MEMORIAL
                   7
WILLIAM   HUME, M. D.
TO THE
HONORABLE THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN
OF THE
CITY OF CHARLESTON.
PUBLISHED BT ORDER OF COUNCIL.
        CHARLESTON:

STEAM POWER PRESS OF WALKER, EVANS <fe CO.,

         No. 3 Broad Street.
1858. 
 
MEMORIAL.
 To the Honorable the Mayor
              and Aldermen, of Charleston—
    The memorial of Wm. Hume respectfully sheweth :
    That  the continuous study of the phenomena  of  Yellow
 Fever, as it appears in the Harbour and  City of Charleston,
 will finally lead to the adoption of such rules and regulations
 as are calculated to relieve the inhabitants from the danger of
 its  introduction, while,  at the same time, they  impose no
 unnecessary or unreasonable restraint  upon merchants  en-
 gaged in the West India trade, now known to be detrimental,
 if not fatal, to  all other commerce.   It  is an established
 principle that the  minority must yield to the majority—that
 the lesser  West India  commerce must yield to the  greater
 commerce of the rest of the world; but the  privileges of the
 minority need not be totally  destroyed, but simply regulated
 with respect to time and mode of conduction.  The acts of the
 General Assembly have given all  power to the City Authori-
 ties, to make and execute such  rules and regulations as shall
 protect the State from the introduction  of dangerous diseases,
 and to accomplish  the desired  and delegated trust, complete
 and accurate knowledge should be obtained, and rigid and
 comprehensive plans adopted to  suit every emergency.  It
 does seem strange, that  after one hundred years of observation
 and disputation, physicians  should not be unanimous  with
 respect to the origin of  this disease in our city.   It is certain
 that the  facts  have never varied ; but the logicians  have
 arrived  at  two  opposite and  antagonistic  conclusions, by
 different systems of reasoning, or they have  misinterpreted
the facts.  The great error has been, that as the disease has 
4
been  studied  as. and when it existed in infected cities, the
conclusion must  naturally  he that it  is of domestic origin.
On this point there cannot be a question—every fact and case
tends to prove the same conclusion.   Every individual in the
infected city is liable to the disease, as he is similarly surround-
ed  with the same  infected atmosphere.   This conclusion is
equally true of an infected house on the land, or an infected
ship on the  ocean.  Every visitor to either is as liable to  the
disease  as if he was  in  the infected  city.  Observations of
this kind, induced Deveze and Rush to assign a local origin to
the disease,  while prevailing in Philadelphia, as early as 1793.
They identified it with  the  common, local  fevers  of  the
country, and concluded that the two diseases were similar, in
all  respects, and  differed only in degree  of intensity.  This
doctrine was  introduced into  South  Carolina by  Doctor
Ramsay, in 1801, and has continued to  prevail, more or less,
ever since.  The identity of the two diseases being established
by  the facts and reasoning  of these leading physicians, the
next step was to establish the identity of origin, which was
easily done.  The indigenous fevers were well known  to pro-
ceed from the soil and vegetation of  the country, and the
Yellow Fever being identical,  must have a similar origin from
the soil and filth  of the city, and so  it  was decreed  and
published, and so has Charleston  suffered  for sixty  years, as
the fruit of her credulity to false  doctrines.  Another unfor-
tunate error of Drs. Deveze and  Rush, was the conclusion,
from  their observations  and  reasoning, that  as the Yellow
Fever had  a  local origin in  cities, it  was not necessary to
assign it a contagious  property; in other words, they deprived
it of the property of self-propagation.  They taught that all
new  cases  in cities were produced  from local,  and  not
personal  causes.   Hence  all  sanitary regulations   were to
to   be directed to places, and not to persons.  Such has been 
5
the practice of our city for the last fifty years, and the amount
of success  is  well known to all.  The greater prevalence of
the disease in  low, moist and filthy  localities, has  seemed to
confirm the truth of the local origin,  and  has been the means
of fixing conviction in  the  minds of many.  In fact  every
observation made in an infected city seems  to confirm the
theory of local origin, in the same manner  as  the continuous
burning of an anthrocite coal fire would  convey to the  mind
of an ignorant person, that the adaptation of the coal and the
grate to each other was not only the cause of combustion, but
also the cause  of ignition.  Deveze and Rush observed the
fire burning in 1793, they saw it extinguished on the advent
of cold weather; they saw it again burning in 1795, but they
did not notice nor inquire into the manner of ignition.  They
were satisfied,  like any  gentleman  who   comes  down  to
breakfast to  find  his fire burning without inquiring of his
servant how he had kindled  it.   That combustibles will burn
after ignition, everybody knows, but the  mode of ignition is
sometimes  involved  in  obscurity.  The  mode of ignition in
the case of Yellow Fever has also been involved in obscurity,
one,  the  Rush party,  maintaining spontaneous  ignition—
the other assuming that some of the same fever must be first
applied to  effect ignition,  and then extension follows.  Now,
it is evident,  if we can show that the application of the disease
to a city will produce the disease in  the city, and the non ap-
plication  will  preserve  continued  health,  we will  have
advanced a  step beyond Deveze and Rush,  and  developed
some of the secrets of the disease, which they  omitted  to  in-
vestigate, and which are destined to lead  to important practi-
cal results in  the exclusion of the disease from our commercial
cities.   The ignition of a house  in a city is considered to  be
a serious affair, requiring legal  investigation and subsequent
hanging of the incendiary; but the ignition of Yellow Fever 
6
is erroneously assumed to be a spontaneous event, requiring no
further investigation—an incident to commerce—a  destiny of
maritime cities, and a natural consequence of an accumulated
population in a limited, naturally unhealthy space.  I cannot
see it in this light.  They are both  natural phenomena, pro-
duced by the agency of man, injurious to society, and capable
of prevention  by the agency of the law, when wisely and
judiciously applied.  It is to add to the wisdom and judicious-
ness of the present Quarantine law,  that the present memorial
is presented.   It  is to investigate its action during the past
summer, and  develop  its advantages and correct its defects.
It is not  to be presumed that a perfect law can be contrived
and executed  in  the face of dispute, and  opposition of inter-
ested parties.  Important points must be yielded for a time at
least, while unnecessary restrictions may have been introduced
and now found to be useless.  Experience and time is neces-
sary to the perfection of  law, as well as other  things, and the
experience of  the past summer has shown that our lawT is loose
in-some  details,  and  unnecessarily  stringent in others.  The
correction  of  these discovered errors is  equally  due to the
citizens and  the  merchants interested in the particular trade
that the Quarantine  is  designed to regulate.   It  is not  mv
design to give a  history of  the Quarantine transactions of the
past summer, but only to point out the facts which have  led
me to recommend certain amendments in the present law.
  The first defect is the clause which regulates the time of de-
tention at  Quarantine to  "at least  thirty days after arrival "
and "at  least twenty  days after the  cargo  shall have been
discharged."   An active  merchant can discharge the cargo in
ten days, and claim admission to the city in thirty days after
arrival.   Suppose this had been done in the case of the Ciscar,
which arrived in  our  harbor on the 8th of July,  with three
cases of fever  on  board ?   She would have been admitted to 
7
the wharf on the 8th of August,  at the very best period to
expand her infection and inflame the city.  Had this been
done, the date of Yellow Fever this  season would  have been
the loth of August, with its gradual increase through Septem-
ber as usual;  but as it was not done, we were exempt from the
disease at that time.   That the Ciscar was an infected vessel,
no one can doubt, and that she was capable of doing mischief
had she been allowed  to come to the city, is founded on the
observations of similar vessels in previous years.
   The next and most palpable danger to the city, was  the
Koophandel,  which arrived on the 27th June, in 49 days from
Rio, loaded with  4,000 bags of Coffee.  Had the consignee
been active in the discharge of the cargo, and the laws execu-
ted according to its letter, she  would have been admitted to
the wharf on the first day of  August—and, allowing seven
days for diffusion of the poison, Charleston  would  have been
infected on the 7th, the customary period, with all the conse-
quences usually observed on such occasions of early introduc-
tion.   Happily, the Mayor and Council refused all concession
in her  favor, and she was not  permitted to come to the wharf.
Arriving  from  an infected   port,  she  was presumed to be
infected, although there was no  disease on board—a presump-
tion  which was  fully borne out  by subsequent facts,  and
showed the wisdom of the law  in  putting on an equality of
danger all vessels  coming from infected ports,  irrespective of
the length of  passage.  That  the Koophandel was an infected
vessel, is  proved by the  consequences of her union with  the
Johannes, which arrived from Embden, Hanover, and of course
was free from Yellow Fever, but was infected with Typhus, or
Ship Fever.  They came together on the  11th of August for
the purpose  of transfering the ballast of the Johannes  into
the Koophandel, which was done by the united crews, and they
separated on  the 17th: on the  27th a man and boy of  the 
8
Johannes were sent to the Marine Hospital, where the disease
was discovered to be Yellow  Fever, and they were remanded
to the  ship, and died.   At this time both vessels had left the
Quarantine station, and were in  Ashley  River,  loading with
lumber.  Additional proof of the infection of the Koophandel,
and consequently of the Johannes, may  be drawn from the
following extract of a letter from Havre, dated JSTov. 2d, 1857:
"We have to report the arrival  of the Caractacus on the 30th
ultimo, with the loss of her captain, and one or two  of her
crew by Yellow Fever." The Caractacus was in Ashley river
with the infected vessels, and the  captains of the Koophandel
and Caractacus were intimate—stayed at  the same boarding
house, (Mrs. Dibble's, King street, No. 249,) and daily visited
each other in their respective ships.  The C. left Charleston
on the 16th September.   There was no other suspected vessel
in Ashley River, and there is no proof that the river itself»is
capable of converting the malarial fevers of its western bank
into Yellow Fever.   Hence the conviction of the Koophandel
as the source of the subsequent development of the especial
fevers  on  board the Johannes and  Caractacus,  is neither
unwarrantable nor unprecedented.  Abundant authority is on
hand to prove similar occurrences at other and previous times,
not only in cases  of direct  inter-communication, but  where
approximation  alone was the  means of  extension.   It  is
possible that Capt. Griggs  may have taken his  disease from
the adjacent infected Johannes,  but  it  is certain  that the
sailors of the Johannes took their disease from the Koophandel.
In  computing  the duration of  infection on board of the
Koophandel, we find it to be  94 days from her departure from
Rio  to her union with the  Johannes, 104 to her separation,
and 114 to the development of  the disease in the crew of the
attached vessel.   If  a vessel  can retain infection for 94 days,
and still be capable of infecting another, of what value is a 
                            9
detention  of  ' not less than thirty days " at  Quarantine ?   It
is  an inconvenience to commerce, without protection to the
city—for it is apparent that had the Koophandel hauled into one
of the docks on the 17th August—104 days after leaving Rio,
she was capable of infecting any adjacent vessel, or any unac-
climated subject who should go on board ; for what so readily
took place in the open harbour, was more likely to occur  in
the  less  ventilated  dock, and the  enemies of  Quarantine
would have rejoiced  in another case  of spontaneous ignition
of the fever, attributable to the filthy dock, unconnected with
foreign introduction, and exhibiting  the perfect  fallacy and
folly of all Quarantine regulations.  A fallacy is not necessa-
rily a folly, but it would be a folly hereafter to limit a Quar-
antine to  30 days, when we now know that the infection will
remain in a vessel for more than 94 days, and possibly as long as
she  remains in a Tropical climate, or a mean temperature of
80° or 75°.   The continuity, or permanency of Yellow Fever
in the Havana may be attributed to this peculiarity of the
disease.   It regularly diminishes its ravages during the winter
months, when  the thermometer descends to  60°, but revives
again during the summer, when the thermometer indicates a
temperature above 80°.  In our latitude it is totally destroyed
by the degree of  cold that prevails in winter, and cannot  be
revived by the returning summer, but may readily be  intro-
duced from abroad  when the tropical season returns.  We
have the grate,  the coal,  and the  lightwood  ready  every
summer;  and to avoid ignition,we  must extinguish the lighted
match at  Morris  Island.   Conflagrations never  occur without
previous  ignition, and he who studies conflagrations, without
reference to previous ignition, may learn how to diminish their
ravages, but will never know how to  prevent their occurrence.
It is the privilege of our age to study the introduction, or
origin of Yellow Fever, beyond the zone of its perpetual pre- 
10
 valence, and to show that the principles seemingly established
by  observation during its prevalence, are not competent to
account for its origin.  We  are not disposed to question  the.
received opinion, that a long voyage in a crowded ship, bad or
deficient food, filth,  and other circumstances connected with
emigrant vessels, should produce Typhus Fever on  board.
Such was probably the case with the Johannes.  The emigrants
were landed at Morris Island—the ship was purified, and the
captain and crew remained well  until the  19th  of August,
when the captain and two of the crew took Typhus  Fever, of
which the captain died on the 24th, and the sailors recovered.
Up  to this period, the Typhus infection  predominated; and on
the  27th it became converted into  the Yellow Fever infection,
as appears from the cases seen in the Marine Hospital.  Now,
was this conversion of one disease into  another, the result  of
the  action  of local  causes on board of the vessel, under the
influence of our climate, or  was it the direct transfer  of the
Yellow Fever infection from the Koophandel, and the  subju-
gation  of  the Typhus infection on board of the Johannes?
The contest for supremacy  may  have  taken  place  with  the
captain and  the two sailors, who sickened two  days after the
separation with symptoms of Typhus, while the announcement
of the victory was manifest in those who sickened on the 27th.
It has been said " that Yellow Fever lends its livery to other
diseases."   It may also be true " that Yellow Fever  borrows
the  livery of other  diseases;"  f.nd Captain Cooper, of  the
Johannes, may have died of Yellow Fever, under the borrowed
and predominant livery of Typhus.   Be  this as it may, it  is
evident that there was no local cause in  the Johannes, or  its
vicinity, adequate to produce this  conversion of one fever into
another save and except the presence of the infected Koophandel.
  The liability of vessels to infect each other at Quarantine, and
then to infect the city,  after liberation and  arrival at  the 
11
wharf, is a matter worthy of consideration, and by no means
impossible and unfrequent.   The rigor of the last summer's
action, under the Quarantine laws prevented such a calamity.
The St. Juan arrived from Porto Rico on the 12th July, then
healthy and  with  all  well  on board.   She  was detained at
Quarantine  until the 27th of August, when she was allowed
to come up into Cooper River, and remain  at the mouth of
Hog Island Channel, opposite the city.  On the 12th August,
her period of regular Quarantine terminated.   Inter-commu-
nication between the vessels  was no longer prohibited.   She
lay  in the  immediate  vicinity of the Ciscar,  with boats
unlocked, and every facility for communication.  To what
extent the privilege was used is unknown ; but on the 3d of
September a death by Yellow Fever occurred on board of the
St. Juan, and another  on the 7th,  while she lay opposite the
city, and at  the mouth of Hog Island Channel.   What effect
these cases would have  produced in  the city, had the vessel
been previously permitted to come  to  the wharf it is impos-
sible to say; but no injurious effect  was  produced  by her
absence—and we have reason to  believe that this was the third
time that the city was saved from infection, by prohibiting the
vessels from coming up to the city after the thirty days deten-
tion at Quarantine had expired.  It is satisfactory to know that
notwithstanding the clamor of some merchants against the rigid
and uncompromising execution of the Quarantine laws, the city
 was saved from pestilence on three separate occasions, and finally
received the infection  by indirect means, and  in a  manner
fully demonstrating the fundamental error of the law which
 liberates vessels after a detention of thirty days.  It will  else-
 where be shown that the St.  Juan at the mouth of Hog Island
Channel  infected the  Village  of Mount Pleasant;  and the
introduction of the  sick from this  village  into the city,  gave 
12
rise to a few cases which, fortunately, occurred so late in  the
summer that propagation was not general.
  If this thirty day Quarantine is now seen to be so disastrous,
it may be  asked why it was enacted ?  In reply, we answer
that it was  the longest period that could be obtained at a time
when the whole law was considered to be oppressive, imprac-
ticable and useless.  It  was  accepted on the hope that  the
interests  of merchants would never allow their vessels to be
detained in idleness, for so long a period, when they had  the
right  to  discharge the import cargo, receive an  export,
and proceed to  sea as soon as possible.  But this reasonable
expectation has not  been  realized—for  six of the Quarantine
vessels have remained in the harbor during the whole summer,
and four of the six  were infected on arrival, or by subsequent
contamination,  and were capable of infecting the city had
they been  permitted  to  enter the  docks.  From dangers so
palpable  it is  designed  to save the city,  by the  proposed
amendment of the law.   It is converting a discretion into an
obligation,  and  relieving those in authority from perpetual
petitions to do what the spirit of the law prohibits,  and what
the safety of the city demands.  An  accumulation of infected
ships  in  our harbor is always dangerous, and it is not always
necessary.  The object of  the present recommendation is to
limit their stay, and thus prevent their inordinate increase and
consequent amount of infection and  continuity of danger.
Thirty days is fully sufficient to discharge and take in a cargo;
and then the vessel  may be ordered  "to depart the State," by
virtue of the  Act  of General  Assembly,  passed December
20th,  1832, Sec.  IV. viz :   " That the Governor of the State,
and in his absence the City Council of Charleston, shall have
full power and authority to order any vessel arriving within
the harbor of  Charleston, with a malignant or contagious 
13
disease or distemper on  board any such  vessel, or with  the
crew or passengers infected with the same, to depart the State
at such time and upon such notice as  the  Governor or City
Council shall think proper and most consistent with the safety
and health of the said City of  Charleston."
                       Respectfully submitted,
                                   WM. HUME, M. D.