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E E C H
THOMAS G. C. DAVIS,
I'll!, ST. T.Oi IS 15 AH,
I  N  S  A  K1TY,
i ■•  iiii.vr.F <f\
ROBERT C. SLOO, ESQ.,
isdici'KI) r./i: hie mmrdek or
JOHN  E. II A L L,
geltoercb at .Sjjafontctoton, Ms., August 13,1657.
     ST. LOUIS:   t



liKdRGE KNA1T A CO., 1"I;1NTER8 A»» BIM)EK3.




        18 58.




  •V * » T \-,^mt *»»V»MIVTMVf»V»M»M 
 
v  ■
SPEECH
THOMAS  G. C.  DAVIS,
     OF THE ST. LOUIS BAR,
UPON THE PLEA OF
INSANITY
IN behalf of
ROBERT C.  SLOO, ESQ.,
INDICTED FOE THE MURDER OF
JOHN E.  HALL.
g*Iitafc at Sfrnfotmiotoix, flk, %\xQnni 13,1657.
     ST. LOUIS:
GEO. KNAPP & CO., PRINTERS AND BINDERS.
        18 58. 
 
JTjrwk  at ®te.  $. $.  § Mis.
  On the 23d day of the trial Thos. G. C. Davis, Esq.,  closed
the  argument for the  defence as follows :

May it please the Court,— Gentlemen of the Jury :

  The exhibition of the wisdom and  moderation  of the law of
this country, which we have witnessed  thus far in the progress of
this trial, is to my mind one of the most sublime  spectacles  ever
displayed before the eyes of the civilized world.   I trust, gentle-
men, that you and I, and all of us, will  retire from  this tribunal
with a consciousness that we are not only  wiser but better men than
we were before.  We have witnessed in the course  of this painful
investigation something which was perhaps to most  of us new.  We
have heard, many of us, doubtless,  things  of which we had no
former conception.  We have  been  taught by this  investigation
how mysterious are the  workings of the human mind, and how un-
accountable, on many occasions, are the  acts of men. By this  too,
gentlemen,  we are taught to rely more firmly than ever upon  that
Divine guidance which alone can conduct us in the path which we
should  travel.
  In whatever I shall say in reference  to this  cause, I trust  that
you will discover a disposition  to treat it in  a proper  spirit,  and
that you will trace naught of malignity or malevolence on my part.
I shall tread lightly upon the ashes of the dead.   Would to  God
that  I with you could restore  to the family of John E. Hall the
husband and the father !   Would to God the act which has brought
this unfortunate  young man  to this  bar  had never transpired!
Much pain, which has been  experienced by you and all present in
the investigation of this case, would have  been saved  but for  this
unfortunate deed. 
—   4  —
  What do we behold? The trial of a young man, who, until within
the last few years, gave great promise of becoming an ornament to
his  country, and the solace of a kind father and mother in their de-
clining years, brought to this bar in consequence of an act done by
him under circumstances of a most peculiar character—so peculiar
as to impress themselves upon every gentleman as being strange
in the extreme.
  Who is the man that has been sent to  his final account?  He was
high in the" confidence of the people of the county of Gallatin ; by
their partiality  he had  been elevated  to trusts of  importance, and
he doubtless endeavored to execute those trusts in the best way he
was capable.   He is deprived of his life at the very  time when he
is engaged in the performance of his official duty.  He is, in the
language of one of the witnesses (Mr. Ingersoll), reading to  him
from a book certain things that  were  to be transcribed.   In  that
situation, and perhaps at a time when he had no expectation of re-
ceiving the deadly ball, he receives a bullet from  the pistol of the
unfortunate defendant; he writhes under its effect, and expires in
a few moments.
  There is something in this which must necessarily strike every
man with pain, and  there is something in this, gentlemen of the
jury, which can not fail to impress itself  upon the mind of every
man as being most remarkable—as quite out of the order of  com-
mon events.
  Great latitude of remark has been indulged in by gentlemen in
the discussion of this case thus far.  Many things have been  said
that might have been much better  left unsaid.  Many things have
been said on both sides, perhaps, which were not  calculated to in-
struct the ear of  the jury in the ascertainment of the fact which
they are empannelled to try.   If  I entertain any hostile  feeling
towards any man  engaged  in this cause, I am  unaware of it; if I
entertain any unkind feelings towards any gentleman engaged in the
prosecution of this cause,  either  counsel or friend  of the deceased,
I am unconscious of it.  I have no reason to entertain such  feel-
ings.   I knew  John E. Hall myself ; towards him  I entertained,
while living, a kindly feeling ; towards  him,  in his grave, I enter-
tain a like feeling.   I  come not here to asperse John E. Hall.  I
have a holier, better, and nobler purpose—a better object in view.
I come here,  gentlemen, for the sole purpose of endeavoring, in
my humble way,  to assist you in the ascertainment  of truth, and
to bring you by that means to  such conclusions  as  are warranted 
—   5  —
by law and by morals.  I should have been pleased  if Mr.  Allen
could have done us the justice  to imagine  that we were not  fabri-
cating a defence.  In the heat of debate gentlemen frequently ex-
press themselves in a way in which they would  not express  them-
selves if they were cooler, or better understood  the just import of
their words.
  Mr. Allen  has told you, gentlemen  of the jury, that a horrid
murder  has been perpetrated.   I concede the  fact  that a horrid
homicide has been committed ;  but, as you have  been repeatedly
told, it is not every homicide that amounts  to a murder.  Mr.  Al-
len has told you further, gentlemen of the jury, that it was neces-
sary to make some defence ;  and that, there being no valid defence
to this prosecution—there being no rational grounds upon which to
meet it—it became necessary that the defendant's counsel should re-
sort  to means that are unjust and untrue. In other words, that after
the fact of the homicide was proved, with its accompanying circum-
stances, and the State had made out her case against the defendant
at the bar, it became necessary that some show of defence should be
made ; and, there being no true defence, one was fabricated.   In
the whole  course of my experience,  and it has been somewhat  ex-
tensive, I  have not received from any one such an accusation.   I
have never been informed before, in the whole course of my expe-
rience as a lawyer, that  I had  been engaged in the fabrication of
facts to exonerate an  unfortunate man, whom I  defended, from the
responsibilities justly devolved upon him by his  own act.  Mr.  Al-
len did not mean to say all that his language imports.   Mr. Allen
did  not mean to be understood as imputing to the gentlemen  en-
gaged in  this defence so dishonorable a character of  conduct as
the fabrication of facts  to exonerate the defendant from the pen-
alty of the law.   He has known some, at least, of the gentlemen
engaged in this defence too long to be justified  in the assertion of
such a thing.   Towards Mr.  Allen I entertain the same kind feel-
ings that I entertain toward the deceased.   Toward the other gen-
tlemen I entertain like feelings ; and if, in the  course of the dis-
cussion, one word shall unfortunately slip from my  lips which is
not  approved  by my  head and  my heart, I shall be sorry  for it.
If I  shall asperse  the memory  of  any man, or make a wrong
ascription of motives to any man, I shall be sorry for it, for such
is not my  intention.   I have a superior and nobler and holier office
to fulfil.   I am here, gentlemen of the jury, to  endeavor, by what-
ever means I may possess, gifts of nature and little learning that 
—  6  —
I may have accumulated during years of toil and difficulty through
which I have passed, to defend an unfortunate young man, under
a most unfortunate state of circumstances ; and that duty, with the
help of  God, shall be fully performed on  my part, whatever may
result from its performance.
   If any case could be surrounded with difficulty, if any case could
justify an advocate in appealing to a jury for their patient atten-
tion to every word  and  act  of his  in the progress of the investi-
gation of it, this is that case.  I shall then, gentlemen of the jury,
beg the attention of the court, and solicit  your  patient hearing,
while I endeavor in my way to present the law of this case, in con-
nection with the facts to your  consideration, and ask for your de-
termination and candid decision.
   I shall, gentlemen, in the first place, endeavor to make the law
plain.   After I shall  have done that, I shall endeavor to answer
the argument submitted by my learned friend Mr. Allen, in such a
way as will, I trust, evince to you that he is mistaken;  not incor-
rigibly mistaken, but mistaken because he has not had sufficient
time perhaps for investigation and conclusion.
   The statute  of this State has been read to you ; it  has  been
read to you repeatedly ; but I beg  your attention to it once more,
for, when my voice shall be still, no man will speak to  you more
for Robert C. Sloo; when I shall utter my last  word  all voices
will be silent—ail will be still—no man will be heard in his behalf ;
while the  State will  be represented  by my  distinguished friend,
Mr. Logan.
   I come to the question of  intention.  No man disputes the  fact
that John E. Hall is dead, and that he came  to his death by the
hands of Robert C. Sloo.  It would be wicked and foolish to  talk
about that fact, for it is proven beyond  controversy.   We  were
ready in the commencement of this investigation to admit it.   We
told the gentlemen when they were exhibiting the clothes of the
deceased, with the view, as we supposed, to inflame your prejudices,
that we would admit that; and yet the gentlemen were not content
with that declaration—they desired more ; from what motive I will
not say.  I ascribe to them no improper  motive.  It  may have
been their  desire to enact the part of  Mark  Antony over the body
of Cassar, but without intending to do wrong.  I will suppose that
the gentleman intended to hold them  up as did Mark Antony the
mantle over the dead body of  Julius Caesar, when  he was appeal-
ing to the people of Rome to take  away the lives of the few patri- 
—   7  —
ots who had taken the life of that great tyrant.  These gentlemen,
perhaps, saw in that something that might be worthy of imitation.
They may  have supposed, gentlemen, that they might exibit them-
selves before you to advantage by holding up that bloody shirt and
that bloody coat, and asking you to look "  there went the deadly
bullet!''   That, I think, must  have been the motive.   If  that was
the motive, then, gentlemen of the jury, it is not dishonorable—it
is  but a noble impulse of  the heart to seek to rise; but if  there
was a different motive, if  the object was  to inflame your  passions
by  the exhibition  of blood, then I tell you it was wrong.  I will
suppose they intended to do right.
   I read from 1st Div. Crim. Code, p. 152,  Rev. Sat.  of  Illinois :
  Section 1.  A crime or misdemeanor consists in a violation of  a public law,
in the commission of which there shall be an union or joint operation of act and
intention, or criminal negligence.
  Sec. 2  Intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the per-
petration of the offence, and the sound mind and discretion of the person accused.
  Sec. 3.  A person shall be considered of sound mind, who is neither an idiot
nor lunatic,  nor affected with insanity; and who has arrived at the age of four-
teen years, or before that age if such  person know the distinction between good
and evil.
  Sec. 4.  An infant under the age of ten years shall not be found guilty of any
crime or misdemeanor.
  Sec. 5.  A lunatic or insane person, without lucid intervals, shall not be found
guilty of any crime or misdemeanor with which  he may be charged ; Provided,
the act so charged  as criminal  shall have been committed in  the condition of
insanity.
   The section  of  the law particularly applicable to this case is  the
third, which is  punctuated  thus—"not  affected  with  insanity;"
I shall  address myself,  gentlemen  of the jury, to an inquiry into
the meaning of this language, and I shall  endeavor to prove  to
you that the construction put  upon it by my friend Mr. Allen is
not  only  not  supported by the  language of the  section  itself,
but  is absolutely contrary to  its just interpretation by the rules
of  law apart from the section.   He reads to you the second clause
of the third section of  the first chapter on Criminal Jurisprudence,
and tells  you that the second  clause, applying the  test of  the
knowledge of right  and wrong, is applicable  to the first clause.   I
state it in the presence  and  hearing of the  court—I state it upon
my responsibility  as a lawyer of  some standing and of  some expe-
rience, that this construction is not only wrong, but it does violence
to the language in the  clause and to the   principles of law which
govern in such cases.    I will  endeavor  to make  this  proposition
clear, by reference to the common law as  it stood prior to  the time 
—   8  —
 of the enactment of this statute, and deduce my conclusion from
 the common law and statute in connection.
   Down to the time of the trial of  Hadfield in 1800, the rule pre-
 vailed throughout England, that, in order to exonerate a man from
 responsibility for crime on the plea of insanity, it was necessary that
 he should be totally deprived of his understanding.  That was the rule
 laid down by Lord Coke and by Lord Hale. Lord Coke laid down the
 rule to be, that in order to establish the irresponsibility of a party, who
 perpetrated a criminal act, upon the score of insanity, it was neces-
 sary that it should be shown to the  jury that he  was totally de-
 prived of understanding.   Lord Erskine, in the  argument  of the
 case of Hadfield, evinced  beyond controversy the utter  absurdity
 of the old test; he showed to the satisfaction of  the court,  and of
 the learned judge who presided at that trial, that the test laid down
 by Coke was not founded on human philosophy or human experience,
 and ought to be repudiated. Lord Kenyon, who tried Hadfield for
 shooting at George the Third, was so prejudiced against  the opin-
 ion  then  being presented by Mr. Erskine, that he could scarcely
 listen to it with patience.   He thought that  the  views being pre-
 sented by that learned gentleman were not in  keeping with the phi-
 losophy of the human mind, and the principles of the common law
 laid down for the government of courts  and juries in the trial of
 criminal causes ;  but, before that learned advocate had  concluded
 his argument, Lord  Kenyon came  to the conclusion that he was
 right, and asked the counsel for the king if he had anything more
 to say—demanded of the attorney general  whether he had any-
 thing to allege in addition to what had been  proved.  He said he
 had nothing, and he  was a learned man—no less a man than John
 Mitford, afterwards Lord Redesdale.  Then said the judge, preju-
 diced as he was,  "this  man  must be acquitted, for the law has
been well stated by Mr. Erskine."   What was  that law  as  stated
by Mr. Erskine ?   It was  that although the  party may be in full
possession of his  mental faculties, although he may be capable of
distinguishing between right and wrong, although he may have a
subtle  and astute genius  and capacity for investigation, yet he
is  not  responsible if he  is laboring  under  a delusion.   That
was a great advance in the  criminal  law in reference to  insanity.
It  was regarded  at  the time, gentlemen, as  one  of the greatest
achievements that had ever been made by an advocate in vindica-
tion of sound principles.
  " On the trial  of  Hadfield"—this  is  the case in which  Lord 
—   9  —
 Erskine  manifested  the  total absurdity of the  old  rule—" there
 was a  great step  made  in this  branch  of medical  jurispru-
 dence, and it might have been expected that the victory thus gained
 over professional prejudices and time-honored errors  would be felt
 in  all subsequent decisions.  But,  though the day has gone by
 when such insanity only as is attended by  total deprivation of
 memory  and understanding can be admitted in excuse for crime,
 the test offered by Erskine was altogether too simple and too philo-
 sophical to be readily adopted by minds that  delight  in  subtleties
 and technicalities."                    • ^
    Gentlemen of the jury, the attorney general  did  lay  down the
 proposition, in  Hadfield's case, that in order to protect a criminal
 from  responsibility, upon the plea  of insanity, there must be a
 total  deprivation of memory and understanding.  That was  the
 doctrine of Lord Coke, that was the doctrine of Lord Hale, that
 was the  doctrine of the darker  ages  of the common law ; but a
 flood  of  light was  shed  upon  the subject by the great genius of
 Erskine.   The law was rescued from the depths of ignorance into
 which it had been plunged.  Erskine said, what every man knows,
 that such a thing as total  deprivation of memory and understand-
 ing never takes place in a madman ;  that  insanity does not, in its
 ordinary  form, deprive the party  absolutely or totally of  memory
 or understanding.   There is no such  case on record, and the whole
 history of mankind is the very reverse  of this absurd proposition.
 The whole knowledge of  man in reference to insane conduct shows
 the absurdity of  the principle.  If to make a madman it  is neces-
 sary that he shall be deprived totally and absolutely of his memory
 and his understanding, then, in the language of Lord  Erskine,
 there never was a madman on the face of the earth, and there never
 will be one ; for madness is never accompanied by such total loss
 of understanding and memory.
   Gentlemen, it will be my endeavor to make  this thing as plain
 as my poor powers will enable me to make it, for there is difficulty
 in it.  I  read now what  Hale says  about criminal responsibility:
 "There is a partial insanity," says he, "and a total insanity." The
 former is either in respect to things, quoad hoc vel illud insanire,
 (to be insane as to this or that thing.)   Some  persons that have a
 competent use of reason in respect of some subjects, are yet under a
 particular dementia  in respect to some  particular discourses, sub-
jects, or applications, or else it is  partial in respect  of degrees;
 and this is the condition of very many,  especially melancholy per- 
— 10 —
sons, who for the most part discover their defect in excessive fears
and griefs, and yet are not wholly destitute of the use  of  reason,
and  this partial insanity seems  not to excuse them"—mark the
words!—" seems not to excuse  them  in the committing of any
offence for its matter capital;  for, doubtless, most persons  that are
felons of  themselves and others, are under a degree of partial in-
sanity when they commit these offences.   It is very difficult to de-
fine the invisible line that divides  perfect and partial insanity ; but
it must rest upon circumstances duly to be weighed and considered
both by judge and jury, lest  on  the  one side there be a kind of
inhumanity  towards the defects of human nature, or on the other
side too great an indulgence given to great crimes : the best measure
that  I can think  of is this—such a person as laboring under melan-
choly distempers hath yet ordinarily as great understanding, as  or-
dinarily a child of  fourteen years  hath, is such a person as may  be
guilty of treason or felony.
  "  Again, a total alienation of the mind, or perfect madness ; this
excuses from the guilt of felony  and  treason: de quibus infra.
This is that, which  in my Lord Coke's Pleas of the Crown, p. 6, is
called by him absolute madness, and total deprivation of memory."
  Lord Hale declares that there are two kinds of  insanity, the one
partial and the other total;  and he says this partial insanity is so
closely connected,  or the line which separates it from total  insanity
is so fine, as scarcely to be  discoverable  by the most learned men
who  may go about  the  investigation ;  and, that being  the  fact,  he
admonishes  courts and juries to be exceedingly cautious in coming
to conclusions in reference to the existence of  one or the other de-
gree of insanity;  and he says that this  partial  insanity of which
he has spoken seems not to exonerate the man who perpetrates a
criminal act under its influence.   That judge was one of the most
honorable that ever sat on the English bench, and, for  the time  in
which he lived,  one of  the most enlightened that ever  adorned the
bench of that or any other  country ;  and one of  the most upright
men that ever administered justice in a temple where purity only
should be  permitted to enter; and he, with  that  humanity which
characterized the whole  course of his life, admonishes courts and
juries to be cautious in  coming to a conclusion in reference to the
existence of one or  the  other degree of  insanity, lest on the one
hand we  might exhibit inhumanity  towards those suffering from
disease, and on  the  other we  might give too much indulgence to
great crimes. 
— 11  —
  But, with all the humanity which characterized the  whole course
of Lord Hale's public career as a judge, he adopted the old rule.
Had Lord Hale lived in the present  age, had he  possessed the ad-
vantages which are now everywhere attainable, he would have enter-
tained a totally different opinion, and would have laid down a doctrine
materially different.  Had he had the advantages which have result-
ed from the institution of  hospitals for the insane  in every civil-
ized country of Europe and in  the United  States—the results  of
the observation of gentlemen  interested in the treatment of the
unfortunate beings who are  committed to  these hospitals for cure
and  protection, he  would have  entertained and given  a different
view of the law.
   Lord Hale says that by the common law  of England it is neces-
sary that there should be  a total deprivation of memory and under-
standing  to protect a defendant against responsibility  for the com-
mission of a criminal  act  and  from punishment.   That was the
rule of the English common law at that time;  that rule was after-
wards  modified—not perhaps until Erskine appeared in court to
defend a man  who attempted to kill the  sovereign of his country.
Remember,  gentlemen—remember,  I pray you, that  Hadfield,
of whom I have  spoken,  attempted  to  assassinate  the King  of
England, in a theatre, in his seat, and in  the  midst  of  his loyal
subjects ; and, although  it  was the King—although in countries
governed  by monarchs the people are generally  inclined to think
more highly of the character of the head of the government than
of any mere citizen or man—notwithstanding  the attempt on the
part of Hadfield to assassinate the King in the presence of his as-
sembled  subjects, and when he was  witnessing  the  exhibition of
plays, to which he retired to protect him from exhaustion,—nothing
was done to that man by way of violence: he was arrested—tried ac-
cording to the forms of the common  law—a great  advocate was ap-
pointed by the King to defend him. Lord Erskine was not an advocate
in the cause by choice of the defendant himself merely, but he was as-
signed under the common law to defend him.  Mark what  an ex-
hibition of a sublime principle of  government was made in that
case !  The King, at whom a deadly shot had  been aimed—the
King, whose life Hadfield had  attempted to take away—appointed,
at the request of Hadfield, Erskine, the ablest advocate in the king-
dom, to defend him against the charge of treason, which must have
resulted, in the  event of  his conviction, in  his execution.  I may
remark, that we have no  such exhibition here ; none was needed— 
— 12 —
 none was asked for—none was desired.  If it had been, perhaps there
 would have been such an one.  Robert C. Sloo is defended, as was
 remarked yesterday by Mr. Allen, by hired counsel  and advocates,
 and they have endeavored (those who have po;ece4ed me) to perform
 their duty toward him ; I am  now  endeavoring  to perform that
 which remains on my part, lest all may not be right. Hadfield was
 acquitted, under the appointment of  the  King, through the instru-
 mentality of his advocate, on the ground of  delusion.
   Then in this case, gentlemen, there was no test of the know-
 ledge of right and wrong laid down  for the  guidance of the jury.
 Lord Erskine stated a proposition that no man dare  controvert and
 pretend to have any knowledge of the insane. He laid down the pro-
 position so clearly as to be approved by the experience of the whole
 civilized world, that a man might be  in possession of his faculties
 and still labor under such a delusion as to exonerate him from the
 consequences of an act committed in that state of mind.
   But what  do  we see, gentlemen ?   At the end  of twelve years
 from that time an unfortunate man  of the  name of Bellingham,
 in 1812, assassinated the Hon. Spencer Perceval, the Prime Min-
 ister of England, in the House  of Commons and in presence of
 the  assembled  representatives  of the nation.   He, was rushed
 to trial;  a grand jury was summoned to present  an indictment ;
 he was indicted in two or three days.  It was not an attempt to kill
 the King, whom the people cherished  as the apple of their eye, but
 it was a mere Prime Minister who had been assassinated ; and Bel-
 lingham was  conducted to trial in the course of a few days, and
 was tried in such a way as to  disgrace the tribunal that had been
 honored by being presided over by such a man as Hale.
  I am coming now to show  you how this common law rule has
 been oscillating like the pendulum of a clock.  On the trial of Bel-
lingham, in 1812, the rule which  was laid down by Lord Kenyon
in the case of Hadfield was departed from, and a judicial butchery
 took place.  Lord Chief Justice  Mansfield presided  at  that trial,
 and he told the  jury who tried that unfortunate man, that the  test
 of responsibility was the knowledge  of  right  and wrong.   After
 the lapse of twelve years, we find an English judge returning to
 the old absurdity of the common law.  He laid down the doctrine
 to be, that the knowledge of right and wrong is sufficient to make a
 man responsible for any criminal act committed in the condition of
 insanity;  and poor Bellingham, in a  very few  days from the time
 that he assassinated Mr. Perceval, was hurled into eternity, a mad- 
— 13 —
man, under a rule of law—a decision which was rather travelling
back into the dark ages than keeping up with the  progress of the
times.
   What rule of the common  law have  we  then ?   What  con-
struction are we to put upon  this statute in order  to enable a jury
to understand the law of the land ?  What principle is to be found
in the cases which must  be applied  to  the  construction of this
statute, that we may know what is the law of  the  State of Illinois
as to responsibility for the commission  of crime  by one affected
with insanity.  Is it the old and barbarous  rule which obtained in
the times of Lords  Coke  and Hale; or  is it a rule, the  result of
enlightened reason, science and progress, which have shed their light
during the  last hundred  years, to  a goal of tolerable certainty?
No man  will say for a moment that we should go  back to the old
rule of the  total  deprivation  of understanding.   Then I demand
to know  what is the rule to govern in  this case—what  common law
rule shall obtain as a rule for the construction of the statute of this
State.   Is it the rule laid down in  Hadfield's case, that the know-
ledge of right and wrong is no test, but the mere presence of  delu-
sion is the test  by which to see if  the party is responsible for the
commission of crime or not ?
   It will be my purpose now to  evince the correctness of my  views
of the just construction of the provisions of this statute, by  read-
ing a few cases.   "In the trial of Lawrence, at Washington, in
1835, for  shooting at President  Jackson, the jury were advised
by the court to regulate their verdict by the principles laid down in
the case of Hadfield, which had been  stated to them by the district
attorney."  Lawrence tried to  assassinate General Jackson at the
funeral  of  the Hon. W. R. Davis, a member of Congress  from
South Carolina, and what did the court say ?  That the jury should
"regulate  their verdict by the principles laid down in Hadfield's
case;" and it is hardly necessary for  me to remark in this connec-
tion, that Lawrence was acquitted.   He  had attempted to assas-
sinate the head of the government  of the United  States, General
Jackson, than whom no man ever exerted a greater influence upon
the minds of his countrymen, or was more devoted to his country's
interests.
   " In the case of Theodore Wilson, tried in York county, Maine,
in 1836, for the murder of his wife  in  a paroxysm  of insanity,
the court charged the jury  that if they were satisfied  the  prisoner
was not of  sound memory and discretion at  the time  of  commit- 
— 14 —
ting the act, they were bound to return a verdict of  acquittal."
And yet we are told that  the right  and wrong test is that which
should be applied to this case.   I  read farther, gentlemen, for I
shall content myself with  nothing less than a thorough exhibition
of the law as it is.   " This is all that could be wished," says the
author, " and considering that two highly intelligent physicians had
given their opinion in evidence that the prisoner had some conscious-
ness of right and wrong, and that the  Attorney General, although
he admitted the existence of  insanity in some  degree, deemed that
it was  of not sufficient extent to  exempt him from punishment, sup-
porting his assertion on the authority of the leading English cases
relating to insanity ; this decision indicates an advance in the crim-
inal jurisprudence of  insanity that does credit to the humanity and
intelligence of that court.  In the trial of Cory for murdering Mrs.
Nash,  in New Hampshire, in 1829, the court, Chief Justice Rich-
ardson, stated in his charge to the jury, that  the only question for
them to settle was whether he was of sane mind when the deed was
done." Whether he was of sound mind—not whether he was inca-
pable of distinguishing between  right and  wrong—not whether he
was totally deprived of his memory and  understanding ; but simply,
if they should be of opinion that he  was not of sane mind at the
time of the commission of the act, he was  entitled to an acquittal.
This is not all, gentlemen :  " The same language was used by the
same court on the trial of  Enscott for the murder of Mrs. Cochran,
in 1834.  On the trial of Rogers, in July, 1843, for  the murder of
Mr. Lincoln in the  State prison of Massachusetts,  the court, Chief
Justice Shaw, charged the jury,  that insanity or delusion is an ex-
cuse for crime in two ways—first, where it amounts to a firm belief
that one  is liable to lose his own life or suffer some great  bodily
injury  : secondly, where some violent outbreak occurs, which, taken
in connection with  former acts, indicates  that  the will was over-
come.   The questions for them to decide were whether such a delu-
sion existed in the mind of the accused ; whether  he did the act
under  an  insane but firm belief that the deceased was going to shut
him up with some dangerous design, and  not for  a slight punish-
ment ; whether the facts indicate that  the  deed was  done at a mo-
ment when the delusion was uncontrollable. On the  trial of Abbot
for killing his wife, in 1841, by  the Supreme Court of Connecticut,
the jury was instructed to  acquit the  prisoner, < if  they found that
at the time of committing the act he was insane—had not sufficient
understanding  to  distinguish right from wrong, and did not know 
—  15 —
 that the murder of his wife was an offence against God and nature.'
 Similar language was used by the court on  the trial of Mercer for
 the murder of Herberton, in New Jersey, April, 1843."
   We have no less than four American  cases totally repudiating the
 old test of right and  wrong as being  applicable to criminal trials
 where the plea of insanity is interposed.  I  know that you may
 find many opinions  that  militate  against this  view of  the law ; I
 know the learned gentlemen that prosecute this unfortunate man
 may be able to bring a vast number of  decisions  that hold the con-
 verse of this legal proposition ; I know that they can bring a case
 from the State of Ohio, tried not many years ago—I allude to the
 case of Birdsall, in which the court laid down the old, antiquated
 and abominable doctrine,  that a man could not be exonerated from
 responsibility  for crime committed  under  the  influence  of  insanity
 contracted by drunkenness—not the immediate result of drunken-
 ness at that time—an opinion repudiated by a  much  higher  au-
 thority.   I allude to the authority of the  Judge  of  the Second
 Circuit of the United States in deciding the case of Drew, who had
 been  drinking  for weeks, and who had resolved to throw  his rum
 and brandy overboard and be a sober man ;  I know well that Mr.
 Logan will read from a book written by Russell  on criminal  juris-
 prudence, and he will find the old test  laid  there ; I know he  can
 read from books that militate with the  view I have presented ;  but
 I insist that the modern view of  the law is accordant with the four
 cases I have read  to you ; I  insist that they are in perfect keeping
 with the legislation of this  State in reference to this infirmity. These
 opinions are in direct keeping, word for word, and syllable  for syl-
 lable, with the principle contained in the third section of  the  act
 to which I have turned your attention.
   What does that act say  ?   That a man " affected with insanity "
 shall not be convicted of a crime that he may commit in a condition
 of insanity ; an idiot shall not be found guilty, " nor a lunatic, nor
 ' one' affected with insanity."   Is there any difference between the
reading of this statute and the decisions which I have read to you ?
 Is there any difference in mere language ?  Is there  any difference
 in principle ?   If  there be, I call  upon the gentlemen to evince it
 clearly by argument.  I shall not content  myself with the mere
 opinion of  any gentleman ; I am one who investigate questions for
myself, and when I come  to a conclusion in reference to any given
question, after laborious  investigation, I think that I may be en-
titled to express that conclusion to the  court and jury,  and to ask 
—  16 —
 if it be not right. Here it is expressly provided that a person shall
 not be convicted if  he be  lunatic or in a condition of  insanity.
 What have the learned gentlemen who have testified on the stand in
 reference to the condition of this unfortunate man  told us ?  What
 have they declared upon their solemn oaths, based  upon an atten-
 tive listening to the testimony of the several witnesses who pre-
 ceded  them,  and upon their  actual  experience,  knowledge and
 learning ?   They have given it as their clear opinion that Robert
 C. Sloo, at the time of the commission of this homicide,  was in  a
 condition  of insanity.   They have told us that  they entertain no
 doubt about the fact that Robert  C. Sloo, when he killed poor Hall
 —I speak of him with tenderness and kindness—was laboring under
 insanity, and  in  the language of the learned gentleman,  Dr. Mc-
 Farland, was " in a condition of insanity at  the very moment of
 the homicide."  His  opinion, gentlemen, comes up  to the whole
 requirement of the statute, for he has declared to you, that,  in his
 opinion, Sloo,  at the time of the  commission of the homicide, was
 in a condition of  insanity.
   Mr. Allen has read to you this  morning some authority  support-
 ing his view of the right and wrong test.   I read to you from au-
 thority higher than any other authority, English or American ;  I
 read to you from authority, the combined product of legal and
 medical learning ;  I read you an opinion from the gentleman who
 is the author of the same book from which Mr. Allen read, but who
 has written this  book subsequent in point of time  ; from a book
 devoted to  the consideration of  this question, and not questions
 of criminal law generally, as  his book is.   Mr. Allen  has read
 you from  this, page 37,  Wharton''s  Medical  Jurisprudence.
 I will read—the head is,  "When the defendant is incapable of dis-
 tinguishing right from wrong in reference to  the particular act."
 "Under this head may be enumerated persons afflicted with  idiocy or
 dementia, or with general mania.   It is certain that wherever such
 incapacity is shown to exist, the court will direct an acquittal; or,
 if a jury will  convict in the teeth of such  instructions, the  court
 will set the verdict aside.   The  authorities  to this effect are so
 numerous that a general reference to them is all that is here neces-
 sary ;  it being observed  at  the  same  time,  that  while the earlier
 cases lean to the  position that such deprivation of  understanding
 must be general, it is now conceded  that it is  enough  if it is
shown to have existed in  refermce to the  particular act.
  " To precisely  this effect is the answer of the  fifteen judges to 
—  17 —
 the questions propounded to them by the House of Lords, in June,
 1843,—answers which were extrajudicially delivered, and which,
 therefore, though of weight as opinions, are not binding as au-
 thority.   ' The jury,' they said, ' ought to be told in all cases that
 every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess  a sufficient degree
 of reason to be  responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be
 proved to their satisfaction;  and that to establish a defence on the
 ground of insanity, it must  be clearly proved that at the time of
 committing the act the party was  laboring und r  such  a  defect of
 reason, from disease of the  mind, as not to know the nature and
 quality of the act he was doing, or  if he did know it, that he did
 not know he was doing what was wrong.' ' To precisely this effect,'
 he says, after having first stated the repudiation of  the old test
 of right and wrong in the abstract, ' to precisely the same  effect,' as
 is stated in the first paragraph, ' is the answer of the fifteen judges
 to the questions propounded to  them by the House of Lords.'"  How
 far has he said that this right and wrong test is a good one ?  He
 has stated that authorities have laid it down  as being a  good test in
 reference to the act in question ;  but has he  stated that such is law
 at the  present time ?  No!  he has stated no  such thing;  but he
 says  to precisely the same effect is the opinion of the fifteen judges,
 which are mere opinions and not entitled to consideration as author-
 ities,  because they were not delivered in a case.
   Then I turn your attention to the consideration of  the  right and
 wrong test,  as  he delivers it.   Mr.  Allen  has  told you that this
 author lays down  the test of right  and wrong  as the  criterion  of
 responsibility.  I tell you he lays down no such thing ; but the re-
 verse  of it.   He says: (Wharton and Stille's  Medical  Jurispru-
 dence, page 46) " The right and  wrong test can never be rightly
 applied,  because it rests in the conscience, which  no human eye can
 penetrate."  Does Mr. Wharton, at the same time that he says that
 the right and wrong test can never be applied, intend to adopt the
 opinion of the English judges in response  to the questions pro-
 pounded to  them by the House of  Lords ?  Certainly not.  He re-
 pudiates the old test in all its parts, and in every particular ; and
why does he repudiate it ?  He repudiates it, gentlemen of the jury,
for the  plain, simple and  philosophical reason  that no  man can
penetrate the conscience of his neighbor  and in  that conscience
discover indicia of insanity which shall determine whether  he  is
insane or sane.  Those philosophical tests, which every man mu-t
feel to be just and reasonable, may be too simple for the learned in
       2 
— 18 —
the technicalities of law in England and of this country.  Has, then,
Wharton adopted the right and wrong test ?  No.   What then, I
demand, is the test ?   Is it the knowledge which enables the party
to discriminate between right and wrong, and does it devolve on
him to show to his peers who sit in judgment upon him  that he was
not in possession of his faculties so as thus to  discriminate ? I de-
mand to know this—I demand  to know, in addition,  upon what
principle of reason or human  experience it is predicated ?   Four
American cases, backed by the  deliberate opinion of Mr. Wharton,
one of the most learned men  in criminal jurisprudence in this or
any other country, support  the view which I take of the state of the
law in reference to the responsibility of  a party committing an act
of violence under the influence  or  an insane delusion, or of  any
form of insanity which Heaven in its wisdom shall visit upon him.
  My rule then is, and I give it to you, gentlemen of the jury, as
the conviction  of  my judgment—the  honest  sentiment  of  my
heart ; my rule is,  that by  the  statute of this State no man is
liable to punishment for crime,  if  he commit the crime in  a condi-
tion of insanity ; for so the legislators of your State have declared,
and so  I understand them, and so I expect to continue to under-
stand them.
  But  Mr. Allen has read to you  an opinion recently delivered in
the case of Huntingdon, in the  city of New York.  For what was
Huntingdon upon his trial ?   For forgery.  It  was because he had
forged bills of  exchange and other commercial paper to an almos
indefinite extent.   He was rolling  in wealth—he had made every
provision for luxury—had three  or four houses, and occupied or let
them to his friends, as his generosity or  caprice governed him.   It
was contended that he was laboring under  insanity.   What form
of insanity?   Monomania for forging paper ;  for dealing in com-
mercial  paper; for flooding the  country with  evidences of debt.
That was the form  of insanity insisted upon, and that therefore he
could not be convicted.  A  few  gentlemen testified  that they  be-
lieved he was laboring under insanity ; true, the judge lays down
the doctrine that a man must  be  unable to discriminate  between
right and wrong in reference to the particular act; true, that judge
says something in reference to the weight to be attached to the tes-
timony of medical witnesses ;  true, the judge nowhere expresses the
opinion  laid down in the books  that their opinions are entitled to
the highest consideration, and  are absolutely  authoritative.  You
have, then, his opinion in  reference to the  power to  discriminate 
— 19 —
 between right  and wrong as to a given act.   Did he know that it
 was  wrong to  forge paper upon his  neighbors ?   That was  the
 question that  was subjected to the investigation of the jury.   Did
 he know that it was wrong to  forge paper—was there any evidence
 of disease on his part, sir ?   Had Heaven afflicted him, or had he
 abused himself until he had made a wreck of his understanding, or
 had impaired his memory so that when he read a book he was  un-
 able  to remember the contents of  it ten minutes ?  Is  there such
 evidence in that case as there  is in this ? Is there any parallel then
 between that case and the case of Sloo, even conceding the propo-
 sition of law,  as laid down by Judge Capron,  to be   correct?   In
 this connection I will read somewhat from the charge of Ch. Jus.
 Shaw, as delivered in the case of Rogers.   Mr.  Allen has read this
 charge with a double purpose ; he has read it to show you that the
 opinions of medical gentlemen upon the question of insanity are not
 conclusive.   I will treat that  view of the subject in the  first place.
 He has told you he would not weigh the testimony of Dr. McFar-
 land against one feather,  and that we are wrong when we tell  you
 that  the opinion of Dr. McFarland  and other medical witnesses in
 this case are authoritative.  (Rogers' Trial, p. 279-80.)

   In general it is the opinion of the jury  which is  to govern,  and  this is to be
 formed upon the proof of facts laid before them. But some questions lie beyond
 the scope of the  observation and experience of  men in general, but are quite
 within the observation and experience of those  whose peculiar  pursuits and pro-
 fession have brought  that class of  facts frequently and habitually under their
 consideration. Shipmasters and seamen have peculiar means of acquiring know-
 ledge and experience  in whatever relates to seamanship and nautical skill.
 When, therefore, a question arises in a court of justice upon that  subject, and
 certain facts are proved  by  other witnesses,  a shipmaster may  be asked his
 opinion as  to the character of such acts.  The same is true in regard to any
 question of science ; because persons conversant with such  science  have pecu-
 liar means,from a larger and more exact observation, and long experience in such
 department of science, of drawing  correct inferences from certain  facts, either
 observed by themselves, or testified to by other witnesses.   *   *  *  *  *  It
 is upon this ground, that the opinions of witnesses who have long been conver-
 sant with insanity in its various forms, and who have had the care and superin-
 tendence of  insane persons, are received  as competent  evidence,  even though
 they have not had opportunity to examine the particular patient, and observe the
 symptoms and indications op disease at the time of its supposed existence.  *  *
 And such opinions, when  they come from persons of great experience, and in
 whose correctness and sobriety of judgment just  confidence can be had, are of
 great weight, and deserve the respectful consideration of a jury.

   "In general," Chief  Justice Shaw says  that the opinion of  the
jury is to control.  " In general."  Does he mean always when he
 merely sajs, in general?   Does he mean to tell that jury, that in 
— 20 —
no case is the  opinion of medical gentlemen authoritative and con-
clusive?   I think he intended no such thing.   Why?
  In  general, then, the opinion  of  the jury is to govern.   This is
the language  of Chief Justice  Shaw; but  there are some things
that lie beyond the observation of men generally, and these things,
I suppose, are just such cases as  this.  I say this to the court and
jury, that when Mr. Wharton lays down the proposition of law, that
the opinions of medical witnesses upon the question of insanity are
authoritative, he means to declare what Ch. Jus. Shaw has stated,
"That there are some questions that lie beyond the scope of the ob-
servations of ordinary individuals."  How many men has any one of
the jury known to be insane ?  Scarcely any.  It has not been the
misfortune, perhaps, of any one of  you, gentlemen, to observe, in
the whole course of your life,  one  single case of insanity ;  and,
perhaps, the most any one of you has seen are not  more than two
or three men that were  said  to be  insane.   To what extent then
would you regard your own opinions upon a question involving the
sanity  or insanity of a party ? Would you  look upon them, though
you had large  experience, as  being entitled to the same weight and
consideration as the opinion of a gentleman who has made the tour
of Europe to  examine  six thousand  persons laboring under this
malady—would you regard them as entitled to the same weight and
consideration as the opinion of  a man who  has  bad charge of a
hospital for the  insane for at least nine years—would you regard
them  as  being entitled  to any consideration in opposition to the
opinion of a man who has read books upon the subject ?   I would
to God that each of you had  read every book that I have read on
this question, and had  considered it well before I commenced my
task!
  Mr. Allen says, however,  that Dr. McFarland's opinion is enti-
tled to no consideration—that he would rather have  the opinion of
any man in this community who had no theory to  support, and who
had  not been contaminated by  intercourse with the insane over
whom he  has  exercised a  supervision for a few years pa<t.  Mr.
Allen would adopt the  " eye  test"—he would look at a man  to see
if he  was insane.   Mr. Freeman illustrated the perfect  absurdity
of such a test by several suppositions, which were enforced  with a
clearness  that  do justice to his character for sense.
   Gentlemen of  the jury, as to  the  question of the identified! >'i
of the whole man—not a mutilated being, not a man laboring un-
der disease and infirmity, but the whole man in the  broad  daylight 
— 21 —
of  noon—I will read you some cases to show you the  fallibility of
the  " eye test" (Will's Circumst. Evid.,  p. 110) :

  It might be concluded by persons not conversant with judicial proceedings,
that personal identification is seldom attended with serious difficulty, but such is
not the ca.-e.  Illustrations are numerous to show that what are  supposed to be
the cleirest intimations  of the senses are sometimes fallacious and deceptive,
and some extraordinary cases have occurred of mistaken personal identity.
Heuce the particularity, and, as unreflecting persons too hastily conclude, the
frivolous minuteness of inquiry by professional advocates as to the causa scient foe
(means or knowledge), in cases of  controverted identity whether of  persons or
of things.
  Two men were convicted at the Old Bailey sessions in 1797, before Mr. Jus-
tice Grose, of the murder of Syder  Fryer, Esq., and executed j  the identity of
the prisoners was positively sworn to by a lady who was  in company with the
de. eas^d at the lime of the robbery and murder; but several years afterwards
two me-i, w:io suffered for other  crimes, confessed  at the scaffold the commis-
sion of the murder for which  these persons were executed.
   Even the testimony of the senses,  though it afford the  safest ground for moral
assurance, can not be implicitly  depended upon, even where the veracity of the
witne>sfs is above all suspicion.  Sir Thomas Davenant, an eminent barrister,
a gentlem in of acute mind  and strong understanding, swore positively to the
pei sons of two men, whom he charged with robbing him in open daylighx.  But
it was proved by the most conclusive evidence, that the men on trial were, at the
time of the robbery,  at so remote a  distance from the spot that the thing was
impossible.  The consequence was that the men were acquitted; and  sometime
afterwards the robbers were taken, and the articles stolen found upon them. Sir
Thomas, on seeing these men, candidly acknowledged his mistake, and it is said
gave a recompense to the persons he prosecuted, and who so narrowly escaped
conviction.  It is probable that Sir Thomas was deceived by the broad glare of
6unlight, but there can be no doubt of the sincerity of his impressions.
  A young man articled to an attorney, was tried at the Old Bailey on the 17th
and i'Jth of July, 1824, on five indictments for different acts of theft.   A person
resembling the prisoner in size  and general appearance had called at various
shops of  the metropolis for the purpose of looking at books, jewelry and other
articles, with the pretended intention  of  making purchases, but made off with
the property placed before him while the  shopkeepers were engaged in looking
out oilier articles.  In each of these cases the prisoner was positively identified
by several persons, while in  the  majority of them  an alibi was  as clearly and
positively establi.-hed; and the young man  was proved to be of  orderly habits
and irreprodch ible character, and under no temptation from want of money to re-
sort to acts of dishonesty.  Similar  depredations on other tradesmen had been
committed by  a person resembling the prisoner, and those persons deposed that,
though there was a considerable resemblance to the prisoner, he was not the per-
son who  had robbed them.  The  prisoner was convicted upon one indictment
but .icipiitted on all the others; and the judge and jurors who tried the last three
ca-es  expressed their conviction that the witnesses had  been mistaken, and that
the prosecutors had been robbed by another person resembling the prisoner.  A
p ird >n was immediately procured in respect of that charge on  which conviction
hid tnken place.
  A fe.v  mo'iths before the last mentioned case, a respectable  young man was
tried for a highway robbery  committed  at  Bethnal Green, in which neighbor- 
—  22 —
 hood both he and the prosecutor resided.  The prosecutor swore positively that
 the prisoner was the man who  robbed him of his watch.  A young woman, to
 whom the prisoner paid his addresses, gave evidence which proved a complete
 alibi.  The prosecutor was then ordered out of court, and in the interval another
 young man, who awaited his trial on a capital charge, was introduced and.>glaced
 by the side of the prisoner. The prosecutor was again put  into the witness-box
 and addressed thus : "Remember, the life of this young'man depends upon your
 reply to the question I am about to put; will you swear again that the young
 man at the bar is. the person who assaulted and robbed you?" The witness turn-
 ed his head toward  the dock, when beholding two men so  nearly alike, he be-
 came petrified with astonishment, dropped his hat, and was speechless for a
 time, but at length declined swearing to either. The  prisoner was of course ac-
 quitted.   The  other young man  was tried for another  offence and executed ; and
 a few hours before his death acknowledged that he had committed the robbery
 in question.

   These are the tests that  gentlemen would apply for the ascertain-
 ment of the presence  or  absence of  insanity.   The eye test, the
 test of  looking   at  a  man, when such  a test proves  frequently
 to be fallible in  reference  to the whole man.   Such  tests are not
 fitted to the  times in which we live  ; such tests have been demon-
 strated to be wrong too often, to be relied  upon  in  this day and
 age, and ought not to be  applied,  as  I  humbly conceive, in any
 case whatever.  This book is perfectly full of such cases.
   But, gentlemen of the jury, suppose that  I am mistaken in re-
 ference to the  law as I have endeavored to  lay it down to you ; sup-
 pose that the real test  is the capacity to distinguish between right
 and wrong in reference to the particular act, at  the time of its
 commission ; suppose that  to be the real  test  of  the law as now
 established, which in my opinion  is  not the test—yet I think I am
warranted in saying that there is the most  abundant evidence in this
 case to  justify the conclusion that the  defendant was acting under
 an irresistible impulse to take the life of  John E. Hall, which no
prudential motive could have restrained.
   What is the  opinion  of the learned gentlemen who  have testified ?
 They have told you that, in their opinion, the  defendant at the time
 of the perpetration of  the  homicide was laboring under such a de-
 gree of  incipient  dementia  as to make  it  impossible for him to be
 conscious of the nature and quality  of  the act he was doing at that
 moment.  If their  testimony is reliable upon this  point, it is rn-st
 clear- that, conceding it to be the rule that  a man is not to be exon-
 erated from responsibility  unless  he can  not distinguish between
right and wrong, in reference to the particular act, at the time when
he does it, that this defendant has been  brought within that rule 
                          — 23 —

and you are bound by every principle  of law and  humanity to re-
turn a verdict of " not guilty."
  To this  view  of  the case,  however, Mr.  Allen  opposes the evi-
dence of gentlemen who have known the defendant from his infan-
cy.   How have  they known  him ?  Did  the  Rev. Mr. Spillman,
who  was brought here to testify  against Robert, know  him ?   He
knew him a few years ago when he was a joyous child—a promis-
ing boy, dear as existence itself  to his parents ; as dear as life to
his loving mother and  his kind,  affectionate, indulgent father—he
knew him  as the bright, glad and promising boy, who wanted to
enter into the ministry and preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ—his
whole mind was inclined to the direction of piety.  He was a boy
at that  time of great promise.   But afterwards  that  gentleman
knew nothing about him for a very considerable length of time, and
especially during the period which elapsed from the time of the vis-
itation which has brought him to the perpetration of this melancholy
deed. How has he known him ? He has known him as a just, upright
man—as one willing at all times to do right, and who is not proved to
have done any wrong from his nativity to the moment when he de-
prived John E.  Hall of his life—a man whose character would com-
pare well with that of the best  man who  lived  under the wide-
spreading heavens—a man  who was not in the  habit of taking the
name of his Maker in vain, but a young man of great  promise
from the time he knew him down to the time when this unfortunate
act was perpetrated by him.   What do other gentlemen know of
him?  (I speak of the witnesses for the prosecution.)  They have
had no particular knowledge  of  him ; they have had scarcely bet-
ter knowledge of him than Sir Thomas Davenant had  of the  man
who robbed him on the public highway ; they have had scarcely bet-
ter knowledge of him than the woman who appeared and testified
against  the two men executed upon her testimony as to their perso-
nal identity.  Have any of the  witnesses who  have testified to his
reputation for intelligence, had better acquaintance with him  than
they would have had with a stranger who had been here but a little
time?  They tell you they have not  been  intimate with  him—he
has been a coy sort of youth ;  some of them thought it was  in con-
sequence of a military education, derived at the military institution
at West Point—that he had been educated  there—and upon his re-
turn to  his native town and county, he exhibited only the air of a
military man, standing erect and bearing himself  according to the
ordinary carriage of persons educated at that institution.  What is 
—  24 —
 there in all this ?  It amounts to nothing.  What is there in all this
 testimony, taking it from beginning to end ?   Well may I say that
 it weighs not a feather.
   But, gentlemen, there are other persons than those whom I have
 named, who it seems did know something of Sloo's character. One
 is a young  man brought here to testify on the  part of the State,
 who lets in  a flood of light upon this dark course, and enables  us
 to discover, what  perhaps  we could not have so fully discovered
 through the instrumentality of any other means.   He tells you this
 young man avoided society, from "gloom  and blues." At other times
 he was advised to court society, that he might throw off ennui and
 be enabled to  enjoy life.  He endeavored so to do, but was he re-
 stored—did he find anything in the social circle, or in the converse
 of youthful friends, to restore him to his  pristine strength, and ori-
 ginal glory and peace  of mind ?  Has any thing occurred at any
 time that has enabled him to  throw off the terrible ideas which have
 preyed upon him for six long years, and deprived him of all that
 is glorious and grand in human nature?  He is still, notwithstand-
 ing he has  taken the advice of his young friend Ridgway, laboring
 under this terrible visitation  of Heaven ;  and, gentlemen, I fear it
 will not please Heaven at any time to restore him to his former state
 of mind.
   If it were possible for me to speak  with as great clearness and
 precision, in reference to delusion, as did my friend Freeman yes-
 terday, I might attempt the task.  Mr. Freeman in his able argu-
 ment to you, delivered in a clear voice and a calm manner, demon-
 strated the   absolute  absurdity of demanding the showing of the
 connection  between the delusion and the act.  In the very  case in
 which Lord Erskine, for the first time, laid down  the doctrine that
 a  party would be " emancipated from  criminal responsibility in
 consequence of the presence of delusion," in that very  case there
 was no delusion except only the delusion that, by being hurried into
 eternity, the man would become  the saviour  of the human race ;
 his delusion was  that he was  called upon to make himself  a sacri-
 fice for the human family.  Was there any delusion in that case in
 reference to the act of  shooting at the King ?  Did he not declare
 when he was arrested, after  attempting  the assassination  of the
 King, that  he knew it was wrong, and that he would  be expcuted
 for it ? believing that his execution  would enable  him to perform
what he believed was required at his hands by the will of Heaven.
   If I  have succeeded, gentlemen, in  satisfying your judgments 
—  25 —
 that the old test of right and wrong, and the new test of the power
 to discriminate between right and wrong in reference to the parti-
 cular act, are fallacious, I have performed a task which I felt it ex-
 ceedingly difficult to perform.  If I have done  so—if  I have sat-
 isfied your minds—or if the gentlemen who have preceded me have
 satisfied your minds that the  defendant perpetrated this  deed under
 insane  and irresistible impulse, then much has been done toward the
 performance  of our whole duty.   If neither of these things  has
 been performed to your satisfaction, then,  gentlemen of the jury,
 I enter upon another inquiry, and.beg your patient listening while
 I shall  endeavor to show that there is as much  absurdity in another
 proposition which has been submitted to you by the prosecution.
   It is  said that a much higher degree,  and it will be said—1 sup-
 pose it  has already been said by gentlemen who  have preceded  me
 —that  a much higher degree  of insanity is  necessary to protect a
 a party against responsibility in a criminal case, than would be re-
 quired to deprive him  of the  control of his property, or to set aside
 his contracts or his will.   If  the doctrine of one of  the cases is to
 be relied upon as proving this  distinction, then I willingly recog-
 nize that as good law.   The doctrine of  that case is, that if there
 " be a  single word sounding  to folly"—if there be a foolish word
 in  the  will—that  that single  word so  "sounding to   folly," is
 enough to  set aside the act.   If that be the law, then I  am willing
 to concede that there is a wide  difference  between that  rule which
 applies  to civil cases, and  that which applies to  criminal cases—/
 mean at common  law.  But I do concede, for it is but fair that I
 should, that the law books do make a distinction between that  sort
 of insanity which will set  aside the  civil  act of  a party, and  that
 degree which will protect him  against criminal responsibility, for an
 act done in a condition  of insanity.   There is a distinction taken
 in the common law books—there is a marked  distinction in  the
 books—for in the  earlier cases it was laid down, that there must
 be complete insanity to protect a party against criminal responsi-
 bility for any act done under the influence of mental  disease ;  but
 it never was, even in the most barbarous ages of the common law,
 laid down that absolute and total  loss of  memory and understand-
ing was necessary to be proved, tc set aside the contract of a par-
ty made in that condition,  or to deprive  him of the control of  his
estate de lunatico inquirendo, or by writ to enquire of  the lunacy
of a person against whom it was executed.  Then  I think that I
may with  propriety  say,  in the presence and hearing  of  this 
—  20 —
court, and to you, gentlemen, that according to the old law there
was a marked distinction between  criminal responsibility for acts
done  under the influence of insane delusion or impulse, and those
which avoided the contract of a party or invalidated his will, or de-
prived him under a  commission  of lunacy of the control of his
property.  It could not have been otherwise than I have stated it,
because at no time was the common law so barbarous in its judg-
ment  and determination—at no time, even from the time I may say
of the conquest, to the period when Lord Hale laid down his dog-
ma—at no time was the common law so barbarous as to say that a
contract could not be set  aside, unless the party making it was to-
tally  deprived of  his memory and understanding.
   It is then perfectly  consistent with the general  principles of the
common law, in reference  to  the  state of  the mind of the party,
that a distinction  should be taken, and that it should be maintain-
ed ; it is perfectly consistent with every principle of that old crude
code,  which was established under the rule  of tyranny and  oppres-
sion,  no way creditable to the head or heart of  any age; that bar-
barous code, I repeat, never discriminated  so nicely as to say that
a party could  not be  deprived of  the control of his property be-
cause he had not lost his understanding and memory totally.
   If  Lord Hale could rise from the grave—if his shade could pre-
side at  this trial—if  he  has had  converse with the spirits of the
other  world—if he has witnessed there the blood-stained judge and
the blood-stained  juror—and, worse than all, the blood-stained wit-
ness,  who have hurled into eternity thousands of men under a mis-
taken view of  the law, he would tell you, gentlemen, that he would
gladly recall every word and every act of his, " sounding  to folly."
He would tell you that the ghost of  Billingham is wandering upon
the shores of the  gloomy Styx, to  which he  was  hurried by
Chief Justice Mansfield and Sir Vicary Gibbs ; he would tell you
that that man who was insane, and was tried and  denied the privi-
lege of having counsel to be  heard  for him at the bar, who stood
up for himself, and having been deprived of  his papers and not
being allowed time to  arrange  them, and having  to vindicate him-
self against the prejudices of the judge and the power of the King,
and the abilities  of the Attorney General, he would  tell you that
that ghost told him that  this old rule was  not the rule  of  reason,
but that it was a bloody and inhuman rule.
  The question presented  this  morning by Mr. Allen to you, was
adjudicated upon by Chief Justice ShaAv in Rogers' case.   I mean 
 whether you are to be satisfied beyond a reasonable  doubt of the
 insanity of the defendant.   He had  told you  (and read from a
 book) that it is not  enough to warrant you in returning a verdict
 of " not guilty"  in this  case, if you were not satisfied beyond a
 doubt  that the defendant  was  insane.   I  read from  Rogers'1
 Trial, p. 281:
   The Chief Justice having concluded his charge at half-past eleven o'clock,
 the jury retired, and at half-past three p. m. came in to ask further instructions
 upon the  two questions—" Must the jury be satisfied beyond a doubt of  the in-
 sanity of the prisoner, to  entitle him to an acquittal?"  "And  what  degree of
 insanity will amount to a justification of the offence?"
   On the first point, the Chief Justice repeated his foregoing remarks upon the
 same head; and added, that "if the preponderance of the evidence were in favor
 of his insanity—if its bearing and  leaning, as a whole, inclined that way—they
 would be authorized to  find him insane."
   On the second point,  he added nothing material to the statement of law alrea-
 dy made.
   The jury again retired, and at half past  four brought in a verdict of " NOT
 GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY."
   Now you perceive, gentlemen of  the jury, that two  questions are
 made  here.   The  first is, should  the jury be satisfied  beyond a
 doubt of the insanity of the  prisoner ?  I have  no doubt, gentle-
 men, but that that argument  had been  urged by the prosecution be-
 fore the jury ; I have no  doubt that had it been contended by the
 gentlemen who prosecuted in that case, that to exonerate the pris-
 oner  from  responsibility  for the  crime that he  had committed, it
 should be shown that  he was insane beyond a  doubt.   The jury
 came back for instructions as to this point, and what does the court
 say ?  On the first point the  Chief Justice repeated his instruc-
 tions ; and then he  directly  charges that if there be a " leaning"
 towards insanity, the jury should acquit.
   What sort of rule have the learned gentlemen laid down for your
 guidance ?  What  sort of rule did the enlightened judge who pre-
 sided at that fearful trial lay down ?   Was it such a rule as has
 been stated by the gentleman in reading this case ?  It was the very
 reverse of it; it was a totally different rule.  If the evidence in-
 clined their minds  in  the direction of insanity, he charged them
they should find  in favor of his insanity, and acquit him on that
finding.   How liable are we in  reading law books to misunderstand
 the just meaning  of  words.    A great difficulty  in the progress of
 human knowledge  is   found  in the  imperfection of  language,
 in its  inadequacy to  convey  ideas  clearly from man  to  man.
Another difficulty is the misapprehension of  the meaning of words 
— 28  —
when employed to convey but one idea.   Has this charge been read
to you in this way by any gentleman who has  preceded me on the
part of the prosecution—has it been  read in the same precise way
by any one who has preceded me in the defence ?  It has been in-
sisted here that the  preponderance of evidence in favor of the in-
sanity of defendant would not  warrant you to return a verdict of
" not guilty."  I tell you in the language of Chief  Justice Shaw,
(and I shall demand that the same language be  employed by this
court,) if the whole of the testimony inclines in that direction, you
are warranted by the  solemn oath you  have  taken—you are im-
pelled by every moral obligation—you are bound by your oaths to
God and to man, to  return a verdict of "  not  guilty" upon the
inclining of  the testimony.
  Who is the man  in whose favor Chief Justice Shaw thus instruc-
ted ?   Was he a better man than Robert C. Sloo ?   Sloo has been
accused of  no crime prior to this unfortunate act; he was no guil-
ty thing that he should shrink from the gaze of men or be branded
with the disapprobation of his countrymen.   Sloo had perpetrated
no crime for the punishment of which he has been deprived of his
liberty; but this man in  whose favor this  instruction was given,
was an inmate of the penitentiary at the time of the act; he was there
as a criminal convicted of the crime of larceny. I demand at least
as much for my client, a native of the county of Gallatin, a gen-
tleman—I demand  for him at  the hands  of this court,  as much
clemency, as much leniency, in the  statement  of the law, as that
thief  received at the hands of Chief Justice  Shaw upon his trial
for the murder of Mr. Lincoln, the superintendent of the Peniten-
tiary of  the State of Massachusetts.  I ask for him  no more than
was done in favor of  that degraded man.  I  demand for him at
your hands, no more than was demanded for the defendant in that
case at the hands of the twelve honest and humane gentlemen who
tried him;  but I do ask for Sloo just the same measure of justice
and just the same  measure of law from the  court, that the thief
received at the hands of him who  sat in judgment  at that trial.
   Are we to be told at this time, that the evidence must satisfy you
beyond a reasonable doubt  of the  insanity  of  Sloo at the time of
the  commission  of  this act,  to exonerate  him  from   criminal
responsibility?  If we  are so told, I  say   it is  not law, and
ought to be scouted from  this court.   Are  we to be told—will
his honor  tell you, presiding as  he does in this case of life and
death, with a heart—I have some  reason  to  know—will he pro- 
— 29 —
noupce to you from that awful tribunal upon which he sits, that the
law requires at our hands evidence to satisfy you beyond a reason-
able doubt that Sloo was insane at the time of the perpetration of
this deed, when Chief Justice Shaw, at the trial of a man certainly
not better than Sloo, said that a leaning in that direction would
warrant a finding of " not guilty" ?  That comes up, sirs, in some
slight degree to  the principle I have laid down in this discussion.
It comes up in some sort to  the spirit of the notions which I have
expressed in reference to the degree of insanity which is necessary
to be shown to exonerate the defendant.   What is it?  It is but a
leaning in the direction  of insanity that  warrants  an acquittal—an
inclination of the mind of the jury under  the  instructions of the
court in favor of the validity of the plea, and the existence of in-
sanity, alleged in exoneration  of defendant, which warrant a jury
to return  a verdict  of  not  guilty.   Does  that  mean that  there
should be conclusive proof of its existence ?  I declare that it is
my solemn conviction that in every case of modern date, if rightly
studied and understood, the principles which I have endeavored to
enforce will be found to be recognized.
   All the cases  which  I  have cited go  upon this  principle—
that  if  there  be  insanity, that  insanity  exonerates  from
criminal responsibility,  sets  the defendant at liberty, and  may
return  him  to  the  bosom  of his family, or send  him  to the
hospital  for  the  cure   of  his unsoundness.   These  cases  have
been  mis-read;  Wharton  has   been  mis-read—-misunderstood.
This  case of  Rogers, taken in its whole  scope, maintains the doc-
trine  which I have contended for as being fairly deducible from the
criminal code of this State.   What is meant when this language is
used, if it be  not to say,  "If there be  insanity, the party shall
be acquitted?"  He means, that  if  twelve men have their minds
inclining  to the opinion that he was  insane, they must acquit him
of the charge.  He  means nothing but that; and there is no other
fair construction that can be placed upon this language.
   There is another  question, and I touch upon this with a view to
do what, in my opinion, is my duty to enforce the views I entertain.
   Now, how are we to understand this  charge ?  The key to the
understanding of it is  to be found in what he subsequently says
upon the  question of evidence to establish insanity.  A great many
of these words have  not been used with that degree of nicety which
is desirable  in  all judicial decisions and determinations; but not-
withstanding, when we  go to the other part of that  charge,  I find 
— 30 —
 the judge telling  the jury that if their minds~are inclined to the
 opinion  (what opinion?) that the defendant was laboring under
 melancholia  accompanied with  delusion, they must acquit him.   I
 ask the court to tell me if this is not  a  fair construction of this
 charge ; I ask you, gentlemen of the jury, to say whether or not this
 is not a  fair and just construction of this charge of  Chief Justice
 Shaw.   What could he have meant when the question before him
 was  simply,  whether  the party was laboring  under melancholia
 accompanied with  delusion ; what  could he have meant when  he
 told the jury  that if they were satisfied that  the evidence inclined or
 leaned in the direction of insanity (what  sort—bare melancholy,
 accompanied  with  delusion?) they ought to acquit the defendant?
   Then, gentlemen of the jury, we have it in proof,  that not only
 has this young man been laboring under melancholy,  from his own
 intimate  friend, young Mr. Ridgway, but we have the  fact that that
 melancholy was induced  by  the most terrible  affliction;  and the
 conclusion of physicians—men of science—upon these facts is, that
 he was  absolutely insane—that  he was  in  a state of  incipient
 dementia.  And now let me tell you what I understand  dementia
 to be.
   Dementia,  as  I understand it, is one of  the classes or forms of
 insanity as found in the books.  Dementia, in its strict and literal
 sense, signifies deprivation of mind ; coming from two Latin words,
 de (out of) and mens  (mind).  Complete dementia is when the
 understanding and memory are totally dethroned ;  not merely when
 madness sits down with reason upon her throne, and, in the words of
 Lord  Erskine, " holds her trembling there."   When there is a total
 deprivation of understanding,  then, and not till then,  there is com-
 plete  dementia.   What sort of dementia have wo established by the
 testimony of the learned gentlemen who have testified on our part in
 this case ?  Mr.  Allen thinks  that the testimony of Dr. McFarland
 is entitled to  no weight;  he that has seen maniacs by thousands ;
 he that has gone, so  intent was he upon gathering information to
 guide and direct him in the performance of his  duty—he that has
 gone  to the cell of Tasso.   He has travelled inthe  hospitals  of
Europe, and  he  has seen thousands of men laboring under this
 disease.   He  has gone to Italy and viewed the ruins of that empire.
If he  has derived no benefit from travel and nine years' presidency
 over lunatic asylums of  this country ;  if he has made no progress,
I demand to  know whose  opinion would weigh with the gentleman
in  coming to a conclusion upon this question ?   Certainly not the 
— 31  —
opinion of Dr.  Condon, for he had the candor to say—while at the
same time there was a manifest disposition on his part to set up his
judgment against the judgment  of  other  gentlemen—he had the
candor to declare that he had never read .a book upon metaphysics
in the whole course of his life, much less upon insanity.   I asked
him  to  tell me if he had ever read Locke—he had not even  read
that through ; if he had read  Esquirol or Ray—he said he had not
read either of  these ; I asked him to tell me what books on meta-
physics  he had read—he  said  he had read none—none of  the
American  standards, nor  Locke, Stewart, or Reid.   Then what
foundation have they to rest his opinion upon ?  He told me he had
read no work upon the disease with which the defendant is afflicted ;
that he had read no work, except generally in works on the practice
of medicine, on the  disease  of  the mind.  He did say something
about his  reading Dr. Rush.

  [It being now 12 o'clock, M., the Court adjourned till 1 o'clock, P. M., when
Mr. Davis resumed as follows] :

   I  have been  endeavoring,  gentlemen, to enforce  the view with
which I set out; I have been endeavoring to make  plain the original
proposition with which I started ; I have been endeavoring, in my
way, to convince you that there  is no  other enlightened and  just
rule  than the rule  upon which I was  insisting.   I trusted that I
had, in some sort, performed  that part of my duty.  I trusted that
I had laid before you, and before this  court, cases so  completely
illustrative of the rule upon which  I  insisted, that there would
scarcely be a doubt in the mind of any man in regard to the cor-
rectness of the  position which  I assume.
   I  felt,  gentlemen of the jury, that the Rogers'  case, rightly
understood and correctly  presented, was in keeping  with  those
views.   I felt,  and so expressed myself, that the chief difficulties
in the Avay of demonstrating the  correctness of my position were to
be found in the adjudications of  the earlier ages, and in the strict
adherence, by the common law judges, to those adjudications.   To
my mind, there  is no clearer proposition, than that proof of the
presence  of insanity  is enough, and that a judge in the exercise of
his office, prompted by considerations of humanity and acting in
obedience to  a just and christian spirit, would never do otherwise
than give the instructions which were given by Chief Justice Shaw
in the case of Rogers ; and whenever that character of instruction
is given, that moment all  the difficulty in the way of  the law in 
—  32 —
re'erence to insanity  is removed—the way is clear,  and lighted
up on every han 1, through which we may pass without danger.
  I have said all that  I proposed to myself to say in reference to
the mere law of this case.   My whole endeavor has been to perform
that  duty in  such a way, and under the influence of such a spirit,
as should be unexceptionable in the opinion of all men.  That dif-
ferences of  opinion should exist  between gentlemen on the same
proposition  is not at  all wonderful;  that differences  of  opinion
should exist  among  judges is equally to be expected;  that differ-
ences of  opinion should exist among men in reference to  every
topic of di:>cussion,  is only what human experience makes  at least
probable.
  But another topic has been addressed to you—a topic apart from
the i.iere law of this case—a topic which appeals to your experience.
You  have been  told that Robert C. Sloo was a young man of  at
lea-t mediocre  intelligence ; indeed,  that  he  Mas quite above the
youths o'J Shawneetown of his own age and condition.   From that
statement you are called upon to infer  that there was no insanity in
him at the time of the perpetration of the deed which has called you
to.:.:;■'ther, and which has detained you from your families these twen-
ty-three days.   If, gentlemen, the test of intelligence was capable
of settling this difficulty—if, through its instrumentality, you should
arrive  at  a  just conclusion—your labor would be  ended with less
difficulty—would be plainer, and more easily performed.  But that
is r.ot the test;  that test is too fallible:  that  test is too little sup-
ported by experience or bv learning.  The test  is not in  accordance
with the enlightened  adjudications  of  the  time in  which we live ;
that  test  never was  recognized as being entitled to  serious consid-
eration in a ease of  this  kind.  I read to you, gentlemen of the
jury, in support of the  views which I have presented upon this topic
of discussion, the case of Bellingham before  Chief Justice Mans-
field, in. 1811,  for  the assassination of  the Chancellor  of  the
Exchequer of England, the Hon.  Spencer Perceval.  I have told
you  already that, according to the forms of English procedure and
English h>w, in  the  trial  of  criminal  cases, the defendant had no
rk'ht to be  heard  by counsel, except it be in a case for treason.
H re is the case of Bellingham:
  Ori Monday, May the  lltli, as  Mr. Perceval  was entering  the lobby of the
Ilon*e of C irnnoi)^, ;it » winder past five in the evening, he was shot with &
pi-. I tired at  nun as h* enteivd  the door. He was in company with Lord F.
0 'Die, nnd immediately  on receiving the ball, which entered the left  breast,
\  .-;a£_'9ied, and fell at the feet of  Mr. W. Smith, who was standing near the 
— 33 —
 second pillar.  The only words he uttered were, "Oh! I am murdered !"  and
 the latter was inarticulate, the sound dying between his lips.   He was instantly
 taken up by  Mr. Smith, who did  not recognize him until he had examined his
 face.  The report of the pistol immediately drew  great  numbers to  the spot,
 who assisted Mr. Smith in conveying the body of Mr. Perceval into the Speak-
 er's apartments ; but all  signs of  his life had departed.
   Mr.  Perceval's body was placed upon a bed when Mr. Lynn, of Great George
 street, who had been sent for, arrived, but too late even to witness the last symp-
 toms of expiring existence.   He found that the ball, which was of an unusually
 large size, had penetrated the heart near its centre, and had passed completely
 through it.  From thence the body was removed to the Speaker's drawing-room
 by Mr. Lynn and several  members, where it was laid on a sopha.
   The horror and dismay occasioned by the assassination of Mr. Perceval, pre-
 vented any attention from being paid to  the perpetrator, and it was not until he
 was raised from the floor, that a  person exclaimed, " Where is the rascal that
 fired ?" when a person of the name of Bellingham, who had been unobserved, step-
 ped up to him, and  coolly replied, " I am the unfortunate man."  He did not
 make any attempt to escape, though he had thrown away the pistol by which
 he had perpetrated the deed, but resigned himself quietly into the hands of some
 of the by-standers.  They placed him upon a bench near the  fire-place, where
 they detained him; the doors were  closed, and the egress of all persons pre-
 vented.  When the  assassin was interrogated as to his motive for this dreadful
 act, he replied, " My name is  Bellingham ; it is a private  injury; I know what
 I have done ; it was a denial of justice on the part of government."
   On Thursday, the grand jury, at Hick's  Hall, found a true bill against  Bel-
 lingham, for the wilful murder of the right honorable  Spencer Perceval. It ap-
 peared that, with respect to  the  manner in which Bellingham passed the pre-
 vious part of the day on  which he committed the murder, he went with a lady
 to the European  Museum, where he was  detained till past four o'clock.   He
 parted from her at the extremity of Sidney's Alley, and went down immediately
 to the House of Commons, without having dined, and with his pistols loaded.
 He was so anxious not to be  disappointed by the  failure of the weapon, that,
 after he had bought his pistols, for which he gave four guineas, he went to Prim-
 rose Hill to try how they  would go off, and, when he had  ascertained their effi-
 cacy, loaded them for his purpose.
   His trial came on  at the Old Bailey, Friday, May 15th.  At half past ten, the
 judges, Lord Chief  Justice Mansfield, Baron Graham, and Sir Nash Grose, en-
 tered the court.   The prisoner was immediately  ordered to the bar.  He advan-
 ced slowly, with the utmost composure of countenance, and bowed to the court.
 He was dressed in a brown coat, striped waistcoat, and dark small clothes. The
 prisoner  pleaded  not guilty, and the facts, already stated, having been proved
 by several respectable witnesses, he was called upon for his defence?
   The prisoner asked whether his counsel had nothing to urge in his defence ?
   Mr. Alley informed him that his counsel were not entitled to speak.
   The prisoner said, that the documents and papers necessary to his defence had
been taken out of his pocket, and had not since been restored to him.   The pa-
pers were then handed to  the  prisoner, who proceeded  to arrange and examine
them.  The prisoner, who had been  sitting till now, rose, and bowing respect-
fully to the court and jury, went  into his defence in a firm tone of voice, and
without any  appearance of embarrassment or feeling for the  awful situation
in  which he  was placed.  He spoke nearly to the following effect: " I feel great
obligation to the Attorney-General for the objection  which he has made to the
plea of insanity.  I think it is far more fortunate that such a plea as that should
           3 
— 34 —
 have been unfounded, than it should have  existed in fact.  I am obliged to my
 counsel, however, for having thus  endeavored to consult my interest, as I am
 convinced the attempt  his arisen from ihe kindest motives.  That I am, or have
 been insane, is a circumstance of  which I am not apprized, except in the single
 instance of my having been confined in Russia—how far that may be considered
 as affecting my present situation,it  is not for me to determine.  This is the first
 time I have ever spoken in public inthis way. I feel my own incompetency, but I
 trust you will attend to the substance, rather than to the manner, of my investi-
 gating the truth of an  affair which  has occasioned my presence at this bar.   if
 beg to assure you, that the crime which. I have committed has arisen from com-
 pulsion  rather than from any hostility to the man whom it has been my fate to
 destroy.  Considering  the amiable  character, and the universally admitted vir
 tues of  Mr. Perceval,  I feel,  if I  could murder him in a cool and unjustifiable
 manner, I should not deserve  to live another moment in this world.   Conscious^
 however, that I shall  be  able to  justify  every thing which I have done,. I feel
 some degree of confidence in meeting the storm which assails me, and shall now
 proceed to unfold a catalogue  of  circumstances, which, while  they  harrow up
 my own soul, will, I am sure, tend to the extenuation of my conduct in this hon-
 orable court.  This, as has already  been  candidly stated  by the Attorney-Gen-
 eral, is the first instance in which any, the  slightest imputation has been  cast
 upon my moral character.  Until  this fatal  catastrophe, which no one can more
 heartily regret than I do, not  excepting even the family of Mr. Perceval him-
 self, I have stood alike pure in the minds of those who have known me, and  in
 the judgment of my own heart.  I hope I see this affair in the true light.  For
 eight years, gentlemen of the jury, have I  been  exposed to all the miseries which
 it is possible for human nature to endure.  Driven almost to despair, I sought
 for redress in vain. For this affair, I had the carte blanche of government, as I
 will  prove by the most incontestable evidence, namely, the writing of the Secre-
 tary of  State himself.   I come before you under peculiar disadvantages.   Many
 of my most material papers are now at Liverpool, for which I have written, but
 have been called upon my trial before it was possible to obtain an answer to my
 letter.  Without witnesses, therefore, and in the absence of many papers necps-
 sary to my justification, I am sure you will admit I have just grounds for claim-
 ing  some indulgence.   I must state, that  after my return from my voyage to
 Archangel, I transmitted to his royal highness, the Prince Regent, through my
 solicitor,  Mr. Windle, a petition ;  and  in  consequence of receiving no reply, I
 came to London, to see the result.   Surprised at the delay, and conceiving that
 the interests of my country were at  stake, I considered this step as essential, as
 well for the assertion  of  my own  right, as  for the vindication of the national
 honor.  I waited upon  Col. McMahon, who stated that my petition had been re-
ceived, but, owing to some accident,  had been mislaid.  Under these circumstan-
ces, I drew out another account of the particulars of the Russian affair, and this
may be considered as the commencement  of that train of events which led to
the afflicting and unhappy fate of Mr. Perceval.  This  petition I shall now  beg
leave to read."  (Here the prisoner read a long petition.)
  In the course of  narrating these hardships, he took  occasion to explain sev-
eral points, and adverted with great feeling to the unhappy  situation in which
he was placed, from the circumstance of his having been but  lately married to
his wife, then about twenty years of  age, with an infant at her breast, and who
had been waiting for him at St. Petersburg!), in order that she might accompany
 him  to England—a prey to all those  anxieties which the  unexpected and cine'
 incarceration of her husband,  without any just grounds, was  calculated to ex- 
—  35 —
cite.  [In saying this, the prisoner seemed much affected.)   He also described his
feelings at a subsequent period, when his wife, from an anxiety to reach her na-
tive country (England) when in a state of pregnancy, and looking to the impro-
bability of his liberation, was obliged  to quit St. Petersburgh unprotected, and
undertake the voyage  at the peril of her life, while Lord L. Gower and Sir S.
Shairpe suffered him to remain in a situation worse than death.  " My God! my
God !"  he exclaimed,  " what heart could bear such  excruciating  tortures, with-
out bursting with indignation at conduct so diametrically opposite to justice and
to humanity.   I appeal to you, gentlemen of the jury, as men—I appeal to you
as Christians—whether, under such circumstances of  persecution, it was possi-
ble for me to regard the actions of the Ambassador and Consul of my own coun-
try with any other feelings  but those  of detestation and horror.   In using lan-
guage thus strong, I feel that I commit an error; yet does my heart tell me,that
men who lent themselves thu3 to bolster up the basest acts of persecution, there
are no observations, however strong, which the strict  justice of the case would
not excuse my  using towards them.   Had I  been  so fortunate  as to have met
Lord Leveson  Gower, instead  of  that truly amiable and highly  lamented indi-
vidual, Mr. Perceval, he is the man who should have received the ball! ! !"
   After reading several other  papers, he thus proceeded :—" I  will now only
mention a few  observations by way of defei.ce.  You have before you all the
particulars of this  melancholy transaction.  Believe  me, gentlemen, the rash-
ness of  which I have been guilty has not been dictated by any personal animos-
ity to Mr. Perceval, rather than injure whom, from private or malicious motives,
I would suffer my limbs to be cut from my body, (i/cre the prisoner seemed again
much agitated.)
   "If, whenever I  am called before the tribunal of God, I can appear with as
clear a conscience  as I now possess, in regard to the alleged charge of  the will-
ful murder of the  unfortunate gentleman, the investigation of  whose death has
occupied your attention, it  would  be happy  for me,  as essentially securing to
me eternal salvation,—but that  is impossible.   That my arm has been the means
of his melancholy and lamented  exit, I am  ready  to allow.   But to constitute
murder, it must clearly and absolutely  be proved to  have arisen from malice pre-
pense, and with a malicious design, as  I have  no doubt  the  learned judge will
shortly lay down, in explaining the law on the subject.  If such is the case, I
am guilty ; if not, I look forward with confidence to your acquittal.
   "That the contrary is the case, has been most clearly and irrefragably proved :
no doubt can rest upon your minds, as my uniform and undeviating object has
been, an endeavor  to  obtain justice, according to law, for a series of  the most
long-continued and unmerited sufferings that were ever  submitted to a court of
law, without having been guilty of any other  crime than an appeal for redress
for a most flagrant  injury offered to my sovereign  and my  country, wherein my
liberty and my property have fallen a sacrifice for the continued  period of eight
years, to the total ruin of myself and family (with  authenticated documents of
the truth of the allegation), merely because  it was Mr. Grant's pleasure that
justice should not be granted, sheltering himself with the idea of  there being no
alternative remaining, as my petition  to Parliament  for  redress could not be
brought forward (as having a pecuniary tendency)  without the sanction of his
majesty's ministers, and that he was determined to  oppose, by trampling  both
on law  and right.
   " Gentlemen,  where a man has so  strong and serious a criminal case to bring
forward as  mine  has  been, the nature of which  was purely national, it is the
bounden duty of government to attend to it, for justice is a matter of right, and 
— 36 —
not of favor.   And, when a minister  is so unprincipled and presumptuous, at
any time, but  especially in a case of such urgent necessity, as  to set himself
above both the sovereign and the laws,  as has been the case with Mr. Perceval,
he must do it at his personal risk; for,  by the law, he can not be protected.
  " Gentlemen, if this  is not fact, the mere will of a minister would be law; it
would be this thing to-day, and the other to-morrow, as either interest or caprice
might dictate.  What would become of our liberties ? where would be the purity
and the impartiality of  the justice we so  much boast  of ?  To government's
non-attendance to the dictates of justice is solely to  be attributed the melan-
choly catastrophe of the unfortunate gentleman, as any malicious intention to
his injury was the most remote from my heart.  Justice, and justice only, was
my object, which government uniformly objected to grant; and  the  distress it
reduced me to, drove me to despair.  In consequence, and purely for the purpose
of having the  singular affair legally investigated, I gave notice at the public
office, Bow street, requesting the  magistrates to acquaint his majesty's minis-
ters, that if they persisted in refusing justice, or even to  permit me to bring my
just p°tition into Parliament for redress, I should be under the imperious necessity
of executing justice  myself, solely for the  purpose of ascertaining, through a
criminal court, whether his majesty's ministers have the  power to refuse justice
to a well  authenticated  and irrefutable act of oppression, committed by the
consul  and ambassador abroad, whereby my sovereign's and country's honor
were materially tarnished by  my person endeavoring to be  made the stalking-
horse of justification to one of the greatest insults  that  could be offered to the
crown.
  " But in order to avoid  so reluctant and abhorrent an alternative, I have hoped
to be allowed to bring my petition to the House of Commons, or that they would
do what was right and proper themselves.
  '•' On my return home from Russia, I brought most serious charges to the privy
council, both against Sir Stephen  Shairpe and Lord G. L. Gower, when the af-
fair was determined to be purely national, and, consequently, it was the duty of
his majesty's ministers to arraign it, by  acting on the resolution of the council
Suppose, for instance, the charge I brought  could have been  proved to be erro-
neous, should I not have been called to severe account for my conduct; but, be-
ing true, ought I not to  have been redressed?
  "After the notice  from the police to the government, Mr. Ryder, conscious of
the truth and cruelty of the case, transmitted the affair to  the treasury, referring
me there for a final  result.  After a delay of some weeks, the treasury came to
the resolution of sending  the affair back to the secretary  of state's office ; at the
same time, I was told by  a Mr. Hill, he thought it would be useless my making
further application  to  government,  and that I was at  full liberty to take such
measures as I thought proper for redress.
  " Mr. Beckett, the under-secretary of  state, confirmed the same, adding, that
Mr. Perceval had been consulted, and could not allow any petition to come for-
ward.  Thus, by a direct refusal of justice, with a carte  blanche to act in what-
ever manner I  thought proper, were the  sole  causes of the fatal catastrophe; and
they have now to reflect on their own impure conduct for what has happened.
  " It is a melancholy fact, that the warping of justice, including all the various
ramifications in which it operates, occasions more misery in the world, in a mor-
al sense, than  all the acts of God in a physical one, with which he punishes
mankind for their transgressions; a confirmation of which, the single but strong
instance before you is one remarkable proof.
  " If a poor unfortunate man  stops another upon the highway, and robs him of 
— 37 —
but a few shillings, he may be called upon to forfeit his life.   But I have been
robbed of my liberty for years, ill-treated beyond precedent, torn from my wife
and family, bereaved of all my property to make good the consequences of such
irregularities ; deprived and bereaved of everything that makes life valuable, and
then called upon to forfeit it, because Mr. Perceval has been pleased to patron-
ize iniquity that ought to have been punished, for the sake of  a vote or two in
the House of Commons, with, perhaps, a similar good turn elsewhere.
  "Is there, gentlemen, any comparison between the enormity of these two offen-
ders?  No  more than a mite to a mountain.  Yet the one is carried to the gal-
lows, while the other stalks in security, fancying himself  beyond the reach of
law or justice : the most honest man suffers, while the other  goes forward in
triumph to  new and more extended enormities.
  " We have had a recent and striking instance of some unfortunate men, who
have been called upon to pay their lives as the forfeit of their allegiance, in  en-
deavoring to mitigate the rigors of a prison.  (Alluding to some recent trials
for high treason, at Horsemonger-lane.)  But, gentlemen, where is  the propor-
tion between the crimes for which they suffered, and what government has been
guilty of in withholding its protection from  me ?   Even in  a crown case, after
years of suffering, I have been called upon to sacrifice all my property, and  the
welfare of my family, to  bolster up the iniquities of the  crown, and then am
prosecuted  for my life because  I  have  taken  the  only possible alternative to
bring the affair to a public investigation, for the purpose of  being enabled to re-
turn to the  bosom of my family with some degree of comfort and honor.  Every
man within the sound of my voice must feel for my situation;  but by you, gen-
tlemen of the jury, it must be felt in a peculiar degree, who are husbands  and
fathers, and who can fancy yourselves in my situation.  I trust that this serious
lesson will  operate ss a warning to all future ministers, and  lead them to do  the
thing that is right, as an unerring rule of conduct; for, if  the superior classes
were more  correct in their proceedings, the extensive ramifications of evil would,
in a great measure, be hemmed up ; and a notable proof of  the fact is, that  this
court would never have been troubled with the case now before it, had their con-
duct been guided by  these principles.
  " I have now occupied the attention of the  court for a period much longer than
I intended; yet I trust they will consider  the awfulness of  my situation to be  a
sufficient ground for  a trespass, which, under other circumstances, would be in-
excusable.  Sooner than suffer what I have suffered for the last eight years, how-
ever, I should consider five hundred deaths, if it were possible for human nature
to endure them, a fate far more preferable.   Lost so long to all the endearments
of  my family, bereaved of all the blessings of life,  and deprived of its greatest
sweet, liberty,as the weary traveller who has  longbeen pelted by the pitiless storm
welcomes the much desired inn, I shall receive death as the relief of all my  sor-
rows.   I shall not occupy your attention  longer; but relying on the  justice of
God, and submitting myself to the dictates of your conscience, I submit to ihe Jiat
of  my fate, firmly anticipating an acquittal from a charge so abhorrent to every
feeling  of my soul."
   Here the prisoner bowed, and  his counsel  immediately proceeded to call wit-
nesses, in order to prove a state of insanity.
   The Lord Chief  Justice, in summing up the evidence, pointed out those species
of  insanity which would excuse murder, or any other crime  ; but a person capa-
ble of distinguishing right from wrong could not be excused.
  The jury, after a quarter of an hour,  brought  in a verdict of Guilty.
   The impressive and awful sentence of the  law was heard  by him without any
apparent emotion. 
—  38 —
  On Monday morning, May 18th, a few minutes before eight, this wretched man
appealed on the scaffold, perfectly resigned to his fate, and, in about two min-
utes, was launched into eternity.

   Will my friend, Mr. Robinson,  or my other friend, Mr. Allen,
and still my other friend, Mr.  Logan, tell me that there are many
men in their sane moments that can make a better speech than this
is ?  What character of test of  insanity  is that which these gentle-
men ask you to establish?   If there can be found anywhere in this
country, or in England, or in any country, any thing which warrants
the  conclusion to which the minds of the prosecution in this case
have been conducted, then I confess my total ignorance of its ex-
istence ; I know not in what school of philosophy it is found.  For
my single self, I have not  had the good or bad fortune to be edu-
cated in such  a school.  I know nothing  of  such processes  of
reasoning, and I repudiate them.  Here  the  unfortunate  man
speaks of  the well known principles of the law ;  here he adverts, in
clear and distinct language, to the well known tests of responsibility,
or rather,  to the well known  principle in reference to guilt, when he
says, that  " before you can convict, it must clearly and absolutely
be proved to have  arisen from malice prepense and with a malicious
design."  This  is the very doctrine, the very  language which  a
judge or  lawyer would hold;  this is the very character of speech
which any sane man would make upon a similar occasion.   A man
can only be held responsible when he acts with malice aforethought,
or, as he expresses it, " with malice prepense and with a malicious
design."
   Bellingham was hanged—convicted under the instruction of Chief
Justice Mansfield, laying dowu a principle which was an absurdity,
that to exonerate himself he must have been in such a condition of
mind as to be totally unable  to distinguish between right and wrong
— notwithstanding his speech—after being confined in Russia as a
lunatic, and as a lunatic having  killed Mr.  Perceval, because he
believed, when he had killed him, he could bring before the country
all the  abuses that he  complained of,  and have them redressed.
He had bent  himself before the government for years, and, after
having done all that he thought possible for him to do, he resolved
that he would kill the Chancellor of  the Exchequer, and in that way
bring his case before his country,  and have it adjudicated upon in
such a manner as to be reimbursed the losses which he had sus-
tained in the service of his country in Russia.
   If that jury could have known his previous history, he would not 
—  39 —
 have been convicted; if  that jury could have witnessed the sublime
 spectacle which has been exhibited in the progress of this trial; if
 they could have beheld  the  law as  it has been here exhibited; if
 they could have seen the trial delayed from time to time, and finally
 allowing to the defendant the privilege of  challenging, if he chose
 to do  so, twenty men ; if  these things could have been brought to
 the aid of that poor individual, circumstanced as he was, he would
 have been relieved from the penalty of the law—he would not have
 been convicted.   Only five days were allowed to elapse between the
 commission  of the offence and the period of  his conviction.  Only
 five days elapsed  from the time when he took the life of the Hon.
 Spencer Perceval  and the time when the judge, with his black  cap
 on, pronounced the sentence  of death upon him.   What a farce of
 a trial I  How deplorable—how pitiable was his condition 1
   But, gentlemen, my chief  object in reading to you this case, is
 to evince  to you,  beyond  successful controversy, that a man may
 be in the possession of almost all his faculties, and still commit a
 crime for which he is not, or ought not to  be responsible.   I read
 to you this  case, chiefly with the view to meet that strange course
 of argument adopted  b^ the prosecution;  I read this case to you
 for the purpose of satisfying your judgment that this is no reliable
 test—that it is not only not philosophical, but that it is cruel and
 inhuman, to say that the possession of high intelligence is conclu-
 sive evidence of sanity.   It is a thing too absurd to be dwelt upon.
 What do the books tell you, gentlemen, and what have the learned
 gentlemen, who have come here under process of law, told you as
 to the possession of intelligence by a man laboring under insanity ?
 They tell you, in  many instances  they evince an  extraordinary
 degree  of subtlety and ingenuity in the  conduct of arguments—in
 the laying of plans, and in their execution.   You have heard from
 Mr. Swett the case of the District Attorney of the United States
 for the District of Missouri.   That man who was so insane as to
 cut off  his own nose, supposing that, like the hair of  his head, it
 would grow again ;  that man  who, in the city  of New York, was so
 fully in the possession of his faculties as to know the law in refer-
 ence to assault, and battery—who, to guard himself  against the
 effects of  collisions in the streets, took a witness, and took his full
half of  the way, and when he came in collision with a vehicle, got
into  a difficulty, and then proved by his witness that he had given
at least  half of the  road, and was guilty of no wrong, and that the
other man struck him  first with a whip—he affords  another com- 
                            — 40 —

 plete illustration  of  the absurdity of  the position insisted upon by
 Mr. Allen.
   There  are  so  many cases which go to illustrate this view of the
 subject, that  it would  be  painful for  me to read them—perhaps it
 would be a loss of time.
   Mr. Robinson has  told you, and Mr. Allen has told you, and my
 learned friend, Mr.  Logan,  will also  tell you, that the papers
 which we have read in  evidence to you are  are not entitled to your
 consideration, because  they do not afford  justification for the act
 done.  They  were not offered with a view to justification—they
 were offered  with  another and a  different view; they were offered
 for  the  purpose of  enabling us to bring before you certain prin-
 ciples laid  down in  the books, or certain doctrines taught by the
 books, in reference to the operation  of defamation  on the  sane
 mind.  Many a man has lost his reason under  the influence of de-
 famation.   Many a man has been deprived of his understanding by
 the  mere operation of  defamation.   Many a man, writhing under
 the lash of  slander, has committed suicide, or has been deprived of
 his reason, so as  to  warrant his incarceration  in a lunatic asylum
 for  the balance of his days.  I  read from Rush to show you the
 reason, in  part, of  the introduction  of these papers  (p.  38):
 " The bedlams of Europe exhibit many cases of  madness from
 public and private defamation, and history informs us of ministers
 of state and generals  of armies having often languished away their
 lives  in a  state of partial derangement, in consequence of beiDg
 unjustly dismissed by their sovereigns."
  Did you hear these papers read ?  I have told you, that if I pos-
 sessed the power  that I would gladly restore John E. Hall to his
 wife and to his children.   I told you but the feelings of my heart
 when I have so spoken to you ; but, gentlemen,  although I enter-
 tain these feelings—although  nothing rankles in my bosom toward
 John E. Hall—although he never offended me, and I have no cause
 for offending  his widow and  his  orphans, you will  pardon me, if
 necessity compels me  to speak somewhat severely of  these articles.
 But I am here to perform a sacred duty—I am here in the execu-
tion of a most solemn office ; not so solemn as that you are  per-
forming, yet such an  office as no man with a head or heart could
 enter upon  the duties of  without feeling a degree of trepidation
 and diffidence.
  I ask, what influence may it be supposed that these articles ex-
erted upon the mind of  Sloo ?  How is it likely he was affected by 
— 41 —
 them ?  Suppose him to be in full possession of all his faculties—
 suppose him to be only such as we all are, perishable, mortal, dying
 bodies ; suppose this, and then ask yourselves, what influence these
 publications were likely to  exert over his  mind, though he were
 sane.   If  the bedlams of Europe have been filled, or if they only
 furnish some  instances  of insane persons, made so by defamation,
 may we not suppose  that in this country this might have some in-
 fluence upon the mind of a gentleman of birth ?
   What were these  words ?  I beseech you to pardon me if any
 allusion of mine to  the memory of John E. Hall may seem to
 be unkind;  I repeat,  towards  him,  his  widow  and children,
 I entertain no unkindness.  What was  the language  of those
 articles—what  character  of articles were those  that have been
 read to you ?  Robert C. Sloo is himself  branded as a coward and
 deserter—he  is  himself spoken  of  in terms of derision and  dis-
 grace—he is described  as  an upstart coming from West Point—he
 is said to be a man, who,  having no sense of his obligation to his
 country, no sense  of honor, volunteering in a certain troop, de-
 serted from  cowardice.  What  more, gentlemen ?  Not content
 with  speaking of Robert in the manner in which I  have mentioned,
 the writer speaks of his father as a " perjured scoundrel," a felon ;
 speaks of  him in every form in which he can apply the epithets of
 dishonor and derision; speaks  of the family  of defendant—the
 female portion of it.  I  once  had a father myself—that father
 sleeps with his fathers ;  I once had a mother myself, who has been
 gathered to her final  home.   Oh, God ! oh,  God! if, while that
 father lived, any man had assailed him as Col.  Sloo was assailed,
 what would have staid my arm ?  what power  save the power of a
 rational  brain could  have arrested it ?—what, but prayer to God
 could  have armed  me  against  it ?—what, but the descent  of  an
 angel from  Heaven to interpose  between  me and  my  vengeance,
 could have  staid my arm ?  And suppose that I were placed in the
 situation of this unfortunate youth; suppose my mother—that
 mother whose kindness nursed and protected me in  my  infancy,
 had been assailed in such a way—before God, I would have rushed
 to my vengeance, and would  have swept from this world any such
 man, even  in  my  sane moments.   I know no  law, human  or
 divine. I will not say divine, because Jesus Christ, while on earth,
taught us, that when we were smitten on  one side, we  should turn
the other cheek, and receive a blow on that also ; but who is there
upon  this earth,  that can  imitate successfully  the  example of the 
—  42 —
 Saviour of mankind?  Who is there  that can act fully in accord-
 ance with  the  teachings  of the very Christ ?  No living man can
 do it.
   Then there are the  sisters of the defendant.   They are spoken
 of too.  How are they spoken of?  I leave you to determine.  I
 shall not address myself  to  the consideration of  the language em-
 ployed in reference to the girls, but I will simply say, Mr. Gray-
 son, once  for  all, that if there  be one sacred tie—one tie that
 should be cemented by every consideration of duty and obligation—
 it is  that tie which  binds the  brother to his sister;  it is that tie
 which has a right to  command the conduct of the brother in the
 vindication of the reputation and standing of a sister.   If there be
 any thing on  earth which  may claim  in some sort a  kindred with
 Heaven, it  is that quality in  the  human heart  which prompts  a
 young man to  rush  to the rescue  of the fame of his  sister from
 the cormorant devouring of  a slanderer.
   A great deal, gentlemen of the jury, has been  said in  reference
 to the means which produce insanity ; they are as various as are the
 likenesses of men; they  are as completely separated  by lines of
 demarkation as you can separate any solid substance by making  a
 line upon it by the  use of a chisel.  Another instance is here ;  I
 will read  from Dr. Rush.   His honor will recognize in the name of
 Dr. Rush a patriot and a scholar ;   and every gentleman will recog-
 nize the fact, that Dr. Rush  was not only the  pride of  his profes-
 sion, but  that he was an  ornament to his country.   He says (p.
 40):
  A clergyman in Maryland became  insane in consequence of having permitted
 some  typographical errors to  escape in a sermon which he published upon the
 death of Gen. Washington.
  Intellectual derangement [continues the same author, p. 40] is more common
 from mental than  corporeal causes.  Of 113 patients in the Bicetre Hospital in
 France, at one time, Mr. Pinel tells us, 34 were from domestic misfortunes ; 24
 from disappointments in love; 30 from the  distressing events of the French
 revolution,  and 25  from what  he  calls fanaticism,  making in all the original
 number. I have taken pains to ascertain the proportion of mental and corpo-
 real causes which have  operated  in producing  madness  in the Pennsylvania
 Hospital, but  I am sorry  to add, my  success in  this  inquiry was less satisfac-
 tory than I wished.  Its  causes were concealed  in some instances, and forgot-
 ten in others.
  Dr.  Roe  testified before you  in such a manner as to entitle  his
evidence to  the  highest  consideration, and he bore himself before
you  (be it spoken in his praise) in such a way as to leave it per-
fectly easy for the gentlemen engaged in this trial  to show that by
the books he is  absolutely  supported. 
—  43 —
   The learned witnesses have spoken in reference to the influence
of climate  and  government upon the mind;  they have  told you.
what is easy to be supported ;  they have told you that government
—that institutions, in  other words, have much to do  with the dis-
eases of the mind.  I read from this  distinguished author to sup-
port the gentleman who  so testified (p. 62):
  Certain climates predispose to madness.  It is very uncommon in such as are
uniformly warm.  Dr. Gordon  informed me in his visit to Philadelphia in the
year 1807, that he had never seen nor heard of a single case of madness during
a residence of six years in the province of Berbice.  It is a rare disease in the
West Indies.  While great and constant heat increases the irritability of  the
muscles, it gradually lessens the sensibility of the nerves and mind, and the irri-
tability of the blood-vessels, and in these I formerly supposed the predisposition
to madness to be seated.  It is more common in climates alternately warm and
cold, but most so in such as  are generally  moist and cold, and accompanied at
the same time with a clouded sky.
   If there  be  any climate under the wide-spread heavens  which
more than all others will predispose to insanity, it is the climate of
Southern Illinois, peculiarly  moist, changeable beyond  any other
country of  this beautiful globe, 'or as much so as any other country
in the world, warm at times and cold at other times.  It may be
that the climate has had something to do  with the production of
disease in the  defendant.   I have no doubt it has had much to do
with it.
  Instances of it are said to be most  frequent in England in the month of No-
vember, at which time the weather is unusually gloomy, from the above causes.
Even the transient occurrence of that kind of weather in the United States  has
had an influence upon this disease.
   Gentlemen have attempted to  laugh to  scorn the learned wit-
nesses who  have appeared for the defendant—appeared for the de-
fendant, did I say ?—who  have  been brought here by the process
of law to appear for the innocent.  Why have they been laughed
at—why has the  smile  of derision made its  appearance upon the
faces of gentlemen engaged in the prosecution ?  It was no unkind
motive that prompted  it, but it  was  an incredulity,  the  result of
not having  investigated the laws  of the human mind, and the causes
which produce  there  this  disease,—that  wreck and ruin, that  in-
duced these gentlemen thus to deride the learned witnesses, (Rush.
p. 67):
  In despotic countries where the public passions are torpid, and where life  and
property are secured only by the extinction of the domestic affections, madness
is a rare disease.  Of the truth of this remark I have been satisfied by Mr. Stew-
ard, the pedestrian traveller, who spent some time in Turkey; also by Dr. Scott, 
— 44 —
who accompanied Lord McCartney in his embassy to China ; and by Mr. Jo-
seph  Roxas, a native of Mexico, who  passed nearly forty years of his life
among the civilized but depressed natives of that country.  Dr. Scott informed
me that he heard of but a single instance of madness  in China, and that was in
a merchant who had suddenly lost £100,000 sterling by an unsuccessful specu-
lation in gold dust.
  Do gentlemen intend to persist  in  their view of this subject and
to pursue that course of argumentation which has had, in part at
least, for its object the derision  and  scorn and contempt of these
witnesses ?   I trust they will not.  Here in this free country, where
every man  is a sovereign in himself, where every man has an equal
right to  speak  in govermental,  religious  and  scientific matters,
guarding himself always, as a matter of course, by that degree of
prudence which shall  not  allow him to overstep discretion ; here,
where we are all free men, there  is a greater tendency  to mental
disease than in any country of the Universe.
  Dr. Rush, gentlemen  of  the jury, gives us another  instance of
insanity, from a cause almost as small as the  cause which madden-
ed the clergyman (p. 37) :
  Fear often produces madness, Dr. Brambilla tells us, in new recruits in the
Austrian army.
  I propose to read no  farther from this distinguished scholar.  I
think, gentlemen, that almost all that has been said by the gentle-
men attacking the testimony of the learned physicians who testified
on the part of the defence  in this  case, is  perceived  to be  of a
character not very commendable.
  Gentlemen, I desired specially  to read  the testimony upon the
point of  the right  and wrong test which has been alluded to by Mr.
Allen as the  true  test  of responsibility in this case ; a test which
with my whole heart I repudiate—a test which  with every faculty
of my mind in full play I  condemn—a test which, before God, I
will never recognize until my judgment  shall be convinced by rea-
soning more potent than any thing I have heard from any man  here
—a  test which has been condemned in at least five instances by tri-
bunals as enlightened and learned and just as any that ever sat in
this or any other country; but, gentlemen, it  may perhaps be suffi-
cient for me to refer, according to my best recollection, to the tes-
timony of  Drs. McFarland, Roe  and Spencer, and upon that ref-
erence to predicate an  argument  in answer to what has been said
by the gentlemen on the other  side, and attempt in my way to show
the utter absurdity of it.  Then what did Dr.  McFarland say about
the condition—I have incidentally noticed it already—of the mind 
— 45 —
 of  defendant at  the  time of the perpetration  of  this lamentable
 act ?   He swore that in his opinion he was in a condition of  insan-
 ity ; that his mind was  diseased to such an extent as to make it
 impossible for him to come  to  any other  conclusion, even  taking
 out many of the facts furnished  by  the evidence.   What did Dr.
 Roe say ? for I will take the testimony of these witnesses in the
 order in which they gave it.  He swore, gentlemen of the jury, as
 you will all recollect—I appeal to  you to say whether or not Dr.
 Roe did not swear that in his opinion the defendant was indubitably
 insane at the time of  the perpetration  of this homicide—I  appeal
 to you, Mr. Grayson—and  to  you, Mr. Cowan—and to you, Mr.
 Edwards—and to all  of  you, to tell me if it was not stated by Dr.
 Spencer, under the sanction of an oath, that in his  opinion there
 could be no question in reference to the existence of  insanity in the
 defendant at the  time of the perpetration of this deed ; and that so
 far had his insanity gone, that it was impossible for him, from the
 impulse under which he acted, to exercise judgment and discretion ?
  Have I mis-stated the testimony ?  Not at all.  What other tes-
 timony have  we ?  We have the testimony of Mr. Rowan, who says
 that when Sloo came  to where he was, or rather when he met Sloo,
 some one  said, "you had better escape."   What did Sloo say to
 him in answer?  Said he, " I have done nothing for which to flee
 my country."  What does Col. Sloo tell you in reference to the
 declaration of Robert, and it was painful, let me say in this con-
 nection, to be compelled to bring the father upon the stand  to tes-
 tify in a case like this ; yet the  gentlemen on the other side have
 declared that he deported himself well, testifying in such a manner
 as to commend his testimony to  their approval; what then did he
 state in reference  to  Robert's  declaration at the time that he met
 him after the perpetration of this  homicide ?  Col.  Sloo  tells you
 that Robert remarked that he had done nothing for which to flee his
 country, upon being told by some one  that  he  had better escape.
 Col. Sloo tells you the same  thing that Maj.  Rowan tells you, and
if there be any thing in  testimony—if there be  any thing in  the
manner of  delivering  it which entitles it to consideration, and the
highest degree of consideration, by a  court and jury, that testi-
mony is entitled to the highest consideration.  Col. Sloo tells you,
in addition, that when these publications came to be seen by Rob-
ert, he declared that it were better that his mother and sisters should
be in their graves than to survive this foul slander.   This, then, is
the  main part of the  testimony of  Col. Sloo, to  which I  invoke 
— 46 —
your attention. There are many other points of it entitled to equal
consideration, as  enabling you to come to a just conclusion in ref-
erence to how you shall  execute your office.   Then, gentlemen,
taking the testimony  of Messrs. Rowan  and Sloo, Robert sup-
posed that he had committed no crime ; that he had done what, in
in the sight  of God and in the presence of his countrymen, he had
a perfect right to do.  Robert C. Sloo seems, if we take that evi-
dence in its  literal acceptation, or consider it in its just bearing,
not to have been in a condition, or  to have had the possession  of
his faculties  to such an extent as to  enable him to know that he had
done wrong  in killing Hall.  If  Robert  declared the conviction  of
his judgment in the hearing of these two witnesses, then his judg-
ment was, that he had  perpetrated  no  crime, and was responsible
to no  tribunal; his  judgment was, that he had done nothing which
he might not rightfully and lawfully do and escape punishment, for
he refused to flee  his country and remained here, never for a mo-
ment attempting  to  escape the just visitation of the law.  Apart
from this particular testimony, allow me to consider for a  few mo-
ments the testimony  of Maj. Rowan and Mr. Sexton in reference
to the habits of the defendant at the bar. What were these habits ?
He retired to places  where he  might meet  no one ; sat upon logs
and broke sticks  and threw them about  as an insane man would.
But we are told by the  learned gentlemen on the side of  the prose-
cution that there  is  nothing in this ; let me  tell you, gentlemen,
that to my  mind there is  much in it.   Allow me, in  illustra-
tion of this  view, to repeat  in your hearing a few words from the
lunatic poet, Cowper—that man who was  confined in an  asylum  in
England in consequence of insanity :
            " Oh ! for a lodge in some vast wilderness !
            Some boundless contiguity of shade."
That  man desired to  retire from the faces   of men ; it was  his
unhappy condition of mind that prompted him  to seek seclusion
and retirement, and it was in that condition, lunatic  as he was, that
he wrote the lines which  I  have quoted;  and, gentlemen, in this
connection, further to enforce my view, let me recite in your hear-
ing from another English poet, almost a lunatic—I allude to Lord
Byron ; he says in the midst of trouble :
         " Oh that  the desert were my dwelling  place,
         With one  fair spirit for my minister :
         That I might all forget the human race,
         And hating no one, love but only her. 
          Ye elements, in whose ennobling stir
          I feel myself exalted, can ye not
          Accord me such a being ?  Do I err
          In deeming such inhabit many a spot,
          Though with them to converse can rarely be our lot?"
          '•'There is a pleasure in the pathless woods,
          There is a rapture on the lonely shore,
          There is society, where none intrudes,
          By the deep sea and music in its roar ;
          I love not man the less, but nature more,
          From these our interviews, in which I steal
          From all I may be, or have been before,
          To mingle with the universe, and feel
          What I can ne'er express, yet cannot all conceal."
   There  is nothing,  however, in all this.   There is nothing in the
 fact  that Robert was seen repeatedly sitting in the position  I have
 mentioned, doing the act which  I have stated.   There is nothing,
 in  the opinion of these gentlemen, in any part of the testimony
 which we have  brought before you ; and they have been so unkind
 as  to charge us, by inuendo  at  least, with  the fabrication of this
 defence for this poor  youth.
   Gentlemen, I will remark to you now, in reference to this charge
 of simulation of madness, there is not the slightest evidence—there
 is not one word, sirs—in the whole of the testimony of  any witness ;
 there  is not one action—there is not one look—there  is nothing to
 warrant the conclusion  that the defendant has simulated madness,
 or that the gentlemen  engaged in the defence have encouraged or
 been willing to encourage any such character of defence.  Not one
 word has  Sloo  uttered  during the whole progress of this case evi-
 dencing any purpose  to simulate madness.   Has Robert C. Sloo
 done any act  which would warrant you to conclude that it was his
 purpose to impress you with the idea that he was insane ?  He has
 done  no such  thing.  Has he done any thing of a violent character ?
 Has he, by word, look, or action, caused you to suspect that he is
 simulating madness ?
  Whenever a defendant seeks  to annul  his  responsibility to the
 laws  of his country by  simulating insanity, he is sure  to do  some-
 thing to impress you with the  suspicion that he is simulating that
 disease.   If you  ask him  a  question, he  will answer it in such a
 way as to  show you that  he is  endeavoring to make you believe that
 he is insane.  He will assume a strange look—his conversation will
be incoherent and  wandering, and wild and absurd.   On the con-
trary, every thing that has appeared  in the conduct of  the defend- 
—  48  —
 ant, from the commencement of  this trial to the present moment,
 has  convinced me that he is a confirmed maniac, of  which, before
 God, in whose presence I must shortly  appear, I make this solemn
 assertion.  Here  is  a test laid down by Dr. Ray for the detection
 of the  simulator  of insanity.   I will read this to you,  and then I
 will  demand of you, what have you seen in Robert's  conduct to in-
 duce you to  believe, or  any  man to suspect,  that he is simulating
 madness  on this occasion?   (Page 353.)

   Jean Pierre, aged 43 years, formerly a notary, was brought  before the Court
 of Assizes of Paris, on the 21st of February, 1824, accused of  crimes and mis-
 conduct, in which  cunning and bad faith had been prominently conspicuous.
 He had already been condemned for forgery, and was now accused of forgery
 swindling, and  incendiarism.  When  examined after his arrest, he answered
 with  precision every question that was put to him ; but  about a month after he
 would no  longer explain himself, talked incoherently, and finally gave way to
 acts of fury—breaking and  destroying  every thing that came  in his way, and
 throwing the furniture out of the window.  At the suggestion of  the medical men
 who were called to examine him, Jean Pierre was sent to the Bicetre, to be more
 closely observed.  There he became acquainted with another pretended lunatic,
 accused also of forging and  swindling, and retained in that house for the same
 purpose—that  of being observed by the physicians.  One night  a violent fire
 broke out at the Bicetre, in three different places at once, in one of the buildings
 occupied by the insane, which circumstance led to the suspicion  that  the fire was
 the effect of malice.  The next day  it  was discovered that the two supposed
 madmen  had disappeared.  Jean Pierre hid himself in Paris, in a house where
 his wife  was employed, and where he was again arrested.  Immediately on his
 escape from the Bicetre, he  wrote a very sensible letter to one of his friends j
 but scarcely had he been taken, when he again assumed the character of a mad-
 man.   From the indictment  it appears, that the person who ran away at the
 same  time with Jean Pierre confessed that they had  formed the plan of escaping
 in company ; that they had profited by the occurrence  of the fire to put it into
 execution.  He  also said that Jean Pierre made him swear to  reveal nothing;
 and he seems to have told as a secret to one of the officers of La Force, that the
 fire was the work of Jean Pierre.
  All the witnesses who had  any transactions with, or had known any thing of
 the accused before  his arrest, deposed that he always seemed to them rational
 enough, and even very intelligent in business.  One of the prisoners in La Force,
 who occasionally met and talked with Jean Pierre, deposed that his conversa-
 tion was often very incoherent, and that in some of the phases of the moon his
 mind was much excited.  But these observations were made after the arrest of
 the accused.  It was his conduct at the  trial, however, which  more than any
 thing  else proved that the madness of Jean Pierre was only assumed ; for there
 is, perhaps, not one of his  answers that would  have been given by  a madman.
 The following are a few of them :
  Q. " How old are you ?"  A. " Twenty-six years."
   He was forty-three.   A lie in the mouth  of  the scoundrel to be-
gin with.
  Q. " Have you ever had any business with Messrs. Pellene and Desgranges?"
(Two of his dupes.")   A. " I don't know them." 
   Didn't know  the men that he had  cheated!  Here is another
 falsehood demonstrating that he was  affecting insanity, and that
 there was no insanity in him.
   Q. " Do you acknowledge the pretended notarial deed which you gave this
 witness ?"  A. " I do not understand this."
   Is there any thing in the character of  Sloo—is there any pretence
 here—any acting on his part, or  on the part of the  gentlemen con-
 cerned in his defence, to warrant  you to conclude that this is a fab-
 ricated defence ?
   Q. "You have acknowledged this deed before the commissary of police?"
 A. "Is it possible !"  Q. " Why, the day of your arrest, did you tear up the bill
 for 3,000 francs?"  A. "I don't recollect." Q.  "You stated on your previous
 examination,that it was because the bill had been paid."  (Asto many other of
 his own depositions, the accused answered in like manner, that he did not recol-
 lect any thing about them.)  Q. "Do you know this witness?"  [The portress
 of the house he lived in.]  A. " I don't know that woman."  Q. " Can you
 point out any person who was confined in La Force with you, who can give an
 account of your then state of mind ?" " I don't understand this."  Q. "At what
 hour did you escape ?" A. "Atone o'clock."  (Three o,clock.)  Q. "What
 road did you take?"  A. "That of Meaux En Bine."  (He took that of  Nor-
 mandy.)  Q.  " Can yon tell who set the Bicetre on fire?"  A.  "I do not know
 what you mean."  Q. "Who wrote a letter  to Captain Froyoff the day after
 your escape from the Bicetre?"  A. "I did not write the  letter."  (It was his
 own handwriting.)
   When charged with  setting fire  to the Bicetre, Jean Pierre uttered the m'st
 horrid imprecations, and incessantly interrupted his counsel and the advocate
 general in their pleading, with contrrdictions, ridiculous  remarks, and curses.
   There is  a test laid down by the  learned and experienced author
 for the detection of simulated  madness.   There  is a test which  to
 my mind affords at least as safe a means for detecting  a person who
 pretends to be insane, but who is  really sane, as can be furnished.
 Now, gentlemen, apply the test thus furnished from an actual case
 which transpired in the city of Paris, to  the case of Robert C. Sloo.
   You  have been  told  by my associate  counsel, that in  order  to
 make out  a  case  of  simulation of madness, it  would be necessary
 for you to suppose  that his counsel  could have advised him six long
 years ago to simulate the disease which is proved by the evidence  of
 gentlemen who are above impeachment.   I call upon you to declare
 upon the solemn oaths you have taken to  try this case according  to
 law and evidence,  and to render such a  verdict as  your consciences
 will approve in after time, in what  way the defendant has simula-
ted madness ?  Does  Robert  C.  Sloo seem to be  conscious of the
awful situation in which he is  placed by the rash act which he com-
mitted on the 11th of  November  last ?   Have you witnessed in his
4 
— 50 —
conduct here or elsewhere during the whole twenty-three days in which
you have oeen engaged in this laborious and painful investigation,
any thing that tends to  the  conclusion that  Robert or his counsel
have  fabricated this defence, seeking to cheat the gallows  of its
due ?   If he had been a simulator—if he had falsely pretended to
be in  a diseased  condition to escape the just penalty of the law for
taking the life of his neighbor, you would have witnessed, perhaps
ere this time, some act  of  violence on his  part towards  the court,
or jury, or counsel  on the one or other side, instead  of  beholding
him thus calm and collected, thus apparently unconscious that he
is in difficulty—that he is being  tried for a crime, for which, if he
be convicted, he will suffer  upon the gallows  the death penalty.
  Mr. Allen has told you that if  he were conscious within himself
of the presence  of insanity in this  defendant, he  would abandon
this prosecution, go to his home and resume his ordinary pursuits.
I have no doubt of the truth of that declaration ; I have no reason
to doubt it, because to doubt it would be to imply brutality on the
part of  Mr. Allen which would disgrace  any man in the  most bar-
barous age  of the world—any mere  American savage with his
scalping-knife in  his hand, reeking in the blood of  the slain.   I
can not suppose him capable of entertaining other views, or being
actuated by any other principle, because  they would class him with
the brute that perishes and never  ascends upward.   If he did be-
lieve it, gentlemen, I have no doubt  he would abandon this prose-
cution, as he ought to do ;  if his feelings and convictions were hu-
mane, he would abandon it now and forever. But Mr. Allen occu-
pies the position of  prosecuting attorney—I speak it of all the gen-
tlemen—I  suppose it is true of  them all—as the hired advocate.
There is  nothing wrong in that—if the  widow  of  the deceased
could hire them.   He comes here to prosecute this young man for
the killing of an old  friend of his, as he tells  you, who took him
by the hand when he first entered upon the practice of the law, and
sought to elevate himself to the highest point in his profession ; he
comes here at the instance  of  the widow of his old friend, to pros-
ecute this young man upon a charge of murder, and to procure hi3
conviction, if possible, consistently with right, for I  suppose he
would not go beyond what is  right;  he comes here invoked by the
tears  of the widow  and the cries of the orphan, as he tells you, and
be^s you in consideration of  those tears and those cries  to convict
this defendant of  the crime of murder, and  to consign  him to an
io-nominious death ; he comes  here prompted by a motive not dis- 
honorable to his heart, whenever his conduct is seen to range with-
in such limits in the performance of what he regards to be his duty
as are right and proper.  Would to God I had the power to dry
those tears forever ;  would to God some power might allay the suf-
ferings of that crippled child, that the father might be restored to
it; but this, alas ! is impossible.
   There is one more branch of  this case to which both of the gen-
tlemen who  have spoken on the part  of the State have adverted,
that is, to threats made by Hall against  Sloo.   Permit me to call
your attention to that subject in a very brief manner; it is not my
object to dwell upon it at any considerable length.
   It is insinuated by the gentlemen  for the prosecution that Mr.
Crandell, who testified  to  threats  on the part of Hall,  testified to
that which is not true. They have brought before you a large num-
ber of witnesses to  prove that Hall was a man  of  peaceable char-
acter ; they  attempted to prove by the  same witnesses, but were
stopped by the  court, that John E. Hall was not only a peaceable
man, but that he was  also a very prudent and discreet man.  Gen-
tlemen of the jury, what is there in such an argument?  What is
it against the validity of the testimony-of an unimpeached witness ?
Did Sloo ever kill anybody until he unfortunately slew Hall ?   His
character has been as peaceable as that of any other man in this
confederacy down to the time of the perpetration of this deed.
   Gentlemen, there is nothing in that argument against the validity
of the testimony of this witness, and you are bound to believe that
he told " the truth, the whole  truth, and nothing but the truth."
If he did not tell the  truth, why was it that although he has lived in
this county upwards  of ten years, that no one  has been brought
here to prove his bad  character  ?  Why did they not impeach him ?
They have  not done it, and it  is now unfair  and  unjust on their
part to seek to  damn him in public  estimation upon the score sim-
ply that Hall was a man of peaceable character, and good demean-
or.  Do you forget that Hall was the author of  the article signed
" Truth?"  That is proved by  the testimony of Mr. Ingersoll, to
whom Hall read it from the original MSS., although gentlemen en-
deavored to  keep that  evidence from  being read to the  jury ,  and
although Mr. Ingersoll came back  into this forum, and demanded
the right—or asked the privilege—to be allowed to make some ad-
dition  to his testimony—of frequent solicitations on the part of
Hall that he would  keep it secret, that  he wrote that article.  It
was refused, yet there is enough in his  testimony to fix  the author- 
ship of  it on Mr. Hall beyond controversy.   I say to you. that the
man who could write such an article as that  could make a threat >
the man who could publish in a  newspaper such an article as that,
could  threaten a man's life at least.   I will not go further in refer-
ence to  what he could do ;  but at least he could utter a threat—I
repeat that.  The man who could calmly and deliberately sit down
at his desk and there write, and afterwards as calmly and deliber-
ately  publish  such an article as that, might threaten your life, Mr.
Jenkins, or  yours,  Mr.  Brown, or yours,  Mr.  Cowan.   It has
been  said by one of  the  counsel for  the prosecution, that both of
these  articles have been  ascribed to Hall.   In my humble opinion
that ascription would be  but just.   Why do I say that ?  Simply
because in the two articles there is  a similarity of style—the same
language—the  same topics are treated of—the same subjects are
written  about—the very same sentiments are expressed ; it is scarce-
ly possible that two  articles would agree in all their essential qual-
ities and be the productions of  different minds.   Then if it be true,
as stated by this  witness, that a threat was made by the deceased
against  the defendant—that that threat was communicated to him
by the witness—I insist  that you  shall  consider it for what it is
worth in  coming to a conclusion  upon the question of insanity
presented for your trial and determination.
   Robert C. Sloo is diseased—he has been diseased for a long time;
he was  suffering under the influence of the disease at the very time
when  there came to  his  ears, through the lips of his  friend, the
statement that John  E. Hall intended to remove him from society.
What is he to understand by the use of that language ?  What is
he to  believe is the  intention  of Hall, thus  expressed?   He is to
conclude, even if rational, that  John E.  Hall has a good deal of
ill-will towards him, and will put that ill-will in act at the first op-
portunity  that offers.   Coupling the articles and  their publication,
and the threat made  against his  life, or at least against  his right to
remain  in Shawneetown,  his native  town—coupling all these things
together, I wish to know whether there was not an  exciting cause
to act upon a mind prostrated  by  disease ?
   I had intended, gentlemen, but it does not seem to me to be ne-
cessary, to detain you with comments on this testimony ; it would
be like  attempting to prove that the sun that lights up the morning
is the sun.   It would be to my  mind a work of  supererogation to
attempt to enforce  this testimony, for the testimony itself is its
own best vindication—the  testimony itself is, to my  mind, the best 
argument to support it—the testimony in my opinion is of  such a
character as to convince every intelligent mind, that all that it con-
tains is essentially true.   I shall not therefore attempt its enforce-
ment any further.
  When I shall cease to speak,  no  voice will be heard to utter a
single word for the unfortunate youth who sits here almost uncon-
scious that he is the object of deep interest—and that  a  tender
mother, a kind father, two angel sisters, are hanging on every word
I pronounce for his deliverance  from the loathsome jail  in which
he has been so long confined, and from the still more horrible doom
of the felon.   Will you not  deliver him from his bonds—gladden
the heart of his  tearful mother—rejoice the souls  of  his weeping
sisters,  and say  to his  father, " thy grey hairs  shall not  go clown
to the grave in sorrow; here is your son, not as when in  the days
of his  innocent prattle he came to climb your knee and smile in
your face; nor as when,  in after years, he was the ornament of
your family, but as he came  to  our hands, a wreck and a ruin,—
take him, and may God grant you the boon of his speedy restora-
tion" ?
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