrees. It would have been more profitable to mankind at large, if the teachers of relig- ion had been penetrated with the superiority of pure Christianity, and if they had followed the example of their great model. Rea- son perfectly agrees with the precepts, to refer every thing to God as the first cause ; to venerate his almighty power and providence; to submit to his decrees and arrangement of things ; to feel grati- tude for his benevolence ; and to adore him in truth and in spirit. Natural religion, as well as the systems which are announced as revealed, endeavors to make us acquainted with God's attributes and with our duties to him, but having reason and the powers prop- er to man for its guide, it rejects all notions which are opposed to them. Phrenology brings new light. Hitherto reason alone was con- sidered as a sufficient guide in natural religion ; but reason is in- fluenced by the feelings as well as by intellectual notions, as by materials on which it acts. If our knowledge be incorrect, our judgment cannot be sound. In the same way our judgment of religious subjects depends on the feelings with which we are an- imated. But then it is a law of the Creator that reason places the feelings proper to man above those which are common to him and animals. Those who believe in natural religion as well as those who rely on revelation, will modify their religious conceptions according to their innate dispositions or gifts, and he who possesses the human feelings and the reflective faculties in a high degree, will reject any revealed law or interpretation that contradicts human sentiments and reason. According to reason the Supreme Being is all perfection, and can neither gain nor lose in felicity by the terrestrial creation. If ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 97 his happiness depended on his creatures, on their respect to him or on their regulations, his nature were imperfect. * ' The giving glory to God,' says Bishop Taylor,* 'and doing homage to him, are nothing for his advantage, but only for ours ; and God created us, not that we can increase his felicity, but that he might have a subject receptive of felicity from him.' It seems, on the other hand, reasonable to admit that all sentient beings have been created for their own happiness, and that to secure this the Creator has traced them determinate laws. The end of natural religion, then, is an entire submission to the Will of the Creator, be it accomplish- ed by love or by fear; 'For this is the love of God,' says St. John,f 'that we keep his commandments.' We may suppose that he prefers the motive of love to that of fear, which, however, is also reasonable, since he makes no exceptions, but applies his laws invariably. The first law, says Michel Montague,^ which God gave to man was that of obedience. Thus, if we can do nothing for the sake of God, nothing to promote his happiness, it follows that all our doings concern ourselves, our like, and the other beings of creation, or that in this life religion consists in mor- ality, and that morality becomes religious as far as it is the will of God. All religious regulations, therefore, ought to be only auxil- iary means of rendering mankind morally good. Hence it is pre- sumptuous and pitiful to perform ceremonies by way of rendering service to God. Many ceremonies destined to glorify God, are ridiculous, and rather calculated to amuse children than to edify reasonable beings. Their aim, which may be laudable and respec- table, ought never to be disguised, nor obscured by absurdities or immoral proceedings. It is edifying to assemble and to sing to- gether the greatness of God's perfections, but it is ridiculous to attribute to him qualities for which we despise each other in soci- ety ; let us reflect on the benevolence and justice of the Supreme Being, but let us not debase him by low passions ; particularly, let us never lose sight of the principal object of religion, viz. the moral improvement of man. As we can understand God's nature * Sermon xii. t First Epistle, v. 3. t Essais, liv. ii. ch. 19. VOL. II. 13 98 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. only as far as we possess qualities in common with him, and as we possess qualities in common with animals, and others which are proper to man, it is evident that in speaking of man being created m the likeness of God, only his higher nature can be said to con- stitute this likeness. Our religion or union with God or liking to him, then, only consists in exertions of such powers, which consti- tute our higher nature. In unfolding and enlarging these powers we truly honor God. Nothing foreign to our original constitution can be required from us, and the cultivation of our rational and moral existence is evidently the noblest tribute we can render to our Creator and the end of our godlike nature. Importance of Revelation. It is certain that religious and moral feelings are innate, but the regulation of their manifestations is an important point. We learn from history that the functions of these powers have been liable to infinite abuses and disorders. The principal object of revelation then is, to regulate and direct the actions of the religious and moral feelings. Reasonable persons, therefore, will never object to revealed laws, but they will not submit indiscriminately to every thing commanded in the name of God. It is really of consummate importance to bear in mind that the pretended ministers of God are men, and therefore liable to be deceived themselves as well as to deceive others. We should never forget that a revealed law must be in harmony with the skill of the Creator, or adapted to human nature, and tend to the honor of God and the welfare of mankind. Interpretations to the contrary give a deathblow to all assumed prerogatives of infallibility. It is remarkable that the belief in Divine revelation is quite gen- eral. It is known that the most ancient governments were theo- cratical and that their civil and religious regulations were imposed as the will of God. Farther, a peculiar kind of craft, or the same spirit has always guided those who call themselves the ministers or confidents of God, and there is something common to all the relig- ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 99 ious creeds both .of ancient and modern times. Every religion has its miracles, mysteries, and martyrs. Each boasts of the most irrefragable testimonies, the most respectable authorities, and the most plausible reasons; each is proposed as true, and requires un- bounded belief and blind obedience. The Indians who rub them- selves with cow's-dung ; the Jews who eat no pork; the Mahom- etans who neither drink wine nor eat pork, but make, at least, one pilgrimage to Mecca during their lives ; and the believers in the infinite number of other religious creeds scattered over the world, have all received special revelations. Diametrically opposite and even immoral opinions, have been defended even to death, and always in the persuasion that God was rather to be obeyed than man. If any article of faith be found irrational, it is called a mys- tery, and belief in it is not at all less obligatory. Who does not know that it is the will of God, and necessary to salvation, to make war, or to maintain peace, to immolate victims, or to preserve that which God has created, to sing kneeling or standing upright, the head covered or uncovered, to repeat certain prayers in a foreign language, to eat certain dishes on certain days, to eat them cold or warm, to burn perfumes, &c, &c? However dissimilar religious doctrines may be in regard to the attributes of God, to his influence on us, to the nature of the soul and its future state, belief is always supported by revelation; it is always God who has spoken either immediately or by means of his messengers. Religious belief has its advantages and disadvantages. To the former belong the powerful influence it exercises on our actions ; and though I am far from rejecting natural goodness, I am, howev- er, convinced from experience, that benevolent persons who have religious belief, are more ready to assist their suffering neighbor than those who have no other motive to act but their innate charity. This, too, is easily conceived since our actions depend on motives ; and the greater the number of the latter is, with the more confi- dence we may expect their effect. On the other hand, however, I do not think that religious belief alone is sufficient to dispose every one to act with charity and righteousness. I merely reckon 100 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. it among the powerful motives of action, and like to see it employ- ed as a means of happiness, but lament every sort of disorder in- separable from its misapplication. Another great advantage of religious faith is to inculcate deter- minate notions of God's attributes and perfections and of the final state of man. Reason can conceive either beginning or end ; it is confined to observation and induction, and the number of those who are apt to reason, is small. It is, therefore, necessary to impose to the great bulk of mankind, whatever they must believe, omit, or do. But here lies the great stumbling block, the delicacy and diffi- culty to distinguish truth from error, true from false prophets, and voluntary from involuntary deceivers. The ignorant are satisfied with faith without reasoning. They commonly obey every com- mandment which is proposed as divine. They attach themselves more to the legislator and to the manner of communicating his will than to the excellency of his precepts. They look for miracles from those who announce the law. They are most ready to be- lieve in that religion which promises most, and flatters the feelings of man to the greatest amount. It is obvious, therefore, why pre- tended ministers of God have always been, and are still interested in presenting ignorance as a virtue, and in preventing thinking peo- ple from communicating their opinions freely. As their religious interpretations do not always agree with the innate laws of intellect, it is rather convenient to interdict the exercise of reason, and un- fortunately, hypocrites succeed too easily. Reason indicates quite another course. It does not allow to any one to arrogate the right of commanding in the name of God; it commands to pay more attention to the nature of the revealed laws than to the time when, the place where, and the means by which they are made known. The precepts of Christian morality, for instance, have been and will be always the same, independently of time and place, for they are inherent in, and adapted to, the nature of man. Truth has its own intrinsic value, and does not acquire its worth from those who teach it. It may be overlooked ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 101 or not be felt by the ignorant, but it cannot be in opposition to reason. The superior qualities of man, called Theological, for instance, cannot be given to mankind in order to gratify the selfish views of some individuals or to entail misery upon the community. Reason will admit every cognition of any immutable law, whether physical or moral, as the will of God, but it will not acknowledge any proposition contrary to the evident decrees of the Creator, nor will it pardon those who impose duties to others which they them- selves neglect. The aim of Religion. Notions of this kind are intimately connected with those of the relationship between God and man. Most contradictory opinions prevail amongst religious persons. This study has been and com- monly still is, considered as the monopoly of a peculiar profession, and degraded to a technical phraseology. A priesthood every- where decided about the articles of belief, and declared the terms unbeliever and immoral as synonymous. But we ought to be aware that belief cannot be forced upon man any more than physi- cal love, attachment, benevolence or any other feeling. Religious intolerance therefore can only encourage hypocrisy. On the other hand, religious belief must be distinguished from our innate moral feelings ; hence the moral and religious sentiments may act sepa- rately from each other, or in union. Though marvellousness is an essential part of the constitution of man, religion should be ranked with other sciences and liberal researches. I think with Dr. Channing that' the claims of religion on intelligent men are not yet understood, and the low place which it holds among the objects of liberal inquiry will one day be recol- lected as the shame of our age.' Whoever believes in the exis- tence of God, should consider religion as the most important object of his reflections, and being personally concerned in this respect, his union with God should be left free from human author- ity, particularly from the spirit of those who have seized upon it as 102 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. their particular property. It is evident that all mental applications ought to be rational; is it not therefore strange that religion—the most important of human concerns—shall not admit the use of human reason, but that on this subject human understanding shall be obscured by symbolic terms and trampled upon by civil and religious governments ; and that in this enlightened age, religion shall remain a technical study, disjoined from all liberal inquiries, and disfigured by errors which gathered round it in times of barba- rism and ignorance ? Priesthood, it is true, does no longer lay down all the moral precepts ; their power has gradually diminished, and civil govern- ments have established a moral code independently of religious belief, so that nowadays we distinguish between civil laws and the rules of religious legislators. Who does not observe many of the pretended Christians neglect the moral precepts of their religious code, confine their religious duty to the belief in the miraculous part of Christianity, and conduct themselves according to the laws of their civil government. Civil legislators now decide even on the value of religious systems, declare one preferable and dominant, and merely tolerate the others. They feel their rights and their duties, and endeavor to promote general order and happiness; their statutes, in fact, are wiser and more forbearing than the interpret- ations of revealed legislation. It is a positive historical fact that religious governments have done more mischief to mankind than civil rulers. Nay, civil governments have been and still are faulty and injurious to the commonwealth in the ratio of their interference with, or of their being guided by religious opinions. Perceiving the influence of religious ideas on mankind in general, civil rulers often unite with priests for the advantage of both parties whilst the sacerdocy commonly contend for exclusive superiority. In the actual state of things it is still impossible to prevent every kind of disorder which may result from the union of, or the contest between, civil and religious powers. Among many changes, necessary to the progress of human happiness, a religious reform is indispensa- ble. Mischief is unavoidable so long as religion and morality are ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 103 under the direction of two distinct classes of governors, and so long as civil governments interfere with theological opinions strictly speaking. Sacerdotal supremacy must terminate, and civil gov- ernments should abstain from meddling with any religious belief which corresponds with the general order and happiness of the community. There should be no exception in the civil code. It should be the same for every member of the nation : for those who sing to the glory of God, and for those who do not sing; for those who on certain days eat flesh, and for those who eat vegetables; for the rich and the poor, for the gay and the gloomy. It should have only one aim, general happiness. Whatever does not con- cern this, ought to be out of its province. Every marvellous con- ception, which neither is in opposition to general happiness, nor troubles the order of the community, should be remitted to the conscience of every believer, and every kind of Churchdom should be abandoned. Religious teachers might form a liberal profession, and their lessons should be attractive, enlivening, and above all, practical. Farther, in every religious system, its morality or the ideas which it involves respecting purity or impurity of tendencies, innocence or guilt of actions, should constitute its most important part. Religion should unite all men in peace before their Creator, but theological subtleties and technical phraseology will never pro- duce such a desirable effect, and many generations will pass, and great changes must take place, before man arrives at that degree of perfection. On the Improvement of Religious Notions. • It does not appear superfluous to examine whether religious notions must remain stationary, as priesthood universally maintains, or whether they vary and must vary with the different degrees of civilisation, and may improve like the functions of every other innate faculty. Common sense tells, that persons of mature age cannot feel and think like children, and that civilized and well in- formed people cannot be satisfied with notions that please the 104 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. ignorant, no more in religion and morality than in arts and sciences. It seems evident that priesthood should not be permitted to check religious and moral improvement any more than academies have the right to impede the advancement of arts and scientific inquiries in general. The cold, obscure and technical theology of the times of slavery, ignorance and superstition is to give place to intelligible doctrines which harmonize with human nature. I respect every one's manner of thinking provided it agrees with the general wel- fare of mankind, but history shows that the religious notions of man, however slow their variations and improvements have been or may be, do not remain unchanged. Progress is the supreme law of the human mind. An irresistible proof of my proposition may be drawn from the revealed law itself. God manifested his will at different times and always with improved additions. He made a covenant with Noah, his seed, and with every living crea- ture;* he made another with Abraham ;f he again instructed Moses and revealed the whole Mosaic law.}. But Jeremiah fore- told that this covenant should not last, but be succeeded by a new one.§ In fact, neither the Jewish dispensation nor Paganism was adapted to the civilisation when Jesus Christ appeared ; and St. Paul in the most positive way, speaks || of ' the mediator of a better covenant, established upon better promises,' adding that if that first covenant had been faultless then would no place have been sought for the second. The gospel, particularly the sermon on the mount, contains rules of conduct very different from those of the Mosaic law. The interpretations of Christianity are numerous. Those which seemed adapted and necessary to former generations, will no longer attract enlightened minds. Religious ideas cannot be sta- tionary any more than civil legislation. Jesus frequently spoke in parables, complained of his disciples not understanding their mean- ing ; IT distinguished between the things as they were from the beginning of the creation, or had been modified in time ; ** and positively stated, that he had to say many things which they could * Gen. ix. 12. t Ibid. xvii. 4. t Exodus. § xxxi. 31 || Heb. viii. 6. IF Matth. xv. 16. * * Mark x. 6. ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 105 not yet bear.* I firmly believe that in many points of Christianity the letter which kills must be replaced by the spirit which vivifies ; and that wherever reason is allowed to reflect on religious matters, the uniformity of doctrine is impossible. It is a common tendency of the sacerdocy to keep religious notions stationary and to monop- olize certain advantages connected with their office. It is therefore natural that they decry every improvement which may be proposed. Accordingly the Roman, English, Scotch or any other dominant church will contend for the necessity of some uniform discipline. But then even in admitting the soundness of the principle the great difficulty remains concerning its application and decision about the nature of the discipline, that is, whether it shall be childish or reasonable, useful to a few or profitable to mankind at large. It has happened that priesthood in feeling it necessary to yield to the march of intellect did it secretly and without mentioning it openly. Sometimes they altered the language, but continued to act with the former spirit. This their proceeding must change. Religious opinions as they have been established in dark ages to the advan- tage of a few, require a reasonable reform in the actual state of civilisation. To that end it is desirable that in every country the clergy keep pace with the public in the acquirements of natural sciences. In that case alone they will be ready to admit ever}' improvement which reason and justice demand not only in language but also in work. Sublimity of Christianity. It is not my intention to examine the various systems of religion which have governed mankind at different times and in different countries. I shall, however, say a few words on Christianity, which deserves the most serious and continued attention of every reflective mind on account of its influence on mankind. The law- giver and the law surpass all other codes in excellence. In pro- portion as men's moral sentiments have been refined, Christ's * John xvi. 12. VOL. II. 14 106 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. moral character has been found praiseworthy. Since the introduc- tion of Christianity all private and public economy and all institu- tions have been changed, and mankind have made great progress ; but in every advanced condition of the world, Christianity unfolds nobler views and keeps in advance of every improved stage of society. Whoever applies Christian morality in his daily transac tions is conscious of its adaptation to his noblest faculties. In short this moral code seems to me the most pure, the most noble, and the most salutary, of all which are mentioned in history. Its laws alone are universal and invariable. It alone appeals to reason- ing and to the consequences of its knowledge as the best proofs of its excellency ; alone it is forbearing ; alone it invites examination, and asks the inquirer to hold by that which is true ; it alone is founded on the faculties proper to man, alone places general happi- ness above partial love and personal interest, and alone agrees with the natural law of morality. I do not hesitate to say that, in my opinion, true Christianity is little understood. Many, many chan- ges must take place before it can be reestablished in its primitive purity. I say with Benjamin Franklin,* ' I do not desire faith diminished, nor would I endeavor to lessen it in any man. But I wish it were more productive of good works than I have generally seen it ; I mean real good works, works of kindness, charity, mercy, and public spirit; not holyday-keeping, sermon-reading, or hearing ; performing church ceremonies or making long prayers, filled with flatteries and compliments, despised even by wise men and much less being capable of pleasing the Deity. The worship of God is a duty ; the reading and hearing of sermons may be use- ful, but if men rest in hearing and praying, as too many do, it is as if a tree should value itself on being watered and putting forth leaves, though it never produced any fruit. The great Master, thought much less of these outward appearances and professions than many of his modern disciples. He preferred the doers of the word, not the mere hearers; the son that seemingly refused to obey his father, and yet performed his commands, to him that pro- * Dr. Franklin's Memoirs and private correspondence, vol. iii. ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 107 fessed his readiness but neglected the work; the heretical but char- itable Samaritan to the uncharitable though orthodox priest, and sanctified Levite; and those who gave food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, raiment to the naked, entertainment to the stranger, and relief to the sick; though they never heard of his name, he declares shall in the last day be accepted, when those who cry Lord! Lord' who value themselves upon their faith, though great enough to per- form miracles, but have neglected good works, shall be rejected. He professed that he came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance; which implies his modest opinion, that there was some in his time who thought themselves so good that they need not hear even him for improvement; but nowadays we have scarce a little parson that does not think it the duty of every man within his reach to sit under his petty ministrations, and that whoever omits them offends God.' Materialism and Spiritualism. I lament with all philanthropists, that man is so much inclined to run into extremes. Idealogists have commonly too much confi- dence in their reasoning powers; they neglect observation, consider religion and morality as mere means of leading mankind, and as- sume their own manner of thinking and of feeling as a type of the human race; while moralists demand blind and unbounded confi- dence in their assertions as emanating from a superior authority, and discountenance or interdict reasoning. In this way, idealo- gists and moralists wage continual warfare, mutually disparage their subjects, and retard the knowledge of the nature of man: they are more attached to the love of dominion than to the love of truth. Abuses and prejudices are kept up for the sake of selfish views, and dialectic subtleties are called reasoning. If they love truth, let both parties examine, without prejudice. Philosophers will find that man is naturally inclined to religious considerations; and the interpreters of the will of God, if they do not act from selfish mo- tives, will not reject the light of reason; they will soon be con- 108 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. vinced that the feelings are blind, and must be guided by reflection, which can alone establish harmony among the fundamental powers and their functions. It is certain that ' there is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral world than we are apt to take notice of;' * and that truth and the knowledge of nature are neither dan- gerous nor in opposition to morality and true religion. It is proved by incontestable facts, that the affective and intellectual faculties are inherent in the nature of man, that their manifestations depend on the cerebral organization, and that the physical world is subser- vient to the moral; but ignorance, hypocrisy, and envy, have taken part in the discussion. The basis of Phrenology was first attacked, viz. its reality was denied. To others it seemed more convenient to blame its consequences, and without knowing why or explaining how, to cry out that it is dangerous. This, in all ages, has been the reception of every discovery. The disciples of the various philosophical schools of Greece inveighed against each other, and made reciprocal accusations of impiety and perjury. The people, in their turn, detested the philosophers, and accused ihose who investigated the causes of things of presumptuously in- vading the rights of the Divinity. Pythagoras and Anaxagoras were driven from their native countries, on account of their novel opinions; Democritus was treated as insane by the Abderites, for his attempts to find out the cause of madness by dissections; and Socrates, for having demonstrated the unity of God, was forced to drink the juice of hemlock. Several of those who excelled in physics in the fourteenth century were punished with death as sor- cerers or magicians. Galileo, when seventy years of age, was cast into prison for having proved the motion of the earth. Vesalius, Varolius, and Harvey, were persecuted on account of their dis- coveries. Those who first maintained the influence of climate upon the intellectual faculties of man were suspected of materialism. The pious philosophers Bonnet, Linnaeus, Buffon, the virtuous Lavater, and many others, have been treated as materialists and fatalists. * Bishop Butler, Sermon vi. ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. The instances of Aristotle and Descartes may be quoted, to show the good and bad fortune of new doctrines. The ancient antagonists of Aristotle caused his books to be burned; but in the time of Francis I. the writings of Ramus against Aristotle were similarly treated. Whoever opposed Aristotle was declared here- tic; and under pain of being sent to the galleys, philosophers were prohibited from combating Aristotle. At the present day, the phi- losophy of Aristotle is no longer taught except at the university of Oxford in England. Descartes was persecuted for teaching the doctrine of innate ideas; he was accused of atheism, though he had written on the existence of God; and his books were burnt by order of the university of Paris. Shortly afterwards, however, the same learned body adopted the doctrine of innate ideas, and when Locke and Condillac attacked it, the cry of materialism and fatalism was turned against them. Thus the same opinions have been considered at one time as dangerous because they were new, and at another as useful because they were ancient. What is to be inferred from this, but that man deserves to be pitied; that the opinions of contemporaries on the truth or falsehood, the good or bad consequences of a new doctrine are always to be suspected; and that the only object of an author ought to be to point out the truth. Ancillon is therefore right in saying with Bonnet: Reason does not know any useless or danger- ous truth. That which is, is. This is the proper answer for those who, valuing things only by the advantage they themselves may reap, are incessantly asking, Cui bono—what is this good for? and for those also who anxiously ask, To what does this lead '? Jesus, the son of Sirach, long ago said, ' We ought not to demand what is this good for; the usefulness of every thing will be known in its due time.' Gall and I never doubted that ignorance and knavery would at- tack our doctrine with abuse; what does not man abuse? Tell him that he ought to expiate his sins, and in his superstition he will im- molate his children. Have not Lucretius and his disciples bent all their powers to prove, that belief in the immortality of the soul in- 110 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND spires fear of death, and poisons every enjoyment of life ? while Christians consider it as the basis of order, of happiness, of morali- ty, and the chief and best solace amid all the calamities that assail them. Establishments for vaccination, and conductors for lightning upon buildings, are, in the opinion of some, laudable and beneficial to humanity; but, in the eyes of others, they are offences against Di- vine Providence. In one word, man finds some cause of com- plaint in all; but we may say with St. Bernard, ' We ought to judge differently the complaints of the ignorant and those of the hypocriti- cal. The former complain from ignorance, the latter from malice; the first because they do not know the truth, the second because they hate it.' Malebranche has very well painted the enemies of new truths. ' Persons of solid and true piety,' says he, ' never condemn what they do not understand; but the ignorant, the superstitious, and the hypocritical do. The superstitious by a slavish fear are enraged when they see an ingenious and penetrating man. If he assign the natural causes of thunder and its effects, they deem him an atheist, Hypocrites, on the contrary, though led by particular motives, make use of notions generally venerated, and combat new truths under the mask of some other truth; sometimes they secretly deride what every one respects, and produce in the minds of others a re- putation which is the more to be feared, in proportion as the things which they abuse are more sacred.' It is a pity that religious people and those who contend for know- ledge, instead of uniting their exertions in order to establish truth, constantly endeavor to restrain each others' pursuits; the former particularly maintain, that knowledge is to be limited by religion, whilst the latter admit with Lord Bacon that ' a little natural philo- sophy inclines the mind to atheism; but a farther proceeding brings the mind back to religion,' adding at the same time with the same extraordinary man that ' there are, besides the authority of scrip- tures, two reasons of exceeding great weight and force why religion should dearly protect all increase of natural knowledge: the one be- cause it leads to the greater exaltation of the glory of God; for as ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. the psalms and other scriptures do often invite us to consider to magnify the great and wonderful works of God, so if we should rest only in the contemplation of those which first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like injury to the majesty of God as if we should judge of the store of some excellent jeweller by that only which is set out to the street in his shop. The other reason is because it is a singular help and a preservative against unbelief and error: For says our Saviour, you err, not knowing the scrip- tures nor the power of God; laying before us two books or vol- umes to study, if we will be secured from error. First, the scriptures revealing the will of God, and then the creatures express- ing his power.' There is no revelation of natural sciences, but the revealed truth does not prohibit the knowledge of nature. Moses was well acquainted with all the Egyptian learning; Solomon petitioned for wisdom from God, and in the prophecy of Daniel it is said that ' science shall be increased.' Its progress indeed has been extraordinary since the times of Lord Bacon, yet I think we may still repeat that which he mentions in his essay on the Inter pretation of Nature, viz. that ' the new found world of land was not greater addition to the ancient continent than there remains at this day a world of inventions and sciences unknown, having respect to those that are known.' None of the arts and sciences conducive to the commodities of life is revealed,—will therefore pious people reject them? Let us rather come to the conclusion that under- standing and religion do not exclude each other, but should be culti- vated in harmony; that divines have no more right to interdict the examination of the Creator's works than natural philosophers are allowed to stop the investigation into his revealed will concerning our moral conduct in this life and our state in that to come. Phrenology, by maintaining that the manifestation of the faculties of the mind depends in this life on the organization of the brain, is said to establish materialism. Let us set out by observing, that the word materialism has two different significations. One class of materialists maintain that there is no Creator ; that matter has always existed ; and that all the phenomena of the world are effects of 112 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. matter. The ancient Romish church used materialism in this sense, and, at the present day, the word is often taken as synony- mous with atheism. The position, that mental manifestations depend on the brain, has nothing in common with this sort of materialism. He who inquires into the laws of phenomena, cannot be an atheist; he cannot consider the admirable and wise concate- nation of all things in nature, and their mutual relations, as existing without a primitive cause. Another kind of materialism is taught by those who admit a Cre- ator, but maintain that man does not consist of two different entities —body and soul; and that all phenomena, ordinarily attributed to the soul, result only from forms and combinations of matter. The soul, in their opinion, is a fluid of extreme tenuity, distributed over all things, and enlivening the whole organization. Neither has Phrenology any thing in common with this opinion. Neither Dr. Gall nor myself have ever endeavored to explain final causes ; we have always declared, that we make no inquiry into the nature of the soul, nor into that of the body; that we are led solely by experiment. Now we have seen that every faculty is manifested by means of the organization. When our antagonists, however, maintain that we are materialists, they ought to show where we teach that there is nothing but matter. The entire falsehood of the accusation is made obvious by a review of the following considera- tions : The expression organ designates an instrument by means of which some faculty proclaims itself; the muscles, for example, are the organs of voluntary motion, but they are not the moving power; the eyes are the organ of sight, but they are not the faculty of seeing. We separate the faculties of the soul or of the mind from the organs, and consider the cerebral parts as the instruments by means of which they manifest themselves. Now, even the adversaries of Phrenology must, to a certain extent, admit the dependance of the soul on the body. In the very same passage in which Professor Walter of Berlin imputes materialism to our physiology of the brain, he says : ' The brain of children is pulpy, and in decrepit old age it is hard. It must have a certain degree ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 113 01 firmness and elasticity, that the soul may manifest itself with great splendor. But this consideration does not lead to material- ism, it shows only the mutual union of the body and soul.' The mutual relation between mind and body is an ancient doc- trine. Many placed the feelings in the viscera, and intellect in the brain. The whole brain is commonly considered as the organ of understanding, whilst we consider the anterior lobes as sufficient to intellect, and ascribe special manifestations of the mind to indi- vidual portions of the brain. In fact we assign smaller organs to mental manifestations, and therefore cannot be more materialists than our predecessors, whether anatomists, physiologists, or phi- losophers and moralists, who have admitted the dependance of the soul on the body. Materialism is essentially the same, whether the faculties of the mind be said to depend on the whole body, on the whole brain, or individual powers on particular parts of the brain : the faculties still depend on organization for their exhibition. To show that all ancient and modern philosophers and the fathers of the Christian church agree with us, that the manifestations of the mind depend on the body, I shall quote a few of their opinions. Plato considered the body as a prison of the soul. Seneca says: ' Corpus hoc animi poena ac pondus est, (Epist. 66.) The Carte- sians, by their doctrine of the tracts which they suppose in the brain, admit the influence of organization on the intellectual opera- tions. Malebranche, when explaining the difference in the facul- ties of the sexes, and the various and peculiar tastes of nations and individuals, by the firmness and softness, dryness and moisture of the cerebral fibres, remarks, that our time cannot be better em- ployed than in investigating the material causes of human phenom- ena. Charles Bonnet said, 'That mankind can only be known and penetrated by their physical nature.' St. Thomas* said, ' Though the spirit is no coporeal faculty, the spiritual functions, as memory, imagination, cannot take place without the bodily or- ganization. Therefore, if the organs cannot exercise their activi- ty, the spiritual functions are disturbed. For the same reason a * Contra Gentiles, c. 12. n. 9. VOL. II. 15 114 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. happy organization of the human body is always accompanied with excellent intellectual faculties.' St. Gregorius Nyssenus* com- pared the body of man to a musical instrument. ' It sometimes happens,' says he, ' that excellent musicians cannot show their talent because their instrument is in a bad state. It is the same with the functions of the soul ; they are disturbed or suspended according to the changes which take place in the organs; for it is the nature of the spirit, that it cannot exercise conveniently its functions but by sound organs.' St. Augustin,f St. Cyprian,+. St. Ambrose,§ St. Chrysostom,|| Eusebius and many other religious and profane writers, consider the body or even the brain as the instrument of the soul, and distinctly teach that the mind is regulated by the state of the body. Phrenologists, therefore, leave the question of ma- terialism, where they found it. SECTION VI. ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. The objects contained in this Section are of the greatest impor- tance, not only to individuals but to mankind at large. They have been examined at all ages, but they are far from being sufficiently understood, and the most contradictory opinions have been defend- ed. I shall consider in succession the doctrine of fatalism, neces- sity, free will and morality, in reference to Phrenology. Fatalism. Phrenology, by contending that all mental dispositions are innate, is said to lead to fatalism. In reply I remark that this term has different meanings. Certain writers understand by fatalism every thing in the world and the world itself as existing, and all events as * De hominis opificio, c. 12. t De lib. arbit. t De operibus Christi. § De Offic. || Ho mil. II. III. super Epist. ad Heb ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 115 results of chance, and not of a supreme and guiding intelligence. This fatalism involves atheism, and cannot be reproached to Phre- nology. Another kind of fatalism admits the creation of the world, and in every being a determinate nature, and operations according to determinate laws, in inorganized as well as organized beings, in vegetative and animal life. No one doubts of this truth in refer- ence to other beings. We can never gather grapes from a thorn bush, and an apple tree can never bring forth pears; and a cat can never be changed into a dog, or any animal into another. It is also certain that the faculties of mankind and their laws are fixed by creation. First, his existence is involuntary. Who has called himself into being? Does it depend on the will of any one to be born in this or in that country ? of these or those parents? under this or that system of government, or of religion? Who has determined his sex? Who can say, I am the eldest or youngest because it was my choice? Who has chosen the circumstances, surrounded by which he sees the light, the capacities of teachers, the mental frame of those about him from earliest infancy, and the thousand other accidents that influence him through future life? The organs of vegetative life perform their determinate functions without our will; the liver can never perform digestion; the kid- neys can never secrete bile ; what is poison can never become wholesome aliment, and so on. It is the same with animal life The existence of the five external senses and their laws are an effect of creation. It does not depend on our will to have the power of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting; we can never hear or see with our fingers, nor smell with our lips, &c It is impossible to see as red that which is blue, or to see as great that which is small. The propensities, sentiments and intellectual faculties, their mutual influence and their various relations to each other, are determined by the Creator. The determinateness of these faculties may, doubtless, be termed fatalism. Moreover the individual dispositions of body and mind are given in different degrees and their manifestations depend on organization. There are individuals deaf, blind, stupid and intelligent, from birth 116 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Bishop Butler* says, ' If, in considering our state of trial, we go on to observe how mankind behave under it, we shall find that some have so little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond the passing day; they are so taken up with present gratifications as to have in a manner no feeling of consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life, any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion in their worldly concerns as well as in religion; others are not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by the little passions, against their better judgment and feeble resolutions, too, of acting better ; and there are men, and truly there are not a few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their mere will and pleasure to be their law of life ; and who, in open defiance of every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing with no remorse and little fear that it will be their temporal ruin; and some of them under the apprehension of the consequences of wickedness in another state. And to speak in the most moderate wray, human creatures are not only coptinually liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so with respect to their temporal interests as well as with respect to religion.' Daily experience, indeed, shows, that in different persons the various feelings and talents of the mind are active in different degrees. This kind of fatalism is certain, and founded in nature, and even in the Supreme Being himself; for perfection and infinite goodness and infinite justice inhere in the nature of God, and he cannot desire evil. So also the feelings proper to man, according to nature, must desire the common wel- fare. It is therefore not astonishing that the philosophers of China, Hindostan, and Greece, the eastern and western Christians, and die followers of Mahomet, have blended a certain kind of fatalism with their religious opinions. Indeed, it cannot be dangerous to insist on such a fatalism in so far as it exists. Christ, his apostles, and the fathers of the church have done so. A proverb of Solo- mon is, ' the Lord gives wisdom;' according to Christianity, ' The * Analogy of Religion, p. 92. ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 117 tree is known by its fruit;' * St. Paul says, ' And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom he did fore- know, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son ; that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called : and whom he called, them he also justified : and whom he justified, them he also glorified.' f And again: 'Who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?'^: St. Augustin taught openly and distinctly our dependance on God, and commanded the preaching of this truth. ' As no one,' says he, ' can give to himself life, so nobody can give to himself under- standing. ' § He calls gifts of God, all good qualities, as the fear of God, charity, faith, obedience, justice, veracity. He says, || that God has not distributed in an equal manner noble sentiments any more than temporal good, as health, strength, riches, honors, the gifts of arts and sciences. I declare then that I believe in that fatalism or in that determinate arrangement by the Creator, according to which the nature of man, his fundamental dispositions of body and mind, their relations and dependence on organization, are fixed. Man in this life can never be an angel. I believe farther in a certain kind of Necessity. The doctrine of necessity has also occupied many minds ; it nas been admitted by some and denied by others. It is necessary to come to a clear understanding about the meaning of the word. I take it as the principle of causation, or in the sense of the relation between cause and effect. This principle is admitted in the physi- cal and intellectual world ; but in the moral operations of the mind it is not sufficiently attended to'. Yet there is no moral effect without a moral cause, any more than a physical or intellectual •Mat. xii. 33. t Rom. viii. 23-30. t 1 Cor. iv. 7. § Lib. de Fide, c. 1. H Lib. de Coreptione et Gratia. i8 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. event without an adequate cause. The principle of causation in the moral world is expressed by the connexion between motives and actions. It seems to me surprising, that this connexion should have been theoretically questioned, while every human being is daily dependent upon its truth. It is perceived in all our projects, in the direction of our family, in the regulations of the government, and in every social proceeding. Motives are proposed whenever we wish to produce actions. Without the law of causation in the moral world there would be no foresight of events, and no science of politics. One might act reasonably or unreasonably, justly or unjustly, well or ill, because he acts without motive. Such a state is contradictory in itself, and in this supposition all institutions which implicate the happi- ness of mankind would be useless. Education, morality, religion, reward and punishment should all be inefficient, man being deter- mined by no motive. And we might expect from every one ha- tred and perfidy as well as friendship and fidelity, vice as well as virtue. Such a state is merely speculative, whilst in reality man is subjected to the law of causation like the rest of nature. This state alone has been professed by ancient philosophers and legisla- tors, and is supposed by religion and moral doctrines, which furnish the nobler motives to direct man in his actions. But I do not Delieve in Necessity as irresistibility. It is positive, that the mental faculties are innate ; that their mani- festations depend on cerebral organs (Fatality;) and that without power we cannot act (Necessity.) The adversaries of Phrenology object, that, therefore, all actions must be unavoidable and irresis- tible, and that there is no responsibility. It is a fact that without power we cannot act, but it is also a fact that the power being given we need not act. Neither in ani- mals nor in man are all the faculties active at the same moment and irresistible. It constantly happens that one power acts while ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. II9 the others are quiescent, and that one deed rather than another is done. If this were not, it should be the height of cruelty to pun- ish animals to prevent peculiar actions. If a dog be punished for having eaten under certain circumstances, do we not see that though hungry, he will not touch a bit under the same occasion ? And is it not precisely so with man ? He has a great number of faculties, but are they always active, are they irresistible ? We can walk, dance and sing, but are we constantly forced to do so ? Who does not often feel within himself a wish for something or an inclination to do some act which he combats by other motives ? In- dubitably then, neither animals nor man are irresistibly forced to act; St. Augustin long ago said,* ' God in giving the power does not in- flict the irresistibility.' Man then is free and accountable ; how far? Free will, or liberty and responsibility. Some philosophers attributed to man an unbounded liberty ; they made him independent of every natural law, so to say, his own creator, and his will the sole cause of his actions ; nay, they gave him an absolute liberty without motives. Such a liberty, however, in a created being is contradictory, and all that can be said in favor of it, is destitute of signification. Being free is the reverse of being forced, and free will or liber- ty is the opposite of irresistibility. The whole constitution of man, though determined by the Creator, does not exclude liberty, deliberation, choice, preference and action, from certain motives and to certain ends. All this is matter of experience universally acknowledged, and every man must every moment be conscious of it. Liberty belongs to the constitution of man. Some moralists, with Dr. Price, maintain that understanding is necessary to establish free will, others derive it from an innate moral sense which is everlasting with truth and reason. My view of free will or liberty is as follows. It consists in the possibility of doing or of not doing any thing, and in the faculty of know- * Lib. de litera et spiritu, c. 31. 120 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. ino- motives and of determining one's self according to them Three things then must be considered in liberty: will, the plurality of motives, and the influence of the will upon the instruments which perform the actions. The first object to be considered is the meaning of the word Will. I have already stated, and repeat for the sake of clearness, that many authors confound will with the propensities, inclinations, or concupiscences, and therefore deny the existence of free-will. Internal satisfaction and free-will, however, are very different things. Satisfaction accompanies the fulfilling of every desire. The sheep and tiger do not act freely, because they are pleased, the one with grazing, and the other with tearing his prey in pieces. Each faculty of animal life being active, gives a desire or an inclination which man and animals experience involuntarily. They are forced to feel hunger if the nerves of that sense act in a certain manner; they must see, if the light strikes the retina of their eyes, &c. Man, then, has neither any power upon accidental external impres- sions, nor over the existence of internal feelings. He must feel an inclination if its appropriate organ be excited; and not master of this, he cannot be answerable for it. But inclinations, propen- sities, or desires, are not will, because man and animals often have these, and yet will not. A hungry dog, for example, which has been beaten, occasionally refuses the food offered to him ; he is hungry, he wants, but wills not to eat. It is the same with man. How often are we all obliged to act against our inclinations! Thus, experience proves not only that the faculties do not act irresistibly either in man or in animals, or, in other words, that there exists liberty or freedom, but also that inclinations are not yet will. Freedom, however, presupposes will. How then is will origin- ated ? To have will, to decide for or against, I must evidently know what has passed or is to happen ; I must compare : hence, will begins with the perceptive and reflective faculties, i. e. with under- standing ; the will of every animal is therefore proportionate to its understanding. Man has the greatest freedom, because his will ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 121 has the widest range ; and this because he has the most understand- ing. He knows more than any animal; compares the present with the past; foresees future events ; and discovers the relation between cause and effect. It is even to be observed that not only will, but also our participation and accountableness, begin with the perceptive faculties. Idiots, have sometimes inclinations, but they are neither free nor answerable. It is the same with children before a certain age ; they are said not to be capable of distinguish- ing good from, evil. A man of great understanding and good edu- cation is also more blameable for a fault than an uncultivated and stupid individual. Thus, the first conditipn to freedom is will, an effect of knowledge and reflection. The second concerns what is to be known and compared, viz. motives. Will is the decision of the understanding, but is adopted according to motives. These result principally from the propen- sities and sentiments, and sometimes from the perceptive faculties; hence they are as numerous and energetic as these, and the animal which has many and powerful faculties, has many and vigorous motives, and freedom in proportion. The plurality of motives, then, is the second condition to liberty. An animal endowed with only one faculty could act but in one way, and cease from action only when this became inactive. If, on the contrary, it were en- dowed with several faculties, it would be susceptible of different motives, and a choice would become possible. Yet a plurality of motives is not alone sufficient to freedom of action; for, in that case, the stronger faculty would occasion the deed. If you offer food to a hungry dog, and at the same moment make a hare run before him, he will eat, or follow the hare, according to his strongest propensity. This is not freedom ; the strongest propensity only prevails. If, on the contrary, the dog, endowed with the faculty of knowing and comparing, has been punished for following hares, he may tremble and have palpitations without pursuing ; he chooses between different motives, he desires, but he remembers the chas- tisement, and he will not. Thus liberty requires will and a plural- ity of motives. It, however, demands still a third condition, viz., VOL. n. 16 122 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. the influence of the will upon the instruments by which the actions are performed. In cases of disease, it sometimes happens that different motives are known, and that the will has no influence upon actions. In convulsive fits, for instance, the patient may know what he does, but necessarily beats his chest, or head. It is remarkable, too, that the will may put certain faculties into action, while others are abstracted from its influence. It cannot excite the affective facul- ties, nor prevent their activity, and therefore we are not answerable for our feelings ; but it has greater power on the intellectual facul- ties, and can reproduce their actions in thinking of their functions. It also influences the external senses by means of voluntary motion, and thus has power over the instruments of action. This is the reason why man is accountable for actions proceeding from feelings, though these themselves are involuntary. But soon as voluntary motion is withdrawn from the government of the understanding and will, liberty, responsibility and guilt are no more. Thus, true liberty is founded on three conditions united, and ceases as soon as any one of them is wanting. 'Examine it narrowly,' says Diderot, 'and you will see that the word liberty is a word devoid of meaning ; that there are not, and there cannot be, free beings ; that we are only what accords with the general order, with our organization, our education, and the chain of events. These dispose of us invincibly. We can no more conceive a being acting without a motive, than we can one of the arms of a balance acting without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. What deceives us is the prodigious variety of our actions, joined to the habit which we catch at our birth, of confounding the voluntary and the free. We have been so often praised and blamed, and have so often praised and blamed others, that we contract an inveterate prejudice of believing that we and they will and act freely. But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame ; neither vice nor virtue ; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished. What then ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 123 is the distinction among men ? The doing of good and the doing of ill! The doer of ill is one who must be destroyed, not punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous.—Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom.' Similar passages may be found in many works of French writers. But their ignorance of human nature is evident. Man is supposed to be a blank paper, tabula rasa, and therefore, every motive con- sidered as 'exterior,' whilst, according to Phrenology, every condition of liberty is given to man, like all his powers, and their employment is left to the influence of his reflective faculties. Freedom or liberty however is not absolute, and in itself it is a gift of the Creator. Man is free though he is not free to be so, and he is made free in order to be answerable or accountable for his actions. There is no effect without a cause, and no action without a motive, but man has received certain faculties to examine the motives of action and to make a choice among them. These faculties again act according to laws which are determined by the Creator, as well as those of life and nutrition. Man, therefore, cannot will every thing indiscriminately, he is obliged to give the preference to that which seems good and to place one motive above another. This choice among motives constitutes our free will. ' God exercises,' says Bishop Butler,* ' the same kind of gov- ernment over us with that which a father exercises over his chil- dren. It evidently appears that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this government to a being who can have no competition or interfering of interest with his creatures. The intelligent author of nature has given us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtues and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious ana of ill desert, which moral discernment then implies a rule of action.' True liberty in itself, however, has not yet a moral character, for many animals exhibit liberty, in different degrees. We must consequently examine where the morality of actions begins. * Part I. Ch. vi. of the opinion of necessity. .24 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. On Morality, its origin and nature. The doctrine of morality—Ethics—is the most interesting sub- ject which can come under our views. Ethics embraces all that is loved in God and in man, the notions of good and evil, of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, of merit and demerit, of moral liberty and responsibility. The majority of every existing community require to be conduc- ted by regulations which must even be imposed upon them in a dogmatic way. A very few only are capable of understanding the concatenation of causes and effects ; and even the natural laws will be incomprehensible dogmas to the great mass of mankind. Belief in, at least submission to, the true laws is quite indispensable to the well being of man, and hence obligatory upon all, but spe- cially upon those who fcnow them. It is remarkable that hitherto all nations have adopted their re- ligion, and a part of their moral laws, from revelation. We may therefore easily conceive that the priesthood will continue to esti- mate their services highly, to keep religious notions stationary, and to make their own interpretations pass as the revealed will of God. All positive laws are imposed, but the obligation of bowing to them is no proof of their being what they ought to be. Indeed the most opposite rules of conduct have, at different times, been en- joined even as divine and infallible, and it has not generally appear- ed singular that divine laws have varied according to persons, localities and circumstances. I cannot, however, help saying that my esteem is not great for a legislator who is constantly in contra- diction with himself, who desires moral good, but who notwithstand- ing his omnipotence corrects only by exterminating, who punishes the innocent on account of the guilty. My intention here is only to show that belief, or the necessity of obeying, does not prove the perfection of positive laws. Some actions in the Christian doctrine are styled good, and others bad or sinful, and whilst the first are commanded, the last are forbidden. Good actions are farther stated to be done after ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 125 the spirit, and sins after the flesh, though the flesh is allowed not to be evil in itself. But if actions be not specified, how can we know which are good and which are bad ? Is there no standard, according to which they may be judged universally ? In every branch of natural science positive and exact knowledge is sought after. I think that the same ought to be done in regard to the morality of human actions. Mere faith in religious opinions will no longer suffice, the reign of positive truth should begin. The moral nature of man ought to be examined, with observation as a guide, and reduced to principles capable of general and con- slant application. Invention in the knowledge of man cannot be permitted, and arbitrary interpretations must give place to invaria- ble laws ; actions done in conformity with which will be declared as good, and those not in conformity as bad. Morality must be- come a science. The nature of every being is regulated by laws, and the human body is evidently so. The laws of propagation and nutrition cannot be changed, and from analogy we may conclude that the moral na- ture of man is not left to the guidance of chance. But in what do the moral laws consist, or how are they to be determined ? Shall it be by force, by a majority of votes ? or are they to be sought from among the works and decrees of the Creator ? It is of the highest importance to be convinced that human nature is governed by natural laws. Many philosophers have acknowledg- ed the existence of natural laws of morality as well as of organi- zation. In the opinion of Confucius ' law is that which is conform- able to nature.' Cicero thinks that the law cannot vary, but that it is the same for every nation; and that no injustice, whatever name is given to it, can be considered as law, though a whole nation may submit to its infliction. Lord Bacon calls the. laws of nature the law of laws. Charron says, that wise men conduct themselves, that nature is their guide, and that the laws are at the bottom of their hearts. Montesquieu observes, that to say there is neither justice nor injustice except that which is so declared by positive laws, is to say that the radii of a circle are not equal before 126 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. it is traced. Nevertheless this writer allowed governments the power of determining or making the law ; his comparison, however, proves that the law exists prior to governments, which are estab- lished merely to watch over its execution ; the number of gover- nors is here a secondary point, the object remains invariably the same, viz. the enforcement of the natural law. St. Paul speaks in the most decisive manner of natural morality, in stating that some persons without the law do things ordered by the law, since this is written in their hearts. ' Man,' says Volney,* ' like the whole world of which he is a part, is ruled by natural laws, which are invariable in their essence, regular in their application, consequent in their effects, and the common cause both of good and evil. They are not written in the stars, nor hidden in mysterious ideas; but inherent in human nature, and identified with man's existence. They act on his senses, advertise his intelligence, and bring with every action penalty or reward. Let man learn these laws, let him understand his own and the nature of things around him, and he will know the cause of his griefs and the remedy.' Volney believed in the existence of natural laws ; but he did not, in my opinion, understand the basis of natural morality, when he conceived that it was self preservation. In his hypothesis, ani- mals should have a moral nature ; but from what I have already said, and from what I shall still say, it follows that neither personal interest nor selfishness of any kind can be recognised as the foun- dation of morality. From the great influence of the natural laws upon the condition of mankind it follows that it is exceedingly important not to err in their determination. To elucidate the natural laws in general, and those of morality in particular, I make the following remarks. In examining the origin of morality we find that the greater number of persons derive the moral sense from revelation ; that some philosophers consider it as innate ; whilst others ascribe it to intelligence, or even to personal interest. __________^^___ * Ruins, ch. v. ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 127 The ancient doctrine that revelation is the only cause of moral- ty must be given up, since the moral feelings are innate indepen- dently of religion, and since revelation can only direct the innate sentiments in their functions. On the other hand it is also certain, that neither the moral nor any other feelings can be derived from intellect. This may guide the functions of the feelings, but cannot produce them. The details of these propositions are found in the first volume of this work, where I treat of the moral powers of man. I therefore here confine myself to the consideration of per- sonal interest as the cause of morality. Man, say the partisans of selfishness, acts by interest; he does that which gives him the greatest pleasure, or seems the most ad- vantageous. Egotism, continue they, is not confined to the search after the pleasures of the body or of sense, but extends over all internal sensations, and all moral and intellectual enjoy- ments. To act, in order to experience pleasure in the moment of action, or to obtain reward either in this life or in that which is to come, is still to act from self-interest. I grant that man is eminently selfish, and that selfishness in union with pride makes him believe what he likes. We may admit with Benjamin Franklin, that he who for giving a draught of water to a thirsty person should expect to be paid with a good plantation, would be modest in his demands, compared with those who think they deserve heaven for the little good they do on earth. The basis of morality founded on selfishness, indeed, is unworthy, igno- ble, and uncertain at the same time. Wherever it prevails man will be unhappy ; and agreement, in regard to that which is moral- ly good, impossible. Individual inclinations of legislators will determine the laws ; and their self-satisfaction be the principal motive of their regulations. This is the law of the strongest, assisted by intelligence. It advises governments to treat subjects with benevolence and justice, because in this they find their own advantage ; to keep the community in ignorance, as it is easier to persuade and arbitrarily to guide ignorant people than to convince those with cultivated understandings; and to foster superstition, 128 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. since it is an excellent means of effecting whatever seems convenient. The insufficiency of this morality has been felt, and therefore it has been deemed necessary to add, that every one has a title to sat- isfy his selfish desires, provided he does not trench on the rights of others. This is the doctrine which moralists of modern times endeavor to establish. It is certainly far superior to the vile sys- tem founded on the right of the strongest, which, for so many centuries, has desolated the world. Self-love, which undoubtedly exists in man, is here combined with love of others,—also an in- herent principle in human nature. This doctrine, if followed, will put an end to many abuses, and prevent numerous disorders ; in many respects it will also promote general happiness. Whoever loves humanity must therefore desire to see it propagated. Nevertheless, the doctrine is founded on the inferior motive of personal interest; and it is what neither Nature nor Christianity teaches. Other philosophers, still considering self-interest and intelligence together as the cause of morality, say that the strong govern the weak; and that if the weak occasionally become the strong, they throw off the yoke, and impose their own will in turn. Thus it is always the strong who govern. In these circumstances one fears another, and then both agree upon what shall be considered as law. This system, therefore, is founded on convention or agreement between the governors and the governed, for their common ad- vantage. Let it be understood that no sentiment results from any other, nor from intelligence. Fear then cannot produce the moral sense. Animals are sensible to fear, and yet are ruled by the right of the strongest. Fear, it is true, may become a motive to act and to make laws ; but it conceives neither the necessity nor the justice of making laws. Positive facts and reasoning prove, that the basis of morality is inherent in human nature; but those who treat of justice and virtue and admit this innateness, do not always attach the same meaning ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 129 to these expressions, and their nature and essence are not yet de- termined. Both terms are taken atone time for faculties, at another for actions. Farther, in considering virtues as good actions, and in maintaining that every good action which has required an inward struggle is virtuous, the meaning of the word virtue is still very variable. The same thing happens with the terms vice, immoral or unjust, and sin, in the language of religion. The ancient philosophers spoke of cardinal virtues, but these are only the just employment of certain fundamental powers. Temperance, for instance, is the right use of the pleasures of sense ; prudence, of circumspection and intelligence ; force, of courage and firmness; justice, of conscientiousness, benevolence, and self-love, together. The virtues styled theological result from three fundamental faculties: hope and charity belong to primitive sentiments, faith or religious belief depends on hope and marvellousness. Hitherto religious and civil governments ;have decided on what tney desired should be called virtue or vice. The same action has, according to circumstances, been declared on one occasion a virtue, and on another a vice. Courage is virtuous in conquerors, as well as in those who defend themselves against aggressors. The church of Rome commands celibacy as a virtue, while other governments reward those who bring up a family. It is remarkable, that all codes, revealed or profane, with one exception, have declared the amorpatrice, or love of country, a principal virtue. The Christian doctrine alone acknowledges no exclusionary patriotism, it alone commands universal love. As in every religious system and civil code the determination of right and wrong varies, the perplexity of the lover of truth must be great; and as long as virtue is defined according to circumstances, or depends on the good will of civil and religious legislators, it will be contradictory and cannot become absolute. Absolute virtue, however, is to be proved; in other words, morality is to become a science. This cannot happen as long as philosophy and religion are not united, and as long as the fundamental powers of the mind, vol. n. 17 130 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. their origin, their modes of action, the effects of their mutual in- fluence, the conditions of their manifestations, the laws of their improvement and the moral and religious nature of man are not perfectly understood. Whatever may be said against the plurality of the faculties and their peculiar organs, they must be admitted. Both vegetative and animal life is, in fact, more or less complicated in the different orders of animals. The vegetative is exceedingly simple in the lowest tribes of all. Nutrition is limited to mere intus-susception, absorption, and assimilation. It becomes complicated by degrees, and in the mammalia includes mastication, deglutition, digestion, chylification, sanguification, respiration, circulation, assimilation, and a great number of secondary and auxiliary functions, as the secre- tion of bile, of pancreatic juice, of urine, &c. Even the particular functions which aid in reproducing the organization, as intus-sus- ception, digestion, respiration, circulation, &c. are performed by a greater or less quantity of apparatus. Yet in the most complex, as in the most simple animals, the end is the same, viz, the pre- servation of the individual. Animal life is also very simple in the most inferior classes of living beings. It begins with the sense of feeling, is complicated by the addition of taste, smell, hearing, and seeing; by various instincts or propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties; and, finally, attains its utmost complexity in man; he alone unites all the faculties which are dispersed among different animals; and, farther, is endowed with several in peculiar. The faculties of man, then, are multiplied. Let us now examine whether there be any sub- ordination among them or not; let us see if they be all equally important. Neither in vegetative nor in animal life is every function of like excellence. Mastication, and the mixture of saliva with the food, are less important than digestion, circulation, and assimilation. The secretion of certain glands is less necesssary than respiration, &c. The same law holds in animal life. Of the external senses, every one would rather lose the sense of smell than of sight. ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 131 Who would not rather give up some talent, as drawing, music, painting, than the faculty of reflection and reason? Every one is offended if we call him stupid; not if we say that he wants such or such a talent. If we farther examine the influence of different faculties of animal life upon the happiness and preservation of man- kind, we shall be convinced that several are much more important than others. The love of approbation is of far less consequence than benevolence ; the Christian religion, indeed, ranks charity above all the other virtues. It must, therefore, be granted that the faculties of animal life are important in different degrees. A great line of distinction between them may at once be drawn by sep- arating such as are common to animals and man, from such as are proper to man. A double nature of man was long ago remarked, and has been designated by different expressions; as the flesh and the spirit; the animal and the man, or the carnal and spiritual part of man. Now, are the faculties common to animals and man, or those proper to humanity, to have the superiority ? • The answer is obvious. The general law of nature is, that inferior are subordi- nate to superior faculties. Physical are subject to chemical laws ; gravity, for instance, is modified by chemical affinity: the particles of a salt attract each other in opposition to their gravity, and form crystals. Again, physical and chemical laws, though existing in organic beings, are modified by those of organization. Plants do not increase by juxtaposition; nor do they assimilate mere homo- geneous substances. In the muscular and circulatory systems, the physical laws of motion and hydraulics are preserved, but they are influenced by the laws of life. Chemical laws remain in diges- tion, but swayed by organic laws. Physical, chemical, and vege- tative laws exist in living creatures, but modified by those of phre- nic life. Animals take food, so do plants; but animals choose it, guided by the sense of taste. Plants propagate their species auto- matically ; animals feel a propensity to do so. The propensities, sen- timents, and intellectual faculties of animals, consequently modify the properties of their organization extremely. 132 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. " The same principle must be applied in regard to the distinguish ing part of human nature: all inferior laws, physical, chemical, or- ganic, and animal, are subordinate to those of the peculiarly human faculties. These, therefore, compose the moral character of man. Thus, as the faculties are not equally important, and as some must be subordinate to others, I divide them, in relation to actions, into three orders: one excites man and animals to determinate actions, as hunger, physical love, the propensity to fight, to build, to gather provision, &c; I style these faculties of action; another, because they assist and modify those of the first kind, I call auxiliary; and another, which ought to direct, I term directing faculties. The faculties proper to man are obviously superior to those common to him and animals, since, by means of his peculiar nature he is master of all that breathes, and, therefore, ought to be master of his own animal nature also. 1, consequently, lay down the fol- lowing principle:—The faculties proper to man constitute his mo- ral nature and his absolute conscience, that is, all actions conform- able to them ar« absolutely good. And now liberty assumes the character of morality, if the will produce actions flowing from mo- tives which are proper to man. Man, then, has not only the largest share of liberty, from his superior will and great number of motives, but he alone possesses moral liberty. The feeling of conscientious- ness is to morality, that which will or the perceptive and reflective faculties are to liberty. As long as actions spring from motives common to man and animals, they are not primitively moral, though they may be conformable to morality. Inferior motives, however, must still be employed in guiding mankind, and must frequently supply the place of such as are moral. We even see that purely moral motives have but little influence in the world. Extent of Morality. In regard to morality, an important question concerns its extent. Is man the only aim of the terrestrial creation, that is, is all the rest made for him? An affirmative answer can only be the result of too ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 133 much self-esteem;—the contrary seems evident, since nature pro- duces poisons for man as well as for other animals. Geology also proves that many beings existed before man. It is however a nat- ural law that superior employ inferior beings to their advantage; and in consequence of his superiority, man, as he is their master, may make use of all the other creatures upon earth. Still this does not prove that every thing exists merely for the sake of man. The human kind may govern all animals, but it has also certain duties towards them, and I cannot believe that man has any right to tor- ment animals for his gratification or amusement. Benevolence and reverence are essential qualities of human na- ture, and man's duties towards his like form the principal object of morality. It is commonly stated that he is created to be happy. This proposition, however, is vague, and individual happiness is too often confounded with the general weal: the former results from the satisfaction of the faculties each person is more particularly endowed with, but it varies, since individual gifts differ widely ; hence it can never become the universal standard of moral actions: actions which are evidently bad may be accompanied with pleasure. Mere pleasure, therefore, is not the aim of man's existence any more than individual happiness; these, indeed, are synonymous expressions. I am of opinion, that the Creator viewed general happiness as superior to that of individuals, and that he intended to produce the second by the first. All nature seems to prove this idea. In considering the immense system of the celestial bodies, it is probable that the earth might rather perish than the universe be destroyed. Geology teaches that our globe has continued to exist while many kinds of animals have disappeared from its surface. Species are preserved while individuals die. The totality of living bodies exists, but particular parts perish. Again, nature has estab- lished a law of violent death, and of the sacrifice of individuals for the sake of general preservation. All animate beings exist at the expense of each other, and all are thereby preserved. Man makes no exception from this general arrangement, and it 134 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. is, therefore, quite certain that the happiness of all mankind is pre- ferable to that of nations ; this to that of families, and this again to that of individuals. Personal interests, it is allowed, must be neg- lected sooner than those of our country, or than family affections. But the same reasons that lead to this conclusion, prove also that the species is more worthy of our love than our native country. The superiority of general happiness is also confirmed by the essential difference of the two natures of man. The greater num- ber of animals find their enjoyments in selfishness ; some, however, live in society, are attached to each other, and feel a kind of love for the country of their birth ; but man alone is susceptible of ex- ercising good-will towards the whole of his own species, and every other being of creation. I am confirmed in my opinion, that gen- eral happiness is the aim of man's existence, since I see the truth of what afflicts many amiable minds, that the just perishes in his righteousness, while the unjust prospers in his wickedness. This happens under the government of the animal nature, which feels no pleasure in general happiness, nor pain in the commission of injus- tice. It shows the predominance of the animal nature, but is it not probable that the Creator intended the satisfaction of those faculties which are proper to man as well as of those he holds in common with the brutes ? There can be no doubt he did. I think that both natures are to be gratified, that no faculty is made in vain, and that all that stamps superiority upon man is not bestowed merely to make him unhappy. Now, as the more noble powers are not satisfied in the actual state of things, religious people hope that they will be ministered to in another life, and this is considered as a conclusive argument in favor of the immortality of the soul. As the peculiarly human nature, however, is preferable to the animal, it must follow that even in this life, its satisfaction is supe- rior to that of the other. I entertain this opinion the rather be- cause the animal part may be satisfied under the dominion of the human, which leads to the recognition of duty universally ; while the brute nature has no feelings of obligation, and looks for mere selfish enjoyments. Wieland, in his Agathon, expresses this idea ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 135 almost in phrenological terms, yet it must be understood that he considered the mind as free and in conflict with the senses. He calls the mind the spiritual part, and the senses the animal part of man. In order to render man that which nature intended him to be, says he, the harmony of these two natures must be preserved. 'If this harmony,' continues he, 'is possible, it can be effected only by the subjection of the animal part to the spiritual, the intel- ligent and the free. This subjection is the more reasonable, for the animal part incurs no danger from the sway of the spiritual, and has no reason to dread any denial of its legitimate enjoyments, since the former knows too well what is necessary for the common good of the whole man to refuse to the animal portion what is necessary to its existence and its welfare. But the animal part knows nothing of the wants of the spiritual, cares not about its own restless struggles against every attempt at control, and the instant that reason slumbers or slips its bridle, it assumes an arbitrary supremacy of which the destruction of the whole internal economy of our nature is the inevitable consequence. Thus, I do not believe that in the eye of God, the unjust who thrives is worth the just who perishes ; I rank the unjust among animals; like them he is pleased with what flatters himself alone; he is even more dangerous than they, on account of his superior understanding. The proposition (it is one which troubles many minds)—moral errors are unavoidably punished in this life—finds it solution also, in the superiority of general happiness. The strong and able-bod- ied man may not seem to suffer from excesses and sensuality ; but his descendants have often to pay the penalty. The love of do- mination is ministered to by the ignorance and servility of nations ; these, however* must bear its blighting influence. He who begins by subjecting his countrymen to his will, and finishes by aiming at the empire of the world, must injure, and make thousands and mil- lions wretched. The few who amass riches do so at the expense of the many who remain poor, and so on. Thus the evil which results from any infraction of the natural laws, is not always felt by 136 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. him who is its first cause ; it is, however, certainly experienced sooner or later. Finally, as I perceive that, in the kingdom of justice, and of general happiness, the individual is never forgotten, whilst individ- uals enjoying happiness so easily forget their neighbors, and the general weal, I most anxiously wish the kingdom of individual hap- piness at an end. Thus, general happiness appears to me the principal aim of phrenic life, as the preservation of the species is the chief end of vegetative life. General happiness is the touchstone for all nat- ural morality, for all social institutions, and for all the actions of man. Every deed which favors the general weal is good, and the more this is opposed the worse is the act. Here we may ask, whether there are certain races of men in civilized society, or certain classes, who deserve the lot of mere animals ? These, on account of their inferiority, are employed by man for his pleasures and purposes ; are the highly gifted among the human kind also permitted to use for their advantage those who are less favored by nature ? Or, are there individuals who may arrogate privileges, and claim immunities ? To reply in the affirmative would be against natural morality. This declares God to be the impartial parent of all, and permits man only to do good to his fellow man ; it does not exclude the agency of self-love, but makes it, along with all other faculties common to man and animals, subordinate to those proper to man. Indeed, I know of nothing more important than it is, to prove the existence of natural morality, and to specify its laws. For, as mankind must be governed, a true legislation is extremely desira- ble. Both religious and civil regimens have done immense injury to mankind, and this in proportion as the inferior faculties, such as self-love, love of approbation, courage, destructiveness, and even attachment and circumspection, have dictated their positive laws. The animal is the enemy of man, it justifies absolute power, the right of the strongest, the spirit of party and of sect, national pride ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 137 and hatred, and every kind of personal design. It looks only for convenience. Religion itself is employed as a tool in its purposes The misery of man will certainly endure so long as the faculties common to him and animals determine.that which is to be done or omitted. Attempts have been made, with more or less success, to im- prove legislation, but all the means have been derived from inferior faculties. Evils, therefore, may have been mitigated, but thev could not be entirely abolished. Final success depends altogether on the sacrifice of personal interest, or of individual to general happiness. The universality and constancy of the natural laws deserve a particular attention. Their basis is the same, at all times and in all countries ; they are independent of personal and of local cir- cumstances. Were it not presumptuous, even absurd, in natural- ists to endeavor to create physical and chemical laws, and in gardeners to change the laws of vegetation ? Those who breed and rear animals must treat them according to their nature ; they will never feed parrots with bitter almonds or parsley. The organiza- tion of man is also allowed to be subject to natural laws, though several are unknown or neglected in social life. That the five senses, in their healthy state, propagate external impressions according to determinate laws, is farther, admitted. No one can see as great that which is small; taste as sweet that which is sour; nor see as blue that which is scarlet. Without perfect regularity in the functions of the senses, it were altogether impos- sible to acquire any positive knowledge of the physical qualities of external objects. Now, why should not the same determinateness pervade the affective and intellectual faculties ? It is, indeed, commonly admit- ted in as far as the intellectual operations are concerned. The principles of the arts and sciences are always pointed out. Who doubts of the mechanical laws ? They are the same now as they were in ancient times. The mechanician never attempts to warp or change them in constructing machines ; in inventing, he only VOL. II. 18 138 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. makes new applications of laws that are invariable. Mathematical laws, also, have not changed with ages; every mathematician, whether aware of them or not, applies them in his calculations. A great musical genius produces harmonious tones, and a great painter agreement of colors, according to natural principles, and without previous study. The laws of all arts exist in nature, and are only discovered, not created. A deep thinker needs no logical precepts to enable him to perceive sound' from false reasoning. Thus the intellectual operations of the mind are governed by natu- ral laws, which can neither be changed by revelation nor by human enactments, neither by praying, by fasting, nor by offerings. They who are born gifted with great talents discover the laws of their faculties, make these known to the less favored in capacities, who then learn and apply them in their mental operations. In the same way, they whose peculiarly human faculties hold such as are common to man and animals in subordination, act in a moral way without precept, and even with pleasure; nay, if con- strained to do evil, they would feel positive pain, precisely as does the great musician from bad music. Moral precepts are necessary to those only who do not possess them in their interior. Now, as the Creator has provided for physical and moral laws, when will man cease to invent laws, and begin to study those the Creator has traced for his guidance ? And when will he be wise enough to submit to them ? Existence of Evil. The natural law of the subordination of the faculties leads us im- mediately to consider moral evil. The first step is to inquire whether evil exists or not. Having settled this point, I shall then examine its origin. Two kinds of evil are commonly spoken of; the one physical, the other moral. There is an evident opposition throughout all nature. Earth, water, and air, present a perpetual scene of de- struction and reproduction, of pain and pleasure. And even as ON THE MOKAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 139 temporal good is often distributed unequally and without personal desert, so physical evil is frequently inflicted without any fault on the part of the sufferer, and this both among animals and the hu- man kind. Why should domestic animals so often be ill fed and harshly treated in reward for their services ? Why should all suffer by contagious diseases ? Wherefore must the children begotten in debauchery, expiate the sins of their parents ? Why, when the hail-storm ravages the wide-spread harvest of the indolent and rich man, does it not spare the little garden of the laborious poor ? Such melancholy queries have been put at all times. The Preach- er says, ' There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wicked- ness.'* ' All things,' says he, ' come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked ; to the good, and to the clean, and to the unclean ; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificed! not: as is the good, so is the sinner ; and he that swear- eth, as he that feareth an oath. This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun, that there is one event unto all : yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the dead.'f In another passage he continues : ' I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understand- ing, nor yet favor to men of skill: but time and chance happeneth to them all.'| Physical evil, indeed, does not merely exist, it even invades all according to the established laws of creation. Moral, no less than physical evil, occurs in the world. Even in thinking himself abased by his wickedness and imperfection, man must acknowledge its existence. Moses said, ' God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every im- agination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.' || David thought, that ' there is none that doeth good, no not one.' § The Psalmist said, ' the wicked man delights in blood.' Christ • Eccles. vii. 15. f lb. ix. 2, 3. J Eccles. ix. 11,12 || Gen. vi. 5. § psalm xiv. 3. 140 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. taught, that 'out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witnessing, blasphemies.' * St. Paul speaks of men, ' being filled with all unrighteousness, fornica- tion, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, envy, murder, de- bate, deceit, malignity; and of whisperers, backbiters, haters of God despiteful, proud, boastful, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.' Moral, as well as physical evil, then, has always existed, and the time when it will be rooted out seems yet to be far off. Origin of Evil. The origin of evil has been a fertile subject of discussion. Evil seemed incompatible with a perfect Creator. The notion 01 a malevolent principle, therefore, came to be entertained. This still prevails among those who, personifying evil, speak of a devil. To explain the existence of evil, however, is a simple and easy task. It is only necessary to know that all natural phenomena depend on certain conditions or circumstances; that things are in relation to each other, and that these relations generally are gov- erned by fixed laws. Now, as soon as the conditions are want- ing or their laws violated, proper effects are not elicited, and evil results. In the inanimate as well as in the animated world, the natural laws must be rigorously followed. The chemist must obey the laws of chemistry to produce crystals ; plants grow well if they be cultivated according to their habits and wants,—it matters not whether the cultivators be Roman Catholics or Heretics, Jews or Mussulmans. Man enjoys good health or suffers from infirmity, in proportion as he attends to or neglects the laws of his vegetative functions. Neither prayers, nor offerings, nor any other religious ceremony whatever, suspend these natural laws ; their execution * Matt. xv. 19. ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 141 is invariably and without distinction rewarded, and their neglect indiscriminately and regularly punished. The infidel who lives moderately and observes all the dietetic rules, has always better health than the orthodox believer who neglects the natural laws of his organization, but prays loudly for soundness of body. The former, if he practice the laws of hereditary descent, will have children preferable to those of the pious man who chooses his wife for her wealth or mere exterior beauty. I suppose, that one with- out religious faith, even an atheist, submits to the natural laws of the vegetative functions ; that he avoids all noxious influences, is laborious, industrious, and regular in his business, while another is very religious in the common acceptation, sings, prays, fasts, eats no meat on Fridays, recommends his soul to God, &c, but, at the same time, is lazy, intemperate, disorderly in his business ; and I ask, of these two, whose condition in life will be the most flourishing ? Thus, physical evil results from the infraction of the physical laws, and moral evil from the infraction of the moral laws of creation. I pass over in silence the opinion which recognises two creative principles—one good and another bad. Neither do I speak of ori- ginal sin in the first man, nor of the origin of evil in admitting free- will ; for, in this latter I find no explanation of its existence. It is true, that without liberty there can be no guilt; but its admis- sion gives no idea of the origin of evil. For as soon as free-will is spoken of, good and evil are supposed : or to what purpose is free-will, were there not two different things, good and evil, be- tween which the free agent may choose ? It is said, that man abuses his liberty; but by what motive does he so, if there be not something within which provokes him to act badly ? Bishop Butler* made the same remark. His words are : ' To say that the fact that creatures, made upright, fall, is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more than that an event's actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of its happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of par- * Analogy of Religion, Part I. Ch. V. 142 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. ticular propensions.' Liberty is neither sufficient to explain the nature nor the origin of moral evil. Are there any bad faculties ? Dr. Gall is disposed to admit , wicked propensities. He says, that man must submit to the laws of creation in regard to moral as in regard to physical evil; that no one can say he is without temptations ; and that all thoughts and inclinations are not innocent or virtuous. He even thinks that moral evil enters into the plan of the Creator. If he say, however, that excessive activity of certain faculties produces illegal actions or moral evil, morality is not yet proved as a natural science; it is at most conventional. I am intimately convinced that no faculty in itself can be bad, and that all the in- nate powers of man have some aim, that every one is necessary; that none leads inevitably to evil; but that each may produce abuses. The faculties are no more bad than any other entity in nature. I think with Philo the Jew, Eusebius,* and St. Augus- tine, that nothing—fire, water, iron, &c, is bad in itself, or a cause of evil; with Augustine f in particular, that evil is not a sub- stance, and that abuses only are ills. I consider no power in it- self as either good or bad. These appellations are applicable to actions alone. I therefore say of every faculty, what the Apostle Paul said to the Romans:+ ' as you have yielded your members servants to uncleanness and to iniquity ; even so now yield your members, servants to righteousness, unto holiness.'—Christianity in speaking of evil propensities, means irregular actions of the feelings, but not the primitive feelings themselves. Evil results only from infringing the natural laws of morality, dictated by the faculties proper to man. The faculties common to man and brutes act in animals in the same way as in man; but they are never said to sin or commit a crime; which by the by is a new proof that liberty has not produced moral evil, for animals modify their con- duct and suppress various instincts by other motives; but none of their actions can be considered in relation to morality.—The phi- losophers who maintain man to be born good or bad, are not ac- * Prsepar. Evang. Lib. vii. n. 22. t Lib. de Vera Religione, c. 20. t vi. 19- OJN THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 143 quainted with the fundamental powers of the mind and with their mutual relations. This knowledge alone satisfactorily explains the nature and origin of evil. Practical reflection. I firmly believe that it is under the government of the natural laws alone- that mankind will ever and can ever become one fami- ly ; these, however, are still very obscure. I have published a catechism on them, but it will be long before they can be gener- ally understood and applied in practical life. Mankind is- not prepared to submit to the precepts of natural morality. The spirit of selfishness, ignorance and superstition—these natural enemies of truth—are still too powerful. Yet the only remark to be made is, that the laws of the Creator are invariable and indispensable to the happiness of man ; that he must submit to them or suffer, and without submission the common weal is impossible ; that all par- tial views must disappear ; finally, that arbitrary regulations may last years, and centuries, but must come to an end at last, while the empire of Creation will endure as long as the human kind remains. Comparison of natural morality with the Christian morality. The preceding considerations on natural religion and morality may, I fear, offend the timorous ; if they sincerely love truth, however, they may be easy and remain quiet. For if we admit that the author of the universe and the God who gave us a revela- tion are one and the same Supreme Being, we must also allow that the revelation made in time cannot be at variance with the laws of creation, otherwise God would have been in contradiction with himself. An impostor, like Mahomet, changes his decrees as con- venience requires, or as caprice impels ; but reason will never ad- mit contradictions in a Divine legislation. To conceive revelation in opposition to natural laws, is either to prove it false, or advance that the Creator of all things is not the God who revealed the law 144 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. or that Supreme intelligence may change its decrees, endow man with natural faculties, and then command these to cease entirely from acting, or to act in opposition to their nature. I am of their opinion who think that the Christian morality is the same as the morality of nature, and that its revealed law is merely a repetition in positive terms of the natural law. They differ only in the man- ner of being communicated, the one being the internal, the other the external revelation of the same unchangeable Being,, who is the same at all times, infinitely wise and good. With this view present, we conceive why the master of Christianity said, ' that light is made to give light,' and why he several times spoke of the things as they were from the beginning of the creation and ought to be such. I hope the time will come when Christianity will be purged of all paganism and superstition. The purity and excellence of its moral precepts, indeed, will be more justly appreciated as human nature is better understood, and the superior feelings become more en- ergetic. Then it will be admitted that the design of Christianity is rational, and free from the load of superstition which had been mix- ed with the law of the Creator. The corner-stone of any religious system is certainly its morality, and the ideas which it inculcates respecting purity and impurity of character, merit or demerit, innocence or guilt. There can be no better standard of refined notions of an all-perfect Being, and no worship more acceptable to the Almighty, than practices which ren- der a man respectable and useful as a human being; than righteous- ness, reverence, beneficence, self-command and wisdom. Chris- tian morality, like that of nature, is reduced to a few principles which are simple, invariable, and applicable in all situations, and under all circumstances. It considers our duties, towards God and our duties towards our like. The former are called love of God, the latter love of our neighbor. The meaning of the particular precepts of Christianity still gives rise to many discussions. Various interpretations have been dis- seminated, and even absurdities been substituted, for the wise regulations of the Gospel. It was, therefore, a point of some im ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 145 portance to prevent man from reading and reflecting on the scrip- tures. The result, however, has been, that the Gospel legislation has fallen into discredit; for the arbitrary interpretations of individ- uals have been confounded with its primitive laws. Every friend of humanity must grieve to see absurdities put into the mouth of the Supreme Being. Were merely rational interpretations of scripture given, there would be less cause to complain of the general want of religious and moral feelings. The human understanding is too much enlightened now to be satisfied with superstitious doctrines, which are useless both to God and to man. Rational and salutary precepts cannot and will not be rejected. Let us proceed then, and consider some of the leading points of Christian morality, which surpasses, in perfection, all other moral codes of civil legislation. Jesus reduced his moral doctrine to two grand heads: the love of God, and the love of our neighbor. ' On these two command- ments/ says he,* ' hang all the law and the prophets.' It is there- fore most desirable to understand their meaning, but I apprehend it is little the case. The first admits the existence of a God, the Creator of all. Be- sides, it commands respect towards him, and obedience to his will. ' Thy kingdom come,' says Christ,f ' thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.' ' This is the love of God,' says St. John,:}: ' that we keep his commandments.' The human understanding cannot but look for the workman, or cause of all that exists. By his powers of reasoning, man arrives at a first cause, which, being personified, is styled God. The Gospel inculcates the same idea. St. Paul says: § ' Every house is builded by some man; but he that built all things is God.' Reason farther judges of the qualities of God according to his works. ' The invisible things of God,' says St. Paul also,|| ' from the creation of the world are clearly seen ; being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.' The attributes which man ascribes to the supreme Ruler are of the * Matt. xxii. 40. t Matt. vi. 10. % 1st John, v. 3. § Heb. iii. 4. || Rom. i. 20. VOL. II. 19 146 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. greatest importance, since man feels disposed to imitate them. Farther, the will of the father depends on his nature. It is therefore not indifferent to demonise, anthropomorphise or divinise the god- head; and to understand the nature and extent of his will. It is exceedingly important to be convinced that the natural laws are the will of God. Jesus makes a distinction between things as they were from the beginning of the creation, and the legislation of Moses. * He speaks of things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world, f and of things which his apostles could not bear.J The Creator, or God, and Revealer, must be the same, and cannot be in contradiction with each other. The first great commandment of Christ, is not, I think, sufficiently understood; it has, indeed, been abused in the most detesta- ble manner. Arbitrary, contradictory, and absurd interpretations were imposed in the name of God; and dissension was, therefore, unavoidable. Those who governed found it convenient to gratify their pride and selfishness, by interdicting reflection, and by com- manding blind obedience and prostration of the understanding. Such a proceeding is common to priestcraft of all ages. This was and is an excellent means of securing themselves in personal enjoyments, of concealing selfish intentions, and of enfor- cing conviction of their infallibility; but it does not prove that the Gospel prohibits us from reasoning, from examining, from believ- ing that which is true, or rejecting that which is palpably false and absurd. In my opinion, those who think force lawful for the sup- port of any opinion, civil or religious, that cannot be supported by reason, and has no relation to the common welfare, may think every untruth lawful, especially when the temporal interest of the deceiv- ers is joined with the eternal interest of the deceived. Jesus said, many times, 'Let them hear, who have ears to hear.' 'Are ye also,' said he to his disciples, § 'yet without understanding?' ' I speak as to wise men,' says St. Paul to the Corinthians; || 'judge ye what I say.' ' Prove all things,' says the same apostle to the * Matt. xix. 8. t Matt. xiii. 35. t John xvi. 12. § Matt. xv. 16. || 1st Cor. x. 15. ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 147 Thessalonians,* ' and hold fast that which is good.' ' Beloved,' says St. John, ' believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God.'f Thus, I believe that all natural laws of the vegetative functions, of intelligence, and of morality, are part of the will of God. If we submit to them, their influence will be more marked and more sal- utary than any adherence to arbitrary regulations. Man ought to know that he can create nothing, but that he has understanding to recognise whatever is, and the conditions under which it is. He may only imitate the proceeding of nature, that is, obey the will of the Creator, to elicit what is for his good. ' The Son of God can do nothing, if he have not seen it done by the Father,' said Jesus. The first commandment of Christianity embraces all kinds of truth, and ought never to be lost sight of; it explains every thing as happening by the will of God. Fire burns, water extinguishes fire; hemlock kills man, and nourishes the goat; fertile countries, when well cultivated, yield abundant harvests ; industrious and or- derly individuals and nations prosper; intemperate persons ruin their health; ignorance commits errors, intelligence avoids them; the animal part of man looks for selfish and lowly gratifications ; the peculiarly human nature finds satisfaction amid the joys of general happiness; and all this occurs by the will of God. Let us then admit it as the will of God also, that the faculties proper to man are to be the sole guides of human actions. In examining natural morality, we have seen that we can do nothing to advantage the Supreme Being; that our relations with him consist in respect for, and submission to, his will. Hence, that true religion is summed up in the fulfilment of our duties to ourselves, to our like, and to the other beings that taste along with us the sweets of existence, and in relating all our duties to the will of the Creator. The worship prescribed by Christianity is also reasonable and spiritual; it consists not in what we are to eat or drink, nor in any dif- ference to be made between the days lent us to enjoy. The Sab- * 1st Thess. v. 21. 11st John, iv. 1. 148 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. bath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.* ' The hour comes, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth.'f ' God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwells not in temples made with hands, neither is he worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed any thing; he who gives to all life, and breath, and all things.'J 'When ye pray, use not vain repetitions as the heathen do ; for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking.'§ Finally, prayers are heard only, if they be conformable to the will of God, and supported by our submission to the laws of the Creator. Under the guidance and fulfilment of the natural laws alone, mankind can become happy; and in neglecting them, all prayers will be in vain. Thus, the first great commandment of Christianity is perfectly agreeable to the experience of all times, and is the basis of all positive regulations ; it embraces all natural laws and even includes the second commandment of Christianity. This, however, on account of its importance, has been announced separately ; it is: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself This precept is very simple; but, like the first, has not escaped manifold abuses. It has always been, and is still eluded by va- rious interpretations. A great number flatter themselves that they are Christians, without ever expending a thought on the happiness of their neighbors ; some are not ashamed to bear the name of Christians though they think all the inhabitants of a country and the country itself made for them. The first absolute king who pretended to be a Christian was a curse to Christianity. On the other hand, in combining the second precept with several pas- sages of the Gospel, some have discussed the question whether Christianity abolishes private property and establishes community of goods or not ? The early Christians made a trial of a true commonwealth; several religious orders or monasteries did the same ; but experience has shown that mankind is not yet in a con- dition to live in such a state of purity. Nevertheless, it is cer- • Mark ii. 27. t John iv. 24,52. $ Acts xvii. 24, 25. § Matt. vi. 7 ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 149 tain, that if the second commandment were fulfilled, there would be no peculiar property. To this may be started the objection of there being a fundamen- tal feeling in which inheres the desire to acquire, a feeling very active in animals and in man. Now, Christianity opposes no nat- ural disposition ; on the contrary, it commands acknowledgment of the natural order, and, indeed, is declared to be destined to re- establish things as they were from the beginning of the creation. The propensity to acquire certainly exists in man as well as in ani- mals; man is also influenced by attachment to his family and coun- try, and both of these feelings are powerful motives to action; yet they also give rise to many disorders, and occasion a great deal of mischief. They are not interdicted by the second precept of Chris- tianity, but they are placed under the dominion of a superior sen- timent, which desires general happiness, and places the well-being of others on a level with our own, our family's, and our country's. Christianity consequently commands, ' Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.'* As well as nature, Christianity proclaims original differences among men. It allows that some are more, others less, talented; but it makes each an- swerable only for the gifts he has received; commanding that those who have received much, give much; that is, contribute largely to the general happiness. Thus, true Christians form a separate society; they receive among them none who are profligate, selfish, ambitious, or who are governed by inferior faculties; but only those who find pleasure in the satisfaction of their peculiarly hu- man powers. They scout idleness with its attendant vices from among them. They have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office ;f there are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit; and the manifestation of the spirit is given to every one to profit withal.t. In short, they consider as brothers and sisters those only who do the will of God; who love each other as themselves. * Matt. vii. 12. t Rom. xii. 4. t 1 Cor. xii. 7. 150 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. The accomplishment of this precept is extremely difficult, but it is essential to see that it is indispensable to the constitution of a Christian. To maintain that it is not, is to be deceived, or to be a hypocrite. Jesus constantly admonished his disciples to love one another.* ' By this shall all men know that ye are my disci- ples, if ye have love one for another.'f Many flatter themselves with being Christians, when they say that they believe in the divinity of Jesus, in his mission and miraculous actions; and all the while neglect the moral principles he inculcated. Jesus, however, has loudly declared, that practice of his commandments is indispensable, in order to enter into the kingdom of God. St.r Paul says, | ' The kingdom of God is not in word, but in power.' And St. James<§> is very clear in writing: 'What does it profit my brethren, though a man say he hath faith and have not works? Can faith save him:—as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also.' It is, indeed, scarcely possible to find a true Christian; but the unbeliever who deems Christian morality merely fanciful, is more excusable than those who call themselves its disciples, but suit Christianity to their own tastes. Such conduct has done incal- culable injury to mankind, and by spreading abroad false concep- tions of its nature, has greatly lowered the Christian system of morality in general estimation. The second precept of Christianity is, therefore, also conform-. able to natural morality, or to the faculties proper to man. For these look for general happiness, and are satisfied with neighborly love, without any regard to personal distinctions. The third precept of Christian morality concerns its propaga- tion. Jesus commands his disciples to preach his doctrine as preferable to all other systems of morality ; to be indulgent and forbearing ; to give freely, as they have freely received ; || and to pardon faults and errors, provided they be corrected. He who does not act according to the law is to be excluded from their * John xv. 12. § ii. 14. 26. t John xiii. 35. || Matt. x. 8. t 1 Cor. iv. 20. ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN 151 society ; excommunication, therefore, is the severest punishment it admits. How lamentable it is that these sublime principles of morality have been so dreadfully disfigured, as now not to be recognisa- ble in social intercourse! Understanding has, from time to time, endeavored to oppose arbitrary interpretations, and hence divi- sions arose. Unfortunately, and in direct contradiction to the mild spirit of Christianity, unbelievers in its doctrines have been persecuted. This was the most certain means of confirming dis- sensions, and is the more to be regretted, as these have always been based upon secondary things, which in themselves never had and never wili have any influence on mankind. By degrees the essential was distinguished from the indifferent portion, and in several countries men are now permitted to do whatever they think agreeable to God, provided it do not trouble the order of society. Civil governments are at present superior to the priest- hood in wisdom. They allow people to believe that God is fond of perfumes, of music, and of various ceremonies, and they tole- rate those who show their love of God by fulfilling their social duties, by esteeming every day alike, and saying with St. Paul, * ' the kingdom of God is not meat and drink.' Let us hope that religious toleration will become general, and that the aim may be no longer confounded with the means: the aim must be the same every where and at all times ; the means must vary according to the natural dispositions of individuals, to the education they have received, and to the circumstances in which they are placed, but still be dictated by the faculties proper to man. Let us hope that the maxim, that no man ought to suffer in his person, property or reputation for his opinion in matters of mere supernatural doctrines, will be established in every enlightened nation. It is indispensable to obey the will of God, but it is by no « means likely that he is pleased with the errors of his creatures, or that he leads them into temptation by trifling and insignificant commandments. It is evident that they are not arrived at refined * Rom. xiv. 17. 152 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. notions of a Supreme Intelligence, who lay the greatest possible stress upon the necessity of a belief in Mahomet's pretended mis- sion; who consider all other virtues as useless if this single point of the prophet's divine appointment be not instantly present to the mind of the aspirant to eternal life. This doctrine, however, prevails throughout the Coran. Farther, Mahomet establishes a scale of meritorious actions in which idle, ridiculous, useless and sometimes mischievous observances occupy the chief place, while many useful and virtuous actions are passed over as unimportant. —May a similar reproach not be made to various creeds among Christians? Is it not rather probable that God has given to man, and identi- fied with his being, such laws as are necessary to his happiness? Surely it is. They, therefore, who call themselves the ministers of God, ought to make it a principal business to study his will, es- pecially the laws of nature, and to consider it an imperious duty to teach these, and by submission to them, to give an example of belief in their truth and excellence. On the other hand, those who understand the natural morality of man, will approve of several propositions of Christianity, which are sometimes declared to be unnatural and absurd. These they will consider as inherent in man, noble in their application, bene- ficial in their effects, and conformable to the law of nature. They will allow that all the faculties common to man and animals are to be subjected to those proper to man. There are three kinds of positive legislation which I shall call to mind in the order of their imperfection or excellence. In the first, there are only absolute masters, who arbitrarily determine what is to be done or omitted, whose pleasure, in fine, is the only reason of their regulations. This administration is the morality of the strongest; it prevails among barbarous nations, and may, in the 19th century, come to an end among the civilized nations of Europe. The second, which prevails among civilized nations, rejects the right of the strongest, and all sorts of privileges. The animal faculties, however, are permitted full scope for their activity, but without having power ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN 153 to constrain other persons to minister to their desires. This morality abolishes slavery, the rights of feudality, respects prop- erty, and allows every one to exert his faculties for his own advan- tage, under the sole restriction, not to take aught that belongs to others. It commands us not to do to others what we would not that they do to us. Thus, the inferior animal faculties still dictate the law, though they are limited by those which are proper to man. Many are susceptible of living under the reign of this degree of moral perfection, civil and religious liberty. Their selfishness opposes the grant of monopoly and privileges to others, and their moral feelings reject them as unjust. The desire to acquire, and attachment, that is, commerce and exclusionary patriotism, here exert a very great influence. Nations, therefore, thus far advanc- ed, are united and powerful, and defend their situation vigorously. They use every effort to advantage their community; but, besides, every one lives for himself, brings up his children for his private ends, and uses all his energies to increase his wealth. The third, and most perfect legislation, results from the supre- macy of the peculiarly human nature. The faculties proper to man guide the aim of everyr action ; all are therefore directed to- wards the universal good. The animal nature becomes a mere auxiliary to this end. Commercial liberty is introduced, national pride and prejudices cease, and nations are allied. Natural mo- rality even here differs in nothing from that of Christianity. Uni- versal charity and love of truth prevail. He who does the will of the Creator, prospers. There is no distinction of person. Eve- ry one does to others what he wishes to be done by them. In this way we understand Jesus when he desires his disciples to abandon their wives and children rather than the doctrine he teaches; he only places man above animals. He does not com- mand abandonment of wives and children, if they love each other as themselves, but of those only who do not the will of God. Animals love their offspring, but parental love is certainly inferior to the love of mankind. Jesus therefore acknowledges as moth- er, brother, or sister, those only who love their neighbors as vol. ii. 20 154 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. themselves.* He wished man to be and to act according to the faculties proper to human nature. If this were so, all would work with pleasure for the common happiness ; those who engaged with °reat talents, would require the same recompense as those who were industrious with slender endowments; private propeity would be at an end, and general peace would reign on earth. Jesus felt that his doctrine was too difficult for man as he is, but he supported bis superiority by its salutary effects and by experience, which shows that it is perfect. Nations may prepare themselves for such a kingdom of love ; but Jesus himself did not rely on this motive alone ; he attended also to the motives of reward and pun- ishment. Moreover he was prepared for the disputes his teaching occasioned. Whoever proposes a new doctrine brings forth an object of difference. Now the moral principles of Jesus being es- pecially opposed to riches and worldly distinctions, to that, there- fore, which man desires most eagerly, necessarily excited adversa- ries and caused persecutions. He came not on purpose to excite dissensions between brothers, relations, or man and man ; but he knew that dissensions were unavoidable in the natural order of things. Now let every one judge for himself, whether it were better to live quietly in error and in injustice, than to suffer and struggle for truth and general happiness. Thus, my conviction is, that the moral precepts of Christianity are those of the Creator. I cannot, however, believe that such a pure system of morality will be easily, or soon adopted. But this can take nothing away from its perfection. It will ever remain the object all regulations ought to have in view, for its reception is the indispensable condition to universal peace. In my work on Edu- cation, I speak of what will avail in procuring the conditions under which man can receive this moral doctrine. Meanwhile, it is certain that they only usurp the name of Christians, who by their enactments prove that their sole aim is individual happiness ; or. who strive after riches and worldly distinctions, and other advance- ment of their merely private estates ; or, who live at the expense * Mark iii. 35. ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 155 of others ; or, finally, who are apt enough to laud, but ever ready to act in contradiction to the precepts of Christianity. It is, indeed, blasphemous to bear the title of Christian without acting up to the sacred duties it requires. Let us, therefore, in acknowledg- ing the purity of Christian morality, put it in practice, before we dare to arrogate the noble name of Christians. Natural goodness of man. There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of moral evil in the world. Man, it is also certain, is commonly inclined to evil, that is, to fol- low the activity of the animal faculties, which are, for the most part, very energetic, and submit with difficulty to the guidance of the powers proper to man. I am, nevertheless, astonished to ob- serve so much goodness in the world. Its abundance evidently proves that man is naturally good, and by no means in consequence of his social institutions ; these, indeed, are for the most part, cal- culated to pervert him. The poor are surrounded with temptation and exposed to corruption on all hands, and the lives led by the rich, especially their idleness and luxury, invite them to immoral- ity. All ranks have their superstitions, and all believe in error, as well as in truth ; all pay for temporal and also for eternal happiness, and all subscribe to the first dogma proclaimed necessary to secure the good things here, or to purchase the joys of immortality here- after,—an entire abnegation of reason. A true picture of society would, indeed, be frightful. Happily, man has received from the Creator so large an infusion of goodness, that it is not to be annihilated. It is lamentable, then, that cer- tain persons attach themselves more to the letter than to the spirit of some symbolic propositions of the gospel, and that mystical, contradictory, and noxious interpretations are rather believed in, than simple, reasonable, and salutary views. There are some naturally good, some who instinctively, so to say, do the things which Christian morality commands. But, have we not all heard religious people say, that this natural disposition 156 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. to do well profits those who exert it in nowise ? Some may wish to excuse their sins in degrading the nature of man, not aware that in degrading man they degrade his Maker, since they tell us at the same time that man is made according to the image of God. Let us examine into the origin of faith and of charity, discuss their comparative excellence, and determine the merit which belongs to natural benevolence. In regard to the origin of religious belief and charity, I refer to the first volume of this work. I shall only repeat that they spring not from the same fundamental faculty, that they may exist sepa- rately or conjoined, and that they may be active in very different degrees. These propositions are as important as those according to which charity and the disposition to faith are inherent in the nature of man. We may, therefore, proceed to ask which of the two is the most important ? Pious people commonly decide on this question according to their individual feelings. But this manner of judging frequently leads into error, and is apt to deceive. Let us, therefore, make abstraction of ourselves, and consider the subject generally. We are very ready to believe that which we' like ; this, how- ever, is not always truth. Religious systems, and the various sects of each are all founded on belief. Jews, Roman Catholics, Luther- ans, Calvinists, Inquisitors, Quakers, &c, all fancy they possess the true interpretation of the revealed will of God. Hence, simple be- lief does not indicate abstract truth. Religious belief is the result of feelings, and all feelings without exception, are blind ; religious belief consequently may be deceived ; and I think it causes error whenever the faculty on which it depends ceases to act in harmony with the other powers proper to man. It has, unquestionably, done a great deal of harm in the world. Some standard, by which its manifestations may be regulated, is therefore extremely desirable. What snail we say of those who maintain that Christianity does not require good works ? Simply, that they wish to make their task very easy ; not reflecting on the very nature of a covenant, which cannot be made without conditions ; and not knowing the gospel ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 157 of Jesus Christ, who desired that his disciples might be known by their works, and the excellence of his doctrine by its effects. Such a basis alone is unobjectionable, since it includes its validity in itself, and soon changes faith into conviction. Now as pure charity is the aim of the doctrine, and was the practice of the life of Jesus, char- ity is evidently the chief of his precepts. Farther, the tendency of charity is solely to do good; but religious belief may do evil too ; it easily finds an excuse for self- love, personal views, and abuses of many complexions. Priestcraft when asked what is right, commonly answers, expediency or our decision. History proves this accusation of religious governors. We may add, with the Apostles St. James and St. Paul, that faith without works is dead. Every hypocrite may say, / believe. Faith should be considered only as an additional motive to exercise char- ity ; and in its inferiority it alone should never be the basis of any religious doctrine. Priestcraft of all denominations, contending for their supremacy, wish to lead the people blindfolded. 'Beware of false prophets,' says Christ,* 'which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye will know them by their fruits.' Finally, even those who have no religious faith, or belief, still admit charity and its good effects. Thus, I do not hesitate to place, with St. Paul,f charity above faith. In regard to the merit of natural benevolence, I think, that the moral laws are as positive and inherent in our nature as are those of vision, and of the harmony of colors and tones ; I also conceive that Christ has commanded certain works because they are good in themselves and according to the will of the Creator, but not that these works are good by their being commanded; and, farther, that the truth of religious interpretations is proclaimed by their compat- ibility with general happiness. If man can do nothing of himself, that is, by the powers which he has received from his Creator, what can be the benefit of the priesthood ? How could Jesus Christ speak of gifts or talents ? How can man be made answerable ? * Matt. vii. 15 t 1 Cor. xiii. 158 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Those who say that natural human benevolence is worthless, might also say that the goodness of God is without value. Persons, it is true, who are naturally good, deserve less credit for their beneficent actions than those who do good principally be- cause it is commanded. The former are charitable because they find pleasure in charity, while the others of charity make an act of virtue. In reference to energy and effect, however, natural benev- olence is superior to that which results from faith. The faculties which act from internal vigor are rewarded by their indulgence ; they persevere with pleasure and constantly tend to action, while those which must be excited by other motives become inactive as soon as these cease to,operate. The naturally good do more acts of beneficence without faith than those who, little endowed with primitive charity, take mere faith as their guide and rule of conduct. Those, however, who unite natural charity and faith are the most assiduous in doing good ; but, to reject natural benevolence is equiv- alent to saying that pure and natural gold is not worth such as is extracted from very heterogeneous minerals, and that a swift and willing horse is inferior to one which must be spurred to go quickly. I finish this section by asking, what individual can determine moral evil and moral good, that is, dictate the moral laws ? I think that it is with moral as with all other principles; a blind man can- not establish the principles of coloring, nor one born deaf those of music ; the great painter gives the rules of his art, and the great genius for music indicates the laws of harmony. In the same way, he who possesses the faculties proper to man in the highest perfec- tion, and in whose actions they predominate, he who can challenge the world to convict him of sin, has a right to determine moral 1 principles, and to fix rules of moral conduct. Those, therefore, who would make exception and say, Follow my words and not my deeds, have no title to give rules of action to the community, or to superintend their practice. How noble was the saying of Christ in reference to this point,* ' If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.' * John, x. 37. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 153 SECTION VI. Practical Considerations. In every science the theoretical must be distinguished from the practical part. The former considers principles, the latter applies them. Both, however, must be in harmony with each other. Saying that experience contradicts a theory, only means that the theory was inexact, and not founded on sufficient experience. But it does not indicate that no theory or principle should be establish- ed. Farther, I think with Socrates, that knowing and acting ought to be inseparable, and that useful knowledge is alone worth attend- ing to; no philosophy, therefore, which cannot be applied in social life deserves to have a student. The knowledge of the hu- man mind is interesting to physicians in reference to insanity, and to teachers and legislators in determining the means of perfecting mankind. I have treated these subjects in separate volumes ; I shall here add some considerations which concern us in our social intercourse, and which may contribute to further general happiness. This I shall do in four chapters. The first will treat of the modi- fications of the affective and intellectual functions in individuals ; the second, of the difficulty of judging the actions of others ; the third, of sympathy and antipathy ; and the fourth, of the happiness of man. CHAPTER I. On the Modifications of the Affective and Intellectual Functions. In philosophy it is commonly admitted, that the world is dif- ferent to every species of animals, and even to every individual of the same species. This is easily understood, when we consider 160 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. that all the beings of nature are in relation one to another, and that these, endowed with consciousness, recognise this ; in other terms, perceive various impressions made on them by other beings. Now, it is evident that each must perceive impressions in proportion to the number and energy of its sentient faculties. Hence it results that the world differs to different species of animals ; that it is essentially the same, but modified to individuals of the same kinds ; and that man, who unites all the faculties distributed among the other living tribes, and possesses some peculiarly and alone, has, so to speak, the most extended world, though this be still modified to individuals, as it is among animals of the same species. I shall now investigate the modifications of the faculties more in detail. First then, the manifestations of every faculty are greatly modified in different kinds of beings. This appears from the func- tions of those faculties, both of vegetative and animal life, which are common to man and animals. The liver secretes bile, the kidneys secrete urine, the salivary glands saliva, &c ; yet these secretions vary in different kinds of animals ; and are even modified in individuals of the same species. The power of motion is modi- fied in different kinds of animals, and the consistence, texture, and taste of its organs, the muscles, also vary. The external senses offer modifications according to species and individuals. Now, are the faculties attached to the brain also modified in different animals ? If we examine their applications, there can remain no doubt of it. The function of the cerebellum must be modified in every species, because the indiv'duals of each prefer others of their own kind. Sometimes also it is quite inordinate. Modifications of philoprogenitiveness are not less certain. Animals love the young of their own more than those of other kinds. Inhabitiveness must be modified in animals which live in the water, on dry land, in the air, and at greater or less elevations. Adhesiveness presents many modifications in solitary and in social animals. Destructiveness and constructiveness are much modified ; all animals do not kill in one way, and the nests of all birds are not built in the same man- PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 161 ner. The song of birds, and the instinct to migrate, are modified universally. Similar observations might readily be made in regard to the whole of the propensities, sentiments, and intellectual facul- ties. Thus it is certain that all are modified both in species and in individuals. Nay, it seems to me that there are idiosyncrasies of all the mental functions, as well as of digestion and the external senses. Certain stomachs do not digest some particular substances; some individuals cannot bear certain odors, savors, colors, and sounds ; and some cannot endure certain modes of feeling or think- ing, certain successions of tones, of ideas, and so on. The same thing is approved or disapproved of by different people according to the manner in which it is proposed. Another cause of the modified manifestations of the faculties is their mutual influence. I only consider the human kind at present. It is indubitable that if two or more persons do the same thing, it will be done in a modified way by every one. Inasmuch as the faculties are essentially the same, the same actions are observed in all mankind : nay, in as far as nations have similar predominating faculties, there prevails a certain analogy in their actions and man- ners, because these are effects of the special faculties and their combinations ; it is only their modifications and different combina- tions that produce varieties in action. Every faculty may act combined with one, or two, or more. The number of binary, ternary, and more multiplied combinations is, therefore, immense, especially if it be remembered that each may be modified in itself, and may be more or less energetic. As this subject, however, is of the highest importance in anthropology, and indispensable to the elucidation of my ideas, I shall treat it somewhat in detail, and choose examples easily understood, and interesting to every one. Physical love alone, combined with adhesiveness, philopro- genitiveness, benevolence and veneration, or with the propensitiesi to fight and to destroy, acts very differently. Two affectionate mothers, of whom the one has philoprogenitiveness combined with much self-esteem, much firmness, a great propensity to fight, and little benevolence ; and the second, philoprogenitiveness combined vol. n. 21 162 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. with adhesiveness, benevolence, veneration, and very little self- esteem and propensity to fight, will love their children in very dif- ferent manners. Determinate or individual justice varies extremely. Justice gives laws universally, but these are modified according to the particular and combined faculties of legislators. What a differ- ence in the characters of Lycurgus and Solon ; but what a differ ence in their precepts also ! Man universally believes in one or several Gods ; but what a difference between the Gods of different nations, and even of dif- ferent men ! The Gods seem to be every where represented with faculties conformable to those of the nations by whom they are adored, or of the religious legislators who have commanded in their name. The sages of the Orient thought God the centre of light and the source of all wisdom : but the Scythes took him for a valiant hero, constantly armed and occupied with battles. The ancient Egyptians supposed their Supreme Divinity to have little eyes, brown skin and dark hair, whilst the natives in the North fancied him to be of exceedingly white complexion with blue eyes and fair long hair. The Caffres imagined him to be black with a broad flat forehead. The God of the Jews, particularly of Joshua, and the Deity of the true Christian, are extremely modified. If different individuals, even of the same religion, be asked their opinion about God, we observe great diversities. St. Peter and St. John speak, the former with fear, the latter with meekness and love, of the same Christian Deity. The holy spirit did not so guide the Apostles as to suspend the peculiarities of their minds. If we examine the opinions of the reformers, Luther, Calvin, Zwingle, and others, do we not always observe the faculties of the individuals? Who, for instance, finds not in the principles of Melancthon, the mildness and moderation of his character ? A per- son endowed with veneration, combined with charity, attachment, and understanding, without pride, destructiveness, and amativeness, will establish a system of religious observance quite different from his who is endowed with veneration combined with covetiveness, pride, amativeness, and destructiveness, without charity and under PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 163 standing. Every one who dares to think for himself, interprets the Bible according to his own feelings. The ambitious contrives to find in it doctrines which favor his love of dominion ; the timid discovers a gloomy system ; and the mystical and fanatical finds a visionary theology. The Evil Spirit or Devil, too, was represented with forms quite opposite to those of God. The Romans, Celtic nations and Ger- mans saw him black, whilst the ancient Egyptians painted their Typhon with a red beard and similar hair, almost as the Germans formed their good principle. Music is different in every nation. We easily distinguish that of the Italians, Germans, French, Scots, &c. Even the music of each composer offers something particular, and connoisseurs distinguish that of Gluck, Mozart, Haydn, and others. It is the same with painting. All painters are colorists, but there is a dif- ference in their modes of coloring ; and every one as regularly prefers certain colors as subjects. Hence the difference in the pictures of Titian, Rembrandt, Paul Veronese, Albano, and others. The canvass of Titian shows reflection and combination ; that of Paul Veronese his fondness for architecture ; Albano again betrays his amorous inclination ; and so of the rest. The same object, represented by various masters of painting, will always show the peculiarities of every artist's mind. Hbw different, for instance, the Virgins of Raphael, Correggio, Guido, Titian, Murillo, Carlo Dolce, Caravaggio, Rubens, &c. The languages of different nations present fine examples of modifications produced by the mutual influence of the faculties. I even admit as a principle, that the spirit of its language proclaims the predominating faculties of a nation. I have spoken of a faculty which learns and knows the signs invented by the superior intellec- tual faculties, to express the feelings and ideas. It is evident, therefore, that a nation with many feelings or ideas must have many signs, and that the number of any one kind of these indicates the energy of the faculty they represent. Thus, the Greek and French languages have a greater number of tenses than the German and 164 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. English. The French, on the contrary, is poor in expressions of reflection and of sentiment; moreover, it has few that are figura- tive ; while the German is rich in all of these, and has also many more signs of disjunction. Frenchmen have the organs of individ- uality and eventuality very much developed, and are therefore fond of facts ; but their faculties of comparison and causality are com- monly smaller. In consequence of this, the French Institute does not admit analogies as proofs ; these consist according to it only in facts. The Germans, on the other hand, are fond of analogies, perhaps too much so, for they compare and wish to explain every thing. French expressions are individual, without any compari- son; therefore, similar sounds denote many different objects. From this it appears that the discriminating faculties are not very active in Frenchmen. The same deficiency is evident in the very different names they give to very similar objects. The German and English tongues are more systematic than the French. The common language of Germany is even conformable to the system of Linnaeus. Whilst the French say, bouvreuil, chardonneret, pincon, &c, the Germans and English preserve the generic name fink, ov finch, and join to it a sign of distinction. In the same way, while the French say, rasoir, couteau, canifi serpette, &c ; in German and English the generic name messer or knife is retain- ed, and a sign of particular destination affixed, as feder-messer, or pen-knife; tafel-messer, or table-knife ; &c. For this reason also, the number of roots of the French language is much more considerable, though that of its words be much smaller than those of the German. Another proof that the French language is very unsystematic, lies in the fact of its very often having a substantive without its derivative adjective, or the contrary, to designate the same idea. These illustrations show the evident influence of the faculties generally, in establishing languages. Thus the number and nature of signs is in relation to the special powers of the mind which invent them. The faculties of individuality and eventuality being the first active in children, we may understand why nouns and verbs are soonest employed, and constitute almost the whole PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 165 artificial language of infancy ; and why all words may be reduced etymologically to these signs. By degrees, as other faculties become active, other significations of signs are discovered, even though their roots remain the same. The construction of languages proves also the modified manners of thinking of different nations. The French like facts, and direct their attention to them, without first considering causes. It is natural, indeed, to begin with the subject, then to join the action of the subject, and after this to express other circumstances. This the French do regularly. If cause and effect be considered, they always begin with the effect, and relate the cause afterwards. The Germans proceed in a very different manner, and their tongue in this respect requires much more attention than the French. It also ordinarily begins with the subject; then follow expressions of the relation between subject and object, both of which are mention- ed; and lastly, the action of the subject upon the object is consid- ered. If an effect and its cause, again, are spoken of, the cause is commonly denoted first and the effect after it. Certain languages are known to admit of a great number of inversions, others of very few. The former appear to me the more logical; for it seems natural that attention should be given first to the most important object. The French language begins almost always with the fact: hence French understandings consider the fact as the most important. From these observations upon language, we may conceive that the spirit of no one language can become general. I am of opinion that the spirit of the French will never please Germans ; and that Frenchmen, on the other hand, will always dislike that of the Ger- man; because the manner of thinking, and the enchainment of ideas, are quite dissimilar in the two nations. I am farther convinced that different philosophical systems have resulted from various combinations of faculties in their authors. He who has much of the faculty of eventuality will never neglect facts. He who possesses less of it, and a great deal of the faculties of comparison and causality, will begin to philosophize with causes, 166 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. and construct the world, instead of observing its existence. He, on the contrary, in whom the faculty of causality is less active, will reject this mode of consideration, and may think it unphiloso- phical to admit a primitive cause. Another who has individuality veiy small may doubt of external existence. The philosopher in whom the superior sentiments are very energetic, directs his mind principally to moral principles, and then we have various systems of virtue and morality, according to the predominance, of one or other of these. One makes virtue consist in prudence, another in benevolence. One considers all actions as done from love of praise or from vanity; another from self-esteem, from love of self-preser- vation, self-interest and so on. Philosophers as well as other men think differently, and each is also apt to consider his own manner of thinking and feeling as the best; his consciousness tells him it is so; but every one errs who assumes himself as a measure of the absolute nature of man. In examining human nature, we ought to make abstraction of ourselves entirely; we ought never to admit in man a feeling as the strongest, and a manner of thinking as the best, solely because they are conformable to our own ; nor ought we ever to deny in others what we ourselves do not possess. We should observe mental phenomena in the conviction that all the es- sential kinds or particular faculties inhere in human nature ; and we should observe how and under what circumstances each faculty can and does act. In this way I think it possible to determine the ab- solute nature of man, and to become acquainted with the infinity of modifications occurring in individuals. It would be easy"to quote examples in the case of every faculty, to prove the mutual influence of the whole; but I shall only dwell on this principle, in reference to abuses of the faculties, for the sake of showing how peculiarities may be explained which seem incon- ceivable to those who know nothing of Phrenology. Suppose, for instance, we are told that of two inveterate thieves presented to us, one has never scrupled to rob churches whilst the other has, the robber of the church may be distinguished from the other: he who has the smallest organ of veneration is the thief of PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 167 the holy articles. Suppose we see two women in confinement, and are told that one has stolen, and that the other has concealed the stolen things ; the former will have the organ of acquisitiveness larger, and that of the propensity to conceal less, while the second will have the organ of secretiveness much developed. If we would detect the chief of a robber band, we examine the organs of self- esteem and determinateness. We may distinguish an habitual vagabond thief from a coiner of false money by his having, besides the organ of acquisitiveness, the organ of locality larger, and smaller organs of cautiousness and of constructiveness. We may also distinguish dangerous and incorrigible criminals from the less desperate and more easily amended. They who have the organs of the sentiments proper to man and of intellect very small, but those of the propensities to fight, to destroy, to conceal, and to ac- quire, very much developed, will be corrected with far more dif- ficulty than such as have the organ of acquisitiveness very much developed, but at the same time the organs of the human faculties and of intellect large, who, in short, are susceptible of moral will. CHAPTER II. On the difficulty of judging others. Having examined the modified manifestations of the faculties of the mind, natural order leads me to consider the difficulty of judg- ing, and of determining the motives and actions of others. From the preceding views it follows, first, that the judgment of every one as well as all his other functions must be modified. If we but at- tend to the judgments of different individuals upon the same object, if we note their reflections, and consider what each praises or blames, we may speedily be convinced by experience of the truth of this. It may, indeed, be admitted as a principle, that every one judges according to the natural modifications and the mutual influence of 168 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. his faculties;—that all judge others by their own nature, or take themselves as the measure of good and evil. Therefore it is that God has at all times been anthropomorphosed; every one has modified the Divinity, and conceived a Creator conformable to his own manner of judging and feeling. And when philosophers, moralists, and the virtuous, regard conscience as the severest judge of malefactors generally, they suppose in these degenerate beings the sentiment they feel themselves;—they judge themselves in the actions of others. In the same way, whatever is conformable to our manner of feeling and thinking is apt to be approved, and the contrary to be disapproved of. To judge well, therefore, we must first distinguish the common nature of man from the modifications of every individual; and then we must know our own nature and the modifications of our faculties to avoid censuring or lauding others according to our own favorite sentiments or ideas. We must, in fact, judge others and ourselves by one and the same standard—absolute good and evil. It is also difficult to judge of the actions of others, and to deter- mine their real motives, because the motives of the same action may be quite different. Appearances are proverbially deceitful. I shall quote but a few examples in illustration ; a very superficial glance, however, will, at all times, show us many motives for the same act done by different individuals. One gives to the poor from ostentation, another from duty, a third from the hope of gaining heaven, and others again from real charity. One wishes to know the history and situation of the unfortunate,—if he be of his sect or party, &c, before he does good; another relieves as soon as he sees misery, every one is his neighbor, his left hand knows not what his right hand does. One goes to church because it is usual; another to see or to be seen; another to obtain the good opinion of the pious; and another from feelings of sincere venera- tion. One is neat and clean only when he goes into society, while another is so at all times, even in solitude. One cultivates an art or science from vanity; another because he is charmed with it; and a third because he finds it advantageous, &c. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 169 It is the same with the abstaining from abuses. One, for in- stance, from charity does not steal; another steals every where except in the house where he lives; another robs churches, but not the poor; another does not steal, for fear of being punished, for fear of injuring his reputation, or from a sense of duty and justice, &c. In short, every one knows that the same action he did, or abstained from, has not always followed from the same motive. Thus, if an action or omission is to be judged, it is necessary to consider whether it resulted from the natural energy or inactivity of the respective faculty, or whether other faculties exerted a determinative influence. In judging others, we must remember that every faculty may be active by its own energy or by the excitement of other powers, and, again, may be inactive by its own insufficient energy, or by the influence of other faculties. Hence it follows, that, on one hand, every function does not suppose large developement of the respective organ; and, on the other, that organs may be greatly developed without producing abuses. The organ of acquisitiveness may be Very large without causing theft; the organ of amativeness much developed without occasioning libertinism; and so of the rest. The functions of very- large organs may be suppressed, though certainly not without diffi- culty. The activity of every organ only produces a particular inclination; the faculties mutually influence each other, and regulate their subordination. Thus we cannot judge of other persons from our own sentiments and intellectual endowments, nor by one or several, but by the whole of their faculties together; and then only censure or praise their actions as they disagree or harmonize with the absolute moral nature of man. The principle that every faculty may be active by its internal energy, answers the question so often proposed in books: What is the origin of the arts and sciences? In examining their source, writers commonly begin from remote antiquity, and endeavor to show how external circumstances have produced and improved them. Without denying the importance of external circumstances as exciting causes, I still think that the most important, the pri- vol. n. 22 170 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. mary cause, indeed, is overlooked; that, namely, which exists in the conate organization ; the same, in fact, as that of the instinctive labors of animals. Man invents and cultivates arts and sciences in the same way and for the same reason that the beaver builds its hut, and the nightingale sings. Every sentiment and every intellectual faculty may act by its internal activity without external excitement; and this is the primitive source of the arts and sciences. Scarcely could Handel speak, before he articulated musical sounds, and his father, grieved at the ehild's propensity to music, banished all musical instruments from his house; but this sublime genius was not to be extinguished by the caprice of a mistaken parent; for the boy contrived to get a little clavichord into a garret, and applying himself to this after the family retired to rest, he soon learnt to produce both melody and harmony. Nature, then, invented arts and sciences, and revealed them to man by means of his organization. Arts and sciences are also gradually perfected only in proportion as they who cultivate them are possessed of energetic organs. Inferences. The consideration of the two sources of activity of the faculties 'eads me to the following question: What actions in reference to morality deserve the greatest confidence, those which result from the goodness of nature, or those which are the effect of virtue ? Though I think that good is always good in itself, and must ever be approved of, I still allow that there is greater merit in virtue than in natural goodness. I agree with the definition of virtue which all the great ancient and modern philosophers have given, as Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Kant, and others. I admit that those who have vanquished temptations deserve particularly to be rewarded, and that by the possibility of being either virtuous or vicious, our actions have the greatest merit or demerit.* Never * Non virtus est, non posse peccare, cum renunciatur improbitati, statim ac- sciscetur virtus. St. Ambrositis.—Nulla sine labore virtus est. Non est glorios, PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 171 theless, I confess that for my own part and guidance in society, I trust more to natural goodness than to virtue. I love goodness and esteem virtue. Guided by early experience, which shows that the greatest number of persons act more from the dictates of their propensities and sentiments than of their understanding and mor- al will, I never choose for my intimate friends individuals in whom the inferior organs are very large, and the superior very small. In the same way I think, that if the intellectual faculties act by their internal energy, they effect much more than if they be excited by sentiments or motives emanating from any other source. From the modifications of our faculties results still another very important practical rule—indulgence. It is impossible that others should feel and think on every point as we do. Precisely as it is generally admitted, that the functions of the external senses cannot be altogether the same, and without any modification—and as it is proverbially said, De gustibus non est disputandum, so also are the internal faculties modified, and no one has a right to desire an- other to feel and think with him. A certain indulgence is indispen- sable in society. I do not maintain that every manner of feeling and thinking, and every action, are to be tolerated. There is a victoria nisi ubi fuerint gloriosa certamina. Idem in Ps. 118, et De Off.—Posse peccare datum est primo homini, non ut proinde peccaret, sed ut gloriosior appar- eat, si non peccaret, dum peccare posset. St. Bernardus de Lib. Arb.—Vita nostra in hac peregrinatione non potest esse sine peccato, sine tentatione,quia profec- tus noster per tentationem nostram fit, nee sibi quisquam innotescit, nisi tentatus; nee potest coronari, nisi vicerit; nee potest vincere, nisi certaverit; nee potest certare, nisi inimicum et tentationes habuerit. St. Augustinus super Ps. 60.— Quidam in juventute luxuriose viventes, in senectute continentes fieri delectantur, et tunc eligunt servire castitati, quando libido eos servos habere contempsit. Ne- quaquam in senectute continentes vocandi sunt qui in juventute luxuriose vixer- unt; tales non haberint proemium, quia laboris certamen non habuerunt, eos enim spectat gloria, in quibus fuerunt gloriosa certamina. Isidor. de Summo Bono, Lib. i. e. 31.—For there are some eunuchs which were so born from their moth- er's womb, and there are some eunuchs which were made eunuchs of men, and there be eunuchs which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. Matt. xix. 12.—Joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that re- penteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons which need no repentance. Luke. xv. 7. 172 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. common touchstone for all mankind. Feelings, thoughts, and ac- tions, must be conformable to the absolute conscience of man ; but all other modifications ought to be permitted. This principle may be applied to both sexes, and to all conditions, and to all ages ; no friendship can be permanent without indulgence upon many mod- ifications in the manner of feeling and thinking. It is the same in regard to religious and other opinions. St. Paul said to the Romans, ' One believeth that he may eat all things ; another, who is weak, eateth herbs ; let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not, and let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth. One man esteemeth one day above another, another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. We then that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves. The kingdom of God is not meat nor drink, but righteousness and peace.' CHAPTER III. On Sympathy and Antipathy. The principle of the universally-modified manifestations of the faculties leads me also to the consideration of sympathy and antipa- thy. Throughout all nature, beings have relations with each other. As we have seen that there are relations between the faculties of the same individual, so there exist relations between the faculties of different individuals. Indeed it is generally observed, that cer- tain beings cannot exist together in society, while others dwell in harmony and peace. Attraction and repulsion in physics, and affin- ities in chemistry, are remarkable and well known; and even among vegetables, some species perish in the neighborhood of certain oth- ers, while many species increase and prosper very well together. Among animals, the same law obtains, not only as different species, out also as different individuals of the same kind are concerned. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 173 Certain individuals of the same species manifest a particular attach- ment, while others cannot bear with each other. In a herd of cows, the bull is commonly more attached to one than to any of the rest; birds, too, pair by choice, &c. It is the same with mankind. Be it, however, remembered, that I do not speak of sympathy and antipathy in the same sense as many authors do when they discuss the sympathies and antipa- thies of the stomach and the five senses. They then describe what is called idiosyncrasy. Certain persons, for instance, can- not digest a particular kind of food, cannot endure certain odors, are disgusted with particular savors, and cannot look at certain figures, or touch certain bodies. I have already said that I admit idiosyncrasies in the internal faculties ; but I here speak of the nat- ural relations between the faculties of different individuals. Some are, as it were, born for each other, while others mutally feel an invincible aversion. This may be explained in the following man- ner: First, certain faculties of man are eminently social, as attach- ment and charity ; others are quite the contrary, for instance, selfishness and pride. Again, according to a general rule, every faculty desires to be satisfied. Hence every one is pleased with whatever is conformable to his manner of feeling and thinking: every one wishes to enjoy; therefore every one likes those who procure or permit him enjoyments. It is consequently evident, that there is no single and invariable combination on which sympa- thy depends. These vary in the same degree as the faculties of different individuals are modified. Before we can decide.whether two individuals will sympathize or not, we must consider all their faculties ; and then we can see as certain that understanding must like understanding ; and every intellectual faculty, manifestations of a similar power in others. The musician is pleased with music ; a mathematician with mathematics ; a philosopher with philosophi- cal ideas ; a philologist with languages, &c. In the same way, the sentiments proper to man look for and sympathize with simi- lar sentiments. A charitable man likes mild and benevolent peo- ple ; the religious choose the society of the devout, and so on. 174 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Thus, the faculties of the understanding and the sentiments proper to man favor sociality. It is not precisely thus with the faculties common to man and animals. Some of them, however, are social, as attachment, and, in a certain degree, amativeness and philoprogenitiveness ; but the greatest number are eminently antisocial. The interested, for instance, do not like the interested, except in as far as their own selfishness is satisfied. Proud persons cannot suffer others en- dowed with the same feeling. The haughty and interested not only dislike one another, but are also disliked by those who are possessed of the superior sentiments. This is the case, too, with the propensities to fight and to destroy. Thus every one will sympathize with those in whose society his faculties are satisfied ; and antipathy will be proportionate to the obstacles in the way of this, that is, to the prevention of enjoyment. It is the animal nature which causes so many unhappy and ill- assorted marriages. Amativeness or adhesiveness brings husband and wife together; perhaps they have thought of money, beauty, sometimes of health and intelligence, but they have forgotten the other dispositions, which are independent of physical love and of attachment, which cannot be bought, and which no intelligence can give, but which, nevertheless, contribute greatly to the happi- ness of those who bind themselves by indissoluble ties. All the other numerous faculties which are not satisfied soon change the original sympathy of the couple into indifference or even into antipathy, and then follow disorder and misery. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. J 75 CHAPTER IV. On Happiness and Unhappiness. In speaking of happiness or unhappiness it is difficult to under- stand each Other. Both ancient and modern philosophers take different views of happiness, and modify accordingly their ethical doctrines. Thales placed it in the health of body, in a compe- tent fortune, and in a cultivated mind ; Socrates in the love of truth, useful knowledge and virtue ; Plato in the contemplation and knowledge of the first Good, God; and in endeavoring to make man as like to it as the conditions of human nature will permit; Aristippus in agreeable impressions on the senses ; Anniceris in pleasant sensations and moral feelings ; Hegasias, a disciple of Aristippus, in voluptuousness ; Epicurus in mental tranquillity, bodily ease, and freedom from labor and pain ; Diogenes in an absolute independence from circumstances ; Zeno in the freedom from all sense of pleasure, and pain, from hope and fear, from all feeling and emotions in every situation, in self-denial and self- command. Marcus Aurelius said, that the true contentment of heart is not found in the study of arts, in eloquence, riches, glory, sensual pleasures, in short nowhere but in the practice of actions which the human nature demands. Paley denied that happiness consists in the pleasures of sense, as in the animal gratification of eating and drinking, or by which the species is preserved ; neither n the refined pleasures of music, painting, architecture, gardening, theatrical exhibitions, splendid shows ; nor in the pleasure of ac- tive sports, as of hunting, shooting, fishing ; neither in greatness, rank, honors, nor in the exemption from pain, care, labor, busi- ness, molestation ; but he placed it, 1st, in the exercise of social affections, as husband, wife, children, kindred, and friends ; 2d, in doing good to others ; 3d, in the pursuit of great engagements and important occupations, and 4th, in health. Yet it cannot be denied that some find their happiness in the ]76 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. cultivation of arts,—in fishing or hunting ; whilst another delights in examining metaphysical questions, or mathematical problems ; and another in religious proselytism. Servile minds despair of supporting existence in a state of civil liberty, whilst the truly free man considers civil and religious liberty as the greatest good upon earth, and indispensable to his happiness. Phrenology easily explains these and many other views of hap- piness. Human nature is composed of numerous special disposi- tions and every special disposition may be active in different de- crees. Now every faculty being active and satisfied, is happy or pleased ; and every active faculty which is not satisfied is displeased or unhappy. Every one, then, who gives a definition of happi- ness, expresses the state of his own mind, or the powers active in him ; he takes his individual happiness as the standard of happiness in general. No one, however, can measure the happiness or un- happiness of others by his own, hence he finds his happiness in the gratification of his active powers, in the same way as the sheep whilst feeding on grass and the tiger whilst devouring its prey, are happy each in its own manner. To speak with precision, it is necessary to divide and subdivide happiness and unhappiness. Both concern individuals, families, associations, nations or man- kind at large. Farther, human nature being vegetative, affective, intellectual, animal and human; it follows that individuals, families, associations, nations, or mankind may be happy or unhappy accord- ing to the special powers. In individuals the sum of happiness is made up by the sum of gratification of the active faculties, and in every society the sum of happiness consists in the number of hap- py individuals. Farther, happiness and unhappiness may be sub- divided into temporal or eternal. The latter lies beyond the reach of my inquiries. I am satisfied with stating that in my opinion both these sorts of happiness are not incompatible with each other; I do not believe that we must be miserable here on earth in order to be happy in the life to come. In speaking of happiness, an important remark is to be kept in view, viz. that the satisfaction of the active powers, not the special PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 177 gratification, is the foundation of happiness. The satisfaction of hunger, not the enjoyment of dainties alone, makes happy. Run- ning and moving about makes children happy, the individual game is not the essence ; the satisfaction of all special powers varies according to age and social circumstances, and they are mistaken who think that individual and particular gratification constitute hap- piness. In this respect there is more compensation in the world than many imagine, in taking themselves as the standard of others. I shall first treat of individual happiness, and then of that of so- cieties. The first condition of happiness certainly is health. Is it then not astonishing that this condition is so much neglected ; whilst the laws of hereditary descent and the dietetic rules ought to be put into practice ? Without health we are unfit to receive educa- tion, and to fulfil our duty in social relations. Without health we are a burden to ourselves and to others. The next condition of happiness is mental activity. This how- ever is very different according to the special dispositions of the mind. It is a matter of fact that, (and Phrenology explains why,) by far the greater number of individuals look for their happiness in the satisfaction of the faculties common to man and animals, such as in the sensual pleasures, in the love of offspring, in the love of approbation, in the love of acquiring, and so on. In certain coun- tries inferior pleasures alone are permitted ; means of subsistence are provided for ; the people have plenty to eat and to drink, but all intellectual pleasures, and those beyond the range of mere ani- mality, are interdicted. Very few persons cultivate arts and science for the pleasure they procure in themselves. They do it to furnish means necessary to the satisfaction of some animal desires. Finally, those who are happy in the exercise of the faculties proper to man are exceedingly rare. They are those who, as St. Paul says, have the law written in their hearts ; those who find their happiness in the abnegation of selfish desires, and in actions of general happi- ness ; those finally who in the eyes of common people are called dreamers or fools. It is a common saying, that man to be happy ought to have few vol. ii. 23 178 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. wants. The expression want is here synonymous with desire,— the effect of every faculty's activity and is as various in kind as the fundamental faculties ; each want individually being proportion- ate to the activity of the power from which it results. Wants or desires then, or in other words the activity of the faculties are not the immediate cause of happiness or unhappiness. The whole of the mental powers acting with energy may be sources either of bliss or of misery. This follows on the possibility or impossibility of gratifying their impulses. He who has many faculties active which he can satisfy, is more happy than the man who has no desire whatever : but it is better to be without desire than to possess very active faculties with no means of ministering to their cravings. Even those who are eminently endowed with the superior senti- ments, and who would like to see every one happy, find a kind of misery in the injustice of mankind. The unfortunate of this kind, however, are by no means the most numerous. The human as well as animal faculties produce wants or desires. To be just is a want for the righteous, as to take nourishment is for him who is hungry. As, however, the animal faculties are the most generally active in men, if wants are spoken of, we commonly think of inferior powers, as of self-esteem, vanity, personal interest, sensual pleasures, and so on. Now as happiness depends on the gratification of active faculties, and unhappiness on their non-satis- faction, it is obvious why those who are fond of ostentation, luxury, riches, distinctions &c, are commonly unhappy : it is impossible to appease their wants or desires. It is also necessary to distinguish in the doctrine of wants in ref- erence to morality, between the faculties themselves and the satis- faction of their desires. The satisfaction may vary and produce good and evil. Religious, sentiments are inherent in human nature, they frequent- ly act with gieai energy, and have done an immensity of mischief to mankind. Yet religion itself should never be ridiculed ; well directed, it may increase our own and our neighbor's happiness, though certain notions and certain actions, called religious, are fit PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 179 butts for mockery. Religious belief may admit reasonable things as well as absurdities, just as we may take wholesome or unwhole- some food. I shall now consider the happiness of societies. It depends, 1st, on the same principles of individual happiness ; and 2nd, on some new principles which modify those of" individual happiness. Here I take for granted, what I have stated in the section on the moral constitution of man, viz. that general happiness seems to be the aim of the terrestrial creation, and that it is impossible without the powers proper to man ; or that general happiness falls together with true morality. Though reason compels us to think that the Lord of the universe in his goodness and perfection, destined man to be happy, it is certain that to whatever side we turn our eyes, we perceive indi- viduals who are unhappy and who lament their lot. ' I have trav- elled over the world,' says Volney, (Ruins, ch. iv.) 'I have visited villages and towns, and perceiving misery and desolation over alk, my soul has been deeply afflicted by the ills which weigh heavily upon mankind. With a sigh I have said, and is man then born only to suffer misery and pain ? I shall ask the ashes of legis- lators, how empires rise and fall ? In what reside the causes of prosperity or decay of nations ? On what principles the peace of society and the happiness of mankind must be based ?' It is not necessary to insist on the existence of human misery, but let us ask for its causes. Various marvellous conceptions of Divines are articles of faith, and do not fall within the reach of my province, confined to observation. The natural causes of human misery may be reduced to two : ignorance and immorality. Both are great. From the cradle man is imbued with prejudices ; he is taught to fear his Maker, who is terrible. Man is the object of his anger; he was told to be tried by visitations and to be destined to lament, to give up the use of his reason and to rely with un- bounded confidence in his civil and religious leaders. The most noble part of human nature, his moral and religious sentiments, have been turned to his oppression, and he had not sense enough 180 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. to distinguish truth from falsehood. Man can never be happy, till he knows his fundamental powers, the conditions on which their manifestations depend, and till he submits himself completely to the will of his Creator, or in other terms, to the natural laws. The ancient speculators in philosophy and religion, by then- doctrine that the mind operates independently of the body, or is rather impeded by it in its operations, have done great harm to mankind. On that account the body has been and is still neglect- ed ; with the progress of civilisation, it degenerates, and becomes effeminate ; diseases multiply and misery is inevitable. The neg- lect of the body is even cause that no family and no nation is lasting. Our ignorance of human nature and of the influence of the body on the mental phenomena extends over the laws of hereditary descent. The neglect of these laws, however, is of incalculable consequences and prepares innumerable sufferings of body and mind. Bodily strength, infirmity or disease, as well as mental energy, weakness or derangement, are hereditary. Phrenology teaches why. The study of the natural laws then ought to be the Vade mecum of every philanthropist. The other great cause of human misery is immorality. Philoso- phers are right in recommending the cultivation of intellect, and by doing so, many disorders will be removed, but the aim will not be attained without attending with the same care to the moral nature of man. In the section on the moral constitution of man I have shown the innateness, nature and necessity of morality. It will last as long as the human kind, and is indispensable to its happiness. Phrenology explains this part of human nature better than it has been done by any philosophical doctrine. It shows why religious- ness may be combined with selfishness, cunning and deceit; why in the midst of wickedness some persons are naturally virtuous; and why selfishness, stupidity, base passions and want of justice are so common. The great activity of the animal nature is evidently a fertile PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 181 cause of human misery, for two reasons. Many are unhappy by not satisfying their excessively energetic feelings, without any moral consideration. It is therefore extremely interesting to ex- amine why the brute nature of man is so active, and why the multitude place happiness in the satisfaction of inferior feelings, and carry in themselves the cause of their own and others' misery. Farther, human misery depends on the relation between the two natures of man, on the different degrees of their activity and on the resistance of the inferior to the superior. For as the moral laws exist, and as kw feel naturally disposed to submit to them, the greater number have to combat their animal propensities. Now, as pain is felt each time any inclination is opposed, or any law is obeyed, which would willingly be eluded, or whose necessity is not understood, it is obvious that in the actual state of things the virtuously good must spend a life of suffering. These ideas are admirably developed in the doctrine of Chris- tianity. Morality is there declared the aim which must be obtain- ed, whether with ease or with difficulty, with pleasure or with pain, through love or through fear. The great difficulty of vanquishing the brute nature is acknowledged, but the necessity of fulfilling the law or will of the Creator is still insisted on. For this, therefore, reward is also in proportion to the pains of success ; eternal life is promised to those who gain the victory, and the 'joy in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth shall be more than over ninety and nine just persons which need not repentance.' * Without pretending to know what the cerebral organization was at the beginning, or whether it has suffered any change in the lapse of time; but in the conviction that the manifestation of the mind depends on the brain, I dare to say, that the wickedness of man- kind, the disobedience to the peculiarly human nature, will con- tinue so long as the brain remains such as it is. I dare answer in the most positive manner the following passage of Volney : (Ruins, ch. xiv.) ' Man who despairest of mankind, hast thou scrutinized the organization of sensibility, in order to determine with precision, * Luke xv. 7. 182 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. whether the motives which dispose man to happiness are essen- tially weaker than those which remove him from it ?' But I still say with him, ' If at one time, and in one place, certain individuals become better, why should not the whole mass improve ? If par- tial societies become more perfect, why should it not happen with society at large ?' Phrenology explains why so few find pleasure in cultivating their intellectual faculties, and why almost all seek en- joyment in gratifying some one or other of the sentiments ;—why the animal nature is so active, and the powers proper to man pro- portionately so weak. The cerebral mass devoted to the intellec- tual operations is to that of the affective functions scarcely as one finger to the whole hand, and the organs of the animal feelings together are much larger than the organs of the human sentiments. These observations are founded on the invariable laws of nature, and it is impossible to insist too much on the error of philosophers ; to consider understanding as the chief and fundamental cause of our actions, and to overlook the influence of the brain in the men- tal phenomena. What must be done to better the lot of Mankind? The friends of man have at all times been interested in this mat- ter. They have proposed many and various means, natural and supernatural, according to the ideas they had conceived of the cause of human misery. Hitherto, however, there has been little or nothing effected. From this I infer that the measures employed were insufficient. Bishop Butler speaks of the moral government, of the superiority and advantages of virtue, of the natural tendency to be virtuous and of the hindrances to be so, but he adds: ' that these hindrances are so far from being necessary that we ourselves can easily con- ceive how they may be removed in future states, and full scope be granted to virtue.' To this end he supposes ' a kingdom or society of men perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages, to which, if you please, may be given a situation advantageous for a universal PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 183 monarchy. In such a state there would be no such thing as fac- tion, but men of the greatest capacity would of course all along have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them, and they would share it among themselves without envy. Each of these would have the part assigned him, to which his genius was particularly adapted, and others who had not any distin- guished genius would be safe and think themselves very happy by being under the protection and guidance of those who had. Public determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom of the community, and they would faithfully be executed by the united strength of it. Some would in a higher way contribute, but all would in some way contribute to the public prosperity, and in it each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in injustice, accompanied with faction, and intestine treachery, would be found mere childish folly and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity, allowing both a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general influence which such a kingdom would have over the face of the earth, by way of example particularly, and the reverence which would be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must gradually come under its empire, not by means of lawless violence, but partly what must be allowed to be just conquest, and partly by other kingdoms submit- ting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its protection one after another in successive exigencies. The head of it would be a universal monarch in another sense than any mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style would be literally applicable to him, that all people, nations and languages should serve him. And though indeed our knowledge of human nature, and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility without some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here on earth, should unite in one society of government, in the fear of God and the universal practice of virtue, and that such a government should 184 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. continue so united for a succession of ages, yet admitting or sup- posing this, the effect would be as now drawn out; and thus, for instance, the wonderful prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the Scripture, would be in a great measure the consequence of what is predicted to them, that the people should be all righteous and inherit the land forever. (Is. i. 21).—The prediction of this kind, continues Bishop Butler, cannot come to pass in the present known course of nature.' Phrenology affords a clearer insight into human nature, and in my work on Education I consider all that I deem requisite to im- prove the species and to establish God's moral government, which, as Bishop Butler says, is not fictitious but natural. Here I con- fine myself to a few general indications, which are commonly neglected by those who exercise some influence on society. The causes of human misery being ascertained, it is evident, that whatever impedes human happiness must be removed or at least diminished. The study of human nature forms the foundation. This being done, moralists will see, that human happiness requires more than to preach moral principles, to give alms, to found charity- institutions, to follow religious ceremonies, and to cultivate the arts and sciences; they will apprehend that the evil is to be attacked by the root, that is, that natural means must be employed to improve dispositions. The body, the temple of the soul, will be more at tended to; the laws of vegetative functions and of hereditary descent will be appreciated and put into practice. The maxim, make the tree good and it will bring forth good fruit, will be con- stantly present to philanthropists and legislators. In short, ignorance and immorality will be attacked by all possible means. All that can augment or excite the animal nature is to be avoided, and every condition that may develope the faculties proper to man is to be encouraged. Governments cannot be serious in their desire for morality so long as they encourage lotteries, countenance games of hazard, and keep mercenary soldiers in pay. The importance of the faculties proper to man, or his moral constitution in regard to general happiness, is a point which cannot be too strongly nor PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 185 loo often recommended. The superior powers are satisfied by their own functions. The just, the benevolent, the religious and the disinterested need not foreign aid to satisfy their noble feelings. Inferior inclinations, on the contrary, almost always depend on the caprices of others for their gratification. The egotist, for instance, is opposed in his undertakings by those who, like him, think chiefly of themselves. The ambitious man is unhappy if he be not approved of, or honored to the extent he thinks he has deserved. He who, prompted by charity, does good, finds his reward in the deed itself; but he who does good to gain approbation, or grati- tude, is liable to be deceived, and, in the very act, often prepares himself a source of sorrow. In proportion, therefore, as the ani- mal nature shall lose in energy, and the peculiarly human faculties gain in strength, the sum of human happiness will increase. As man, in the actual state of things, cannot be left to himself, as his actions must be directed by social institutions, it is much to be wished that these were conformable to the invariable laws of natural morality. I fear, that notwithstanding the sincerest love of truth and the purest intentions, some means which are useless, and even noxious, will be resorted to, on account of human nature not being sufficiently known. Whatever may be done, however, the progress will necessarily be slow. Governments must as a first step begin by nourishing pure intentions, by giving up all selfish and exclusionary views and in all their particular regulations, by favoring general happiness. Let those whose duty it is to direct society, reflect on the two natures of man ; on the superiority of the one over the other ; and, farther, on the faculties which compose each ; let them be convinced that every fundamental power exists of itself; that charity is not the result of faith, nor faith of charity; and that all the faculties, though existing independently, may be combined, and mutually aid and excite each other. Though the animal faculties being the principal cause of human misery, must, by all means, be diminished, yet it is to be remem- bered that no fundamental power can be annihilated, but the actions vol. n. 24 186 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. of all must be directed. I have explained my ideas sufficiently, not to be suspected of speaking in favor of any arbitrary regulation ; yet I shall always insist on the necessity of restraining the animal faculties by those proper to man. In my opinion, consequently, personal, as well as moral liberty is limited. I have already treated of moral liberty ; I shall here add my views of that which is per- sonal in connexion with general happiness. CHAPTER V. Of Personal Liberty. Man, it is said, is born free. This proposition has been used by some authors in a very extensive signification. Every one, they have said, may do whatever he pleases. This interpretation, however, is incompatible with the constitution of the human mind Let us observe the order of nature, that we may understand the will of the Creator. Personal liberty we see is first limited by the laws of nature. Conception, birth, growth, health, and every function of vitality, as subjected to positive circumstances, force us at once to look on man as very dependent. Farther, man depends entirely upon others during his long infancy. And, again, as a social being, he has duties to fulfil, and rights to reclaim ; now, the idea of mutual obligation is incompatible with unbounded, or that liberty which admits every kind of individual gratification. We must live and permit others to live ; we must do our duty as child, as parent, and as citizen. The elucidation of these points belongs to the study of the law of nature, or of the rights and duties of man. The personal liberty of man is also limited by the reality of his two natures, and by the superiority of the one. The animal fac- ulties must be subordinate to the powers proper to man, and the true PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 187 Christian is still the slave of justice. This principle, the touch- stone of the excellence or imperfection of civil laws, bounds at the same time those who govern and those who are governed, and it proves clearly that by the will of the Creator the personal liberty of man is limited. It has, indeed, been said repeatedly, that with- out morality no society can exist, and that liberty is not licentious- ness. This is strictly true. The laws, however, must be just in favoring the common welfare. Finally, the faculties proper to man may deviate from their natural destination, and this they do each time they act separately. Benevolence without justice and reflection, may do much evil, and justice without benevolence may be too severe. Thus even the most noble parts of man's nature are limited, and kept in check by each other ; all must act in harmony to elicit good. The truth, that personal liberty is very much circumscribed, is never neglected without great disorders following. We must, however, add that no one has any natural right, arbitrarily and from selfish motives, to limit the personal liberty of others. Vol- ney says, 'Wheresoever I cast my eye, whatever the period of which I think, I find the same principles of increase, or of destruc- tion, of elevation and of decline. If ever a nation be powerful, or an empire prosper, its conventional laws are conformable to those of nature. If, on the contrary, a state sink in ruin or be dissolv- ed, the laws are imperfect or vicious, or the government is corrupt and violates the laws.' Civil restrictions ought to be the mere application of those of nature; they ought to be the same for every member of the .community, and the aim of their imposition—the general happiness. Nature applies its laws constantly and indis- criminately ; nature is incorruptible, and makes no exceptions. Human regulations alone are liable to this reproach. Governors and the governed are subjected to the same laws of propagation, of nutrition, of health, disease and death. Who can deny that nature is equally constant in the application of its moral laws? Happy period when every one will be obliged to conform his conduct to them ! 188 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. In order to elucidate my ideas on the necessity of submitting the individual desires to the natural laws of morality, I shall quote physical love, attachment, self-love or covetiveness, and the love of approbation, and whatever I say of them will apply to the other feelings common to man and animals. The subordina- tion of the animal nature to proper humanity, seems to me as necessary to the happiness of mankind, as is attention to matters used as food to individual preservation. A poisonous substance can never become wholesome aliment, and any action inimical to the happiness of mankind will never lose its essential and immoral character. Is it permitted to limit physical love in society ? The faculties proper to man decide the question. For as these are destined to general happiness, physical love being an animal feeling, must be restrained whenever it acts in opposition to their dictates. Now, there can be no doubt that the number of inhabitants in a country influences their state of being. Too crowded a population un- avoidably causes misery and degeneration of the species. Both natural and Christian morality forbid us to exterminate or to forsake such unhappy beings as exist ; society is even bound to take care of them, but their farther multiplication, as well as every other cause that militates against general happiness, may be lawfully opposed. The most enlightened economists, admit that population increas- es in the ratio of the means of subsistence, in the same way as all living beings multiply or perish, according as they are well or ill supplied with nourishment. Vegetation prospers if the soil be well manured. Birds that live on insects are more or less numerous in districts, according to the quantity of food they afford. Herbivo- rous animals abound in lands which are rich in forage, and countries are peopled in proportion as they furnish the means of living. It is true that a greater number of sober and temperate than of glut- tonous and luxurious persons may live in a given district, but nour- ishment is still the principal condition influencing population. The equilibrium between aliment and consumers is always preserved ; PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 189 sometimes, however, at the expense of a vast quantity of individual suffering. Were it not more meritorious, therefore, in govern- ments, and more beneficial to the community at large, entirely to prevent the evil which becomes necessary to diminish the number of inhabitants ? Since beggars, and those with hereditary dispositions to diseases, only propagate to the detriment of society and entail misery on their progeny, were it not better to prevent them from marriage altogether ? Let those who think differently reflect on the destination of mankind, and on all that is done, or rather neglected in society as relates to marriage, and they will not, without distinction, defend personal liberty in regard to propagation. Both civil and religious regulations have, in some instances, re- strained the desire, or even abstracted the power of propagation. Libertinism is interdicted in all countries, and adultery is punished as a crime. Soldiers and sailors are prohibited from marrying ; they, however, are the stoutest and best made men ; for bodily weakness and disease exempt and exclude from the military and naval service. Now, if society can prevent the choice of its youth from propagating, nay, if it think proper to make them expose their lives for the common welfare, as it is said, why should it not also have the right to interdict the marriages of those who propagate to the common calamity ? Let us farther reflect on the celibacy of priests of the Romish Church, and even on the example of Christ's apostles, who were advised against marriage. Now, if the prohibition of marriage be just and necessary as soldiers, sailors, and priests are concerned, and if polygamy in general be inadmissible, why should the propa- gation of infirmities and vices be endured ? I think that marriages ought to be regulated by the rule of natural morality, and that this is an essential condition to general happiness. More details on this subject are given in my work on Education. Another point conformable to the civil laws of all countries, but contrary to the morality of nature and Christianity, concerns exclu- sive love of every kind. Love of our family and of our country 190 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. are natural it is true, but both are common to man and animals, hence they must be subordinate to universal charity. Farther, attachment to those around us is laudable, but justice and truth are to precede every other consideration. The man must always triumph over the animal; hence we must prefer truth and general happiness before our country; we must give up national pride and the innumerable prejudices and evils that result from it, for the sake of entire humanity. Let us appreciate things in themselves and independently of occasions or causes. The Samaritan who has compassion on an unfortunate Israelite, dresses his wounds, and takes care of him, is truly his neighbor, and not the Jew or the Levite who looks at him and passes on. On the score of universal love, man, indeed, generally, and pretended Christians particularly, are very far behind. There is no nation which practises this noble precept of Christianity, and nothing but a perfect knowledge of human nature will ever incline men to follow it, or induce them to change the erroneous and pernicious opinions they entertain on this subject. I arrive at the third point, which is equally delicate and con- tested, but indispensable to general happiness ; I mean the restric- tion of selfishness. This feeling is the most formidable of all the enemies of mankind. It particularly induces neglect of the natural laws of morality, and divides society ; it excites one individual against another, family against family, and nation against nation ; it saps the foundations of empires, for it sells places, justice, and even puts up Heaven and immortality at a price ; it concentrates all power in an individual, and establishes absolute governments, &c. We may therefore ask whether society has the right of restraining the desire to acquire, and how far it may enforce it ? The answer is similar to that given to the questions implicating the other animal faculties. The desire to acquire is a fundamental power, and cannot be annihilated by any enactment; it is a strong motive exciting the other aptitudes and dispositions, and may be most usefully employed ; however, to what extent its activity is admissible is a point not yet determined. As an animal feeling, PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 191 it must necessarily be subordinate to the moral nature ; indeed, as all countries have laws against its abuses, the propriety of limiting its desires is evident. We are, now-a-days, permitted openly to maintain the injustice and the violation of natural morality and of true Christian principles, committed when individuals are secured in the possession of pecu- liar privileges and immunities. We may now also dare to say that personal merit is preferable to the pride of ancestry; that it is more just to reward talents than incapacity; and that every one should be obliged to exercise his natural powers to add to the common stock of industry, and ought only to reap the fruits of his own exertions. This, the effect of civilisation, is a great step towards natural morality—the only basis of general happiness ; but I dare maintain that it is not yet sufficient to render it paramount. The obstacle lies in the inequality of natural talents, and in the weakness of the moral sentiments, in by far the greater number of individuals. So long as every one shall work merely for his own interest, fortunes will necessarily be unequal. A few will succeed each other in opulence, and many will dwell in poverty and misery. This incon- veniency is mentioned in the Christian system ; a difference of natural gifts is recognised ; but all are commanded to employ their endowments to the common advantage. In this, as in every discussion having the actions of man for its object, I start from the principle that natural morality ought to govern mankind, and that general happiness is preferable to that of individuals. He then who uses his faculties to the furtherance of the common weal, ought to enjoy full liberty, and to meet encour^ agement in his noble purposes ; while all who think only of their private interest are to be superintended, lest the commonwealth suffer by their undertakings. Great manufactories, for instance, which are so apt to ruin the body and the mind of those engaged in them, must be overlooked ; no one has the right to make others vicious and unhappy, that he may procure enjoyments or amass riches ; and if personal morality 192 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIiND. suffice not to prevent the doing evil, society has a prime right to interfere, and, guided by general morality, to supply all that is de- fective. Hence, universal happiness, as it is the aim of legislation in gen- eral, must be the basis of all enactments relative to property. So long as individuals shall be suffered to collect riches without limits, the causes of misery and of slavery will endure. The poor will sell themselves to the rich, and the rich will find easy means of imposing their arbitrary will as law upon society. This, however, is a subject surrounded by innumerable difficul- ties. Much has been written upon it, but all has not yet rendered it clear in every one of its points. Property must be respected, otherwise civil wars and the dissolution of society would be un- avoidable ; but, again, if in the regulations Concerning property, general happiness be neglected, the order of things established can- not be permanent. Fortunes get more and more concentrated, the equilibrium is disturbed, and in the end the rich to maintain pos- session are obliged to repel by force the attacks of the poor, who think themselves strong in their numbers. The division of property is, therefore, a necessary condition to general happiness ; hence, primogeniture is inadmissible, and opposed to natural morality, which recognises reward as well-bestowed for personal merit alone. I have already said, that if it be unjust to punish children for the faults of parents, it cannot be just to reward them for the merits of sires ; I add— That to me it seems necessary for the nations which would secure a permanent existence, to fix the maximum of the proper- ty that may be acquired, as well as the conditions, viz., natural morality, in conformity with which it may be amassed; or else, as it seems fair that every one should enjoy the fruits of his labor, parents might, under certain conditions, be permitted to acquire to the extent they pleased, but still have the power of transmitting a certain sum only to their children when arrived at the age of maturity, while the rest of their gains should revert to the common- wealth, and be employed in purposes of public usefulness. This PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 193 would be the best way of doing justice to the community, and of preventing idleness, that foster-parent of vice. History proves that nations attain the highest prosperity when every one is permitted to work for his peculiar advantage; but history also proves that this prosperity is not permanent; its very causes involve the elements of decline ; for luxury, indolence, moral corruption, degeneracy of body, and feebleness of mind, are consequences of its temporary endurance, and these are the sure precursors to the death of empires. I leave this discussion to those who are occupied with politics. I am particularly interested in calling the attention of all thinking people to the necessity of found- ing society on the broad basis of natural morality, itself the sole, sure, and unalterable foundation of universal welfare. This ground is more stable than that which sensual pleasures or the arts and sciences can supply. The indulgence of inferior appetites degrades, morality ennobles human nature, and is indispensable, whilst the arts and sciences are mere embellishments of existence. Jesus taught his disciples to be satisfied with their daily bread and with what is necessary to their existence. He condemned riches in the most severe terms. To impress still more deeply the importance of subordinating the animal feelings to the faculties proper to man, I shall speak summarily of the love of approbation. This sentiment exists in animals and in man, and exercises a powerful influence over all our actions in society. Still to permit its unbounded activity is a very great error. Nations in whom it prevails are scarcely fit for a free government, servility, so to speak, is their natural bent. Blinded by external appearances they overlook the common wel- fare. Titles, decorations, encomiums are effectual instruments in the hands of their governors to enslave them. Two prime errors are to be guarded against; in the first place, distinction is never to be conferred on account of actions resulting from the animal nature, undirected by the superior faculties ; and again, distinction ought never to be the aim of human actions. From all I have said then, it follows that I consider the submis- VOL. II. os 194 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. sion to the natural laws and the practice of natural morality as in- dispensable to the welfare of mankind at large, and that all social institutions ought to be founded on this natural morality, which has been, is, and will ever be, invariable. Individually I call those happy who enjoy good health and without difficulty subject their animal nature to the faculties proper to man ; who, for instance, are satisfied with such things as are merely necessary—with their daily bread; who desire not superfluities, luxuries, riches, or dis- tinctions ; who taste of all pleasures in moderation, enjoying every thing, but abusing nothing; who cultivate art or science for the delights it affords; who in every situation do their duty, and who stand not in need of others or foreign aid, to satisfy their active faculties. Unhappy, on the other hand, are almost all who look for their personal well-being in things which are opposed' to natural morality; who have many and active faculties, the satisfaction of which depends on others ; whose inferior faculties, in short, are the most energetic, especially if they injure the health, and if their indulgence be expensive. SECTION VIII. Explanation of different Philosophical Expressions. Nothing is more vague than the language of philosophy. Many expressions have several significations, and almost every term in use has been invented to designate actions, and not the facul- ties which produce them. To make this difference felt I shall collect several of the most common words, and in one column give their usual signification, in another their explanation accord- ing to the fundamental faculties, referring the reader to the pas- sages either in the physiological or in the philosophical part of this work, in which the terms as they occur are more particularly explained. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 195 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. Absolute. Unconditional; not relative. Nothing but God is absolute. In man every thing is relative and conditional. Admiration. A tribute paid by individuals to It is an affection of the sense of whatever appears to them good marvellousness. and excellent. Adoration. The external homage paid to The effect of the sense of ven- the Divinity. eration. Affectation. A singular manner of speaking ; It results from the love of appro- the making an external ap- bation when not combined pearance in order to attract with understanding; it in- the attention of others. creases in combination with secretiveness and ideality. Affections. Certain states of the mind. They are the modes of being affected of the fundamental faculties. See p. 56 of this volume. Ambition. Great desire of preferment and An effect of great activity of the distinction. !<>ve of approbation applied to things of importance. See p. 206, vol. i. 196 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Common Significations. Explanation according to the Fnculties. Anger. Uneasiness upon a receipt of A violent emotion with an incli any disagreeable sensation. nation to revenge. Apathy. The quality of not feeling ; ex- Inactivity of every fundamental emption from passion ; free- faculty ; it is partial, or more dom from mental excitation. or less general. Ardor. Heat, or eagerness in action. Great activity of every funda- mental power. Art. A word used in opposition to The result of individual powers nature ; something effected by of the mind. skill and dexterity. Attention. Application of the mind to any The result of the individual in- subject, tellectual faculties. See p. 42 of this volume. Attrition. Grief of sin arising from the A disagreeable affection of the fear of punishment. sense of conscientiousness caused by that of veneration, assisted by benevolence and circumspection. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 197 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties Beautiful. Each agreeable sensation by It designs the harmonious rela- means of hearing and seeing. tions between external impres- sions and the intellectual fac- ulties of the mind, principally the senses of extension, con- figuration, coloring, tone, and order. Belief. Credit given to something which Hope disposes to belief; hope we knew not of ourselves and marvellousness produce religious belief. Benevolence. Disposition to do good. A fundamental faculty. See p. 212, vol. i. Charming. Pleasing in the highest degree. Springs from a high degree of satisfaction of every funda- mental faculty. Compassion. Painful sympathy. A disagreeable affection, or mode of action of benevolence. Confusion. Distraction of mind and indis- Defect of order in general, dis- tinct combination of ideas. cord among the functions 198 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. Conscience. The faculty by which we judge A mode of action of conscien- of good and evil. tiousness. Constancy. Unalterable continuance. The effect of firmness assisted by the activity of the individ- ual faculties. Consternation. Astonishment accompanied with An affection of marvpllousness terror. and circumspection without hope and courage. Contempt. The act of despising. A disagreeable affection of self- esteem, produced by various causes. Contentment. Acquiescence without plenary A degree of satisfaction of every satisfaction. fundamental faculty. Contrition. Sorrow for sin. A disagreeable affection of con- scientiousness, caused by be-• nevolence, veneration, and marvellousness. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 1 99 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. Courage. Active fortitude. A fundamental power. See p. 185, Vol. i. Cruelty. Delight taken in the pain of It results from the satisfaction others. of destructiveness without be- nevolence. Cupidity. Unlawful longing. Great activity of acquisitiveness. Desire. Wish to enjoy. A result of every faculty in ac- tion. See p. 53, of this vol. Desolation. A sort of mixture of melancholy A disagreeable affection of at- and despair. tachment, and of benevolence, or of circumspection without courage, hope, and firmness. Despair. Hopelessness. A disagreeable affection of cir- cumspection without hope. Despise. An act of contempt. A disagreeable affection of seh- esteem. 200 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. nee. Want of confidence. The effect of circumspection, combined with secretiveness and intellect. A sort of contempt. Disdain. A disagreeable affection of self- esteem. Disorder. Irregularity, neglect of rule. Want of order and time; often also want of justice and be- nevolence. Uncertainty of mind. Doubt. The effect of circumspection, combined with intellect. Duty. That to which a man is by any The effect of conscientiousness. natural or legal obligation bound. Envy. Pain felt at the sight of excel- The effect of selfishness, com- lence or happiness in ano- bined with various inferior ther. powers, and without benevo- lence. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 201 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. Ecstasy. Rapture and excessive eleva- The faculties of marvellousness, tion of the mind. ideality, mirthfulness, and hope, dispose to this state of mind. Faith. Belief in the revealed truths of The effect of marvellousness and religion. hope. Friendship. The state of minds united by A fundamental feeling. See mutual benevolence. Vol. i. p. 161. Fright. A strong and sudden fear. A strong and sudden affection of circumspection. Fury. A violent fit of anger. An affection and strong irritation of courage and destructive- ness. Genius. A man endowed with mental The highest degree of activity powers in a high degree. of the individual faculties. Grief. Sorrow for something past. A state of dissatisfaction of every fundamental faculty. vol. n. 26 202 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. Ill-will. State of satisfaction. Pride, arrogance. Hatred. A compound affection, it results from opposition to our selfish riews, whilst benevolence and justice are inactive. Happiness. The effect of the satisfaction of every fundamental faculty. Haughtiness. The effect of self-esteem, some- times combined with firmness and justice. Honor. Reputation, dignity. Its basis is the love of appro- bation. It is often modified by self-love and veneration. Hope. Expectation of something which A we desire. fundamental Vol. i. power. See Horror. Terror, mixed with detestation. A disagreeable, more or less com- pound, affection of benevo- lence, veneration, justice, cir- cumspection, approbation, and configuration. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 203 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. Idea. Thought, mental image. The effect of each intellectual faculty. Imagination. The power of forming ideas, The spontaneous and great acti- and of representing ideas of vity of every faculty; activity- absent things. Inability to suffer delay. Great vivacity in action. Want of attention. Unconcernedness. of ideality. See p. 3S, of this volume. Impatience. Great activity of every funda mental faculty. Impetuosity. Great and quick activity of the fundamental faculties, princi- pally of ideality, self-love, cou- rage, of the love of approbation and of mirthfulness, without circumspection. Inattention. Inactivity of every intellectual faculty. See. p. 35 of this volume. Indifference. Little activity of every funda- mental faculty 204 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Explanation according to the Faculties. Common Significations. uxpiaim Indignation. Anger, mingled with contempt A compound affection of self- i iisgnst <*leem> JusUCe' r™86' E the love of approbation. Indolence. Laziness, carelessness. Little activity of the fnndamen- tal faculties. Insolence. Pride, displayed in contemp- The effect of great self-esteem, tuous treatment of others. conrage, and other mfenor feelings, combined with little justice. Instinct. An impulse to act in the mind The effect of spontaneous activi- not determined by delibera- ty of every faculty. See p. 28, of this volume. tion. ' Jealousy. Suspicious caution, or rivalry. A compound affection of selfish- ness, and various fundamental powers. Joy. A lively and agreeable emotion An agreeable affection of every of the mind. fundamental faculty, particu- larly of the feelings. Judgment. The power of judging ; the de- A mode of action of the intel- termination come to. lectual faculties. See p. 40, of this volume. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 205 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. Knowledge. Cognizance, clear perception. The effect of the activity of every intellectual faculty. Love (physical.) The passion between the sexes. A fundamental power. See vol. i. p. 147. Lukewarm. Indifferent, not ardent. Little activity of the fundamental faculties. Melancholy. A gloomy temper. A disagreeable affection of the feelings, particularly of cir- cumspection. Memory. The power of recollecting things An internal repetition of its func- past. tion by every intellectual fac- ulty. See this vol. p. 36. Moderation. Forbearance; not going to ex- A moderate activity of every tremities. faculty. Modesty. Decency, purity of manners. Little activity of self-esteem with benevolence, circumspection, and justice. 206 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties Morality. Practice of the duties of life. The effect of the faculties pro- per to man, particularly of conscientiousness. Negligence. The habit of omitting, or of Little activity of the individual acting carelessly. faculties, particularly of order, of the desire to acquire, &c. Nobility. Persons of high rank. True nobility results from acti- vity of the superior senti- ments. Pain. A disagreeable sensation. A disagreeable affection of every fundamental faculty. Passion. Violent emotion of the mind. The highest degree of activity of every faculty. See p. 52, of this volume. Patience. The power of expecting long, Moderate activity of the facul- or of suffering without discon- ties, supported by circumspec- tent. tion, firmness, and sometimes by benevolence ; also, the activity of individual facul- ties, assisted by firmness. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 207 Common Significations Explanation according to the Faculties. Perplexity. Distraction and irresolution of A compound affection of cir- m;nd, cumspection, combined with the love of approbation and justice, increased by little courage. Pleasure. Gratification of the mind. An agreeable affection of every faculty. Pretension. Claim, true or false. Great activity of self-esteem, in- creased by the love of appro- bation. Rage. Violent anger. Great activity of courage and destructiveness. Ravishment. Violent but pleasing excitement A high degree of pleasure pro- of the mind. duced by the satisfaction of every faculty very active. Regret. Vexation for something past. A disagreeable affection of every faculty combined with the remembrance of some enjoy- ment lost. 208 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. Reminiscence. Recollection. The peculiar memory of the power of knowing facts (Event- uality). See p. 38 of this vol. Remorse; or, Repentance. Pain of guilt. A disagreeable affection of con- scientiousness. Science. Knowledge built on principles. It is the effect of the reflective applied to the perceptive fac ulties. Self-esteem. A fundamental power. See. vol. i. p. 208. Sensation. Perception by means of the The knowledge of every impres- senses. sion either external or inter- nal. See p. 32 of this vol. Shame. The passion felt when reputation A disagreeable affection of the is supposed to be lost, or love of approbation, combin- when a bad action is detect- ed with justice and circum- ed spection. Sorrowful. Mournful ; grieving. A disagreeable affection of every faculty. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSIONS. 209 Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties. Spite. Malice, rancor. A disagreeable affection of self- esteem and courage. Stupor. Great diminution, or suspension A great degree of inactivity of of sensibility. the faculties. Sublime. Exalted, high in excellence. The effect of ideality, combined with the superior sentiments, and intellectual faculties. Temperance. Moderation and sedateness. A moderate activity of the infe- rior feelings. . Temptation. The act of temptmg, and the The effect of every active fac- state of being tempted. ulty which incites to action. Tranquil. Quiet. The effect of little activity. Uneasiness. State of disquiet. The effect of great activity of every faculty. Unhappiness. Distress. The state of dissatisfaction of every active faculty. vol. ii. 27 210 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Common Significations. Explanation according to the Faculties Unreasonable. Want of reason. Inactivity of the reflecting fac ulties. Vengeance. The desire and act of render- Self-esteem being offended, com- ing evil for evil. bined with courage, destruc tiveness, and other inferior sentiments, whilst benevo- lence and justice are inactive, incites to revenge. Virtue. Moral goodness, that which Every action conformable to gives excellence. natural morality; the result of the contest between the two natures of man. Want. The state of not having ; de- Want, in the sense of desire, is s]re. • the effect of every active fac- ulty. Will. A faculty of the mind, and the Decision according to motives determination which results which are proper to man, and from it. enlightened by the reflecting faculties.—See p. 47 of this volume. Wisdom. The power of judging rightly. The regulation of every action, by the rule of natural morali- ty. RECAPITULATION. 211 Recapitulation and Conclusion. In this volume I flatter myself with having proved that idealo- gists and moralists have confined themselves to general notions of the mind, and have taken mere modes of action for fundamental faculties. I have proposed a new classification of the faculties of the mind, capable of being ascertained by observation and applica- ble in social life. Moreover, I have examined into the origin of the fundamental faculties, and shown that neither outward circum- stances, nor education, nor the external senses, nor the will, ex- plains their existence ; but that each is innate, and depends on the cerebral organization for its exhibition. I have particularly insisted on the moral nature of man, and am convinced that the lovers of truth will not now accuse Phrenology of teaching either materialism or fatalism, in the sense that the fac- ulties being innate, act irresistibly. I have considered the condi- tions necessary to liberty, the nature of moral liberty, and the origin of evil. I have compared Christianity with the natural mo- rality of man, and am of opinion, that true Christianity will gain by the knowledge of human nature. I have decided- in favor of natural goodness, because it may rather be depended on than the goodness which is prompted by virtue. I have entered into some considerations relative to the practical part of Phrenology, and spoken of the modifications observable in the manifestations of each faculty ; of the difficulty of judging of others ; of the necessity of mutual indulgence ; of natural sympathy and antipathy; and of the happiness of mankind. At the end I have given an explanation of several expressions according to the fundamental faculties of the mind, and their modes of action. 212 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. Conclusion. The object of anthropology in its extensive signification is im- mense, extremely difficult, but important and interesting in the same proportion. It will still require much exertion to be render- ed perfect. I shall be happy if I succeed in calling the attention of others to the study of man, and particularly to the consideration of his moral nature, which is essential to general happiness, and which, I think, has been too much neglected in modern times. I conclude in hopes that the things prescribed by Providence, and the victorious forces of truth will finally prevail. BOOKS OF STERLING VALUE RECENTLY PUBLISHED B"X HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW-YORK. i. ENCYCLOPEDIA 0F DOMESTIC ECONOMY. A complete Repertory of all Matters connected with the Economy of Housekeeping. By T Webster, Esq. 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