THE WEAVER CASE 
BY 
HAMPTON L CARSON Esq 
READ BEFORE THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE SOCIETY MAY 1887 
THE CASE OF JOHN DALEY 
BY 
JOHN B CHAPIN M D 
REPORTED TO THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE SOCIETY APRIL 1888 
PHILADELPHIA 
PUBLISHED BY THE SOCIETY A SUMMARY OF THE WEAVER CASE. 
HAMPTON L, 
CARSON, ESQ. 
Read before the Medical Jurisprudence Society of Philadelphia, 
The Weaver case has become famous, partly 
because, from the beginning, it constituted a 
local sensation, partly because the verdict of the 
jury was against the united and uncontradicted 
testimony of six experts in insanity, and the 
great weight of lay testimony; partly because 
the Commissioner formally dissented from the 
verdict, and thereby raised novel questions of 
practice; and lastly, because the Supreme 
Court, by its recent decision, reversed the action 
of the lower court in quashing the proceedings, 
reinstated the question finding the fact of 
insanity, and remitted the respondent, Dr. 
Weaver, to a traverse which will result in a 
trial before twelve jurors and one of the judges 
in the Common Pleas, to be again carried to 
the Supreme Court upon writ of error, after 
motions for a new trial have been disposed of 
in the lower court, before the question of Dr. 
Weaver’s sanity or insanity can be finally 
determined. The facts were these : Upon the 
i6thof October, 1885, a nephew of Dr. Weaver’s 
filed a petition, alleging that the said Martin 
Weaver now is, and for the last five years past 
and upward has been, so far deprived of his 
reason and understanding that he is rendered 
altogether unfit and unable to govern himself, 
that he has become altogether incapable of 
managing his estate and is wasting and destroy- 
ing the same. 
The particular type of the insanity from which 
it was alleged that the Doctor was suffering was 
not stated in the petition ; but the general alle- 
gation was made that his mental unsoundness 
unfitted him for the proper care and manage- 
ment of his business and his estate. 
This allegation, general though it was, raised 
the exact question which the Supreme Court of 
our State has said is the proper inquiry under 
the Acts of Assembly regulating proceedings in 
lunacy. The sole question to be determined is 
whether the mind is deranged to such an extent 
as to disqualify the respondent from conducting 
himself with personal safety to himself and 
others, and from managing and disposing of 
his own affairs and discharging his relative du- 
ties. 
The Commissioner instructed the Sheriff’s 
jury that, in order to find the respondent a man 
of unsound mind, it would not be necessary to 
be satisfied that he was either a hopeless idiot 
or imbecile, or that he was a sufferer from acute 
or violent mania; nor would they be justified 
in finding him insane, even if they felt convinced 
that he was a man of weak mind or eccentric 
conduct, provided they were satisfied that he 
had sufficient capacity to manage his property 
and take care of himself. That the sole ques- 
tion before them was whether Dr. Weaver 
possessed sufficient mental capacity to manage 
his estate and take care of himself. The jury 
were also instructed that in medicine, insanity 
meant an established and prolonged departure 
of an individual from his natural mental condi- 
tion, arising from bodily disease, and that 
insanity at law meant a permanently disordered 
state of mind beyond the control of the indi- 
vidual and produced by disease. 
The jury were told that law and medicine 
united in declaring it to be a rule for the conduct 
of investigations into the state of a man’s mind, 
that he must be measured by a standard fur- 
nished by himself in hisordinary daily existence, 
and that therefore they were to inquire whether 
in the conduct, behavior, action, speech and 
manner of Dr. Weaver, as testified to by the 
witnesses, there was a prolonged departure, 
without an adequate external cause, from the 
state of feeling and modes of thinking usual to 
him when in ordinary health. The jury were 
also instructed to inquire whether Dr. Weaver 
did any of the acts, alleged to be insane acts, 
under the control and influence of some firmly 
fixed and incorrigible delusion in relation either 
to a person or a thing which had no basis in 
point of fact, but which was solely the creation 
of his own morbid fancy. They were also told 
that the presumption of the law was in favor of 
sanity, and that the burden of proving insanity 
was upon the person alleging it; that until a 
permanent disorder of mind was proved to 
exist, no presumption of insanity could arise 
merely from the sudden and motiveless, the de- 
praved or the self-injurious nature of acts com- 
mitted ; that all such acts were within the sphere 
of entire moral liberty, and sanity being the 2 
normal condition of the human mind was 
favored by the general presumption of law. The 
jury were also told that a man had the unfet- 
tered right to direct by will what disposition 
should be made of his property after his death, 
or he could dispose of his property by deed in 
his lifetime as he saw fit; that no right of the 
citizen was more highly valued than the power 
to dispose of his own property at his sovereign 
will and pleasure ; that no right is more solemnly 
assured to him by law ; that it is guaranteed to 
him by the Constitution and the decisions of the 
Courts. The right does not depend in any 
sense upon the judicious exercise of it, and that 
it rarely happened that a man disposed of his 
estate to the entire satisfaction of either his 
family or his friends. That not until the con- 
duct of a man became a menace to himself or 
others and involved the interests of himself and 
family, considered as the wards of society, will 
the law interpose to restrain his freedom of 
person, or his freedom of action in regard to his 
property. The jury were also told that they 
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Dr. Weaver either did not know what he 
was doing at the time he executed the deed 
conveying the property, or that he was not a 
free agent at that time. With these instructions 
as to the nature and limits of the inquiry, the 
evidence was submitted to the jury. 
The evidence grouped itself about a few 
considerations, such as these: First, the con- 
trol exercised by Miss Emerson (now his wife) 
over Dr. Weaver ; second, Dr. Weaver’s lack 
of affection for his first wife and children; 
third, his habits, style of dress, conversation, 
personal appearance, behavior and mode of 
living; hereditary taint in the blood ; delusions; 
business dealings and business capacity, and 
finally, the acts immediately surrounding and 
attending the execution of the deed by which 
Miss Emerson became the trustee, and in a 
great part the beneficiary, of Dr. Weaver’s 
estate. 
Upon the first of these—the alleged control 
exercised over Dr. Weaver by Miss Emerson— 
there was the testimony of the Doctor’s 
daughter to numerous changes of residence 
forced upon the Doctor during a comparatively 
brief period of time; the locking up of her 
father in the closet when any one called at the 
house; the arrangement that he should not 
come to the door except upon a given signal at 
the bell; the restriction of his walks to the back 
roads; his inability to rent his properties with- 
out Miss Emerson’s consent; the fact that she 
collected the rents, paid the bills, and handled 
his money; his demonstrations of affection 
toward her, and the intimate footing between 
them, which permitted her to enter his bed- 
room at midnight or to lie on his bed by day; 
the Doctor’s preference for Miss Emerson to 
his daughter; his reference to Miss Emerson 
of the question as to whether Bessie should 
return to the house after he had told her to 
; clear out; her subsequent arrest and detention 
in the station house ; her return to her father’s 
house, and the next morning being taken by 
Miss Emerson to the Rosine Home, and his 
neglect to bid her good-bye. All of which acts 
the witness attributed to Miss Emerson, who 
was obeyed by Dr. Weaver as a child; and, 
finally, Miss Emerson’s presence at the signing 
of the deed, which was executed at the school 
house at which she was a teacher. There was 
also evidence of witnesses who saw Miss 
Emerson in the Doctor’s company, who trans- 
! acted the Doctor’s business with her, or who 
received the Doctor’s money from her hands. 
On cross-examination Miss Weaver testified 
that on one occasion she herself held the key 
for some hours after her father had been locked 
in the closet. In connection with the matter 
of Miss Emerson's control, the Doctor’s nephew 
and his sister-in-law testified that he was head- 
strong, violent, bent on having his own way; 
that in the lifetime of his wife the wife could 
not control him ; that he generally did as he 
pleased, and had his own way because he 
wouldn’t be controlled. 
As to the second point—Dr. Weaver’s lack 
of affection for his wife and children—it was 
testified that he was unkind to his daughter, 
and had told her, when she complained to him 
of keeping a strange woman in the house, 
“You can go; go along with you; clear out;” 
that he failed to provide her with clothing, and 
that what she had was cheap and of poor 
material. It was also in evidence that Dr. 
Weaver put his children in a pen to keep them 
out of the street; that the children were put in 
a room with straw on the floor, a stove in it, 
! and a fence around the stove; that he was 
indifferent to his wife in her last illness, getting 
into bed with his clothes on beside his wife as 
! she lay dying; that he refused to allow her to 3 
have flowers in her room, although she wished 
it; that he brought an undertaker to see her 
before she was dead; that he neglected his 
child, who died in the midst of filth and vermin 
a year after the death of the mother; that he 
was cruel to his child, seizing it by the hair 
and throwing it on the floor, and was rough to 
his wife on the cars, shaking his fist at her and 
shaking her. 
Upon the matter of his habits, style of dress, 
conversation, personal appearance, behavior 
and mode of living, it was testified that he was 
dirty and shabby, wore old clothes, an old 
battered high hat, a bandanna handkerchief 
for a neckcloth; wiped his hands, after clean- 
ing fish and chickens, on his coat; had his 
clothes selected for him by his sisters; talked 
in a rambling fashion; mumbled to himself; 
laughed in monosyllables; said, “Yes, yes, yes; 
no, no, no,” when questions were asked; was 
nervous and excited; restless; was unable to 
sit still; picked things up and put them down ; 
ran in and out of the room; got furiously angry 
and chattered with rage; looked wild and 
fierce; that his hair stood up; that he preached 
on the front door steps and in the garden 
among the trees; that he talked to himself; went 
into the street on several occasions with no 
clothing on but a wrapper and slippers; went to 
a fire with his shirt outside of his pantaloons; 
that he marched with the Salvation army ; that 
he played hide and whoop with his wife with 
the bedquilt around her; that they caught and 
rolled one another over and over; that he 
refused to keep servants to help his wife ; that 
he cooked his own food and let his wife stand 
at the washtub when she was sick ; when his 
sister died, he said, “ Liz is dead, Liz is dead; 
hurrah ! I am a free man; I can now get married 
again,” and seemed in high glee; that he threw 
his hat at roosters when they crowed; chased a 
cat and threatened to kill it; chased boys down 
the street, who called him, “ Crazy old Dr. 
Weaver,” brandishing a coal scuttle and a 
stick; that he hammered on the curbstone try- 
ing to straighten a spike that was not crooked.; 
that he behaved strangely at church while 
hymns were sung, and was eccentric and pecu- 
liar. The acts testified to covered a long 
period of years, and many witnesses on both 
sides said that he had always acted in this way, 
was always eccentric and peculiar and had 
always been so for fifty years ; that he was high 
tempered, close, and sharp at a bargain; that 
his wife and he both drank and often got drunk 
together; that his hair was naturally bushy and 
that he wore it long. 
Upon the matter of the hereditary taint in 
the blood, the evidence was slight. The 
nephew of the Doctor stated that the Doctor’s 
father died insane, and had been so for more 
than a year before his death, and that the 
Doctor’s mother died of apoplexy. The 
character and symptoms of insanity were not 
stated. It was also testified that one of the 
Doctor’s nephews had died out of his mind 
from a cancer in his face, which had eaten into 
the brain. The only other evidence upon the 
point was that of one of the physicians who 
admitted that he had said that he didn’t con- 
sider the Doctor’s daughter as bright mentally 
as she might be; but he denied having said, 
“Why, what else could you expect from a 
child of Dr. Weaver?” 
Upon the question of the Doctor’s delusions 
the evidence was also slight. The Doctor’s 
sister-in-law testified at one of the interviews she 
had with him, he all at once looked up and 
said, “ Do you remember when George (he is 
my husband’s brother) got into the third story 
window and robbed the house?” She said, 
" I don’t know what you mean,” and he said, 
“Don’t you remember it?” She said, “ You 
don’t know him ; you never saw him ; he 
never was in Germantown or at your house ; 
he died before you saw him.” He insisted 
that it was so. Another witness said that 
the Doctor had asked her whether she 
had ever seen a lady up in the front of the 
house dressed in a silk dress, and said, “ That is 
one of my relations; she is there.” The wit- 
ness said,“No, sir ; I do not believe in ghosts.” 
There was no lady there. 
Upon the capacity of Dr. Weaver to manage 
himself and take care of his estate, the testi- 
mony of several witnesses was that he was of 
unsound mind; that he was so in 1884; that 
it had been growing on him. The daughter 
did not express an opinion on her father’s 
business capacity. The nephew, who started 
the proceedings, testified that he thought he 
was of unsound mind, but on cross-examination 
said that Dr. Weaver first became insane since 
his wife’s death in 1877 ; that prior to that time he 
was a fool; that he.was partially insane before that 
for thirty years ; and that at no time since did he 4 
recollect him as being perfectly sane. He was 
not asked for, nor did he express, an opinion 
upon his capacity to manage his estate, while 
he admitted, on cross-examination, that in the 
settlement of the witnesses’ grandfather’s estate, 
in which he had represented his mother, who 
was entitled to a share amounting to a one- 
quarter interest, she got $6000 from Martin 
Weaver, and a deed from Martin Weaver con- 
veying a part of the property to her, and that 
he had no hesitation in taking a crazy man’s 
deed for his mother, nor in taking his money ; 
that the settlement had been attended to by 
two well-known lawyers. He also testified that it 
was twenty-one years before Dr. Weaver filed an 
account in this estate, and that he did so only upon 
compulsion. He alleged that Dr. Weaver, as 
executor, had mismanaged property, and had 
illegally sued a tenant, who subsequently 
recovered damages. The Doctor’s sister-in-law 
stated that she had had no business transactions 
with him, and that in her opinion he was of 
unsound mind; that his actions would lead her 
to suppose that he was not fit to manage his 
estate. Another witness said she did not 
believe that he was sane, and that she thought 
he was incapable of doing any kind of business. 
On cross-examination she admitted that she had 
rented a house from Dr. Weaver, and did not 
object to paying him rent or to taking his 
receipts ; that she then owed him rent which 
she did not expect to pay. The Doctor’s 
brother-in-law testified that he was a man of 
unsound mind ; that he was of the opinion that 
he had been insane ever since he first saw him, 
which was shortly after his marriage, in 1865. 
This witness testified that he had had a walk 
with the Doctor through his orchard in 1872, 
and had been shown where they were building 
on the south of his land; that the Doctor talked 
about building some houses himself and about 
cutting streets through, and said, “ Are you a 
builder? There might be ajob for you.” That the 
Doctor, when the witness asked him about the 
size of the building he thought of erecting, 
immediately turned the subject and called 
attention to some large trees which he talked 
about having transplanted. Another witness 
testified that he had regarded the Doctor as a man 
of unsound mind for more than twenty years; 
that he would not want to have any dealings 
with him that would call for business judgment, 
as he did not think him competent. On cross- 
examination he admitted that he had never 
had any business transactions with him. The 
next witness, who was a tenant of the Doctor’s, 
declared that she believed him to be an insane 
man and incompetent to take care of himself, 
his child, or his estate. On cross-examination 
she admitted that she had paid him rent, and 
had taken receipts from him without objection; 
that the Doctor was quite punctual in the col- 
lection of his rent, but would sometimes let it 
run over, or sometimes ask for it in advance. 
Another witness testified that the Doctor’s sisters 
purchased material for his clothing, selected it 
for him and paid for it; that the Doctor was a man 
of no judgment and incapable of taking care of 
himself or his estate. On cross-examination he 
admitted that he took a part in the selection of 
his clothes, and that he would say, “That will 
do,” or “That will not do.” The next witness 
stated th at he thought that the man,“ by a stronger 
mind than his own, could be imposed upon ; 
whether you make that out sanity or insanity ; 
you may call it what you please.” He declined 
to express an opinion on his business capacity, 
never having met him in business matters. On 
cross-examination he said that he had no hesi- 
tation in accepting the Doctor as a tenant or in 
making a bargain with him; that he lived up to 
it promptly and punctually ; that he always 
thought him a highly respectable gentleman, 
honest and straightforward, and that he always 
lived up to his religion. The next witness had 
known the Doctor from boyhood ; that when 
sick he had sent for the Doctor, who approved 
of the dose of laudanum and camphor which he 
had taken; ordered him to repeat the dose and 
prescribed some stiff toddy ; that he had yielded 
his own judgment, as to the propriety of being 
bled, to the Doctor’s judgment. When asked 
whether he was sane or insane,he replied, " He 
is a very eccentric man. I wouldn’t like to say 
that he was insane, but he is very eccentric.” 
And in reply to the question," Do you think he 
iscapableof attending to business?” said,“Well, 
I do not know. I cannot answer that.” The 
last witness was a conveyancer and real estate 
agent, and formerly a magistrate, who had 
known the Doctor for many years. He said 
that he had always thought him peculiar and 
eccentric, more of late years than formerly; 
that he had had business transactions with him, 
and had been requested to sell some of his real 
estate; that a price had been fixed and the 5 
customers secured; and that while the agreement 
was being prepared, he came into the office 
greatly excited, with no hat on and his hair 
flying about, and said, “Stop it, stop it; Eliza 
won’t let me ; ” that he then went off and was 
not seen for some time, and that the witness 
ascertained upon inquiry that Eliza had not 
objected. That the Doctor wanted to open a 
street which would be of decided advantage to 
him, because it opened up some of his back 
ground, but that he could not be made to see 
the disadvantage to his neighbor. He also 
testified to the Doctor having instituted pro- 
ceedings before himself as a magistrate, which 
he subsequently neglected to prosecute. This 
witness said that Dr. Weaver was not an idiot 
or insane man, but was a lunatic or crazy man, 
and one to whom he would not be willing to 
entrust any business. He defined the distinc- 
tion which he drew, as follows: “The insane 
man is not capable of taking care of himself at 
all, and has to be confined. The idiot is one 
that has no mind at all, a mere child in point 
of intellect. A lunatic is one that is not capable 
of forming, or that has no judgment, and might 
be influenced to his own injury, and deserves to 
have some one appointed to take care of his 
estate ; and a crazy man is a lunatic to a certain 
extent.’’ On cross-examination he said that he 
thought the Doctor was very sharp at a bargain ; 
that he had many eccentricities and that he held 
his real estate, as the witness thought, at rather 
too high a price. It was before this witness, as 
a magistrate, that the Doctor instituted legal 
proceedings, and he also took without objection 
Dr. Weaver’s acknowledgment to a deed. 
A deed of trust was then offered, in evidence 
of an insane act on the part of Dr. Weaver, 
between himself and Miss Emerson (now his 
wife) dated September 30th, 1884, and duly re- 
corded, which, after making a provision of five 
hundred dollars a year for his daughter, con- 
veyed the bulk of the estate to Miss Emerson 
It was also shown that the daughter was sole 
heir at law and that the property owned by the 
Doctor amounted to the sum of $41,216 66. 
This closed the case for the Commonwealth. 
For the defence, twenty-nine witnesses were 
called. 
The evidence related to three principal mat- 
ters—the ability of Dr. Weaver to manage his 
own business; his eccentricities and the pe- 
riod of their duration ; and the scientific inter- 
pretation of these facts. Upon the question of 
his business capacity, four distinct classes of 
witnesses were called—business men, who had 
had business relations with him ; clergymen 
who had known him in their parishes ; lawyers 
who had attended to his legal business; and 
physicians who are also experts in insanity. 
Of the first class, a carpenter and builder 
who had known the Doctor for fifty years and 
had had considerable business with him, had 
attended to the payment of his taxes, had done 
curbing and paving for him, had repaired his 
houses and for a time had some of them in 
charge, testified that he thought that the Doctor 
was eccentric and singular, but was able to take 
care of himself and business quite as well as 
the witness could attend to his. That he con- 
sidered him sane, and that he had retained his 
physical and mental strength remarkably well 
for an old man ; that he thought he held his 
properties rather high ; that his eccentricities 
were the same now as fifty years ago, and that 
his singularity had nothing whatever to do with 
his capacity to take care of himself or his 
property. To the same effect was the testimony 
of a son of the preceding witness, who had 
aided his father in the transaction of Dr. 
Weaver’s business. He had always thought 
him able to take care of himself and able to 
make contracts; he had had a talk with 
him about building a house, and thought him 
very cautious ; he had never any dfoubt as 
to his ability to take care of his property and 
himself, and never had any doubt of his san- 
ity. The next witness was a coal merchant 
who had sold him coal and had frequently 
talked to him ; he judged him to be a sane 
man. The only business transactions between 
' the parties was the sale of coal, for which the 
Doctor sometimes paid in person. The next 
witness was the brother of one of the witnesses 
for the Commonwealth, who testified that he had 
no doubt of his sanity, but looked upon Dr. 
: Weaver as an unusually intelligent man for one 
of his years. 
The next witness, a real estate agent and a 
member of the bar, had had business transac- 
tions with the Doctor about 1876, about renting 
a property; it never had occurred to him 
■ that the Doctor was not entirely able to 
> take care of himself or his estate. The next 
■ witness had boarded with the Doctor for a year 
or so, from the spring of 1879, and had never 6 
questioned his sanity; said that he found him 
reading the Greek testament in the evening; 
considered him an intelligent man, capable of 
taking care of himself, and at times a little 
shrewd at a bargain. 
To the same effect was the testimony of amiller 
who had known the Doctor for 30 years, and inti- 
mately for the last 17; he had never had any busi- 
ness transactions with him, but had frequently 
met him at the Young Men’s Christian Associa- 
tion and also at church. To the same effect was 
the testimony of a man who had worked for the 
Doctor prior to ’62, though he had met him 
frequently after ’66. Then came a member of 
the Bar and an ex-Sheriff of the County, who 
had purchased a property from the Doctor, had 
taken his deed without hesitation, and had paid 
him $7000. Another man, a printer, had bought 
a piece of ground from the Doctor 10 or 12 
years ago ; paid part cash and left part upon 
the ground, and twice a year had to see the 
Doctor to pay him ground rent; about five 
or six years ago he paid the rent off; since 
then, within about four or five months, he had 
gone to see him about buying another piece of 
ground but did not purchase it, as the Doctor’s 
price was too high; he thought him a very 
sharp, shrewd man and a very sane one; that 
he was able to take care of himself in business 
transactions, more so than a good many men 
of 35 years of age. Three clergymen, who had 
known him in ’82, ’83, and in the winter of ’79 
and since, declared that he was perfectly sane. 
Four well-known members of the bar, who at- 
tended to the Doctor’s professional business, 
testified that he was perfectly sane, and that in 
all their dealings with him, though they thought 
him eccentric, deemed him perfectly able to 
take care of himself and his estate. Doctors 
D. Hayes Agnew, Thomas G. Morton, Charles 
K. Mills, Henry D. Wetherill, John C. Hall, 
John B. Chapin and Dr. Landis, his private 
physician, all testified that they had carefully 
examined him, conversed with him upon sev- 
eral occasions and that they thought him men- 
tally sound.- Testimony was then offered in 
relation to the circumstances attending the exe- 
cution of the deed of trust. The account was 
given by the professional gentleman who pre- 
pared it, who said that the Doctor had consulted 
him about the disposition of his property, and 
told him that certain of his family had threat- 
ened to attack any paper by which he might 
dispose of his property on the ground that he 
was insane, and (hat he wished the attack to be 
made in his lifetime while he could be exam- 
ined by competent physicians. He said that 
his family had treated him so badly that he did 
not propose to leave any of his property to 
them ; that he wanted to leave it to Miss Emer- 
son, who had been a faithful and devoted friend 
for m iny years, subject to an annuity payable 
to his daughter. He mentioned the sum of 
$500 per annum, and said that he fixed that sum 
because she had not sufficient capacity to take 
care of money and that she was addicted to 
immorality. The deed was then prepared, 
taken to the Doctor’s house, read over to him 
} and executed and acknowledged in the pres- 
: ence of Dr. Landis, Miss Emerson, Miss 
Weaver, the Notary Public, and the attorney. 
| The testimony of the attorney as to what took 
| place at the time of the execution of the deed 
| was corroborated by that of the physician and 
the Notary Public ; both testified that they were 
fully satisfied that he fully understood the con- 
tents of the deed and was satisfied, and the 
Notary said, “ 1 supposed or thought he was as 
sane as any man could be ; if I had not thought 
so, I would not have taken his acknowledgment, 
of course.” Several deeds from members of 
the family to Martin Weaver and from Martin 
! Weaver to members of the family, to one of 
which the petitioner in these proceedings was a 
witness, the deed being dated February 12th, 
1884, and to another of which another one of 
the witnesses for the Commonwealth had acted 
as Notary Public, in taking the acknowledg- 
ment,were offered in evidence. 
The only evidence in rebuttal was that of the 
petitioner, who stated that the first time he ever 
mentioned to anybody that he thought Dr. 
Weaver was insane was about two years ago, 
but he did not remember to whom it was or 
whether it was to more than one person. There 
was no rebuttal expert testimony. 
The Commissioner and the jury visited the 
Doctor at his own house early one morning, 
without having given him notice of the intended 
visit, and held a conversation with him for 
more than half an hour. 
The jury found that the said Martin Weaver 
is, at the time of taking this inquisition, a luna- 
tic, and has been so for three years and up- 
ward, with lucid intervals, but of such short 
duration as to render him incapable of taking 7 
care of his property and estate; and at the 
time of the execution of the deed of trust, 
dated September 30th, 1884, he was not in the 
enjoyment of a lucid interval, and that at the 
time of his becoming a lunatic he was seized 
and possessed of certain lands and tenements, 
goods and chattels, valued at the net valuation 
of $41,216.67 ; and that the said Martin Weaver 
has since disposed of his lands and tenements, 
goods and chattels, by a deed of trust, dated 
September 30th, 1884, duly recorded, excepting 
therefrom an annuity of $500 to his daughter 
for life; that the said Martin Weaver is of the 
age of 81 years or thereabouts; and that his 
wife, with whom he has intermarried since the 
commencement of the proceedings, of the age 
of 35 years, and his daughter, a minor, of the 
age of 18 years, are the heirs and next of kin 
of the said Martin Weaver. 
The Commissioner did not agree with the 
conclusions reached by the jury, and expressed 
his dissent in the following words : “ The Com- 
missioner feels himself obliged to disagree with 
the conclusion reached by the jury in finding 
the said Martin Weaver to be a lunatic. The 
evidence satisfied him that the said Martin 
Weaver has been eccentric all his life, but has 
never undergone any marked change of char 
acter during the past fifty or sixty years; that 
instead of wasting and mismanaging his estate, 
he is unusually close, cautious and penurious ; 
and your Commissioner was satisfied from the 
interview held by him with the said Martin | 
Weaver, in the presence of the jury, that there 
was not the slightest trace of insanity in either 
his speech or conduct; that he is able to con- 
verse upon a great variety of subjects—medi- 
cine, history, theology, classical literature and 
the ordinary topics of the day—with intelligence, 
sound sense and remarkable strength of mem- 
ory for a man 81 years of age; and that his 
memory appeared to be as good with regard to 
recent events as to those many years old in point 
of time. Your Commissioner was also satisfied 
from the evidence that on the day of the exe- 
cution of the deed to Emilie J. Emerson, dated 
September 30th, 1884, he fully understood what 
he was doing, knew all about his property, re- 
membered the objects of his bounty and gave 
intelligent reasons for his action.” 
As the law then stood in Pennsylvania, there 
was no decision of any court that a Commis- 
sioner in Lunacy formed no part of the tribunal 
charged with the duty of making the prelimi- 
nary inquiry into a man’s mental condition, or 
that he had no right to express his views upon 
the evidence. He was obliged to certify to the 
inquisition and to affix his hand and seal to it, 
together with the jurors. Holding views so 
diametrically opposed to those of the jurors, he 
did not desire that his signature and seal should 
be misinterpreted into acquiescence with the 
result, and he argued to himself that if he had 
no such right in law, as forming no part of the 
tribunal to determine the question of fact, then 
his dissent could not affect the integrity of the 
verdict, as it could be readily expunged from 
the record ; but that if he had such a right, 
then he preferred not to forego his opportunity 
of expressing his real views. The Court below 
reviewed the testimony, and being of the same 
opinion with the Commissioner, set the inqui- 
sition aside. A certiorari removed the record 
to the Supreme Court, and that Court, in an 
opinion delivered upon the 2d of May, 1887, 
reversed the action of the lower Court, rein- 
stated the inquisition, and remitted the record 
for further proceedings, holding that in a pro- 
ceeding de lunatico inquirendo the Court of 
Common Pleas cannot set aside an inquisition 
finding the fact of lunacy, upon the ground 
that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the 
finding. The only method to contest the valid- 
ity of the inquisition on the question of the fact 
of lunacy is by a traverse and trial by jury. 
I The Court declared that it was singular that 
there was such a dearth of authority upon this 
question, and declared that in Pennsylvania 
the absence of authority was doubtless due to 
the fact that the uniform practice had been to 
contest the finding of the inquest upon the 
merits by means of a traverse, as provided in 
the Acts of Assembly, which they held to be 
conclusive of the subject. They further held 
that the Acts of Assembly gave the whole power 
to the jurors sitting upon the inquest to deter- 
mine the fact of lunacy, and while the Com- 
missioner may differ in opinion upon the facts 
in question from the jury, he has no power to 
participate in the finding, and hence his opinion 
can in no manner control the finding of the 
inquest. And so, it was apprehended, as to the 
further proceedings to impeach the findings of 
the inquest upon the controverted facts, they 
must consist of a traverse and a jury trial. To 
allow the Court to review the testimony taken 8 
before the inquest and decide upon it's merits, 
is practically to supersede the traverse which is 
the remedy provided by law. It was also held 
that the testimony formed no part of the record 
and should not have been returned to the Court 
or reviewed by it. It must be borne in mind, 
therefore, that the decision of the Supreme 
Court does not touch the question of Dr. 
Weaver’s sanity or insanity. The testimony 
was not carried to the Supreme Court, and they 
held that the lower Court ought not to have 
looked at it. 
The decision turns simply upon the technical 
point as to the method of proceeding in order 
to contest the truth of an inquest finding a man 
to be insane. The effect, therefore, is to remit 
Dr. Weaver to the position of having been 
found a lunatic by a Sheriff’s jury of six, and 
the only way in which he can have that finding 
of fact reviewed is to traverse the inquest, go to 
trial before a jury of twelve and one of the 
Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, where 
either party, petitioner or respondent, may, if 
dissatisfied with the result of the trial, that is, 
with the verdict of the jury of twelve, make a 
motion for a new trial, and, if this be refused, 
carry the case together with all the testimony, 
by Bill of Exceptions, to the Supreme Court for 
final adjudication. Not until these proceedings 
have been taken and carried to the end, can it 
be asserted that the Supreme Court has decided 
Dr. Weaver to be either sane or insane. Upon 
the testimony, when it finally reaches the eyes 
of our judges of the court of last resort, it is 
quite confidently predicted that they will agree 
with the Court below in its view of the case when 
reviewing the testimony, unless, indeed, a jury 
of twelve should find him to be sane, the Court 
below refuse to grant a new trial, and the Su- 
preme Court affirm that action. To make 
the matter plain to popular apprehension, we 
would compare the proceeding by inquisition 
before a Sheriff s jury to a presentation of a bill 
to the Grand Jury, which, though it may find a 
true bill, by no means determines the guilt of 
the indicted person, who may upon his trial 
before a petit jury prove his innocence and 
secure a verdict of acquittal. It, therefore, 
by no means follows, because a Sheriff’s jury 
finds a man to be insane, that he necessarily is so. 
In fact, miserable would be the condition of the 
man in such a position, if such were to be the 
case, for it has become a noticeable fact in 
Pennsylvania that almost all inquests, with 
exceptions so rare that no one’s memory can 
recall them, have found men to be insane; 
whether the proceedings have been set on foot 
to rescue an estate from reckless dissipation, 
the result of incapacity and mismanagement, or 
for the purpose of gratifying the disappointed 
hopes of some injured relative who fancies that 
a man ought to dispose of his estate in a manner 
satisfactory to his critic; while, at the same 
time, the provisions of the law in relation to 
costs, which are thrown upon the estate of the 
lunatic so alleged, present too great a tempta- 
tion to a careless consideration of the testi- 
mony by those who are too often led to believe 
that mere eccentricity of conduct is conclusive 
evidence of insanity, and that medical experts, 
even when uncontradicted and harmonious 
among themselves, have little or no knowledge 
of what they are talking about. The case will 
always be a landmark in our law, and conclusive 
upon the point of practice involved, unless, 
indeed, the Legislature should see fit to alter it. 
A different result was arrived at in the State 
of New Jersey in Perrine’s Estate, 4 Central 
Reporter, p. 62, where the facts were almost 
identical with the case under consideration. 
The inquisition, as returned to the Court, found 
that the alleged lunatic was of sound mind. 
The Commissioner certified that she was not fit 
to transact business. Application was made to 
set aside the inquisition, on the ground that the 
finding was contrary to the evidence, and the 
Chancellor held, that though the jury found 
that Miss Perrine was of sound mind and capa- 
ble of controlling her property, yet the Com- 
missioner certifying that she was incapable of 
I understanding any matter of business, he set 
aside the inquisition. It was believed that 
the Court of Common Pleas in lunacy proceed- 
ings acted as a Court of Chancery under the 
well-settled idea that lunatics were the wards of 
the crown, and that a chancellor, who was the 
keeper of the conscience of the king, though 
he might refer a question of fact to a jury for 
determination, was not bound by their verdict, 
and could set it aside and do as to conscience 
and equity seemed right. But whatever theoretic 
views might have been entertained upon this 
subject, they are all set at rest by the decision 
of the Supreme Court, which, until departed 
from by some subsequent ruling, or changed in 
effect by some act of the Legislature, remains 
the law of the State, and to this all good citizens 
must bow. THE CASE OF JOHN DALEY, 
INDICTED FOR MURDER AND ACQUITTED ON THE PLEA OF INSANITY. 
BY JOHN B. CHAPIN, M. D, 
Reported to the Medical Jurisprudence Society, 
The case of John Daley, indicted for murder 
and acquitted on the plea of insanity, is a very 
interesting one in some respects, and I will ask 
your indulgence in making the verbal report of 
it. 
On the 14th of July, 1887, Mr. Kennedy, a 
resident of the city of Washington, a dealer in 
real estate, left his office in the afternoon about 
five o’clock, and proceeded toward his home. 
On reaching a tree standing near the walk, a 
man was noticed to approach him and touch 
him upon the shoulder, and upon his turning 
around he plunged a knife into Mr. Kennedy. 
Kennedy sank to the pavement, and died in a 
few moments ; the cause of his death being 
hemorrhage. 
John Daley was arrested, and when asked 
why he had committed the deed, he said, “ Wait, 
it will come out in the trial.” He was placed 
in the district jail, and in due course of time 
indicted for homicide. 
In the month of October I was asked to join 
Dr. W. W. Godding, Physician of the Govern- 
ment Asylum for the Insane, in making an 
examination of Daley, and to submit a report, 
upon which the government would then decide 
whether to try him or to take further proceedings. 
On the 23d and 26th of October, we passed 
perhaps eight hours in conversation with Daley 
in the jail. He freely communicated his history, 
which was fully confirmed on the trial. He 
stated that in 1857 he left Smyrna, Delaware, 
where he had been engaged in making coaches 
and wagons as an apprentice, and went to the 
city of Washington, where he remained until 
the year 1875. During this time he accumu- 
lated small sums of money as a porter about 
the public buildings, portions of which he paid 
over to his father, who paid these sums, as also 
other sums which he had himself earned, to Mr. 
Kennedy for the purchase of a piece of prop- 
erty, a small lot. 
He seems to have come to Philadelphia in 
1875, and thence to have gone to the Falls of 
Schuylkill, where he was engaged in one of the 1 
manufacturing establishments in that place, j 
The business suspending, he went to seek ser- 
vice with the Roman Catholic Brotherhood, 
known as the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, in 
Germantown. He entered as a lay brother, 
promising to render certain services in return 
for his board, and was placed in charge of the 
greenhouses and to watch the fires. One night 
he fell asleep, and awoke in a chill, seemed to 
be cold, and had oppression of breathing. He 
applied to the head of the establishment, who 
procured a prescription from the physician 
of the institution—I think he stated to me that 
his name was Dr. Winstine. Dr. Winstine 
seems to have made some prescription for him, 
and that seems to have been the foundation 
of a great portion of his imaginary trouble after- 
ward. This medicine, he alleged, produced a 
gummy exudation and disturbed his bowels, so 
that his digestive organs were very much disar- 
ranged and “ dried up.” He, however, remained 
in the service of this Society until 1878, when 
he went to Washington on account of his step- 
mother’s death. He placed his father in a 
charitable hospital for care, and returned 
again to Germantown. He remained in Ger- 
mantown until 1882, when his father died, and 
he went on to Washington to look after the 
estate, or the supposed estate. On reaching 
Washington he was informed by Mr. Kennedy, 
who seems to have transacted a good deal of 
the business, that there was no portion of the 
estate coming to him—that the avails of it had 
been used in burying his father, paying taxes’ 
and various expenses. 
He then boarded at one place and another, 
changing his boarding-house frequently, alleg- 
ing that detectives were pursuing him. These 
detectives were persons who were called 
“ Members of the Order.” He fixed upon a 
number of persons whom, by their appearance, 
he regarded as suspicious persons. He changed 
his residence probably five or six times, consum- 
ing, gradually, the balance of his savings, as he 
ceased to earn any money after 1882, until he 
found that he had but about ten dollars in money 
left. This sum of money he expended partly 10 
in purchasing some clothing, and the purchase 
of a pistol for the purpose of shooting a Dr. 
Elliot, whom he alleged was one of the “ De- 
tectives of the Order.” 
Not meeting with Dr. Elliot, he finally sold 
his pistol for a small sum, which he expended 
in lodging, and was left entirely destitute and 
fell sick. He then applied to the police head- 
quarters, and was furnished with an order for 
admission to the district hospital. He was at 
the hospital for two weeks, and then asked for 
a pass to go into the city to procure clothes. 
While walking along the city drives about one 
of the squares, he saw Dr. Elliot in his carriage, 
and followed him. He went to the Capitol and 
entered, procured a large stone, and placed it 
in his pocket. He went into the Senate Cham- 
ber, and then went to the door and waited until 
Dr. Elliot should come out. Elliot came out 
in a short time, and advanced toward his car- 
riage. Daley followed him, and within four or 
five feet of him he hurled the stone at him with 
all his strength, and, describing the effort, he said 
he meant to kill him. The stone did not strike 
Dr. Elliot, and passed near his head. Daley 
rushed upon him, threw him down, and used 
his fists upon him. He was arrested and taken 
to the office of the Chief of Police, where Dr. 
Elliot made a complaint of assault against him, 
and he was sent to the district jail for ninety 
days. Dr. Elliot did not know the man, and 
no examination of his mental condition was 
made. 
After serving out his time he was transferred 
to the Almshouse. Soon after entering the 
Almshouse, he secreted one of the knives used 
in the dining-room—an ordinary case knife— 
which he ground to a fine point, and sharpened 
it on both sides. That knife he carried in his 
pantaloons or his stocking, but never carried it 
in his pocket. This was probably six months 
before the commission of the homicide. 
After spending several months at the Alms- 
house he was discharged, the physician stating 
that there was nothing the matter with him, and 
he must go. He went at once to the city and 
took the position near the tree, and awaited the 
coming of Mr. Kennedy, as was alleged by the 
prosecution, but, as he alleged himself, he still 
intended to pursue and find Dr. Elliot. 
On further conversation with him he stated 
that he had entertained the delusion about the 
” detectives of the Order ” from the year 1878. 
He stated that he knew the difference between 
right and wrong; that he had been carefully 
educated, and had been instructed according 
to his religion. He also stated that he had no 
delusions about Mr. Kennedy, and we failed to 
find any indication of any delusive idea asso- 
ciated with him. 
He said he intended to kill him when he saw 
him, for the reason (to use his own language) 
“ he had beaten me in this money transac- 
tion.” 
In submitting a report, we embodied this 
history, and the conclusions, which, as they 
were very brief, I will read as they were pre- 
sented :— 
“ As conclusions, we find and are of the 
opinion :— 
“ ist. That John Daley, the prisoner, was in- 
sane on the day he committed the homicide. 
“ 2d. That we have been unable to connect 
the homicide with any delusion that he held at 
the time, but are of the opinion that, in conse- 
quence and resulting from the insanity, his self- 
control was to a considerable degree impaired, 
and he was liable, more than in his normal 
condition, to become the prey of sudden passion 
and frenzy. 
“ 3d. That he is at the present time an in- 
sane and dangerous person, for the reason that 
he entertains the delusion that he has been 
drugged or poisoned, and that he is the con- 
stant object of surveillance by detectives and 
suspicious persons. 
“4th. That, though an ignorant man, he is 
now up to such a mental standard, as compared 
with his former state, that he could comprehend 
the proceedings of a court or trial. 
“ 5th. That his memory is unimpaired, and 
that no attempt to feign the condition we ob- 
served was made, neither did he seem to us to 
prevaricate.” 
The government decided to try the issues on 
or about the 6th of January, and the case was, 
I think, very fairly and fully tried. The jury, 
after an absence of about ten minutes, brought 
in a verdict of acquittal—I think very much to 
the surprise of both sides. 
I have presented this case for two reasons : 
First, it has an interest in connection with that 
of Webber, recently tried in this city, which it 
much resembles. Both committed atrocious 
murders ; both were insane prior to and at the 
time of the homicides, yet it did not appear 11 
that the crimes had any direct connection with 
delusions entertained by either. Both crimes 
seemed to result from sudden passion and in- 
sufficient provocation, not an unusual history 
of crime. Both had a knowledge of right and 
wrong. 
Daley said, in his own language, that he had 
killed Kennedy because he had cheated him 
in a money transaction, and Webber alleged 
he killed his victim because he “ fired him out 
of the store.” 
John Daley had been confined in prison and 
at the Almshouse under circumstances that 
should have led to his committal as a lunatic, 
and the wife of Webber is reported to have en- 
deavored to have him admitted to a hospital 
for the insane. No doubt can exist that in both 
cases physicians would have certified to the ex- 
istence of insanity, and two valuable lives have 
thus been spared. 
Both cases were properly referred to a jury 
to determine their criminal accountability for 
the commission of their acts. As human law 
is enacted partly for the protection of society, 
the question recurs, to what extent shall crimi- 
nals who are conceded to be partially insane be 
excused from the consequences of acts which 
are only indirectly the outgrowth of mental dis- 
ease ? Also, does not conviction in these cases, 
rather than acquittal, and the subsequent exer- 
cise of mercy, if called for, exercise a whole- 
some deterrent influence over a large number 
of eccentric, partially insane persons, commonly 
called “ cranks,” who would otherwise commit 
some serious crime ? 
The final disposition of the two cases was 
quite different; Daley was acquitted, and Web- 
ber was convicted. 
Second. The charge of Judge Montgomery, 
of the District Court, is so in accord with the 
existing state of medical knowledge and 
experience that, if not in accordance with 
present accepted legal doctrines, it will honor 
the intelligence and humanity of a succeeding 
age. 
If not taxing your time too much, I will read 
the report of the charge as printed in one of the 
district papers:— 
“ Upon the positions of the prosecution and 
defense the judge charged as follows :— 
“ ‘ First. If the defendant was, at the time of 
the homicide, wholly incapacitated mentally—a 
madman, without intelligent or rational under- 
standing, or in a condition of “ frenzy or rav- 
ing madness,” I hardly need say he is not re- 
sponsible for his acts. 
“ ‘Again, I instruct you generally, that a de- 
fendant charged with murder is not to be held 
responsible when, at the time of the commission 
of the homicide, he was incapable of determin- 
ing whether the act was right or wrong. 
“ ‘ The jury should consider the following 
questions: First, Was the defendant at the 
time of the act, as a matter of fact, afflicted with 
disease of the mind ; was he wholly or partially 
insane ? 
“ ‘Second, If he was so afflicted, did he know 
right from wrong as applied to the homicide in 
question ? If he did not have such knowledge, 
he is not legally responsible. 
“ ‘ Third, If he did have such knowledge, had 
he, by reason of the duress of such mental dis- 
ease, so far lost the power to choose between the 
right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in 
question, as that his free agency was at the time 
destroyed, and if so, was the homicide so con- 
nected with such mental disease in the relation 
of cause and effect as to have been a product 
of it (the mental disease) solely ? 
“‘ If this be the fact, he is not legally respon- 
sible. If, by reason of the insane delusions 
which the defendant had been harboring, he 
had reached that condition of mind when the 
morbid impulse to kill became irresistible, and 
existed in such volume as to subjugate his intel- 
lect and will and render it impossible for him to 
do otherwise than to yield and do as he did, 
then he is not to be held accountable. 
“ ‘ On the contrary, if you are satisfied, from 
the evidence, that the defendant was not insane, 
either wholly or in part; that he had no mental 
affliction, or, if you are satisfied that even 
though he was to some extent afflicted men- 
tally, he was to a degree mentally unsound; 
that he still had sufficient capacity to under- 
stand and did understand right from wrong, as 
applied to this act, and you are further satisfied 
that there has been no such duress, such stress 
of his mental disease as to render him power- 
less to choose, powerless to avoid doing the act, 
that his free agency was not destroyed; that 
the homicide was not the product of his mental 
infirmity (if he had any), then he should beheld 
responsible and convicted as indicted.’ ” 
The insane criminal was committed to the 
Government Hospital for the Insane.