REPORT 
OF THE 
COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO 
INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF THE 
WAR DEPARTMENT IN THE 
WAR WITH SPAIN. 
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION: 
y % i 
Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, Iowa, President. 
Col. James A. Sexton, Illinois. 
Col. Charles Denby, Indiana. 
Capt. Evan P. Howell, Georgia. 
Ex-Governor Urban A. Woodbury, Vermont. 
Brig. Gen. John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, 
U. S. A. 
Gen. James A. Beaver, Pennsylvania. 
Ma,j. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. A. 
Dr. Phineas S. Conner, Ohio. 
Richard Weightman, Secretary. 
Lieut. Col. E. B. Jones, Chief Quartermaster of 
Volunteers, Disbursing Officer. 
Maj. Stephen C. Mills, Recorder. 
WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1899. REPORT 
OP THE 
COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO 
INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF THE 
WAR DEPARTMENT IN THE 
WAR WITH SPAIN. 
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION: 
Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, Iowa, President. 
Col. James A. Sexton, Illinois. 
Col. Charles Denby, Indiana. 
Capt. Evan P. Howell, Georgia. 
Ex-Governor Urban A. Woodbury, Vermont. 
Brig. Gen. John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, 
TJ. S. A. 
Gen. James A. Beaver, Pennsylvania. 
Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, TJ. S. A. 
Dr. Phineas S. Conner, Ohio. 
Bichard Weightman, Secretary. 
Lieut. Col. E. B. Jones, Chief Quartermaster of 
Volunteers, Disbursing Officer. 
Maj. Stephen C. Mills, Recorder. 
WASHINGTON : 
government PRINTING OFFICE. 
l 8 9 9- OFFICE OF COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO 
INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT IN 
THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 
Washington, D. C., February 9, 1899. 
To the President : 
Sir: The undersigned, members of the commission appointed by you 
to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with 
Spain, have the honor to submit the following report: 
On the 8tli day of September, 1898, Gen. E. A. Alger, Secretary of 
War, submitted to you a letter (a copy whereof is annexed hereto, 
marked “A’7), wherein he requested you to appoint a board, consisting 
of from five to seven members, with full power to investigate every 
bureau of the War Department and everything connected with the 
Army during the recent War with Spain. 
In pursuance of this request you appointed the undersigned a com- 
mission for the purpose indicated. 
At your request the members of the commission assembled at the 
Executive Mansion September 24 last. You then read to them a paper 
embodying your instructions (a copy whereof is hereto attached, 
marked “B”). In this paper you instruct the commission to thor- 
oughly investigate all charges of criminal neglect of the soldiers in 
camp, field, hospital, and on transports; and to make the fullest exami- 
nation of the administration of the War Department in all of its branches 
with the view of establishing the truth or falsity of the accusations of 
neglect and incompetency which had been made in the public press 
and elsewhere. Under your instructions there was no limit to the 
scope of our investigation, and you assured us that every facility would 
be afforded for the closest scrutiny and examination of all departments 
connected with the Army. You impressed upon us in the strongest 
manner your wish that our investigation should be so thorough and 
complete that our report should, when made, fix the responsibility for 
any failure or fault by reason of neglect, incompetency, or maladminis- 
tration upon the officers and bureaus responsible therefor, if it should 
be found that the evils complained of had existed. 
Appreciating to the fullest extent the candor and earnestness of your 
instructions, and resolved to abide by them in tlieir meaning and spirit, 
we entered upon the discharge of our important duties. Immediately 
on leaving your presence the commission organized by electing Gen. 
Grenville M. Dodge, of Iowa, president; Col. Charles Denby, of Indi- 
ana, vice-president; and Mr. Eichard C. Weightman, of Washington 
City, secretary. Gen. James A. Beaver, of Pennsylvania, was desig- 
nated to conduct the examination of witnesses. Lieut. Col. F. B. Jones, 4 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
chief quartermaster of volunteers, was detailed by the War Depart- 
ment as disbursing officer, and Maj. Stephen G. Mills, U. S. A., was 
appointed by you recorder of the commission. 
The organization of the commission took place at the War Depart- 
ment September 24, but on the next day and thereafter we met at the 
Lemon Building, in Washington City. 
At the second meeting of the commission the necessary arrangements 
were made for the securing of clerks and stenographers, and a general 
discussion had as to the line of investigation to be pursued. 
It was determined that the fullest possible publicity should be given 
to the proceedings of the commission. 
Only two rooms were assigned us for public use. One was used and 
occupied by the members of the commission for the taking of testimony 
and other business; the other by the employees of the commission. 
There was, therefore, but little space available for the accommodation 
of reporters desiring to report proceedings; but there were allowed to 
be present at the sessions of the commission during the examination of 
witnesses six representatives, three of whom represented the three press 
associations of the United States, to whom all needed conveniences were 
assigned. A copy of the orders relating to reports by representatives 
of the press is annexed hereto, marked “0.” 
In further preparation for the labors of the commission it was 
resolved at the first meeting for business, held September 25, that the 
Secretary of War, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, 
the Commissary-General, and the Surgeon-General should be requested 
to transmit to the commission all complaints received by them since 
April 1, 1898, touching the conduct of the war. 
This request was promptly complied with by the officials above 
mentioned, and a large number of letters and communications touch- 
ing the subject-matter thereof were transmitted to the commission for 
its consideration. For the resolution see the paper hereto annexed, 
marked UD.” 
In order that all persons should have the most ample opportunity to 
present to the commission any complaints they might see fit to make 
touching the conduct of the War Department, the commission, by a 
resolution adopted September 27, which was immediately given to the 
press, resolved that it invited and was ready and willing to receive and 
consider any complaints about the conduct of the War Department from 
any person or persons, and that it was respectfully requested that such 
complaints should be made in writing, stating facts that the party 
might know of his own knowledge precisely and in detail, giving names 
of any officers or enlisted men who were charged with misconduct or 
incompetency, and that such communications should be addressed to 
the secretary of the commission at Washington, D. G. 
A copy of this resolution is hereto annexed marked UE.” 
In compliance with this resolution we received many hundreds of 5 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
letters and newspaper clippings, all of wliicli were duly considered by 
tlie commission. 
In order to further facilitate our labors and to furnish every possible 
opportunity for presenting complaints it was ordered that whenever 
any person made a complaint which was not specific, he should be 
requested to forward a written statement, giving in as definite and 
complete a form as practicable all facts based upon personal experience 
and knowledge that would aid the pending investigation. (See paper 
hereto annexed, marked “F.77) 
September 26,1898, a communication was addressed to the Secretary 
of War, wherein he was requested to direct the Adjutant-General, the 
Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-General, the Surgeon-General, 
the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief of Ordnance to furnish to the 
commission, as soon as practicable, information as to the condition of 
their several departments at the time of the declaration of war with 
Spain, and the operations of the same from that time until the war 
closed; a copy of which communication to the Secretary of War is 
annexed hereto, marked “G.77 
This communication recited in detail the subjects on which informa- 
tion was desired, comprising facts touching the mobilization of troops, 
and their organization; the amount and kind of camp and garrison 
equipage on hand at the beginning of the war, the amount subsequently 
purchased; similar information with regard to furnishing the troops 
with arms and accouterments; information as to which of the volunteer 
regiments were armed and equipped in the various State camps; how 
the location of the camps of general rendezvous was determined; full 
particulars as to the transportation of troops; an account of the quan- 
tity, quality, and kind of food furnished; information as to the tentage, 
beds, linen, medicines, and all other necessaries for the hospitals; as 
to whether the medical staff was efficient; and as to the conditions and 
operations of the engineer and ordnance departments. 
To aid the Secretary of War in complying with this request there was 
submitted a list of special questions addressed to the heads of depart- 
ments, which list is attached to said communication. 
The Secretary of War and the heads of the departments, to wit, the 
Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-Gen- 
eral, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief of 
Ordnance, in compliance with our request, furnished answers to the 
questions propounded to them, copies of which, in the order above 
named, are hereunto annexed, marked, respectively, “H,77 “I,” “K,” 
“ L,77 “ M,77 “ N,77 and “ O.77 
These replies have materially aided us in our investigation. Hav- 
ing thus arranged the preliminary matters which seemed advisable to 
be determined, the commission resolved that all charges specifically 
brought before it should be made the basis of the examination of wit- 
nesses who had, or professed to have, knowledge of the facts involved 
in such charges. 6 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
It was further determined that in the examination of witnesses the 
strict rules of evidence as applied in legal proceedings should not be 
adhered to, but considerable latitude should be allowed. 
While, therefore, in general, the rules of evidence have been followed, 
we have not hesitated to relax their application when thought advis- 
able. During our sessions we examined 495 witnesses. All of these 
were sworn or affirmed, except one who declined to take the oath. 
The chief examination was couducted by the member designated for 
that purpose, but each witness was interrogated by every member of 
the commission who desired to do so. 
Our purpose in the discharge of our duties was to arrive at the facts 
touching the conduct of the war, and no effort was spared by us to 
reach that result. We have examined the Secretary of War; the Com- 
manding General; heads of departments; officers of corps, divisions, 
brigades, regiments, and companies; noncommissioned officers and 
privates; nurses, and persons from many employments in private life. 
No man or woman who has stated to us that he or she had any material 
matter touching the subject of our inquiry to communicate has been 
refused a hearing. 
All the members of the commission have been engaged in taking 
testimony. It lias happened that subcommittees have been occupied 
in hearing witnesses at four different places at the same time. 
Testimony has been taken in Washington, D. C.; Jacksonville, Fla.; 
Fort McPherson, Ga.; Anniston, Ala.; Huntsville, Ala.; Chattanooga, 
Tenn.; Knoxville, Tenn.; Lexington, Ky.; Chicago, 111.; Cincinnati, 
Ohio; Detroit, Mich.; Harrisburg, Pa.; New York City; Boston; Bur- 
lington, Vt. ; Tampa, Fla., and Fernandina, Fla. The commission visited 
in person most of the old camps; Jacksonville, which was occupied by 
the Seventh Corps; the sites of the camps at Tampa, Fernandina, and 
Camp Thomas; the new camps at Anniston, where the First Division of 
the Fourth Corps was located; Huntsville, where the Second and Third 
divisions and cavalry division of the Fourth Corps were located; Knox- 
ville, where the Second Division of the First Corps was located; Lex- 
ington, where the headquarters and First Division of First Corps were 
encamped; and Camp Meade, where the Second Corps was encamped. 
As a rule the inspection was not only of camps but of troops and 
supplies, and much valuable information was obtained by contact with 
officers and enlisted men. 
At all of these places we have invited, sometimes with special insist- 
ence, every person to come before us and testify who could throw any 
light on the conduct of the War Department in any of its branches. 
Any charge of corruption or intimation of fraud or bribery in con- 
nection with the letting of any contract, even a hint of wrongdoing, 
has been carefully investigated. 
It may be said now, at the beginning of this report, that there has 
been no evidence before us that anyone in or connected with the War REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
7 
Department has dishonestly received a dollar. We have made persist- 
ent efforts to secure the attendance of persons to whose names rumor 
had attached an allegation that they knew of corruption of officials in 
the War Department, but these men have either denied the statements 
attributed to them or have maintained silence when invited to tell 
what they knew. 
Preliminary to a specific report on the conduct and management of 
the bureaus of the War Department, as well as on camps and sanita- 
tion, and the conditions attending the operations of armies in the field, 
attention is called to certain topics had under consideration. We have 
regarded it as a part of our duty to make suggestions touching changes 
that might be desirable in the future control and management of the 
Army. 
RETIRED OFFICERS 
Under existing laws tlie officers of the Army are retired when they 
reach the age of 64. We have had before ns many suggestions made 
by officers on the retired list, who are men of experience and dis- 
tinction, that this law should be so amended as to give to the Presi- 
dent the right to call into active service any retired officer during the 
time of war. This right exists as to the retired officers of the Navy, 
and it seems to us there is no reason why it should not be extended 
to embrace retired Army officers. 
It does not appear reasonable that an arbitrary law should prevent 
during the existence of war the use of experienced men merely on 
account of their age. We think it would be wise to make it discre- 
tionary with the President to use the officers on the retired list for 
filling positions during war and not trench on the active organization, 
that may be needed in the field. 
During the recent war many positions were filled by the appointment 
of civilians to wliich retired officers could have brought professional 
training, valuable knowledge, and large experience. 
These remarks must not be construed as reflections on the appoint- 
ments made from civil life. The young civilians who received staff and 
other appointments in the main discharged their duties in a highly 
commendable manner. Although inexperienced, they learned quickly. 
Among the officers of the staff departments appointed from civil life 
were many who had had experience in work identical with or similar 
to that they were called upon to perform while in service. 
REGIMENTAL OFFICERS. 
Volunteer regiments commanded by regular officers or by officers of 
experience were better cared for than those regiments which were com- 
manded by inexperienced men. The colonel of a regiment is responsi- 
ble for the care of the men in every respect as to their health, drill, and 
discipline, and incessant care is necessary on his part to force upon 8 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
the men the practice of hygiene in all matters relating to camp life, such 
as cleanliness, bathing, care of kitchen and sink, and general policing. 
The less sickness among regular troops as compared with volunteers 
must be ascribed, in part at least, to the fact that they are commanded 
and cared for by skilled and experienced officers. 
EXAMINATION OF APPOINTEES IN THE ARMY. 
In order to secure competent officers in all the branches of the Army, 
it is desirable that before receiving his commission every applicant 
should be examined by a board designated for the purpose by the 
President. The fact that regimental officers are nominated by the 
governors of the States constitutes no valid objection to their being 
compelled to undergo such examination. If it were known that 
appointees would be examined as to their qualification, greater care 
might be exercised by the governors in their selections. All such 
appointees are to be mustered into the service of the United States, 
and before the muster takes place the Government should be satisfied 
that they are capable of properly discharging the duties incumbent 
upon them after muster into service. It is the practice of the Govern- 
ment now to require every officer up to a certain grade to be examined 
for promotion. During the war it was the practice of the Govern- 
ment to require nominees for appointment in the Regular Army to be 
examined. The system should be adhered to in increasing the Army in 
time of peace and in all future wars. The short duration of the war 
with Spain, perhaps, did not render it practicable to convene boards 
of examination, but there is no reason why such should not be con- 
vened hereafter. 
SCHOOLS OF INSTRUCTION 
We have been greatly impressed by the proof taken before us as 
to the advantages derived from schools of instruction, which were 
established in many brigades and regiments. Regular Army quarter- 
masters and commissaries held such schools at some places where 
large numbers of troops were cpllected; their services were greatly 
appreciated by civilian appointees, and good results followed. There 
were also in many regiments schools held for instructing the commis- 
sioned and noncommissioned officers in tactics and other soldierly 
duties. Binding regulations on this subject should be enacted, and 
the system extended to all branches of the service, particularly in 
any special duties pertaining thereto. It would be perhaps especially 
beneficial to surgeons appointed from civil life, who, informed in the 
line of their profession, are usually unacquainted with the purely mili- 
tary duties in which they should be specially instructed. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
9 
PAPER WORK OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT. 
The routine work in the departments, in our opinion, is far beyond 
what is necessary, and each year seems to increase it. The methods 
employed make it almost impossible to transact business promptly. 
The heads of all departments, officers of large depots, chiefs of staff 
departments, corps, and divisions have necessarily been obliged to give 
the time and attention to details which should have been given to 
matters of larger moment. No well-regulated concern or corporation 
could transact business satisfactorily under such regulations as govern 
the staff departments, and the fact that every officer of each of the staff 
departments holding responsible positions has been obliged to ignore 
routine demonstrates the necessity of a thorough reform. 
On the 1st day of April, 1898, the strength of the Army was 2,143 
officers and 26,040 enlisted men, a total of 28,183. War with the 
Kingdom of Spain was declared April 21, 1898. Jnst before the war 
began portions of the Regular Army were stationed in Washington, 
Idaho, California, Utah, Nebraska, Wyoming, Montana, the Dakotas, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and at various posts, 
amounting in all to 80 in number. On April 15,1898, by direction of the 
Secretary of War, the regiments of the Regular Army, with few excep- 
tions, were ordered to proceed to various points in the South—Chicka- 
mauga, Ga., New Orleans, La., Mobile, Ala., and Tampa, Fla. By 
proclamation of April 23 the President called for 125,000 volunteers, 
and on May 25 for an additional force of 75,000. Congress also author- 
ized an increase of the Regular Army to 61,000 and in addition pro- 
vided for 16 regiments of volunteer infantry (immunes), cavalry, and 
engineers. 
On May 31, 125,000 volunteers had been mustered into the service. 
In August, 1898, the Regular Army numbered 56,365, the Volunteer 
Army 207,244—a total of 263,609. 
These figures of themselves indicate that an immense work was 
thrown upon the War Department. After thirty-three years of peace, 
during a great part of which the Army did not exceed 26,000 men, 
it suddenly became necessary to arm, clothe, feed, and equip more than 
a quarter of a million. 
How that duty was discharged will appear in detail in subsequent 
parts of this report. The sudden emergency which called our people 
to arms after an interval of half a century of peace with all foreign 
powers was met by the War Department with earnestness and 
energy. The situation found the country unprepared with any large 
stock of arms, ammunition, clothing, supplies, and equipments. That 
they were duly provided and that the numerous demands on the indus- 
tries of our people were met so promptly will remain one of the marvels 
of history. 
THE ARMY. 10 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
It is to be noted that the organization of the Army indicated a desire 
on the part of the War Department to place in separate and responsible 
commands experienced officers of the Regular Army and officers from 
civil life who had received a military education and had experience in 
the civil war. The chiefs of the staff departments in the field were 
selected from a similar class of officers. They took charge of the depots 
of supplies at the camps and were assigned the most responsible posi- 
tions. So many officers of the Regular Army commanded, supplied, 
and superintended the movement of troops that :the service was 
markedly reduced in its field, line, and staff. 
The rapidity with which commanding officers of corps, divisions, bri- 
gades, regiments, and officers of the staff departments have profited by 
the first six months’ service is shown in the improvements in the new 
camps, their location, water supply, and sanitary arrangements. The 
weak spots in the first arrangements for camping troops were soon dis- 
covered, and it was learned that with proper system and little expense 
they could be camped under favorable sanitary conditions. The pres- 
ent camps are models, the hospitals adapted to the comfort and care of 
the sick, the grounds clean, and the sanitary conditions greatly improved. 
The troops are now moved with promptness, without friction, and with 
more rapidity than in the beginning of the war. These improvements 
have come from experience, and the new army now is far advanced in 
facilities for feeding, equipping, camping, and transportation. 
CASUALTIES. 
The reports before us show that during the war 23 officers and 257 
enlisted men were killed; 113 officers and 1,464 enlisted men wounded. 
Between May 1 and September 30, inclusive, the deaths from all 
causes were 107 officers and 2,803 enlisted men, being an aggregate of 
2,910 out of a total force of 274,717, but a little over one per cent. 
PREPARATIONS FOR FUTURE WARS. 
One of the lessons taught by the war is that the country should 
hereafter be in a better state of preparation for war. Testimony has 
been taken on this subject, and suggestions have been made that large 
supplies of all the material not liable to deterioration should be kept 
on hand, to be continuously issued and renewed, so that in any emer- 
gency they might be available. Especially should this be the case with 
such supplies, equipment, and ordnance stores as are not in general 
use in the United States and which can not be rapidly obtained in 
open market. 
THE AID SOCIETIES. 
It is gratifying to report that most valuable assistance to our soldiers 
during the war was rendered by various voluntary relief associations the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
11 
more conspicuous of which were the American National Red Gross, 
the National Relief Commission, the Daughters of the American Revo- 
lution, the Army and Navy League, and the Young Men’s Christian 
Association. Representatives of these and other societies worked 
in cooperation with many good men and women in all the States and 
were present in the camp, the hospital, and on the field of battle. 
To these societies and those who cooperated with them the country 
owes a debt of gratitude. 
There were many individual instances of personal devotion to the 
interest of the soldiers. We do not name these beneficent laborers here, 
but they will not be forgetten. 
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY. 
For many years the divided authority and responsibility in the War 
Department has produced friction, for which, in the interest of the 
service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied. The Constitution 
makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Army, and he 
can not transfer that authority to any other person. The President 
selects his Secretary of War, who has his confidence, and who is his 
confidential adviser. The commanding general is assigned to duty as 
such by the President, and under the Military Laws of the United 
States his duties are defined as follows: 
The command exercised by the commanding general of the Army, not having been 
made the subject of statirtory regulation, is determined by the order of assignment. 
It has been habitually composed of the aggregate of the several territorial commands 
that have been or may he created by the President. 
The military establishment is under orders of the commanding general of the 
Army in that which pertains to its discipline and military control. The fiscal affairs 
of the Army are conducted by the Secretary of War through the several staff depart- 
ments. (Par. 187, A. R., 1895.) 
All orders and instructions from the President or Secretary of War relating to 
military operations or affecting the military control and discipline of the Army will 
he promulgated through the commanding general. (Par. 188, A. R., 1895.) 
Lieutenant-General Schofield, who has probably had as much 
experience and given the question as much thought and study as any 
one in our country, says in substance: 
Recent experience has served to confirm all the results of my lifelong study and 
large experience that the proper position for the senior officer of the Army on duty 
at Washington is not that of commanding general, a position which is practically 
impossible, but that of general in chief, which means in fact chief of staff to the 
President. The title of general in chief was a permanent one during the entire 
history of the country up to the time when General Grant became Lieutenant- 
General. 
When I became the commanding general I addressed to the President a letter, in 
which I pointed out to him what had been the result of my study and experience, 
and saying that the only way was to abandon entirely, which I did during my seven 
years of service, all pretense of being the commanding general and to content myself 
with acting as the chief of staff of the Army under the Secretary of War and the 
President. The result was that perfect harmony prevailed during my time, and I 12 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
did exercise a legitimate influence in command of the Army, this because I did not 
claim to exercise anything which the law did not give me. 
The President must have the same power of selection of his general 
in chief as he has of his Secretary of War; without this there can be 
no guaranty that he will give, or that the Secretary of War will place 
in the general in chief, that confidence which is necessary to perfect 
harmony. .Neither the President nor the Secretary of War should 
have in the command of the Army an officer who is not working in har- 
mony with him. 
The records of the War Department, which have been laid before us, 
show that the Secretary of War extended to all chiefs of bureaus cor- 
dial and full support, and promptly responded to every proper demand 
made upon him by commanding officers. 
No testimony has been presented showing intentional neglect of duty 
nor any attempt to serve personal interests. The charges made that 
the Secretary of War was pecuniarily interested in contracts, purchases, 
and other transactions of the War Department have been thoroughly 
examined and found baseless. 
In the judgment of the commission there was lacking in the general 
administration of the War Department during the continuance of the 
war with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was essen- 
tial to the highest efficiency and discipline of the Army. 
The commission has refrained from criticizing certain of the heads of 
bureaus for not having acted with foresight in jmeparing their various 
departments for active war before war was actually declared, because 
it has appeared that the national defense fund provided by the act of 
March 9, 1898, was not made available for use, except for the Navy 
and for coast defenses and the expenditures incident thereto, until 
after the declaration of war. 
THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 
ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT. 
BRIG. GEN. H. C. CORBIN, ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., IN CHARGE. 
The working force of this department is composed of 6 officers, 105 
permanent clerks, and 195 temporary clerks. 
The Adjutant-General’s Department is the bureau of orders and rec- 
ords of the Army. Orders and instructions emanating from the War 
Department or Army Headquarters and all general regulations are 
communicated to troops and individuals in the military service through 
the Adjutant-General. In his office are the records of the War Depart- 
ment relating to the personnel of the permanent military establishment 
and militia in the service of the United States, to the military history 
of every commissioned officer and soldier thereof, and to all movements 
and operations of troops. 
The department is divided into divisions as follows: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
13 
The Military Academy division has charge of the qualifications and 
manner of appointment of cadets. The graduation of the classes of 
1898 and 1899 in advance of the usual time created the impression that 
there must necessarily be a corresponding increase in the number of 
cadet appointments, which occasioned a large increase of applications 
and correspondence in this division. 
Enlisted branch of the Regular Army.—The work of this division com- 
prises the appointment of noncommissioned staff officers, transfers, 
furloughs, discharges, etc. This work up to September 1 was largely 
increased because of the added charge of the enlisted men of the Vol- 
unteer Army. Since that date the division has had to do with men of the 
Regular Army only. The discharges by favor in years before the war 
were less than 100 per month; since September 1 there have been over 
600 per month. The enlisted branch of the Volunteer Army since 
September 1 has had charge of the enlisted men of the volunteers, and 
there have passed through the office about 1,500 papers per day. 
This division also has charge of special orders. It receives the com- 
munications from soldiers serving with their regiments, soldiers away 
from their regiments, relatives and friends of soldiers, Members of 
Congress and other influential people asking for discharges and fur- 
loughs of volunteers. This correspondence has greatly increased from 
the fact that regulations and military discipline have often been 
ignored. 
Division of orders, boohs, and blanks.—From May 1 to August 1,1898, 
the number of special orders issued was 79; the number of special 
orders distributed was 31,752; number of paragraphs of special orders 
issued, 5,660; number of paragraphs of special orders distributed, 
23,800; general orders issued, 102; general orders distributed, 736,000; 
circulars issued, 36; circulars distributed, 256,000. During this time 
4,000,000 blanks were distributed to the Army from Porto Rico to 
Manila, and 15,700 packages of blank and record books. 
Army rolls division.—This division has control of the enlistment 
papers, descriptive and assignment cards, and death and disability 
papers pertaining to the enlisted men of the Regular Army. On the 
muster in of the volunteer organizations all similar records pertaining 
to them were committed to the care of this division. Before the war 
the average number of muster rolls received bimonthly was 855. Dur- 
ing the war this has been increased to 4,000. 
Appointment, promotion, and commission division.—Ordinarily about 
350 appointments and commissions were issued in a year, while since 
March 1, 1898, in the Regular and Volunteer Army 3,997 commissions 
have been issued. There have been filed over 30,000 applications for 
appointment as general and general staff officers of volunteers. 
Returns division.—This division has charge of receiving, examining, 
notiug, and filing all the various Army returns, keeping record of service 
of all officers of the Army, movement of troops, establishment of posts, 
their abandonment, etc. It also has charge of the records of the various 14 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
departments, corps, divisions, brigades, commanders, and staff offi- 
cers of each command, the movements and operations of the entire 
Army, as well as that of a single company, actions in which engaged, 
losses sustained, etc. It is in receipt of thousands of letters and news- 
papers daily going to regiments and individuals of the Army, which 
have to be readdressed and remailed. Since the commencement of the 
muster out of the volunteers a record is kept of the home addresses of 
all volunteer officers. 
Mail and record division.—All mail received in the office of the Adju- 
tant-General is opened and distributed in this division, requiring the 
services of three clerks. During the eight months preceding the war 
with Spain there were received 60,000 pieces of mail, and from May to 
December, 1898, 400,000. 
Muster-in division.—This division prepared the regulations for the 
muster in, the ordinary rolls, and other blanks. There were detailed 
in each State for mustering duty from one to three officers, to whom 
was assigned the further duty of arranging for the sheltering, subsist- 
ing, and clothing of the volunteers. They made physical examinations 
of 288,000 men, accepting 216,500, and have mustered out to date about 
110,000. 
Telegraph division.—Prior to the war with Spain the business of this 
branch of the service was 1,000 telegrams per month. With the 
sinking of the Maine, on February 15, the telegraph business began to 
steadily increase, so that on April 21, when war was declared, the 
working force was 8 operators, which number steadily increased to the 
time of the battle of Santiago, when there were 20 operators, 5 clerks, 
and 7 messengers. 
Recruiting division of the Regular and Volunteer Army.—Prior to 
March, 1898, the monthly rate of enlistment was from 700 to 1,000. 
Under the stimulus of the war, during the month of May the enlist- 
ments for the Regular Army reached 9,569, and for the three months 
May, June, and July they numbered 25,500, accepted from 102,000 
applicants. In addition, under the President’s second call, over 40,000 
volunteers were enlisted individually from 50,000 applicants to recruit 
the regiments mustered in under the first call. During the months 
of August, September, and October, the rate of enlistment for the 
Regular Army was 3,300; since November the monthly rate has been 
5,000. 
Military information division.—The work of this division began a long 
time before war was declared. Information was collected as to the 
strength, armament, supplies, and operations of the Spanish troops in 
Cuba and Porto Rico. Lieutenant Whitney visited Porto Rico and 
Lieutenant Rowan Cuba, and the result of this labor and personal 
examination was that when war was declared the War Department 
was in possession of information showing the probable amount of 
resistance to be met with at any given point. Plans of the forts around 
Havana and other fortified points and the troclias were obtained. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
15 
Military maps and military notes of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philip- 
pines were published, and illustrated pamphlets of the Spanish navy 
prepared for the purpose of informing- the commanding officers of 
seacoast forts of the character of the ships they might have to cope 
with. In conjunction with the Navy Department a confidential code 
of signals between our ships and the forts was drawn up. It also sent 
and received all the confidential telegrams of the War Department. 
There were submitted to the commission by the Adjutant-General 
detailed statements respecting the Regular Army, the volunteers, and 
militia, and correspondence and telegrams in relation to the three dif- 
ferent campaigns. For information on these subjects reference is made 
to reports appended. 
This department, which was organized and trained to take care of a 
small regular army, was required to rapidly provide for organizing and 
mustering in 250,000 soldiers, and within six months to muster out 
LOO,000. The Adjutant-General’s Department of the Army having full 
knowledge of the condition of the Army when the declaration of war 
was made, it could not be surprised by the inability of the departments 
to immediately respond to the demands. The economy of previous 
years, by which nearly every article of equipment not immediately 
needed by the Army was disposed of and no provision made for 
emergencies, rendered immediate effective expansion of the Army 
impossible. In the organization of the Army for active duty provision 
was made for eight corps, seven of which were fully equipped and 
placed in the field. 
The suggestion has been made, and opinion given, that it would have 
been better to have organized the Army and equipped the troops in each 
of their States before they were concentrated and mobilized into bri- 
gades, divisions, and corps, but the War Department had not the offi- 
cers to send to each State to organize, muster, feed, and equip them, 
nor had it officers of sufficient rank to command, drill, and discipline 
the troops while in State camps. Early removal of regiments from 
State camps has the advantage of avoiding the disturbing influences 
of home locality. 
During the organization and equipment of the Army a daily report by 
telegraph from each camp was received, showing what supplies they had 
and what was needed, and a copy of this report was furnished each 
staff department. Where important deficiencies were reported, the Sec- 
retary of War called attention to the fact, and in most cases it was 
found that such deficiencies were due to the nonexistence of the arti- 
cles. 
There were about 250 regiments, batteries, and separate organizations 
in the Army, from only 25 of which came complaints, aside from those 
affecting the Medical Department. Investigation has shown that the 
most of these complaints were because of lack of supplies not obtainable 
at first or were due to the inexperience of officers in command, not, so far 16 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
as we can discover, from any intentional neglect. Prompt action seems 
to liave been taken in most cases to remedy them, but they were what 
occur naturally from new experiences, new conditions, unexpected and 
emergency movements, and in fact from the entirely new life, discipline, 
and training. 
In the staff departments about 400 regular officers, on the strength 
of their efficiency records, were taken to All the more responsible posi- 
tions. Then it was found necessary to go outside and appoint from 
civil life, the selections being frequently made from officers who had 
had experience in the National Guard, graduates from military colleges 
and schools, and citizens whose business or professions fitted them for 
the positions for which they were selected. The testimony shows that 
they were honest and manifested a desire to become efficient in their 
duties. Not one has been court-martialed and but few dropped as 
incompetent. 
In the Inspector-General’s Department every appointee except one 
had had experience. In the Medical Department the President did 
not appoint unless the Surgeon-General had examined the application 
and recommended the applicant. 
The Adjutant-General testified that there had not been a deficiency 
of one dollar reported on the part of a volunteer staff officer, and that 
he wished to make it a matter of record that in the distribution of 
many millions of dollars during this war there was yet to be made the 
first charge of defalcation against an army officer, regular or volunteer. 
The testimony shows that it was the custom of the Secretary of War, 
when any large or emergency movement was contemplated, to call in 
consultation the heads of the different departments that related to the 
movement. It also shows that the heads of departments consulted the 
Secretary of War frequently, at times daily, upon matters relating to 
their departments, and were given prompt and ample support in their 
various duties. 
The military colleges of the United States should be encouraged, 
especially those that have a system of education and drill similar to 
West Point, and their graduates should be given preference, after 
West Point, in the appointment to the grade of second lieutenant 
in the Army over other civilians. It is a simple and effective way 
for the United States to induce young men who have a taste for 
military life to fit themselves for it, and creates a reserve force that 
always in times of war seeks service and performs efficient and valuable 
duties. 
From the day war was declared until this hour the office of the Adju- 
tant-General has not been closed. The heads of the departments were 
frequently called in the night for consultation and to furnish supplies 
in emergencies. The Adjutant-General was in his office almost the 
entire time, often spending the night there, and the greater part of the 
force worked Sundays and holidays and at all hours when the emergency 
required it. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
17 
There have been very few complaints against this department. The 
records and testimony show that it has been prompt in its work, and 
has added greatly to the efficiency of the Army. Lack of proper leg- 
islation and strict construction of laws and regulations made officers 
hesitate in assuming responsibilities and meeting emergencies by going 
outside the regulations and laws. However, most officers, seeing the 
necessity and appreciating the emergency, obtained by purchase and 
in other ways all needed supplies, being sustained in their action by 
the Secretary of War and chiefs of bureaus. This, however, will not 
relieve them of their personal liabilities, which can be removed only by 
act of Congress. Under the law no contract or actual expenditure 
preparatory for war could be made until appropriations were available. 
The different staff departments were called upon to obtain information 
and to make such preparation as was possible under the law and ex- 
isting conditions. 
INSPECTOR-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT. 
BRIG. GEN. J. 0. BRECKINRIDGE, INSPECTOR-GENERAL, U. S. A., IN 
CHARGE. 
DUTIES. 
The Inspector-General’s Department has no power to order inspec- 
tions except as directed so to do by the Secretary of War or the Major- 
General Commanding the Army, and has no control over inspectors- 
general assigned to department, corps or division headquarters. 
Its duties are prescribed partly by the statute law and partly by 
Army Regulations and General Orders. Those prescribed by statute 
are: 
First. Inspections or surveys of unserviceable stores, act of March 
3, 1825. 
Second. Frequent inspections of disbursements of appropriations 
made by officers of the Army, act April 20, 1874. 
Third. Annual inspection of the Soldiers’ Home at Washington, D. 0., 
act March 3, 1883. 
Fourth. Annual inspection of the National Homes for Disabled 
Volunteer Soldiers, act August 18, 1894. 
Army Regulations and General Orders prescribe that the sphere of 
inquiry of an inspector includes every branch of military affairs, except 
when limited in orders or by the Army Regulations. 
General Order 81 of 1898 prescribes that inspectors will be assigned 
by the War Department to the headquarters of geographical depart- 
ments, and to the headquarters of armies and army corps in the field, 
and by the commanding generals thereof to divisions. 
Inspectors thus assigned are under the orders of their commanding 
officers, and make such inspections as are directed. An inspector, of 
himself, has not the authority to inspect when and where he pleases. 18 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
It is directed in general order 81 of 1898 that he make known his orders 
or instructions to commanding or other officers whose troops and affairs 
he is directed to inspect, and an attempt to inspect without such 
orders would meet with a prompt and proper refusal to be inspected. 
Ordinarily an inspector is given wide latitude by his immediate com- 
manding officer and becomes a confidential staff officer. Frequently he 
is empowered to give orders in the name of the commanding officer to 
correct irregularities, or meet the deficiencies exposed by inspections, 
but this is in the discretion of the commanding officer and applies 
usually to troops only. The heads of the other staff departments, being 
staff officers of the commanding officer, their departments are inspected 
only by order. 
Inspeetors-general report in person to the Commanding General and 
by letter to the Adjutant-General of the Army. They report monthly 
to the Adjutant-General of the Army the inspections and investiga- 
tions made by them during the month. Their reports are made to 
their immediate commanding officer, who forwards them to the Adjutant- 
General of the Army for transmittal to the Inspector-General of the 
Army. They will not give orders unless specially authorized to do so, 
and then only in the name of the superior giving such authority. 
In active service, many of the reports of inspecting officers are made 
verbally. With new troops especially, commanding officers do not 
desire to have written reports of all inspections made. It is recognized 
that many errors, irregularities, and deficiencies are the results of inex- 
perience, and it is not thought desirable to make a record of all these 
matters which may soon be corrected, but which, put on record, would 
be a source of mortification to the troops afterwards. 
This feature, together with the immense amount of work to be done 
and the want of clerical assistance and appliances in the field, explains 
the lack of complete reports on file in the office of the Inspector- 
General in Washington. 
REPORTS. 
PERSONNEL. 
At the beginning of the war the Department had a force of one 
brigadier-general, two colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, and two 
majors. The act of Congress approved July 7, 1898, made a tem- 
porary increase of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, and one major 
during the war. 
The largest number of officers in the regular Department during the 
war was ten, which number was reached in August, when those newly 
appointed reported for duty. Of these, four were appointed general 
officers of the volunteers by the President of the United States and 
assigned to duty on their volunteer rank. 
The other six were on duty with troops or in the office of the 
Inspector-General in Washington. 
REGULAR ESTABLISHMENT. REPOET OF THE COMMISSION. 
19 
Five line officers were performing the duties of acting inspectors- 
general at geographical departments, detailed by the War Department 
for such duties on the recommendation of the Inspector-General of the 
Army. As indicative of the class of men so selected, it may be noted 
that the division commanders in the battle of July 1, in front of 
Santiago—Kent, Sumner, Lawton, and Chaffee—had all been acting 
inspectors-general. 
The Inspector-General of the Army, Maj. Gen. J. C. Breckinridge, 
while inspecting Camp George H. Thomas, under orders issued from 
headquarters of the Army, under authority from the Secretary of War, 
was ordered by the Major-General Commanding the Army to Tampa, 
Fla., and, discontinuing his inspection, he reported to the major- 
general commanding there June 5. 
At General Shafter’s request, approved by the Secretary of War, he 
was ordered to embark with the Fifth Corps for Cuba, was present at 
the operations which resulted in the surrender of the city of Santiago 
and the Spanish army, and as Inspector-General of the Army reported 
upon these operations. 
The following table shows the stations of inspectors-general, regular 
and volunteer, during July, 1898: 
Stations. 
Regular. 
Volun- 
teers. 
Total. 
Command 
of troops. 
Special. 
Inspec- 
tor’s 
duties 
with 
troops. 
With army at Santiago 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
3 
4 
8 
3 
4 
8 
2 
4 
4 
9 
3 
4 
1 
Total 
2 
1 
3 
28 
34 
INSPECTORS-GENERAL OP VOLUNTEERS. 
The act of Congress approved April 22,1898, authorized the Presi- 
dent to appoint one inspector-general with the rank of lieutenant- 
colonel for each army corps and one with the rank of major for each 
division organized. 
Under this authority there were appointed nine inspectors-general 
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel and twenty-three with the rank of 
major. 
Of the nine lieutenant-colonels so appointed, six were from the 
Regular Army and three from the National Guard. Of the twenty- 
three majors, sixteen were appointed from the Regular Army and 
seven from civil life, the latter, with one exception, having had experi- 
ence with the National Guard. 20 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
The Adjutant-General of the Army testifies tliat the officers appointed 
inspectors-general from the Regular Army were selected on their 
efficiency records. 
There is before the commission no evidence nor statements that the 
individual officers of the Inspector-General’s Department, either Regu- 
lar or Volunteer, with one exception, were not fitted for and did not 
properly perform their duties. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Tlie commission find that the Inspector-General’s Department was 
not as efficient as it ought to have been. There seems to have been 
question as to the authority by which inspections were to be ordered. 
On at least one occasion, May 17, the Secretary of War instructed the 
Major-General Commanding the Army to inspect certain camps, viz, 
those at Cliickamauga, Atlanta, New Orleans, Mobile, Tampa, Miami, 
and Key West. The Major-General did notact upon such instructions, 
stating it to be his place to order inspection. 
Further, the commission find that although several of the officers 
of this department were assigned to duty in command of troops in 
the field, still competent officers were left in charge of the depart- 
ment in Washington to perform such duties as were assigned to them. 
The organization in the field was ample, and the inspectors made 
reports to the commanding officers to whom they had been assigned. 
Those reports were often not acted upon and were not forwarded to 
the War Department. 
For this important branch of the Army a better system could be 
adopted. It is recommended: 
1. That it should be the duty of the Inspector-General to submit to 
the Secretary of War, at stated intervals, plans for the inspection of 
camps and troops. 
2. The corps of inspectors-general should be sufficiently large to 
fully perform its duties, and inspections should be frequently made. 
3. Reports of such inspection should be promptly forwarded by 
the Inspector-General’s Department to the Secretary of War for his 
information. 
JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT. 
BRIG. GEN. G. N. LIEBER, JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL, U. S. A., IN 
CHARGE. 
The Judge-Advocate-General’s Department consists of eight officers, 
and is the bureau of military justice. The Judge-Advocate-General is 
the custodian of the records of all general courts-martial, courts of 
inquiry, and military commissions, and of all papers relating to the 
title of lands under the control of the War Department, except the 
Washington Aqueduct and the public buildings and grounds in the 
District of Columbia. The officers of this department render opinions REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
21 
upon legal questions when called upon by proper authority. The only 
addition made to the department during the war was judge-advocates 
for corps. The Judge-Advocate-General considered that such officers 
for divisions should also have been appointed, but did not think that the 
failure to so appoint was detrimental to the best interests of the service. 
For the twelve months ending September 1, 1898, the trials by gen- 
eral court-martial were: 
Commissioned officers: 
Regulars 3 
Volunteers 12 
Enlisted men: 
Regulars (convicted 1,148, acquitted 94) 1, 242 
Volunteers (convicted 497, acquitted 126) 623 
Total 1,880 
The superior class of men that has been recruited for the Regular 
Army is shown by the less number of courts-martial in 1898 as com- 
pared with 1897, which was 139; also in the decrease of desertions, 
which for 1894 were 518, for 1897, 244, and for 1898, 176. The total 
number of convictions for desertion in 1898 was, regulars 176, and 
volunteers 18. 
About one-half of the time of this office was occupied in civil 
matters, such as preparing contracts, examining titles, etc. 
No complaint has been received by the commission in relation to the 
office or any member of its corps, therefore the commission concludes 
that it has performed its duties with efficiency and to the benefit of the 
service. 
THE QUARTERMASTER’S DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY. 
BRIG. GEN. M. I. LUDINGTON, QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, U. S. A., IN 
CHARGE. 
The duties devolving upon the Quartermaster’s Department under 
the Secretary of War during peace and war, as required by law and 
regulations, are as follows: 
To provide the Army with military stores and supplies requisite for its 
use, such as clothing and equipage, tents, band instruments, tableware 
and mess furniture, equipments for bakeries, fuel, forage, stationery, 
lumber, straw for bedding for men and animals, all materials for camp 
and for shelter of troops and stores, furniture for barracks, heating and 
cooking stoves for use in barracks and quarters, tools for mechanics 
and laborers in Quartermaster’s Department, furniture, books, etc., for 
post schools, reading matter for post libraries, wagons, ambulances, 
carts, saddles, harness, water supply, sewerage, plumbing, illuminating 
supplies, and heating for all military posts and buildings. 
The department is also charged with the duty of transporting, by 
land and water, troops, munitions of war, equipments, and all articles 
of military supplies from the place of purchase to the several armies, 
garrisons, posts, and recruiting places. 22 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
It also supplies quartermaster’s stores, clothing, and equipage to 
the militia of the States and Territories, furnishing transportation 
therefor as well as for ordnance and ordnance stores issued by the 
General Government to States and Territories. 
It prepares the plans and constructs the barracks, quarters, store- 
houses, hospitals, etc., builds the wharves, constructs the roads, builds 
bridges at military posts, provides, by hire or purchase, grounds for 
military encampments and buildings, contracts for all horses for cavalry, 
artillery, Indian scouts, etc., and pays all incidental expenses of the 
military service which are not provided by other branches. 
On March 1, 1898, with the possibility of war with Spain, the Quar- 
termaster’s Department found itself charged with the varied, numerous, 
and important duties indicated in the foregoing, its appropriation small, 
and facing the probability of a large army being soon organized for 
field service. 
The department consisted of fifty-seven officers. It was provided 
with all necessary clothing, camp and garrison equipage, for the Reg- 
ular Army of 25,000 men; was prepared to equip and move an army at 
least double that size under peace conditions, but was suddenly called 
upon to furnish within a short period all that was required to fit out an 
army of 275,000 men for probable operations in an enemy’s country. 
The department, up to March 1, 1898, found itself confronted with 
the following statutes, the legality of which is unquestioned and which 
apply to all departments of the Army: 
Sec. 3679 (Revised Statutes). No department of the Government shall expend in 
any one fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress for that 
fiscal year or involve the Government in any contract for the future payment of 
money in excess of such appropriations. 
Sec. 3732. No contract or purchase on behalf of the United States shall he made 
unless the same is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate to its 
fulfillment, except in the War and Navy Departments, for clothing, subsistence, 
forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities 
of the current year. 
Sec. 3709. All purchases and contracts for supplies or services in any of the 
departments of the Government, except for personal services, shall be made by 
advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals respecting the same, when the 
public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery of the articles or perform- 
ance of the service. When immediate delivery or performance is required by public 
exigency, the articles or service required may be procured by open purchase or 
contract at the places and in the manner in which such articles are usually bought 
and sold or such services engaged between individuals. 
It will thus be observed that the declaration of war threw upon the 
Quartermaster’s Department an amount of labor and responsibility for 
which it was neither physically nor financially prepared. 
Under the acts of Congress approved April 22 and July 7, 1898, 121 
volunteer officers were appointed to the Quartermaster’s Department, of 
whom 23 qualified in May, 49 in June, 31 in July, 14 in August, and 4 in 
September. Of this number 22 were regular officers who received higher 
rank in the volunteer service. One of the officers of the regular estab- 23 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
lishment was temporarily transferred to duty in the Judge-Advocate- 
General’s Department, so that during the period of hostilities the Quar- 
termaster’s Department had at its command the services in all of 155 
officers of the regular and volunteer establishments. 
FUNDS AVAILABLE. 
By the act of March 9, 1898, Congress appropriated the sum of 
$50,000,000 for national defense, a portion of which was allotted to the 
Quartermaster’s Department. The available funds during the war were 
as follows: 
At the command of the Quartermaster’s Department April 1,1898, 
available for war expenditure $2, 657, 456.87 
Allotments to the department from the appropriation for national 
defense 1, 500, 000. 00 
Appropriated by the act of March 15,1898 6, 555, 000. 00 
Appropriated by the deficiency act of May 4,1898 19,550, 000. 00 
Appropriated by the deficiency act of July 7,1898 103,200, 000. 00 
Appropriated by the act of July 8,1898 2C0, 000. 00 
Making in all 133, 662, 456. 87 
It will thus be seen that however handicapped the Quartermaster’s 
Department might have been for lack of funds before war was declared, 
Congress freely placed immense sums at its disposal so soon as it was 
believed that a determined struggle seemed inevitable. 
In order that the subject may be more systematically discussed, it is 
deemed best to take up, seriatim, the various branches of this impor- 
tant division, both during peace and war, of the supply departments 
of the Army. 
1. CLOTHING, CAMP AND GARRISON EQUIPAGE. 
The department has reported that on April 1, 1898, it was amply 
provided with all necessary clothing and equipage supplies for three 
months for the Army as then organized and for probably 10,000 addi- 
tional troops; that on April 23 it was confronted with the problem of 
clothing and equipping an army of 125,000 men; that on April 26 the 
Regular Army was increased to 61,000 men, and on May 25 the second 
call for 75,000 volunteers was issued. Adding to these the 10 regiments 
of immunes, the 3 regiments of cavalry, the 3 regiments of volunteer 
engineers, and the Signal Corps, it appears that within a few weeks it 
became necessary to provide for clothing and equipping an army of 
more than a quarter of a million of men. 
So soon as funds were available, so soon as war was inevitable, so 
soon as law permitted, the Quartermaster’s Department undertook this 
enormous work; probably its chief had foreseen the great emergency 
in advance; possibly someone else would have gone into the market 
earlier, anticipating approval of his acts in case war was declared and 
the Army increased tenfold; that the Quartermaster-General threw the 
energy of his department into this work when funds were available 24 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
seems evident, and tliat liis officers labored faithfully in tlieir efforts to 
aid him is plain to those who have carefully studied their work. 
To clothe and equip 275,000 soldiers was a massive undertaking; 
kerseys and flannels of required quality were not in the market; arti- 
cles were procured conforming as nearly as practicable to the army 
standard, but difficulties were encountered everywhere; some of the 
material so rapidly obtained failed to retain its color, other portions 
proved to be of defective quality, soon wearing out, and the blame of 
course fell upon the Quartermaster’s Department, few realizing the 
demands upon it and the struggles and anxieties of its officers. 
The troops concentrating in the South and coming from the North 
and West were supplied with clothing required for the climate in which 
they had been serving; that on hand April 1 was not suitable for trop- 
ical climates. To meet the call for such clothing the department pro- 
cured a supply of twilled and plain duck for issue to troops in Cuba 
and Porto Rico, but this was not available until after the surrender of 
Santiago. 
It seems unnecessary to enumerate the many articles furnished by 
this department, but it may be said that on April 1, there were on 
hand at the depots at Philadelphia, Jeffersonville, and San Francisco 
and due under contract, about 69,000 blankets, 28,000 blouses, 53,000 
forage caps, 98,000 canton-flannel drawers, 28,000 campaign hats, 
12,000 cork helmets, 23,000 overcoats, 12,000 ponchos, 47,000 dark blue 
flannel shirts, 62,000 pairs of shoes, 305,000 pairs cotton socks, 167,000 
pairs woolen socks, 35,000 pairs foot soldiers’ trousers, 23,000 pairs 
mounted soldiers’ trousers, 170,000 cotton undershirts, 83,000 woolen 
undershirts, besides other necessary articles of apparel for the soldiers’ 
use, together with 210,000 yards of blouse flannel, 114,000 yards of shirt 
flannel, and 137,000 yards of kersey. 
Of camp equipage there was available about 6,750 common tents, 
1,450 conical wall tents, 730 hospital tents, 38,000 halves of shelter 
tents, 2,750 wall tents, 400,000 yards of duck canvas, and a tolerably 
good supply for the existing army of the many articles needed for use 
in camp and on the march. 
In March the Quartermaster-General directed the officers at the 
Government manufacturing depots to push manufactures in certain 
lines, and authorized the purchase of additional material for tentage and 
clothing, not, however, on an extensive scale. He also instructed the 
depot officers to ascertain and report the number of tents of every size 
that could be purchased and how rapidly they could be manufactured. 
Some purchases were made early in April, and about the middle of that 
month correspondence was opened with manufacturers of blankets, 
blouse and shirting flannels, kersey, shoes, leggings, and other neces- 
saries for the purpose of ascertaining prices and in what quantities 
and how rapidly the articles could be obtained. 
On April 20 and 25 proposals were invited, under a few days’ notice, 
for large quantities of clothing materials, for blankets, forage caps, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
25 
ponchos, shoes, summer underclothing, and in fact all classes of mate- 
rials for clothing, camp and garrison equipage. 
During April and May arrangements were made for purchases in vari- 
ous large cities of our country amounting in value to about $3,000,000. 
Among the articles issued by the department between May 1 and 
August 15 were about 546,300 blankets, 390,800 blouses, 523,200 pairs 
trousers, 476,700 campaign hats, 153,170 canvas field uniforms, 782,300 
pairs shoes, 588,800 pairs leggings, 622,200 dark blue flannel shirts, 
1,257,000 undershirts, 1,210,680 pairs drawers, 65,000 tents, exclusive of 
shelter tents, 372,400 halves of shelter tents, 39,000 axes, 34,300 camp 
kettles, 58,600 mess pans, besides a multitude of minor articles. 
It is understood that the department, after having once started with 
its plans, adopted every possible expedient to obtain supplies, but met 
with many difficulties. 
There was but very little standard duck canvas in the market of this 
country, and the production of tents was governed entirely by the 
ability of the mills to turn out proper material. 
To meet the immediate demands of the troops, all the tentage that 
could be obtained in the various cities, which seemed of fair quality, 
was purchased. Much of this proved short lived, and the troops during 
the rainy season suffered discomfort accordingly. 
The same trouble occurred with some of the articles of clothing, par- 
ticularly in the article of sky-blue trousers, where the wool had to be 
dyed out of which to manufacture the cloth. It became necessary to 
provide dark-blue material, which was available, but which did not 
come up to the standard of the sky blue, being lighter and not satisfac- 
tory on account of color. 
The Quartermaster-General states that these articles were shipped in 
bulk to the various camps as soon as obtained, without waiting for 
requisitions or requests of any sort, and the depot quartermasters were 
urged to inform the department as the supply of any article ran low. 
In spite of every effort there were occasions where troops suffered 
from poor tentage or from lack of tentage and absence of straw for 
bedding, where clothing was scarce and troops suffered discomfort for 
lack of shoes, shirts, and other articles of apparel. This was noticed 
even as late as October in the camps at Anniston, Huntsville, and 
Lexington, while at Huntsville, Ala., and Fort Monroe, Va., in spite of 
the cool nights, there was a lack of stoves in the hospitals, and at 
Huntsville the supply of wood was short. With some of the troops 
sent from San Francisco to Manila the deficiency in shoes of proper 
size continued even up to August 31. 
At Santiago the deficiency at the front appears to have been caused 
rather from lack of transportation from the coast than from lack of 
clothing and tentage, a supply of which was on the transports. 
The question of the character of clothing for troops in a tropical 
country is one for serious consideration of experts, and this commission 26 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
is gratified to learn that the matter is receiving the thoughtful attention 
of the War Department. 
2. PUBLIC ANIMALS FOR WAGONS, ETC., WAGONS, HARNESS, AMBU- 
LANCES—HORSES FOR CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY. 
On April 1, 1898, the department had at its command 6,701 horses, 
1,188 wagons, and 4,963 sets of harness. Between July 1, 1897, and 
March 31, 1898, the average cost of animals was as follows: 
Cavalry horses $126.15 
Artillery horses -• 137.79 
Draft horses 148.11 
Draft mules 99.84 
Pack mules 72. 93 
Between April 1 and August 31, 1898, there were purchased at 
prices indicated the following: 
Average cost. 
10,743 cavalry horses $100. 42 
2,551 artillery horses 130.85 
1,137 draft horses 125. 38 
2,115 riding horses (inclnding 1,500 small horses for Cuban service) 77. 70 
32 bell horses 49.84 
40 pack horses 30. 00 
17,515 draft mules 110. 05 
2,667 pack mules 83.15 
The wagons, ambulances, harness, etc., procured between July 1, 
1897, and March 31,1898, and between April 1 and August 31,1898, 
were as follows: 
Peace period, from July 1, 
1897, to Mar. 31, 1898 (9 
months). 
War period, from Apr. 1,1898, 
to Aug. 31,1898 (5 months). 
Hum- 
ber. 
Total cost. 
Average 
cost. 
Num- 
ber. 
Total cost. 
Average 
cost. 
604 
$61,467. 00 
8,584.75 
238, 942. 75 
18, 218.00 
$101.77 
78.76 
109 
3, 605 
70 
66. 28 
8 
$2, 295. 00 
944.00 
$286.87 
236.00 
260. 26 
4 
8 
lj 540. 60 
192. 58 
Ambulances: 
500 
122, 950. 00 
13, 259.50 
245. 90 
59 
224. 74 
224 
13,148. 50 
58. 70 
Total 
12 
3,239.00 
900. 00 
5,179 
28, 012 
478, 111. 10 
Harness, sets, single 
30 
30.00 
358, 449.18 
Horses for cavalry were purchased, so far as was practicable and 
economical, in the States from which the regiments came by boards of 
officers appointed for the purpose. The mules and a portion of the 
horses were purchased by officers of the Quartermaster’s Department 
after a call for figures. 
Before war was declared the Quartermaster-General called upon 
prominent wagon and harness manufacturers of the country for infor- 
mation in reference to their ability to promptly supply wagons and REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
27 
harness suitable for army use in case of emergency and to what extent 
their factories could be relied upon to supply the needs of the Army. 
These inquiries also secured information as to the stock of wagons and 
harness on hand and enabled the department when the emergency did 
arise to place wagons and harness at convenient points for issue to the 
troops in the field. 
The following animals, wagons, and ambulances were purchased and 
issued by August 31: 
Purchased: 
Horses 16,618 
Mules 20,182 
Total 36,800 
Wagons 4,620 
Ambulances 559 
Issued: 
Horses 16,483 
Mules 19, 550 
Total 36,033 
Wagons and ambulances 4, 891 
Great complaint was made of lack of transportation facilities at the 
camp at Montauk Point, N. Y., and Col. W. H. Forwood, Assistant 
Surgeon-General, United States Army, chief surgeon of the camp, 
testifies as follows: “The trouble was, we did not get ambulances and 
wagons as fast as we needed them;” and further states, “when ambu- 
lances came they were sometimes incomplete.” 
Col. C. P. Miller, of the Quartermaster’s Department, states that it 
was decided to use Montauk as a camp on August 2, and that trans- 
portation was shipped to that locality between August 3 and Septem- 
ber 7, as follows: 
Date. 
From whence. 
Mules. 
Horses. 
Wagons. 
Ambu- 
lances. 
1898. 
Aug. 3 
6 
8 
96 
20 
7 
4 
8 
4 
1 
9 
150 
25 
10 
60 
25 
11 
101 
13 
9 
13 
120 
20 
14 
100 
25 
14 
107 
20 
7 
50 
25 
16 
60 
25 
18 
97 
24 
19 
128 
62 
19 
286 
44 
19 
218 
36 
28 
179 
44 
Sept. 3 
4 
5 
18 
5 
15 
7 
36 
Total 
1,578 
232 
396 
a48 
a In addition to the 48 ambulances there was a number brought from Tampa and Lakeland with 
troops. 28 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
3. TRANSPORTATION BY LAND AND WATER. 
RAILROADS. 
No arrangements were made for the movements of regiments by rail- 
road for field duty previous to April 1. 
On May 8 the Quartermaster-General, in anticipation of the trans- 
fer of large bodies of troops, notified the officers of his department of 
the proposed movements, and directed them to make proper arrange- 
ments with the railroad officials, so that the troops might be moved 
with comfort and celerity. These officers appear to have acted with 
zeal in obtaining rates, in many cases very advantageous to the Gov- 
ernment. When extended journeys covering night travel were to be 
made, tourists’ cars were obtained wherever possible, and when these 
could not be obtained the contracts provided that each soldier should 
have a double seat. 
The Quartermaster-General reports that in making these movements 
the rates generally did not exceed l\ cents per mile for passengers in 
many cases being less. 
There were transported by rail between April 1 and the breaking up 
of Camp Wikoff, early in November, 17,863 officers and 435,569 enlisted 
men. 
Many complaints were made in reference to unnecessary delays and 
lack of promptness on the part of the Quartermaster’s Department in 
moving regiments and in the care of sick and convalescents returning 
home either with their regiments or alone. 
Col. H. L. Turner, of the First Illinois Volunteer Infantry, states that 
his experience was terrible when he removed his regiment from Mon- 
tauk to Chicago, the suffering of the sick having been intense, greatly 
owing to the delay of one railroad company in having proper cars 
ready for his command. 
In explanation of this delay it is stated that a mistake was made by 
the commanding general of the camp at Montauk in ordering the regi- 
ment to be in readiness to embark twenty-four hours in advance of the 
time indicated by the chief quartermaster in New York City. 
Vast quantities of freight were handled and sent to the camps at 
Chickamauga, Jacksonville, Fernandina, Miami; Dunn-Loring, Va. 
(Camp Alger); Camp Meade, Pennsylvania; Camp Wikoff, Montauk 
Point, and to the camps at Anniston, Huntsville, Knoxville, Lexington, 
Tampa, and other localities throughout the South. 
Great complaint was made of the railroad congestion at Tampa and 
the absolute lack of ability to bring order out of chaos at that place 
during the early part of the period of its occupancy by troops. The 
Major-General Commanding has stated that supplies for 70,000 men for 
90 days were ordered there, and the confusion on the railroad when he 
reached Tampa was very great, 1,000 cars being sidetracked, some of 
them as far back as Columbia, S. C. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
29 
It is stated that in the hurry and rush attending the commencement 
of this work the contents of cars were unknown at Tampa; that bills 
of lading were not forwarded, and that it seemed impossible for a time 
to determine where absolutely necessary articles were located. 
Colonel Bird, of the Quartermaster’s Department, testifies that this 
was corrected later on, when the contents of cars were clearly marked 
upon them and bills of lading promptly forwarded. 
The condition of the railroad congestion during the early portion of 
the time Tampa was occupied by troops seems unparalleled, showing 
an almost inexcusable lack of excutive ability on the part of those 
charged with the loading, unloading, and handling of the trains. 
Colonel Bird and General Humphrey testify that there were very 
poor facilities for transferring troops and supplies arriving at Tampa 
via the Florida Central Railroad to the Plant System leading direct to 
Port Tampa. 
Order was finally brought out of chaos, the cars unloaded, the con- 
gestion overcome, and a vast amount of supplies of every character 
delivered at this immense encampment. 
Congestion also occurred at Cliickamauga Park, probably with not 
so serious results as at Tampa, but complaint was made that materials 
of different classes, belonging to different departments, were frequently 
packed in the same car, rendering it necessary to remove large packages 
of quartermaster’s or commissary stores in order to obtain the smaller 
packages of medicines and medical supplies. 
There was also congestion and confusion in connection with therailroad 
facilities between the oth and 15th of August at Camp Wikoff, caused 
by the side tracks being in such condition that they could not be used. 
Cars in switching would get off the track and cause blockades for hours; 
troops and animals came by rail from Long Island City more rapidly 
than they could be unloaded and cared for at Montauk. By the middle 
of August the side tracks were in order and necessary storehouses made 
available for supplies. The railroad between Montauk and Long Island 
City was evidently worked to its maximum capacity. 
WATER TRANSPORTATION. 
For more than half a century it had not been necessary for the United 
States to send large bodies of troops by sea for the invasion of a foreign 
country, but in May, 1898, the Quartermaster’s Department was sud- 
denly called upon to prepare for work of this important character. 
The Quartermaster-General reports that the needs of his department 
for the transportation of troops and supplies by sea were canvassed 
prior to April 1, 1898, and measures taken to ascertain the best method 
for providing such transportation. 
On March 24, the Quartermaster-General directed the depot quarter- 
master in New York to report at once all available vessels of the coast- 
line steamship companies that could be obtained by charter, and to 
state their capacity, etc. The reply reached him on March 29, furnishin g 30 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
the desired information, but adding that a member of the board on aux- 
iliary cruisers had stated that the Navy had absolute option on all boats 
of the most prominent steamship companies. 
The testimony before the commission shows that between April 1 and 
August 31, 44 steamships were chartered and 14 purchased for service 
on the Atlantic and Gulf waters; that 17 were chartered and 2 pur- 
chased for service on the Pacific Ocean, and that all were fitted up, to 
a certain extent, for the transportation of troops, animals, and supplies. 
While complaints have been made as to the character of the equip- 
ment of the vessels used on the Atlantic, the reports from those on the 
Pacific show them to have been arranged as satisfactorily as was 
possible. 
The steamship John JJnglis was also purchased, at a cost of $450,000, 
for the use of the Medical Department, and after some delay was refitted 
as a hospital ship, at a cost of $136,851.11, and renamed the Relief. The 
total tonnage of the ships used as transports on the Atlantic coast was 
166,987 tons, and the Quartermaster-General reports that they were 
fitted up for the accommodation of 40,723 officers and men. 
The total tonnage of the ships on the Pacific coast was 61,287 tons, 
and they were reported as having been arranged so as to accommodate 
18,120 officers and men. 
The records of the Quartermaster’s Department show that troops and 
civilian employees were transported by sea between April 1 and Sep- 
tember 15, 1898, as follows: 
Men. 
To Cuba 28,195 
To Porto Rico 17, 460 
To Manila 16, 405 
To Honolulu 629 
Returned from Cuba 21,686 
Returned from Porto Rico 5, 541 
Civilian employees transported 2, 920 
Total 92,836 
The testimony shows that the first call upon the Quartermaster’s 
Department was for ships to transport 5,000 men to Cuba, and that 
soon after the call was increased and demand made for steamers to 
transport 25,000. 
The fleet of transports concentrated at Port Tampa, Fla., for trans- 
portation of these 25,000 men to Cuba consisted of 38 vessels, and 
included 2 water boats, 3 steam lighters, 1 collier, 1 tug, and 2 decked 
barges. Upon loading these vessels it was found that their capacity 
had been largely overrated, and it was impossible to carry upon them, 
without great discomfort and danger, more than 16,000 men, with their 
equipments, artillery, ammunition, subsistence, medical supplies, and 
2,295 animals, for a voyage of 1,000 miles. Even with this reduction 
the vessels appear to have been crowded. 
In spite of the efforts of the Quartermaster’s Department many of 
these vessels were poorly equipped with sleeping accommodations; the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
31 
sinks in many instances were inconvenient and insufficient, and some of 
the vessels were badly ventilated and filled with disagreeable odors. 
It has been stated that had the fleet encountered a severe storm while 
en route for Cuba the eliscomfort would have been intense and there 
might have been loss of life. The Quartermaster’s Department ought to 
have been able to more thoroughly equip these vessels, and surely it 
should have been more certain of their carrying capacity. A sufficient 
number of vessels for transporting 25,000 men, with the required 
lighters for their disembarkation, should have been promptly fur- 
nished, even had such action rendered necessary the seizure of every 
steamer on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts sailing under the American 
flag. 
Testimony shows that the vessels were not loaded systematically. 
A battery with its guns and horses would be placed on one vessel and 
its ammunition on another. The Second, Seventh, and Seventeenth 
Eegular Infantry were each divided up and portions in each case sent 
on three different vessels. 
The Quartermaster-General reports that pontoons were taken for use 
in landing in coves and in still water when possible; that urgent but 
unavailing efforts were made to procure lighters for purposes of dis- 
embarkation; that three steam lighters were chartered at Galveston 
and one ocean tug at Mobile and sent to Port Tampa to accompany 
the Santiago expedition, and that two decked barges were purchased 
at Tampa for the same purpose. 
A seagoing tug with three barges started from Mobile for Cuba; 
another with two barges started from New Orleans for the same des- 
tination, but all of these barges, except one, were lost, and only one of 
the tugs reached Santiago. One tug was reported as having broken 
down or left the fleet while en route for Santiago. 
The fleet of transports arrived safely at Daiquiri, but the failure to 
provide a full and sufficient number of lighters for disembarkation 
of troops, supplies, and artillery caused delay, anxiety, (annoyance, 
and danger, and had there been serious storms, or had the landing 
been opposed by a vigilant and well-trained force of the enemy, the 
result might have been far different. 
Finally, the Quartermaster’s Department entered into contract with 
a New York firm to fit out an expedition with a large force of mechanics 
and laborers, with necessary materials, machinery, pile drivers, and 
implements for construction of docks and railways. The Quartermaster- 
General reports that this outfit proceeded to Santiago, Cuba, and thence 
to Ponce, Porto Eico, where its services were of much assistance to the 
Army. 
The testimony shows that in the transportation of the Spanish pris- 
oners from Santiago to Spain the interests of the General Government 
received the most ample protection; that proposals were invited; that 
every effort was made to procure proper vessels, to provide for the care 
and comfort of the men, and that the cost of transportation by the 32 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
Spanish Trans-Atlantic Company was at the rate of $55 each for officers 
and $20 each for enlisted men. The first proposal of the company was 
at the rate of $60 and $30, respectively, but they finally reduced their 
demands, so that the total price paid was over $200,000 less than the 
original offer. 
The contract required that at the price named the company should 
furnish subsistence and medical attendance and practically care for 
these prisoners from the time of their embarkation until landed in 
Spain. Tlie total number of persons transported was 22,864, at a cost 
of $513,860. 
The purchase of transports by the department showed an equal effort 
to guard the interests of the General Government, and the testimony is 
to the effect that the purchase of these vessels was made direct either 
with the owners or their agents; that the prices were reasonable, and 
neither fees nor allowances were granted by the Government officials 
or paid by the Government to so-called middlemen. 
The following vessels were purchased for use on the Atlantic and 
Gulf coasts: 
Name of vessel. 
Tonnage. 
Cost. 
Class. 
Carrying capacity. 
Officers. 
Men. 
Animals. 
2, 085 
$41, 000 
10 
400 
2,' 792 
ilb, 000 
25 
400 
2,194 
125' 000 
15 
700 
5, 658 
660j 000 
80 
1, 000 
1, 000 
5 ’ 780 
660,000 
do ... 
80 
1, 000 
1 000 
5, 673 
660, 000 
80 
1, 000 
1, 000 
5,673 
660, 000 
do 
80 
1, 000 
1, 000 
5, 796 
660,' 000 
100 
1, 200 
1, 000 
3, 732 
350' 000 
40 
800 
800 
3| 722 
350, 000 
do 
40 
800 
800 
4,126 
240, 000 
45 
1,100 
50 
3, 656 
250,' 000 
50 
1, 800 
100 
5, 641 
400' 000 
75 
2, 000 
4k, 770 
200|000 
Total 
61, 298 
5,431, 000 
720 
12, 700 
6, 750 
Eight of these vessels were provided with refrigerators for the trans- 
portation of fresh meat, seven of them having a capacity of 1,000 tons 
each. Two, the Panama and the Rita, were captured by the Navy, and 
were purchased by the Quartermaster’s Department after having been 
condemned as prizes by the proper courts and offered for sale. 
All of these were merchant vessels, and were temporarily fitted up as 
army transports to meet the urgent demands of the service, for which 
purpose an expenditure of $178,018.37 was made. 
For use in the Pacific Ocean the following steamships were pur- 
chased : 
Name of vessel. 
Tonnage. 
Cost. 
Carrying 
capacity 
(men). 
4, 253 
5,000 
$200,000 
600, 000 
1,500 
Arizona 
lj 700 33 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
The Seandia was fitted out as a hospital ship and the Arizona for the 
transportation of troops and supplies to Honolulu and Manila. Seri- 
ous complaints were made in reference to the condition of the Chester, 
upon which the First United States Volunteer Engineers were trans- 
ported to Porto Rico, and of the Berlin when it was loaded at New 
Orleans with the First United States Volunteer immunes. 
It was stated that when the Sixth Massachusetts Volunteers were 
taken to Porto Rico on the United States naval vessel Yale they 
were subjected to discomfort and abuse. The testimony before the 
commission does not sustain this charge, but shows that the discomforts 
were no greater than might have been anticipated for any troops mak- 
ing such a trip under similar circumstances. 
TRANSPORTS FOR PORTO RICO. 
The first troops for the Porto Rican campaign sailed on the war vessel 
Yale from Guantanamo, Cuba, under the Commanding General of the 
Army, on July 21, and landed at Guanica, Porto Rico, July 25; from 
that date until August 26 forty transports arrived at the island, loaded 
with troops, munitions of war, and supplies. 
In addition to these, the Gypsum King arrived August 10, towing three 
large lighters or barges consigned to Messrs. Van Aiken & Go., con- 
tractors, and loaded with lumber, bridge timber, railroad iron, coal, 
and other supplies, and a steam tug. The latter was transferred to the 
Quartermaster’s Department, and was of great assistance in towing 
lighters to and from the transports to shallow water, in which they 
could be pulled to the docks. 
The loading of some of these transports exhibited carelessness, and 
in several instances important supplies intended for the army of Gen- 
eral Shafter were fouud upon them. 
Thirty-six vessels arrived at Porto Rico without invoices to show 
their contents, causing much confusion and requiring the overhauling 
of the entire cargo in order to learn the contents of the ship. The first 
invoice was received with cargo No. 37, that of the Alamo, which left 
Newport News, Va., on August 9 and reached Ponce on August 16. 
After that date regular invoices accompanied each vessel. 
The first steam launch supplied by the Quartermaster’s Department 
arrived on the Rita, which sailed from Tampa August 15, and reached 
Ponce August 23. 
Gen. James H. Wilson, United States Volunteers, testifies that his 
command, while en route for Porto Rico, was delayed two weeks in 
Charleston, S. C., by failure of the transports to arrive, and that when 
he reached Ponce the disembarkation of the troops and materials was 
delayed by lack of landing facilities, so that ten days were required 
for a work that should have been accomplished in two days had there 
been proper steam tugs, launches, etc., available. 34 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
THE MANILA EXPEDITION. 
Major-General Merritt testifies that the transports used on the Pacific 
Ocean for conveying troops to Manila were carefully inspected by the 
Quartermaster’s Department; that every jmssible change that was 
necessary was made, and that the vessels reached their destination 
without severe sickness among the troops or serious annoyance of 
any kind. 
The first expedition for Manila sailed from San Francisco, Cal., on 
May 25, under command of General Anderson, with 2,491 officers and 
men, upon three steamships, City of Sydney, Australia, and City of 
Peking. 
The second expedition, under command of General Greene, with 3,586 
officers and men, sailed on June 15 on the steamships China, Colon, and 
Zealandia. 
The third expedition, under command of General Merritt, with the 
command of General MacArthur, consisting of 4,847 officers and men, 
sailed on June 25, 27, 28, and 29 on the steamships Senator, Morgan 
City, City of Para, Indiana, Ohio, Valencia, and Newport. 
The fourth expedition, under command of Gen. Elwell S. Otis, with 
1,682 officers and men, sailed July 15 on the steamships Peru and City 
of Puebla, followed on July 19 by the steamship Pennsylvania, with 
1,348 officers and men. 
The last expedition, under command of Gen. H. G. Otis, sailed on 
July 23 and 29 on the steamships City of Rio de Janeiro and St. Paul, 
with 1,735 officers and men. 
These vessels arrived safely at Manila, and the reports show that as 
a rule the health of the men was maintained during the long voyage 
of over 7,000 miles. 
The sailing ship Tacoma, with 30 enlisted men, 19 civilian teamsters, 
210 horses and mules, 44 wagons and ambulances, and six months’ sup- 
ply of subsistence and forage, sailed from San Francisco on August 6. 
On August 21 the steamship Arizona, with 490 officers and men and 4 
women nurses on board, sailed from San Francisco, and on August 
29 the steamship Scandia sailed with troops for Honolulu and 173 offi- 
cers and men for Manila. 
The entire movements show that transportation was furnished from 
San Francisco to Manila for 16,405 persons, with their equipments and 
supplies. 
CONTRACTS. 
Contracts covering millions of dollars were made by tlie Quarter- 
master’s Department during the period between April 1 and October 1, 
and although indefinite charges have from time to time been made of 
fraud and collusion, no evidence has been produced before the commis- 
sion to substantiate these charges, although the parties making them 
have been invited to appear. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
35 
The commission has made every effort to reach witnesses who might 
be supposed to have any knowledge upon this subject. 
Under date of November 1, the New York World telegraphed the 
president of the commission that it had collected many facts of alleged 
influences exerted to affect the awarding of war contracts by the Gov- 
ernment and offered to present to the commission “legal documents, 
contracts, articles of retainer, affidavits,” etc., bearing directly upon 
contracts and efforts to influence their award, together with the names 
of persons that could be called as witnesses in relation to the facts in 
the World’s possession. 
The World requested the commission to give the matter immediate 
attention and added that if this could be done its representative would 
at once be sent to Washington to present the facts. 
On November 2, the commission through its vice-president notified 
the World that when it arrived in New York it would be very happy 
to hear any witnesses that might be produced by the World or by any 
person. 
When the commission reached New York under date of November 
19, it notified the World that it was prepared to investigate any con- 
tract that had been made by the Government, where fraud was charged 
against any officer of the War Department, and would be pleased to 
hear any evidence bearing upon such cases. 
Under date of November 29, after the commission had left New York 
City, the following reply was received: 
[The World. Morning Edition. Editorial Department, Pulitzer Building, Park Row, N. Y.] 
New York, November 29,1898. 
Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, 
President of the Commission appointed by the President to 
Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain. 
Dear Sir: The World received in due course your courteous note of November 
19, stating that “The commission is prepared to investigate any contract that has 
been made by the Government where fraud is charged or undue influence against 
any officer of the War Department/’ and adding that “If the World has any evi- 
dence bearing upon such cases, the commission would be pleased to hear it.” 
Knowing the great difficulty often experienced in establishing facts by legal 
proof, even in a court of justice, the World carefully considered and took counsel 
on your offer during the nearly three weeks that elapsed between the making of the 
proposition and the meeting of your commission in this city. It observed the pro- 
ceedings of the commission from day to day, and could not fail to perceive the pub- 
lic knowledge of the fact that your commission had neither the power to com- 
pel the attendance of witnesses nor to protect those who had volunteered their 
testimony. 
The witnesses to the facts discovered by the World in relation to a trade in army 
contracts were unwilling to submit to an ex parte examination in these circum- 
stances. As their attendance could not be compelled, the World deems it best to 
await the Congressional investigation which it hopes will be ordered and conducted 
with a determined purpose and adequate authority to bring to light all the facts 
relative to the “conduct of the War Department in the Avar with Spain.” 
Repectfully, yours, 
The New York World. 36 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
At a later date tlie statement was made that a Mr. W. H. Ryan had 
intimated that there had been fraud or rascality in the matter of con- 
tracts. 
The only Mr. W. H. Ryan known to the commission was a Representa- 
tive-elect from the State of New York. He was courteously invited to 
appear before the commission, but under date of December 12 tele- 
graphed from Buffalo, N. Y., as follows: 
I have made no complaint personally or in writing concerning war investigation; 
any use of my name verbally is unauthorized, in writing is a forgery. 
Representative Ryan did not appear before the commission, and the 
parties making the statement in reference to a Mr. Ryan failed to fur- 
nish his address when requested. 
Under date of November 21, 1898, Mr. E. M. Knox, of New York, a 
prominent merchant engaged in the hat business, wrote to the commis- 
sion, charging that the quartermaster’s department in Philadelphia was 
rotten and corrupt, and stating that he had made earnest and unavail- 
ing efforts to have the Quartermaster-General investigate the subject; 
that the latter was holding the evidence he had submitted, and urging 
the commission to aid him in obtaining the papers he had left with the 
Quartermaster-General, and then to grant him a hearing. 
Under date of November 22 the commission offered to hear Mr. 
Knox on the 28d of November, and added that if he preferred to await 
the return of his papers it would be gratified to hear him in Wash- 
ington. 
The commission brought the subject to the attention of the Quarter- 
master’s Department, and requested the return to Mr. Knox of his 
papers. 
In the meantime it was learned that the matter in which Mr. Knox 
was interested was a large contract for hats, which contract, it is under- 
stood, he claimed should have been awarded to him. 
The subject was carefully investigated by Col. James M. Moore, assist- 
ant quartermaster general, United States Army, who, in his testimony 
before this commission, fully demonstrated that the award of the con- 
tract as madewas a proper one and perfectly free from the very slightest 
taint of fraud. 
Upon the return of the commission to Washington, and after Colonel 
Moore’s report had been made, it again invited Mr. Knox before it, but 
he declined, on the ground that the Quartermaster-General had not 
returned to him all the evidence he had left with him, and he was, 
therefore, not ready to testify. 
The foregoing were the only specific cases submitted to the commis- 
sion, and in each instance, as will be observed, the parties presenting 
them failed to appear and substantiate their statements. 
From all the facts before the commission there is no reason whatever 
even to suspect that any officer or agent of the Quartermaster’s Depart- 
ment has been actuated by other than the purest motives in making REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
37 
contracts for supplies and transportation, and that in every instance 
they had in view the best interests of the great Government they had 
sworn to support. 
Comment has been made in reference to the contract with the Long 
Island Railroad in regard to traffic between the camp at Moutauk Point 
and New York City. This contract provided for the transportation of 
all persons connected with the military service of the United States at 
the rate of 1 cent per mile and freight at a discount of 25 per cent off 
the regular published tariff freight rates of the railroad company; .it 
also required that the company should construct additional side tracks 
where necessary and provide free switching of cars to secure prompt 
loading and unloading. 
The proviso which caused invidious comment was as follows: 
And in consideration thereof the military authorities in charge of said camp will 
not contract with or employ any other carrier for transportation facilities for troops 
or freight between said camp and New York or points on Long Island, and that no ves- 
sel owned or controlled by private individuals or corporations shall be permitted to 
land at or use the present or any future docks on Moutauk Point for passengers or 
freight traffic between said camp and New York or points on Long Island without 
the permission of the railroad company. It is agreed, however, that any Govern- 
ment transport or vessel may discharge and load troops or supplies at such dock or 
docks, and that vessels may take or discharge passengers thereat from or to other 
points than those hereinabove excepted, with the permission of the military authorities. 
It was claimed that this contract gave the railroad company complete 
control of the entire transportation from all points to Moutauk Point. 
The last portion of the part quoted shows that the Government reserved 
the right to use its transports and vessels as it pleased between New 
York and elsewhere and Montauk Point, and that from all locali- 
ties except New York City and points on Long Island any vessels 
might take or discharge passengers with permission of the military 
authorities. 
Testimony before the commission shows that the proviso prohibiting 
vessels owned or controlled by private individuals or corporations from 
landing at the docks for passenger or freight traffic between New York 
and Montauk Point was especially inserted by the distinguished officer, 
since dead, who signed the contract, for the purpose of preventing the 
landing of excursion parties or of improper articles at Camp Wikoff. 
TRANSPORTATION OP MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND OF SICK AND WOUNDED SOLDIERS. 
It is somewhat difficult to follow up the transportation of medical 
supplies. 
Large quantities were purchased by the surgeons in charge of the 
medical depots in New York, St. Louis, and San Francisco, carefully 
boxed, and transferred to the Quartermaster’s Department for trans- 
portation to the various camps and to the armies in the held at Santiago, 
Porto Rico, and Manila. 
So far as railroad transportation was concerned, the usual steps appear 38 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
to have been taken. The supplies were sent as freight, and the great 
delay in delivery at Tampa and Chickamauga was mainly due to the 
congestion of the railroads at those places, to which reference has been 
made in the foregoing. The supplies were sometimes sent by express, 
thus insuring their more prompt delivery. It would have been prefer- 
able in every large shipment by railroad had an agent of either the 
Quartermaster’s or Medical Department accompanied the supplies to 
their destination. 
The delay in some instances in receiving medical supplies at Santiago 
seems to have been partially due to carelessness in loading them on the 
transports. This is shown in the cases of the steamship La Grande 
Duchesse, which left Charleston, S. C., July 20; upon unloading the 
vessel at Ponce, on July 28, a large supply of medical stores were found 
upon her destined for General Shatter’s army at Santiago. The vessel 
was ordered to Santiago July 31. 
When the Mobile, which left Charleston July 22, was being unloaded, 
on August 5, at Ponce, five tons of ice and a large supply of medical and 
hospital stores, intended for the army at Santiago, were found on board. 
The Mobile was ordered to Santiago August 7. 
Attention is invited to the fact that General Shatter’s telegram to the 
Secretary of War, reporting scarcity of medicines at Santiago, is dated 
August 4,1898. 
Under date of July 30, Colonel Greenleaf telegraphed the Surgeon- 
General that there was a large sick report at Ponce, Porto Pico; that 
tentage, medical supplies, and doctors were lacking, and urging that 
hospital ships should be sent there promptly. 
A special outfit was provided, under orders of the Secretary of War, 
to be used by the Surgeon-General as a hospital train. This train was 
made up of ten tourist sleepers, two kitchen and dining cars, and a 
combined passenger and baggage ear. It was furnished by the Medical 
Department, supplied with trained nurses, and kept exclusively for 
the purpose of carrying sick and wounded to points designated by the 
proper medical officers. 
For the transportation of the sick and wounded by sea the steamship 
John LJnglis was purchased, thoroughly refitted, after some delay, with 
all modern appliances and conveniences as a hospital ship, and trans- 
ferred to the Medical Department. 
On July 1 Mr. B. N. Baker, president of the Atlantic Transport Line, 
Baltimore, Md., generously placed at the disposal of the Government 
the steamship Missouri, with its captain and crew, for use as a hospital 
ship. Mr. Baker’s offer was promptly accepted, and on July 15 the 
Quartermaster’s Department was requested to fit the vessel for the pur- 
pose of transporting six or seven hundred sick or wounded men; that 
department stated that its officer in charge of such work in New York 
reported that the necessary improvements could be made within two 
weeks, but it was not until August 23 that the ship was ready to sail. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
39 
The steamship Olivette was selected by Lieutenant-Colonel Pope, of 
the Medical Department, for a hospital ship, to accompany the army to 
Santiago. 
The steamers Seneca and Concho were used as hospital ships for the 
return of sick and wounded from Santiago in July. Their conditions for 
this purpose were very unsuitable. An officer who was on the Seneca 
reports: 
The water supply aboard the vessel was beyond description. It smelled badly 
and was filled with something that looked like iron rust, but which I was told was 
rotten wood, and was of such a character that I absolutely could not drink it. 
A witness testifies that on the steamer Conclio, during the trans- 
portation of the sick, the water was offensive to the sight, taste, and 
smell, and that the sleeping accommodations consisted of rough board 
bunks, without mattresses, pillows, or blankets. 
Another witness testifies that, by consent of the medical authorities, 
she went on board the Seneca on July 13, the day before the vessel 
started north with sick and wounded, and acted in capacity of nurse 
during the voyage. She states that the captain of the ship informed 
her that his vessel was not clean, not fit for a hospital ship, and that 
not a soul had examined or inspected it for hospital purposes. She adds 
that the ship was overcrowded; the staterooms on starting were occu- 
pied by passengers to the exclusion of the sick; that the two surgeons, 
one of whom was ill nearly all the time, had no surgical instruments, 
and that, with the exception of a few supplies she obtained from the 
Red Cross Association, there was no food on board for the sick and 
wounded other than the regular army ration; the staterooms were 
vacated after starting and given up to the sick and wounded. 
The condition of the transports and the treatment on board of the sick 
and wounded are discussed elsewhere in the report of the commission. 
The following statement shows the sailing of army transports between 
July 12 and November 22,1898, from Cuba and Porto Rico with troops, 
dates of sailing, destination, date of arrival, and number of sick and 
convalescents on board so far as shown by the records of the Quarter- 
master-General7 s Office: 
Name of vessel. 
Port sailed 
Irom. 
Date of 
sailing. 
Destination. 
Date of 
arrival. 
Troops on board. 
Number 
of sick 
and conva- 
lescents. 
Santiago.. 
1898. 
Aug. 8 
Sept. 6 
Aug. 26 
July 24 
Aug. 19 
July 30 
Sept. 15 
July 30 
Sept. 8 
Montauk Point. 
1898. 
Aug. 14 
Sept. 8 
Sept. 2 
July 30 
Aug. 26 
Aug. 13 
Sept. 21 
Aug. 6 
Sept. 14 
331 
50 
Convales- 
cent. 
255 
Do... 
Paymasters and 
clerks. 
Do! 
Montauk Point. 
Tampa and New 
York. 
Half 34th Michigan. 
Do 
Do 
do 
New York 40 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
Number 
Name of vessel. 
Port sailed 
from. 
Date of 
sailing. 
Destination. 
Date of 
arrival. 
Troops on board. 
of sick 
and conva- 
lescents. 
1898. 
1898. 
Siboney .. 
Santiago.. 
July 12 
Aug. 13 
July 28 
Aug. 19 
Sept. 22 
July 18 
Aug. 18 
Do 
Montauk Point. 
wound- 
ed. 
150 
Do 
Aug. 26 
Sept. 26 
Half 7th Infantry.. 
7 officers; 46 dis- 
charged men. 
Do 
City of Washing- 
ton 
Aug. 28 
Montauk Point. 
Sept. 1 
cent. 
Sept. 14 
July 22 
Sept. 22 
July 28 
Fort Monroe 
wound- 
ed. 
Do 
Ponce 
Sept. 8 
Sept. 15 
company of the 
Provisional Engi- 
near Battalion. 
Santiago.. 
July 23 
Fort Monroe 
July 27 
wound- 
ed. 
Do 
Aug. 17 
Montauk Point. 
Aug. 22 
2 troops 9th Cav- 
alry, 3 companies 
12tii Infantry, 2 
companies 34th 
Michigan. 
July 28 
July 22 
Aug. 3 
July 28 
105 
Fort Monroe 
wounded. 
Do 
Aug. 13 
Montauk Point. 
Aug. 20 
airy. 
July 28 
July 22 
Sept. 8 
80 
July 27 
Sept. 16 
Sick. 
Do... 
Ponce 
3 companies 2d Wis- 
consin; Company 
A, 1st Illinois; 
Company H, Dis- 
trict of (Columbia; 
Battery C, Penn- 
sylvania Volun- 
teer Artillery. 
Aug. 2 
July 31 
do 
Aug. 10 
Aug. 5 
Came up in ballast. 
No report of what 
was carried. 
Santiago.. 
Aug. 13 
Aug. 8 
25th Infantry. 
1st Cava lr v and Bat- 
tery H, 4th Artil- 
lory. 
13th Infantry. 
Aug. 20 
fautry. 
Playa del 
Este. 
July 21 
July 27 
cent. 
Santiago.. 
Aug. 19 
Montauk Point. 
Aug. 26 
1st Infantry, except 
Company F. 
eluly 20 
July 25 
Sept. 1 
Do 
Montauk Point. 
11 companies 1st 
Illinois. 
350 
July 28 
Aug. 6 
Convales- 
cent. 
Do 
Montauk Point. 
Part of 9th Massa- 
chusetts. 
Aug. 15 
Aug. 19 
Montauk Point. 
203 
Aug. 23 
Aug. 21 
Aug. 14 
Aug. 14 
Aug. 7 
41 
do 
Troops of 3d and 6th 
Cavalry. 
Aug. 17 
Aug. 2 
July 30 
Aug. 26 
Aug. 7 
Au». 6 
410 
10 officers, 32 men. 
cent. 
Playa del 
Este. 
July 21 
Fort Monroe 
July 25 
wounded 
Do 
Santiago.. 
Montauk Point. 
Auo'. 26 
1 st and 2d battalions 
of 1st District of 
Columbia. 
Aug. 25 
Aug. 30 
lery. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
41 
Name of vessel. 
Port sailed 
from. 
Date of 
sailing. 
Destination. 
Date of 
arrival. 
Troops on board. 
Number 
of sick 
and conva- 
lescents. 
Santiago.. 
1898. 
Aug. 26 
Aug. 17 
Aug. 26 
July 23 
Aug. 2 
Aug. 9 
Aug. 13 
Sept. 1 
Oct. 3 
Oct. 22 
Nov. 22 
Sept. 4 
Sept. 29 
Oct. 23 
Aug. 19 
Aug. 22 
Aug. 11 
Sept. 4 
Sept. 30 
Sept. 11 
Aug. 18 
Aug. 12 
Sept. 7 
Oct. 21 
Aug. 25 
Oct. 11 
Sept. 3 
Oct. 22 
Aug. 28 
July 31 
Sept. 1 
Oct. 6 
Aug. 25 
Oct. 5 
Sept. 11 
Oct. 12 
July 27 
Sept. 1 
Oct. 29 
Oct. 12 
Aug. 25 
July 31 
Montank Point. 
1898. 
Sept. 1 
Aug. 23 
Sept. 2 
July 29 
Aug. 8 
Aug. 15 
Aug. 19 
Sept. 5 
Oct. 8 
Oct. 25 
Nov. 26 
Sept. 10 
Oct. 5 
Oct. 31 
Aug. 23 
Aug. 25 
Aug. 15 
Sept. 10 
Oct. 5 
Sept. 17 
Aug. 24 
Aug. 19 
Sept. 13 
Oct. 26 
Aug. 29 
Oct. 17 
Sept. 10 
Oct. 27 
Sept. 4 
Aug. 5 
Sept. 7 
Oct. 11 
Aug. 30 
Oct. 10 
Sept. 18 
Oct. 19 
Aug. 3 
Sept. 6 
Nov. 3 
Oct. 21 
Sept. 1 
1 company 1st Illi- 
nois. 
Battery E 1st and 
Battery F 2d Ar- 
tillery. 
1 battalion 24th In- 
fantry, detach- 
ment'lst Illinois. 
Sick. 
246 
262 
255 
175 
Sick. 
400 
191 
252 
Sick and 
wounded. 
No report of what 
was on board. 
17th Infantry, 2 bat- 
talions 71st New 
York. 
La Grande Du- 
chesse. 
do 
Porto Rico 
Santiago.. 
Ponce 
Montauk Point. 
Do 
Philadelphia 
Fort Monroe . 
Philadelphia 
Fort Monroe 
Montauk Point. 
Fort Monroe 
Do 
Do 
Do 
Santiago.. 
Ponce 
Arroyo ... 
Santiago.. 
Do 
Do 
Yale 
Montauk Point. 
3d and 20tli Infantry 
Half of 33d Michigan 
2d Infantry and 4 
companies 71st 
New York. 
St. Paul 
do 
Ponce 
Fort Monroe 
Do 
Fort Mon- 
roe. 
Santiago-. 
Montauk Point. 
8th Ohio 
2d and 8th Infantry, 
2d Massachusetts. 
Ponce 
Do 
2 battalions 3d Wis- 
consin. 
2 companies 33d 
Michigan, 2 com- 
panies 1st District 
of Columbia, part 
2d Cavalry. 
16th Pennsylvania.. 
Troops A and C New 
York Cavalry, 
Sheridan and Gov- 
ernor’s Troop 
Pennsylvania Cav- 
alry. 
6th Massachusetts.. 
2 companies 9th 
Massachusetts. 
Minnewaska 
Do 
Santiago.. 
Montauk Point. 
Do 
San Juan . 
Santiago.. 
Ponce 
Montauk Point. 
Newport News . 
Do 
9 companies 2d Wis- 
consin. 
Do 
Santiago.. 
Montauk Point. 
Do 
Miscellaneous cargo 
General Lawton and 
stragglers. 
No report of what 
was carried. 
4th Pennsylvania... 
do 
Ponce 
Do 
San Juan . 
Santiago.. 
Montauk Point. 
Troop M, 10th Cav- 
alry. 
Ponce 
t 
a Hospital ship. 
In addition to the foregoing, shown by the records of the Quarter- 
master-General, Brig. Gen. 0. F. Humphrey, United States Volunteers, 42 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
chief quartermaster of General Shatter’s expedition, under date of 
September 15, 1898, reports the following vessels as having left Cuba 
between June 30 and July 12, 1898: 
Name of vessel. 
Date of 
depar- 
ture. 
Troops or civilians returning. 
Destination. 
July 9 
July 5 
July 8 
June 30 
do ... 
Fort Monroe. 
Key West. 
Port Tampa. 
Do. 
Do. 
Key West. 
Port Tampa. 
Fort Monroe. 
Port Tampa. 
Do. 
D. &. Miller...° 
Civilian employees, sick and dis- 
charged soldiers. 
July 2 
July 3 
July 10 
July 3 
June 30 
Civilian employees, sick and dis- 
charged soldiers. 
Civilian employees, sick and dis- 
charged soldiers. 
LAND TRANSPORTATION OF THE COMMAND DURING THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 
Owing to the lack of necessary transports, the means of land trans- 
portation during the Santiago campaign was painfully deficient. 
The testimony shows that the entire number of animals, wagons, and 
ambulances shipped with the expedition from Tampa and Mobile was 
as follows: 
Government horses 578 
Private horses 381 
Pack and draft mules 1, 336 
Wagons from Tampa „ 114 
Ambulances from Tampa and Mobile 7 
Wagons from Mobile 84 
General Shatter testifies that lie could carry no more on his transports 
from Tampa; that he realized that he would have very few ambulances, 
but that wagons could be used for transportation both of the wounded 
and of supplies, while ambulances could be employed only for one pur- 
pose. General Humphrey testifies that no more land transportation 
was taken simply because the vessels were fully loaded. Lieut. J. M. 
Kennedy, assistant surgeon, appeared at the front near Santiago July 2 
with ten ambulances, which had been brought over on the Louisiana. 
There were eight pack trains, consisting in all of 580 mules, and the 
value of their services in carrying provisions and ammunition to the 
front was simply inestimable. 
The testimony shows that the transports arrived off the south coast 
of Cuba near Santiago on June 21; that the pack trains were landed 
on June 22; that the first wagons were landed on June 25, and that the 
landing of the latter was continued more rapidly than they could be 
set up on shore, and that in fact some of those that were landed were 
never set up at all. 
General Chaffee testifies that on July 1, at the battle of El Cauey, 
ten days after the arrival of the fleet, there were no ambulances or REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
43 
wagons available, and that the roads were so horrible that they could 
not reach the front. He adds that only litters could have been used for 
the wounded, but even these were not on hand, as owing to oversight 
none had been landed. 
It is plainly evident that this army of 17,000 men disembarked in the 
face of an enemy in a hostile country, and, rapidly thrown forward 
against a well-armed force, was painfully deficient iu land transpor- 
tation, but in spite of the absence of this almost absolutely necessary 
portion of the equipment of a well-trained command, it drove the enemy 
before it, captured their outposts, pushed them behind their main de- 
fenses, drove their fleet from Santiago Bay to absolute destruction as 
it faced the Navy of our country, and finally, after most gallant fight- 
ing under a tropical sun, amidst most adverse conditions, captured a 
strongly fortified city, and received as prisoners of war over 23,000 
Spanish soldiers. 
In addition to its military operations, it performed a work which 
neither its commander nor others ever imagined would devolve upon 
it—that of feeding, at least to a limited degree, the vast host of men, 
women, and children who fled from Santiago on account of the fear of 
its bombardment, and, passing through our lines, sought refuge in El 
Caney; for days nearly as many rations were issued to these refugees 
as to the army itself, thus taxing the land transportation to its utmost 
limit. 
The conclusions drawn from the foregoing are as follows: 
1. The Quartermaster’s Department, a month before war was declared, 
was neither physically nor financially prepared for the tremendous 
labor of suddenly equipping and transporting an army over ten times 
the size of the Begular Army of the United States. 
2. That the department devoted the ability, zeal, and industry of 
its officers to accomplish the herculean task before it so soon as funds 
were made available and war was declared. 
3. That it deserves credit for the great work accomplished, for the 
immense quantity of materials obtained and issued within so short a 
period, and for its earnest efforts in reference to railroad transporta- 
tion and in protecting the great interests of the General Government 
committed to its charge. Its officers, especially those at the headquar- 
ters of the department and at its depots, worked earnestly and labori- 
ously day and night, sparing themselves in no possible way. 
4. There appears to have been a lack of system, whereby, even as late 
as October, troops in camps and in the field were lacking in some arti- 
cles of clothing, camp and garrison equipage; and hospitals, at least at 
two important localities in the South—Fort Monroe, Va., and Hunts- 
ville, Ala.—lacked stoves, while at Huntsville fuel was wanting. 
5. There appears to have been lack of executive or administrative 
ability, either on the part of the Quartermaster’s Department or the 
railroad officials, in preventing the great congestion of cars at Tampa 44 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
and Chickamaug'a when these camps were first established, which con- 
gestion caused delay, annoyance, and discomfort to the large bodies of 
troops concentrating at those places. 
6. There appears to have been a lack of foresight in preparing and 
promptly having available at some central locality on the seacoast the 
necessary fleet of transports which it seemed evident would be required 
for the movement of troops to a foreign shore, and, finally, when the 
call came suddenly and the emergency was supreme, the department 
appears not to have fully comprehended the capacity of the fleet under 
its command; not to have supplied it with a complete outfit of light- 
ers for the immediate disembarkation of troops and supplies; to have 
accepted without full investigation the statement that the vessels 
were capable of transporting 25,000 men, while really they could not 
and did not transport more than 17,000 with their artillery, equipments, 
ammunition, and supplies, and lacked sufficient storage room for the 
necessary amount of wagon transportation—that very important ele- 
ment in the movement of an army in the face of an enemy. 
7. The Quartermaster’s Department should maintain on hand at all 
times a complete supply for at least four months for an army of 100,000 
men of all articles of clothing, camp and garrison equipage, and other 
quartermaster’s supplies which will not deteriorate by storage or which 
can not at once be obtained in open market. 
Finally. In the opinion of this commission, there should be a division 
of the labor now devolving upon the Quartermaster’s Department. 
Whether there should be one great department of supply, covering 
the Quartermaster’s Department except transportation, the Subsistence 
Department, and the Pay Department, and another covering the 
important problem of transportation, including the movement of armies 
by land and by sea and the supply of animals, wagons, ambulances, 
and harness, is a subject for the serious consideration of a board of 
officers whose experience in peace and war, at home and in an enemy’s 
country, would render them most competent to make an exhaustive 
investigation and to present a complete report upon this important 
subject. 
SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT. 
BRIG. GEN. CHARLES P. EAGAN, COMMISSARY-GENERAL U. S. A., IN 
CHARGE. 
The Subsistence Department is charged with the purchasing, issu- 
ing, and preservation of subsistence supplies; also, with the distribu- 
tion, selliug, and accountability therefor. During the past thirty-five 
years the number of officers of the Subsistence Department has been 
so reduced that when war with Spain was declared it had only 22 
officers, viz, the Commissary-General, 2 colonels, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 
8 majors, and 8 captains. This number was barely sufficient to per- 
form subsistence duties for the Army of about 26,000 officers and 
enlisted men. The number was not large enough to allow officers of REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
45 
the department to serve with troops in the field. Soon after the first 
call 5 officers of the Subsistence Department were appointed commis- 
saries of volunteers, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Four of 
these were assigned as chief commissaries of corps. The remaining 
officers of the department were engaged in purchasing supplies and in 
caring for various State camps at which the volunteers were first con- 
centrated for muster. 
The subsistence officers with the troops in the field were, with the 
exception of the 4 above noted, either volunteers or line officers detailed 
for subsistence duties-, many of whom, however zealous, lacked the 
knowledge which only experience can give. 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION. 
Prior to the war with Spain each geographical department had a 
chief commissary. To him the post commissaries submitted requisi- 
tions for needed subsistence supplies; in turn he requested purchasing 
commissaries stationed in the large centers of trade to have shipped 
the articles called for. It was the duty of the purchasing commissaries 
to examine, test, and inspect the supplies and to determine whether or 
not they were pure and up to the required standard. Owing to the 
small number of officers, purchasing commissaries were given, in some 
cases, more than one geographical department to supply. 
During the war, instead of supplying 26,000 men, they supplied 
approximately 275,000. As soon as the volunteers were concentrated 
in the large camps, most of the chief commissaries were assigned to 
depot and other duty. 
The depots were under the immediate control of the Commissary- 
General, and from them there was a report of rations on hand. The 
greatest latitude was given commissaries with troops to enable them to 
avoid difficulties that arose from unforeseen conditions. Supplies were 
available, and it was the duty of the commissaries to see that they 
were issued, although they had no control over them from the time 
they were shipped from the depots until delivered to the troops. 
THE RATION. 
The ration is fixed by law. Additions have been made to it from time 
to time, so that at the beginning of the war with Spain it was liberal 
and capable of giving great variety. Its proportions were such that the 
proper percentages of proteids and carbohydrates could be obtained, 
giving the variety in diet necessary to a well-balanced ration. 
We give below tables showing the several rations issued by the Sub- 
sistence Department. 46 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
Table I.—The “garrison ” ration, with the usual proportions of fresh and salt meats 
and vegetables. 
1,000 complete rations. 
Net 
weight. 
Approxi- 
mate gross 
weight. 
Meat: 
Pounds. 
Pounds. 
75 
125 
150 
177 
Fresh beef, seven-tenths, 875 pounds, or fresh beef, 750 pounds, and 
canned salmon, 100 pounds 
875 
885 
1,125 
1, 507 
Vegetables: 
75 
81 
Or rice or hominy 
50 
54 
Fresh potatoes, 800 pounds, onions, 200 pounds, or potatoes, 700 pounds, 
\ 800 
808 
canned tomatoes, 300 pounds 
/ 300 
350 
Coffee, green .’ 
100 
122 
150 
161 
80 
97 
Candles 
15 
17 
40 
44 
40 
44 
2.5 
3 
1,000 rations 
3,877.5 
4, 475 
1 ration 
3.88 
4.88 
Table II.—The “field” ration. 
1,000 complete rations. 
2Tet 
weight. 
Approxi- 
mate gross 
weight. 
Pounds. 
750 
Pounds. 
883 
1, 000 
1,125 
150 
162 
1, 000 
80 
1,158 
92 
150 
161 
80 
97 
15 
17 
40 
44 
Salt 
40 
44 
2.5 
3 
3, 307.5 
3. 31 
3,786 
3.79 
When flour is issued instead of hard bread, 40 pounds of baking powder or dry yeast. 
Table III.—The “travel” ration used on journeys by railroads, stages, or steamboats 
1,000 complete rations. 
Net 
weight. 
Approxi- 
mate gross 
weight. 
(For first four days.) 
Pounds. 
1.000 
750 
450 
80 
150 
Pounds. 
1,125 
875 
520 
92 
161 
2,430 
2.43 
1,000 
2,773 
2.77 
1,360 
(After fourth day add) 
3,430 
3. 43 
4,133 
4.13 
1 ration REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
47 
Table IV.—The “travel” ration for journeys when liquid coffee is furnished. 
1,000 complete rations. 
Net 
weight. 
Approxi- 
mate gross 
weight. 
Pounds. 
1,000 
750 
450 
Pounds. 
1,125 
875 
520 
2, 200 
2.2 
2, 520 
2.52 
1 ration 
Twenty-one cents per ration are allowed for purchase of liquid coffee. 
Table V.—The “emergency” ration, as authorized hy General Orders, No. 49, Head- 
quarters of the Army, A. G. O., series of 1896. 
1,000 complete rations. • 
Net 
weight. 
Approxi- 
mate gross 
weight. 
Pounds. 
1,000 
625 
250 
125 
.58 
40 
2.5 
31.25 
Pounds. 
1,000 
625 
250 
125 
.58 
40 
2.5 
31.25 
100 
Salt 
2,074. 33 
2.07 
2,174.33 
2.17 
Our investigation showed that rations as above indicated were issued, 
and always on hand in abundance. The department exercised great 
vigilance in the inspection of all articles, and obtained, as far as we can 
ascertain, the best quality for the price paid. 
In addition to the regular ration, the Subsistence Department had 
for sale to officers and enlisted men many articles in the nature of 
personal convenience and food delicacies. The troops not using all 
the ration had what is known as “company savings.” These the 
department purchased, or they could be disposed of anywhere, money 
thus obtained being added to the company fund. From this fund, which 
is administered by the company commander under regulations of the 
War Department, purchases for the exclusive benefit of the enlisted 
men are made, thus giving a greater variety to the ration. From 
reports received from officers serving in the tropics, it is thought that 
the ration would be improved by adding more sugar and rice and 
some dried fruits. With these additions it is believed that it in all 
respects will be suitable for any climate. The cost of the garrison 
ration, based on New York prices, during the winter preceding the 
breaking out of the Spanish war, was 13.68 cents, and the cost toward 
the end of the war was 15.17 cents. 
There were sent to Cuba when the Fifth Corps sailed, on June 14, 
approximately 2,000,000 rations, being about four months’ supplies for 
16,000 men. When reenforcements were sent on June 22 about 500,000 48 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
additional rations were shipped, seventy-five days’ supplies for 6,400 
men, and in addition, a large supply of sales articles, all from Tampa. 
During June and July large quantities of the various components of 
the ration, as also sales articles, were shipped from New York and 
Chicago. 
A cargo of refrigerated beef was sent to Santiago and arrived on 
July 21, 1898, the day after the port was opened. 
Approximately 2,000,000 rations (together with refrigerated beef) 
were sent to Porto Rico, being about four months’ supplies for 16,000 
troops. 
The Hawaiian and Philippine islands were kept fully supplied. In 
the Hawaiian Islands beef was purchased from the native butchers. 
This, judging from reports, was not as satisfactory as the American 
refrigerated beef which the various transports carried. The troops in 
the Philippines were furnished frozen beef from Australia. The Navy 
had a refrigerator ship laden with it, and an arrangement was made 
whereby the troops were to purchase from the Navy until its suj)ply 
was exhausted, at which time the Subsistence Department expected 
a cargo of frozen beef to be in Manila and the Navy was then to obtain 
supply therefrom. 
The Commission has carefully investigated the subject of the condi- 
tion, quality, and quantity of the food supplied to the Army. Almost 
without exception it has been shown by the testimony taken that 
wherever the troops were ordered, whether to the various camps in the 
United States, or in Porto Rico, Cuba, and Manila, the rations prescribed 
by law were on the transports and at the camps with the soldiers. 
So far as we have been able to ascertain there was but one occasion, 
that of a, day, in front of Santiago, when the troops were seriously 
short of rations; these had been supplied but thrown aside when the 
men went into action; the condition of roads and lack of transporta- 
tion prevented prompt reissue. At times the vegetable ration was not 
of good quality, the potatoes and onions being spoiled. Condemned by 
a board of survey such vegetables were destroyed and an equivalent 
part of the ration issued. Some trouble occurred because such vegeta- 
bles and other damaged food were disposed of by the company without 
the warrant of a board of survey. This was done through ignorance, 
their officers not knowing what was necessary to be done. 
All the inspectorsof the Army, who were examined touching the quan- 
tity and quality of food, testified that it was not only abundant but of 
unusually good quality, one of them stating that “the troops at Chicka- 
mauga were constantly kept supplied with vegetables, fresh bread, and 
fresh meat. Each company and each command was supplied with ample 
cooking arrangements, the Buzzacott stove being used. There was no 
lack of fuel for cooking, and if deficiency or irregularity obtained in 
properly rationing or feeding the soldiers it was due to the ignorance 
and inefficiency of company and regimental officers.” This language 
was also embodied in the annual report made by the Inspector-General REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
49 
to the General of the Army, bearing date of November 1, 1898. The 
inspection reports quoted in this annual report state in substance the 
same thing about the meat and other food furnished, and the Insiiector- 
General, on page 47, says: “The Commissary Department has conducted 
its business, so far as I have been able to observe, in a most satisfactory 
manner in this war;” and, on page 56, “The quality of the food fur- 
nished is generally reported excellent and there has been no complaint 
as to the quantity.” 
The Commission investigated personally the quality of the food 
issued at Jacksonville, Anniston, Huntsville, Knoxville, Lexington, 
and Camp Meade, interrogating large numbers of soldiers, and hear- 
ing few complaints as to the quality or quantity of rations issued. 
Some complaint was made about the manner of preparing the rations, 
but no one testified that the rations prescribed by law were not issued 
regularly, and if any part thereof was spoiled they stated that the 
same was supplied on application to the subsistence department, pro- 
vided proper condemnation of the decayed food was made, as pre- 
scribed by law. Officers and enlisted men testified that when camps 
were moved the proper ration was issued. 
RECOMMENDATIONS. 
At each State camp of instruction an officer of the Subsistence 
Department should be detailed for the purpose of instructing officers 
and men in the method of making requisitions, the use of the ration, 
and the care of subsistence supplies. Instead of a caterer furnishing 
meals, the men should do their own cooking, using the regular ration 
and such articles as are for sale by the commissary. Each regiment 
should have an officer to act as regimental commissary, and also a 
regimental commissary-sergeant. 
All cooking and eating utensils should be furnished by the Subsist- 
ence Department. Under the present system utensils are furnished 
by each of three departments, thereby producing confusion. So 
important to the welfare of a company is a good cook that it is of the 
utmost importance that some method be devised whereby he may be 
obtained. Probably the best method would be to increase the pay to 
$25 a month and establish cooking schools, where on enlistment men 
could be sent and taught the best methods of army cooking. Company 
cooks should in turn instruct each member of the company. The army 
cookbook contains in detail description of the methods of garrison and 
field cooking. It was liberally distributed, but the troops did not, as a 
rule, avail themselves of the information to be found in it. 
REFRIGERATED BEEF. 
This commission was organized the 24th day of September last. Up 
to the 21st day of December its members had taken testimony in 
seventeen different towns and cities and nine camps. It had also 
received many hundred letters, communications, and newspaper clip- 50 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
pings from persons living in all parts of the country. Examination of 
numerous officers and enlisted men had been made as to the quality 
and condition of the meat issued to the troops. The testimony, with 
some exceptions, showed that the refrigerated beef issued was pure, 
sound, and wholesome. 
The question now is not whether, under all circumstances and con- 
ditions, this beef can be kept sound. It is liable to decay if kept too 
long or exposed for a time to the effects of heat and moisture. The 
question is whether chemically treated meat has been issued to the 
soldier. 
The subject of such meat seems to have been first called to the atten- 
tion of officers of the Army by Mr. Alex B. Powell, in a letter dated 
May 25, 1898, copies of which were sent to General Miles, General 
Eagan, and Hon. Amos Cummings, in which he incloses the following 
statement: 
In conversation with Mr. H. 0. Armour, of the Kansas City Packing Company, he 
tells me the Government anticipates shipping fresh beef, pork, mutton, etc., to 
Cuba. As I have had long experience in shipping meats to Florida at all times of 
the year by my process, I beg to suggest that in the climate of Cuba meats exposed 
after being taken from the ice boxes will only stand up a very short time. I have a 
process which I have been using for several years shipping meats to Florida. It so 
purifies the meats that they will stand any climate for from four to ten days after 
leaving the ice house. 
I shipped all the meats used at the Ponce de Leon and the Alcazar, of St. Augus- 
tine, Fla., from the time they opened up to 1894, under the management of Mr. O. D. 
Seavey, at present manager of the Hotel Champlain, Clinton County, N. Y., who 
knows all about my process, if you will kindly inquire of him the results. I also 
shipped all the meats used by the Tampa Bay Hotel during the management of J. H. 
King; also the St. James Hotel, Jacksonville, Fla., and many others up to the time 
the Chicago people commenced to ship refrigerator cars to their agency there. In 
fact, I shipped one-half the meat that went into Florida via the Clyde Steamship 
Line previous to their having broad-gauge railroads running into the State. Of this 
the agents of the Clyde Line will bear me evidence. 
My mode of shipping was in common barrels, with a simple bag covering. In many 
cases it was ten days on the trip, and I never lost 100 pounds by spoiling. I also will 
refer you to Count De Barry, agent for Mumm’s Champagne, New York, who has a 
residence in central Florida, who has for the past ten years up to the present time 
used no meats that did not come from me by my process. 
My proposition to the Government would be to process all their fresh meats in the 
cars at Tampa, or any other place where the cars could reach. I can process 10 car- 
loads, or 100,000 pounds, in four hours, at my own expense, and put the meats in a 
condition to be hung up in any part of the ship, which will keep in perfect condition 
for from four to ten days. I simply so purify the germs of the meats that they will 
stand the destroying elements of any climate. My price for doing it would be one- 
half cent per pound. Kindly send this to the proper party and have them investi- 
gate. I shall be pleased to go to Washington to confer with any party you suggest. 
May 27 this communication was referred by the Major-General com- 
manding the Army to the Commissary-General of Subsistence. The 
copy of Mr. Powell’s letter sent had evidently been previously referred 
to General Eagan, for on the 26th of May he wrote him as follows : 
Your letter of the 20th instant to the President of the United States upon the 
subject of preservation and shipment of fresh beef, pork, mutton, etc., to Cuba has REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
51 
been referred to this office. In reply have to say that the subject of furnishing 
fresh beef in Cuba is now being considered. This department is not engaging any 
one with methods to cure meats. If it purchases meat it will be from someone who 
will furnish meat and guarantee its good condition on arrival and for seventy-two 
hours thereafter, or who will slaughter and deliver as required, wherever the troops 
may be. 
This correspondence shows doubtless how the idea that processed or 
treated meats were being used in the Army originated, and also that 
the Commissary-General of Subsistence did not entertain the propo- 
sition of Mr. Powell. 
On the 21st day of December last Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, upon 
the written request of the president of this commission, appeared 
before it. He refused to be sworn, as all other witnesses had been 
except one, who affirmed, stating that he would make his statements 
without being sworn, and was responsible for what he said. He pro- 
ceeded, and for the first time in the history of this investigation the 
allegation was made that refrigerated beef issued to the troops had 
been chemically treated. 
In the statement, revised by himself, General Miles said: 
There was sent to Porto Rico 337 tons of wbat is known as so-called refrigerated 
beef, which you might call embalmed beef. * * * 
He proceeded to read a communication from Dr. W. H. Daly, major 
and chief surgeon, United States Volunteers, on his staff, bearing date 
of September 21, 1898, wherein Dr. Daly stated that— 
In the several inspections I made in the various camps and troopships at Tampa, 
Jacksonville, Chickamauga, and Porto Rico I found the fresh beef to be apparently 
preserved with secret chemicals which destroy its natural flavor, and which I also 
believe to be detrimental to the health of the troops. 
The entire report is as follows: 
Washington, D. C., September 21,1898. 
The Assistant Adjutant-General, 
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.: 
Sir : I have the honor to report, in the interest of the service, that in the several 
inspections I made in the various camps and troopships at Tampa, Jacksonville, 
Chickamanga, and Porto Rico, that I found the fresh beef to be apparently preserved 
with secret chemicals, which destroys its natural flavor, and which I also believe to 
be detrimental to the health of the troops. 
While on duty at headquarters of the army at Tampa at the time of the embarka- 
tion of the “Shatter expedition,” Colonel Weston, the efficient chief commissary, 
showed me a quarter of beef that had already, as a test, been sixty hours in the 
sun without being perceptibly tainted, so far as the sense of smell could detect. 
It is impossible to keep fresh beef so long untainted in the sun in that climate 
without the use of deleterious preservatives, such as boric acid, salicylic acid, or 
nitrate potash, injected into it in quantities liable to be hurtful to the health of 
the consumer. 
At Ponce, Porto Rico, much of the beef I examined arriving on the transports 
from the United States was also of the same character, being apparently preserved 
by injecting chemicals to aid deficient cold storage. 
“Where efficient cold storage is impossible transporting beef alive is the 
method that should receive the fullest consideration by the Government as being 52 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
safest for the health of the consumer. When detailed to take charge of the trans- 
port Panama, for conveying convalescents to the United States, I obtained 2,000 
pounds of fresh beef from the commissary at Ponce. It looked well, but had an 
odor similar to that of a dead human body after being injected with preservatives, 
and it tasted when first cooked like decomposed boric acid, while after standing a 
day for further inspection it became so hitter, nauseous, and unpalatable as to be 
quite impossible for use. I was therefore obliged, owing to its condition, and the 
just complaints of the sick about it, and the disgustingly sickening odor it emitted 
when being cooked, and its mawkish, flat taste when served, and the safety of my 
patients—255 convalescent soldiers on hoard—to organize a board of survey, con- 
demn and throw 1,500 pounds, all we had, overboard; consequently the convales- 
cents were entirely without much-needed fresh beef, making the duty of bringing 
the men to the United States in an improved condition a very difficult matter. 
In my inspection of the Fourth United States Volunteer Infantry at Jacksonville 
recently I observed the same odor and taste upon the fresh beef, but not so marked, 
and at camp of Sixth United States Volunteer Infantry at Chickamauga I also, at 
severally inspections, observed it markedly. I there inspected a lot of beef just 
issued to that regiment, and, while it looked well, was of a sickening odor, like a 
human body dead of disease and injected with preservatives, and when cooked was 
quite unpalatable, consequently likely to prove an efficient cause of ill health. The 
men complained of its insipid and mawkish flavor that high seasoning could not 
conceal. 
Believing that the Commissary Department has been imposed upon by the misdi- 
rected commercial spirit of persons furnishing beef, I respectfully recommend that 
the matter be investigated by experts making a quantitative and qualitative chemical 
analysis of the several preservatives suspected to be used by getting samples of beef 
furnished for export to Cuba and Porto Rico. 
If the question arises that a report should have been made by me earlier, I beg to 
say that I have endeavored, with all my opportunities, to first inform myself, by 
observation, of the conditions above noted sufficiently to warrant my drawing the 
attention of the Adjutant-General at Headquarters of the Army to the matter. 
Very respectfully, 
W. H. Daly, 
Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. Volunteers. 
General Miles further said: 
I do not think that beef such as was sent to Cuba or Porto Rico would be good 
in any country in the stomach of any man. 
If I was furnished for any expedition in this country, or any other, with such 
stuff, I would prohibit the men from taking it. 
I do not know what may have been injected into it. 
The understanding is that this is a secret process of preserving beef. 
This last was in answer to a question whether Dr. Daly made a chem- 
ical analysis of refrigerated beef. He further said: u It may be that 
they are still sending the stuff down there,” meaning Porto Rico. From 
these quotations it is apparent that General Miles distinctly and 
unqualifiedly stated that the refrigerated beef furnished to the troops 
had been chemically treated, or was “ embalmed beef.” 
Of the witnesses examined by this commission, General Miles and 
Dr. Daly are the only ones who make this charge. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
53 
General Miles did not state that he personally inspected any refriger- 
ated meat. He did not refer us to any witness who would testify that 
the beef issued to the troops was embalmed beef, unless his reading' of 
the report made by Dr. Daly to him, the true date of which Dr. Daly 
stated should have been October 21, 1898, may be considered such a 
reference. 
Although Dr. Daly swears that he informed General Miles about the 
1st of August, 1898, that he suspected that the refrigerated beef was 
chemically treated, it does not appear that the General informed you 
or the War Department that an officer of his staff had made this dis- 
covery, nor does it appear that he at the time ordered any of the 
officers under his command to probe to the bottom an allegation which, 
if true, concerned the health of 275,000 soldiers of the United States. 
It appears from the report of Dr. Daly, which he handed to General 
Miles October 21 last, that he then specifically stated that the refriger- 
ated beef furnished to the troops was “apparently” chemically treated. 
It does not appear that when this charge was made, October 21, it 
having been already made to him in August, 1898, that General Miles 
communicated to you, or the Secretary of War, or to the Commissary- 
General, the belief or suspicion entertained by him that refrigerated 
meat, dangerous to health, was issued every day to the troops, in fail- 
ure to do which there was dereliction of duty. It is true that on 
September 20 he had directed that an order should be issued asking 
for reports relative to meats issued, but the order specifically mentions 
“canned fresh roast beef” and nothing else, and it was the reports 
received in answer to this that were presented in abstract by the 
General at the time of his appearance before the commission and since. 
In his report Dr. Daly does not make the all-important statement 
that he had already chemically analyzed any meat, although he sug- 
gests that such analysis should be made. He does state that in the 
several inspections made by him at Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga, 
and Porto Pico he “found the fresh beef to be apparently preserved 
with secret chemicals.” He says that at Ponce the beef he examined 
“ was also of the same character, being apparently preserved by injected 
chemicals.” 
For months, as it appears, Dr. Daly concealed the knowledge of the 
commission of a crime affecting men under his charge, whom, as an 
officer and a physician, he was bound to protect. 
On the 20th day of January he appeared as a witness. He was 
duly sworn, and testified that he commanded the steam transport 
Panama on her voyage from Ponce, Porto Pico, to Fort Monroe, Ya. 
She sailed about September 4 last with 150 convalescent soldiers on 
board. The day previous she received about 1,500 pounds of refriger- 
ated beef. There was no refrigerator aboard, but there was a quantity 
of ice, and the beef was put on it. The meat did not keep. It was 
used until September 7, and on that day, what remained, 963 pounds, 54 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
was thrown overboard, being decayed, and putrid. A board of survey 
had condemned it, but neither the board, nor any member thereof, 
nor Dr. Daly, at that time suggested or intimated that this beef had 
been chemically treated. Dr. Daly testified that previous to the con- 
demnation of the beef he took from a kettle, in which some of it was 
being boiled, two bottles of the broth, and having corked but not sealed 
the bottles, placed them in his portmanteau for safe keeping. One of 
the bottles was broken and the contents lost. He preserved the fluid 
contained in the other bottle and on or about September 15, at his 
home in Pittsburg, analyzed it, obtaining a residuum which exhibited 
the characteristics of boric and salicylic acid. 
Dr. Daly when he testified had in his possession a brownish powder, 
which he said was the residuum from the broth above mentioned. He 
consented that Professor Clarke, chief chemist of the United States 
Geological Survey, should analyze the substance. It was so analyzed, 
and Professor Clarke testified that traces of boric and salicylic acid 
were found. 
The meat sent aboard the Panama had been kept ashore some time 
out of a refrigerator. It was handled by several persons and exposed 
to deterioration at Ponce and aboard the Panama. 
It is to be further noted that Dr. Daly afterwards saw other beef at 
Chickamauga and Jacksonville which he suspected to have been chem- 
ically treated, but he did not take samples of the beef, nor analyze it, 
nor did he at the time report his suspicions to any person, so far as is 
known to the commission. 
Dr. Daly states that the injected meat “tasted when first cooked like 
decomposed boric acid.” The proof before us is that boric acid in meat 
does not decompose and that it has no taste. He speaks of the odor 
emitted by the meat, but the proof is that boric acid has no odor. 
After being delivered from the refrigerator ship this meat was on 
shore under a shed. The commissary received it as good meat and 
issued it as such, but there was no refrigerator at Ponce. The meat 
was exposed to the elements and to the handling of many persons. 
Little attention need be paid to the statement made by Dr. Daly 
touching the question of beef shown him by Colonel (now General) 
Weston that had already, as a test, been sixty hours in the sun with- 
out being perceptibly tainted, so far as the sense of smell could detect, 
for Dr. Daly says that he has implicit confidence in General Weston, 
and that whatever the latter may say about it is true. 
We insert here a copy of General Weston’s testimony, which abso- 
lutely disposes of the charge that the beef seen by Dr. Daly at Tampa 
was beef that was furnished by the contractors, or issued to the troops. 
Question 1. As stated (in testimony of Colonel Osgood), four quarters of beef, said 
to liave been prepared by meat process, were allowed to be bung up on the deck of 
a transport sailing from Tampa that the preservation power of the process might be 
tested. Please state fully all you know about this matter. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
55 
Reply. About June 8,1898, the Comal, on which I sailed to Cuba, lay at Port 
Tampa, where I received from Mr. Edwards and Mr. Powell a few cattle to test by 
exposure to the sun, the object being to find out how long the beef would last before 
decomposition would set in. The beeves were cut up, and some, if not all, covered 
with burlap. Mr. Edwards said that the beef had been treated in a closed car at 
Port Tampa, by a Mr. Powell of New York city. Mr. Powell was present. I talked 
to him as to the manner of treatment; asked him if it was gaseous or liquid. He 
said it was a simple and harmless process, and if the beef stood the test and his bid 
was accepted that he would submit the process to us, and if not satisfactory, we 
needn’t take it. 
I took the beef to test it, and asked Mr. Edwards to send some of it to a few 
regiments. I know some was sent to Colonel Wood’s regiment (Rough Riders), and 
to some other ships where the Third and Sixth Regiments of Cavalry were, and to 
explain that we wanted the beef tested by exposure to the sun. 
At this time the troops were subsisting on the travel ration, the meat portion of 
which was canned beef, so that there appeared no probability of the few regiments 
I sent the quarters to, to get it mixed up with fresh beef for issue, nor could it be 
taken for an issue, as all of the three beeves I had received, the bulk of which I kept 
on the Comal, wouldn’t have been more than enough for one day’s ration for one regi- 
ment of 1,200 men. 
The test aboard the Comal was certainly satisfactory, as the beef, covered with 
burlap, held out eighty hours, and I so informed the Commissary-General of Sub- 
sistence under date of June 11, 1898; also Mr. Powell, who was present. 
This beef was at no time the property of the United States, nor was any of it 
issued to United States troops. During the process I examined the beef frequently, 
sometimes every two or three hours, accompanied by the surgeon-general of the 
Swedish or Norwegian army, by the doctor on board the ship, and others; indeed, I 
was so enthusiastic over my work I showed the beef to almost every passer-by. 
Among others to whom I showed the beef, was Major Daly, surgeon, whom I had 
observed with General Miles standing on the bridge of the ship, to whom I explained 
everything I knew about it, namely, that it was beef treated by Mr. Powell, and 
that we were experimenting with it, Mr. Edwards and Mr. Powell having furnished 
it for that purpose. 
Question 2. Was any specially prepared, i. e., chemically treated beef received by 
you, and if any such was received, was any issued to troops; and if so, to what 
extent, at what place, and to what troops? 
Reply. No. No specially prepared beef was received by me in an official sense. 
The beef referred to in reply to question No. 1 was received by me for the purpose of 
testing it after the manner indicated in the same reply. 
Question 3. Did you ever know of any beef being supplied to the Army which had 
been treated by any process intended to delay decomposition through the action of 
any chemical substance other than salt and saltpeter? 
Reply. No. 
Question 4. Were you at any time, either before or during the war with Spain, 
asked or ordered to receive, for issue to troops, any so-called fresh beef which had 
been treated chemically for preservation reasons ? 
Reply. No. 
Question 5. If you were so asked or ordered, state when, where, and by whom you 
were so asked or ordered. 
Reply. No. 
It may be well briefly to describe the inspection of the beef by the 
officers of the Government of the United States. Inspection of refrig- 
erated beef is provided for by the act of Congress approved March 3, 
1891. 56 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
By the third section of this act the Secretary of Agriculture shall 
cause to be inspected, prior to their slaughter, all cattle which are sub- 
jects of interstate commerce, aud which are about to be slaughtered at 
slaughterhouses iu any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
the carcasses of which are to be transported to, or sold in, any other 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, and he may also make 
a post-mortem examination of the carcasses of such cattle. The exam- 
ination is to be made according to rules adopted by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, and after such examination the carcasses which are found 
to be free of disease, and wholesome, sound, and fit for human food, 
shall be marked, stamped, or labeled for identification, as may be pro- 
vided by said rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture. 
It is made a criminal olfense to forge, counterfeit, or knowingly and 
wrongfully alter, deface, or destroy any of the marks, stamps, or other 
devices provided for in the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture 
of any such carcasses. It is unlawful to transport from one State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia into another State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, or for any person to deliver to another for 
transportation, as above stated, the carcasses which have been exam- 
ined in accordance with the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the act, 
and which on said examination have been declared by the inspector 
making the same to be unsound or diseased. Inspectors are author- 
ized to give official certificates of the sound and wholesome condition 
of the cattle, their carcasses, and products, and one copy of every cer- 
tificate shall be filed in the Department of Agriculture, another copy 
shall be delivered to the owner or shipper, and when the cattle or their 
carcasses and products are sent abroad a third copy shall be delivered 
to the chief officer of the vessel on which the shipment shall be made. 
Under this act rules and regulations have been enacted by the Bureau 
of Animal Industry, and will be found in Bulletin No. 9, issued by that 
bureau. Dr. D. E. Salmon is chief of the Bureau of Animal Industry. 
We can not quote in full the complete regulations adopted by the 
Bureau of Animal Industry. It is sufficient to say that proprietors of 
slaughterhouses must make application to the Secretary of Agricul- 
ture for inspection of cattle and their products. This application must 
be in writing, and the applicant must agree to conform strictly with 
all lawful regulations or orders that may be made by the Secretary 
of Agriculture. An official number is given to every slaughtering- 
establishment. 
The Secretary of Agriculture designates an inspector to take charge 
of the examination and inspection of animals and their products for 
each establishment which has been officially numbered, and details to 
such inspector such assistants or other employees as may be necessary 
to carry on the work of inspection. The inspector and all employees 
under his direction have full and free access to all parts of the build- 
ing used in the slaughtering of animals and the conversion of their 
carcasses into food products. Each employee must wear a badge. An REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
57 
antemortem examination of all animals arriving at the stock yard for 
slaughter shall be made when they are weighed. Any animal found to 
be diseased or unfit for human food is marked by placing in the ear a 
metal tag bearing aU. S. Condemned” and a serial number. Such 
animals are placed in pens and removed by a numbered permit, signed 
by the inspector, to the abattoir or rendering works, designated by the 
said inspector, where they shall be killed under the supervision of an 
employee of the Bureau of Animal Industry, and rendered in such 
manner that their products will be unfit for human food. All animals 
must be inspected before they are slaughtered, and no animal shall be 
allowed to pass the slaughtering room until it has been inspected. 
After the animal is slaughtered each carcass is inspected. The head 
of each animal shall be held until the inspection of the carcass is com- 
pleted, in order that it may be identified in case of condemnation of 
the carcass. Should any carcass on the postmortem examination be 
found to be diseased and unfit for human food, it shall be marked with a 
metal condemnation tag, and shall be removed to tanks on the premises 
and deposited therein, and rendered in such a manner as to prevent its 
withdrawal as a food product. Any person who removes any tags may 
be prosecuted under the acts of Congress of March 3,1891, and March 
2, 1895. Carcasses designed for interstate or export trade will be 
tagged by the inspector or an employee designated by him with a num- 
bered tag issued by the Department of Agriculture, and a record of 
the same is sent to the Department at Washington. 
This reference to the rules and regulations of the Bureau of Animal 
Industry will sufficiently show how perfect and complete is the super- 
vision of the Government over the meat products of the country. It 
is of course barely possible that in spite of this active and thorough 
supervision the meat may be tampered with, but it is improbable that 
any chemical substances can be applied to it while it is still in the 
packing establishment. When this inspected and tagged meat leaves 
the establishment of the packer for its destination it is put in a car 
which is prepared for refrigerating purposes, and this car is sealed 
with two seals, one affixed by the packer and one by the railroad com- 
pany. If intended for exportation, the meat is delivered from the car 
to the ship, on board of which there is a refrigerator under the charge 
of men employed by the packers. It can not be said that it is impos- 
sible that the meat while on a car or ship may be tampered with, but 
it is highly improbable that such a thing would happen. The system 
of cold storage has been for many years largely used in all parts of 
the world, and without the use of chemicals it has been found sufficient 
to preserve slaughtered meats. 
In the contracts made by the Commissary-General of Subsistence 
for the furnishing of meat at points on the seacoast of the island of 
Porto Rico occupied by the army of the United States it is provided 
that refrigerators are to be supplied to all ships on which such meat is 
to be transported. It is also provided that the contractors shall have 58 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
and operate refrigerating buildings at such points in the island of 
Porto Eico occupied by the army of the United States as may be neces- 
sary for carrying out the purpose of their contract. The beef to be 
furnished by the contractors is to be of uniform good quality, from fat 
steers, United States Government inspected, weighing not less than 
600 pounds dressed weight per carcass, and shall be refrigerated, 
chilled, or frozen in quantities according as it shall be called for by the 
Commissary-General of Subsistence of the United States Army. 
A copy of this contract is attached to the testimony of Brigadier- 
General Eagan, and a reference to it will show that the beef was to be 
of the best quality. By the terms of the contract it was to be perfectly 
good and fit for use seventy-two hours after being issued from the ship’s 
refrigerator, or twenty-four after being issued from the refrigerator 
buildings to the proper officer of the Government. 
This commission has made earnest efforts to arrive at the truth of 
the charge that the meat furnished by the contractors to the troops 
was chemically treated. We have hereinbefore detailed at length the 
testimony of the single witness who, from his own declared knowledge, 
advances the charge. On the other side there is a mass of proof that 
there is no truth in the charge. We have taken the testimony of many 
witnesses who, from their opportunities to know the truth, were able to 
testify as to the character and condition of the meat issued to the troops. 
The Navy uses when practicable refrigerator beef; some of its officers 
have testified to its soundness and excellence. Many officers, Govern- 
ment inspectors, noncommissioned officers, cooks, and privates, have 
given similar testimony. 
It is an established fact that beef kept for a long time in cold storage 
gathers upon its exterior a mold known as the “beard” or “whiskers,” 
which gradually affects the meat to a depth varying with the length of 
time the growth has been forming. Iiemoval of the affected outer por- 
tion usually shows the meat below to be sound and fit for consumption. 
By the evidence presented to the commission the meat has been traced 
from the animal on the hoof to the commissaries, who received it 
from the contractors and issued it to the troops, all of which seems to 
negative the idea that it had been chemically treated. 
The commission has not confined itself to merely verbal or written 
proof. Immediately upon hearing the testimony of Dr. Daly, on the 
20tli of January telegrams were sent to all issuing commissaries in 
Cuba, Porto Eico, and at the various borne camps occupied by troops, 
asking that samples of refrigerated beef be at once taken, placed in 
glass jars, securely sealed, and forwarded to the commission. These 
samples were to be of 1 pound weight from the outside and 1 pound 
weight from the inside of a quarter. In response to this request many 
samples have been received and later sent to the chemists of the 
Agricultural and Interior Departments for careful chemical examina- 
tion. The result of analysis has been reported to us in 29 cases, and, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
59 
as will be seen by the reports appended, in no specimen examined has 
either boric or salycilic acid or other deleterious chemicals been found. 
In view of the facts above set forth, the commission is of the 
opinion that no refrigerated beef furnished by contractors and issued 
to the troops during the war with Spain was subjected to or treated 
with any chemicals by the contractors or those in their employ. 
CANNED MEATS. 
In considering questions concerning canned meats it is not the duty 
of the commission to inquire into the character, kind, or condition of 
all the canned meats that may be in use in this country. Our specific 
duty is to give an opinion as to the quality of those furnished the sol- 
diers during the recent war with Spain. There has been neither 
allegation nor proof before us that boric, or salicylic, or any other 
acid has been used in the canned meats furnished to the troops, but 
such meats have nevertheless been greatly criticised, and they have, 
for that reason, been tested by us and have been analyzed under our 
direction, and we have taken a great deal of testimony as to the mode 
of their preparation. The canned meat is ordinarily taken from the 
forequarters of beeves. 
Under the regulations of the Agricultural Department, each article 
of food product made from inspected carcasses must bear a label con- 
taining the official number of the establishment from which said product 
came and also contain a statement that the same has been inspected 
under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1891. A copy of said label 
must be filed at the Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. 0., and, 
after filing, said label will become the mark of identification, showing 
that the products to which it has been attached have been inspected, as 
provided by these rules and regulations; and any person who shall 
forge, counterfeit, alter, or deface said label will be prosecuted under the 
penalty clause of section 4 of the act of March 3, 1891, as amended in 
the act of March 2,1895. Each package to be shipped from said estab- 
lishment to any foreign country must have printed or stenciled on the 
side or on the top by the packer or exporter the following: 
(a) Official number of establishment. 
(&) Number of pieces or pounds. 
(c) Trade-mark. 
FOR EXPORT. 
Iii case said package is for transportation to some other State or 
Territory or to the District of Columbia, in place of the words “for 
export’7 the words “Interstate trade” shall be substituted. 
The inspector of the Department of Agriculture in charge of the 
establishment at which the meat was prepared being satisfied that the 
articles in said packages came from animals inspected by him, and that 
they are wholesome, sound, and fit for human food, shall paste upon 
such packages meat-inspection stamps bearing serial numbers. 60 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
Iii order that the stamps may be protected and to insure uniformity 
in affixing, inspectors will require of the proprietors of abattoirs and 
packing establishments the adoption of cases suitable for one of the 
two methods mentioned below. The stamp may be affixed in a grooved 
space let into the box of sufficient size to admit it, similar to that 
required by the Internal-Revenue Bureau for the stamping of packages 
of plug tobacco. Stamps may be placed on either end of the package, 
provided that the sides are made to project at least half an inch to 
afford the necessary protection from abrasion. 
The stamp having been affixed, it must be immediately canceled. 
Great care is taken in the securement of these stamps. They are 
not allowed to remain loose about the office or the abattoir and strin- 
gent rules in this regard are made for the government of the inspector. 
Whenever any package of meat products bearing the inspection stamp 
shall have been opened and its contents removed for sale, the stamp on 
said package must be obliterated. Reports of the work of inspection 
carried on in every establishment shall be daily forwarded to the 
Department by the inspector in charge on such blank forms and in 
such manner as are specified by the Department. 
We take the following description of the preparation of this meat 
from a jiaper issued by the Agricultural Department: 
In preparing the meat for canning, large pieces are put in vats of boiling water 
and thus cooked. This softens the meat, makes it more tender, and facilitates the 
separation of hone and gristle. After these are removed, the meat is cut into pieces 
of proper size for the can. The top is then soldered on the can, but a small hole is 
left, through which air and steam escape in the heating of the can which follows. 
This heating also kills the bacteria. The hole is then closed by a drop of melted 
solder, and the can is hermetically sealed. The cans are then tested to see whether 
this handling has been done so as to protect the meat from deterioration. To this 
end they are kept in a warm room for a number of days. If the bacteria have not 
been killed, the meat will decompose, gases will be produced, and the cans will 
swell. The number of cans that swell and thus indicate imperfect handling is said 
to average about one-fourtli of 1 per cent. The meat in them is thrown into the 
waste heap with the intestines and other refuse and made into fertilizers. 
Tliis statement corresponds with oral testimony taken by us. As 
appears from the testimony of Dr. W. O. Atwater, professor of chem- 
istry at Wesleyan University at Middletown, Conn., it is impossible, 
by the process described, to remove from the meat which goes into the 
cans any considerable part of the actual nutriment. Tbe difference 
between the meat as prepared in this way and that ordinarily cooked 
in the household is that the canned meat does not contain the bone 
and gristle, which are not edible. According to analyses the per- 
centage of protein in boiled beef is 24 per cent, and canned 26 per cent. 
The proportion of fat in the canned meats analyzed was relatively 
smaller, doubtless because leaner meat was used for canning. The 
value of meat, as of other foods for nourishment, depends upon its 
digestibility; that is, upon the proportion of nutritive material that is 
absorbed from the digestive tract during its passage through the body. 
Numerous tests have been made of the digestibility of fresh meats as REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
61 
ordinarily cooked for eating. The number of experiments made with 
canned meats is smaller, but there is no reason to assume any consider- 
able difference between the two. 
Nearly all the protein of beef, as it is ordinarily eaten, is digested 
and assimilated by the system. The high nutritive value of properly 
cooked canned meat is therefore well settled by accurate experiment. 
In the great stock yards in Chicago, Kansas City, and elsewhere, where 
nearly all of the canned meat is put up, all the meat is inspected on the 
hoof and at the time of slaughtering by Government experts, who are 
on the ground all the time, and without whose examination not an ani- 
mal is killed ; and no shipment of meat can be made without inspection 
without violation of Government regulations. This furnishes a guar- 
anty for the quality of the canned meat. In treating of refrigerated 
beef we have minutely explained the process of inspection as to refrig- 
erated meats, and the same applies as to canned meat. 
Dr. Atwater has been conducting an extended investigation of the 
nutritive value of food. The food problem has also been very carefully 
studied in Europe. Distinguished scientists in France, Germany, Kus- 
sia, and other European countries have been engaged in this investi- 
gation. The value of different foods for men engaged in ordinary occu- 
pations, for soldiers in time of peace and war, and persons in various 
other conditions of life has been studied. In treating of these ques- 
tions Dr. Atwater has said that in the cooking and canning, which is 
in the nature of boiling rather than roasting, water is expelled, but the 
amount of nutritive material removed is very small indeed, so that a 
pound of ordinary canned meat has, on the average, much more nutri- 
ment than the same weight of the fresh meat from which it is prepared. 
The removal of the bone and part of the water, while so little nutri- 
ment is taken away, leaves the meat in a less bulky and more concen- 
trated form, so that pound for pound the canned meat has a higher 
nutritive value than the fresh meat. 
In a large number of analyses of fresh and canned meats, collected 
at Chicago during the World’s Fair, and in other parts of the country 
before and since that time, and analyzed under the direction of Dr. 
Atwater, these proportions of the nutritive ingredients in the canned 
meats have been found to be larger than in the ordinary fresh meats. 
This is especially true of the protein compounds, which are used by the 
body to build up its nitrogenous materials, as blood, muscle, and bone. 
Among the analyses made by him some of the largest proportions of 
protein were found in the boiled meats. He greatly commends such 
prepared meats. 
The use of canned meats, according to the proof before us, is very 
general. It has been a part of the ration in our military service since 
August 1, 1878, as appears by order hereinafter quoted, confirmed by 
General Order, No. 8, February 8, 1888, also quoted. It is issued as a 
ration every ten days in our Navy. We have had before us a number 
of abstracts of reports made by officers, reciting that the tinned meat 62 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
issued to the troops is unpalatable, that it is stringy, that it is coarse, 
flat, and tasteless. On the other hand, other officers and enlisted men 
and citizens with equal opportunities for having knowledge have testi- 
fied before us that the tinned roast beef is pure, sound, and palatable. 
This difference of opinion must to some extent be accounted for by diver- 
sity in taste. We ourselves have tasted the contents of several cans of 
the meat, some of which had been issued to troops in Porto Rico and 
brought back by them, some of which were furnished to us by the Com- 
manding General; three cases bearing the brand of different packers 
were sent at our request by Captain Grooine, of the First city troop of 
Philadelphia, and some we purchased at random. Specimens of all 
these samples were furnished to expert chemists in Washington for 
analysis. The reports of these analyses are appended hereto, marked 
Exhibit P. In connection with them will be found a report from Capt. 
A. E. Hunt, of the Pennsylvania Artillery, in which he transmits the 
result of an analysis of a can of fresh roast beef, taken by him from a 
case which had been issued to his battery in Porto Rico, and brought 
home. 
There is no doubt that when issued to soldiers in Cuba and Porto 
Eico, where it was exposed to the heat, and where they did not have the 
proper means of treating the cans, as directed on the labels, and could 
not properly cook it, the meat was unpalatable, especially to those 
suffering from malaria, or convalescent. 
The result of our own testing and of all the analyses made at our 
instance, as also the analysis made by Mr. James O. Handy, chief 
chemist, Pittsburg testing laboratory (specimen referred to by Captain 
Hunt), is that the canned meat which has been brought to our attention 
is pure, sound, and nutritive. It has not been found to contain any 
acids or any deleterious substance, but to be unadulterated meat. 
The testimony before us is that the canned meat is not, in general, 
intended to be issued to troops except as an emergency ration. The 
preponderance of the proof is that meat on the hoof and the refrigerated 
beef are more acceptable. A number of officers and others have testi- 
fied that the meat is unpalatable. Its palatability greatly depends 
upon the mode in which it is cooked. 
In a tropical climate, carried on the march, exposed to heat, the meat 
so changes in appearance as to become repulsive. In the Navy, where 
the meat is properly cared for, there has been no complaint, so far as 
has appeared in evidence before us. 
After careful consideration we find that canned meat, as issued to 
the troops, was generally of good quality, was properly prepared, and 
contained no deleterious substance. At times probably material of poor 
quality is issued; in one of the cans sent to us and examined by the 
chemist a large amount of gristle was found. 
That it was not issued “under pretense of an experiment” is indi- 
cated by the fact that it has been in use in the Army for more than REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
63 
twenty years, as shown by the following extract from general orders 
from the Headquarters of the Army of the United States: 
General Orders, 
No. 59. 
Headquarters of the Army, 
Adjutant-General’s Office, 
Washington, August 1, 1878. 
By direction of the Secretary of War the following order is published to the 
Army: 
I. The following issues may be made to troops traveling upon cars or transports, 
or in the field, when it is impracticable to cook their rations, viz: Seventy-five 
pounds of canned fresh or corned beef, and sixteen 3-pound cans or six 1-gallon cans 
of baked beans, or 15 pounds of cheese per hundred rations—the issues of canned 
beef to be in lieu of the meat, and the beans and cheese in lieu of the vegetable 
ration authorized by existing regulations and orders. None of the above-mentioned 
articles will be sold by companies or detachments as savings. 
command of General Sherman: 
E. D. Townsend, Adjutant-General. 
General Orders, , 
No. 8. ' 
Headquarters of tiie Army, 
Adjutant-General’s Office, 
Washington, February 8, 1888. 
By direction of the Secretary of War, paragraph 2150 of the regulations is 
amended to read as follows: 
2150. A ration is the established daily allowance of food for one person. For the 
United States Army it is now composed as follows: 12 ounces of pork or bacon or 
canned beef (fresh or corned), or 1 pound and 4 ounces of fresh beef, or 22 ounces of 
salt beef; 18 ounces of soft bread or flour, or 16 ounces of hard bread, or 1 pound 
and 4 ounces of corn meal. To every 100 rations, 15 pounds of beans or peas, or 10 
pounds of rice or hominy, 10 pounds of green coffee, or 8 pounds of roasted (or 
roasted and ground) coffee or 2 pounds of tea, 15 pounds of sugar; 4 quarts of vine- 
gar, 1 pound and 8 ounces of adamantine or star candles, 4 pounds of soap, 4 pounds 
of salt, 4 ounces of pepper; and to troops in the field, when necessary, 4 pounds of 
yeast-powder to the 100 rations of flour. 
By command of Lieutenant-General Sheridan: 
R. C. Drum, Adjutant-General. 
Official. 
Assistant Adjutant-General. 
As respects the quality of canned meats in general as used in the 
Army, the following communication is indicative of what the opinion 
has been of those best informed charged with the duty of examining 
and reporting in relation thereto : 
War Department, Adjutant-General’s Office, 
Washington, October 19,1897. 
Mr. W. Clarke Marshall, 
Produce Exchange, 6646 Wentworth avenue, Chicago, III. 
Sir ; I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 
19th ultimo, to the Secretary of War, giving information regarding the proper 
food to be taken to the sufferers in Alaska, and also for the subsistence of the troops 
there, and ascribing the sickness in that locality to the use of salt meats, and in 
reply thereto the Secretary of War desires me to call attention to the following 
remarks of the Medical Department of the Army, in which the Major-General Com- 
manding the Army concurs: 
“ Canned meats put up by reputable firms are wholesome and have the fall nutri- 
tive value of the meat contents, and in the absence of fresh meat are to be preferred 64 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
to any of the three substitutes suggested by the writer. Meat when salted loses a 
certain proportion of its albuminoids and extractives, but what remains is valuable 
as food and has no specific influence in the production of scurvy. With hard bread, 
bacon, pea meal, and an occasional issue of fresh beef, or in its absence canned meat, 
a dietary of a satisfactory force value can be provided. To these there should be 
added, for the prevention of scurvy, occasional issues of potatoes, onions, or canned 
vegetables, or in their unavoidable absence desiccated vegetables and dried fruit.” 
Very respectfully, 
; Signed) W. H. Carter, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. 
Mailed October 19,1897. 
All the above in quotation is the indorsement upon the letter of 
Mr. Marshall, signed by 0. Smart, Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. A. 
The indorsement of the major-general commanding is in the following 
words: 
Headquarters of the Army, 
' Washington, D. C., October 18, 1897. 
The major-general commanding concurs in the remarks of the deputy surgeon- 
general, 4th indorsement. 
(Signed) J. C. Gilmore, 
Assistant Adjutant-General. 
Reference has been made to reports received from Army officers and 
transmitted to the commission by the Major-General Commanding the 
Army. These reports were made in compliance with the following 
general order, issued in accordance with memorandum * submitted by 
him: 
Adjutant-General’s Office, 
Washington, D. C., September 20,1898. 
Commanding General, Department of the East, 
Governor’s Island, New York: 
Major-General Commanding directs that each regiment of regular troops in active 
service in Cuba and Porto Rico be called upon for report as to results obtained from 
use of canned fresh roast beef during campaigns in those countries. 
(Signed) H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General. 
(Signed) H. O. S. H. 
(Same to commanding general, Department of Santiago, Santiago, Cuba; command- 
ing general, U. S. Troops, Porto Rico; commanding general, Camp Wikoff, Montauk 
Point, N. Y.; commanding general, Department of Gulf, Atlanta, Ga.; commanding 
general, Department Lakes, Chicago, 111.; commanding general, Department of 
California, San Francisco, Cal.; commanding general, Department Colorado, Denver, 
Colo.; commanding general, Department Missouri, Fort Omaha, Nebr.; command- 
ing general, Department Dakota, Fort Snelling, Minn.) 
* Headquarters of the Army, 
Washington, D. C., September 20, 1898. 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL. 
The Major-General Commanding directs that the commanding officer of each regi- 
ment of regular troops that were in active service in Cuba and Porto Rico he called 
upon for a report as to the results obtained from the use of canned fresh roast beef 
during the campaigns in those two countries. 
' When all these regiments have been heard from the reports will be sent to these 
headquarters for the necessary action. 
(Signed) J. C. Gilmore, 
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers. 65 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 
BRIG. GEN. GEORGE M. STERNBERG, SURGEON-GENERAL, U. S. A., IN 
CHARGE. 
By paragraph 1392 of the Regulations of the Army, u the Medical 
Department, under the direction of the Secretary of War, is charged 
with the duty of investigating the sanitary condition of the Army, and 
making recommendations in reference thereto, with the duty of caring 
for the sick and wounded, making physical examinations of officers and 
enlisted men, and furnishing all medical and hospital supplies, except 
for public animals.” 
Prior to the declaration of war (April 21) no preparation for the 
approaching conflict had been made by the Medical Department. The 
number of officers was as it had been in time of peace. Many of the 
older surgeons were on bureau and administrative duty; several of 
the corps were not in physical condition to take the field. Under the 
Revised Statutes of the United States (Sec. 1259) retired officers could 
not be called upon for active service, and for want of appropriations by 
Congress it became impossible, after July 15, 1892, to employ civilian 
physicians under contract. 
Seven hundred and ninety-one men were in the Hospital Corps on the 
1st of May, only 74 more than on the 1st of January preceding, and of 
these, under existing laws, not to exceed 100 could be hospital stewards. 
The privates had become more or less skilled in litter bearing and first 
aid work, but had received only a limited amount of training as nurses. 
The medical supplies on hand were only what remained at the posts 
of the semiannual issue of the preceding January, the several purvey- 
ing depots at New York, St. Louis, and San Francisco not having as 
yet received any of the medicines and stores contracted for in antici- 
pation of the regular issue of the coming July. Models of improved 
medical and hospital chests had been determined upon, but no contracts 
for such chests had been given out, nor was it thought that bids for 
them could be legally asked for. 
The need of a hospital ship had been made known to the Secretary 
of War, but no steps had been taken to secure such vessel. Only 
$20,000 had been given to the Department out of the $50,000,000 emer- 
gency fund, and the Secretary of War had directed the Surgeon-Gen- 
eral to make no purchases until the question of whether or not there 
was to be war had been definitely settled. 
More than a week before the President’s proclamation of April 23 was 
issued the regular regiments were moving or under orders to move. 
By that proclamation the National Guard to the number of 125,000 was 
called out, and thirty days later there was a call for 75,000 more. 
MEDICAL OFFICERS. 
Each regular regiment had a medical officer and each volunteer 
regiment a surgeon and two assistants. These medical officers of the 66 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
volunteer force were, with few exceptions, unacquainted with the mili- 
tary duties that would necessarily devolve upon them in the field, how- 
ever well fitted they might be to care for the sick and wounded. The 
act of Congress of April 22 directed that a chief surgeon should be 
on the staff of a commander of a corps, on that of a division com- 
mander, and on that of the brigade commander. A liberal construction 
of this provision of the act led to the appointment by the President 
during the war of seventy-seven surgeons from civil life, and he also 
commissioned a surgeon and two assistant surgeons for each of the regi- 
ments of United States volunteer infantry, cavalry, and engineers, 
as it was organized. By act of May 12 fifteen additional assistant 
surgeons of the United States Army were authorized, as also the employ- 
ment under contract of civilian physicians, the total number thus 
employed being between 600 and 700. 
None of the medical men from civil life commissioned by the Presi- 
dent underwent any examination, nor did any of the contract surgeons 
until after October 21. No rank and but very moderate pay being given 
to the contract doctors, few men of wide experience and matured judg- 
ment were found among them; though among the civilians commis- 
sioned by the President as corps, division, and brigade surgeons, were 
some of the ablest men in the medical profession of our country. The 
testimony shows that, as a rule having few exceptions, the medical offi- 
cers of the Army were faithful, earnest workers, and to their unremit- 
ting efforts to properly and skillfully care for the sick and wounded, 
often in the midst of adverse conditions, is in large measure due the 
unusually low mortality rate indicated in the returns. 
At Camp Thomas after the 1st of July, in some degree at Montauk, 
and especially in Cuba, there was a scarcity of medical officers, due to 
the unexpectedly large number of sick and of wounded, and the break- 
ing down of those on duty. It is to be regretted that due provision by 
law was not made for the commissioning of surgeons and assistant sur- 
geons, United States Volunteers, on the general staff of the army as 
are the medical officers of the regular establishment. There would 
have been thus obtained competent men in full number and the best 
interests of the sick beyond question subserved. 
NURSES AND NURSING. 
As already stated, there were in the Hospital Corps of the Regular 
Army on the 1st of May a little less than 800 men—99 hospital stew- 
ards, 100 acting stewards, and 592 privates. By the act of Congress of 
June 2, permission was granted to increase the number of hospital 
stewards to 20o, and such increase was rapidly made. In the act 
establishing the volunteer force (passed April 26), a hospital steward 
was authorized for each battalion, but no provision was made for a hos- 
pital corps, though such corps to number 25 privates for eacli regiment 
and 50 additional for each division had been asked for. Tin; failure to REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
67 
provide for a volunteer hospital corps on the part of Congress is much 
to be regretted, since it necessitated the disbanding of the Hospital 
Corps in connection with the regiments of the National Guard. Not a 
few of these had been fairly well organized and some were quite thor- 
oughly trained. Many of the men of these corps enlisted as privates 
in the regiments, but many did not, and of those so enlisting only a 
limited number, some by transfer to the Hospital Corps of the Regular 
Army, and still fewer by detail, were later of service as hospital orderlies 
and nurses. 
In many cases it was found that former members of the Hospital 
Corps of regiments of the National Guard, while willing to care for the 
regimental sick, would not enter the regular service for a term of years, 
and of those who did so enter, among whom were a few physicians, 
some druggists, and quite a large number of medical students and for- 
mer hospital attendants, much discontent prevailed as soon as the peace 
protocol was signed and applications for discharge became numerous. 
The great majority of the Hospital Corps men secured by enlistment 
and transfer had little or no proper training as nurses, and as a conse- 
quence were largely inefficient. As hospitals were established and 
the sick became numerous, attendants had to be secured by detail from 
regiments, some of the men assigned to such duty being of good char- 
acter and anxious to serve, but the large proportion in every respect 
unfit for nurses. As the regiments were moved the men belonging to 
them who had been detailed for hospital duty were called in, with 
resulting derangement of hospital organization and greater or less 
interference with the proper care of the sick. The system of securing 
so-called nurses by detail is a bad one and should be abolished. If 
the nursing in semipermanent camps and hospitals other than regi- 
mental is to be done by men, there should be maintained in time of 
peace a hospital corps of size proportionate to any reasonably to be 
expected emergency demand; a corps trained to properly care for the 
sick as well as to dress and remove the wounded. 
In the last twenty years the value, the efficiency, and the availability 
of well-trained women nurses has been demonstrated, and it is much to 
be regretted that this fact was not fully realized by the medical officers 
of the Army when the war commenced. It is to be remembered 
though that in military hospitals in the field women had been employed 
as nurses, if at all, only to a very limited extent, and there was good 
reason for questioning whether a field hospital, with a moving army, 
was any place for a woman. Our recent experience may justly be 
held to have shown that female nurses, properly trained and properly 
selected, can be duly cared for and are of the greatest value. Those 
who have been serving under contract in our military hospitals, and 
there have been about 1,500 of them, have with scarcely an exception 
done excellent work, and it is to the high credit of the' American 
soldier that not a single complaint has been made by any nurse of 
personal discourtesy. 68 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
These women nurses, with the exception of those belonging to the 
religious orders, and certain immunes, chiefly colored women sent to 
Santiago about the middle of July, were selected by the Daughters of 
the American Revolution, under the official direction of Mrs. Dr. McGee, 
of Washington, for several months past an acting assistant surgeon, 
United States Army, on duty in the Surgeon-General’s Office. Of the 
members of religious orders, a few over 200 were Sisters of Charity, 12 
Sisters of Mercy, 14 Sisters of the Holy Cross, 12 Sisters of St. Joseph, 
5 Congregated American Sisters (Indian women from South Dakota), 
quite a number of St. Barnabas Guild, and 2 Sisters of St. Margaret, 
the two organizations last mentioned being Protestant. No nurses 
were furnished by the Red Cross Society proper, except the few taken 
by Miss Barton to Cuba. Of the female nurses it is reported that they 
were much overworked, especially at Montauk, and 13 of them died. 
As early as the 27th of April Mrs. Dr. McGee officially asked the 
Surgeon-General if he would accept the services of female nurses, at 
which time the Daughters of the American Revolution had several 
hundred applications from women duly trained. On the 13th of May 
four nurses were sent to the general hospital at Key West, but as the 
Surgeon-General was unwilling to send women nurses, except when they 
were asked for by surgeons in charge of hospitals, fewr were placed 
under contract before the 1st of July—less than 50—and not more than 
100 before the 15th of July, at which date between 2,000 and 3,000 had 
been examined and approved by the Daughters of the American 
Revolution and were subject to contract. 
MEDICAL SUPPLIES. 
At the commencement of hostilities the Medical Department had few 
medicines and practically no hospital furniture. The economy with 
which it had for years been administered, due to lack of appropriations 
by Congress, except for annual needs of the Army, had prevented the 
accumulation of any reserve stores. No contracts, even provisional, 
had been made during the months of March and April to provide 
proper furniture and food stuffs, funds not being available. 
If such contracts could have been made, if in open market supplies 
in large amounts could have beeu purchased and stored ready for 
prompt shipment as needed, much of the complaints and wants of the 
sick and the surgeons would have been prevented. 
As the regular regiments were mobilized, the medical officers with 
them were ordered to take for immediate use such medicines and 
hospital stores as were at the various posts at which they had been 
stationed, an order not obeyed in all cases, some of the regiments as 
they arrived at the places of rendezvous being found to be practically 
unsupplied. The several supply depots having but little material on 
hand, the Surgeon-General on the 3d of May telegraphed the governors 
of the various States asking that their troops might take with them the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
69 
medical and hospital supplies belonging to them as national guard 
organizations. Sixteen of the States were found to be without such 
supplies and a large number of the others had them in but limited 
quantities, so that most of the volunteer regiments on arrival at Camp 
Thomas or Camp Alger had neither medicines nor hospital stores. 
As no part of the national .defense fund could be used prior to the 
declaration of war for purposes other than coast defense, to secure in 
advance meant direct violation of rules and regulations, the result of 
which might be, under the existing system of accountability, official or 
financial ruin or both. 
By the 1st of May a contract had been made for the medical and sur- 
gical field chests, the patterns of which had been previously determined 
upon. Delivery of these chests was to begin in a couple of weeks, but 
in fact it was the last of the month before any were ready, the issue of 
the various articles to be packed in such cases being correspondingly 
delayed. To meet immediate wants, on May 12 a few medicines, stores, 
articles of hospital furniture, bedding, etc., were ordered to be placed 
in common chests and sent forward as an advance outfit for regiments, 
twenty-five of which were ready at the York depot on the 16th 
of May and five at St. Louis on the 21st. Authority to purchase nec- 
essary medicines was promptly given to officers in the field, and such 
purchases were made in small quantities and at irregular intervals. 
To provide for the wants of the large number of regiments assembled 
at Camp Thomas, a special supply depot Avas established May 23 at 
Lytle, Ga., to which supplies were sent from the St. Louis depot, the 
first shipment in any amount not reaching its destination until Lite in 
May. Local depots were opened at Tampa, Jacksonville, and other 
places eon\renient to large camps; but, though there were these sec- 
ondary distributing centers which received and issued in the aggregate 
a great amount of medicines and hospital supplies, there was very 
widespread and persistent complaints of lack of what Avas needed or 
was thought to be. 
A large number of regimental officers and hospital surgeons have 
testified to existing deficiencies. Commanding officers, inspectors, and 
special boards called attention again and again to the needs of the sick. 
As a rule, with comparatively few exceptions, the most important 
and most necessary drugs were to be had, though at times in limited 
quantities, or could be secured by purchase at some place near by. 
What were the reasons for the existence of these wants'? In the first 
place, the almost absolute lack of any supplies in store when the war 
broke out. Medicines could be purchased in any quantity and without 
delay, as could bedding and certain articles of hospital furniture, but 
other articles of adopted pattern, as surgical instruments or cots of 
special design, could not. Time was lost in having manufactured 
standard chests of various kinds to contain drugs, stores, dressings, 
furniture, etc., and the making of these articles never kept up with the 
demand for them. 70 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
Next, the too restricted supply table, which might very properly have 
had upon it a number of drugs in common use in civil life, the issue of 
which had not been authorized by the Medical Department of the Army. 
Next, the lack of knowledge on the part of untrained medical officers 
how to get what they needed when it was on hand and ready for issue. 
Next, the unwise restrictions put upon medical officers by chief sur- 
geons, notably at Camp Thomas, as respects the form of requisitions 
and the articles that might be called for. 
Next, the taking away of regimental supplies to lit up division hos- 
pitals, and the issue of medicines to regiments only through such 
hospitals. 
Next, the actual want of supplies at local depots or the difficulty of 
getting them out of such depots on approved requisitions. 
Next, the necessary draining of scantily supplied depots to lit out 
troops about to move. 
Many times the scarcity was apparent, not real, articles being wanted 
that could not readily and safely be transported, and therefore were 
not for issue, or were of questionable value, or were preparations the 
place of which could be supplied by articles already on hand of like or 
essentially the same therapeutic character. 
The reasons stated are those which concern the Medical Department, 
for which it may properly be interrogated. But no small part of the 
troubles consequent upon lack of supplies was due to the slowness with 
which such supplies were transported and the failure to properly deliver 
them, the responsibility for which rests upon the Quartermaster’s 
Department. 
In the earlier weeks this department objected very strongly to ship- 
ping by express, because of the expense, and again and again trans- 
portation by so-called fast freight occupied many days, at times weeks, 
e. g., to cite but one out of the many cases stated in evidence, supplies 
sent from the St. Louis depot to Chickamauga May 17 were not received 
by the end of the month. The stores were often sent in comparatively 
small quantities, much less than a carload; the railway lines were 
blocked for miles with unloaded cars, and in the absence of cards on 
the outside indicating the kind of freight within, medical stores could 
be found only by the opening of many cars and the overhauling of 
what they held. In a number of instances medical supplies, once even 
to the extent of a complete outfit of a 200-bed hospital, were lost for 
weeks; in a few cases to be found only upon the cleaning out of aban- 
doned warehouses. 
Bad as the conditions were on land, they were worse when the 
transportation was across the sea. Medicines, stores, and hospital 
furniture were often put in the holds of transports for Cuba and 
Porto Rico under all sorts of freight. At Siboney and Daiquiri, 
because of the lack of proper landing facilities, and the difficulties 
of finding ships and getting at their contents, perhaps a full third 
of the supplies taken aboard at Tampa early in June were not 
put on shore until the middle of July, after the surrender of Santiago REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
71 
and the opening of its harbor, and some of these stores were carried 
north to be later brought back undisturbed. On the transport 
Grande Duchesse, sailing from Charleston on the 20th of July, and on 
the Mobile, sailing from the same port on the 21st of July, were large 
quantities of medicines and hospital stores for the Fifth Corps in Cuba, 
which were carried to Porto Rico, where the vessels were detained for 
seven and ten days, respectively, and did not reach Santiago, the Grande 
Duchesse until August 2 and the Mobile August 10. Had these medi- 
cines and hospital stores for the troops in Cuba been sent direct instead 
of by way of Porto Rico they would have been received ami in the 
hands of those requiring them days before the 4th of August, when 
General Shatter reported by telegram the extreme shortness existing 
and declared it to be a “ chronic condition.” The supplies on the Concho 
for the troops in Porto Rico were so stored in the hold that they were 
not gotten at until after the ship had gone to Arroyo, partially 
unloaded, and returned to Ponce a week later. 
The loading, shipping, and unloading of medical stores are not done 
under the orders of the Medical but of the Quartermaster’s Depart- 
ment, and the Medical Department is not responsible therefor. The 
blame for so much of the lack of medical supplies as was the result of 
slow transportation and failure to deliver, and it is no small portion 
thereof, must rest upon the Quartermaster’s Department, the system 
it follows, and the officers belonging to it. 
The lack of supplies in Cuba for six weeks after the landing of the 
expeditionary force was so great, and its results at times so threatening, 
that it should be noticed somewhat in detail. Just on the eve of 
embarkation at Tampa there was put upon the transports the outfit of 
one division hospital and a part of another, and an amount of medicines 
and dressings deemed sufficient for the needs of the force expected to 
be able to capture the city of Santiago without seiious loss, open up 
the harbor, and get away to some other place, in Porto Rico or Cuba. 
Only seven ambulances were taken, and this by order of General Shaf- 
ter, who has accepted the responsibility and frankly acknowledged that 
it would have been better had more been carried along. Even of these 
seven, only three were at the disposal of the medical officers on July 1. 
Arrived on the Cuban coast, the division hospital outfit was landed, but 
without tents, and as no transportation of any kind, save the horses 
of medical officers, was furnished for this hospital until after its estab- 
lishment toward the front on the third day, only such supplies were 
carried forward as could be taken on the horses just mentioned and in 
the hands of the men of the Hospital Corps. The fragmentary outfit of 
the cavalry division was also landed and moved forward in much the 
same way. 
Of the regimental outfits but few were unloaded, and those taken 
ashore were, for want of transportation, almost without exception 
left behind when the troops moved to the front. While there were 72 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
surgical dressings enough for a first treatment of the large number 
of wounded from the fights of July 1 and 2, there was no food for 
the men other than such soup as could be made out of the commissary 
canned meat and vegetables, supplemented, and largely so, by the 
more proper gruel, milk, cocoa, and rice furnished by the Red Cross 
organization, and prepared and distributed by Miss Barton and the 
nurses accompanying her. The base hospital at Siboney, in working 
order July 1, was quickly overcrowded with wounded, and had scarcely 
enough medicines and stores for immediate use. The hospital steamer 
Olivette was fairly equipped as a floating division hospital, but could 
only to a very limited extent furnish medicines to the troops on shore. 
By the end of the first week in July the medical supplies were almost 
entirely exhausted, but large amounts of medicines and stores were 
about this time brought by the Belief and later by the Olivette. These 
supplies, in turn, were so quickly expended that on the 4-th of August 
the chief surgeon of the First Division reported that for eleven days 
the only medicines he had on hand for distribution were quinine, 
epsom salts, and castor oil. An emergency purchase in open market 
in Santiago was ordered and made. 
Fortunately for the sick, at various times and in many places private 
charity came to the rescue and a large amount of milk and ice, of deli- 
cacies, of even lacking medicines, instruments, and articles of hospital 
furniture were supplied by the National Relief Commission, auxiliary 
Red Cross organizations, State and local aid societies, and individuals. 
Without doubt, at times undue advantage was taken of the opportunity 
thus afforded surgeons to get what they wanted; since no responsibility 
attached to the receipt and expenditure of articles thus obtained as 
there would have been had they been drawn on requisition from the 
Medical Department. It was a fact and one to be regretted, one that 
should not have existed, that again and again agents of private organ- 
izations had on hand and ready for issue an abundance of necessary 
and needed supplies, when officers of the Government, whose duty it 
was to furnish them, did not have them and therefore could not give 
them out. 
From the very limited information furnished the commission, it would 
appear that the troops sent to Manila were fairly well supplied with 
medicines, dressings, and hospital stores for use en route and after 
arrival in the Philippines. 
SICKNESS AND MORTALITY. 
During the early weeks of the occupation of the various camps of 
instruction (Alger, Thomas, and Tampa being the large ones), notwith- 
standing the want of shelter, of proper sanitation, of well-trained regi- 
mental officers, of competent cooks, of any knowledge on the part of 
the men as to how to take care of themselves, there was very little sick- 
ness, except of a comparatively unimportant character, as intestinal 
troubles of moderate severity, venereal affections, the effects of recent REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
73 
vaccination, a small amount of measles, etc. A few regiments had 
already had in their State camps some typhoid fever. In the Fifteenth 
Minnesota, at St. Paul and Fort Snelling, there were, in August, 260 
cases out of a total strength of 1,323. A very few cases of the disease 
appeared in some of the regiments soon after arrival at Chickamauga 
and Camp Alger. Malarial diseases quickly began to prevail, but were 
controlled in ordinary degree. Of a little over 150,000 men, during the 
month of May, though about 6f per cent were reported sick, the deaths 
were only 70, i. e., less than 1 in 2,000 of the men enrolled. 
In June sickness was twice as great, but the deaths were still few, 
hardly 1 in 1,500 of the main strength. In July the sick were one- 
third more numerous than in the preceding month, the death rate 
was three times as great. In August the sickness was nearly one- 
half greater than in July, with a mortality nearly double. In Sep- 
tember the sickness had diminished nearly one-third and the death rate 
about 40 per cent. Sixty per cent of the sickness in July, August, and 
September was malarial, typhoid, and diarrheal; and 40 per cent of all 
deaths were from typhoid fever. The mortality from diseases of all kinds 
during five months would, from the returns received, appear to be less 
than 1 per cent of those taken up on sick report. Of the 60,969 volun- 
teers at Camp Thomas, first and last, only 354 died before leaving Chick- 
arnauga (0.58 per cent), and only 995 (1.63 per cent) up to the 2d of De- 
cember, as appears from the returns tabulated by Brigadier-General 
Boynton. The malarial fever, which so generally affected the troops in 
front of Santiago and produced such intense debility and prolonged 
ill health, can hardly be attributed to want of shelter, food, drugs, or 
medical attention, though there were all these wants, since, according 
to the statement made by Major-General Wood, himself a physician, it 
was as largely prevalent among the troops stationed in the locality after 
the return of the Fifth Army Corps, though they were properly sheltered 
and cared for, and many of them were supposed to be immune. 
Of typhoid fever * at Camp Alger, Camp Thomas, Camp Meade, Camp 
Wikoff, Tampa, Jacksonville, Santiago, and Porto Eico, there were 
reported 13,770 cases, with 906 deaths, a trifle less than 7 per cent, an 
unusually low mortality rate. 
Camp or district. 
Regimental hos- 
pitals. 
Field hospitals. 
General hospitals. 
Admis- 
sions. 
Deaths. 
Admis- 
sions. 
Deaths. 
Admis- 
sions. 
Deaths. 
Camp “Wikoff 
85 
956 
653 
1,380 
55 
1,742 
58 
204 
1 
43 
11 
79 
1 
13 
2 
4 
24 
1, 347 
80 
1,094 
212 
1, 825 
116 
343 
3i' 
"ii’ 
18 
227 
3 
25 
552 
105 
Camp Alger 
Camp Thomas 
Camp Tampa, Fla 
Camp Jacksonville, Fla 
Camp Santiago, Cuba 
450 
952 
| 1,193 
68 
381 
57 
113 
65 
34 
Total 
5,133 
154 
5, 041 
378 
3,596 
374 
* Statistics of typhoid fever' in certain camps and districts. 74 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
From testimony presented it is probable that the number of cases was 
decidedly greater than reported, since there is good reason for believ- 
ing that at Camp Alger, and especially at Camp Thomas and in Florida, 
many cases diagnosticated and treated as malarial were really typhoid. 
The error of diagnosis was not made by all surgeons, but the opinions 
of those holding that the prevalent disease was not malarial were often 
received with scant favor by the medical officers highest in authority at 
the camps. In one instance, to which attention has been called, the 
surgeon in chief at Chickamauga, under a threat of court-martial, com- 
pelled a surgeon to retract his statement that typhoid fever epi- 
demic, though in point of fact it was epidemic. 
The outbreak aud prevalence of this disease may properly be attrib- 
uted to the combined operation of many causes. Large bodies of men 
who are not soldiers, Tinder officers who have had little or no military 
training, can not be brought together and held for many weeks in camp 
and remain healthy. If the water supply is not abundant or is not 
good; if the thoroughly well-established rules of sanitation are not 
observed; if the discipline of the camp puts little restriction on drunk- 
enness and immorality; if the soldier does not know how to live and 
his officers do not watch him and teach him; if his food is poorly cared 
for and badly cooked, and he is permitted to eat and drink anything 
and everything that he can find, sickness certainly will prevail. If, as 
at Camp Thomas, a regiment can go for ten days without digging sinks; 
if the sinks dug are not used or they quickly overflow and pollute the 
ground; if practically no protection is afforded against the liquor sellers 
and prostitutes of neighboring places; if commands are crowded 
together and tents are seldom struck, or even never during the occu- 
pation of the camp; if no one is called to account for repeated violation 
of sanitary orders, it can not but be that tyjdioid fever once introduced 
will spread, rapidly, widely. 
How much may be accomplished by intelligent and watchful super- 
vision on the part of surgeons and regimental officers and the observ- 
ance of the well-established rules of camp sanitation is shown by the 
record of the Eighth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry at Camp 
Thomas. This regiment was for many weeks very healthy, while much 
sickness was occurring in regiments near by, though the conditions 
of camp site, of water, and of drill were practically the same. 
The responsibility for the conditions at Chickamauga rests upon those 
who assembled over 60,000 raw levies and kept the great mass of them 
together for weeks, and upon those whose duty it was to inspect, advise, 
and order—officers, medical and military, regimental, brigade, division, 
corps, and of the camp, and the higher the authority the greater the 
responsibility. 
Yellow fever, as it prevailed in Cuba, was of mild type and its mor- 
tality rate low. That its outbreak might have been prevented by the 
burning of all houses at Siboney, and by more complete isolation of the 
Cuban and Spanish refugees is a question, but certainly the chances of REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
75 
avoiding the anticipated and much dreaded disease would have been 
increased had such measures been adopted. That it was kept out of 
our coast cities is due to the watchfulness of national and local quaran- 
tine officers and to the establishment and maintenance of a detention 
camp at Montauk. 
The wounded were comparatively few—1,581. How many of these 
died has not as yet been ascertained, but all reports show that the per- 
centage of recovery was extraordinarily high, due to the combined influ- 
ences of small-caliber bullets, first-aid dressings, and skillful aseptic 
and antiseptic treatment. Major operations were seldom required, 
the whole number of amputations, excisions, ligations, laparotomies, 
and trephiniugs reported being but 51.* Praise should be given to 
* Major surgical operations, United States Army, May to December, 1898. 
[The correct number of gunshot and shell wound, incurred during the Spanish-American war is 
1,581, as reported by the Adjutant-General of the Army.] 
Total major operations 98 
Amputations 34 
Hip joint 3 
Thigh 5 
Leg 10 
Foot 2 
Arm 12 
Arm (reamputated) 1 
Forearm 1 
Hernia (Bassinfs 17) 18 
Appendicitis 15 
Laparotomy 9 
Bullet wound 4 
Intestinal obstruction 1 
Abdominal drainage 1 
Not stated 3 
Urethrotomy 3 
Trephining 7 
Resection bones 3 
Resection veins 1 
Neurorrhaphy (tibial nerves) 1 
Ligation, femoral 1 
Ligation, subclavian (aneurism) 1 
Floating cartilage 1 
Skin grafting 1 
Tracheotomy 1 
Exsection, middle third of humerus 1 
Bullet removed from wall of bladder 1 
It must be noted that the number of operations reported as having been done dur- 
ing the advance against Santiago is undoubtedly considerably underestimated, 
since, in the press of work, record of the surgical work then being performed was 
often impracticable. While the report of the field hospital, Fifth Army Corps, 
shows that 516 men were received in that hospital direct from the firing line, only 
seven of the cases so received are noted as having required operative surgical inter- 
ference. It would seem probable, therefore, that in several instances only such 
operations as were of special professional interest were made matters of record, 
although the necessity for active operative treatment was largely abrogated by the 
humane character of the wounds and the maintenance of careful antisepsis. 76 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
the well-trained, faithful, hard-working, and overworked surgeons, who, 
on the fighting line and in the hospitals, thoroughly discharged their 
duty, and who, as General Young has said, “deserve the thanks of the 
American people for their splendid work.” 
The charge of neglect of the wounded, based upon the infrequent 
dressing of their wounds, has had no good basis, as it is an established 
rule of modern treatment that inspection and redressing are to be post- 
poned until there is observed either staining of the dressings or rise 
of temperature. Stated generally, the less it is disturbed the more 
quickly and kindly a wound heals. 
HOSPITALS. 
Each volunteer regiment as it came out had its hospital, as a rule, it 
is true, poorly equipped. By Circular No. 3, Surgeon-General’s Office, 
May 18, such hospital was done away with, and in its place there was 
directed to be established one of maximum capacity of 200 beds lor 
each division, to which should be sent all sick requiring treatment 
other than that which might be needed for slight injuries or such ail- 
ments as permitted of the continuance of full or at least partial duty. 
All regimental outfits were ordered turned in and used in the equip- 
ment of the hospital, medicines and dressings for minor affections 
treated in camp to be obtained from the hospital on requisition 
approved by the division surgeon. As a brigade or division moved, 
a corresponding part or the whole of the hospital was to go with it; 
and, to insure feady mobility, no case that was very serious or likely 
to require prolonged treatment was to be kept in a division hospital, but 
sent to a general hospital. 
In theory the plan was a good one, as it permitted of more perfect 
classification of the sick, better attendance upon them with fewer 
doctors, and a more economical administration; as carried out it worked 
badly. Because of the scarcity of medical officers unconnected with 
regiments those so connected had to be detailed for hospital duty. 
Regimental pride was touched and strong opposition was at once 
made. Medical officers protested, commanding officers objected, and 
State authorities and the War Department were appealed to. The sick 
would not go to hospital as long as they could avoid it; the regimental 
surgeon would keep them as long as possible. The single medical 
officer on camp duty often found in the amount of work imposed reason 
for doing no more than was absolutely necessary. Field and company 
officers largely made the excuse for neglect of sanitation that it was 
the medical officer’s business to look after that and two-thirds of their 
doctors had been taken away from them. 
Brigade or regimental surgeons were put in charge of the hospitals 
as they were organized, who, as a rule, knew nothing of their duties at 
first and many could not or would not learn. Those assigned to ward 
duty often felt that such service was unbecoming the dignity of their REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
77 
rank. Of trained hospital stewards there were very few; rarely did an 
attendant have any familiarity with the work of a nurse. Medicines, 
stores, tents, cots, and hospital furniture in general, were for a time 
obtained with difficulty and in insufficient quantities; in Camp Thomas 
this was largely true up to the last. Ultimately in most of the division 
hospitals a fair degree of order prevailed; a few were excellently admin- 
istered. As the imperfections of the system became apparent and the 
hospitals overcrowded the reestablishment of regimental hospitals was 
permitted. That the division-hospital plan may succeed there must be 
enough well-trained surgeons to fill the positions of officers in charge 
and executive officers, and a full number of competent medical men to 
discharge ward duties, and this without depleting the regiments. 
Nowhere else were the evils of the system and the unfortunate results 
of its application as strongly evidenced as at Camp Thomas, especially 
in the hospitals of the First Division of the First Corps and the Second 
Division of the Third Corps. These were almost always overcrowded; 
their officers in charge were frequently changed; their nurses were 
limited in number, and, generally, indifferent; their discipline was lax 
and their police bad. A large share of the responsibility for the exist- 
ing conditions rested upon the chief surgeons of camp and corps and 
the general officers in command of the same. These officers, medical 
and military, knew or should have known of the state of affairs, and 
knowing should have compelled a change. In the case of the hospital 
of the First Division of the First Corps, General Brooke did order the 
chief surgeon of the camp to personally take charge and put it in 
proper running order. Had well-trained surgeons of the regular estab- 
lishment been placed in charge of the Chickamauga hospitals, even but 
for the time required to organize and set them going, the after history 
would have been different. Unfortunately it was thought that such 
surgeons could not be spared for the duty, though they could not have 
been better employed during the months of June and July. Further, 
it would appear that for want of medical inspectors and of due reports 
from the corps surgeons, the Surgeon General was for a long time una- 
ware of the prevailing confusion and distress. 
General hospitals were established as became necessary at Key West, 
Fort McPherson, Fort Thomas, Fort Monroe, Chickamauga, and Wash- 
ington, and the post hospitals in New York Harbor, at the Presidio at 
San Francisco, and at Vancouver Barracks were so enlarged as to 
become, practically, general ones. Organized and administered by regu- 
lar officers, these hospitals were in large measure free from the troubles 
of the division hospitals. Comparatively few complaints were made of 
them, though some were for a time overcrowded, and up to the middle 
of July the nursing, mainly or wholly done by men of the hospital corps, 
was far from satisfactory. 
Large numbers of sick, after July 15, were sent to civil hospitals, 
chiefly in New York and Philadelphia, with resulting relief of pres- 78 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
sure upon the army hospitals and advantage to the sick, though in 
many cases the condition of the patients transferred was such as should 
have prevented removal. The hospitals in New York also received 
many men on furlough from Montauk and elsewhere, who, on reaching 
that city, proved to be physically unable to travel farther. 
So great was the, number of furloughs granted in the earlier weeks 
after the signing of the protocol to sick and convalescents who were 
not fit to leave the hospitals, that orders were issued establishing 
boards of medical officers, whose duty it was to carefully examine each 
and every applicant for furlough. Even then the evil was but partially 
corrected, for frequently men who seemed to be strong enough to safely 
leave, quickly broke down on the way to their homes. 
The sick at Montauk were so many, practically all the army that in 
August and September came back from Cuba, that the hospitals at that 
place must be specially considered. The establishment of a receiving 
camp, with necessary hospital accommodations, was determined upon 
late in July and the eastern end of Long Island was selected as its site, 
because of isolation and healthfulness. In the first week of August 
measures were taken to prepare the camp.' Before a hospital tent was 
up troops began to come in from Tampa and other places in the South, 
bringing a few sick with them. 
To send these men, over 4,000 in number, to a camp intended as one 
of recuperation for a large force almost completely broken down, was, 
medically considered, a mistake, as they would be unnecessarily ex- 
posed to any infectious diseases that might exist in camp. From an 
administrative point of view it was none the less so, since it increased 
the number of those who had to be provided with shelter and food. To 
make matters worse, several thousand horses and mules were sent at 
the same time, the supplying of which with forage added greatly to the 
transportation difficulties on the railroad and at the station. The 
transports from Cuba began coming in less than a week and the hospi- 
tals were not ready for the men. Though an enormous amount of work 
was done and the energies of all in charge strained to the utmost, it 
was for weeks a constant struggle to provide shelter for the sick, the 
number of whom was vastly in excess of that anticipated. Hospital 
tents were put up as fast as they were received from the Quartermaster’s 
Department, and that department, by the 16th of August, had at Mon- 
tauk 701 of them ready for issne, sufficient to shelter 4,000 men. Yet 
they did not actually reach the ground and were not put up fast enough, 
and many times it happened that the sick were at the hospital hours 
before tents were ready for them. 
Supplies were on baud in large quantities, furnished by tlie Govern- 
ment, by charitable organizations, and by private individuals. Women 
nurses were present before any preparations had been made for their 
care, and they kept coming in rapidly. Doctors, commissioned and 
contract, were on duty, if not as early as they were needed, soon 
enough to prevent any serious neglect of the sick. The limited kitchen REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
79 
facilities of the early days were by the 21st of August supplemented 
by the establishment of a diet kitchen by ladies of the lied Cross 
Auxiliary and representatives of the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid 
Association. Ho laundry was in operation for a month and large quan- 
tities of soiled bedding, sheets, etc., were piled up, to be later burned. 
The sanitation was not that of a well-managed city hospital, but with 
all its defects it was not bad. Ward work was much interfered with 
by the crowds of visitors that were daily at the camp. Discipline was 
lax and there was no proper and efficient hospital guard. Record 
keeping was imperfectly done and much trouble was caused both 
medical officers and friends of patients by the efforts, often fruitless, 
to find particular soldiers known to be, or supposed to be, in the 
hospital. 
The time of the officer in charge and that of the executive officer was 
largely taken up in attending to those who were asking, begging, 
demanding furloughs or discharges, and in preparing the necessary 
papers. Much delay, in some cases actual suffering and positive risk 
to life, were consequent upon the methods adopted to put into the 
hand of the furloughed man his transportation order and ration money. 
Had these been furnished by a properly detailed line officer at the hos- 
pital, instead of at the railroad station, it would have been much better 
for those whose enfeebled condition made it hard for them to stand and 
wait. 
The history of these Montauk hospitals is the history not of careful, 
thorough preparation and smooth administration, but of hurried adap- 
tation to extraordinary demands. In less than sixty days after the 
time when the site of Camp Wikoff was a waste, over 10,000 sick had 
gone through the hospitals—general, detention, and division—over 
4,000 more had been examined, if not treated, at their regimental 
hospitals, and neither typhoid nor yellow fever had become epidemic 
in the camp. 
The hospitals established at a number of places after the middle of 
August were well supplied and properly administered, and, so far as 
has been seen and heard, there were no good grounds for any complaints 
respecting the care of the sick in them. 
Under regulations in force up to the 10th of August, special food sup- 
ply for the sick other than the condensed milk, beef extract, and tea. 
included among the hospital stores, could be secured only by purchase 
with the money of the hospital fund. As a consequence, as long as 
there was no fund, because of recent establishment of a hospital or fault 
in its management, very necessary articles of diet for the sick, includ- 
ing milk, as also ice, were obtained only by contribution or with money 
donated. Organized and individual charity furnished very liberally 
the articles required, but there were many complaints, and well-founded 
ones, too, that the sick were not receiving such food and in such quan- 
FEEDINGr THE SIQK. 80 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
tity as their condition demanded. Again and again it was charged 
that there was actual starvation, but all testimony given, and it is in 
abundance, proves the charge unfounded. Typhoid cases, even up to 
the time of almost complete recovery, were kept, and properly so, on 
restricted diet, largely fluid, and it was chiefly from these patients and 
non-medical persons seeing them that the complaints came. In a lim- 
ited proportion of the severe malarial cases, food, if taken and retained, 
was imperfectly assimilated and emaciation necessarily followed. Men 
no longer under hospital treatment, but returned to their commands, 
who, though convalescent, were far from well (and this was the case 
with the vast majority of those brought north from Cuba), had to live 
on the army ration, except so far as company funds made possible the 
purchase of other supplies or they were furnished by those outside of 
the Army. 
To remedy the well-recognized defects in number and variety of 
articles on the diet list for the sick, measures, at first local, then gen- 
eral, were adopted to create a fund for the purchase of what might 
be needed. The Key West general hospital was on the 17th of May 
allowed 60 cents a day per man; a like allowance was on the 16th of 
June made for those on the hospital train, and on the 2d of August for 
the sick at Pablo Beach, Fla. In the early part of August 75 cents a 
day was allowed at Santiago. On the 10th of August, by General Orders, 
Ko. 116, Adjutant-General’s Office, it was directed that at Montauk, at 
Pablo Beach, Fla., and at general hospitals, as also on hospital trains 
and on hospital transports, up to 60 cents per patient should be allowed 
in commutation of ration, to constitute a special fund, from which should 
be purchased the entire diet of the enlisted men while undergoing med- 
ical treatment. By General Orders, Ko. 136, Adjutant-General’s Office, 
of September 3, a similar allowance was made to those sick in post and 
field hospitals, and the letters and telegrams of the Commissary-Gen- 
eral show that it was the intention that every sick man, wherever he 
might be, in hospital or in quarters, should have the money allowance 
of the ration. 
There was some delay in patting the new plan in operation, conse- 
quent in part upon nonreceipt of orders, in part upon the reluctance 
with which some medical officers, chieliy regimental, assumed increased 
pecuniary responsibilities, with associated vouchers and returns. As 
soon as this delay was over there was no more trouble about supplying 
the sick with proper diet and in full quantity. Indeed the fund created 
by the commutation of rations at the maximum amount allowed—60 
cents—was not seldom found to be unnecessarily large. 
That the food supplied might be so prepared as to meet the wants of 
the various classes of sick, in addition to the regular kitcheus, special 
diet ones were established in the general and later in the division hos- 
pitals, at Montauk even in the regiments, such kitchens being often 
under charge and supervision of ladies belonging to relief and aid 
societies in the vicinity. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
81 
TRANSPORTATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED. 
Becognizing the fact that if there should be a war with Spain mili- 
tary operations would be carried on in Cuba, and consequently sick 
and wounded brought back by sea, the Surgeon-General, early in April, 
urged the fitting up of a hospital ship; but no action was taken at the 
time. Very soon after the declaration of war each of several ves- 
sels was inspected with reference to its fitness for use as a hospital 
transport. As no one could be secured under charter, the steamer John 
Bnglis was purchased on the 18th of May. Plans for her fitting up 
were submitted, but for ten days or more held under consideration by 
the Quartermaster-General, the estimated cost being considered too 
great. 
It was not until the 4th of June that the work of preparing her was 
actually begun, under the supervision of Naval Constructor Bowles. 
Every effort was made to get the ship ready as quickly as possible, but 
it was the 2d of July before, as the hospital ship Belief she was able 
to leave New York for Cuba, carrying the regular supplies for twenty 
regiments for a half year and in addition a quantity of the more impor- 
tant medicines, stores, dressings, etc.; in all, an equipment of a 750-bed 
hospital for six months. Her outfit was most complete, more than 
$130,000 being spent upon it. Arriving at Siboney July 7, she dis- 
charged her cargo of over 700 tons weight, and on the 19th of July left 
with 135 wounded on board, who were in due time landed at New York. 
From this time on she has been in constant use, carrying sick and 
transporting medical supplies. 
As during the time in July that she was at Siboney sick and con- 
valescents were being shipped away on ordinary transports, not 
properly prepared for use as hospital vessels, and as when she left 
there was a large number of sick to be sent north as quickly as possi- 
ble, much complaint has been made that, though she could properly 
carry and care for 250, scarcely more than half that number of men 
were taken. Apparently a just complaint, in fact it was not such. 
Yellow fever was prevailing, and had the Belief taken cases of this 
disease and become infected, as probably she would have been, her 
usefulness as a hospital ship, for a considerable time at least, would 
have been at an end. To prevent such a condition occurring the sur- 
geon in charge decided, and wisely, too, that in view of an existing 
uncertainty of diagnosis he would not take any cases of fever of any 
kind, and therefore sailed with only a limited number of patients, all 
wounded. During the two months—July 15 to September 15—the 
Belief transported 1,234 sick, of whom 49 died, and 251 wounded, of 
whom 16 died. * 
When the Fifth Corps left Tampa for Cuba the transport Olivette 
was set apart as a floating hospital, being supplied with the outfit of a 
division hospital. Taking up the sick from the transports en route, 
after arrival at Siboney the wounded from the engagement of the 24th 82 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
of June, and later patients from the shore hospital, the Olivette sailed 
for New York on the 9th of July with 279 wounded. Returning to 
Santiago with a considerable quantity of medical supplies, she sailed 
again on the 15tli of August with 203 sick and convalescents, who were 
carried to Boston. On the 31st of August she sank at the wharf at 
Fernandina, Fla. 
A third steamer, the Missouri, tendered to the Government on the 
1st of July by Mr. B. N. Baker, was properly fitted up and late in 
August sent to Cuba, returning to Montauk with 256 sick. She is still 
in service. 
By the liberality of the citizens of Boston and its vicinity the Massa- 
chusetts Volunteer Aid Association was enabled to well equip a hospital 
ship, the Bay State, which proved to be of great value in transporting 
a large amount of medicines and stores furnished by the society, and 
in bringing back sick from Santiago and Porto Bico, 336 in number, of 
whom only 4 died. This vessel, for which the Massachusetts Vol- 
unteer Aid Association paid $50,000 imrchase price, and $113,000 for 
outfit, was employed to the great advantage of the sick, as well as of 
the Medical Department of the Army, until November 15, when she 
was sold to the Government. 
TRANSPORTS. 
The unexpectedly large number of wounded, the severe sickness that 
rapidly developed, and the fear of and actual outbreak of yellow fever, 
made it necessary in Cuba to early and frequently send off hospital 
patients and convalescents, the large proportion of them on ordinary 
transports. Much and at times very serious complaint was made of 
the unfitness of the vessels, of their lack of cleanliness and sanitary 
provision, the bad quality of the water supplied, and the want of doc- 
tors, nurses, medicines, and hospital stores. 
From evidence submitted, the conclusion must be reached tbat 
many of the complaints were well founded. Inspection of ships at 
Siboney and Santiago prior to the establishment of a board on August 4 
was imperfectly made, if made at all. Overcrowding there was, at 
times not because of putting on board too large a number of sick, but 
because convalescents and supposedly well men while in transit fell 
sick in unexpectedly large proportion. On some of the ships numbers 
of civilians were either permitted to take passage or managed to get on 
board shortly before the sailing, their presence, unprovided for, adding 
largely to the difficulties of caring for the sick. Doctors and nurses 
were few, but there was only a small number of them that could be 
spared from service on shore. Much of the time in the earlier weeks 
there was great scarcity of medicines and stores with the troops; as a 
consequence little could be supplied to those on shipboard. 
Further, and most important, it was believed by all in authority, 
military and medical, that in view of expected engagements, later of the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
83 
danger of yellow fever, and all the while of the extreme debility of the 
men, it was highly desirable that every sick or wounded soldier should 
be sent away as soon as possible, even at the cost of a few days’ incon- 
venience, or it might be actual privation. 
So far as related to the fitting up of the 24 transport vessels employed 
in this transfer of sick and wounded from Cuba, their cleanliness and 
water supply, the responsibility for any existing deficiencies rested 
upon the Quartermaster’s Department; while upon the Medical Depart- 
ment was the responsibility for want of food supplies and medicines, 
for lack of doctors or nurses, and for any avoidable failures to properly 
care for the sick. 
Both departments have found excuse in the conditions prevailing at 
Tampa and in Cuba. But these conditions could not excuse every- 
thing, e. g., the not having fresh sweet water, or sending men on board 
without proper clothing and without knives, forks, spoons, and plates. 
To two transports in particular, the Seneca and the Conclio, general 
attention was strongly drawn by rcqmrts published soon after the arri- 
val of the vessels at New York. The facts were as stated—the ships 
had too many sick, and the sick had not enough doctors and nurses; 
medicines and supplies were in insufficient amount; beds and bedding 
neither in quantity nor quality were such as the sick should have had; 
the water supply was not pure and fresh. But it must be remembered 
that a large number of those on board were at the time of leaving 
Cuba thought to be able to care for themselves and not to need any 
medical attention, and all such men were by law entitled to only the 
ordinary ration. Again, it is in evidence that there were many more 
passengers on these vessels, officers, civilians, employees, etc., than 
were put on board by medical officers to be provided for by the Medical 
Department. 
RAILROAD AMBULANCE TRAIN. 
On the 16tli of J une a well-appointed hospital train of Pullman—later 
tourist—sleepers and service cars was put on the road, and remained 
in constant use thereafter. Its full carrying capacity was 270, and 
under careful management it proved of great value in transferring sick 
from camps and division hospitals to various general hospitals. In 
two and a half months it had carried nearly 2,000 patients, with but 4 
deaths en route. 
AMBULANCES. 
As far as can be determined, full regulation supply of ambulances 
was not provided, certainly not for many weeks after the troops were 
assembled in camps. At most places no serious consequences resulted, 
as there were enough to answer the requirements. 
At Montauk, where in time there were 48, only about half of them, 
perhaps, in good working order, more would have been of service and 
should have been on hand; but in Cuba, where they were really 84 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
needed, ambulances were almost wholly wanting. When the Fifth 
Corps was ready to leave Tampa, the Medical Department had a fully 
equipped train of 40. By command of Major-General Shafter it was 
left behind, and the expedition landed with only 3 ambulances, 10 
more being received some days later, after the fights of the 1st and 2d 
of July. The result was that at first transportation was lacking for 
what supplies were gotten on shore, the medical wants of the troops 
were not as well satisfied as the material on hand would have per- 
mitted, and a large number of wounded were subjected to unnecessary 
hardship and suffering. It should be remembered, however, that the 
roads between the fighting line and the base hospitals were such that 
the moving of wounded in ambulances would have been hardly less 
trying and painful than it was in wagons. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
1. That at the outbreak of the war the Medical Department was, in 
men and materials, altogether unprepared to meet the necessities of the 
army called out. 
To sum up, in brief, the evidence submitted shows: 
2. That as a result of the action through a generation of contracted 
and contracting methods of administration, it was impossible for the 
Department to operate largely, freely, and without undue regard to 
cost. 
3. That in the absence of a special corps of inspectors, and the 
apparent infrequency of inspections by chief surgeons, and of official 
reports of the state of things in camps and hospitals, there was not 
such investigation of the sanitary conditions of the army as is the 
first duty imposed upon the Department by the regulations. 
4. That the nursing force during the months of May, June, and July 
was neither ample nor efficient, reasons for which may be found in the 
lack of a proper volunteer hospital corps, due to the failure of Congress 
to authorize its establishment, and to the nonrecognition in the begin- 
ning of the value of women nurses and the extent to which their 
services could be secured. 
5. That the demand made upon the resources of the Department in 
the care of sick and wounded was very much greater than had been 
anticipated, and consequently, in like proportion, these demands were 
imperfectly met. 
6. That powerless as the Department was to have supplies trans- 
ferred from point to point, except through the intermediation of the 
Quartermaster’s Department, it was seriously crippled in its efforts to 
fulfill the regulation duty of “furnishing all medical and hospital 
supplies.” 
7. That the shortcomings in administration and operation may justly 
be attributed, in large measure, to the hurry and confusion incident to 
the assembling of an army of untrained officers and men, ten times REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
85 
larger than before, for which no preparations in advance had been 
or could be made because of existing rules and regulations. 
8. That notwithstanding all the manifest errors, of omission rather 
than of commission, a vast deal of good work was done by medical offi- 
cers, high and low, regular and volunteer, and there were unusually 
few deaths among the wounded and the sick. 
What is needed by the medical department in the future is— 
1. A larger force of commissioned medical officers. 
2. Authority to establish in time of war a proper volunteer hospital 
corps. 
3. A reserve corps of selected trained women nurses, ready to serve 
when necessity shall arise, but, under ordinary circumstances, owing 
no duty to the War Department, except to report residence at deter- 
mined intervals. 
4. A year’s supply for an army of at least four times the actual 
strength, of all such medicines, hospital furniture, and stores as are not 
materially damaged by keeping, to be held constantly on hand in the 
medical supply depots. 
5. The charge of transportation to such extent as will secure prompt 
shipment and ready delivery of all medical supplies. 
6. The simplification of administrative “paper work,” so that medical 
officers may be able to more thoroughly discharge their sanitary and 
strictly medical duties. 
7. The securing of such legislation as will authorize all surgeons in 
medical charge of troops, hospitals, transports, trains, and independent 
commands to draw from the Subsistence Department funds for the pur- 
chase of such articles of diet as may be necessary to the proper treat- 
ment of soldiers too sick to use the army ration. This to take the 
place of all commutation of rations of the sick now authorized. 
Convalescent soldiers traveling on furlough should be furnished 
transportation, sleeping berths or staterooms, and $1.50 per diem for 
subsistence in lieu of rations, the soldier not to be held accountable or 
chargeable for this amount. 
PAY DEPAKTMEET. 
BRIG. GEN. T. H. STANTON, PAYMASTER-GENERAL, IT. S. A., IN CHARGE. 
The Pay Department has charge of the supply and distribution of 
and accounting for funds for the payment of the Army, and such other 
financial duties as are especially assigned to it. 
Previous to the declaration of war, payments were made to the Army 
by check and in currency sent by express. After the organization of 
the volunteer force it was not found practicable to pay by this method, 
consequently all payments in the field were made by paymasters in 
person, in cash, which has required an immense amount of work, as 
the troops have been scattered over two hemispheres. 
The corps of paymasters was increased by seventy-two, and these 86 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
officers and their clerks entered the service with little or no knowledge 
of army accounts. A school of instruction was organized, in which 
each was made familiar with the necessary forms to be used in pay- 
ments, and the principles of making and rendering accounts; and as a 
result each officer entered upon his duties with a fair knowledge of the 
business before him. This preparation lias enabled the troops to be 
paid promptly and intelligently, resulting in fewer errors than would 
otherwise have occurred. 
The principal delay in the payment of troops was in Cuba and Porto 
Eico. In Cuba the colonels of some of the regiments did not desire 
their regiments paid there, and Major-General Shatter, commanding 
the army there, approved their requests. The Pay Department had in 
Cuba 11 paymasters and $1,500,000, and paid about one-third of the 
United States forces on that island, the other two-tliirds being paid 
after their arrival at Montauk. There has been complaint made as 
to the payment of the army in Porto Eico. Ten paymasters, with 
$1,500,000, were sent there. They were stopped at Santiago, and Major- 
General Miles, Commanding the Army, telegraphed not to have them 
sent to Porto Eico, as the money might be infected, although it had 
never been landed from the vessels. 
In view of this request it was decided not to send these funds to Porto 
Eico, and new paymasters and new money were sent from ISTew York to 
make the payments to troops there; this caused the delay of which 
complaint was made. Except as above, there have been no complaints 
presented to the commission against this department, and it is evident 
that for the nonpayment of troops it was not in any instance primarily 
responsible. The Paymaster-General testified that there was no time 
during the continuance of the war at which he did not have the money 
and the officers ready and willing to pay in accordance with law and 
the customs of the service. So far as the commission can ascertain, 
all the officers of the Pay Department have performed their duties 
promptly and efficiently. 
THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, AND CORPS OF ENGINEERS. 
BRIG. GEN. JOHN M. WILSON, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS IT. S. A., IN 
CHARGE. 
The Corps of Engineers is charged with the improvement of rivers 
and harbors; construction, care, and operation of canals; construction 
and maintenance of works of defense, including the operation of sub- 
marine mines; the construction and repair of light-houses, and numer- 
ous other special and minor duties. 
At the outbreak of the war the Corps of Engineers consisted of 109 
officers and a battalion of engineer soldiers organized into four com- 
panies, with a maximum authorized strength of 500 enlisted men, 
although the maximum legal strength was 752, organized into five 
companies. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
87 
GUN AND MORTAR BATTERIES. 
The possibility of war impressed itself so fully upon the chief of this 
corps that on January 25, 1898, all officers having charge of the con- 
struction of seacoast defenses were directed to mount, as rapidly as 
possible, all guns and carriages then on hand or received later, even if 
it should be at the disadvantage of incomplete work, the object being 
to have the guns available for service. The carrying out of these 
instructions entailed considerable hardships and inconveniences in the 
North Atlantic forts, where snow to a great depth covered the ground. 
Every effort was made during the ensuing two months to get in place 
every possible piece of ordnance that could be obtained for the batter- 
ies at that time under construction. 
The first allotment for coast-defense purposes from the appropria- 
tion for national defense was made March 17, 1898, and amounted to 
$2,975,000, of which all but $250,000 was devoted to the construction 
of additional gun batteries. Telegraphic orders for the construction 
of these works were issued the same day, and in several instances 
ground was broken the day following. Additional allotments were 
made from time to time from the appropriation for national defense for 
the construction of additional gun batteries, both permanent and 
temporary. 
A summary of the work accomplished in the construction of gun and 
mortar batteries during the period of the war is as follows, the first 
table giving the condition of the permanent seacoast armament prior 
to the outbreak of hostilities, the second the condition August 1, 1898: 
I. 
12-inch. 
10-inch. 
8-inch. 
Mortars. 
Rapid- 
fire. 
Armament in place , 
Ready for armament 
Under construction 
Total 
10 
5 
9 
44 
32 
6 
9 
22 
o 
88 
72 
72 
0 
5 
4 
24 
82 
33 
232 
9 
II. 
Armament in place 
16 
70 
35 
144 
26 
Ready for armament 
27 
28 
7 
64 
16 
Under construction 
37 
19 
22 
104 
37 
Total 
80 
117 
64 
312 
79 
- 
— 
Ill addition to the permanent armament, temporary batteries for old- 
type rifled and smoothbore seacoast guns and for modern siege guns 
and for modern 8-incli B. L. rifles on improvised carriages were erected 
at various points either wholly defenseless or deficient in armament. 
Seventy-five emplacements of this character were built and armed dur- 
ing the war at 21 different harbors. 88 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
SUBMARINE-MINE DEFENSES. 
On March 28 the following instructions to all officers of the Corps of 
Engineers in charge of torpedo defenses were issued: 
Office of the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, 
Washington, March 28,1898. 
Sir: I have the honor to request that you will endeavor to organize a corps of 
about 120, more or less, patriotic citizens, ivho, without promise of pay, will be ready to 
give you their services in case of a sudden emergency under which immediate action 
may be demanded. 
These citizens should consist of expert electricians, civil engineers, machinists, 
telegraph and telephone experts, steam fitters, cable men, in fact men who are will- 
ing to aid in an emergency, and whose youth, brains, and mechanical ingenuity 
will be of great help to you in a crisis. 
This corps should be organized into convenient divisions, according to the class of 
work to be performed, such as land telegraph or telephone work, submarine-mine 
work, expert electrical work, etc. 
The divisions should be further organized into convenient squads with regard to 
further classification of work. 
The divisions and squads should be assigned to the charge of the most expert and 
capable men as commanders. 
A scheme of this kind already put in operation covers four divisions of four squads, 
each classified according to the nature of the work, and embracing all branches of 
electrical and steam engineering work and of signal work. 
You are also requested to endeavor to have this organization, at its own expense, 
equip itself with tools ready for an emergency, everything boxed for a sudden move- 
ment, and you are also requested to find out just where you can place your hands 
upon all materials necessary for equipping and working the mines now under your 
control, and assisting in the defense of the various harbors in the engineering dis- 
trict under your charge. 
Arrangements of this character have been made for one or two of the most 
important districts, and it is hoped that you may be able to accomplish something 
of the same character. 
Far more is now expected of the Corps of Engineers than ever before, aud even 
with the very limited funds and materials at its command I am satisfied that it will 
be able to accomplish important results when the crisis comes. 
Upon receipt of a telegram from me to go ahead, yon will be authorized to make 
purchases of materials required and to employ such persons as are necessary, and I 
will endeavor to get an allotment for payments. 
Your rolls should fully cover the name, character of employment, rate of pay, and 
time of all persons who may aid you when called upon. 
Very respectfully, 
John M. Wilson, 
Brigadier-General, Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army. 
At the outbreak of the war there was on hand at various harbors a 
fairly sufficient number of mine cases and of operating caseinates, but 
practically no cable, explosives, operating apparatus, search lights, or 
any of the multitude of minor articles necessary for successfully plant- 
ing and operating the mines. An allotment of $250,000 from the 
appropriation for national defense, made March 17, 1898, was applied 
at once, under telegraphic orders, to the purchase and distribution REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
89 
of the most necessary articles of torpedo material, especially cable. 
Pending the acquisition of sufficient standard material, the following 
instructions, under date of April 3, were issued for torpedo harbor 
defenses. 
Headquarters Corps of Engineers, United States Army, 
Washington, April 3, 1898. 
Sir : The emergency which has been anticipated appears to be almost upon us. 
I received yesterday an allotment of funds for torpedo service, and at once ordered 
by telegraph the purchase of materials; it will probably take three months to obtain 
what will be needed for one-fourth of our coast line. 
In the meantime you must make the best possible torpedo defense for the harbors 
in your charge, with the materials in hand and such temporary expedients as you 
can devise. 
You can telegraph Major Knight * asking when he can furnish what is absolutely 
necessary to complete the system, so far as the mines you have available are con- 
cerned; and if his reply does not indicate that you can get them in a week or ten 
days then you are authorized to purchase whatever is absolutely necessary in open 
market wherever you can obtain it, reporting purchases and cost to this office. 
You are requested to commence, on receipt of this letter, preparations for planting 
mines and to go as far as possible in your work without interfering immediately 
with main channels; yon are authorized to employ all necessary help, to adopt tem- 
porary expedients of any kind deemed proper by you, and to understand that all 
necessary power and responsibility, so far as law and regulations will admit, are 
now committed to you. 
Be as economical as possible, and remember that there are numerous harbors 
besides those in your charge, in regard to which similar orders will be sent. 
It is not the fault of the Corps of Engineers that we are not fully prepared, but it 
will be its fault and that of each district officer in case we do not at once take 
advantage of the limited means now at our command. 
I requested yesterday that orders be sent to Willets Point to send to you noncom- 
missioned officer and privates to aid you in your torpedo work. I would gladly send 
more, but already over one-third of the battalion has been named for these details. 
Use every effort in this emergency; arrange for boats; set up operating apparatus 
in casemates; arrauge mooring anchors; lay your cables and junction boxes; pre- 
pare your compound plugs; get your mines ready; purchase what is absolutely 
necessary for the mines you now have that you can not procure at once from Major 
Knight; extemporize temporary mines, employ all the help you want, but go ahead 
and show what the Corps of Engineers can do when an emergency arises for which 
our country is unprepared. 
Very respectfully, John M. Wilson, 
Chief of Engineers, TJ. S. Army. 
It was the foresight indicated by these letters that enabled the corps 
so promptly to protect our principal h arbors with proper torpedo defense, 
which had great effect in satisfying the commercial interests of the 
country that they were safe from successful attack. 
April 21 the order to plant mines was given, and by the close of the 
month practically nearly every harbor of importance was defended by 
at least a preliminary line of mines, the material of which, in part, had 
to be improvised from local sources. 
The purchase and shipment of standard [submarine-mine apparatus 
* The officer in charge of the torpedo depot at Willets Point, N. Y. 90 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
of all kinds were pushed with the greatest possible energy, and the tor- 
pedo lines at each harbor were constantly extended, improved, and 
maintained. The conditions under which some of this work was carried 
on, particularly in the early stages, were most trying, unusually stormy 
and cold weather prevailing and rendering work on the water disagree- 
able and hazardous. In connection with the submarine-mine defenses 
it was necessary to prescribe special regulations for the navigation of 
friendly vessels and to maintain a fleet of patrol boats to enforce them. 
Owing to the deficiency in a trained personnel, it was practicable to 
assign only a few engineer soldiers to each harbor, the total number 
distributed to some 25 harbors being 156. Eeliance was largely placed 
upon civilian electricians, mechanics, and laborers. This civilian force 
was organized in part from volunteers prior to the time when funds 
became available. 
Among the principal items of torpedo material purchased during 
the war may be named 44 search lights, 150 tons explosives, 400 miles 
cable, 1,650 mine cases, 1,500 compound plugs, 17 sets operating appa- 
ratus, besides avast multitude of minor miscellaneous articles, weighing 
in the aggregate many hundred tons. 
In consequence of the destruction of the Spanish fleet under Admiral 
Cervera and the siguing of the protocol, the work of clearing harbors 
and channels of the mines was commenced early in August and restric- 
tions upon commerce removed as rapidly as possible. 
EQUIPMENT OF ENGINEER TROOPS. 
On April 16 orders were sent to prepare all available pontoon material 
for a sudden call, and on April 29 the entire available equipment at 
Willets Point and West Point embarked for Florida with Company E, 
battalion of engineers. All available intrenching tools were sent at 
the same time. For many years, for want of funds, the pontoons and 
intrenching material at the engineer depot had been steadily deterio- 
rating, so that the amount available on the first call was barely equal to 
the demand. Allotments of $10,000 and $3,000 from appropriation for 
national defense were made April 20 and May 4 and at once applied to 
increasing the stock of pontoon material and intrenching tools. The 
various deficiency acts subsequently passed rendered available addi- 
tional funds for equipment of engineer troops, and the Department was 
at all times able to respond promptly to every requisition for sup- 
plies. An additional bridge train was sent to Tampa for use of the 
expeditionary force, and a large assortment of intrenching tools, special 
tools, drawing and surveying instruments and materials were issued 
during the period of the war. 
ENGINEER BATTALION. 
As stated above, the authorized enlisted strength of the Engineer 
Battalion prior to hostilities was 500 men, organized into four com- REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
91 
panies. Owing to the diplomatic situation it was deemed prudent to 
represent the advisability of increasing the strength of the battalion 
to its maximum legal strength, viz, 750, and application was accord- 
ingly made March 21. Under date of April 4 the Secretary of War 
authorized the enlistment of 202 additional men and' one additional 
company, making the strength of the battalion 702. Subsequently the 
act of Congress for increasing the Regular Army in time of war brought 
the strength of the battalion to 752. Two companies, of 100 men each, 
accompanied the expedition to Cuba and rendered valuable service 
with the Army. One company of about 125 men was dispatched to 
Manila, P. I. The remainder were employed on the torpedo defenses 
and at the engineer depot, Willets Point, assisting in the shipment of 
the torpedo material and material for equipment of engineer troops. 
Wherever officers of this corps have been assigned to duty the testi- 
mony shows that they have acted with great promptness and to the 
great benefit of the service. The testimony of commanding officers of 
campaigns, troops, and camps has been in high praise of the services 
of the Corps of Engineers. This commendation has been because of 
the efficient preparations made before the beginning of the war with 
Spain for any emergency, the energy displayed by the officers of the 
Department and the esprit de corps that permeates the entire force. 
ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 
BRIG. GEN. D. W. FLAGLER, CHIEF OF ORDNANCE, IT. S. A., IN CHARGE. 
The duties of the Ordnance Department are, procuring, by purchase 
or manufacture, and distributing the necessary ordnance and ordnance 
supplies for the Government, and the establishment and maintenance 
of arsenals and depots for their manufacture and safe-keeping. 
At the beginning of the war the Ordnance Corps consisted of 1 brig- 
adier general, 3 colonels, 4 lieutenant-colonels, 10 majors, 22 captains, 
14 first lieutenants, 1 ordnance storekeeper with rank of major, 1 ord- 
nance storekeeper with rank of captain, 104 ordnance sergeants and 
488 enlisted men. The act of Congress approved July 8, 1898, added 
to the regular establishment 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 2 
captains, and G first lieutenants, and authorized the appointment of a 
chief ordnance officer with the rank of lieutenant-colonel for each army 
corps, and a chief ordnance officer with the rank of major for each 
division organized. 
This increase was not large enough to furnish the officers needed by 
the Department for the discharge of the greatly increased duties. It 
must be borne in mind that the efficient ordnance officer is a specialist 
who must be trained by experience and can not be improvised. 
The work of the department was, of course, greatly increased by 
the war with Spain. When it was seen that war was probable the 
necessity of a rapid completion of the system of coast defenses was at 92 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
once appreciated. The Ordnance Department, in connection with the 
Engineer Department, made strenuous efforts to provide for defenses 
needed, the first steps being taken in February before any appropria- 
tion was available. From the 9th of March the work of completing the 
armament for the coast defenses was pushed with all possible dispatch, 
night shifts being employed, the force increased at the gun factory, and 
the completion of guns and forgings hastened. 
FTot much could be done to hasten the deliveries of the larger seacoast 
guns, the time required for manufacturing the forgings and the finish- 
ing and assembling of the guns being too great. Attempts were made 
to induce the manufacturers who had contracts for mortars to expedite 
their work. Five additional 10-inch guns were obtained from the Beth- 
lehem Iron Company under their contract. 
The manufacture of carriages could be hastened and proper steps 
were taken to complete those necessary for the guns on hand and in 
process of manufacture. With rapid-fire guns it was possible to 
accomplish more, and they were purchased as fast as satisfactory 
offers to furnish them could be obtained from American and foreign 
manufacturers. 
When war seemed imminent the supply of powder and projectiles on 
hand for coast defense was inadequate. Manufacturers of these were 
conferred with and the necessities of the nation explained to them, the 
result being that they increased their plants, and in some cases employed 
outside establishments, thus multiplying their capacity. 
The results of all these attemps to rush the completion of the coast 
defenses, in its various ordnance branches, was, as had been foreseen, 
inadequate. The making of heavy guns, mortars, carriages for the same, 
and the projectiles necessary for their nse requires plants whose instal- 
lation is a matter of time. These once installed and in working order, 
the time required for the necessary work is so long and the difficulties 
inherent in the manufacture so great that a large increase in the out- 
put can not suddenly be made. 
The experience of the late war supports what has been so often said 
by the ordnance specialists, that the coast defense of the country must 
be provided for before an emergency arises. 
The details as to the supplies of ordnance and ordnance stores on 
hand at the beginning of the war are given in the replies of the Chief 
of Ordnance to the inquiries of the commission. 
SMALL ARMS. 
On April 1, 1898, the small arms with which the Army was provided 
was the rifle and carbine, caliber .30, and revolver, caliber .38. 
There were on hand April 1: 
Rifles, caliber .30 53, 508 
Carbines, caliber .30 14, 875 
Revolvers, caliber .38 4,517 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
93 
There were received up to September 1: 
Rifles, caliber .30 26, 728 
Carbines, caliber .30 1,140 
Revolvers, caliber .38 5, 850 
And there were issued to troops up to September 1: 
Rifles, caliber .30 53, 571 
Remaining on band 27, 665 
Carbines, caliber .30 11, 715 
Remaining on band 4, 300 
Revolvers, caliber .38 9, 515 
Remaining on band 852 
The National Guard was armed largely with the S. B. L. rifle and 
carbine, caliber .45, and revolver, caliber .45. Of these there were on 
hand, received, and issued up to September 1 as follows: 
On hand 
Apr. 1. 
Received. 
Issued. 
On hand 
Sept. 1. 
265, 895 
7, 983 
1,645 
3, 526 
84,391 
3, 276 
13,363 
185, 030 
4, 705 
4,582 
16, 300 
The volunteers were, with few exceptions, provided with the Spring- 
field B. L. rifle and carbine, caliber .45, and the caliber .45 revolver, as 
the Department did not have on hand enough caliber .30 arms for the 
purpose; nor could it manufacture them fast enough to supply the 
demand. The manufacture was hastened, and as the arms were fur- 
nished the volunteers were supplied with them, there being put in their 
hands up to December 8,110,000 rifles and carbines, caliber .30. 
The putting of the caliber .45 rifle in the hands of troops has been 
much criticised during and since the war. It was done because there 
was need of immediately arming them, and as the country did not pos- 
sess the requisite number of the caliber .30 rifles the weapons on hand 
had to be used. Further, in the opinion of certain general officers, the 
caliber .45 rifle, with smokeless powder, was more destructive than the 
caliber .30 arm, and was a simpler, less complicated weapon. 
At the beginning of the war the Regular Army was furnished with 
small-arms ammunition in which the smokeless powder was used, all 
the caliber .30 ammunition being of this character. The Ordnance 
Department had been for two or three years experimenting on powder 
for the caliber .45 cartridge and had succeeded in finding what it 
wanted, but as the capacity for making such powder in this country is 
limited, the first efforts were directed toward supplying a sufficient 
amount of it for the ammunition for the caliber .30 arm. The Chief of 
Ordnance testifies that in about two months he was able to get it for 
the .45-caliber cartridge from private manufacturers, and after this time 
it was used in the making of nearly all the caliber .45 ammunition. 94 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
The trooi>s armed with the caliber .45 rifle at the time of the engage- 
ments at Santiago had black powder, as also had those in Porto Rico 
and the Philippine Islands. In the fights about Santiago the use of 
black powder was severely condemned by the officers in command. 
The smoke located the position of the troops. The men armed with 
the caliber .45 rifle and using the black powder were withdrawn from 
the actions on the 1st and 2d of July. The light batteries at Santiago 
also had black powder at the engagements of July 1 and 2, and it was 
found that the smoke of the discharges made an excellent mark for 
the enemy’s artillery fire. 
The advantages of smokeless powder were fully understood by the 
Ordnance Department, and the initial steps were taken for its use with 
both small arms and artillery. The ammunition for field guns in the 
hands of troops and in store at the beginning of the war was black 
powder, because it was on hand and economy required that it should 
be used for peace purposes. When the war came the Department was 
unable to at once furnish smokeless powder for the field guns, but the 
manufacture of it was promptly begun, and in a short time a supply of 
it was available. 
For the troops armed with the caliber .45 rifle—and these were, as 
has been stated, practically all the volunteers—so little ammunition 
was supplied up to the middle of July that not even ten black-powder 
cartridges per man could be issued for target practice. 
EQUIPMENT. 
The Department did not have on hand at the beginning of the war 
any large supply of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and horse equipments. 
The buildings for a plant for their manufacture had been erected at Rock 
Island Arsenal, but the plant itself had not been installed through fail- 
ure to obtain the necessary appropriation. 
In the first issues of equipments to troops there was some delay 
caused by the lack of proper plant for their manufacture, and as they 
were not on the market as articles of commerce they could not be pur- 
chased at once. Steps were immediately taken to correct the evil; the 
plant was installed at Rock Island Arsenal, and the number of employees 
there increased from 400 on April 13 to 2,900 on August 31. At this 
latter date the Department was turning out 6,000 sets of infantry equip- 
ments per day. 
An element in the production of delay at first in issuing equipment 
to the volunteer troops was the fact that many sets of such equipments 
had been issued to the National Guard of the several States. These 
were reported as serviceable, and when the National Guard was called 
out as volunteers it was presumed they would be properly equipped 
from the stores in the hands of the State authorities. It was found, 
however, that a large proportion of these stores were not in fit condi- 95 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
tion for field service, and they had to be replaced, thus making an 
unexpected call upon the resources of the Department. 
The greatest difficulty and confusion in the supply of equipment to 
the troops was experienced at Camp Thomas. The chief of ord- 
nance had recommended the establishment of a depot at that place, but 
his recommendation was not complied with, the general commanding 
the camp not concurring because of the proximity of the arsenal at 
Columbia. Tenn., which arsenal, however, was soon used for other pur- 
poses. Had such depot been established the confusion and delays in 
the matter of equipment of the troops there would undoubtedly have 
been much lessened. 
SUMMABY. 
The testimony before the commission shows that the Ordnance Depart- 
ment was untiring in its work both before and during the war, and that 
every effort was made by its officers to properly arm and equip the 
troops. The delays that occurred were none of them of serious import, 
and it was beyond the power of the Department to prevent them. 
The great work of this department must be done in times of peace 
before war conies. Guns, mortars, carriages, small arms, ammunition, 
and equipments must be decided upon in advance, the plants for their 
production established, and a supply accumulated sufficent for the 
probable needs of the country. There is no time after war is declared 
in which to make this provision. It is a great work, requiring careful 
study and investigation on the part of the officers, a wide compre- 
hension as to the probable needs of the country, and the disbursing of 
large sums of money. The work of preparing for war can be done no 
faster than appropriations will permit, and a very important duty of 
the Chief of Ordnance is submitting to Congress the proper recommen- 
dations and estimates for appropriations to carry on the work of his 
department in the best manner. 
The testimony before the commission shows that the Ordnance 
Department had in the past fully appreciated the situation; that it 
had so far as lay in its power provided for the contingency of war; 
that its chief had placed before Congress the necessary data to enable 
that body to judge knowingly of the needs of the department to do its 
appointed work; that he had in his recommendations as to the dis- 
tribution of money appropriated anticipated the conditions which war 
would bring, had urged that the making of guns and carriages might 
take precedence of that of other articles which require less time to 
manufacture, and that the necessary plants might be established to 
meet the demands that would immediately follow a declaration of war. 
RECOMMENDATIONS. 
The commission would urge that— 
1. An amount of arms, ammunition, and equipments should he kept 96 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
constantly in store to secure the prompt outfitting of any force that 
may reasonably be expected to be suddenly called out. 
2. That the shops at the various arsenals, especially those at Rock 
Island, should be thoroughly equipped for any work that they may be 
required to do, and maintained in a condition of complete preparation. 
THE SIGNAL CORPS. 
BRIG. GEN. A. W. GREELY, CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, U. S. A., IN CHARGE. 
The Chief Signal Officer is charged, under the Secretary of War, 
with the direction of the Signal Bureau; with the control of the officers, 
enlisted men, and employees attached thereto; with the construction, 
repair, and operation of military telegraph lines; with the supervision 
of such instruction in military signaling and telegraphy as may be 
prescribed in orders from the War Department; with the procurement, 
preservation, and distribution of the necessary supplies for the corps. 
He has charge of all military signal duties, and of books, papers, and 
devices connected therewith, including telegraph and telephone appara- 
tus and the necessary instruments for target ranges and other military 
uses; of collecting and transmitting information for the Army, by tele- 
graph or otherwise, and all other duties pertaining to military signaling. 
On account of the very meager appropriation to this branch of the 
service prior to the commencement of hostilities, this corps was not in 
condition for war. General Greely says that “the approach of the 
war found eight available officers and fifty men of the Signal Corps 
widely scattered—from Oregon to Texas on the south and New York 
on the east. There were not more than two men at any station, and 
only $800 was available for war expenses.” 
For the amount of work to be done, and done promptly, there was no 
department in the Army so utterly helpless as the Signal Corps. This 
condition of affairs was not its fault. The facts stated in the last 
annual report of the Chief Signal Officer will show that he did all that 
he could to have the corps in better shape, and urged that much of the 
work be done in peace that was required in an emergency. The long line 
of Atlantic coast, the Gulf coast, and the Pacific coast, with their many 
harbors and harbor defenses, were not supplied with proper telegraph 
cables for electrical interconnection between adjacent fortifications. 
General Greely says: 
These harbor defenses, save two or three experimental stations, had no electrical 
installation for the fire-control system, an absolutely necessary adjunct of disap- 
pearing guns. Under this system the range officers, located a long distance from 
the batteries, determine every minute or less the position of the enemy’s ships and 
communicate this information to the officer who controls the firing. The control 
officer plots the positions and at a suitable instant causes, through the firing officers, 
the mortars to he discharged or one or all the guns to rise, deliver their fire, and 
then disappear in their pits. REFORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
97 
All our modern fortifications were, with the exceptions named, with- 
out this connection between the range, the control, and the firing 
officers. To establish this communication was the work to be done, 
and to be done at once. 
In addition to this the volunteer and regular troops that had been 
called out and mobilized had to have their camps equipped with tele- 
graph or telephone lines, connecting the brigade, division, and corps 
headquarters. The permanent military telegraph lines along the Mex- 
ican frontier, or running to the heart of the great Indian reservations, 
aggregating 900 miles, had to be regularly operated by the corps. 
These duties confronted the Signal Corps before there was a gun 
fired. The chief signal officer and the officers and men under his com- 
mand were equal to every emergency, and the work was so quickly 
and successfully done that there has not been a complaint filed from 
any source before this commission. The officers who have testified 
before us about the workings of this corps have, without a single 
exception, complimented in the highest terms the skill, efficiency, 
energy, and courage of the corps. 
What the corps did we will briefly state. It is due these gallant 
men that we should go into more extended detail, but we refer those 
who want to examine this work more fully to the testimony and to the 
various reports of the officers of the Signal Corps. On April 5 the 
Secretary of War allotted from the nationaldefense fund $23,700 for 
New York Harbor. Other important harbors were subsequently pro- 
vided for from the same fund. Cables were immediately laid to con- 
nect adjacent fortifications in many of the most important harbors. 
Electrical installation was provided for all the important modern bat- 
teries. Skilled men to operate these various appliances were provided. 
The force was supplemented by the addition of 45 trained sergeants 
and about 50 detailed men, partly instructed. The Volunteer Signal 
Corps was organized under acts of Congress approved May 18 and 
July 7. There were mustered into service under these acts 115 officers 
and about 1,000 men. 
One provision of the acts of Congress was of great advantage in 
securing the best men for this service, to wit, that two-thirds of the 
officers and enlisted men should be skilled electricians or telegraphers. 
Highly trained officers in the prime of life were secured, and the 
remarkable fact is reported that not one of them was either invalided 
or obliged to quit his duties during the war, though they served at 
Santiago, in Porto Rico, and at Manila. This Volunteer Signal Corps 
built and equipped over 250 miles of telephone and telegraph lines in 
the different camps in the United States, bringing all the various 
headquarters in close communication. 
When war commenced and the fleets started for Cuba and the trans- 
ports to Manila, the Signal Corps was on hand. The men of this corps 98 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
cut the cables, often displaying great courage in doing their work 
under the enemy’s guns. At Santiago they located Cervera and the 
Spanish lines. They landed with the troops, laid their telegraph lines, 
following the line of battle as it advanced, kept up communication 
with the base of operation almost from the firing line, and when the 
two days’ fighting that resulted in the capture of Santiago occurred 
General Shatter said he had telegraphic communication with all his 
division commanders from his headquarters to the firing line. After 
the capture of Santiago and before the news of the surrender had 
reached all parts of the United States this corps had coupled the 
broken cable, and the President of the United States was able to learn 
promptly the details of the surrender at Santiago. The same suc- 
cessful work was accomplished at Porto Rico, and also at Manila, 
except the cable. The total amount of money available for the Signal 
Corps for eighteen months, ending December 31, 1898, aggregated 
$609,000. 
In addition this corps was charged with the censorship of all dis- 
patches passing over the cable lines, the delicate and responsible duties 
connected with which were faithfully discharged. 
During the past twenty-five years, owing to the rapid development 
of artillery and small arms, great changes have taken place in modern 
warfare, whereby lines of battle of opposing forces are formed at such 
great distances apart, the movements of assaulting columns have be- 
come so much more dangerous, the determinations by scouts or armed 
reconnoissances of the position and strength of an enemy have been 
rendered so difficult, that the services of the Signal Corps during time 
of war have become of inestimable value. 
The work accomplished by the Signal Corps was of great aid to the 
army in the field and very efficient in maintaining communication in 
all of the camps. 
CAMPS AND THEIR, SANITATION. 
CAMP GEORGE H. THOMAS. 
On April 15, 1898, by direction of the Secretary of War, a part of 
the Eegular Army was ordered to rendezvous at Ckickamauga Park, 
selected by the Commanding General of the Army as a place for the 
assembling of a portion of the troops intended for use in the anticipated 
war with Spain. On the 23d of the same month the encampment was 
designated as Camp George H. Thomas. 
Ohickamauga Park, as is well known, is situated about 9 miles from 
the city of Chattanooga, Tenn., in the State of Georgia, and is the 
property of the United States. When this property was purchased as 
a reservation to commemorate the great three days’ battle of 1863, 
fought thereon, it was contemplated that it might be used as a place 
for assembling troops in case of war. The means of communication REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
99 
between Chattanooga and the park were and are a good macadam turn- 
pike and the Chattanooga, Borne and Southern Railway Company, 
which has a single track only. The Southern Railway runs along near 
the western boundary of the park, and some troops were unloaded and 
loaded at Rossville, a station about 3 miles distant. Other troops were 
brought upon the Atlarrtic and Western Railway to Ringgold, about 6 
miles away. 
The park contains about 7,000 acres, two-thirds of which is wooded 
largely with oak trees, the balance being cleared or open land. The 
wooded portion had been thoroughly cleaned of underbrush, and the 
trees are a sufficient distance apart and the surface is sufficiently 
smooth so that loaded wagons can be driven over nearly every part of 
it, and is so open that the sun can shine upon the ground almost every- 
where at some hour of the day. The surface of the park is gently 
rolling and is effectively drained in nearly every part. The height of 
the different portions above the sea level varies from 720 to 940 feet. 
It has no very rough or precipitous places, and the ground occupied by 
the troops was easy of access and sufficiently level for comfort and 
convenience. It is traversed in various directions by about 24 miles of 
good macadam roads, making transportation unusually easy. The soil 
is of a clay loam upon a foundation of limestone, which comes near the 
surface in most places and quite so over a large part of the wooded 
por tion. The strata of this limestone rock run at all angles from per- 
pendicular to horizontal and are loosely connected with each other. 
The climate was reputed to be dry and not excessively or uncom- 
fortably hot in summer, and the locality free from typhoid fever and 
other infectious diseases and generally healthful. As soon as it was 
decided to use the park, preparations were commenced for the reception 
and care of the troops. Storehouses for quartermaster’s and commis- 
sary’s stores and corrals for animals were rapidly constructed. The 
terminal facilities at Battlefield Station, which is situated at Lytle, on 
the southern border of the park, at that time were very limited5 but 
the railroad people showed commendable activity in putting in addi- 
tional sidings for the largely increased traffic which was to come. The 
railroad facilities, although in time fairly sufficient, were never as ample 
as was desirable. This lack was not so great as to be serious or to 
materially affect the desirability of the park for a camp site. Ten store- 
houses, 20 by 100 feet, for the commissary stores and a sufficient num- 
ber for quartermaster’s supplies were rapidly constructed. 
The park commissioners immediately commenced the sinking of wells, 
and the work was rapidly pushed forward until forty-live in all were 
ready for use. The needs of the coming forces appeared to be appre- 
hended by all the departments to which were committed the duty*of 
preparation. 
Enough tentage for the troops was furnished except to the hospitals, 
where the supply was sometimes very inadequate. Transportation was 
usually sufficient. 100 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
Rations were good in quality and abundant in quantity. 
Medicines and medical supplies were at times deficient. Laundry 
work for the hospital was done at Chattanooga. An adequate and 
satisfactory refrigerating plant for the reception and preservation of 
fresh beef was erected by the beef contractors. A large bakery with a 
capacity of 60,000 loaves per day was built, and in a reasonable time 
after the establishment of the camp it was in operation and furnished 
excellent bread. 
Most of the regular troops were encamped on the open ground and 
most of the volunteers in the woods heretofore described. Regiments 
and brigades were usually placed quite close together—closer than 
was desirable or necessary, as there was ample space. The reasons 
assigned for placing the troops in the woods were that in hot weather 
the shade would be grateful and the open ground would be left for 
drilling and tactical maneuvers. 
MOVEMENT OF TROOPS. 
The first regiment of the Regular Army arrived about the middle of 
April and tlie others followed in rapid succession until 7,283 officers 
and men were in the park. The first volunteer troops arrived about 
the middle of May and were quickly followed by others, until by May 
31 there were 44,227 present. Some days as many as five or six regi- 
ments arrived, taxing the railroads and camp transportation to the 
utmost. When the Chattanooga, Rome and Southern Railway was 
unable to handle all the troops arriving they were unloaded at Rossville 
and some of the artillery and cavalry at Chattanooga and all marched 
into camp. 
On June 30 there were 58,548 troops in camp; on July 31 43,823 
troops; on August 31 there were 13,161 troops; total number of troops 
that arrived at Camp Thomas was 69,459 volunteers and 7,283 regulars. 
The average number in camp during May, June, and July was 46,947. 
On May 7 the First Army Corps was constituted and May 16 Maj. 
Gen. John R. Brooke was placed in command of it, being already in 
command of the camp. The Third Army Corps was constituted the 
same date, and May 16 placed under the command of Maj. Gen. James 
F. Wade. All the regular troops left for Tampa in the early part of 
May. 
Ernst’s Brigade, of Wilson’s Division, left Camp Thomas July 8 for 
Porto Rico; the balance of the First Division, First Corps, with General 
Brooke in command, left July 23 for the same place. 
During the latter part of August quite a large number of troops 
were ordered to their several States and subsequently mustered out. 
Those remaining were disposed of as follows, viz, on August 21 and 
22, the Second and Third Divisions of the First Corps were sent to 
Lexington, Ky., and Knoxville, Tenn., respectively. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
101 
Early in September what was left of the Third Corps was transferred 
to Anniston, Ala., and subsequently made part of the Fourth Corps. 
At the end of September there was but a small detachment of troops 
left in camp. 
Maj. Gen. John B. Brooke commanded the camp from April 20 to 
July 23; Maj. Gen. James F. Wade from July 23 to August 2, and Maj. 
Gen. J. C. Breckinridge from August 2 until its practical abandonment. 
WATER SUPPLY. 
At the time the first troops arrived at the park there were nine deep- 
drilled wells, besides several wells at farmhouses and a number of 
cold springs which had been considered pure. These springs and 
wells were cleaned out and the wells provided with pumps by the 
park commissioners before the water was used. These wells and 
those subsequently sunk were piped to the bottom with six-inch iron 
tubing, which projected two or three feet above the surface of the 
ground. The pipes above the ground were protected by stone laid in 
cement for the purpose of preventing surface drainage getting into 
the wells. 
The principal springs outside the park are Crawfish Springs, capacity, 
say, 15,000,000 gallons per day, distance 1£ miles; Blue Springs, dis- 
tance, 3 miles; Ellis Springs, distance, 4 miles. All furnished good and 
abundant water. The water supplied the camp was obtained from 
the springs above mentioned, hauled in barrels furnished by the 
Quartermaster’s Departmen to the different regimental organizations 
from the nine wells in existence in the park before the arrival of 
the troops, and thirty-six more that were rapidly sunk in convenient 
localities, and from Chickamauga Creek. The wells furnished one 
barrel per minute by vigorous pumping. The use of Crawfish Springs 
was discontinued about July 1 on account of disagreement with the 
owner as to compensation, and the direct supply from that source 
was cut off. 
The park commissioners put in a water system at Chickamauga 
Creek, where it touches the park on its northern and eastern corner. 
An intake was constructed at that point, a power house erected and 
furnished with steam pumping machinery, with a capacity of 1,800,000 
gallons per day, and a reservoir with a capacity of 17,000 gallons was 
erected some distance from the pump house upon an elevation suffi- 
ciently high so that the water could be distributed through the various 
portions of the park by gravity. The water-pipe line was about 10 
miles in length and extended to the camps of numerous regiments. 
Chickamauga Creek has its source some 20 miles distant from the 
park, in the highlands, and is fed by numerous springs, the most 
important of which are Pond, Gowdy, (3wen, Lee, and Crawfish. The 
anxiety to furnish the water to the troops at the earliest possible 102 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
moment prevented putting the pipes into the ground at first, but as 
soon as possible and as far as practicable this was done. 
In the meantime the heating of the pipes by the sun’s rays made the 
water very warm and unpalatable. The water supply was a cause of 
much anxiety and comment by officers and men during the entire occu- 
pancy of the camp, and much testimony has been taken respecting it. 
We visited the park October 28 and examined the source ofsujtply at 
Chickamauga Creek; also the wells and some of the springs. The 
banks of the Creek are composed of a reddish loam, readily soluble, 
which makes its waters always usually more or less roily, and after 
heavy rains quite muddy. Cave Creek, which drains a large portion 
of the camp occupied by the troops, naturally ran into Chickamauga 
Creek at a point near the intake pipe of the AArater system. Before any 
water was pumped a ditch was cut from Cave Creek at a point about 
60 feet above where it entered Chickamauga Creek to a point in said 
creek 60 feet below where the intake pipe was placed. A dam was 
constructed across the natural channel of Cave Creek, thus diverting 
its Avater into the ditch. 
It appears from the testimony that the top of the dam washed off 
once or twice during the heavy rains, but that no water was pumped 
at those times. We do not think that the water supply was con- 
taminated by the drainage through Cave Creek. A careful examination 
of the camp sites and general formation of the ground leads to the 
conclusion that the waters of Chickamauga Creek at the intake Avere 
not contaminated from the park. 
All the chemical and bacteriological examinations made of this water 
of which we have knowledge show that it Avas not a source of infection 
and might have been used with safety. The fact remains, however, 
that the water was quite unsatisfactory and repugnant to most of the 
troops. Many of them refused to drink it, and at last its use was inter- 
dicted unless boiled. Boiling as a rule was found to be impracticable, 
or, at least, was not generally adopted and soon ceased almost entirely. 
The hot weather made the water very warm and the heavy rains made 
it muddy and unpalatable. Filters were used to a limited extent, but 
their use amounted to but little, as they soon clogged with the large 
amount of solid substances which were held in suspension in the water. 
At first ail the wells in the camp furnished cool and pure water, but 
later some of them became contaminated and their use was discontinued. 
Whether any of those which were not discontinued were contaminated 
may be a mooted question, but the evidence before us does not warrant 
the statement that such was the fact. A very considerable quantity of 
the water used for drinking during July and August was drawn from 
the springs above mentioned, which were located outside of the park, 
the procuring of which was at times a serious inconvenience. There 
were but few bathing houses, soldiers generally bathing below the 
intake in Chickamauga Creek. The troops washed their clothing in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
103 
water obtained from the pipe system, from the wells and springs, and 
in Chickamauga Creek. 
The water supply at Camp Thomas was at times insufficient for com- 
fort, especially when the largest number of troops were there. At 
these times of shortness of water considerable inconvenience and dis- 
comfort were caused, but it did not amount to distress. It is very 
difficult to determine from the evidence to what extent impure water 
contributed to the production of sickness, but it is probable that it did 
to a considerable degree. The men would drink any clear water with- 
out much thought as to its source, and it appears that they used water 
which was known to be impure and which was forbidden. In some 
cases this practice was induced no doubt by disinclination to drink 
the roily water from Chickamauga Creek. 
SANITATION. 
Many causes conspired to make the sanitary condition of Camp 
Thomas very imperfect and at times decidedly bad. In the woods where 
most of the troops were located the soil was very shallow, so that sinks 
could not generally be dug on an average of more than 3 or 4 feet, 
which was not over oue-lialf of the regulation depth, before rock would 
be struck. When the heavy rains came in July the sinks, owing to the 
character of the soil, which would not allow seepage of liquids through 
it and the rock underneath, filled with water and overflowed, carrying 
the fecal matter over the surface of the ground to a greater or less dis- 
tance. The earth was only slightly absorbent, and when thrown into 
the sinks, as some was supposed to be many times during the day, 
it would absorb but little of the liquid contents and do but little if 
any good. 
At first but a small quantity of disinfectants were used in or about the 
sinks, as the regulations prescribed that they should not be furnished, 
and the necessity for their use did not seem to be fully appreciated. 
Even after their use became urgent great difficulty in procuring them 
was experienced, and it was not until August that lime and other dis- 
infectants were furnished in sufficient quantities. It is much to be 
regretted that so much delay occurred in this important matter. 
Another potent cause of the insanitary condition of the camp was fur- 
nished by the men defecating in the woods in close proximity to their 
tents. The pollution varied in different localities, but was at first quite 
general, and, with the sinks, was no doubt a prolific soure of infection. 
Vigorous efforts were made to put a stop to such an unsoldierly and 
dangerous practice, but, although materially lessened, it was never 
wholly suppressed. 
The camping places proper of the various regiments were, with few 
exceptions, well policed and kept in good sanitary condition, excepting 
the sinks, which were very often too near the quarters of the men, and 104 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
were not inclosed for some time after the establishment of the camp. 
Much of the refuse of the camps and corrals was drawn to various 
places more or less remote and burned, and it does not appear that any 
neglect to do this was a serious cause of unhealthfulness of the troops. 
Some of the regiments burned their kitchen refuse in their kitchen 
fires. 
During the existence of the camp as many as 600 licenses to hucksters 
were granted. A system of inspection of what they had for sale was 
adopted, and all articles supposed to be deleterious to the men were 
excluded; but there can not be much doubt that the large quantities 
of pies, cakes, fruits, etc., eaten were the cause of much sickness, 
especially intestinal disorders. Many of the regiments maintained can- 
teens, from which were sold large quantities of beer, quantities so large 
that the health of the men must necessarily have been injuriously 
affected. Passes to Chattanooga were allowed to from two to six men 
per day per company. That place offered full facilities for indulgence 
of appetite in many directions, and the dissipation of the men who 
visited that city, with or without permission, worked much injury to 
the command. 
The weather was extremely hot up to July 1, and after that very 
rainy, which was unexpected and unprecedented, and caused great 
discomfort to all and suffering and sickness to some. The rapid 
decomposition of kitchen and other refuse contributed materially to 
the development of disease. 
When the insanitary condition of the camps became known, the 
troops should have been moved into the open ground, and if neces- 
sary the places for drilling and tactical manceuvers sacrificed. In 
not doing this the various commanders of the camp were in error. 
In excuse it may be said that it was daily expected by the various 
commanders up to August 15 that a large portion of the troops would 
be ordered away from the Park to Cuba or Porto Rico. The evidence 
shows that the various commanding officers of the camp promulgated 
proper orders for sanitation, and that daily inspections were made, and 
it is equally in evidence that these orders were not obeyed, and that 
these inspections failed of securing their proper result, and the insani- 
tary conditions continued to an unusual extent. One of the great 
causes of insanitation was the inexperience of the men, who, not regard- 
ing the restrictions imposed upon them as reasonable or necessary, 
paid little attention to the sanitary orders issued. 
Making due allowance for the stated causes of insanitation, the 
responsibility for the failure to materially lessen the evils which existed 
must rest upon the several commanders and chief medical officers of 
the camp and corps. 
Myriads of flies, rapidly propagated by the favorable conditions of 
heat, moisture, kitchen and other garbage and the excreta of men and 
animals, infested the camp in all its parts and caused great annoyance REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
105 
and discomfort to man and beast, aud was one of the assigned causes 
of the spread of typhoid fever. 
The instruction in company and regimental drill and brigade and 
division movements was carried on as the weather and the health of 
the command permitted. 
On the whole, the camp was unsatisfactory by reason of the existence 
of conditions which we have enumerated. In August, when it was 
apparent that no more troops would be needed for active service, the 
men became discontented, and the order for breaking it up was hailed 
with great satisfaction. 
The better condition of the camps that succeeded Camp Thomas and 
the other early ones was the result of dearly bought and consequently 
appreciated experience. 
Considering the area of the open spaces and the rocky formation of 
the ground in the wooded portions, and considering the water supply, 
we are of opinion that Chickamauga Park can not comfortably accom- 
modate more than 20,000 troops at once for any great length of time. 
As bearing upon the healthfulness of this locality, it may be stated 
that Surgeon Hepburn, of the Eighth United States Volunteer Infantry, 
at present post surgeon at Gamp Thomas, under date of January 28, 
1899, reports that, from October 8, 1898, to January 20, 1899, there 
were 1,150 troops there; that there had been during that time 111 
separate cases treated in the hospital and not a death had occurred 
from disease, nor a case of typhoid fever developed. 
CAMP ALGER. 
Gamp Alger was established May 18, after a report to the Quarter- 
master-General dated May 8, as to its suitableness, by Capt. M. G. 
Martin, assistant quartermaster, United States Army, concurred in by 
Captain Seyburn, on duty at the headquarters of the Army. The 
report says: 
I liav« the honor to report that a tract of ]and, containing upward of 1,400 acres— 
meadow, pasture, and woodland—can be obtained for camping purposes at a distance 
of about 2 miles from Falls Church, Va. This tract is owned by Mr. C. L. Campbell, 
is well watered, and, I think, contains enough cleared land for the camping of an 
army corps. It is about 300 feet higher than Washington and is the only large tract 
which I have been able to find in one body and within reasonable distance of this city. 
It lies between 1 aud 3 miles of three different stations on a branch of the South- 
ern Railway, Avhich will put in the necessary sidings and provide free of cost the 
necessary land on its right of way for storehouses, etc. 
On May 8 the recommendations were approved by the Quarter- 
master-General and by the Secretary of War. 
Gamp Alger was about miles from Bunn Loring, a station on a 
branch of the Southern Railway, as above stated, and 7 miles from 
Washington, and about 5 miles distant from Fort Myer. The surface 
of this tract is rolling, partly wooded, with cultivated clearings and 106 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
with good drainage. The soil is of clay and sand and nearly impervious 
to water. Immediately after the selection of this camp preparations 
were made for the reception of troops by the erection of storehouses at 
Dunn Loring, where the Southern Railway put in extra sidings to 
accommodate the increased traffic. The Second Army Corps was 
constituted May 7, and May 16 Maj. Gen. W. M. Graham was assigned 
to the command, and the troops which were to compose the corps were 
ordered to this camp. General Graham arrived May 19 and assumed 
command, which he exercised during the existence of the camp. This 
corps was composed wholly of volunteers. The troops commenced 
arriving the 18th of May, and by the last of that month there were 
18,309 officers and men in camp. On the last day of June there were 
23,511 officers and men, on the last day of July there were 22,180, on 
the last day of August the troops present at this camp and Camp Meade 
were 21,456. 
Total number of troops that went to Camp Alger 31,195. 
August 2 one division of the corps marched to Thoroughfare Gap, 
80 miles distant, and remained in camp there for about one month. 
Duffield’s brigade left camp June 15 and Garretson’s brigade July 5, 
both for Santiago. 
Early in September the remainder of the corps was transferred to 
Camp Meade, near Middletown, Pa. 
The supply of transportation for this corps was somewhat limited at 
first but subsequently was abundant. The water supply was also 
quite limited and never was sufficient for other uses than cooking and 
drinking, and not that until about the 25th of June, when about forty 
wells had been sunk. There were no adequate bathing facilities nearer 
than the Potomac River, which was 7 miles distant. The troops were 
encamped both in the open and wooded portions. Those in the latter 
did not seem to suffer ou account of their position. The sinks were 
generally properly policed, of the regulation depth, and were very soon 
inclosed. 
The woods were quite badly polluted by the excreta of the men; but 
the commanding officer issued stringent sanitary regulations and used 
great efforts to see that they were obeyed. His efforts were fairly suc- 
cessful. The troops were well supplied with tentage. The camps of 
the different regiments were well policed, and the refuse properly dis- 
posed of by burning. The rations were abundant in quantity and good 
in quality. Field bakeries were established in the camp and at Dunn 
Loring on August 2, from which the corps was supplied with excellent 
bread. As heretofore stated, on the 1st of August it was decided to 
reduce the number of troops, one division being sent to Thorough- 
fare Gap, and about two weeks later it was decided to move the 
whole corps. Early in September that was accomplished. During the 
existence of this camp the weather was exceedingly hot and some por- 
tion of the time very rainy, both of which conditions, with myriads of REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
107 
flies which infested the camp, were the causes of much discomfort to 
the men. The health of this locality is reputed to be as good as any in 
the section of country about Washington. 
The number of deaths from May 18 to October 11 was 71, and at 
Thoroughfare Gap 34. This death rate is not abnormal, and, judging 
from it, the locality can not be considered unhealtliful. The Seventh 
Illinois Begiment, which was encamped there during the whole time, 
lost but one man up to the 14th day of December, a record probably 
not equaled by any other regiment in the service. The establishment 
of Camp Alger is justifiable upon the report as to the suitableness of 
the site, but considering the scarcity of water and the want of facilities 
for bathing, we are of opinion that it was very undesirable, and was not 
abandoned too soon. 
CAMP CUBA LIBRE, JACKSONVILLE, FLA. 
Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee selected this camp and established it May 
29. Its abandonment was begun October 23, the corps being trans- 
ferred to Savannah, Ga. This camp was located from 2 to 4 miles 
from the business portion of Jacksonville, near the banks of the St. 
Johns Eiver, upon a sandy plain, sparsely covered with pine trees. 
The ground is generally level and the soil of such a character that 
sinks could be dug to the required depth and the liquid portion of the 
contents absorbed. There was one division of about 10,000 men 
encamped immediately upon the banks of the St. Johns ltiver, the 
balance of the command being in the interior. This division con- 
structed a system of troughs for sinks, through which water was 
pumped and the excrement carried into the river and thence by the 
tide to the sea, an admirable and convenient sanitary arrangement. 
One division of the Seventh Corps, formerly Sehwan’s division, Fourth 
Corps, was for a time at Miami, but was brought to Jacksonville as soon 
as the unhealthful situation of Miami was definitely ascertained. 
The strength of the Seventh Corps, June 30, was 19,156 officers and 
enlisted men; July 31, 24,102; August 31, 28,842. 
The total number of troops which went to Camp Cuba Libre was 
28,842, all volunteers. 
Humber of deaths from May 26 to September 30, 246. 
This camp and Jacksonville were visited October 17 to 20 and 
carefully inspected. The camp was clean and the officers and men 
mostly cheerful and well contented, although anxious to move either 
to Cuba or home. Many of the regiments made low houses of boards 
from 4 to 6 feet in height, upon which were mounted their tents, 
making practically a two-story tent. The lower story was very con- 
venient for storage, and added much to the comfort and health of the 
men. The water supply, which was abundant and good, was fur- 
nished from the city waterworks of Jacksonville, and was carried by 
pipes to the camps of the various regiments. Bathing houses were 108 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
erected, and their use contributed much to the comfort and healthful- 
ness of the men. The sanitary arrangements were excellent, and were 
so from nearly the first establishment of the camp. The hospital 
arrangements were ample and good, the rations good in quality and 
sufficient in quantity. The discomfort from heat during the months of 
August and September was considerable. 
It was wise to move the corps to Savannah at the time it was done, 
for reasons hereinbefore stated in regard to camping troops too long in 
one place, and also for the morale and contentment of the men. 
A camp for convalescents was established at Pablo Beach, about 
12 miles from Jacksonville, where about 1,400 men were treated. 
While there are many favorable things that may be said about the 
camp at Jacksonville, that it would be much better not to encamp 
troops in the State of Florida during the summer months, except as a 
military necessity to do so. 
CAMP AT FERNANDINA, FLA. 
Two members of the commission were detailed to examine the aban- 
doned camp site at Fernandina and report what facts they could ascer- 
tain in regard to it. Charges of corruption in connection with the 
selection of the site of this camp had been made; investigation proved 
them to be unfounded. This camp was occupied by the Third Divi- 
sion of the Fourth Corps, under command of Brig. Gen. L. H. Carpenter, 
from July 3 to about the middle of August, when this division was 
moved to Huntsville, Ala. 
The report, which expresses our views of this camp, is as follows: 
In compliance with the instructions of the commission, we have the honor to 
report that we visited Fernandina, Fla., on the 18th instant, and made a careful and 
critical inspection of the site occupied as a camp by the troops lately stationed at 
that town, and found the conditions to be as follows: 
The Florida Central and Peninsular Railroad, leading into Fernandina, is a well- 
equipped one-track road, with sidings at the town amounting in all to about two 
miles. Its facilities for receiving and delivering troops appear to be very good. 
The facilities for embarking and disembarking troops by water are also very good, 
there being a dock front over a half mile long, with a minimum low-water depth over 
the bar at the mouth of the harbor of not less than 17 feet and a rise of tide of 6 feet. 
The location of the camp is excellent, probably quite equal to any site for the 
purpose that could have been selected on the Florida coast. The ground is rolling, 
its maximum elevation about 60 feet above the level of the sea, with no swamp 
except a tidal salt marsh beyond the highest ground. The sea-bathing facilities are 
excellent. 
We visited and walked over a large portion of the area occupied by the troops, 
and although there had been a severe storm the night before our arrival, the ground 
was practically dry. 
We carefully examined the site of the camp of the Third Pennsylvania Volunteers, 
which it has been reported was a tropical jungle, worthless land until cleared, and 
upon which the troops worked like slaves to clear it until it was lit for camping. 
While your committee can not state the condition of this land when the troops 
arrived, it found no appearance of a tropical jungle here or in the vicinity. There 
were no evidences of there having beeu serious work in preparing the camps, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
109 
although, as is usual, there were small bushes, vines, low palms, etc., scattered here 
and there over the camp site and the adjacent land. Altogether the committee was 
most favorably impressed with the character of the site selected. 
We were informed that it had been occupied by about 16,000 troops. 
We visited and obtained from the county clerk of Nassau County, Fla., Mr. George 
E. Wolff, a map showing the lands occupied by the troops, and his official certificate 
as to the ownership of the land. This certificate states that the greater part of the 
lands occupied reverted to the State of Florida in June, 1897, by reason of unpaid 
taxes, and that no one by the name of Alger ever controlled any lands in the county 
of Nassau, as shown by the records, and that the land occupied by the Third Penn- 
sylvania Volunteers at Fernandina as a camp was at the time the property of the 
State of Florida. 
The distance of the site of the camp from town is from 1 to 1-J- miles. The water 
was piped without expenditure to the camp from Fernandina, being from an arte- 
sian well about 600 feet deep. The supply was unlimited. The water had a slight 
sulphur taste, which it is said some of the troops disliked, and. occasionally used 
surface water. 
The locations of the hospitals as pointed out to us were on high ground, well 
drained, and apparently well selected. 
The time the site was occupied by the troops was from July 21 to August 15, in all 
about three weeks. 
The mayor of Fernandina informed us that Major Hendley, the surgeon in charge 
of the camp, had stated to him just before the troops left that the number of sick 
was 540. Your committee therefore has the honor to report that, in its opinion, 
the camp was well selected; that probably tbe site was equal in all respects to any 
other that could have been found on the Florida coast; that from the information 
they obtained and what they saw it was far from being a tropical jungle, and 
that the certificate of the county clerk indicates that no Government official was 
interested in the land; that the amount of work done in clearing the underbrush 
was no greater than might have been expected at almost any locality in the South 
selected for camping purposes; that the site was well drained, the water for driuk- 
ing and cooking purposes good, and the bathing facilities at the sea beach excellent. 
Appended to the report was the certificate in footnote below: 
State of Florida, County of Nassau: 
I, George E. Wolff, clerk circuit court and custodian of public records in and 
for Nassau County, Fla., hereby certify that I have carefully searched the public 
records of said county, and find that R. A. Alger does not own or control, directly 
or indirectly, any land on the island of Amelia, Nassau County, Fla. I further cer- 
tify that the records show that fee simple title to the lands lately occupied by the 
military camps at Fernandina, as indicated by maps hereto attached and made a 
part of this certificate (red lines of said map indicating water pipes of said camp), 
are vested in the several persons and corporations as follows: 
Fernandina Development Company, Florida Town Improvement Company, S. A. 
Swann, S. D. Swann, Fred. W. Haward, A. T. Williams, M. B. Self, W. H. Hendricks, 
Mrs. D. M. Hammond, W. C. Yulee, P. Edwards. 
That I further certify that the greater part of said lands, as indicated by green 
coloring on said map, reverted to the State of Florida, June, 1897, by reason of 
unpaid State and county taxes for the years 1895, 1896. 
I further certify that no one by the name of Alger ever owned or controlled any 
lands in said county of Nassau, and further that the lands occupied by the Third 
Pennsylvania Volunteer Regiment at Fernandina as camp was at the time property 
of the State of Florida, having reverted to the State for unpaid taxes previous to its 
occupation as such camp. 
Witness my hand and official seal this 18th day of October, 1898. 
George E. Wolff, 
Clerk Circuit Court, Nassau County, Fla. 110 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
CAMP AT MIAMI, FLA. 
In the early part of June, Miami was selected for a camp by the Major- 
General Commanding the Army, upon the recommendation of a board 
of officers consisting of Assistant Surgeon-General Greenleaf, Maj. G. 
H. Hopkins, and Maj. Walter Eeed, the first two of whom testified 
before us that they did not expect it to be used as a permanent camp, 
but only as a camp of isolation. On June 20 a division of the Fourth 
Corps under the command of General Seliwan was sent there, and on 
June 28 was designated as the First Division of the Seventh Corps. 
July 31 this camp was abandoned and the troops transferred to Jack- 
sonville, because it was found in all respects unsuitable. 
This place has been severely criticised, but the Commanding General 
of the Army said of it in a communication to the Secretary of War, 
dated June 14, “ It has been cleared for 5,000 troops, and additional 
ground will be cleared for any number. Its advantages are the cool 
ocean breezes, nearness to the Gulf Stream and Cuba, and perfect isola- 
tion from yellow fever, which is the principal objection to Savannah, 
Jacksonville, and Mobile,’7 and, u I think it of the highest importance 
that the troops be placed in the three healthful camps of instruction— 
Chickamauga, Fernandina, and Miami.” 
CAMP AT TAMPA, FLA 
The Seventh Army Corps, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee commanding, was 
organized May 16 at Tampa. This corps was removed to Jacksonville 
May 31, with the exception of the First Division, which remained at 
Tampa. On the same date, May 16, the Fifth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. 
William E. Shatter commanding, was organized, with headquarters at 
Tampa. On the 30th day of May this corps comprised 16,426 men. On 
June 7 it embarked on transports for Santiago de Cuba, leaving in the 
camp parts of several organizations, with a large number of horses 
and mules. The camp was established May 2, and was not intended 
for a permanent one, but merely as a rendezvous for troops pending 
shipment from Port Tampa. Port Tampa had good facilities in the 
way of extensive wharfage, which would accommodate from fifteen to 
twenty vessels at a time, enabling troops and supplies to be loaded 
with reasonable dispatch. 
This is more especially true of troops, as the narrowness of the 
wharves tended to confusion in handling stores, teams, and artillery. 
Most of the men were encamped in healthful locations, but some of 
them upon ground so low that when the rainy season commenced much 
discomfort was experienced. The water supply was ample and good, 
being obtained from the works of the Plant system, which was 
extended into the camps of the various organizations. The railroad 
transportation facilities were the Plant system and the Florida Central REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
and Peninsula Eailway. The excessive heat of the summer caused 
considerable discomfort to the troops and live stock, and the order for 
transfer to Montauk Point the first part of August was very welcome. 
The whole number of troops that went to Tampa during the existence 
of the camp was 20,470 volunteers and 27,002 regulars, a total of 48,072. 
There were present on J une 20,19,322 troops, and on J uly 20, 25,300. 
The number of deaths from disease and accident from May 2 to 
September 30 was 50. 
CAMPS MERRIAM AND MERRITT, SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. 
These camps were instituted for the mobilization of troops intended 
for the Philippine Islands. Camp Merriam was first located on the 
Presidio reservation, near the Lombard street entrance. About 10,000 
men were encamped there. The area of the camp was quite limited 
and the troops were somewhat crowded. The water supply was good. 
As soon as it was understood that the .force was to be increased Camp 
Merritt was established near the northern boundary of the Golden Gate 
Park and the troops from Camp Merriam moved to that place. Eighteen 
thousand men were encamped in Camp Merritt, occupying it only until 
the fleet upon which they embarked was assembled and fitted for their 
reception. There was considerable sickness, especially measles. Some 
typhoid fever appeared. Camp Merriam was commanded by Maj. Gen. 
Henry C. Merriam, and Camp Merritt by Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt. 
The camps at New Orleans and Mobile were only temporary. The 
Fourth Corps was organized at Mobile the 1st of June and immedi- 
ately commenced moving to Tampa. The whole number of troops at 
Mobile were 9,534, under command of Maj. Gen. John J. Coppinger. 
CAMP WIKOFF. 
Named in lionor of the colonel of the Twenty-second United States 
Infantry, killed at San Juan July 1, Camp Wikoff was at Montauk 
Point, 125 miles distant from New York, 45 from Newport, E. I., and 28 
from New London, Conn. 
The u Point ” is surrounded by water and has a good harbor on the 
Sound side which affords shelter from the Atlantic storms. It is a 
United States quarantine station, and has one good wharf, but the 
water is not of sufficient depth to allow heavy draft ocean steamers 
to lie alongside of it. 
The surface of the ground is rolling, nearly bare of trees; the soil of 
loam, clay, and gravel, with a solid turf and good covering of grass. 
The place is healthful and during the summer cool and comfortable. 
About 15,000 acres were available for camp purposes—ample space for 
50,000 men. 
The site had been favorably considered by a board of officers that had 
carefully examined it on the 3d of June preceding, which board, as 112 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
stated by a member, General Frank, was looking for a place “ where 
we can take the troops from the Santiago campaign, rest them, recuper- 
ate them, and cake them in the fall for the Havana campaign.” 
Provisional arrangements for the use of the land were made with the 
owners of the property through the president of the Long Island Rail- 
road, Mr. Baldwin, he insisting upon one thing as a prerequisite to any 
contract, that at least two weeks’ notice should be given before the 
ground was occupied by troops, so that the Montauk end of the railroad 
might be put in proper condition. 
The surrender of the Spanish forces at Santiago and the subsequent 
rapid increase of sickness in the regiments of the Fifth Corps led the 
War Department to consider the advisability of withdrawal of the 
corps from Cuba, the absolute and immediate necessity for which was 
recognized on receipt (August 4) of a telegram from Major-General 
Shafter, transmitting the following letters of commanding officers and 
chief surgeons: 
Maj. Gen. W. E. Shafter, 
Commanding United States forces in Cuba: 
We, the undersigned general officers commanding various brigades, divisions, etc., 
of the United States Army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that 
this army must be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point 
on the northern seacoast. of the United States; that this can be done without danger 
to the people of the United States; that there is no epidemic of yellow fever in the 
army at present—only a few sporadic cases; that the army is disabled by malarial 
fever to such an extent that its efficiency is destroyed and it is in a condition to be 
practically entirely destroyed by the epidemic of yellow fever sure to come in the 
near future. 
We know from reports from competent officers and from personal observations 
that the army is unable to move to the interior, and that there are no facilities for 
such move, if attempted, and will not bo until too late. Moreover, the best medi- 
cal authorities in the island say that with our present equipment we could not live 
in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever almost as 
bad as from yellow fever. This army must be moved at once or it will perish. As 
an army it can be safely moved now. Persons responsible for preventing such a 
move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our 
opinions are the result of careful personal observations and are also based upon the 
unanimous opinion of our medical officers who are with the army and understand 
the situation absolutely. 
(Signed) Jos. Wheeler, major-general volunteers; Samuel S. Sumner, command- 
ing Cavalry Brigade; William Ludlow, brigadier-general United 
States Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Second Division; 
Adelbert Ames, brigadier-general United States Volunteers, com- 
manding Third Brigade, First Division; Leonard Wood, brigadier- 
general United States Volunteers, commanding city of Santiago; 
Theodore Eoosevelt, colonel, commanding Second Cavalry Brigade; 
J. Ford Kent, major-general volunteers, commanding First Division, 
Fifth Corps ; J. C. Bates, major-general volunteers, commanding 
Provisional Division, Fifth Corps; H. W. Lawton, major-general 
volunteers, commanding Second Division, Fifth Corps; C. McKibbin, 
brigadier - general United States Volunteers, commanding Second 
Brigade, Second Division. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
113 
The Adjutant-General Fifth Army Corps. 
Sir : The chief surgeon of the Fifth Army Corps and the chief surgeons of divisions 
consider it to he their imperative duty, after mature deliberation, to express their 
unanimous opinion that this army is now in a very critical condition. They believe 
that the prevalent malarial fever will doubtless continue its ravages and that its 
mortality will soon increase; that there is imminent danger that the yellow fever, 
now sporadic and of a mild type, may any day assume a virulent type and become 
epidemic. They unanimously recommend that the only course to pursue to save the 
lives of thousands of our soldiers is to transport the whole army to the United States 
as quickly as possible. Such transport they consider practicable and reasonably 
free from danger. The proposed move to the plateau of San Luis they believe dan- 
gerous and impracticable. 
Very respectfully, V. Ha yard, 
Major and Surgeon, U. S. Army, Chief Surgeon. 
H. S. Kilbourne, 
Major and Surgeon, Chief Surgeon Second Division, Fifth Corps. 
M. W. Wood, 
Major and Chief Surgeon First Division, Fifth Corps. 
Frank J. Ives, 
Major and Surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, Chief Surgeon Provisional Division. 
H. S. T. Harris, 
Major and Surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, Chief Surgeon Cavalry Division. 
Montauk Point had already been decided upon as the site for the 
proposed camp, it being accessible by water, thus obviating the neces- 
sity of transshipment from transports to cars, and so isolated as that 
the communication of yellow fever to places outside the camp could 
almost certainly be prevented. 
On August 2 an agreement had been entered into by Colonel Gillis, 
U. S. A., representing the Government, and Mr. W. H. Baldwin, jr., 
representing the owners of the land, and on August 4 contracts were 
made by the Quartermaster’s Department for lumber, pumps, piping, 
tanks, etc., which were at once shipped to Montauk. On the 6th the 
sinking of a well was started; lumber began to arrive the same day, 
and the building of commissary and quartermaster’s storehouses was 
commenced. 
Maj. Gen. S. B. M. Young having arrived August 5, with orders to 
establish the camp, great activity was shown in preparing for the troops 
expected from Santiago. 
As rapidly as possible the railroad company put down about 4£ miles 
of side tracks capable of holding 380 cars, but for a while there was 
difficulty in so getting at these tracks as to permit of quick unloading. 
Work was pushed on the ordered five detention camps for 1,000 men 
each, with their hospital accommodations for 500, for through these 
camps had to x>ass all the men coming from Cuba. A general camp of 
new tents intended to shelter from 9,000 to 10,000 men was ready for occu- 
pancy before a transport came in. The general hospital was prepared 
for patients as fast as was permitted by the limited number of workmen 
and the delays in getting tents and lumber on the ground. 114 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
When the work of preparing the camp had hardly commenced, before 
a single tent was pitched on Montauk Point, on the 7tli of August 
troops began to come in from Tampa and other places in the Southern 
States, and within forty-eight hours there were, of these recruits and 
men left behind when the Fifth Corps sailed for Cuba, a force number- 
ing 4,293, and with it seven or eight thousand horses and mules. The 
first of these troops arrived without tents or equipment of any kind 
and with only travel rations, which General Young testified gave rise 
to “a great deal of scandal,” though there was no occasion therefor, as 
the men did not suffer, and within twenty-four hours the baggage trains 
came in. 
As Camp Wikoff' was to be a place of rest and recuperation for the 
sick army expected from Cuba, and at the same time a quarantine 
station for the protection of the country, it would certainly, for every 
reason, have been better if these thousands of men and animals had 
not been ordered to Montauk. Their arrival and presence increased 
the confusion and added to the burdens of all officials, military and 
railroad. 
It was about two weeks before the camp was in tolerable running- 
order, and during this time troops kept coming in, all in a “pitiable 
condition.” 
Major-General Wheeler, who had arrived on August 15, was on the 
18th placed in command, and remained so until the latter part of 
September. 
Under orders from the President and the Secretary of War to have 
the men at Montauk cared for “without considering expense,” General 
Wheeler, upon assuming command, ordered by telegraph a large quan- 
tity of supplies,* which were soon received and “ given to the soldiers 
in addition to their regular rations.” 
In addition to the food stuffs furnished by the Government and those 
purchased under orders from the general in command of the cam]), an 
immense quantity of necessaries and luxuries, of food and clothing, 
was distributed by representatives of various aid societies; and no 
small amounts were brought in by visitors, who in crowds daily came 
to the hospitals and regimental camps, doing much good, but adding 
largely to the prevailing confusion, and at times, by their indiscriminate 
generosity, increasing the ill health of many of those convalescing from 
fever, whose condition necessitated very careful attention to diet. 
* Two thousand, one hundred pounds of halibut, 47,900 (in round numbers 48,000) 
pounds of lima beans, about 400,000 pounds of ice, 21,000 pounds of evaporated 
apricots, 21,000 pounds of butter, 14,000 cans of green corn, 1,000 pounds of cocoa, 
4,000 pounds of crackers, 21,000 pounds of sugar-cured hams, 29,000 cans of evapo- 
rated cream, 23,000 pounds of oatmeal, 15,000 pounds of peaches, 18,000 poimds of 
evaporated peaches, 12,000 pounds of canned pears, 14,000 pounds of canned pease, 
10,000 pounds of prunes, 20,000 cans of soup, 5,000 cans of pickles, 300 boxes of 
oranges, 53,000 dozen eggs, 250 pounds of tea, 28,000 gallons of fresh milk. 115 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
Disinfection of men and clothing was duly effected at quarantine 
and in the detention camp. 
The water supply seems to have been ample and of good quality, and 
there has not been presented any satisfactory evidence that the wells 
were polluted with surface drainage. 
A large well 50 feet deep, with a capacity of 300,000 gallons per day, 
was early dug, and there were other wells from which perhaps 200,000 
gallons more could be drawn. About 12 miles of pipe were laid from 
these wells, and the water carried to each regiment, where there was 
one faucet or more from which it could be drawn. 
From one million and a half to two million feet of lumber were used 
in the camps for the construction of storehouses and other buildings, and 
for flooring the tents, which at the general hospital were all floored 
before being used, though those at the detention and general camps 
were not so for some time after the troops arrived. 
Transportation at the camp was insufficient, and as a consequence 
supplies were not delivered as promptly as was desirable, and the trans- 
fer of sick and convalescents from the vessels to the detention camp was 
at times slower and more trying than it should have been. Much com- 
plaint was made, and justly so, of delays in getting furloughed men 
away, but the train service of the railway was enormously taxed. It 
was much to the credit of the Long Island Railroad Company, that, 
notwithstanding the great crowd of passengers carried to and from 
Montauk during the existence of Camp Wikoff, not a life was lost and 
not a person injured. 
The sanitation of the camps and hospitals while far from perfect was 
perhaps as good as might reasonably have been expected. There 
should have been more general and free use of disinfectants in and 
about the sinks, the location and protection of which were according to 
rule. There was no epidemic of yellow or typhoid fever, though it was 
both feared and predicted that there would be. 
A camp bakery was established August 27, of sufficient capacity to 
furnish all the troops with good wholesome bread, and a laundry was 
early contracted for, but it was not ready for use for a number of weeks. 
A morgue for the reception and preparation of the dead was constructed, 
but proper care of the bodies was not always taken. The Y. M. C. A. 
had large tents in the different camps, in which religious services were 
held, and conveniences for writing, etc., were furnished. 
The total number of troops which arrived from Cuba was 17,577, with 
those from Tampa and other places, 21,870. The number in camp 
August 20 was 7,686; September 1,14,863; September 10,14,444; Sep- 
tember 30, 3,187. 
The number of deaths to September 30 was 257. 
The camp was practically abandoned early in November and the 
general hospital closed November 16. 
On the whole it may be said that Montauk Point was an ideal place 116 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
for the isolation of troops who had been exposed to or had yellow fever, 
and for the recuperation of those greatly debilitated by malarial attacks 
of marked severity. The time allotted for preparation was altogether 
too short, and as a consequence the camp was occupied long before it 
was ready. Because of this, and because of the great number of sick 
and convalescents and of those on the ground who were unconnected 
with the Army, there was much confusion, some lack of proper atten- 
tion to matters of sanitation and to the sick, and without doubt cases 
of distress, it may be neglect. But after all there was much exagger- 
ation in what was written and said about the conditions at Camp Wikoff, 
exaggeration at times intentional, generally the result of unfamiliarity 
with the life of the soldier and with the appearance of a large number 
of sick and broken-down men brought together in a limited space. 
CAMP SHIPP, ANNISTON, ALA. 
Camp Shipp was instituted September 3, and the remainder of the 
Third Corps was transferred from Camp Thomas to this place and 
placed under the command of Brig. Gen. Royal T. Frank. This camp 
was visited October 21-25, and the testimony of a large number of officers 
and men taken concerning their experience and observation during 
their term of service at the different camps where they had been sta- 
tioned. An inspection was made of the camp and troops, and they 
were found in excellent condition and comfortably located upon spa- 
cious and suitable grounds. The sinks were of the regulation depth 
and at a proper distance from the quarters of the men, and were duly 
inclosed and disinfected. 
The division and regimental hospitals were of sufficient capacity, 
and well equipped and conducted. Bathing houses for officers and men 
had been established and were in use. The command was supplied 
with pure and cool water from the city water system, which had been 
extended to every organization. This remnant of the Third Corps had 
been merged into the Second Division of the Fourth Corps, and was 
fully equipped and ready for service. The number of deaths to Sep- 
tember 30 was 12. 
CAMP WHEELER, HUNTSVILLE, ALA. 
This camp was visited October 26 aiul 27 and much testimony taken. 
It was instituted August 23, and was under the command of Brig. Gen. 
L. H. Carpenter. The troops encamped were the First Division, Fourth 
Corps, and the First Cavalry Brigade and Light Artillery Battalion of 
the same corps. The headquarters of the corps were at this place. 
The same conditions as to water, hospitals, sanitation and equipment, 
camping space, etc., existed here as at Camp Shipp. These troops came 
largely from Camp Wikoff and from Tampa, Fla. 
Number of deaths to September 30 was 35. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
117 
CAMP POLAND, KNOXVILLE, TENN. 
This camp was visited October 30 and 31, and the troops and grounds 
inspected. The same conditions as to supply of water, space for troops, 
hospitals, sanitation, etc., existed here as in the last two camps. The 
testimony of a number of officers and men was taken. This camp was 
instituted August 21 and was the headquarters of the Second Division 
of the First Corps, and was commanded by Col. J. A. Keurt of the 
Second Ohio. Number of deaths to September 30 was 23. 
These troops were transferred from Camp Thomas. 
CAMP HAMILTON, LEXINGTON, KY. 
This camp was instituted August 23, and was visited October 31 and 
November 1, and the camp and troops inspected and the testimony of 
many officers and men taken. It was the headquarters of the First 
Army Corps, Maj. Gen. J. H. Wilson commanding, the First Division 
of which was stationed there. As to situation, spaciousness, hospitals, 
water supply, sanitation, etc., it compared favorably with the other 
three camps heretofore described. The number of deaths to September 
30 was 29. 
These troops were transferred from Camp Thomas. 
CAMP MEADE (NEAR MIDDLETOWN), PA. 
This camp was instituted August 24, and soon thereafter was occu- 
pied by the Second Army Corps of about 22,000 men, under command 
of Maj. Gen. William M. Graham, which had been moved from Camp 
Alger. It was visited November 3 and 4, and found to be spacious and 
well laid out. The water supply was obtained from artesian wells, 
and was piped to every organization. It was both good and abundant. 
The hospitals were commodious, and well equipped and conducted. 
The bathing facilities for the men were ample. The sanitary and other 
conditions were of high order, and the camp as a whole was open to but 
little criticism. The testimony of a number of officers and men was 
taken, and the troops and camp inspected. In November this camp 
was discontinued and the troops—not mustered out—distributed to 
the various camps in the South. The number of deaths to October II 
was 64. 
The condition of these five camps illustrates the value of the expe- 
rience obtained in those in which the troops had formerly been. It 
shows conclusively that oidy time and experience, and both are essen- 
tial, are needed to teach officers and men the best methods for caring 
for themselves. 
In conclusion it may be said that it is impossible to bring together a 
regiment of 1,300 men whose lives and habits have all been different 
and place them in camp, subject them to its discipline, diet, and duties, 118 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
without much complaint. They must become acclimated and accus- 
tomed to camp life before sickness can be prevented; and until the 
individual soldier appreciates the necessity of complying fully with the 
regulations and confines himself to the regular food—and this the sol- 
dier never does until experience teaches him the necessity—he will 
driuk polluted water, eat noxious food that disturbs his digestive 
organs, and will not take care of himself, and no discipline or watching 
will prevent it. The imprudent acts of the soldiers are the first and 
greatest cause of sickness in camps. 
Another great cause of complaint was the inexperience of officers 
and surgeons as to proper sanitation, necessity of daily exercise, 
the camping too long in one place, lack of exercise by marches and 
other methods to take up the soldier’s thoughts. This occurs to 
all volunteers. It has been much less so in this war than in others, 
and there has been far less sickness and fewer deaths. The troops 
are now acclimated, their health is excellent, their discipline and 
camp sanitation showing that officers and men have all made won- 
derful progress because of experience. It would seem that little can 
be added to the camps as now organized to make them healthier. 
They are models of arrangement and cleanliness, and it is greatly to 
the credit of officers and men that they have made such progress in so 
short a time. No complaints come from them, and the Army as now 
constituted, except as to marksmanship, is almost as well prepared to 
enter campaigns as the Regular Army was at the beginning of the 
war. 
INDIVIDUAL CASES. 
A large number of complaints of neglect affecting individuals have 
been brought to the attention of the commission, respecting which evi- 
dence has been taken either by affidavit or personal examination. 
These cases are submitted in abstract (appended), together with the 
facts and conclusions arrived at by the commission. 
SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 
In accordance with the written request of the Major-General Com- 
manding the Army, Brig. Gen. (now Maj. Gen.) William R. Shatter was, 
on the 29th day of April, 1898, directed, upon his arrival at Tampa, Fla., 
to assume command of all troops there assembled. This assignment 
practically determined the command of the Fifth Corps and of the 
expedition to the southern part of Cuba, which resulted in driving 
Cervera’s fleet to its destruction by the navy and the final capture of 
the city of Santiago, with all of the Spanish forces in the province of 
Santiago de Cuba. 
The circumstance which determined the campaign was the reported 
presence of Cer sera’s fleet in the harbor of Santiago. At 2.30 a. in. REPOET OF THE COMMISSION. 
119 
May 31, 1898, instructions were sent to General Shatter, by telegraph, 
as follows: 
With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your com- 
mand on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of San- 
tiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your 
judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto the high 
grounds and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best enable 
you to capture or destroy the garrison there, and cover the Navy as it sends its men 
in small boats to remove torpedoes; or, with the aid of the Navy, capture or destroy 
the Spanish fleet noAV reported to be in Santiago harbor. 
The Major-General Commanding the Army immediately repaired to 
Tampa, and telegraphed the Secretary of War June 1, 2.35 p. m.: 
Everything is being pushed as rapidly as possible to embark troops at Tampa and 
Mobile, and a small number will be embarked at New Orleans on the Orizabo. Men 
are working day and night. 
On the 7th of June, at 7.30 p. m., by direction of the President, infor- 
mation received from Admiral Sampson was telegraphed General 
Shatter as follows: 
If 10,000 men were here the city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. 
Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be 
defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet. 
On the same day, in a telegram received at the Executive Mansion 
at 10.15 p. m., General Shatter wired: 
I expect to have 834 officers, 16,154 men. on transports by daylight, and will sail at 
that hour. 
Before sailing, however, he was directed to wait for further orders, 
which were subsequently communicated, based upon the reported pres- 
ence of a Spanish armed cruiser and torpedo-boat destroyer in St. 
Nicholas Channel. The alleged presence of these vessels delayed the 
departure of the expedition nearly a week, and it did not sail until 
June 13 and 14. 
The transports furnished General Shafter for his expedition were 
supposed to have a capacity sufficient for 25,000 men, with quarter- 
master, subsistence, ordnance, and medical stores and supplies for sev- 
eral months. It was found on a careful inspection of the transports, 
however, that their capacity had been greatly overrated, and that 
General Shafter would be unable to embark the force at his command 
without uncomfortably crowding. He realized the necessity for sailing 
with all the troops available, and assumed the risk of the elements 
rather than land upon a hostile foreign shore with insufficient force. 
The dilemma which presented itself was clearly defined, and he deliber- 
ately assumed the risk and at the same time the responsibility therefor. 
The risk was undoubtedly well taken. The crowding of the transports 
could in any event result only in discomfort to the men and animals on 
board, or, at the worst, in the loss of a comparatively few by close con- 
finement on crowded vessels. The effects of a failure of the campaign 120 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
by reason of ail insufficient force would have been disastrous, if not 
fatal. 
The Navy Department, on the 31st of May, 1898, sent the following 
communication to the honorable the Secretary of War: 
This Department begs leave to inquire what means are to be employed by the War 
Department lor landing the troops, artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other 
heavy objects when the pending military expedition arrives on the Cuban coast 
near Santiago. 
W7hile the Navy will be prepared to furnish all the assistance that may be in its 
power, it is obvious that the crews of the armored ships and of such others as will 
be called upon to remove the Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish fleet in action 
can not be spared for other purposes, and ought not to be fatigued by the work 
ncident to landing of the troops and stores, etc. 
This information, so far as can be ascertained, was never communi- 
cated to either General Miles or General Shatter; the expedition there- 
fore left Tampa with no facilities for landing other than were afforded 
by the boats of the several transports conveying the expedition, with 
the exception of several lighters and steam tugs of light draft, such 
as could be hastily secured. The Major-General Commanding the 
Army, who was present during the entire time in which the expedi- 
tion was being loaded, and the commander of the expedition, both 
relied upon the hearty cooperation of the Navy, which had been prom- 
ised them by its representative on the ground, with whom they were 
in communication. 
The means for landing an expedition of 17,000 men on a foreign and 
hostile shore in the face of an enemy whose presence was to be expected 
were undoubtedly insufficient. Here, again, the commander of the 
expedition assumed the risks. His orders were peremptory. The exi- 
gency of the movement admitted of no delay. He would not have been 
justified in postponing the departure of the expedition even if no means 
of disembarkation had been available except the boats of the trans- 
ports themselves. He assumed the risk of their sufficiency, and, as in 
the case of the crowding of the vessels, he was justified in assuming 
these risks, as the results show. War in the main is based upon risks 
assumed. If no army moved until everything was in perfect readiness 
for the movemeut and success was certain, few battles would be fought 
and fewer victories won. A commander who assumes risks not alto- 
gether unreasonable in themselves and succeeds is justified by his suc- 
cess, and is not to be held accountable for what might have been. 
The expedition reached a point off Santiago about noon of the 20th 
of June. A conference between General Shatter, Admiral Sampson, 
and General Garcia was held at “ General Rabi’s place,” at which the 
plan of campaign was outlined by General Shatter and approved by 
Admiral Sampson and General Garcia. A feint was to be made by 
3,000 or 4,000 men at some point west of Santiago, and the expedition to 
be landed at Daiquiri to march on Santiago; General Castillo was to 
have 1,000 men at Daiquiri to capture the escaping Spaniards while the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
121 
Navy bombarded: the Navy to bombard on the morning of the 22d 
Daiquiri, Aguadores, Siboney, and Cabanas as a feint, and the whole 
expedition to land at the place first named. In accordance with this 
plan the Navy bombarded the places mentioned on the morning of the 
22d, and the landing was made at Daiquiri. 
The expedition as it arrived off the southern coast of Cuba consisted 
of the Fifth Army Corps, composed of two divisions of infantry, com- 
manded by General Kent and General Lawton,respectively; a division 
of dismounted cavalry, commanded by General Wheeler; a battalion of 
light artillery, consisting of batteries E and K of the First and A and 
F of the Second United States Artillery, and a siege artillery train, 
consisting of batteries G and H of the Fourth United States Artillery. 
The entire corps disembarked on the 22d and 23d of June, practically 
unopposed by the enemy and in the same condition as to numbers as it 
had embarked at Tampa, less two men drowned during the landing. 
Later, about the 27th of June, a brigade of volunteer infantry, com- 
manded by General Duffield, consisting of the Thirty-third and Thirty- 
fourth Michigan and Ninth Massachusetts regiments, about 2,500 
strong, joined General Shatter’s command. 
The infantry division of General Lawton was first disembarked, fol- 
lowed by the cavalry division of General Wheeler. The Second Brigade 
of General Wheeler’s division, commanded by General Young, disem- 
barked on the evening of the 22d and on the morning of the 28d. 
During the afternoon of the 23d, in order to find good camping ground 
and water, a march of several miles was made, and finally Siboney, 
where General Wheeler had his headquarters, was reached. A slight 
skirmish had taken place on the evening of the 23d. The desirable 
camping ground in the neighborhood of Siboney was all occupied by 
other troops, and General Young requested permission of General 
Wheeler to move out in the morning and drive a force of Spaniards said 
to be in the neighborhood from elevated ground, which he regarded as 
desirable for camping purposes. Permission was given, and in this 
way the affair of Las Guasimas was brought on. It was widely heralded 
at the time as an ambuscade, and has been later characterized as a 
disobedience of orders. It was neither. As to the former charge, it 
was absolutely foundationless, and the latter rests upon no sufficient 
evidence. 
Although not part of the plan of campaign, and a mere incident in it, 
it was deliberately planned and authorized by General Wheeler, who 
undoubtedly had authority to do so. Notwithstanding the fact, as 
stated by himself, “I was especially and repeatedly enjoined not to 
make any forward movement which would bring on an engagement 
until the entire command reached the front,” he was undoubtedly sat- 
isfied, as the result showed that this was a detached outpost, and that 
no general engagement would be brought on by attacking it. 
A careful reconnoissance revealed the enemy in an intrenched posi- 
tion in line of battle on elevated ground. General Young’s brigade 122 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
consisted of nine troops of the First United States Cavalry, eight 
troops of the Tenth United States Cavalry, and the First United States 
Volunteer Cavalry. The latter, under command of Colonel (now Major- 
General) Wood, advanced by one road, accompanied by two staff offi- 
cers of General Young; the latter accompanied the other wing, com- 
posed of the First and Tenth United States Cavalry and three Hotchkiss 
guns by another road, the two wings being about equal in number. 
The plan of attack was discussed in advance and fully understood by 
Colonel Wood. A regular deployment was made of both wings, and 
the interval between the two was carefully guarded. The attack was 
opened by our own forces; there was no surprise, no ambuscade, no 
lack of definiteness as to plan, and no uncertainty as to purpose. 
The Spaniards, as already remarked, were on elevated ground, in an 
intrenched position in line of battle. General Young’s brigade had 
been carefully deployed, the position of the enemy was thoroughly 
understood, and the only uncertainty existing in the minds of the 
officers in command of the troops was as to whether or mot the troops 
occupying the intrenched position were Spaniards or Cubans. Gen- 
eral Wheeler says: 
We did not attack immediately. I was afraid. There was some doubt about their 
being Spaniards, and I examined their line with my glasses for about twenty-live 
minutes before giving orders to fire. I realized it would have been a terrible thing 
to lire into our own Cuban friends; but after half an hour I became satisfied they 
were Spaniards, and I directed a shot from a Hotchkiss gun, and the Spaniards 
replied, opening fire from a line nearly a mile long. I ordered the line to advance, 
and no soldiers could have gone forward more handsomely than our regulars did. 
They advanced and fired with wonderful accuracy. The firing was very different 
from what I had seen years before. Thirty-three years ago we fought at short range; 
but here we commenced at seven or eight hundred yards. We could see no smoke of 
the enemy, and we could see the fire of our men was having its effect upon the enemy. 
The Spaniards fired in volley; but when our men reached the foot of the hill upon 
which the Spaniards were stationed, they retreated toward Santiago. 
The result of this affair was a loss of 10 killed—8 in the volunteer 
regiment and an equal number among the regular troops—and 52 
wounded. As a part of the campaign for the reduction of Santiago 
this skirmish was unimportant, but its incidental results were both 
important and, on the whole, beneficial. The volunteers were tried 
and were not found wanting; the enemy had been driven from an 
intrenched position with comparatively little loss; our own soldiers 
were elated and those of the enemy correspondingly depressed; and 
the moral effect was good. General Young secured the camping 
ground which he desired for his troops, who encamped at the point 
reached by them after an exciting chase of the Spaniards for several 
miles. 
The objective points of the campaign were the city of Santiago, the 
troops garrisoning the same, and Cervera’s fleet assembled in its harbor 
In order to gain the desired results the complete investment of the city 
was necessary, and was the prime object to be attained. In order to REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
123 
accomplish this it was considered necessary to reduce a small outlying 
fortified post at El Caney, 5 miles to the northeast of the city, which 
might have been flanked, but was an element of danger in the rear of 
the army. 
The time intervening between the 24th and the 30th of June was 
occupied in landing supplies and in ascertaining the position of the 
enemy. On the 30th of June, General Shatter testifies, “we were 
against their pickets in front of Santiago.” In the absence of topo- 
graphical maps, careful observations as to roads and practicable trails 
and routes of march were made by engineers and other young intelli- 
gent officers, and reconnoissances made to ascertain the position and 
strength of the enemy and the practicability of the reduction of El 
Caney. As a result ot the examination of the latter, General Lawton 
and General Chaffee reported that they could capture it before 9 o’clock 
in the morning. General Shatter, therefore, wisely planned a movement 
which, while if carried out, would place his troops in a favorable posi- 
tion around the city of Santiago, would at the same time reduce El 
Caney and eliminate that as a factor in the problem to be solved. The 
plan involved the”division of the army into two distinct wings. To 
General Lawton was assigned the duty of reducing El Caney, and after 
its reduction joining the other two divisions of the corps to which had 
been assigned the duty of securing a position which would command 
the fortified lines of the enemy surrounding the city. 
General Shatter had his headquarters at a point from which he could 
conveniently communicate with both wings of his army. He was in 
close touch with them by telegraphic and telephonic communication. 
During the battle which followed he was able to witness the movements 
of both wings from an elevated position which commanded the entire 
field of operations. To guard against any possible interruption of 
electrical communication, Colonel Miley, as chief of staff, who was thor- 
oughly conversant with his plans, was sent to the left wing of the army, 
operating under Generals Wheeler and Kent, with a number of order- 
lies to be used in case of an emergency for carrying dispatches. Rely- 
ing upon the ability of Lawton to reduce El Caney by 9 o’clock in the 
morning as he expected, Wheeler’s and Kent’s divisions were directed 
to advance across the San Juan River and capture the San Juan hill at 
10 o’clock, the presumption being that Lawton by that time would 
join the right of Wheeler's division and would be able to move with the 
balance of the corps in its advance upon the enemy. 
The plan of battle was followed by both wings of the army. General 
Lawton was occupied, however, until after 3 o’clock in capturing 
El Caney, and in moving to his assigned position in the line in front of 
Santiago encountered a force the strength of which he was unable to 
ascertain. In the meantime Generals Kent and Wheeler had advanced 
their positions, had carried the intrenchraents occupied by the enemy 
upon San Juan hill, and were in plain sight of the city. Lawton was 124 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
directed by General Shatter, instead of moving directly forward, to 
return during the night by the road upon which he had advanced the 
day previous, and by moving in the rear of the divisions already in 
position to take his assigned place on the right of General Wheeler’s 
division the next morning. This was successfully accomplished by the 
morning of the 2d of July, and by noon of that day “the last musketry 
firing was over.” The plan of campaign had been successfully carried 
out, and the city of Santiago was practically invested. 
While these movements were taking place on the east and northeast 
of Santiago General Garcia with a force of about 5,000 men was oper- 
ating on the northwest of the city with a view of intercepting any 
reenforcements which might attempt to find their way into the city 
from the north, considerable bodies of Spanish troops being known to 
be at Holguin, Guantanamo, and other points. Although not entirely 
successful in his efforts to prevent the arrival of reenforcements, his 
force served to distract the enemy and aid in the complete investment 
of the city. 
Following the movements of th*e army on the 1st and 2d of July, 
which resulted in the establishment of a continuous fortified line around 
the city, Admiral Oervera on the morning of the 3d of July, and as a 
result of the operations of the army, withdrew his entire fleet from the 
harbor of Santiago and met the crushing blow at the hands of our 
Navy which sealed the fate of every vessel composing his fleet. 
By the 4th or otli of July the city of Santiago was well surrounded 
and the avenues of escape by the Spanish army practically closed. 
From this time forward until the day of final surrender, on the 17th of 
July, the contest was one rather of diplomacy than of arms. On the 
3d of July a demand for the surrender of the city was made and refused, 
and on the same day, at the request of the consular officers of foreign 
governments in the city, information was given to the Spanish com- 
mander that the bombardment of the city would be suspended until the 
5th. The truce thus established was continued from time to time until 
the negotiations for surrender had resulted in the complete capitulation 
of the city and of all the Spanish forces within the province of Santiago 
de Cuba, numbering between 23,000 and 24,000. 
The result of the campaign was the complete realization of the 
several objects contemplated: The capture of the city with its forti- 
fications and munitions of war, together with immense supplies ot 
food stuffs and ammunition (the former estimated by General Wood at 
1,200,000 rations); the surrender of the entire province of Santiago de 
Cuba, with all the troops garrisoning the same (amounting, as already 
stated, to between 23,000 and 24,000); the destruction by the Navy of 
Admiral Cervera’s fleet after its departure from the harbor, and the 
general demoralization of the Spanish forces and the discomfiture of 
the Spanish Government and people, leading almost immediately to 
overtures for peace by Spain. All this was accomplished without the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
125 
loss of a prisoner, a gun, or a color, and with a list of casualties 
aggregating in killed less than 250 and in wounded less than 1,400— 
losses which, in comparison with results, are less than have ever here- 
tofore occurred in modern warfaie. 
The cooperation of officers and men in this campaign is to be noted. 
The commander of the expedition was as hearty and cordial in his com- 
mendation of all who were under his command as they were in their 
devotion to the service which was demanded of them; and, as was said 
by him in his testimony— 
From the day that the Fifth Army Corps was organized until its disbandment 
there was never an unkind word between the general officers, not an officer was 
brought to trial, and, so far as I know, not a soldier was tried. 
THE CAMPAIGN IN PORTO RICO. 
During the time when the expedition intended for operations in Cuba 
was being fitted out at Tampa a second expedition was in contempla- 
tion, and, in a preliminary way, in preparation. It was intended for 
the assistance of the forces operating against Santiago in case rein- 
forcement was needed, and for the capture of the island of Porto Rico 
in case such help was unnecessary or after the help was rendered. It 
was part of the plan also that the force under General Shafter should, 
after the accomplishment of its work at Santiago, reinforce or supple- 
ment this expedition. It was under the immediate command of the 
Major-General Commanding the Army, Gen. Nelson A. Miles, and con- 
sisted for the most part of volunteer troops, with artillery and cavalry 
from the Regular Army, drawn from the camp at Chickamauga and 
other points. Some of the troops composing the expedition were landed 
at Santiago before its surrender, and assisted in maintaining the lines 
around the city. Although subjected to very little fighting, the moral 
effect of their presence was wholesome and stimulating. 
After the fall of Santiago yellow fever became epidemic among the 
troops operating there, and it was therefore considered undesirable to 
use any of the forces which originally composed the expedition com- 
manded by General Shatter or those which had landed at Santiago to 
assist in its reduction. In consequence of this determination, wisely 
reached, General Miles left Santiago on the 21st of July with about 
3,400 men who had not disembarked. 
The original plan of campaign involved a landing at the northeast 
corner of the island, near a place called Point Fajardo, and a move- 
ment thence toward San Jnan. Two considerations induced General 
Miles to abandon the intention of landing at Point Fajardo, and to 
land instead at the harbor of Guanica, on the southern coast of the 
island. The first consideration was the fact that the intention to land 
at Point Fajardo had in some way been made public, and was antici- 
pated by the Spaniards ; and the second, that the intended point of 
disembarkation was an open roadstead, and that he had inadequate 126 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
facilities for the purpose of landing there. The harbor of Guanica was 
protected, and had deep water so near the shore that by the construc- 
tion of a pontoon bridge from one of the transports men and animals 
were easily and quickly disembarked. 
From that point, after the disembarkation, the troops commenced a 
movement east and north, although the expeditionary force at that 
time numbered less than 3,300 officers and men fit for duty, and the 
island was supposed to contain in all about 17,000 Spanish troops. 
Within three days after the first lauding, Major-General Wilson, com- 
manding a portion of the First Corps, arrived and disembarked at 
Ponce, to the east of Guanica. Major-General Brooke arrived later 
with other troops of the First Corps and disembarked farther east, at 
Arroyo, and thence moved to Guayama. The arrival of these reen- 
forcements made the aggregate of the forces available for the expedi- 
tion approximately 10,000 men, which were later further reenforced by 
additions making the entire force, officers and men, on the date of the 
cessation of hostilities, 14,365. 
In moving from Guanica toward Ponce General Garrettson had a 
skirmish with the Spanish troops near that place and an engagement 
near Yauco, moving thence with General Henry’s command to Ponce. 
General Wilson having in the meantime disembarked at the latter 
place, the force was regarded as sufficient for active operations. 
Ponce is the principal city on the southern side of the island, and is 
connected by a good military road with San Juan, the island’s capital, 
on the northern side. The Spaniards, supposing that General Miles 
would move his forces by this road, intrenched themselves at Coama 
and Aibonito. General Wilson, instead of moving directly upon Coama, 
flanked the position and coming in upon its rear captured the garrison. 
In the meantime, General Brooke moved to the east and north by a cir- 
cuitous route, in order to turn the position of the Spaniards at Aibonito 
and reach their rear. General Schwan was sent to clear the western 
portion of the island of Spanish troops. He had a sharp engagement 
at Hormigueros and captured the town of Mayaguez, which contained 
a population of about 20,000. He then moved with his command north 
and east and had another engagement at Las Marias, and was in pur- 
suit of the Spaniards, who were in retreat, when stopped by orders 
suspending hostilities. 
The general plan of campaign was to avoid a direct attack upon Aibo- 
nito, which was a supposedly strong position in the mountains; and to 
move General Schwan around the mountains westward to the north of 
the island. While he was making this movement, a trail over the 
mountains between Ajuntas and IJchuado was discovered by Gen. Roy 
Stone, who repaired the road and made it available for the march of 
troops. Garrettson’s brigade was moved over this trail, reaching the 127 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
northern side of the mountain before the Spaniards were aware of it, 
they having neglected to either fortify or guard the pass. 
It was intended that this force should form a junction at Arecibo with 
General Schwan’s brigade, forming a division which, under General 
Henry, was expected to move from Arecibo, which was to serve as a 
base, using the line of railroad running thence to San Juan for the 
transportation of stores. General Wilson threatening the Spanish 
troops in their front at Aibonito, arranged to move a brigade through 
the mountains so as to attack them in the rear. General Brooke also 
was expected to move to Gayey, which would block the line of retreat 
from Aibonito to San Juan. These dispositions, successfully made, 
completely flanked the position of the Spaniards at Aibonito, and must 
necessarily have resulted in its evacuation as soon as the movements of 
the forces under General Miles were discovered. Completely outma- 
neuvered, the Spaniards would have been compelled to abandon Aibo- 
nito. If the contemplated movements of our troops had been carried 
out their retreat to San Juan would have been cut off. At this 
juncture of affairs, however, notice of the signing of the protocol, 
and the consequent cessation of hostilities, was received, and hostile 
operations were suspended. Four days more would have concentrated 
General Miles’s forces at or near San Juan, prepared for the investment 
of that place. 
The suspension of hostilities occurred on the 13th of August, about 
twenty days after the advance guard of General Miles’s expedition 
landed upon the island. In the different movements in this campaign 
about 6,000 of our troops were under fire. There were six different 
actions of greater or less severity, in all of which our forces were 
successful. 
The total casualties of the campaign were 3 enlisted men killed and 
4 officers and 36 enlisted men wounded. 
THE EXPEDITION TO MANILA. 
The forces intended for operations in the Philippine Islands left San 
Francisco, at various times during the months of May, June, and July, 
and when assembled around the city of Manila aggregated about 15,000, 
13,000 of whom were volunteers and the remainder troops from the 
Regular Army. Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt was in command of these 
troops. Having landed at Cavite, on the island of Luzon, July 25, 
1898, he found the city already invested by the troops of the United 
States and the insurgent forces under General Aguinaldo. The insur- 
gents occupied a line of intrenchments on the land side of the city, 
our troops, under General Greene, occupying another line in their rear. 
After carefully reconnoitering the position General Merritt concluded 
that the attack must necessarily be made from the water side of the 
city. Preparations were made for this attack about the first week in 
August. The Spanish forces consisted of from 10,000 to 15,000 troops. 128 
INVESTIGATION OF CONDUCT OF WAR WITH SPAIN. 
Negotiations for a surrender proved fruitless, and on the 13th of August 
an attack in force was made. 
Waiting for low tide, the troops were deployed along the beach, and 
after a spirited engagement lasting for about two hours charged and 
captured the enemy’s intrenchments and speedily reduced the city. 
The troops behaved with great gallantry and accomplished the result 
aimed at with comparatively little loss, the casualties aggregating 17 
killed and 9 officers and 96 enlisted men wounded. 
In this as in all the other campaigns of the war with Spain the Army 
had the active and efficient cooperation of the Navy. 
The military expedition to Manila was made necessary by the destruc- 
tion of the Spanish fleet and the capture of the harbor of Manila by 
Admiral Dewey in the early part of the war; and in all military oper- 
ations around the city General Merritt and Admiral Dewey cooperated 
in the most hearty and cordial manner. In the engagement which 
resulted in the capture of Manila, the navy bombarded the city, some 
of its light-draft vessels going close to shore and shelling the intrench- 
ments, preparatory to the charge made by the troops. The cordial rela- 
tions which existed between the Army and the Navy in their joint 
operations against Manila are specially to be commended. Not only 
during active hostilities, but in the furnishing of supplies and in other 
ways, these arms of the service, owing allegiance to the same flag, 
cooperated in a way which is most gratifying to record. 
The several campaigns herein very briefly and imperfectly sketched 
reflect great credit upon the soldierly qualities of the officers and men 
of the several commands engaged in them. They were conducted 
under new and trying conditions; they were carried on for the welfare 
and uplifting of peoples foreign to our blood, but bound to us by the ties 
of a common humanity; they brought honor to out' flag, and in their 
remarkable results are the wonder of the world. 
It is with profound regret that the commission reports that during 
its later sessions Col. James A. Sexton was prevented by sickness from 
being present, and on the 4th day of February our loved colleague 
closed an honored and active life. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. 
129 
In concluding its labors it is with much pleasure that the commission 
reports that notwithstanding the haste with which the nation entered 
upon the war with Spain, the resulting and almost inevitable confusion 
in bureau and camp, the many difficulties of arming, assembling, and 
transporting large bodies of hitherto untrained men, the carrying on of 
active operations in two hemispheres, the people of the United States 
should ever be proud of its soldiers, who, cooperating with its sailors, 
in less than three months put an end to Spanish colonial power, enfran- 
chised oppressed people, and taught the world at large the strength 
and the nobility of a great Republic. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Grenville M. Dodge. 
Charles Denby. 
A. McD. McCook. 
John M. Wilson. 
James A. Beaver. 
Urban A. Woodbury. 
Phineas S. Conner. 
Evan P. Howell.