OF 
1/ 
CHARLES A. LEE, M. D., 
IN THE MATTER OF 
CARLTON GATES, deceased. 
NCTRTOMft* 
WILLIAM .J. READ, LAW AND JOB PRINTER, 
116 Fulton St., (New Iron Building—bet. Dutch and Nassau Sts.) 
1870. OPINION OF CHARLES A. LEE, M.D. 
A definition of insanity is usually considered an essential 
preliminary in the decision of questions like the present, al- 
though it is generally acknowledged, that a definition applica- 
ble to all cases, is quite an impossibility. The following, 
however, may be deemed sufficiently accurate for all practical 
purposes. Insanity is a chronic disease of the brain, pro hieing 
either derangement of the intellectual faculties, or a prolonged 
change of the feelings, affections, and. habits, or both,; its form 
depending on constitution, temperament and various accidental 
circumstances ; but, in all cases, perverting or destroying the free- 
dom of the will. 
The following “ opinion” has been deliberately and con- 
scientiously formed, from a knowledge of the entire testimony 
offered in this case, all of which has been either heard or 
carefull}' read ; also, from my own intimate acquaintance of 
over twenty years : 
I. Carlton Gates labored under confirmed insanity during 
the last year of his life at least, and probably for a much 
longer period. 
II. The form of his mental disease, was, what usually goes 
under the name of monomania, that is, a perversion of the un- 
derstanding limited to a single object, or a small number of 
objects, accompanied in the present instance, as it often is, 
with moved perversion, or disorder of the natural feelings, af- 
fections and habits. 2 
III. A striking characteristic feature in the case, and one 
which was never absent during the last year of Carlton’s life, 
was the existence of delusions on a variety of subjects, but 
chiefly in regard to the hostility of his parents and relatives, 
and to poisoning. 
IY. The mental derangement was amply sufficient to im- 
pede and destroy the free and healthy exercise of the intel- 
lectual faculties, and the freedom of the will, so that the power 
of thinking and acting freely was annulled. 
Y. In consequence of this impairment of the mind and free- 
dom of the will by disease, Carlton was incapable of perform- 
ing a valid civil contract, as making a will ; and was also de- 
prived of all criminal respovisibility. 
YI. The proof of delusion in the mind of the testator, is 
amply proved by the testimony of almost every witness in the 
case, especially his physicians, parents, relatives, and such 
servants as were allowed to be about his person, and per- 
mitted to testify. It seems remarkable, that those who were 
with him the most during his last illness, as the Rev. Dr. 
Hulbert, his housekeeper, nurse, Ac., and knew best the state 
of his mind at that time, were not called upon the stand to 
testify. There is, however, abundant proof to the point with- 
out it. 
VII. This deponent is not called upon to discuss the sub- 
ject of undue influence any further than to say, that the mind 
of the testator was in such a diseased and perverted state, as 
to render him peculiarly liable to impositions and unreason- 
able prejudices of all kinds, especially to artful attempts to 
excite suspicions of his nearest and best friends, and to make 
him entertain a belief that the individual making such at- 
tempts was his very dear and “ particular friend.” 
VIII. That such attempts were persistently made, and that 
they proved successful in the present instance, is abundantly 
established by various witnesses, as well as by the wording of 
the will itself. The a priori improbability of such a wicked 3 
effort being made, must yield before the evidence adduced in 
proof of the fact, which in this case cannot be disputed. 
IX. When it is considered that, just before his last visit to 
Europe, Carlton had made a will, restoring the whole of his 
property to his mother; and that it remained unaltered, until 
his weak and perverted mind had been thoroughly poisoned 
against her, and nearly up to the time of his death ; when a 
new will was executed, revoking his former bequests in favor 
of the very individual, who, it is proved, had caused the new 
will to be made, and who had- had sole charge of Carlton’s 
person for the last two weeks of his life ; such an instrument 
appears so unreasonable, so unnatural, and so unjust on its 
very face, and bears upon it such irresistible marks of in- 
trigue, dishone-ty and fraud, that it must necessarily be re- 
jected. 
X. rIhat the existence of (/elusion is the recognized legal 
test of insanity, is so well known and acknowledged, that the 
learned counsel, employed by the contestants of the will, will 
have no difficulty in establishing it by many well attested 
cases and decisions, both foreign and native. I shall there- 
fore only quote here, two legal authorities in point. 
XI. Setting aside cases of dementia or loss of mind and 
intellect, the true test of insanity is mental delusion. If a per- 
son persistently believes supposed facts, which have no real 
existence except in his fevered imagination, and against all 
evidence and probability, and conducts himself, however 
logically, upon the assumption of their existence, he is, so far 
as they are concerned, under a morbid delusion ; and delusion 
in that sense is insanity.—Abbott's N. Y. Digest, Vol. VII, 1SG3. 
XII. “What constitutes insanity of mind is a question 
which has been very much discussed, especially of late years ; 
and the opinions of learned judges seem at first view, to be 
conflicting ; but much of the apparent discrepancy may be 
reconciled by adverting to the nature of the cases respectively 
in judgment. The degree of uusoundness or imbecility of 
mind, sufficient to invalidate the acts.of the party in some 4 
cases, may not suffice in others. Bat in regard to insanity, 
where there is no frenzy or raving madness, the legal and true 
character of the disease is delusion ; or as the physicians express 
it, illusion or hallucination ; and the insane delusion consists 
in a belief of facts, which no rational person would believe.” 
—Professor Greenleaf's Law of Evidence, Vol. I, p. 464. 
Numerous other legal authorities to the same point are 
omitted. 
XIII. There is perfect uniformity of opinion in regard to 
this test of insanity among all the medical authorities. They 
all agree with our distinguished countryman, Dr. Isaac Bay, 
who declares that11 delusions, if genuine, can only spring from in- 
sanity"—Med. Jurisprudence of Insanity, p. 142. Beference 
on this point may be made to Mandeley on the “ Physiology 
and Pathology of the Mind,” p. 327; also to Esquirol, Pritch- 
ard, Guy and Combe, on Insanity. 
In monomania proper, and in melancholia," says Mandeley, 
“ we have a partial ideational insanity, with fixed delusion or 
delusions upon one subject or a few subjects, apart from which 
the patient reasons tolerably correctly. Psychologically 
speaking, the existence of a delusion indicates fundamental 
disorder of mental action—radical insanity ; secondly, the de- 
lusion reacts injuriously upon other mental phenomena, in- 
terfering secondly with correct ratiocination, or due coordina- 
tion of functions, and predisposing to convulsivo mental phe- 
nomena; and thirdly, while it cannot be subordinated to 
reflection, the individual may at any moment be subordinated 
to it, and act under its instigation.” 
It is unnecessary to quote medical writers to any greater 
extent, to show that morbid- delusion is regarded as a true test 
of insanity. It must be recollected, however, that it is not 
maintained that such delusion exists in every case of insanity, 
but, that where it docs exist, there insanity exists. For instance, 
I have known of several cases of mania or general insanity 
and melancholia, and had charge of them, where there existed 
no delusion whatever. 
XIY. There is another test of insanity, which is regarded 
by medical men as very important in forming correct conclu- 5 
sions in regard to the existence of mental derangement, and 
which I have always looked upon as an invaluable guide in 
forming a correct judgment in these cases ; madness, for ex- 
ample, is not often indicated so much by any particular ex- 
travagance of thought or feeling, as by a well marked change of 
character, or departure from the ordinary habits of thinking, 
feeling and acting, without any adequate cause. I believe it can- 
not be questioned that the testimony fully discloses such a 
change in the conduct and character of Carlton Gates during 
the last year of his life, without any adequate motive or 
cause, and therefore conclusively establishes the fact of his 
insanity (see the testimony of Dr. and Mrs. Gates, Mrs. and 
Miss Nesbit, (fee., <fec.) 
From a life-long and intimate acquaintance with the testa- 
tor, he having resided a year in my own family, I was able to 
testify to the naturally amiable and kind disposition of Carl- 
ton, especially his strong attachment to his mother, and 
ardent affection for her; manifested, when abroad, by send- 
ing her numerous costly presents ; his entire change in these 
and other respects, is amply exhibited in the testimony, and 
needs no comment. 
XV. In forming a judgment in this case in regard to the 
state of mind of the testator, I also find sufficient evidence of 
insanity in the nature of the will itself. To say nothing of the 
strange and unnatural nature of the bequests themselves, 
proving conclusively the change of feeling and disposition al- 
ready referred to ; the confident expression of Carlton’s be- 
lief in the fact of his having been poisoned, notwithstanding 
the positive assurance of all his physicians that such was not 
the fact—the direction to have the contents of his stomach 
analyzed for the detection of poisons, supposed to have been 
administered many months before—he being a medical man; 
the appropriation of $25,000 (at first $o0,000), for the prose- 
cution of certain suspected persons, not named in the will ; 
the gift of the Yonker’s estate to the Corporation of Yonkers, 
although he knew he had no legal title to it, and was only 
trustee of the property ; the false statements in regard to his 
father and mother, and her income, imbecility, <fcc., tfec. When 
to all this, we add the extraordinary fear and suspicion of de- 6 
tection and discovery, during the drawing and execution of the 
will, directing “ doors to be carefully closed,” and “ to see 
that no one was about,” who might possibly hear what was 
going on ; all this, so characteristic of the cunning and secrecy 
of the insane, proves, in connection with the other circum- 
stances, the positive insanity of the testator. There was, un- 
doubtedly, reason enough remaining to render him conscious 
that he was about doing a wrong, perverse, and wicked act, 
for the insane are often able to distinguish between right and 
wrong, for as soon as the will was executed, he exhibited no 
fear or suspicion whatever. 
XYI. Nearly all professional writers on insanity, speak of 
the great irritability of the insane—the perversion of the 
moral sense, and especially a change in the sentiments and 
feelings of affection towards their relatives and friends—a com- 
plete indifference or positive hostility towards them ; and all 
this while they themselves are perhaps quite unconscious of 
the existence of any disorder, and then only, where it has 
come on by slow degrees, and is only partial in its effects but 
especially in the form of monomania, which afflicted Carlton. 
When the partial derangement of the intellect becomes organ- 
ized and systematized, it is remarkable what a desperate de- 
gree of tenacity it presents ; we find it in vain to attempt to 
argue with the patient, or convince him of his errors. He 
shelters himself behind his convictions with unshaken con- 
fidence in their truth ; and, if for a moment ho be compelled 
to admit that his enemies are imaginary, and those from 
whom he has become alienated his best and dearest fiiends, 
in a short time, however, his delusive notions again re-appear 
and take full possession of his mind. 
XVII. I have generally found that in this form of insanity 
the understanding is tolerably sound on most subjects but 
those connected with the delusion ; and even where the dis- 
order is more complicated, involving a more extensive train 
of morbid ideas, though the patient may reason correctly, and 
talk rationally on many subjects unconnected with those of 
his delusion, the understanding is more extensively deranged 
than is generally supposed. In these cases, by close observa- 7 
tion, we can generally detect some perversity of feeling or 
action altogether foreign to their ordinary character ; and 
thus it was with Carlton during the last years of his life. At 
first, and, indeed, for a considerable portion of the time, there 
was little intellectual derangement, but gradually there was 
distinctly observed creeping over him a profound perversion 
of the sentiments and affections, marked at times by real 
maniacal excitement and acts of violence which have been 
erroneously attributed to intoxication. But if one had con- 
versed with him, during all this time, on subjects not con- 
nected with the morbid part of his mental state, probably, 
little or no difference between him and other persons would 
have been noticed. He preserved so correct a notion of pro- 
priety of conduct and the etiquette and social observances of 
life, that he usually conducted himself in society as well as 
most other people. But through the influence of selfish and 
interested persons, as shewn by the witnesses, whose avari- 
cious designs prompted them to the unholy work, his feelings 
became alienated from his friends—he imputed to them de- 
signs against his welfare, his happiness, and even his life; 
he suspected even his parents of a design of poisoning him ; 
and at last, contrary to all evidence and assurances, died in 
the full belief that he had been poisoned ! 
XVIII. The evidence, then fully sustains the following 
conclusions : 
1. The existence of permanent delusion on several points, 
especially in regard to the matter of poisoning—by various 
persons, and at different times. 
2. A marked change of feeling, character and conduct; in- 
deed, an apparent total loss of affection for his parents and 
friends, and deadly hostility towards them. 
3. Paroxysms of monomaniacal excitement, during which 
his conduct was marked by acts of insane violence, restless- 
ness, boisterous behavior, profanity, sleeplessness, abusive 
language, Ac. 
4. Positive hatred of his mother, and a desire to punish 
her by excluding her from any share in the property given 8 
him by her, and considering her insane against all evidence 
to the contrary. 
5. A persistent belief in the existence of facts which had 
no real existence except in his disordered imagination, and 
against all evidence and probability, and bearing directly on the 
nature of his will. 
6. As these delusions and false notions had special refer- 
ence to his parents and relatives, who would naturally have 
been the objects of his testamentary capacity, a will, made 
under these circumstances, must necessarily be invalid. 
XIX. The above statements and considerations, perhaps, 
contain all that is really necessary to establish the want of 
testamentary capacity in the testator ; there are some con- 
siderations, however, connected with the subject which may 
properly find expression in this place. 
XX. Although it is claimed by most writers on mental dis- 
eases that the mind of the monomaniac is sound, apart from 
his delusions, I hold that the diseased idea is a part of the 
mind ; and that the mind, therefore, is no more sound than 
the body is sound, when a man has a serious disease of 
some vital organ—that the exquisitely delicate and complex 
mechanism of mental action-—the brain, is radically deranged ; 
else, the morbid idea could not have been engendered and ex- 
ist. The mind is not unsound upon one point only; but an 
unsound mind expresses itself in a particular morbid action. 
Moreover, as in the case of Carlton, when the delusion is 
once produced, there is no power of drawing a sanitary 
cordon around it, and thus, by putting it in quarantine, as it 
were, preserving all other mental processes from infection ; 
on the contrary, the morbid centre reacts injuriously on the 
neighboring parts, and there is no guarantee that at any 
moment the most desperate consequences may not ensue. In 
other words, speaking psychologically, I regard the existence 
of a delusion as indicating f undamental disorder of modal action 
—radical insanity; and that, secondly, the delusion reacts in- 
juriously upon other mental phenomena, interfering, more or 
less, with correct ratiocination, and predisposing to acts of 9 
violence; and, thirdly, while it cannot be fully subordinated 
to reflection and consciousness, the individual may at any 
time be subordinated to it, and act under its instigation. 
Whore delusion then exists, however partial the mental de- 
rangement may appear, the mind is actually unsound, not to 
be relied on ; and not to he held responsible ; disease is going on 
in it, and no one can tell when or where it will end. 
XXI. Carlton Gates inherited a weak bodily frame, and an 
extremely active, sensitive, nervous temperament; in fact, it 
may be truly stated that he inherited what has been called the 
insane temperament, characterized by singularities or eccen- 
tricities of thought, feeling and action. He was impression- 
able to subtle and usually unrecognized influences. There 
was in his constitution an innate tendency to isolation—to 
act independently, as an element in the social system ; and 
there was evidently a personal gratification in the indulgence 
of such a disposition which seemed to mark great selfishness 
and vanity. This peculiarity of temperament was allied in him, 
with considerable native talent and genius, qualities which we 
often find closely allied to madness ; in his estimation he was 
right, all the rest of the world wzas wrong ; he was forever in 
“ a minority of one.” This fatal heritage was painted upon 
his physiognomy, on his external form, his ideas, passions, 
habits and inclinations. There was little power of vital re- 
sistence in his system, and his personal habits were not conser- 
vative of vital force. Pari passu, with the progress of corpo- 
real disease, we find in him as might almost have been antici- 
pated, the feeling or affective life greatly perverted, his whole 
habit and manner of feeling was changed, his passions and 
moral affections became perverted and deranged more than 
one year before his decease ; ideational or intellectual derange- 
ment succeeded, and, probably, had he lived, would have soon 
predominated. But, as in numerous other similar cases, the 
affective disorder was the fundamental fact preceding, and then 
accompanying intellectual disorder; and both would have 
been equally prominent had he long survived. But during his 
life moral alienation was the predominant form of his mental 
derangement. He had labored for many months previous to 
his death under a tubercular state of the lungs, seriously im- 10 
peeling the oxygenation and healthy renewal of the blood, 
and necessarily aggravating the mental disorder. 
XXII. It cannot be denied, that in the presence of stran- 
gers, Carlton, for the most part, manifested no special signs of 
insanity; but then it is to be recollected that the insane have 
great poicer of self-control ; they can frequently conceal all in- 
dications of mental demngement, where it is policy to do so ; 
and so notorious is this the fact, that insane individuals, and 
even inmates of our lunatic asylums, are often considered 
sane by others and unjustly confined. To feign sanity on the 
part of the insane is far easier than the opposite—to feign in- 
sanity on the part of the sane. The latter requires what is 
not often possessed, namely, an accurate acquaintance with 
the characteristic features of the various kinds of mental de- 
rangement. Such persons, accordingly, are apt to overact 
their part and seldom escape detection. It is generally sup- 
posed that persons actually mad, must show it on all occa- 
sions, and in their whole conduct. But this is far from being 
the case where there is any motive to sane conduct. Thus, in 
nearly all our insane asylums religious chapel-services are 
regularly observed on Sundays, at least, and in many of 
them daily prayers are held night and morning, at which a 
large proportion of the patients are present, and whose con- 
duct is as quiet and orderly as is generally observed in reli- 
gious assemblies among sane people. Violent conduct, growing 
out of ungovernable impulse, is rare among the insane. Carl- 
ton Gates is a good example to show to what extent a mad 
man may have control of his actions even where a powerful 
impulse prompted him to acts of extreme and murderous 
violence ; and so decorous was his behavior in the presence 
of his physicians, and the subscribing witnesses to his will, 
that they were even led to doubt his insanity. But when we 
consider that they had no suitable opportunity and used no 
proper tests by which to judge of his mental condition, it is 
by no means remarkable that they failed to discover his actual 
state ; and their opinion should have, therefore, very little, if 
any weight. It is somewhat singular, however, that a few 
days before his decease, they all thought him incapable of 
making a valid will. 11 
XXIII. As already remarked, mental derangement is a 
matter of degree, and as no two people are exactly alike in 
mental character and development, so no two cases of mental 
degeneration are exactly alike. As the brain presents every 
variety of individual functions in health, so also it presents 
every variety of morbid function in disease ; consequently, 
two cases of insanity may resemble one another in the gene- 
ral features of exaltation or depression, or in the character of 
the delusion (as poisoning for example), and yet each have 
its own special features. In fact, insanity is no fixed morbid 
entity; but every case of it is an example of individual de- 
generation, representing individual mental life under other 
conditions than those regarded as uormal or typical. The 
features of insanity in any given case, must depend very much 
on the degree of development the mind of the individual has 
reached ; the more cultivated the mind, the more various and 
complex the symptoms of its derangement; moral insanity, so 
called, does not exist among savages. 
XXIV. This attempt to conceal the existence of insanity, 
on the part of an individual, implies of course a self-con- 
sciousness that he is a victim to it. 
As we often see in the incipient stage of intoxication—a 
person will make a determined effort to comport himself like 
a sober man, being to some extent, conscious of the degrad- 
ing and brutalized condition to which he is reduced ; he thus 
endeavors to conceal from observation his actual state by 
making a great effort to control his ideas, talk rationally, and 
walk steadily ; and although much intoxicated, he is possibly 
able by a resolute and determined effort of the will, for a 
time to play well his part, and disarm all suspicions as to his 
actual condition of inebriation. This is very analogous to the 
state of the mind in incipient insanity. The patient is toler- 
ably aware of his condition—he battles courageously and often 
successfully, to disarm all suspicions as to his mental un- 
soundness—to banish all unnatural and unhealthy thought 
and mental impressions ; but the morbid condition of the 
brain proves too much for him—too strong for his will to con- 
trol ; and first one weak point shows itself and then another, 
till finally he becomes, as Carlton Gates did, the victim of 
morbid delusion—a mere wreck of what he once was ! 12 
XXY. It is now nearly thirty years since the laws of Eng- 
land and the decisions of the Courts, both in that country and 
the United States, have recognized both partial and general 
intellectual insanity, as well as partial and total moral insanity, 
as a ground, both of exclusion of convictions for crime, and as 
incapacitating for the performance of civil contracts ; espe- 
cially for making a valid will. 
Besides other cases, where partial moral insanity, assuming 
the form of monomania has served as a successful ground of 
defence for an alleged criminal act, I may mention that of 
Kleim, tried in the City of New York in 1845, before Judge 
Edmonds, for homicide. In charging the jury in this case, 
Judge Edmonds remarked as follows : 
“ It must be borne in mind that the moral as weld as the intellec- 
tual faculties may be so disordered by disease as to deprive the 
mind of its controlling poioer 
From that time, at least, to the present, moral insanity has 
become firmly established as a part of the jurisprudence of 
this state. 
It will, doubtless, yet become an admitted principle in 
jurisprudence, that sometimes the character of the criminal 
act itself will furnish sufficient evidence of its having been 
prompted by insanity, especially where the motive defies all 
penetration or suspicion, and the mind itself has previously 
evinced no positive signs of impairment, and the most skilful 
psychological expert will detect no other proofs of its exist- 
ence, after the closest investigation of the bodily and mental 
condition of the party ; as where a mother murders her 
children, Ac., Ac. 
And so, also, the nature of a civil act, as a will, depriving 
a parent, brother, sister, or other relative of an inheritance, 
which would naturall}7, rightfully and legally fall to them, 
and which perhaps, as in the present instance, was bestowed 
on the party by them, and toward whom no feeling but that 
of affectionate attachment had existed up to a late period, 
and then had become changed without any adequate cause 
or motive; I say such an unnatural and causeless act, will of 
itself prove the mental uusoundness of the party, and the will 
or other act will be declared, as a matter of course, invalid. 
This would be a much safer principle to act upon in jurispru- 13 
donee than an abstract knowledge of right and wrong ; and 
while the results would be more satisfactory, an immense 
amount of useless litigation and expense would be saved. 
XXYI. The time will probably come when insanity will be 
divided into two grand classes, viz : insanity without positive 
delusion, and insanity ivitli delusion ; or affective and ideational 
insanity; the present artificial classification of the disease, is 
certainly not in conformity with nature; and the one sug- 
gested is really more scientific than one which, by postulating 
an exactness that does not exist, is a positive hindrance to an 
advance in psychological knowledge. Until this time arrives, 
medical experts will have to recognize forms of mental de- 
rangement where there are no delusions. The deviation from 
healthy mental life are innumerable, and the divine mind can 
only be pronounced perfectly sound ; but let us not make 
division in knowledge where there are none in nature, but 
regard all present classifications as only provisional; some 
writers, for example, would make four kinds of insanity, with 
reference to the perceptions, the emotions, the intellect and 
the will, which it is stated, may be disordered aggregately or 
separately ; but nature knows no such classification ; these 
forms of insanity run into each other, or co-exist in the same 
case ; the intellect, for example, cannot be deranged without 
affecting the will; delusion, the true test of insanity, may 
exist in all forms of it, and the same is true, of emotional dis- 
turbance, &c. 
XXVII. I have already mentioned the strong predisposi- 
tion to insanity on the part of Carlton, and some of the 
causes which probably precipitated it. These causes were 
such as usually undermine the constitution, and produce 
bodily as well as mental disease. During his residence of 
many years abroad, it is believed he made a rather free and 
probably habitual use of wine, although he was not fond of 
distilled liquors; but even this mild stimulant exerted, no 
doubt, a very unfavorable influence upon his nervous irre- 
pressible temperament, and it constituted almost the only al- 
coholic liquor he drank after his return from Europe, in No- 
vember, 18G8; on the few occasions on which he ventured 14 
on a stronger drink, lie exhibited symptoms of slight intoxi- 
cation ; to which, the attempt has been made by the coun- 
sel employed to sustain the will, to attribute the halluci- 
nations, delusions, and other symptoms of insanity manifested 
by the testator. This attempt, however, must signally fail, 
inasmuch as these delusions, <fce., were permanent during the 
whole of the last year ; whereas he seldom drank intoxicating 
or distilled liquors, and then generally far within the limits 
of decided inebriation. Yet it is a fact, well known to those 
who have investigated disorders of the mind, that positive in- 
sanity is not unfrequently produced by alcoholic drinks ; and 
these are often, it is to be feared, the occasions of great in- 
justice being done by our legal tribunals. Statistics prove that 
intemperance is the most frequent caTisc of ins miti/ in the United 
States. 
XXVIII. Persons who are strongly predisposed to mental 
derangement, who possess the insane temperament, who 
labor under severe constitutional disease or chronic affec- 
tions, where the blood is contaminated, or who are easily 
affected by small quantities of liquor, are often liable to be- 
come actually insane after taking such drinks ; during which 
they are really as irresponsible for their acts as those laboring 
under the most decided insanity produced by any other cause. 
In this condition, it is true, hallucinations, illusions and delu- 
sions may exist, and the sufferer may perpetrate crimes, of 
which afterwards he has no recollection, and of the nature of 
which, at the time, he is entirely unconscious. We meet occa- 
sionally with cases where the individual imagines he sees 
strange sights and hears strange sounds, as in delirium 
tremens, and commits strange and violent acts under such 
delusive impressions. The courts have repeatedly decided 
that such persons cannot be held responsible for civil or 
criminal deeds committed during the existence of such hallu- 
cinations. 
XXIX. It has long been a well-known fact that a vitiated 
state of the blood exorcises a marked effect upon the func- 
tions of the brain ; and the frequently observed effects of 
alcohol upon this organ, is the best and simplest illustration 15 
of this statement. It is doubtless true that the temporary 
derangement produced by alcohol is very similar in many 
cases to the permanent insanity produced by any cause what- 
ever. First, we usually observe an agreeable excitement—a 
lively flow of ideas, and a general activity of mind, as in 
the earlier stages of mania; then follow incoherence of 
thought and speech, passional excitement, the nature of 
which depends much on the temperament of the individual ; 
then a stage of depression, followed, perhaps, by convulsions, 
paralysis, dementia, stupor, and even death. Just as we see 
in insanity, alcohol like the other causes of derangement., 
affects different people according to their temperament— 
making a furious maniac of one, a drivelling melancholic of a 
second, and a third it readers stupid, dull and heavy ; the 
constitution rather than the nature of the cause determines 
the form which the madness takes. 
XXX. Another interesting fact may be noticed in this 
connection, and that is, that besides alcohol, many other nar- 
cotic poisons may enter the blood and derange the functions 
of the brain, such as opium, belladonna, conium, stramonium, 
Indian hemp, Calabar bean, the., producing more or less deli- 
rium, hallucinations, illusions, and even insanity, where their 
use is long persisted in, or they are taken in considerable 
quantity. But the blood is not only thus poisoned by sub- 
stances taken into the stomach, but also by the formation in 
the tissues, and retention in the blood, of matters generated 
in the system as urea and urie acid in Bright’s disease of the 
kidneys, so called. If not eliminated from the body these 
agents produce urcemic poisoning attended with delirium, con- 
vulsions and death. Hallucinations and false perceptions are 
produced by all these substances. 
XXXI. I have chiefly attributed the monomaniacal insanity 
of Carlton, to a peculiar constitution and temperament, in 
which there manifestly existed a certain inherent aptitude or 
tendency to morbid, mental and corporeal degeneracy, and 
lacking that reserve power necessary to the trying occasions 
—“the wear and tear” of life. Insanity and pythisis were 
its natural and legitimate fruits. Considerable predisposing 16 
influence in this case has been attributed to the circumstances 
of his education and to faulty moral training ; but while 
it is freely admitted that an injudicious bringing up may 
aggravate an inherent latent mischief or defect, yet, where the 
germs of future disease, as in this case, are so deeply im- 
planted in the very constitution itself, it must bo an excep- 
tionally excellent training, both physical and mental, that can 
prevent the usual and natural results; no one will pretend to 
say that the testator inherited any morbid taint of blood or 
vice of nature from either parent, except that which is 
common to all the race ; neither was there ever set before 
him the evil of a bad parental example ; but the morbid 
nervous element in his constitution accidentally predominated, 
subordinating to it all the other elements of his nature, and 
wrought the effect of developing an unnatural precocity 
strongly predisposing to disease. There was no parental 
harshness or neglect in his treatment; but, on the contrary, 
the utmost kindness, indulgence and affection. This indul- 
gence, it is possible, may have been carried to that extent as 
to somewhat interfere with or weaken the necessary lessons 
of renunciation and self-control : but this is so common a 
defect in the education and training of the youth of the 
present age that it calls for no special condemnation in this 
instance. “ Let him that is without fault cast the first stone.” 
So far as moral causes are concerned, much of the increasing 
insanity of the times may be traced to the habitual encour- 
agement on the part of parents of self-feeling, vanity, and the 
egotistic element in the child, which go far to create a morbid 
predisposition and irritable sensitiveness which disqualify 
from bearing up successfully against the calamities and ad- 
verse circumstances of life. The prevention of insanity, will, 
doubtless be found in all those circumstances that go to 
develop strong characters—strong, mentally and physically— 
intellectually, morally and corporeally. 
XXXII. Edmonds, in his “Select Cases ” (Yol. 1, p. 35), has 
defined a sane man as one, 
1. Whose senses bear truthful evidence. 
2. Whose understanding is capable of receiving that 
evidence. 17 
3. Whose reason can draw proper conclusions from the 
truthful evidence thus received. 
4. Whose will can guide the thought thus obtained. 
5. Whose moral sense can tell the right and wrong grow- 
ing out of that thought. 
(i. And whose act can, at his own pleasure, be in con- 
formity with the action of all these qualities—“ all 
these unite to constitute sanity" (it is said); “the 
absence of any one of them makes insanity.” 
XXXIII. If the above statements be admitted as true, then 
Carlton Gates was evidently riot sane; in other words, he was 
insane; fori. “His senses did not bear truthful evidence,” 
nor “was his understanding capable of receiving that evi- 
dence.” For example, his mother invariably had treated him 
with the utmost forbearance, kindness and affection ; all her 
acts he interpreted as manifestations of neglect, abuse, 
and enmity. He was not capable of truly interpreting her 
conduct, as he always had been before. 2. His reason, such 
as it was, did not draw proper conclusions from the truthful 
evidence exhibited to him. His conclusions were all false, 
unreasonable, and unfounded, and therefore justify the infer- 
ence that he was destitute of sound reason and under- 
standing. 3. It is also manifest that his “ moral sense ” did 
not distinguish the “ right and wrong ” of his thoughts, or of 
the testamentary acts growing out of them, and therefore that 
he possessed no real freedom of the will; in other words, was 
insane. 
XXXIV. I repeat, the symptoms and phenomena mani- 
fested in the case of Carlton, so far as known and testified to, 
justify the conclusion that there was present physical disease 
of the brain, which insanity always presupposes, and to that 
extent as to prevent perfect freedom of thought and action. 
XXXV. It is very possible that physiology may not, for 
many years to come, furnish the complete data of a positive 
mental science ; but it is not too much to say that it has 
already advanced sufficiently far as to the data of 18 
a false psychology, resting solely on self-consciousness. 
That the brain is the organ or instrument of the mind is now 
generally conceded ; and that with each display of mental 
power, there are correlative changes in the material sub- 
stratum—the brain—that ever}' phenomenon of mind is the 
result, as manifest energy, of some change, molecular, chemi- 
cal, or vital, in the nervous elements of this organ, is also 
admitted. We need not here enter into a consideration of 
the real nature of mind; it is enough to know that it is most 
certainly dependent for its every manifestation on the brain 
and nervous system, and scientific research is daily disclosing 
more clearly the relations between it and its organ. Mental 
power is but an organized result, matured by insensible 
degrees in the course of life, and as much dependent on the 
nervous structure as the function of the liver is on the hepatic 
structure. So well established is this proposition that physi- 
ologists no longer seek for proof that the brain is the organ 
of the mind, but rather to investigate the conditions of its 
healthy activity, and the pathological evidence of the disease 
in the various forms of mental derangement or impairment. 
Those pathologists who have devoted the most attention to 
this department of science, tell us that they have not failed 
to discover invariably pathological changes in the brain where 
intellectual disorder has existed in madness, and even in that 
form of insanity called melancholia, and also in extreme old 
age. Whatever may be said by the pure psychological school 
of philosophers, the world is indebted to physicians and 
physiologists for the only true philosophy of mind, namely : 
that instead of being a simply entity—an independent source 
of power and self-sufficient cause of causes—it is dependent 
on a material organ for all its manifestations. 
XXXYI. If this be so, it is very evident that when physi- 
cians, from disordered mental manifestations, infer the exis- 
tence of cerebral disease, it is nothing more nor less than a 
pure induction from well-known established facts and princi- 
ples. It is not a deductive process of reasoning at all as 
assumed by some philosophers, but one of simple induction ; 
and having established the fact of the existence of cerebral 
disease, they may surely go on to point out its consequences, 19 
as revealed and illustrated by the pathological history of such 
cases. The process does not vary at all from that pursued in 
regard to any other important organ of the body—the heart, 
the lungs, liver or kidneys—persistent disordered function, 
points to a physical lesion, and this, in turn, demonstrates what 
was the nature and cause of the functional derangement. 
This has, indeed, been called “ reasoning in a circle but it 
arises from the very nature of the case, and must be so, if there 
is any reasoning whatever. It is true that the phenomena, as 
regards mental soundness and capacity, are objective to the 
physiologist as well as others; to bo determined by observa- 
tion and the usual mode of inquiry; but the physiologist and 
pathologist are alone qualified to draw any correct conclu- 
sion whatever in regard to the nature or extent of cerebral 
disease. It is true that “physicians are not necessarily meta- 
physicians,” if they were merely such, they would be no better 
judges in respect to questions of sanity or insanity, cerebral 
health, or cerebral disease, than any other persons; in short, 
it would be quite absurd to call them in as experts in any case 
involving these questions. Any other opinions would be 
equally as valuable and reliable. The pure psychologist, who 
relies entirely on the psychological method of self-concious- 
ness in investigating mental phenomena; who regards the 
mind as an entity, acting independently of a material organ- 
ism, and aims to discover the laws of the human mind b}r 
contemplating it in itself, must confess that, if his theory be 
admitted in insanity, the mind itself is diseased, and if diseased 
it may perish like the body. To such a conclusion must the 
psychologist inevitably arrive, who rejects the received doc- 
trine of the dependence of mind on a material structure, for 
its earthly manifestations. When these psychologists over- 
look the physical structure and functions of the body in their 
study of the human mind, they remind us of the story of the 
philosopher, who, while he gazed upon the stars, fell into the 
water; for if he had looked down he might have seen the 
stars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the 
water in the stars.—Lord Bacon De Augment Scient., B. 2. 
Judicial Decisions in Similar or Analogous Cases. 
XXXVII. As the legal bearings of the case belong more 20 
especially to the learned and able counsel employed by the 
contestants of the will, it will not be necessary for me to en- 
ter upon them to any great extent. During the last quarter 
of a century, there have been several decisions in the English 
and American Courts, both in criminal and civil cases, espe- 
cially in such as relate to wills, based on the now recognized 
principle that delusion is a true test of insanity ; and these 
decisions have now the force and authority of Common Law. 
XXXVIII. “ Where there is no direct evidence of the de- 
ceased’s state of mind at the time, of the act done, recourse 
must be had to the usual mode of ascertaining it in such 
cases—which, is looking at the act itself. The agent is to be 
inferred rational, or the contrary, in such cases from the 
character broadly taken of his act. Testamentary dispositions 
that conflict ivith the natural distributions of property and the 
known and expressed intentions of the testator, are to be held as 
sufficient evidence of unsound mind." (Carlton had made a 
will already, giving all his property to his mother.)—Sir John 
Nichol in Addotns Ecclesiastical Reports, 74. 
“ I cannot but think that a mental disorder operating on 
partial subjects, should with regard to those subjects be at- 
tended with the same effects as a total deprivation of reason.” 
—Pothier on Obligations, Appendix 24. 
“ When a man suffers under a partial derangement of in- 
tellect, if the act done bears a strict and evident reference to 
the existing mental disorder, we cannot see why the law 
should not interpose a limited protection ; and still less, why 
courts of equity should deny their aid in such cases.”—Paris 
& Fonblanque Med. Jurisprudence, p. 30. 
ENGLISH CASES. 
Case I. 
XXXIX. In the case of Dew v. Clark (Addoms Ecclesi- 
astical Reports, 79), the existence of monomania is recog- 
nized on the ground of delusion, and its operation on the un- 
derstanding, in controlling the civil acts of an individual. 
The testator, Scott, had conceived a violent antipathy against 
his daughter, without any real or adequate cause, which was 21 
declared to be solely the offspring of delusion in a disordered 
mind ; and his will, which cut her off from all participation in 
his estate, was set aside on that ground alone. 
Case II. 
XL. See case of White v. Wilson (13 Vesey's Reports, 88). 
Here the testator, in a state of delirium, in fever, received 
a draught from the hands of his brother, and conceived the 
idea that it was intended to destroy him ; which belief 
continued after his recovery, and became so controlling, that, 
in consequence, he disinherited his brother in his will; a 
verdict was obtained in the Common Pleas against the will, 
but resulted afterwards in a compromise. “No one,” says 
Ray, commenting on this case, “would be hardy enough to 
affirm that Greenwood’s mind was perfectly rational and 
sound, and as his insanity displayed itself on all topics rela- 
ting to his brother, every act involving his brother’s interests 
to go no farther, ought consequently to have been invalidated.” 
—Med. Jurisprudence of Insanity, p. 239. 
(Esquirol has related a case of a very similar kind ; where 
a person conceived an antipathy against his brothers, sisters 
and other relations, who, he believed, were seeking to destroy 
him; under the influence of this delusion, he made testamen- 
tary dispositions, and Esquirol being consulted respecting 
their validity, gave it as his opinion, that the testator was la- 
boring under insanity. The will was consequently set aside. 
—Annates d'Hygiene Publique, 111, p. 370.) 
Case III. 
XLI. An elderly lady was excessively penurious and eccen- 
trie, very irritable and quarrelsome. She conceived the in- 
sane delusion that her brother had joined the Catholics, to 
whom she felt a strong aversion, and in consequence, disin- 
herited him. The will was consequently set aside (Wharton 
and Stitle American Medical Jurisprudence, p. 20).* In this 
case Lord Brougham denied the existence of monomania or 
partial insanity, and maintained that the mind, being “ one 
and indivisible, and if unsound on one subject, provided 
that unsoundness is at all times existing on that subject, it is 22 
quite erroneous to suppose such a mind really sound on other 
subjects ; it is only sound in appearance”—( Waring v. Waring, 
6 Moore P. C. Cases, 349). “ It may therefore be considered 
as the present law of England,” says Wharton, p. ‘23, “ that a 
person partially insane is incompetent, so far as the making 
of wills or contracts is concerned.” 
XLII. It is quite unnecessary to quote English decisions in 
criminal cases. The principle, however, which has been re- 
cognized in all the recent cases is that— 
1. “ Any species of insane delusion exempts from pun- 
ishment the perpetrator of an act committed under its 
influence.” 
2. “ The belief unfounded in fact, that a party is in im- 
mediate danger of his life from another, may.be such 
a delusion ; or, the belief that taking the life of another 
is the appropriate remedy for a minor though imagined 
evil, may be also an insane delusion.” 
3. “ That, therefore, homicide, under such a delusion, is 
not liable to punishment.”* 
AMERICAN DECISIONS. 
XLIII. The various decisions of American Courts are well 
summed up as follows, by Judge Sergeant of Philadelphia, 
before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of 
Boyd v. Eby (8 W., 70), 1839. 
“ The only question in such a case is, whether the testator 
teas under a delusion, though there be but a partial insanity ; yet 
if it be in relation to the act in question, it is ivell settled it toill 
invalidate contracts generally, and defeat a will which is the di- 
rect offspring of this partial insanity.” 
* By the term “ punishment,” as here used, is to be understood such pun- 
ishment as is inflicted on persons of sound mind It is essential, however, to 
the policy of the present more humane mode of treatment of the insane, that 
in all cases where a party is acquitted on jround of insanity, strict confinement 
should be directed, in such a way as will exempt the community from any pro- 
bable recurrence of such delirious outrages. 23 
XLIY. Judge King, also of Philadelphia, in the case of Leech 
v. Leech, 11 Pa. L. J., 179, then closing a judicial career of 
twenty-seven years duration, remarked as follows : 
“ A monomaniacal delusion, inveterately entertained by a 
testator against those who would otherwise have been the 
natural objects of his bounty, and shown to be the reason 
which has excluded them from it, and to have had no other 
existence, except in the distempered imagination of the tes- 
tator, would invalidate a will made under such influence. 
And for the very plain reason that a will made under the 
suggestion of such an insane delusion, is not what the law re- 
quires a will to be, the product of a mind capable of reason- 
ing rightly ; for although the law recognizes the difference 
between general and partial insanity, yet if the will has been 
made, under the influence of such partial insanity, and as the 
product of it, it is as invalid as if made under the effects of 
an insanity never so general.” 
XLV. I would refer also to the case of The American Sea- 
mens Friend Society and others, Appellants, v. Herter, Hopper, 
and others, Respondents (Tiffany N. Y. Reports, Appeals, vol. G, 
p. 619). 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case, was ren- 
dered by Judge Denio (December, 1865), affirming the fol- 
lowing principles, and the decree of the Surrogate and the 
Supreme Court, rejecting the will: 
1. The true test of insanity affecting testamentary capa- 
city, Ac., aside from cases of dementia, or loss of mind 
and intellect, is mental delusion. 
2. A person, persistently believing supposed facts, which 
have no real existence, against all evidence and pro- 
bability, and conducting himself upon the assumption 
of their existence, is, so far as such facts are concerned, 
under an insane delusion. 
3. If a testator at the time of making his will is laboring 
undei any such delusion in respect to those who would 
natuially have been the objects of his testamentary 
bounty, and the Court can see that the depository pro- 24 
visions were or might have been caused or affected by 
such delusion, such instrument is not to be deemed 
to be his will. 
In this case, the testator believed that all his relatives were 
set against him, and had conspired together, and were en- 
deavoring to kill him by the administering of chloroform, or 
some other means. His physician testified that he considered 
the deceased a monomaniac in respect to his family and rela- 
tions. 
XLVI. The same principles were affirmed by a decision of 
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in the case of 
Stanlon and miff, Appellants, v. IVetherwax and others, Respon- 
dents (April, 1853—Barbours' Supreme Court Reports, vol. 1G, 
p. 259). 
Judge Gridley, after quoting as authority, Sir John Nichol 
in the celebrated case of Dew y. Clarke (3 Ad. 79 ; English 
Ecclesiastiecd Report, vol. 1, p. 441). See above case already 
referred to, proceeds to say that, “ the testator was partially 
insane, and something more than a monomaniac, for he was 
under a strong delusion. On more than one subject a mono- 
maniac may make a valid will, where the provisions of the 
will are entirely unconnected with, and of course, uninfluenced 
by the particular delusion. Hut where there is good reason 
to believe the will is the offspring of that particular delusion 
which has seized his mind, and controls its operation, the 
rule is otherwise. A will thus made, under the influence of a 
powerful delusion, which has not only impaired but perverted 
his judgment and understanding in relation to subjects con- 
nected with the provisions of the will, so as to exercise a con- 
trolling influence in the disposition of his property, is not the 
will of a testator of sound mind (p. 2G2). His mind is un- 
sound quoad the very subject on which he is called to exeicise 
its powers in making the will.” 
The decisions of the Surrogate of Herkimer County was 
reversed, and the will declared null and void. 
XLYII. The most recent case bearing on the question of 
„monomania as affecting testamentary capacity, is that lately 25 
brought before the Surrogate of Orange County, N. Y., in the 
matter of proving the last will anti testament of John C. Cal- 
houn. I need not give the particulars of this interesting 
case, as they are, doubtless, well known to this Court; in 
many respects they bear a striking resemblance to those of the 
present case, but the proof of delusion and insanity in the tes- 
tator is far less strong. It will suffice for my present purpose 
if I quote briefly from the opinion of his Honor Gilbert O. 
Hulse, Esq., Surrogate; an opinion equally honorable both 
to his head and heart. 
“ I will first consider the question whether the testator was 
so far unsound in mind, that the will is invalid for that reason. 
He was not an idiot or a lunatic, but it is said that he was 
afflicted with a form of insanity known as monomania. Mono- 
maniacs are those persons who are insane upon some one or 
more subjects, whether it relate to ‘one or more persons or 
things, and are apparently sane upon all others. Such persons 
are competent to make a will, unless the subject of their infir- 
mity is involved in the making of it. The belief in the existence 
of mere illusions or hallucinations, creations purely of the imagi- 
nation, such as no sane man would believe in, is unequivocal 
evidence of insanity. The persistent belief of a person in sup- 
posed facts, ivhich really have no existence, except in his imagina- 
tion, and who acts on such belief, proves him, so far as such, acts 
are concerned, to be acting under a morbid delusion. Such a 
delusion is partial insanity. When seen it appears that the ivill 
is the direct of spring of such partial insanity, it must be regarded 
as invalid, though the general capacity of the testator is unim- 
peached.”—Neivburgli Journal. 
The will was not admitted to probate ; partly on the ground 
of monomania, undue influence, and partly on the fact that the 
testator entirely disinherited all his relatives, and gave all his 
property to a Dr. Jones, with whom he had been acquainted 
only a few months. 
XLYIII. George Moore of Kentucky, made his will in 
April, 1822, and shortly afterward died. The validity of the 
will was disputed on the ground of unsoundness of mind in 
the testator. It was shown that about twenty-four years 
before his death he had had a dangerous fever, during which 26 
ho contracted a strong hatred against his brothers, whom ho 
imagined intended to injure or destroy him, although they 
had attended him through his illness, and never gave any 
cause for his suspicion. This antipathy continued until 
the day of his death, with a single exception, when he made 
a will in their favor, which he subsequently cancelled. The 
Court in its decision, said, “ that he cannot be accounted a 
free agent in making his will, so far as his relatives are con- 
cerned, although free as to the rest of the world. But how- 
ever free he may have been as to other objects the conclusion 
is irresistable that this peculiar defect of intellect did influence 
his acts in making his will, and for this cause it ought- not to 
be sustained.”—Little s Reports, 371. 
XLIX. The case of Madame Jumel, decided by the Su- 
preme Court of New York, in 1866, is another case in point. 
This well-known lady died several years since, leaving the 
bulk of a large estate to various Ecclesiastical and charitable 
institutions, and disinheriting her relatives. This case was 
brought to trial before the Supreme Court of New York City 
(1866). It was shown in evidence that the testatrix was very 
old, and that she was subject to delusions of various kinds; 
among others, she conceived the idea that several of her 
relatives were trying to poison her, and she refused to take 
food which they gave her. 
The Court charged that if the testatrix was of uusound 
mind on account of those delusions, she was not capable of 
making a will. 
The jury found that she was of unsound mind when she 
made the will.—Supreme Court Reports, 1866. . 
L. James C. Johnston, of North Carolina, died in 1865, 
excluding his natural heirs, by his will, from any partici- 
pation in his estate, and the whole of his property was de- 
vised to persons in no way connected with him, and with 
whom he had never been intimate. The testator had labored 
under monomauia for several years, having occasional parox- 
ysms of delirium, but possessing a good degree of self-control; 
without any aparent cause, he conceived a violent prejudice 
against his son and other relatives, towards whom he mani- 27 
Zested the utmost hatred. The will was justly considered 
unnatural and motiveless, the result of delusion and mono- 
mania, and was accordingly declared null and void. “ In- 
sanity in its Medico Legal Relations.” Bv William A. 
Hammond, M. D. N. Y., I860. Also, “ Opinion relating to 
the Testamentary Capacity of James C. Johnson, of North 
Carolina.” By the same. 1866. 
LI. The case of Morrison vs. Smith, Bradford's Surrogate 
Reports, vol. 3, p. 209, presents some points worthy of notice 
in this connection. 
The decedent, a short time after the execution of his will, 
was committed to the lunatic asylum, after an examination by 
a phj’sician, who found him insane, and laboring under a 
delusion that some of his children were spurious. He was 
exceedingly cautious on the subject of the delusion, and 
careful not to betray it to the examining physician until the 
latter succeeded in gaining his confidence. He had been 
melancholy for a length of time, and his depression of spirits 
had been greatly increased by the recent decease of his wife. 
Within a few days of the date of the execution of the will, he 
had become suddenly violent at night to such an extent as to 
require physical restraint; and about the same time he gave 
indications of the delusion in respect to his children. Held, 
that a will made very near the time of these developments, 
unequal in its provisions, and favoring the only two members 
of the family privy to it, one of whom was present when the 
instructions were given when the draft was submitted, and 
when the instrument was signed, and both of them had been 
the decedent’s agents, and had possession of his estate, 
needed more than the formal proof of the factum ; and the 
evidence failing to show affirmatively the soundness of the 
decedent’s mind at the time of the transaction, probate was 
denied. 
The will in question was executed on the 4th or 5th Jan- 
uary, 1853 ; on the 21st of same month he was committed to 
the lunatic asylum, at Bloomingdale. Dr. Brown testified 
that he was laboring under that chronic form of insanity 
called melancholia—a form of disease which does not ordinarily 
supervene with a violent paroxysm ; that his present state of 28 
mind (21st January), had existed about five months ; that ho 
disavowed the identity of his children, and that he was sup- 
posed to indulge suicidal propensities. And yet Dr. Gray 
and Dr. Kelley, his physicians, who were intimately ac- 
quainted with him, the Rev. Mr. Evans, Ac., testified to his 
sanity. Dr. Gray, in a certificate dated January 7, 1853, and 
Dr. Kelley, in a certificate dated January (5, 1853. The latter 
states that “the said John Morrison is of sound mind and in- 
tellect, and in full possession of all the faculties of reason and 
intelligence.” And Dr. Gray states that “ said Morrison is in 
a sound state of mind and capable of managing his affairs.” 
The Rev. B. Evans visited him on the 4th, 9th and 16th of 
January, and discovered no signs of “irrationality.” 
The Surrogate, Mr. Bradford, very justly remarks in con- 
nection with this case, that “ there are cases on record whore 
the subject has for a length of time defied every effort to 
make him convict himself of irrationality, yet, when the key 
was discovered, instantaneously disclosed his delusion. So, 
here the decedent’s cautiousness and craftiness were more 
than a match for the physician’s experience and shrewdness, 
until the secret spring was found and touched, and then he 
laid bare his mind.” As to the witnesses Drs. Gray and 
Kelley, and Rev. Mr. Evans, adduced to prove the rationality 
of the decedent, their attention was not directed to any special 
examination of the case. How little reliance can be placed 
upon casual observation is illustrated by the fact, that even 
after the 9th of January, and when the decedent was un- 
doubtedly insane, the Rev. Mr. Evans spent some time in conver- 
sation ivifh him, without discovering any symptoms of derange- 
ment (p. 113, 225). 
LII. In the case of Hopper already referred to above, 
Judge Brown, for twenty years an eminent Justice of our Su- 
preme Court remarked before the Court of Appeals, (p. 690). 
“ If a careful examination of the evidence taken before the 
Surrogate results in showing that Charles Hopper, upon some 
subjects, and indeed generally, had mind and memory, sense 
sufficient to know and comprehend ordinary transactions, 
still it will also result that upon the subject of his wife and 
his other relations, those who would naturally have been the 29 
objects of his care and bounty, and who would have succeed- 
ed to his estate, he was a maniac, given to the grossest in- 
sane delusions. The instrument proposed cannot be regarded 
as his will, because upon such a subject he was incapable of 
expressing or forming an intelligent will. It is the result, not 
of a clear unclouded intellect, having an intelligent compre- 
hension of the relation of the things with which it has to deal, 
but the result of a delusion which controls the judgment and 
misleads the understanding in relation to the subjects upon 
which it is acting. A monomaniac may make a valid will 
when its provisions have no connection with the particular 
delusion, and there is no reason to think they are influenced 
by it. But when, as in this case, the delusion relates to the 
persons, who would, in the natural and usual course of things, 
become the objects of the maker’s care, solicitude and bounty, 
and especially, upon whom the law would cast the inheritance 
of his property, the instrument must be regarded as invalid to 
pass the estate, because its does not express the will of a tes- 
tator of a sound and disposing mind.” 
LIIT. These cases could be multiplied, if there was any ne- 
cessity for so doing. In regard to criminal canes, where in- 
sanity, characterize! by delnsion has existed, Chief Justice 
Shaw of Massachusetts, has clearly laid down the law in the 
case of Rogers, who was tried for murdering his keeper in the 
State Prison.—Am. Laic, Jour. No. 3, 128, (N. S.) 
“ The conduct may be in many respect regular, the mind 
acute, and the comluet apparently governed by rules of pro- 
priety, and, at the same time, there may be insane delusion, by 
which the mind is perverted. The most common of these 
cases is that of monomania, when the mind broods over one 
idea, and can not be reasoned out of it. This may operate as 
the excuse for a criminal act in one or two modes ; either the 
delusion is such that the person under its influence has a real 
and firm belief of some fact, not true in itself, but which if it 
were true, would excuse his act; as where the belief is, that 
the party killed had an immediate design upon his life, and 
under that belief, the insane man killed him in supposed self- 
defence.” 30 
And “ secondly, where some violent outburst occurs, which 
taken in connection with former acts indicates that the will 
was overborne. The questions for them to decide were 
whether such a delusion existed in the mind of the accused ; 
whether he did not act under an insane but firm belief that 
the deceased was going to shut him up with some dangerous 
design, or not for a slight punishment ; whether the facts in- 
dicate that the deed was done at a moment when the delusion 
was uncontrollable.” 
The same principles were laid down in the case of Abbott, 
by the Superior Court of Connecticut, indicted for killing his 
wife in 1841 ; also by the Court on the trial of Mercer for the 
murder of Aeberton.in New Jersey, April, 1843. (In some of 
the recent trials of murder, some new principles of Medical 
Jurisprudence have been laid down, if not by Courts, by law- 
yers and juries; as in the case of Coles, who was declar- 
ed to have been sane the moment before the act was commit- 
ted, as well as the moment afterwards ; but that lie was utter- 
ly insane, when he committed the murderous act, and on this 
principle he was acquitted.)