ELEMENTS 
OF 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 
I 
EMBRACING THE TWO DEPARTMENTS OF THE 
INTELLECT AND THE SENSIBILITIES, 
BY THOMAS C. UPHAM, 
PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHV IN 
BOVVDOIN COLLEGE. 
IN TWO VOLUMES.-VOL. 1. 
THIRD EDITION. 
PORTLAND, 
PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM HYDE, 
FOK Z. HYDE. 
1839. Entered, according to the Act of Congress, by Thomas C. Upham. 
in the Clerk's office of the District court of Maine. 
PRESS OF J. GRIFFIN, BRUNSWICK.. PREFACE. 
The present work has been prepared in the hope of promoting 
a more general acquaintance with an important department of sci- 
ence. As it is designed chiefly for those who are young, and are 
in a course of education, it lays claim to no other merit, than what 
might ordinarily be expected in a text-book, founded on the inqui- 
ries of many valuable writers. Guided by their researches, it 
endeavors to give a condensed, but impartial view of Mental Phi- 
losophy, so far as its principles are understood at the present time; 
and the writer has learnt from a number of esteemed instructors of 
youth, that his design is approved by them. He is by no means 
insensible to this favorable sentiment; and if the present work should 
prove to be the means of awakening an increased interest in mental 
science, he will feel himself amply rewarded for whatever trouble its 
preparation may have occasioned. 
The Philosophy of the Mind has grown up like other sciences, 
from small beginnings. Many propositions, coming too in many 
instances from able writers, have been thrown aside; truth has been 
sifted out from the mass of error, until at last a great number of 
important principles is ascertained. But while it is exceedingly 
necessary, that our youth should be made acquainted with these 
principles, it is impossible that they should go through with all the 
complicated discussions, which have been held in respect to them. 
Many of the books, in which these discussions are contained, have 
become exceedingly rare; and if they were not so, no small number 
of students, who are now in a course of as thorough an education as 
our country affords, would not be able to purchase them. And 
besides, by placing before the student a mass of crude and conflict- 
ing statements, his mind becomes perplexed. To be able to resolve 
such a mass into its elements, and to separate truth from error, 4 
PREFACE. 
implies an acquaintance with the laws of the intellect, and a degree 
of mental discipline, which he is not yet supposed to have acquired; 
and hence, instead of obtaining much important knowledge, he be- 
comes distrustful of every thing. 
Now these evils, saying nothing of the loss of time attendant on 
such a course, are to be remedied in the same way as in other sci- 
ences. In other departments of learning, ingenious men discuss 
points of difficulty; conflicting arguments are accumulated, until 
the preponderance on one side is such that the question in debate is 
considered settled. Others employ themselves in collecting facts, 
in classifying them, and in deducting general principles, and when 
all this is done, the important truths of the science, collected, from 
such a variety of sources, and suitably arranged and expressed, are 
laid before the student, in order that he may become acquainted with 
them. Very seldom any one thinks it advisable, that the pupil, in 
the course of an education limited to a very few years, should be ob- 
liged to attempt an acquaintance with every scientific tract and book, 
whether of greater or less value. It is neither desirable nor possible, 
that he should be made to consult all the Memoirs of Institutes and 
of Royal Societies; and still less to read the multitudes of half form- 
ed suggestions, which are either struck out in the momentary heat 
of debate, or are developed from all quarters in the natural progress 
of the mind. It belongs rather to professional men and to public 
instructers, to engage in this minute and laborious examination, and 
to present those, whom they instruct, with the results of their inqui- 
ries. It may indeed be desirable to give them some knowledge of 
the history of a science, and to point out such authors as are particu- 
larly worthy of being consulted by those, whose inclination and 
opportunities justify more particular investigations. But this is all, 
that is either demanded, or can be profitable in the ordinary course 
of education. And this is what is attempted to be done in the pres- 
ent work. 
It has been my desire and endeavor, as was intimated at the 
beginning of these remarks, to give a concise but correct view of 
the prominent principles of Mental Philosophy, so far as they seem- 
ed at present to be settled. The statement of these principles is 
attended with a perspicuous summary of the facts and arguments, on 
which they are based ; together with occasional remarks on the 
objections, which have been made from time to time. In selecting 
facts in confirmation of the principles laid down,I have sought those, 
which not only had a relation to the point in hand, but which prom- 
ised a degree of interest for young minds. Simplicity and uniformity PREFACE. 
5 
of style have been aimed at, although in a few instances the state- 
ments of the writers referred to, have been admitted with only slight 
variations, when it was thought they had been peculiarly happy in 
them. As my sole object was the good of young men, I did not 
feel at liberty to prejudice the general design, by rejecting the facts, 
arguments, and in some cases even the expressions of others. And 
it may be added here, in respect to this department of science in 
general, that entire originality is out of the question. A person, 
who should attempt to give a sketch of the human mind, without 
consulting and availing himself of the learned and judicious labors 
of Locke, Reid, Stewart, De Gerando, Cousin, and many others, 
would succeed only in exposing his own unwise presumption. 
It is impossible, that any one man, however respectable his tal- 
ents, should acquire, by his own unaided exertions, a full acquaint- 
ance with this subject. Aristotle possessed one clear view, viz, that 
of the connection of the intellect with the material world, and of the 
external origin of knowledge in general; Plato, on the other hand, 
directed his attention chiefly to the internal origin of thought. 
Locke had the sagacity to combine these two great views; and his 
plan has been carried out more decisively and fully by his succes- 
sors. And it is thus throughout, both in respect to the intellectual, 
and the sentient or active part of our nature. One has sketched the 
plan; another has corrected and enlarged it. One has pointed out 
the sources of materials; while others have hastened away and pro- 
cured them; and others again have been employed in putting them 
together, and in ornamenting the completed edifice. 
Bowdoin Colege, (Maine,) September, 1839. 
THOMAS C. UPHAM. CONTENTS. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Chap. I.-primary truths.. 
Sect. 
Importance of preliminary state- 
ments in mental philosophy 1 
Nature of such preliminary state- 
ments 2 
Of the name or designation given 
them 3 
Primary truth of personal exist- 
ence 4 
Occasions of the origin of the idea 
or belief of personal existence 5 
Primary truth of personal iden- 
tity 6 
Reasons for regarding this a pre- 
liminary truth 7 
There are original and authorita- 
tive grounds of belief 8 
Primary truths having relation to 
the reasoning power 9 
No beginning or change of exist- 
ence without a cause 10 
Occasions of the origin of the pri- 
mary truth of effects and causes 11 
Matter and mind have uniform 
and fixed laws 12 
This primary truth not founded 
on reasoning 13 
Chap. II.-immateriality of the 
mind. 
On the meaning of the terms, ma- 
terial and immaterial 14 
Difference between mind and mat- 
ter shown from language 15 
Their different nature shown by 
their respective properties 16 
rhe soul's immateriality indica- 
ted by the feeling of identity 17 
The material doctrine makes 
man a machine 18 
No exact correspondence be- 
tween the mental and bodily 
state 19 
Evidence of this want of exact 
correspondence 20 
Comparative state of the mind 
and body in dreaming 21 
The great works ofgenius an ev- 
idence of immateriality 22 
The doctrine of materiality in- 
consistent with future exist- 
ence _ 23 
Chap. III.-laws of belief. 
Of belief, its degrees, and its 
sources 24 
Of suggestion, consciousness,and 
the senses as grounds of belief 25 
Memory and Testimony consid- 
ered as sources of belief 26 
Objection to reliance on testimo- 
ny 27 
Ofrelative suggestion as a ground 
of belief 28 
Of reasoning as a ground or law 
of belief 29 
Chap. IV.-general classifica- 
tion. 
The mind may be regarded in a 
threefold point of view 30 
Evidence of the general arrange- 
ment from consciousness 31 
Evidence of the same from the CONTENTS. 
7 
terms found in different lan- 
guages 32 
Evidence from incidental re- 
marks in writers 33 
Further proof from various wri- 
ters on the mind 34 
Classification of the intellectual 
states of the mind 35 
DIVISION FIRST. 
THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTAN- 
DING. 
INTELLECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL 
STATES OF THE MIND. 
PART FIRST. 
INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL 
ORIGIN. 
Chap. I.-origin of knowledge in 
GENERAL. 
Connection of the mind with the 
material world 36 
Of the origin or beginnings of 
knowledge 37 
Our first knowledge in general of 
a material or external origin 38 
Further proof of the beginnings 
of knowledge from external 
causes 39 
The same subject further illustra- 
ted 40 
Subject illustrated from the case 
of James Mitchell 41 
Illustration from the case of Cas- 
par Hauser 42 
Of connatural or innate know- 
ledge 43 
The doctrine of innate knowledge 
not susceptible of proof 44 
The doctrine tried by the idea of 
a God 45 
The discussion of this subject su- 
perseded and unnecessary 46 
Further remarks on the rise of 
knowledge by means of the sen- 
ses 47 
Chap. II.-sensation and percep- 
tion. 
Sensation a simple mental state 
originating in the senses 48 
All sensation is properly and tru- 
ly in the mind 49 
Sensations are not images or re- 
semblances of objects 50 
The connection between the men- 
tal and physical change not sus- 
ceptible of explanation 51 
Of the meaning and nature of 
Perception 52 
Of the primary and secondary 
qualities of matter 53 
Of the secondary qualities of 
matter 54 
Of the nature of mental powers 
or faculties 55 
Chap. III.-the senses of smell 
AND TASTE. 
Nature and importance of the 
senses as a source of know- 
ledge 56 
Of the connection of the brain 
with sensation and perception 57 
Order in which the senses are to 
be considered 58 
Of the sense and sensation of 
smell 59 
Of perceptions of smell in distinc- 
tion from sensations 60 
Of the sense and sensation of 
taste 61 
Design and uses of the senses of 
smell and taste 62 
Chap. IV.-the sense of hearing. 
Organ of the sense of hearing 63 
Nature of sonorous bodies and 
the medium of the communica- 
tion of sound 64 
Varieties of the sensation of 
sound 65 
Manner in which we learn the 
place of sounds 66 
Application of these views to the 
art of ventriloquism 67 
Uses of hearing and its connec- 
tion with oral language 68 
Chap. V.-the sense of touch. 
Of the sense of touch and its sen- 
sations in general 69 
Idea of externality suggested in 
connection with the touch 70 
Origin of the notion of extension, 
and of form and figure 71 8 
CONTENTS 
On the sensation of heat and 
cold 72 
On the sensation of hardness and 
softness 73 
Of certain indefinite feelings 
sometimes ascribed to the 
touch 74 
Relation between the sensation 
and w hat is outwardly signified 75 
Chap. VI.-the sense of sight. 
Of the organ of sight and the uses 
or benefits of that sense 75 
Statement of the mode or process 
in visual perception 76 
Of the original and acquired per- 
ceptions of sight 77 
The idea of extension not origi- 
nally from sight 78 
Of the knowledge of the figure of 
bodies by the sight 79 
Measurements of magnitude by 
the eye 80 
Of objects seen in the mist and 
of the sun and moon in the hor- 
izon 81 
Of the estimation of distances by 
sight 82 
Estimation of distance when un- 
aided by intermediate objects 83 
Of objects seen on the ocean, &c. 84 
Supposed feelings of a being call- 
ed into existence in the full 
possession of his powers 85 
Chap. VII.-of reliance on the 
senses. 
By means of sensations we have 
a knowledge of outward things 86 
Objection to a reliance on the 
senses 87 
The senses circumscribed or lim- 
ited rather than fallacious 88 
Some alledged mistakes of the 
senses owing to want of care 89 
Of mistakes in judging of the mo- 
tion of objects 90 
Of mistakes as to the distances 
and magnitude of objects 91 
The senses liable to be diseased 92 
On the real existence of a mate- 
rial world 93 
Doctrine of the non-existence of 
matter considered 94 
The senses as much grounds of 
belief as other parts of our con- 
stitution 95 
Opinions of Locke on the testi- 
mony of the senses 96 
Chap. VIII.-habits of sensation 
AND PERCEPTION. 
General view of the law of habit 
and of its applications 97 
Of habit in relation to the smell 98 
Of habit in relation to the taste 99 
Of habit in relation to the hear- 
ing 100 
Of certain universal habits based 
on sounds 101 
Application of habit to the touch 102 
Other striking instances of hab- 
its of touch 103 
Habits considered in relation to 
the sight 104 
Sensations may possess a rela- 
tive, as well as positive in- 
crease of power 105 
Of habits as modified by partic- 
ular callings or arts 106 
The law of habit considered in 
reference to the perception 
of the outlines and forms of 
objects 107 
Notice of some facts which fa- 
vor the above doctrine 108 
Additional illustrations of Mr. 
Stewart's doctrine 109 
Chap. IX.-muscular habits. 
Instances in proof of the exist- 
ence of muscular habits 110 
Muscular habits regarded by 
some writers as involuntary 111 
Objections to the doctrine of in- 
voluntary muscular habits 112 
Chap. X.-conceptions. 
Meaning and characteristics of 
conceptions 113 
Of conceptions of objects of 
sight 114 
Of the influence of habit on our 
conceptions 115 
Influence of habit on concep- 
tions of sight 116 
Of the subserviency of our con- 
ceptions to description 117 
Of conceptions attended with a 
momentary belief 118 
Conceptions which are joined CONTENTS 
9 
with perceptions 119 
Of our conceptions at tragical 
representations 120 
Chap. XI.-simplicity and com- 
plexness OF MENTAL STATES. 
Origin of the distinction of sim- 
ple and complex 121 
Nature and characteristics of 
simple mental states 122 
Simple mental states not suscep- 
tible of definition 123 
Simple mental states represen- 
tative of a reality 124 
Origin of complex notions and 
their relation to simple 125 
Supposed complexncss without 
the antecedence of simple feel- 
ings 126 
The precise sense in which 
complexness is to be under- 
stood 127 
Illustrations of analysis as ap- 
plied to the mind . 128 
Complex notions of external or- 
igin 129 
Of objects contemplated as 
wholes 130 
Something more in external ob- 
jects than mere attributes or 
qualities 131 
Imperfections of our complex 
notions of external objects 132 
Chap. XII.-abstraction. 
Abstraction implied in the anal- 
ysis of complex ideas 133 
Instances of particular abstract 
ideas 134 
Mental process in separating 
and abstracting them 135 
Of generalizations of particular 
abstract mental states 136 
Of the importance and uses of 
abstraction 137 
Chap. XIII.-general abstract 
ideas. 
General abstract notions the 
same with genera and species 138 
Process in classification or the 
forming of genera and species 139 
Early classifications sometimes 
incorrect 140 
Illustration of our earliest clas- 
silications 141 
Of the nature of general ab- 
stract ideas 142 
Objection sometimes made to 
the existence of general no- 
tions 143 
The power of general abstrac- 
tion in connection with num- 
bers, &c. 144 
Of general abstract truths or 
principles 145 
Of the speculations of philoso- 
phers and others 146 
Of different opinions formerly 
prevailing 147 
Of the opinions of the Realists 148 
Of the opinions of the Nominal- 
ists 149 
Of the opinions of the Concep- 
tualists 150 
Further remarks of Brown on 
general abstractions 151 
Chap. XIV.-or attention. 
Of the general nature of atten- 
tion 152 
Of different degrees of atten- 
tion 253 
Dependence of memory on at- 
tention 154 
Of exercising attention in read- 
ing- 155 
Alledged inability to command 
the attention 156 
Chap. XV.-dreaming. 
Definition of dreams and the 
prevalence of them 157 
Connection of dreams with our 
waking thoughts 158 
Dreams are often caused by our 
sensations 159 
Explanation of the incoherency 
of dreams. (1st cause.) 160 
Second cause of the incoheren- 
cy of dreams 161 
Apparent reality of dreams 
(1st cause.) 162 
Apparent reality of dreams 
(2nd cause.) 163 
Of our estimate of time in 
dreaming 164 
Of the senses sinking to sleep in 
succession 165 
General remarks on cases of 
somnambulism 166 10 
CONTENTS 
Further illustrations of som- 
nambulism 167 
DIVISION FIRST. 
THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTAN- 
DING. 
intellective or intellectual 
STATES OF THE MIND. 
PART SECOND. 
INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTERNAL 
ORIGIN. 
Chap. I.-internal origin of 
KNOWLEDGE. 
The soul has fountains of know- 
ledge within 168 
Declaration of Locke, that the 
soul has knowledge in itself 169 
Opinions of Cudworth on the 
subject of internal knowledge 170 
Further remarks of the same 
writer on this subject 171 
Writers who have objected to 
the doctrine of an internal 
source of knowledge 172 
Knowledge begins in the senses, 
but has internal accessions 173 
Instances of notions, which have 
an internal origin 174 
Imperfections attendant on 
classifications in mental phi- 
losophy 175 
Chap. II.-original suggestion. 
Import of suggestion,and its ap- 
plication in Reid and Stew- 
art 176 
Ideas of existence, mind, self- 
existence, and personal iden- 
tity 177 
Origin of the idea of externality 178 
Idea of matter or material ex- 
istence 179 
Origin of the idea of motion 180 
Of the nature of unity and the 
origin of that notion 181 
Nature of succession, and ori- 
gin of the idea of succession 182 
Origin of the notion of duration 183 
Of time and its measurements, 
and of eternity 184 
Marks or characteristics of time 185 
The idea of space not of exter- 
nal origin 186 
The idea of space has its origin 
in suggestion 187 
Characteristic marks of the no- 
tion of space 188 
Of the origin of the idea of pow- 
er 189 
Origin of the idea of the first or 
primitive 190 
Of the ideas of right and wrong 191 
Origin of the ideas of moral 
merit and demerit 192 
Of other elements of knowledge 
developed in suggestion 193 
Suggestion a source of princi- 
ples as well as of ideas 194 
Chap. III.-consciousness. 
Consciousness the 2nd source 
of internal knowledge 195 
Further remarks on the proper 
objects of consciousness 196 
Consciousness a ground or law 
ofbelief 197 
Instances of knowledge devel- 
oped in consciousness 198 
Chap. IV.-relative suggestion 
OR JUDGMENT. 
Of the susceptibility of perceiv- 
ing or feeling relations 199 
Occasions on which feelings of 
relation may arise 200 
Of the use of correlative terms 201 
Of the great number ofour ideas 
of relation 202 
Of relations of identity and di- 
versity 203 
Of axioms in connection with 
relations of identity and di- 
versity 204 
(II) Relations of degree, and 
names expressive of them 205 
Relations of degree in adjec- 
tives of the positive form 206 
(III) Of relations of proportion 207 
(IV) Of relations of place or 
position . 208 
(V) Of relations of time 209 
(VI) Of relations of possession 210 
(VII) Of relations of cause and 
effect 211 
Of complex terms involving the CONTENTS 
11 
relation of cause and effect 212 
Remarks on instituted or con- 
vention relations 213 
Connection of relative sugges- 
tion or judgment with reason- 
ing 214 
Chap. V.-association. (prima- 
ry laws.) 
Reasons for considering this 
subject here 215 
Meaning of association and il- 
lustrations 216 
Of the general laws of associa- 
tion 217 
Resemblance the first general 
law ofassociation 218 
Resemblance in every particu- 
lar not necessary 219 
Of resemblance in the effects 
produced 220 
Contrast the second general or 
primary law 22l 
Contiguity the third general or 
primary law 222 
Cause and effect the fourth pri- 
mary law 223 
Chap. VI.-association. (secon- 
dary laws.) 
Secondary laws and their con- 
nection with the primary 224 
Of the influence of lapse of 
time 225 
Secondary law of repetition or 
habit 226 
Of the secondary law of co-ex- 
istent emotion 227 
Original difference in the men- 
tal constitution 228 
The foregoing law as applica- 
ble to the sensibilities 229 
Of association caused by pres- 
ent objects of perception 230 
Causes of increased vividness 
in these instances 231 
Chap. VII.-casual associations. 
(I) intellectual. 
Association sometimes misleads 
our judgments 232 
Casual association in respect to 
the place of sensation 233 
Connection of our ideas of ex- 
tension and time 233 
! Of high and low notes in mu- 
sic 284 
I Connection of the ideas of ex- 
tension and color 235 
Tendency of the mind to pass 
t from the sign to the thing sig- 
nified 236 
■ Whether there be heat in 
fire, &c. 237 
Whether there be meaning in 
words ? 238 
Benefit of examining such con- 
nections of thought 239 
Power of the will over mental 
associations 240 
Association controlled by indi- 
rect voluntary power 241 
Further illustrations of indirect 
voluntary power 242 
Chap. VIII.-memory. 
Remarks on the general nature 
of memory 243 
Of memory as a ground or law 
of belief 244 
Of differences in the strength of 
memory 245 
Of circumstantial memory, 
or that species of memory, 
which is based on the rela- 
tions of contiguity in time and 
place 246 
Illustrations of specific or cir- 
cumstantial memory 247 
Of philosophic memory, or that 
species of memory which is 
based on other relations than 
those of contiguity 248 
Further illustrations of philo- 
sophic memory 249 
Of that species of memory call- 
ed intentional recollection 250 
Instance illustrative of the pre- 
ceding 251 
Remarks on the memory of the 
aged 252 
On the compatibility of strong 
memory and good judgment 253 
Marks of a good memory 254 
Directions or rules for the im- 
provement of the memory 255 
Further directions for the im- 
provement of the memory 256 
Of observance of the truth in 
connection with memory 257 
Of committing to writing as a 
means of aiding the memory 258 12 
CONTENTS 
Of mnemonics or systems of arti- 
ficial memory 259 
Chap. IX.-duration of memory. 
Restoration of thoughts and 
feelings supposed to be for- 
gotten 260 
Mental action quickened by in- 
fluence on the physical system 261 
Other instances of quickened 
mental action and of a restor- 
ation ofthoughts 262 
Effect on the memory of a se- 
vere attack of fever 263 
Approval and illustrations of 
these views from Coleridge 264 
Application of the principles of 
this chapter to education 265 
Connection of this doctrine with 
the final judgment and a fu- 
ture life 266 
Chap. X.-reasoning. 
Reasoning a source of ideas and 
knowledge 267 
Illustrations of the value of the 
reasoning power 268 
Definition of reasoning, and of 
propositions 269 
Process of the mind in all cases 
of reasoning 270 
Grounds of the selection of 
propositions 271 
Reasoning implies the exist- 
ence of antecedent or assum- 
ed propositions 272 
Of reasoning a priori 273 
Of reasoning a posteriori 274 
Of reasoning a fortiori 275 
Of differences in the power of 
reasoning 276 
Of habits of reasoning 277 
Of reasoning in connection with 
language or expression 278 
Chap. XI.-demonstrative rea- 
soning. 
Of the subjects of demonstra- 
tive reasoning 279 
Use of definitions and axioms in 
demonstrative reasoning 280 
The opposites of demonstrative 
reasonings absurd 281 
Demonstrations do not admit of 
different degrees of belief 882 
Of the use of diagrams in de- 
monstrations 283 
Of signs in general as connect- 
ed with reasoning 284 
Of the influence of demonstra- 
tive reasoning on the mental 
character 285 
Further considerations on the 
influence of demonstrative 
reasoning 286 
Chap. XII.-moral reasoning. 
Of the subjects and importance 
of moral reasoning 287 
Of the nature of moral certain- 
ty _ 288 
Of reasoning from analogy 289 
Caution to be used in reasoning 
from analogy 290 
Of reasoning by induction 291 
Of the caution necessary in in- 
ductive processes 292 
Of instances or experiments in 
inductive reasoning termed 
instantiae crucis 293 
Of combined or accumulated ar- 
guments 294 
Chap. XIII.-practical dirrec- 
TIONS IN REASONING. 
Rules relating to the practice of 
reasoning 295 
Of being influenced in reasoning 
by a love of the truth 296 
Care to be used in correctly 
stating the subject of discus- 
sion 297 
Consider the kind of evidence 
applicable to the subject 298 
Reject the idea of false argu- 
ments or sophisms 299 
Fallacia equivocationis or the 
use of equivocal terms and 
phrases 300 
On the sophism of estimating 
actions and character from 
the circumstances of success 
merely 301 
Of adherence to our opinions 302 
Effects on the mind of debating 
for victory instead of truth 303 
Chap. XIV.-imagination. 
Imagination an intellectual pro- 
cess closely related to reason- CONTENTS. 
13 
ing 804 
Definition of the powerof imagi- 
nation 305 
Process of the mind in the cre- 
ations of the imagination 306 
Further remarks on the same 
subject 307 
Illustration from the writings of 
Dr. Reid 308 
Grounds of the preference of 
one conception to another 309 
Illustration of the subject from 
Milton 310 
The creations of the imagina- 
tion not entirely voluntary 311 
Illustration of the statements 
of the preceding section 312 
On the utility of the faculty of 
the imagination 313 
Works of the imagination give 
different degrees of pleasure 314 
Importance of the imagination 
in connection with reasoning 315 
Of misconceptions by means of 
the imagination 316 
Explanation of the above mis- 
representations of the imagi- 
nation 317 
Feelings of sympathy aided by 
the imagination 318 
Chap. XV.-complex ideas of in- 
ternal origin. 
Of complex ideas of external or- 
igin 319 
Nature of complex ideas of in- 
ternal origin 320 
Of complex notions formed by 
the repetition of the same 
"thing 321 
Of the help afforded by names 
in the combination of num- 
bers 322 
Instances of complex notions 
made up of different simple 
ideas 323 
Not the same internal complex 
ideas in all languages 324 
Origin of the complex notion of 
a Supreme Being 325 
DIVISION FIRST. 
THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTAN- 
DING. 
INTELLECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL 
STATES OF THE MIND. 
PART THIRD. 
IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED IN- 
TELLECTUAL ACTION. 
Chap. I.-connection of the 
MIND AND BODY. 
Disordered intellectual action 
connected with the body 326 
The mind constituted on the 
principle of a connection with 
the body 827 
Illustration of the subject from 
the effects of old age 828 
The connection of the bodily 
system with the mental shown 
from the effects resulting from 
diseases 329 
Shown also from the effects of 
stimulating drugs and gases 330 
Influence on the body of exci- 
ted imagination and passion 831 
This doctrine of use ii) explain- 
ing mental phenomena 332 
Chap. III.-excited conceptions 
OR APPARITIONS. 
Of excited conceptions and of 
apparitions in general 833 
Of the less permanent excited 
conceptions of sight 334 
Of the less permanent excited 
conceptions of sound 835 
1st cause of permanently vivid 
conceptions or apparitions. 
Morbid sensibility of the reti- 
na of the eye 336 
2nd cause of permanently exci- 
ted conceptions or appari- 
tions. Neglect of periodical 
blood-letting 337 
Methods of relief adopted in 
this case 338 
3d cause of excited conceptions. 
Attacks of fever 339 
4th cause of apparitions and oth- 
er excited conceptions. In- 
flammation of the brain 340 
Facts having relation to the 4th 
cause of excited conceptions 341 
5th cause of apparitions. Hy- 
steria 842 
Of ghosts and other spectral 14 
CONTENTS 
appearances 343 
Other circumstances character- 
istic of their recurrence 344 
Further illustrations and re- 
marks on the same subject 345 
Remarks of Walter Scotton the 
subject of ghost stories 846 
Chap. III.-idiocy. 
Misfortune of an imperfect or 
disordered state of mind 347 
Of the degree of intellectual 
power possessed in idiocy 348 
Of the natural and moral sensi- 
sibilities in idiocy 349 
Of the origin and causes of id- 
iocy 350 
Idiocy to be ascribed sometimes 
to the effects of age 351 
Illustrations of the causes ofid- 
iocy 352 
Of restoration from a state of 
idiocy 353 
Chap. IV.-partial insanity. 
Meaning of the term and kinds 
of insanity 354 
Of disordered or alienated sen- 
sations 355 
Of disordered or alienated ex- 
ternal perception 356 
Disordered state or insanity of 
original suggestion 357 
Unsoundness or insanity of 
consciousness 358 
Insanity of the judgment or rel- 
ative suggestion 359 
Disordered or alienated asso- 
ciation. Lightheadedness 360 
Illustrations of this mental dis- 
order 361 
Of partial insanity or alienation 
of the memory 362 
Of the powers of reasoning in 
the partially insane 363 
Instance of the above form of 
insanity of reasoning 364 
Of readiness of reasoning in the 
partially insane 865 
Partial mental alienation by 
means of the imagination 366 
Insanity or alienation of the 
power of belief 867 
Chap. V.-total insanity or de- 
lirium. 
Idea of total insanity or delirium 368 
Of perception in cases of total 
or delirious insanity 369 
Of association in delirious in- 
sanity 370 
Illustration of the above section 871 
Of the memory in connection 
with delirious insanity 872 
Of the power of reasoning in 
total or delirious insanity 373 
Of the form of insanity called 
furor or madness 474 
Of the causes of the different 
kinds of insanity 375 
Of moral accountability in men- 
tal alienation 376 
Of the imputation of insanity 
to individuals 377 
Of the treatment of the insane 378 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. INTRODUCTION. 
CHAPTER FIRST. 
PRIMARY TRUTHS. 
§. 1. Importance of preliminary statements in mental philosophy. 
It is often highly important, in the investigation of a de- 
partment of science, to state, at the commencement of such 
investigation, what things are to be considered as prelimina- 
ry and taken for granted, and what are not. If this precau- 
tion had always been observed, which, where there is any 
room for mistake or misapprehension, seems so reasonable, 
many useless disputes would have been avoided, and the 
paths to knowledge, too often unnecessarily perplexed and 
prolonged, would have been rendered more direct and easy. 
It is impossible to proceed with inquiries in the science of 
mental philosophy, as it will be found to be in almost every 
other, without a proper understanding of those fundamental 
truths, which are necessarily involved in what follows. And 
it will, accordingly, be the object of this chapter to endeavor 
to ascertain some of them. 
§. 2. Nature of such preliminary statements. 
Those preliminary principles, which may be found neces- 
sary to be admitted as the antecedents and conditions of all 
subsequent inquiries, will be called, for the sake of distinction 
and convenience, primary truths.-But what are these ? 
Or how do we know them ? 
According1 to the view of this subject, taken by Buffier, 
who has expressly written upon it, and whose views are ap- 
proved and adopted by Mr. Stewart, they are such, and such only, 
as can neither be proved, nor refuted by other propositions of greater 
perspicuity. And this seems to be not only a succinct, but a 18 
INTRODUCTION. 
satisfactory account of them, since, if there were other propo- 
sitions, into which they could be resolved, and by means of 
which they could be made clearer, then they could no longer 
be regarded as Primary, but those other clearer propositions 
would have that character. 
But it may be asked again, are there any propositions of 
this kind ? Are there any so clear, that the great instrument 
of human reasoning cannot render them more perspicuous ? 
Can there not be a complete action of the human mind in all 
its parts without the laying down of any antecedent truths 
whatever, as auxiliaries in its efforts after knowledge?-The 
answer to such questions, however formidable they may at 
first appear, is by no means difficult. In the first place, every 
man, who investigates at all, often experiences doubts in his 
inquiries. He accordingly endeavors to render such doubtful 
views clearer by argument. He goes on from step to step, 
from one proposition to another ; but, unless he at last finds 
some truth utterly too clear to be rendered more so by rea- 
soning, he must evidently proceed, adding deduction to de- 
duction without end. His resting-place, accordingly, is in 
those truths, which are elementary, and which illuminate the 
understanding by their own light, and not by a light let in 
from any other source. Again, the nature of reasoning it- 
self leads us to the same view. A process of reasoning is es- 
sentially the successive perception of relations; but there can 
be no feeling or perception of relation, where there is but one 
object of contemplation.-Something, therefore, must, from 
the nature of the case, be assumed, as the antecedent, the ba- 
sis, or necessary condition of every such process. 
We propose to call those propositions, which are so ele- 
mentary as to be susceptible neither of proof nor of refutation 
from other propositions of greater clearness, primary truths. 
Such propositions are termed, in the first place, truths, since 
they are forced upon us, as it were, by our very constitution. 
They exist as surely as the mind exists, where they have 
their birth-place ; they as certainly and as strongly control 
the convictions of men, as the demonstrations of geometry ; 
and not of one man merely, or any particular set of men, but 
of all mankind ; for the few, who pretend to reject them in 
§. 3. Of the name or designation given them. PRIMARY TRUTHS. 
19 
speculation, constantly retract and deny such rejection of them 
in their practice. And yet they are not the deductions of 
reasoning ; but rather the natural and unfailing concomitants 
of human nature. With sufficient reason also, are the prop- 
ositions in question called primary ; because, as would seem 
to follow from the very definition of them, they are the propo- 
sitions, into which all reasoning ultimately resolves itself, 
and are necessarily involved and implied in the various inves- 
tigations, of which the mind is capable, whether they relate 
to the great subject before us, or to others. As has been in- 
timated, there cannot possibly be a process of reasoning, with- 
out some first principle or admitted truth from which to start. 
§. 4. Primary truth of personal existence. 
The primary truth, which we are naturally led to consider 
first, is that of the reality of our personal existence. The 
proposition, that we exist, is a sort of corner stone to every 
thing else ; the foundation of our knowledge ; the place and 
basis, from which the edifice must rise. Without undertak- 
ing to prove this fundamental truth, we nevertheless fully re- 
cognize and admit it. In other words, it is a proposition, an- 
tecedent to reasoning, but which, notwithstanding, fully and 
perfectly secures our belief. If we reason on the subject of 
personal existence, there is necessarily implied an I, a person- 
al self, by whom the process of reasoning is conducted ; and 
which rendersail such reasoning nugatory. If we doubt, con- 
cerningour personal existence, there is the same implication ; 
since there can be no doubting, unless there is some one to 
doubt. And of course there can be no one to doubt where 
there is no personal existence. That we exist, therefore, is 
a truth of nature, and not of argumentation. Nothing, which 
comes within the reach of the human mind, is more clearly 
defined to its perception, more thoroughly controlling and op- 
erative, and more raised above cavilsand scepticism, wheth- 
er rational or irrational, than this. 
It remains, however, a distinct subject of inquiry, Under 
what circumstances this elementary belief arises ?-And in 
answer to this inquiry, we may say with abundant confidence, 
if it be not the earliest, it is at least among the earliest notions, 
§. 5. Occasions of the origin of the idea or belief of personal existence. 20 
INTRODUCTION. 
which the mind is capable of forming. A kind Providence 
has not conceded to a conviction, so essential to our whole 
mental history, a dilatory and late appearance. But that 
same Providence has given a place as well as a time, an occa- 
sion as well as a period of its formation ; and although it may 
be impossible for us ever to ascertain that occasion with cer- 
tainty, we may at least conjecture. 
We look, therefore, in our meditations on this topic, at 
man in the commencement of his existence. We see him sud- 
denly called forth from a state where there was neither form 
nor knowledge nor power, endowed with such capabilities of 
thought and action, both internal and external, as his Creator 
saw fit to give. Thus brought into being, and thus fitted up 
for his destined sphere, we will suppose, that some external 
object is for the first time presented to the senses. The re- 
sult of this is, that there is an impression made on the senses ; 
and then at once there is a change in the mind, a new thought, 
a new feeling. Although, as already suggested, there is room 
for different conjectures here, there is much reason to believe, 
that this is the true occasion of the origin of the belief in ques- 
tion. The first internal experience, the earliest thought or 
feeling is immediately followed by the notion of personal or 
self existence, as the subject of this new thought or feeling. 
And this idea or conviction of personal existence, which arises 
at this very early period, is continually suggested and confir- 
med in the course of the successive duties, enjoyments, and 
sufferings of life. 
Such has commonly been supposed to be the origin of the 
belief in question. We may as well suppose it to come into 
being in connection with the first act of the mind, as with any 
subsequent act; although with less distinctness and strength, 
than afterwards. But whether this account of the origin of 
the conviction of our personal existence be the true one or 
not, we may still hold to the fact of the belief itself, as some- 
thing beyond doubt. We may also regard it as necessarily 
resulting from our mental.constitution, and as wholly insep- 
arable from our being. 
§. 6. Primary truth of personal identity. 
The second of those preliminary truths, which we term 
primary, is the proposition of our Personal Identity.-If the PRIMARY TRUTHS. 
21 
consideration of our personal existence naturally comes first 
in the order of time, that of the truth now before us is not 
secondary in point of importance. We cannot dispense with 
either, without unsettling the grounds of inquiry and belief, 
and barring the access to all knowledge whatever. 
Identity is synonymous with sameness, and is the name 
of a simple state of mind. Although, therefore, its meaning 
is as clear as that of other simple ideas, and every body is 
supposed to understand it, it is not susceptible of definition. 
The term is applied to various objects, and among others to 
men.-The word personal implies Self, and personal identity 
is, therefore, the identity of ourselves. But the term self 
is complex, embracing both mind and matter, and hence we 
are led to consider the distinct notions of mental and bodily 
identity. 
I. Mental identity ;-By this phrase we express the 
continuance and oneness of the thinking principle merely. 
The soul of man is truly an unit. It is not like matter sepa- 
rable into parts. It may bring, from time to time, new sus- 
ceptibilities into action ; but its essence is unchangeable. 
That, which constitutes it a thinking and sentient principle, 
in distinction from that, which is unthinking and insentient, 
never desertsit, never ceases to exist, never becomes other 
than what it originally was. 
II. Bodily identity ;-By these expressions we mean the 
sameness of the bodily shape and organization. This is the 
only meaning we can attach to them, since the materials, 
which compose our bodily systems, are constantly changing. 
The body is not ar unit in the same sense the soul is. It 
was a saying of Seneca, that no man bathes twice in the 
same river ; and still we call it the same, although the wa- 
ter within its banks is constantly passing away. And in like 
manner we ascribe identity to the human body, although it is 
subject to constant changes, meaning by the expressions, as 
just remarked, merely the sameness of shape and organiza- 
tion. 
III. Personal identity ;-This form of expression is 
more general than either of those, which have been mention- 
ed. It has reference to both mind and matter, as we find 
them combined together in that complex existence, which we 22 
INTRODUCTION. 
term man or person. It is equivalent to what is conveyed by 
the two phrases of mental identity and bodily identity. But 
it is evident we cannot easily separate the two, when speak- 
ing of men. And accordingly, when it is said, that any one 
is conscious of, knows, or has a certainty of his personal iden- 
tity, it is meant to be asserted, that he is conscious of having 
formerly possessed the powers of an organized, animated, and 
rational being, and that he still possesses those powers. He 
knows, that he is a human being now, and that he was a hu- 
man being yesterday, or last week, or last year.-There is no 
mystery in this. It is so plain, no one is likely to misunder- 
stand it, although we admit our inability to give a definition 
of identity. 
If personal identity be a primary truth, it is antecedent to 
argument, and is independent of it.-What grounds are there, 
then, for regarding it as such ? 
In the first place, the mere fact, that it is constantly im- 
plied in those conclusions, which we form in respect to the fu- 
ture from the past, and universally in our daily actions, is of 
itself a decisive reason for reckoning it among the original and 
essential intimations of the human intellect. On any other 
hypothesis we are quite unable to account for that practical 
recognition of it in the pursuits of men, which is at once so 
early, so evident, and so universal. 
The farmer, for instance, who looks abroad on his cultiva- 
ted fields, knows, that he is the same person, who, twenty 
years before, entered the forest with an axe on his shoulder, 
and felled the first tree. The aged soldier, who recounts at 
his fireside the battles of his youth, never once doubts, that 
he was himself the witness of those sanguinary scenes, which 
he delights to relate. It is altogether useless to attempt eith- 
er to disprove or to confirm to them a proposition which they 
believe and know, not from the testimony of others or from 
reasoning, but from the interior and authoritative suggestion 
of their very nature ; and which, it is sufficiently evident, can 
never be eradicated from their belief and knowledge, until 
that nature is changed. 
A second circumstance in favour of regarding the notion 
of personal identity, as an admitted or primary truth, is, that 
§. 7. Reasons for regarding this a primary truth. PRIMARY TRUTHS. 
23 
men cannot prove it by argument if they would ; and if they 
do not take it for granted, must forever be without it. The 
propriety of this remark will appear on examination.-There 
evidently can be no argument, properly so called, unless there 
is a succession of distinct propositions. From such a succes- 
sion of propositions, no conclusion can be drawn by any one, 
unless he is willing to trust to the evidence of memory. But 
memory involves a notion of the time past, and whoever ad- 
mits, that he has the power of memory, in however small a 
degree, virtually admits, that he has existed the same at some 
former period, as at present. 
The considerations which we have now particularly in 
view, and which are greatly worthy of attention in connec- 
tion with the principle under examination, may with a little 
variation of terms be stated thus. 
Remembrance, without the admission of our personal iden- 
tity, is clearly an impossibility. But there can be no process 
of reasoning without memory. This is evident, because ar- 
guments are made up of propositions, which are successive 
to each other, not only in order, but in point of time. It fol- 
lows then that there can be no argument whatever, or on any 
subject,without the admission of our identity, as a point, from 
which to start. What then will it avail to attempt to reason 
either for or against the views, which are here maintained, 
since in every argument which is employed, there is necessa- 
rily an admission of the very thing, which is the subject ofin- 
quiry. 
§. 8. There are original and authoritative grounds of belief. 
Supposing men actually to exist, and to be conscious of the 
continuance and sameness of their existence, we are next to 
enter into the interior of their constitution, and to inquire af- 
ter such elements of intelligence and action, as are to be 
found there. The next proposition, therefore, which is to be 
laid down as fundamental and as preliminary to all reasoning 
is, that there are in men certain original and authoritative 
GROUNDS OF BELIEF. 
Nothing is better known, than that there is a certain state 
of the mind, which is expressed by the term, belief. As we 
find all men acting in reference to it, it is not necessary to en- 
ter into any verbal explanation. Nor would it be possible by 24 
INTRODUCTION. 
such explanation to increase the clearness of that notion, 
which every one is already supposed to entertain. Of this 
belief, we take it for granted, and hold it to be in the strictest 
sense true, that there are original and authoritative grounds 
or sources ; meaning by the term, original, that these grounds 
or sources are involved in the nature of the mind itself, and 
meaning by the term, authoritative, that this belief is not a 
mere matter of chance or choice, but naturally and necessari- 
ly results from our mental constitution, and is binding upon 
us. 
Sometimes we can trace the state of the mind, which we 
term belief, to an affection of the senses, sometimes to con- 
sciousness, sometimes to memory, and at others to human tes- 
timony. In all these cases, however, the explanation, which 
we attempt to give, of the origin of belief, is limited to a 
statement of the circumstances, in which the belief arises. 
But the fact, that belief arises under these circumstances, is 
ultimate, is a primary law; and being such, it no more ad- 
mits of explanation, than does the mere feeling itself. 
Many writers have clearly seen, and defended the neces- 
sity of the assumption, which has now been made. Mr. 
Stewart among others has expressed the opinion,(Hist. Dis- 
ser. Pt. I. §. Il,) that there is involved, in every appeal to 
the intellectual powers in proof of their own credibility, the 
sophism of reasoning in a circle or petitio principii ; and ex- 
pressly adds, that, unless this credibility be assumed as un- 
questionable, the further exercise of human reason is altogeth- 
er nugatory. Not less decisive is the languageof Sir James 
Mackintosh on this subject, (Ethical Philosophy, Sect. vi. ) 
" Universal skepticism involves a contradiction in terms. It 
is a belief, that there can be no belief. It is an attempt of the mind 
to act without its structure, and by other laws than those to 
which its nature has subjected its operations. To reason 
without assenting to the principles on which reasoning is 
founded, is not unlike an effort to feel without nerves, or to 
move without muscles. No man can be allowed to be an opponent 
in reasoning, who does not set out with admitting all the principles, 
without the admission of which it is impossible to reason. It is in- 
deed a puerile, nay, in the eye of wisdom, a childish play, to 
attempt either to establish or to confute principles by argu- PRIMARY TRUTHS. 
25 
ment, which every step of that argument must presuppose. 
The only difference between the two cases is, that he who 
tries to prove them can do so only by first taking them for 
granted ; and that he who attempts to impugn them falls at 
the very first step into a contradiction, from which he never 
can rise." 
§. 9. Primary truths having relation to the reasoning power. 
Man may be sure of the fact of his existence and of its per- 
manency ; he may be possessed of grounds of belief to a cer- 
tain extent, such as have been mentioned ; and still we may 
suppose him incapable of reasoning. His knowledge would 
be greatly limited, it is true, without that noble faculty, but 
he would know something ; his consciousness would teach 
him his own existence ; his senses convey to him intimations 
of external origin ; the testimony of others furnish various 
facts, that had come within their observation. But happily 
man is not limited to the scanty knowledge, which would 
come in by these sources alone ; he can compare and com- 
bine, as well as perceive and experience ; and by means of 
the propositions thus combined and compared together, is en- 
abled to deduce conclusions. 
But there is this worthy of notice, that the reasoning pow- 
er, although it exists in man, and is a source of belief and a 
foundation of knowledge, is necessarily built upon principles, 
which are either known or assumed.-This is seen in the 
most common and ordinary cases of the exercise of this sus- 
ceptibility. And it will be found also on examination, that 
one assumption may be resolved into another, and again into 
another, until we arrive at certain ultimate truths, which are 
at the foundation of all reasoning whatever. It is important, 
therefore, to inquire, what general assumptions, having par- 
ticular reference to the reasoning power and absolutely es- 
sential to its action, are to be made. And these will be found 
to be two in number ; one having special relation to the past, 
and the other to the future. 
10. No beginning or change of existence without a cause. 
The one, which has a relation to the past, and is the foun- 
dation of all reasonings, having a reference to any period an- 
tecedent to the present moment, may be stated as follows : 26 
INTRODUCTION. 
that there is no beginning or change of existence without a cause - 
This principle, like others which have been mentioned, we 
may well suppose to be universally admitted. Whemany new 
event takes place, men at once inquire the cause ; as if it 
could not possibly have happened without some effective or 
preparative antecedent. 
And such being the general and unwavering reception of 
the principle before us, it would seem to follow clearly, that 
there are grounds for it in the human constitution. A reli- 
ance on any principle whatever, so firm and general as is here 
exhibited, is not likely to be accidental. And when we in- 
quire what these grounds are, we shall not fail to come to the 
conclusion, that the proposition inquestion is supported by an 
original intimation or feeling, which is utterly inseparable from 
our mental nature, and which is made known to us by con- 
sciousness alone. Although the feeling of belief, which is 
implied in the proposition, that there is no beginning or change 
of existence without a cause, is an original one, directly result- 
ing from our nature, still it is in our power to give some ac- 
count of the circumstances, in which it arises. 
§. 11. Occasions of the origin of the primary truth of effects and causes. 
The mind embraces the elementary truth, which we are 
considering, at a very early period. Looking round upon na- 
ture, which we are led to do more or less from the commence- 
ment of our being, we find every thing in motion. Things, 
which had no existence, are raised into life ; and new forms 
are imparted to what existed before. The human mind, which 
is essentially active and curious, constantly contemplates the 
various phenomena, which come under its notice ; observing 
not only the events and appearances themselves, but their 
order in point of time, their succession. And it is led in this 
way to form the belief, (not by deduction but from its own 
active nature,) that every new existence and every change 
of existence are preceded by something, without which they 
could not have happened. 
Undoubtedly the belief, as in many othercases, is compara- 
tively weak at first, but it rapidly acquires unalterable growth 
and strength ; so much so that the mind applies it without 
hesitation to every act, to every event, and to every finite PRIMARY TRUTHS. 
27 
being. And thus a foundation is laid for numberless conclu- 
sions, having a relation to whatever has happened in time 
past. It is true, that the verbal proposition, by which our 
belief in this case is expressed, is not always, nor even gen- 
erally brought forward and stated in our reasonings on the 
past, but it is always implied. 
This primary truth is an exceedingly important one. By 
its aid the human mind retains a control over the ages that 
are gone, and subordinates them to its own purposes. It is 
susceptible in particular of a moral and religious application. 
Let this great principle be given us, and we are able to track 
the succession of sequences upward, advancing from one step 
to another, until we find all things meeting together in one 
self-existent and unchangeable head and fountain of being. 
But there it stops. The principle will not apply to God, since 
He differs from every thing else, which is the object of 
thought, in being an existence equally without change and 
without beginning. 
§. 12. Matter and mind have uniform and fixed laws. 
It is necessary to assume also, particularly in connection 
with the reasoning power, that matter and mind have uni- 
form and permanent laws. 
This assumption, as well as the preceding, is accordant 
with the common belief of mankind. All men believe, that 
the setting sun will arise again at the appointed hour, that 
the decaying plants of autumn will revive in spring, that the 
tides of ocean will continue to heave as in times past, and the 
streams and rivers to flow in their courses. If they doubted, 
they would not live and act as they are now seen to do. 
This belief in the uniformity and permanency of the laws 
of nature does not arise at once ; but has its birth at first in 
some particular instance ; then in others, till it becomes of 
universal application. In the first instance the feeling in 
question, which we express in various ways by the terms, 
anticipation, faith, expectation, belief, and the like, is weak 
and vacillating ; but it gradually acquires strength and dis- 
tinctness. And yet this feeling, so important in its applica- 
tion, is the pure work of nature ; it is not taught men, in the 
strict sense of that term, but is produced within them ; the 
necessary and infallible product and growth of our mental be- 28 
INTRODUCTION. 
ing ; a sort of inalienable gift of the Almighty to every man, 
woman, and child ; arising in the soul with as much certainty 
and as little mystery as the notions, expressed by the words, 
power, duration, right, wrong, truth, or other elementary 
states of the mind. It is true, it is an expectation or belief, 
directed to a particular object, and, therefore, is not easily 
susceptible of being expressed by a single term, as in the case 
of the ideas just referred to ; but the circumstance of its be- 
ing expressed by a circumlocution does not render the feel- 
ing itself less distinct or real than others.-As, therefore, the 
strong faith, which men entertain in the continuance of the 
laws of creation, is the natural and decisive offspring of that 
mental constitution, which God has given us, there is good 
ground for assuming the truth of that, to which this faith 
relates, and to regard it as a principle in future inquiries, 
that matter and mind are governed by uniform laws. 
§. 13. This primary truth not founded on reasoning. 
But perhaps it is objected, that we can arrive at the great 
truth under consideration without assuming it as somethin^- 
ultimate, as something resulting from our constitution ; and 
that nothing more is wanting in order to arrive at it, than a 
train of reasoning.-The sun, it is said, rose to-day, therefore, 
he will rise to-morrow : Food nourished me to day, therefore, 
it will do the same to-morrow : The fire burnt me once, there- 
fore, it will again. 
But it demands no uncommon sagacity to perceive, that 
something is here wanting, and that a link in the chain of 
thought must be supplied, in order to make it cohere. The 
mere naked fact that the sun rose to day, without any thing 
else being connected with it, affords not the least ground for 
the inference that it will rise again ; and the same may be 
said of all similar instances. Now the link, which is wanting 
in order to bind together the beginning and the end in such 
arguments as have been referred to, is the precise assump- 
tion, which has been made, and which is held to be as reas- 
onable as it is necessary, because it is founded on an acknowl- 
edged, universal, and elementary feeling of our nature. And 
we may here affirm with perfect confidence, that, without 
making this assumption, the power of reasoning cannot de- PRIMARY TRUTHS. 
29 
duce a single general inference, cannot arrive at so much as 
one general conclusion either in matter or mind, which has 
relation to the future. 
But the moment we make the assumption, a vast founda- 
tion of knowledge is laid. Grant us this, (to which we are 
fully entitled by virtue of that elementary belief, which the 
Author of our being has uniformly called forth in the human 
mind in his appointed way,) that nature is uniform in her 
laws ; then give us the fact, that food nourished us to-day, or 
that the sun rose to-day, or any other fact of the kind, and it 
follows with readiness and certainty, that what has once been 
will be again. So that we must regard the principle of the 
permanency and uniformity of the laws of nature as some- 
thing antecedent to reasoning and not subsequent to it; a 
principle authorized and sustained by an ultimate, and not by 
any secondary action of the mind. 
CHAPTER SECOND. 
IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 
§. 14. On the meaning ofthe terms, material and immaterial. 
Another of those topics, which may be deemed introduc- 
tory and auxiliary to the main subject, is the question of the 
materiality or immateriality of the soul. In entering- upon 
this inquiry, which is obviously too important to be altogeth- 
er dispensed with, it will be necessary, in the first place, to 
explain the meaning of the leading terms. The words 
material and immaterial are relative ; being founded on the 
observation of the presence, or of the absence of certain 
qualities. Why do we call a piece of wood, or of iron, ma- 
terial ? It is, because we notice in them certain qualities, 
such as extension, divisibility, impenetrability, and color. 
And in whatever other bodies we observe the presence of 
these qualities, we there apply the term. The term imma- 30 
INTRODUCTION. 
terial, therefore, by the established use of the language and 
its own nature, it being in its etymology the opposite of the 
other, can be applied only in those cases, where these quali- 
ties are not found. 
Hence we assert the mind to be immaterial, because in 
all our knowledge of it we have noticed an utter absence, 
(or perhaps more properly have always failed to detect the 
presence,) of those qualities, which are acknowledged to be 
the ground of the application of the opposite epithet. The 
soul undoubtedly has its qualities or properties ; but not 
those, which have been spoken of. Whatever we have been 
conscious of and have observed within us, our thought, our 
feeling, remembrance, and passion, are evidently and utter- 
ly diverse from what is understood to be included under the 
term materiality. 
Such is the origin of these two terms, and the ground of 
the distinction between them. And thus explained they can 
hardly fail to be understood. We may, therefore, now pro- 
ceed to state the evidence of the actual existence of that dis- 
tinction between mind and matter, which is obviously impli- 
ed in every application of them. In other words we are to 
attempt to show, that the soul is not matter, and that 
thought and feeling are not the result of material organi- 
zation. 
§. 15. Difference between mind and matter shown from language. 
Is it a fact, that the being or existence, called the soul, is 
distinct and different from that existence, which we call mat- 
ter?-It is not unusual in writings on the philosophy of the 
mind to refer to the structure of languages in order to illus- 
trate our mental nature ; and in respect to the question now 
before us, we are warranted in saying, in the first place, that 
Language in general is one proof of such a distinction. In 
the preceding section, we have seen the use of certain terms 
in our own language, and the grounds of it. All other lan- 
guages, as well as our own, have names and epithets, dis- 
tinctly expressive of the two existences in question. This 
circumstance, when we consider, that the dialects of men 
are only their thoughts and feelings embodied as it were, 
may be regarded as a decisive proof that the great body of 
mankind believe in both, and of course believe in a well 
founded distinction between them. IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 
31 
That such is the belief of men generally, as clearly evin- 
ced by the structure of languages and in various other ways, 
will not probably be denied. It is a matter too evident to 
permit us to anticipate a denial. When, therefore, we take 
into view that there are grounds of belief fixed deeply and 
originally in our constitution, and that, in their general 
operation they must be expected to lead to truth, and not 
to error we are unable to harbor the supposition, that men 
are deceived and led astray in this opinion ; that they so 
generally and almost universally believe in the existence of 
what in point of fact does not exist. 
§. 16. Their different nature shown by their respective properties. 
Again, the distinction between mind and matter is shown 
by the difference in the qualities and properties, which men 
agree in ascribing to them respectively.-The properties of 
matter are extension, hardness, figure, solidity, divisibility, 
and the like. The attributes of mind are thought, feeling, 
volition, reasoning, the passions. The phenomena, exhibit- 
ed by matter and mind, are not only different in their own 
nature, but are addressed to different parts of our constitu- 
tion. We obtain a knowledge of material properties, so far 
as it is direct and immediate, by means of the senses; but all 
our direct knowledge of the nature of the mental phenomena 
is acquired by consciousness. 
Every one knows, that the phenomena in question are 
not identical. There is no sameness or similitude, for in- 
stance, in what we express by the terms hardness and de- 
sire, solidity and hatred, divisibility and belief, extension 
and imagination. But let us look more at particulars. All 
matter is divisible. The smallest particle has its top and 
bottom, its right and left side, and is susceptible of measure- 
ment. But what does consciousness testify in regard to the 
mental phenomena? Does it give us the least intimation, 
that they are mechanically divisible ? Is any man ever con- 
scious of a half, quarter, or third of a hope, joy, or sorrow 
actually cut asunder and set off from the remaining half, two 
thirds, or three quarters of such hope, joy, or sorrow ? It is 
not only true, that no one has had such experience; but no 
one ever conceives such experience possible. And as to ex- 
tension, are we ever conscious of a thought, feeling, or voli- 32 
INTRODUCTION. 
tion as having length and breadth ; as being, for instance, 
an inch in length, and a half an inch in breadth ? There is 
nothing of the kind. Consciousness never gave, and it is 
not too much to say, that it never will give any such infor- 
mation. The properties or attributes of matter and mind, 
therefore, are entirely different. And as all persons hold it 
to be unphilosophical to ascribe attributes so different to the 
same subject, we conclude the subjects of them are not the 
same. And accordingly we call the subject of one class of 
phenomena Mind, and that of the other Matter. 
§. 17. The seal's immateriality indicated by the feeling of identity. 
There is another somewhat striking consideration, which 
may aid in evincing the immateriality of the soul. It is well 
known, that the materials, of which the human body is 
composed, are constantly changing. The whole bodily sys- 
tem repeatedly undergoes, in the course of the ordinary 
term of man's life, a complete renovation, and yet we pos- 
sess, during the whole of this period, and amid these utter 
changes of the bodily part, a consciousness of the permanen- 
cy, as well as of the unity of the mind. "This fact (re- 
marks Mr. Stewart,) is surely not a little favorable to the 
supposition of mind being a principle essentially distinct 
from matter, and capable of existing when its connection 
with the body is dissolved." 
Truly if the soul, like the body, were made up of parti- 
cles of matter, and the particles were in this case as in the 
other, always changing, we should be continually roving, as 
an old writer expresses it, and sliding away from ourselves, 
and should soon forget what we once were. The new soul, 
that entered into the same place, would not necessarily en- 
ter into the possession of the feelings, consciousness, and 
knowledge of that, which had gone. And hence we rightly 
infer, from an identity in these respects, the identity or con- 
tinued existence of the subject, to which such feelings, con- 
sciousness, and knowledge belong. And as there is not a 
like identity or continued existence of the material part, we 
may infer again, that the soul is distinct from matter. 
18. The material doctrine makes man a machine. 
The doctrine, that thought is the result of material or- IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 
33 
ganization, and that the soul is not distinct from the body, is 
liable also to this no small objection ; that it makes the soul 
truly and literally a machine. If what we term mind be in 
truth matter, it is of course under the same influences, as 
matter. But matter, in all its movements and combinations, 
is known to be subject to a strict and inflexible direction, the 
origin of which direction is exterior to itself. The material 
universe is truly an automaton, experiencing through all 
time the same scries of motions, in obedience to some biuh 
and authoritative intelligence ; and is so entirely subject to 
fixed laws, that vve can express in mathematical formulas 
not only the state of large bodies, but of a drop of water or 
of a ray of light; estimating minutely extension and quanti- 
ty, force, velocity, and resistance. 
It is not thus with the human mind. That the mind has 
its laws is true ; but it knows what those laws are ; where- 
as matter does not. This makes a great difference. Matter 
yields a blind and unconscious obedience ; but the mind is 
able to exercise a foresight; to place itself in new situa- 
tions ; to subject itself to new influences ; to surround itself 
with new motives, and thus control in a measure its own 
laws. In a word, mind is free ; we have the best evidence 
of it, that of our own consciousness. But matter, as we 
learn from all our observations of it, may justly be character- 
ized as a slave. It does not turn to the right or left ; it does 
not do this or that, as it chooses ; it possesses no self-deter- 
mining and self-moving element ; but the subject of an over- 
powering allotment, it is borne onward to the appointed 
mark by an inflexible destiny.-If these views be correct, we 
see here a new reason for not confounding and identifying 
these two existences. 
§. 19. No exact correspondence between the mental and bodily state. 
The train of thought in the last section naturally leads us 
to remark further, that there is an absence of that precise 
correspondence between the mental and bodily state, which 
would evidently follow from the admission of materialism. 
Those, who make thought and feeling the result of material 
organization, commonly locate that organization in the 
brain. It is there the great mental exercises, in the phrase- 
ology of materialists, are secreted, or are developed, or are 34 
INTRODUCTION. 
brought out in some other mysterious way, by means of a 
purely physical combination and action. Hence, such is the 
fixed and unalterable nature of matter and its results, if the 
brain be destroyed, the soul must be destroyed also ; if the 
brain be injured, the soul is proportionally injured ; if the 
material action be disturbed, there must be an exactly cor- 
responding disturbance of the mental action. The state of 
the mind, on a fair interpretation of this doctrine, is not less 
dependent on that of the body, than the complicated motions 
of the planetary system are on the law of gravitation. But 
this view, whether we assign the residence of the soul to 
the brain or to any other part of the bodily system, does not 
appear to be accordant with fact. It is not only far from be- 
ing approved and borne out, but it is directly contradicted 
by well attested experience in a multitude of cases. 
§. 20. Evidence of this want of exact correspondence. 
We are desirous not to be misapprehended here. We 
readily grant, that the mind, in our present state of exist- 
ence, has a connection with the physical system, and par- 
ticularly with the brain. It is, moreover, obviously a natur- 
al consequence of this, that when the body is injured, the 
mental power and action are in some degree affected ; and 
this we find to be agreeable to the facts, that come within 
our observation. But it is to be particularly noticed, that 
the results are just such as might be expected from a mere 
connection of being ; and are evidently not such as might be 
anticipated from an identity of being. 
In the latter case the material part could never be affect- 
ed, whether for good or evil, without a result precisely cor- 
responding in the mind. But in point of fact, this is not the 
case. The body is not unfrequently injured, when the mind 
is not so ; and on the other hand the soul sometimes appears 
to be almost entirely prostrated, when the body is in a sound 
and active state. How many persons have been mutilated 
in battle in every possible way, short of an utter destruction 
of anima] life, and yet have discovered at such times a more 
than common greatness of mental power! How often, when 
the body is not only partially weakened, but is resolving, at 
the hour of death, into its original elements, and possesses IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 
35 
not a single capability entire, the mind, remaining in undi- 
minished strength, puts forth the energy and beauty of past 
days ! 
We are now speaking of injuries to our corporeal part 
and of bodily debility in general, but if we look to the brain 
in particular, which is more intimately connected with the 
mental action than any other part of the bodily system, we 
shall find ourselves fully warranted in an extension of these 
views there. According to the system of the materialists, 
the soul does not merely exist and act in connection with 
the body, but is identical with it. And not only this, they 
go further and locate this identity in the brain, making the 
soul and the brain not merely connected together, but iden- 
tically the same thing. But the objection to their views, 
which in its general form has already been made, exists here 
in full strength. If that organization, which they hold to re- 
sult in thought and feeling, be identical with the brain, it 
must be diffused through the whole of that organ, or limited 
to some particular part. But it appears from an extensive 
collection of well authenticated facts, that every part of the 
brain has been injured, and almost every part absolutely re- 
moved, but without permanently affecting the mental pow- 
ers, which is absolutely impossible, if there be an identity of 
the two things. "Every part of that structure, (says Dr. 
Ferriar in a learned Memoir, the statements of which have 
not, as far as we know, been disproved,) has been deeply 
injured or totally destroyed, without impeding or changing 
any part of the process of thought." He remarks again, af- 
ter bringing forward a multitude of undoubted facts, as fol- 
lows. "On reviewing the whole of this evidence, I am dis- 
posed to conclude, that as no part of the brain appears es- 
sentially necessary to the existence of the intellectual facul- 
ties, and as the whole of its visible structure has been mate- 
rially changed, without affecting the exercise of those facul- 
ties, something more than the discernable organization must 
be requisite to produce the phenomena of thinking."* 
§. 21. Comparative state of the mind and body in dreaming. 
The views of the two preceding sections receive some 
•Memoirs of the Manchester Philos. Society, Vol. IV. 36 
INTRODUCTION. 
confirmation from the comparative state of the mind and body 
in dreaming.-In sound sleep the senses sink into a state 
of utter and unconscious sluggishness ; the inlet to every 
thing external, as far as we can judge, is shut up ; the mus- 
cles become powerless ; and every thing in the body has the 
appearance of death. It is true, the soul appears for the 
most part to be fallen into a like state of imbecility ; but this 
is not the case in its dreams, which are known to take up 
no small portion of the hours of sleep. At such times it does 
not appear to stand in need of the same repose with the 
body ; otherwise it would seek and possess it. On the con- 
trary, when the powers of the body are utterly suspended, 
the soul is often exceedingly on the alert ; it rapidly passes 
from subject to subject, attended sometimes with sad, and 
sometimes with raised and joyful affections. 
But this is not all ; often in the hours of sleep the intellect 
exhibits an increased invention, a quickened and more exal- 
ted energy in all its powers. Many writers have remarked, 
that the conclusions of abstruse investigations have been sug- 
gested to them at such times. Not a few would conclude 
themselves persons of genius, if they could pronounce the 
arguments and the harangues in the awakened soberness of 
the morning, which they had framed in the visions of the 
night. Does not this state of things seem to indicate, that 
there is a natural and fundamental distinction between the 
mental and the material part of man ? 
§. 22. The great works of genius an evidence of immateriality. 
Now let us look at what mind in man's awakened mo- 
ments is able to accomplish ; and see if the results of its ac- 
tion, in its higher and nobler exercises, are such as we com- 
monly expect from or ascribe to matter. Look first at the 
kindred powers of memory and imagination. I am at this 
moment sitting in my chair with a book and paper before 
me, and a pen in my hand. But my memory is aroused ; 
my imagination takeswing; and my soul suddenly finds it- 
self, (at least considered in reference to its operations,) in a 
far distant place. I see distinctly before me the'trees which 
shaded me, and the hills where I wandered in my childhood. 
The same waters flow before me ; the same bright sun shines IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 
37 
in the heavens ; I see around me a multitude of familiar fa- 
ces, and embrace, with all the vividness of early affections, 
my old companions. In this excursion of the soul, how many 
recollections have been revived ! How many feelings have 
been restored 1 What pictures of natural and social beauty 
have been presented to the intellectual sight ! But do we 
commonly, or can we with any show of reason ascribe this 
wonderful power, which transfers ns in a moment to the dis- 
tant and the past, to a mere mass of matter ? I think not. 
Look again, at the powers of judgment and reasoning, 
and of imagination in its greater and more permanent efforts. 
In doing this, we are to keep in mind, that those things 
which cannot be known directly and in their own essence, 
are known for the most part simply by their results. And in 
accordance with this view, which leads us to look from re- 
sults to causes, I ask myself, what was it that originated and 
perfected the demonstrations of Euclid ? Where was the 
authorship of the political institutions of Solon and Lycurgus, 
of modern England and France, and of that still greater ef- 
fort of political wisdom, the American Constitution ? What 
was it that infused the breath of immortality into the Iliad 
and Odyssey ? What was it, that gave birth to the wonder- 
ful inventions and combinations of the Jerusalem Delivered, 
the Fairy Queen, and the Paradise Lost ? Where shall we 
look for the origin of the Philippics of the Ancients, or in la- 
ter times of the speeches of Fox and of the orations of Bos- 
suet ? 
In these, and in all other cases, where human genius has 
achieved its higher triumphs, we submit it to any one to say, 
whether mankind generally would be likely to ascribe their 
origin to a mere lump of matter ? When men cast their eyes 
upon a piece of matter, they look simply for material herbage 
and flower, leaves and fruit; for something which is addres- 
sed, and addressed exclusively, to the taste and touch, the 
sight and smell ; and not for political axioms and mathemati- 
cal demonstrations, for flights of fancy and flashes of elo- 
quence. We venture to assert, that the man, who gives him- 
self up to the influence of the vast conceptions, embodied in 
the works and institutions of human genius, will find it is as 
difficult to attribute them to a purely material cause, as it is 38 
INTRODUCTION. 
to adopt the theory of the atheist, and ascribe the beautiful 
and complicated machinery of the universe to a fortuitous 
concurrence of atoms. 
§. 23. The doctrine of materiality inconsistent with future existence. 
With the subject of the immaterial nature of the soul, 
that of its immortality is closely connected. It is true, the 
immortal existence of the soul does not follow with absolute 
certainty from the mere fact of its immateriality ; but it is at 
least rendered in some degree probable. Certainly we have 
no direct evidence of the discontinuance of the soul's exist- 
ence at death, as we have of that of the body. What takes 
place at death is only a removal of the soul's action from our 
notice, but not, as far as we know, a cessation and utter ex- 
tinction of it. The supposition, therefore, is a reasonable 
one, that the soul will continue to exist, merely because it 
exists at present, inasmuch as its immaterial nature does not 
require the suspension of its existence at death ; and as we 
have no direct evidence of such an event. Death, in the 
language of Mr. Stewart, only lifts up the veil, which con- 
ceals from our eyes the invisible world. It annihilates the 
material universe to our senses, and prepares our minds for 
some new and unknown state of being. 
But the opposite doctrine, that which asserts the material- 
ity of the soul, so far from furnishing a presumption in favor 
of our future existence, seems to render immortality impos- 
sible. Those, who hold that thought and feeling are in 
some way the direct and positive result of material organiza- 
tion, are understood to admit, that the soul, (or rather what 
they speak of as the soul,) dies with the body ; and certainly 
they would be very inconsistent with themselves, if they did 
not do so. Where then is that immortality, of which the light 
of nature as well as Revelation assures us ? Wc are aware 
of what the materialist will say here. W'e understand him 
to assert, that a new soul will be created after death, either at 
the final resurrection, or at some antecedent period, which 
will take the place in all respects of the old one, which per- 
ished with the body. But there is an insuperable difficulty 
here. It is inconceivable, (we assert it with entire confidence,) 
that a soul, created subsequently in time, should be conscious 
of, or rather should recognize, mental operations and affec- IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 
39 
tions as its own, which operations and affections pertained in 
point of fact to another soul. Such a case would constitute 
an origination, rather than a continuance of existence ; it 
would not be our immortality, but that of another ; the chain, 
connecting the present with the future, would be broken ; 
and we, who are destined on the system of materialism to 
perish with the body, could not by any possibility participate 
in that future existence, which is raised up to take the place 
of the present. Would there be any propriety or justice in 
bringing such new-created soul before the judgment seat of 
the Supreme Being in reference to crimes or to virtues, which 
in fact pertained to another soul ! It is evident, since such a 
soul could not be conscious of or recognize a previous exist- 
ence, simply because such existence had never taken place, 
it would not be a suitable subject of praise and blame, reward 
and punishment, in reference to deeds done in the present 
life. So that it seems to be an inevitable conclusion, that the 
souls, which are destined to come under the divine adjudica- 
tion, must remain permanent, whatever may become of the 
body,until the final sentence shall be passed upon them. But 
if the soul is material and dies with the body, then it is not 
permanent, and cannot be so. The immateriality of the soul, 
therefore, on the supposition of the body's being dissolved 
and destroyed at death, becomes the basis of its immortality. 
If the doctrine of immateriality falls, then that of immortality 
and ofa future retribution fall with it.-All arguments, there- 
fore, which go to sustain the soul's immortality and its liabili- 
ty to future judgment, indirectly support the doctrine of its 
immateriality. We add nothing further, excepting the single 
remark, that the distinction between the body and soul is 
either implied or asserted in various passages of the Scrip- 
tures ; as, for instance, when we are directed " not to fear 
them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul." CHAPTER THIRD. 
LAWS OF BELIEF. 
§. 24. Of belief, its degrees, and its sources. 
Man is so constituted, that, under certain circumstances, 
he naturally and necessarily believes, and has knowledge. 
As that state of mind, which we term belief, is simple and 
consequently undefinable, we have therefore a knowledge of 
it, not by verbal definition, but wholly by our own internal 
reflection or consciousness. Belief is always the same in 
kind or nature ; but it admits of different degrees. We ascer- 
tain the existence of these differences of strength, which we 
express by various terms, such as presumption, probability, 
high probability, and certainty, by means of that same inter- 
nal consciousness, which assures us of the existence of the 
mere feeling itself. 
In the chapter on Primary Truths, we had occasion to as- 
sert it as an indisputable principle, that there are in men certain 
original and authoritative grounds of belief. This is an important 
doctrine in mental philosophy, and one which is always to be 
kept in mind. It is perhaps proper, before we proceed fur- 
ther, to state some of those original principles, by which our 
belief is thus naturally controlled. 
§. 25. Of suggestion, consciousness, and the senses as grounds of belief. 
The most marked and prominent of those grounds or laws 
of belief, which are understood to be original and ultimate 
in the mental constitution, are Original Suggestion, Con- 
sciousness, the Senses, Memory, Testimony, Relative Sug- 
gestion, and Reasoning. LAWS OF BELIEF. 
41 
I, Original Suggestion. By means of this we have 
a knowledge of certain elementary notions, such as the ab- 
stract conceptions of existence, mind, self-existence, or self, 
personal identity, succession, duration, space, unity, number, 
power, right, wrong, and some others. All men possess these 
notions ; all understand them ; but if they are asked in what 
way they come to a knowledge of them, they can only say, 
that, in virtue of the constitution of the mind itself, they are 
naturally and necessarily suggested. The mind is so con- 
stituted, that they naturally and necessarily flow forth from it, 
and thus furnish the foundations of belief and knowledge. 
II, Consciousness. By means of that internal reflec- 
tion, which is denominated consciousness, we have a knowl- 
edge of our mental states, of the various perceptions, affec- 
tions, and decisions of the mind. In regard to all such ob- 
jects of knowledge, we are obliged to rest ultimately upon 
consciousness. The belief from this source is in the highest 
degree authoritative and decisive. It is impossible for us to 
disbelieve, that the mind experiences certain sensations or 
puts forth certain operations, whenever in point of fact that 
is the case ; or to believe them to be otherwise than they in 
fact are. 
Ill, The senses. The states of mind, to which ope- 
rations upon or affections of our senses give rise, are also, by 
our very constitution, the occasions or grounds of belief. By 
means of the senses, we have a knowledge, in particular, of 
the external, material world ; of trees and fields and waters, 
of the sounds of the elements and the music of birds, of the 
sun and moon and stars, and all the various and beautiful 
forms of the tangible and visible creation. Men, prompted 
by the suggestions of their own mental nature, universally re- 
ly upon the senses, in respect to every thing which comes 
within their appropriate sphere. When one man states to 
another a report of what has happened at some time, the 
hearer yields to him a greater or less degree of credence ac- 
cording to the circumstances. But if the narrator asserts, 
that he saw or heard it w'ith his own eyes or ears, that the 
affair actually came under the cognizance of his own senses, 
every body deems such a statement satisfactory- A¥hat bet- 
ter evidence, they say, than that of his senses ! 42 
INTRODUCTION. 
§. 26. Memory and Testimony considered as sources of belief. 
IV, Another original ground or law of belief is the 
Memory. So far as we are confident, or rather have no par- 
ticular reason to doubt, that the original sensations and per- 
ceptions in any given case are correctly reported in the re- 
membrance, the latter controls our belief and actions not less 
than those antecedent states of mind, on which it is founded. 
" The evidence of memory, says Dr. Beattie, commands our 
belief as effectually as the evidence of sense. I cannot possi- 
bly doubt, with regard to any of my transactions of yesterday 
which I now remember, whether I performed them or not. 
That I dined to day, and was in bed last night, is as certain 
to me, as that I at present see the color of this paper. If we 
had no memory, knowledge and experience would be impossi- 
ble ; and if we had any tendency to distrust our memory, 
knowledge and experience would be of as little use in direct- 
ing our conduct and sentiments, as our dreams now are. 
Sometimes we doubt, whether in a particular case we exert 
memory or imagination ; and our belief is suspended accord- 
ingly : but no sooner do we become conscious, that we remem- 
ber, than conviction instantly takes place ; we say, I am cer- 
tain it was so, for I now remember I was an eye-witness."* 
There remains, however, another inquiry, What is the or- 
igin of this confident reliance? And the reply here is, as in 
many other cases ; it is our nature, our mental constitution, 
the will and ordinance of the Being, who created us. What- 
ever may be said on the subject, there must be, and there are 
certain original grounds, certain fundamental laws of belief, 
which, in every analysis of our knowledge, are fixed and per- 
manent boundaries, beyond which we cannot proceed. And 
reliance on memory is one of them. 
V, Human Testimony. By this is commonly meant the 
report of men concerning what has fallen under their person- 
al observation. And this forms another ground of belief. As 
to the fact, that men readily receive the testimony of their 
fellow beings, and that such testimony influences their belie, 
and conduct, it cannot be denied. They thus universally 
yield credence to the statements of each other, unless some 
• Beattie's Essay on Truth, Pt. I, ch. II. §. 4. LAWS OF BELIEF. 
43 
thing comes to their knowledge unfavorable to the credibility 
of the narrator, because it is natural or constitutional to do 
so. In other words, the very nature of our mental constitu- 
tion, independently of the suggestions of reason and experi- 
ence, leads us to believe what men assert. We are so con- 
stituted, that the very first sound of the human voice, which 
reaches us, calls into action a disposition on our part to ad- 
mit the truth of whatever intelligence it conveys. In sup- 
port of this view, (which, it may be remarked, has in its fa- 
vor the weighty names of Reid and Campbell among others,) 
reference may properly he made to what we observe in chil- 
dren. In the earliest period of life, as soon as the first gleams 
of intelligence are visible, they look with hope and fondness 
to those, who support them ; there seems to be no doubt, no 
suspicion, no want of confidence. This strong reliance dis- 
covers itself from time to time, as they advance towards 
youth ; and in the whole of the early part of our existence, is 
so distinct, strong, and operative, that men have given to it 
a specific name, in order to distinguish it from the more chas- 
tened credence of riper years. We speak of the caution and 
the convictions of manhood, and of the simplicity and credu- 
lity of children. 
§. 27. Objections to reliance on testimony. 
It may be objected to the doctrine of reliance on human 
testimony, that we are liable to be led into mistakes by the 
statements of our fellow men. This objection merits some 
attention ; and the answer to it may be summed up in two 
particulars. First. The proportion of cases of deception, 
compared with those where we are not deceived, is very 
small. We admit that we may be disappointed and deceived 
sometimes, but not often, in comparison with the whole num- 
ber of cases where we place reliance. Men are naturally 
disposed to speak the truth ; it is much easier than to speak 
what is not true, for truth is at hand, but the practice of pre- 
varication and mis-statement requires labor and invention, 
besides conflicting- with the general estimate of human char- 
acter, and jarring violently upon every honorable sentiment 
within us. So capable is this view of being sustained, that 
even those men, who have brought upon themselves the in- 44 
INTRODUCTION. 
famy of being considered liars, probably utter the truth an 
hundred times, where they utter a falsehood once. Sec- 
ond.-Admitting, that we are liable to be led astray by means 
of testimony, still it is in our power, and is our duty to take 
suitable precautions against this liability. We are by no 
means required to place implicit confidence in it, without a 
regard to the circumstances under which it is given, and the 
character and opportunities of the person who gives it. Eve- 
ry one knows, that there are in himself tendencies and prin- 
ciples, which, in certain circumstances, may be brought in 
conflict with the more ennobling principle of truth ; and that 
he is liable to error, even when he supposes himself to 
be seeking the truth, from the mere want of labor and care. 
And we may make use of this experience in judging of the 
testimony of others, since we may reasonably suspect in 
them the existence of similar tendencies, and similar want 
of circumspection. It is, therefore, consistent with any suit- 
able degree of reliance on testimony to satisfy ourselves, 
whether the person, who testifies, possessed ample means 
of information ; whether he made use of those means ; and 
whether, in giving testimony, he may not be under the influ- 
ence of interest or passion. 
§. 28. Of relative suggestion as a ground of belief. 
VI, Another ground or law of belief of such a nature, 
as to be entitled to a distinct consideration, is relative sug- 
gestion. By this phrase is expressed the power or suscepti- 
bility, by means of which we perceive the relations of objects. 
"What relations themselves are, it is unnecessary to attempt 
to define ; no mere form of words can render the conception 
of them clearer to any person's comprehension, than it is al- 
ready supposed to be. All, that needs be asserted, is the mere 
fact, that, when the mind contemplates two or more objects, 
we naturally put forth other perceptions or feelings ; we can- 
not avoid doing it. For instance, we feel or perceive such 
objects to be the same or different, like or unlike, equal or un- 
equal, cause or effect, whole or part, attribute or subject,&c. 
These new feelings, as well as the direct perceptions of 
the objects, to which they relate, are occasions of belief. 
We not only believe the existence of the feelings themselves, LAWS OF BELIEF. 
45 
but find ourselves unable to resist and exclude the belief of 
the actual existence and truth of that, to which they corres- 
pond, viz, relations. The relations of things, it is true, are 
not objects, directly addressed to the external senses ; and 
as we cannot directly see them, nor hear them, nor feel them, 
they seem comparatively obscure. And yet we are so con- 
stituted, that the cognizance of them is utterly inseparable 
from a knowledge of those objects, in respect to which they 
exist. If they are not perceivable by the outward senses, 
they are nevertheless perceivable by the mind, and are un- 
doubtedly, in some important sense, real subjects of contem- 
plation and knowledge. Accordingly, relative sugges- 
tion, the name of the susceptibility, by means of which we 
become acquainted with relations, is properly regarded a 
LAW OF BELIEF. 
§. 29. Of reasoning as a ground or law of belief. 
VII, All reasoning, both Moral and Demonstrative, 
and in whatever form it exists, is also an original foundation 
of belief. Relative suggestion and reasoning are closely con- 
nected together ; since every train of reasoning implies, and 
involves a series of felt or perceived relations. Perceptions 
of relation may be regarded as the links, which bind togeth- 
er such separate perceptions, facts, or truths, as come with- 
in the range of the subject reasoned upon ; and without 
which they would inevitably remain in their original state of 
insulated and unavailable propositions. Truth is added to 
truth, feeling arises successive to feeling, until we arrive at 
the conclusion, which invariably fixes our belief. 
When, however, we assert, that the conclusions, deduced 
from a process of reasoning, invariably influence our belief, 
we should particularly keep in mind here, that belief may ex- 
ist in very various degrees. When the successive feelings, 
which we have in a train of reasoning, are all intuitive, and 
the propositions, with which we commenced, were certain, 
or were assumed as such, belief is of course of the highest 
kind. And this is always the case in demonstrations ; for 
there we always begin either with known or assumed truths, 
and as the propositions compared together are entirely ab- 
stract, there seems to be no room for doubt or mistake. But 46 
INTRODUCTION. 
in moral reasoning, although the mental process is the same, 
the conclusion is not necessarily true ; the propositions con- 
templated are in general of a different character from what 
we find in demonstrative reasoning ; and the conclusion will 
vary from mere presumption to absolute certainty according 
to the nature of the facts laid before the mind. 
But is it a fact, that Reasoning necessarily controls our 
convictions in any case ? What evidence is there, that our 
belief, in a greater or less degree, is naturally dependent on 
its conclusions ?-If we can suppose such a question to be se- 
riously put, a prompt and satisfactory answer is to be found 
in the general and in individual experience. No man has it 
in his power to refuse obedience to the decisions of reasoning; 
nor does he ever do it, except from an inability to embrace 
at once, and to balance the successive steps of the process. 
So far as he fully understands the elementary parts, which 
enter into a just train of reasoning, and can estimate the rela- 
tive bearing of one part on another, just so far his belief is 
naturally and necessarily affected. 
CHAPTER FOURTH. 
GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 
§. SO. The mind may be regarded in a threefold point of view. 
It is undoubtedly true, that the human soul is to be re- 
garded as constituting a nature, which is one and indivisible; 
but still there is abundant reason for asserting, that its nature 
can never be fully understood by contemplating it solely and 
exclusively under one aspect. There are accordingly three 
prominent and well defined points of view, in which the 
mind may be contemplated, viz, the Intellect, the Sensibili- 
ties, and the Will ; otherwise expressed by the phrases in- 
tellectual, sensitive or sentient, and voluntary states of 
the mind. Whatever truly and appropriately belongs to the GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 
47 
intellect, has something peculiar and characteristic of it, 
which shuts it out from the domain of the sensibilities ; and 
whatever has the nature of a volition has a position apart 
both from the intellectual and the sentient. This is a funda- 
mental arrangement, which, when properly and fully carried 
out and applied, includes the whole soul. To the one or the 
other of these general heads, every thing, involved in our 
mental existence, may be referred. In fully exhausting, 
therefore, these topics, we may justly count upon having 
completed the exploration of the mental constitution. 
§. 31. Evidence of the general arrangement from consciousness. 
The general arrangement, which has been spoken of, viz, 
into the intellectual, sentient, and voluntary states of the 
mind, appears to be susceptible of abundant illustration and 
proof. It is not our intention, however, to enter into the 
discussion of its correctness, at much length ; but merely to 
indicate as briefly as possible, some of the grounds, on which 
it has been made ; premising at the same time, that the 
whole of this work, while it is based in a good degree on 
this fundamental division, will be found to furnish incidental 
evidence throughout of its truth. 
In proof of the propriety of the general arrangement in 
question, we may refer in the first place, to Consciousness. 
In doing this we are of course obliged to presume, that the 
reader understands what is meant by the term consciousness; 
and that he assents to the truth, so readily and generally ac- 
knowledged, that we have much of our knowledge of the 
mind by its aid. Mental philosophers assure us, that we are 
enabled, by means of consciousness, to ascertain what 
thought and feeling are in themselves, and to distinguish 
them from each other. And if we are not willing to depend 
upon the information thus given us, if we reject its authority 
in the hopes of finding something more certain, we shall only 
be involved in greater difficulty ; in the language of Condil- 
lac on this very subject, "we stray from a point, which we 
apprehend so clearly, that it can never lead us into error."* 
But if it be true, that the existence and distinctive character 
of the mental acts is made known, in a good degree at least, 
* Origin of Knowledge, Pt. I, ch. I. 48 
INTRODUCTION. 
by consciousness, and that we may justly and confidently 
rely on its testimony, we naturally inquire, what does it teach 
in the present case ? And in answering' this question, we 
may safely appeal to any person's recollections, and ask, 
whether he has ever been in danger of confounding a mere 
perception, a mere thought, either with desires and emotions 
on the one hand, or with volitions on the other ? Does not 
his consciousness assure him, that the mental states, which 
we thus distinguish by these different terms, are not identi- 
cal, that the one class is not the other, that they as actually 
differ from each other, as association does from belief, or im- 
agination from memory ?-It may be objected, however, that 
we find ourselves perplexed and at a loss to explain, by any 
statement in words, the precise difference in this case, what- 
ever that difference may actually be. We readily admit the 
fact, implied in this objection, but without admitting that it 
has any weight as proof against the distinction in question. 
No simple notion or feeling whatever is susceptible of a defi- 
nition, of an explanation by mere words alone. And it can- 
not be expected of anything, whose own nature we cannot 
explain by words, that we can fully explain by a mere verbal 
statement, its difference from other things. 
It would seem, therefore, that we may rest in this inquiry 
upon men's consciousness ; not of one merely, but of any and 
all men. The understanding stands apart from the rest. 
The will also has its separate and appropriate position. We 
may at least assert with full confidence, that no one is in dan- 
ger of confounding volitions with intellections ; that is to say, 
with the mere notions of the understanding. On this point 
there is certainly a general agreement. And yet our con- 
sciousness, if we will but attend to its intimations with prop- 
er care, will probably teach us, that the nature of a volition 
more nearly approaches that of a purely intellectual act, 
than it does the distinctive nature of emotions and desires. 
It is undoubtedly true, that volitions may have aroused and 
excited antecedents, and may thus be very closely connected 
with the various affections ; but in themselves they are cold 
and unimpassioned ; they are purely executive or mandato- 
ry, and are as obviously free from any actual impregnation GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 
49 
of appetite, sentiment, or desire, as the most abstract and 
callous exercises of the intellect. 
§. 32. Evidence of the same from terms found in different languages. 
We are enabled further to throw some light on this sub- 
ject from a consideration of the terms, which are found in 
various languages. Every language is, in some important 
sense, a mirror of the mind. Something may be learnt of 
the tendency of the mental operations, not only from the 
form or structure of language in general, but even from the 
import of particular terms. There can be no hesitation in 
saying, that every language has its distinct terms, expressive 
of the threefold view of the mind under consideration, and 
which are constantly used with a distinct and appropriate 
meaning, and without being interchanged with each other 
as if they were synonymous. In other words, there are 
terms in all languages, (meaning those of course which are 
spoken by nations somewhat advanced in mental culture,) 
which correspond to the English terms, intellect, sensibil- 
ities, will. If such terms are generally found in languages, 
differing from each other in form and in meaning, it is cer- 
tainly a strong circumstance in proof, that the distinction, 
which we propose to establish, actually exists. On the sup- 
position of its having no existence, it seems impossible to ex- 
plain the fact, that men should so universally agree in mak- 
ing it. If on the other hand it does exist, it is reasonable to 
suppose, that it exists for some purpose ; and existing for 
some purpose, it must of course become known ; and being 
known it is naturally expressed in language, the same as any 
other object of knowledge. And this is what we find to be 
the case. So that we may consider the expression to be an 
evidence of the fact ; the sign, an intimation and evidence of 
the reality of the thing signified. 
§. 33. Evidence from incidental remarks in writers. 
We now pass to other sources of evidence on this subject. 
No small amount of knowledge, bearing upon the capabilities 
and the character of the human mind, may be gathered from 
the incidental remarks of writers of careful observation and 
good sense. And accordingly if we find remarks expressive 50 
INTRODUCTION. 
of mental distinctions, repeatedly made by such men, when 
they are not formally and professedly treating of the mind, it 
furnishes a strong presumption, that such distinctions actual- 
ly exist. Their testimony is given under circumstances the 
most favorable to an unbiassed opinion ; and ought to be re- 
ceived into the vast amount of evidence, drawn from a great 
variety of sources, which goes to illustrate the true nature of 
the soul. The popular author of Literary Hours has given 
in one of his Works an interesting biographical sketch of Sir 
Richard Steele. After remarking upon the inconsistencies 
of his life, his excellent resolutions and his feeble performan- 
ces, his successive seasons of riot and repentance, he refers 
the cause of these inconsistencies to the feebleness of the 
will; and in doing it, he incidentally, but very clearly, makes 
the distinction under consideration. " His misfortune, the 
cause of all his errors, was, not to have clearly seen, where 
his deficiencies lay ; they were neither of the head, nor of 
the heart, but of the volition. He possessed the wish, but not 
the power of volition to carry his purposes into execution."* 
As we are not at liberty to suppose, that so respectable a 
writer employs words without meaning, he must be regarded 
as intending to make the distinction, which has been assert- 
ed to exist. 
In Dr. Currie's well written Life of Burns, it is asserted, 
that the force of that remarkable poet lay in the powers of 
his understanding and the sensibilities of his heart. And 
the writer not only thus clearly indicates the distinction be- 
tween the understanding or intellect and the heart ; but in 
another passage, which undoubtedly discloses the key to the 
poet's character and conduct, he distinguishes both of them 
from the voluntary powers. The passage referred to is this. 
"He knew his own failings ; he predicted their consequences; 
the melancholy foreboding was not long absent from his 
mind ; yet his passions carried him down the stream of error, 
and swept him over the precipice he saw directly in his 
course. The fatal defect in his character lay in the compara- 
tive weakness of his volition, which, governingthe conduct accor- 
ding to the dictates of the understanding, alone entitles it to 
be denominated rational."! 
♦Drake's Essays illustrative of the Tatler, Spectator, and Guardian, Vol. I. p. 50. 
t Currie's Life of Burns, Philadelphia Ed p 62. GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 
51 
A recently published Inquiry, concerning' the Indications 
of Insanity, in which are various sketches of personal histo- 
ry and character that illustrate certain traits of the mind, has 
the following statement.-" Delinquents of this description 
are, perhaps, not unable to distinguish between what is right 
and what is wrong, but their will is not governed by their 
understanding, and they want the power of restraining them- 
selves from that which, when committed, they are afraid to 
reflect upon. Their will remains ; but it springs from de- 
praved sensations and emolions, or from passions inordinate and 
unrestrained."* 
A celebrated writer, in giving directions to his son as to 
the manner of conducting negociations with foreign minis- 
ters, makes use of the following language.-"If you engage 
his heart, you have a fair chance for imposing upon his under- 
standing, and determining his will." f This writer, as well as 
many others, employs the more common term heart to express 
the sensibilities ; and he evidently uses language, as if there 
were a known and admitted distinction between the intellec- 
tual, sentient, and voluntary parts of our nature, since he 
speaks of the control or regulation of the understanding, as 
being, in the case under consideration, subsequent to the 
possession of the heart, and the determination of the will as 
subsequent to both, or at least as not identical with them. 
We might multiply passages of this kind to almost any ex- 
tent, if our limits would permit it. And these passages, if the 
distinction for which we contend, does not exist, must obvi- 
ously convey erroneous ideas. This we cannot well suppose. 
On the contrary, we have not the least doubt, that they ex- 
press a great and important fact in our mental constitution ; 
a fact, which is at the basis of all true philosophy of the mind. 
A single extract more from Shakspeare, (Hamlet, Act. I, Sc. 
2d,) will close this topic. 
"It shows a will most incorrect to heaven, 
"A heart unfortified, 
"An understanding simple and unschool'd. 
§. 34. Further proof from various writers on the mind. 
The distinction in question has also been fully recognized 
*Conolly's Inquiries concerning the Indications of Insanity, &c. Lond. Ed. p. 454. 
^Chesterfield, Lond. Ed. Vol. Ill, p. 137. 52 
INTRODUCTION. 
by various distinguished writers on the mind. The follow- 
ing passage is to be found in Mr. Locke. "Thus by a due con- 
sideration, and examining any good proposed, it is in our power 
to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that 
good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work 
upon the will, and be pursued. For, good, though appearing, 
and allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised desires in our 
minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches 
not our wills."* Here the threefold division in question is 
distinctly recognized. The due consideration and examining, 
which are spoken of, imply an act of the intellect ; the de- 
sires, which are subsequently raised, are appropriately as- 
cribed to the sensibilities ; and these last are followed by an 
act of the other part of our nature, viz, the will. 
Mr. Hume, in his Dissertation on the Passions, has the 
following passage, which is clear enough in its import with- 
out comment. " It seems evident that reason, in a strict 
sense, as meaning the judgment of truth and falsehood, can 
never of itself be any motive to the will, and can have no influ- 
ence but so far as it touches some passion or affection." 
In the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural 
Religion, ascribed to Lord Kaimes, is a passage as follows. 
" He hath appetites and passions, which prompt him to their 
respective gratifications ; but he is under no necessity of 
blindly submitting to their impulse. For reason hath a pow- 
er of restraint. It suggests motives from the cool views of 
good and evil. He deliberates upon these. In consequence 
of his deliberation he chooseth ; and here, if any where, lies 
our liberty." 
Among writers more recent, who have insisted on this 
distinction with much earnestness and clearness, we may 
mention Sir James Mackintosh. In some strictures on Dr. 
Price's Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, he has 
occasion to make a remark, the substance of which had been 
given before and is repeated afterwards, "that no perception 
or judgment, or other unmixed act of the understanding, mere- 
ly as such and without the agency of some intermediate emo- 
tion, can affect the will." f 
• Essay on the Understanding, Ek. II, ch. xxi, §. 46. 
f General View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 157. GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 
53 
A writer of our own country, who has furnished some 
valuable contributions to a knowledge of our mental struct- 
ure, expresses himself thus-" Why do not philosophers con- 
sider all the operations of the understanding, and the affec- 
tions as constituting but one general class of operations, and 
as belonging to one faculty ? The reason is, they see no 
similarity between intellectual perceptions and affections. A 
perception is not a feeling either of pleasure or pain, nor a 
desire. And pleasure and pain and desires, they clearly see, 
are not perceptions. Hence classing them together would 
be improper and create confusion. It would be confounding 
things which differ, and destroying all those distinctions, 
which are necessary to the acquirement of scientific knowl- 
edge. For a person has no more than a confused notion of 
things, who does not make distinctions where there are dif- 
ferences ; or point out the difference between one thing and 
another. As perceptions and affections generically differ, 
philosophers have distinguished them, and formed them into 
distinct classes; and so they have admitted the existence of 
two faculties. And for the same reason they admit two, 
they ought to grant there are three faculties. For when we 
attend to the affections and to volitions, it is evident there 
is a generic difference between them. It is evident that 
pain, pleasure, and desires, are not volitions ; and have no 
similarity to those voluntary exertions, which produce 
effects on the body, and in other things around us. For 
these affections do not immediately produce any external 
effects ; they are effects themselves produced by the heart, 
and are either virtuous or vicious. For it has been shown, 
that vice and virtue belong to the heart only, and its opera- 
tions, or affections. There is, therefore, no more propriety 
in classing the affections and volitions together, than in ma- 
king but one class of the affections and perceptions. The 
affections and volitions so widely differ, that they naturally 
divide themselves into two distinct, general classes." * 
It would be easy here, as in the case of writers not pro- 
fessedly and formally treating of mental philosophy, to mul- 
tiply passages of the same import from numerous other 
inquirers into the mind, if it were thought necessary. The 
• Burton's Essays on Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology, p. 92. 54 
INTRODUCTION. 
view thus taken by English and American writers is sustain- 
ed by judicious metaphysicians of other countries, of which 
our limits will permit us to give only a single passage as an 
instance. The writer, after some remarks on the origin of 
the desires, hopes, and fears, proceeds as follows. "Ces 
affections internes sont ce que nous nommons sentimens. Ils 
different des sensations, en ce que les sensations ont leur 
source directement dans 1'exterieur, tandis que les sentimens 
sont produits en nous seulement a 1'occasion de 1'exterieur, 
soit qu'il nous affecte actuellement, soit qu'il nous ait prece- 
demment affectes. Ils resemblent aux sensations, en ce que, 
comme elies, ils sont independans de notre volonte, et non suscep- 
tibles d'etre produits ou empeches par nous. Qui peut, en 
effet, desir er, esperer, craindre d volonte ?"* 
For the reasons, which have been given, we find ourselves 
authorized, in the first place, in arranging the states, exerci- 
ses, or acts of the mind, (for these terms, the most general 
we can employ, will apply to all of these classes,) under the 
three general heads of Intellectual, Sensitive or Sentient, and 
Voluntary. Our intellectual states of mind, together with 
their corresponding susceptibilities or powers, will first come 
under consideration. On looking attentively, however, at 
the intellectual part of our nature, we readily discover, that 
the results which are to be attributed to it, are susceptible of 
a subordinate classification, viz, into intellectual, or intel- 
lective states of External, and those of Internal origin. 
It is presumed, that on a little examination this distinction 
will be sufficiently obvious. If the mind were insulated and 
cut off from the outward world, or if there were no such out- 
ward world, could we feel, or see, or hear ? All those men- 
tal affections, which we express, when we speak of the diver- 
sities of taste and touch, of sound and sight, are utterly de- 
pendent on the existence and presence of something, which 
is exterior to the intellect itself. But this cannot be said of 
what is expressed by the words, truth, falsehood, opinion, in- 
telligence, cause, obligation, effect, and numerous creations 
of the intellect of a like kind. 
§. 35. Classification of the intellectual states of the mind. 
*De La Liberte etde ses Differens Modes, par Augustin-Francois Th^ry. GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 
55 
It is worthy of remark, that the subordinate classification, 
which is now proposed to be made, did not escape, in its es- 
sential characteristics, the notice of very ancient writers. 
We have the authority of Cudworth,* that those intellectual 
states, which have an internal origin, bore among the Greeks 
the name of noemata, thoughts or intellections ; while those of 
external origin were called aisthemata, sensations. Although 
this classification, the grounds of which cannot fail readily to 
present themselves, has been recognized and sanctioned, in 
some form or other, by numerous writers on the human mind, 
it is probable that some future opportunity will be found more 
fully to explain and defend it; the objections which have 
sometimes been made will not be overlooked ; and it will 
readily be perceived, that we shall be better prepared for this 
proposed explanation, after having considered the relation, 
which the mind sustains to the external world by means of 
the senses, and analyzed the knowledge, which has its origin 
in that source. 
* Cudworth's Immutable Morality, Bk. IV. ch. I. DIVISION FIRST. 
THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING. 
INTELLECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MIND. 
PART FIRST. 
INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN. CHAPTER FIRST. 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 
§. 36. Connection of the mind with the material world. 
The human mind has a nature and principles of its own ; 
but at the same time it cannot properly be said, that it is en- 
tirely independent in its action ; that is to say, it undoubtedly 
has a connection, more or less intimate and important, with 
other things. An entire separation of the soul and its action 
from every thing else is merely a supposition, an hypothesis, 
which is not realized in our present state of being. What 
the soul will be in a future state of existence is of course 
another inquiry. It is possible, that it may be disburdened, 
more than it is in this life, of connections and dependencies, 
and will possess more freedom and energy ; but it seems to 
be our appropriate business at present to examine it, as we 
find it here. 
Whatever Providence may have in reserve for us in a fu- 
ture state, it is obvious, that in our present existence it has 
designed and established an intimate connection between the 
soul and the material world. We have a witness of this in 
the mere fact of the existence of an external creation. Was 
all this visible creation made for nothing? Are the flowers 
not only of the wilderness, but of the cultivated place, formed 
merely to waste their sweetness on the air? Are all those va- 
rieties of pleasing sound, that come forth from animate and 
inanimate nature, uttered, and breathed out in vain? Can 
we permit ourselves to suppose, that the symmetry of form, 
every where existing in the outward world, the relations and 
aptitudes, the beauties of proportion, and the decorations of 60 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 
colors exist without any object? And yet this must be so, if 
there be no connection between the soul of man, and outward 
objects. What would be proportion, what would be color, 
what would be harmony of sound without the soul, to which 
they are addressed, and from which they are acknowledged 
to derive their efficacy? Where there is no soul, where there 
is a deprivation and want of the conscious spirit, there is no 
sight, no hearing, no touch, no sense of beauty. Every 
thing depends on the mind ; the senses are merely the medi- 
um of communication, the conditions and helps of the percep- 
tions, and not the perceptions themselves. With such 
considerations we justify what has been said, that Providence 
designed, and that it has established an intimate connection 
between the soul and the material world. 
And there is another train of thought, which leads to the 
same conclusion. On any other supposition than the exist- 
ence of such a connection, we cannot account for that nice 
and costly apparatus of the nerves and organs of sense, with 
which we are furnished. Although we behold on every side 
abundant marks of the Creator's goodness, we may safely say, 
he does nothing in vain. The question then immediately re- 
curs, What is the meaning of the expenditure of the Divine 
goodness in the formation of the eye, in the windings and in- 
genious construction of the ear, and in the diffusion of the 
sense of touch? We cannot give a satisfactory answer to this 
question, except on the ground, that there is a designed and 
established connection between the mind, and the material 
world. If we admit the existence of this connection, every 
thing is at once explained. 
§. 37. Of the origin or beginnings of knowledge. 
The Creator, therefore, established the relation between 
mind and matter ; and it is a striking and important fact, 
that, in this connection of the mental and material world, we 
are probably to look for the commencement of the mind's 
activity, and for the beginnings of knowledge. The soul, 
considered in its relationship to external nature, may be com- 
pared to a stringed instrument. Regarded in itself, it is an 
invisible existence, having the capacity and elements of har- 
mony. The nerves, the eye, and the senses generally are IN GENERAL. 
61 
the chords and artificial frame-work, which God has woven 
round its unseen and unsearchable essence. This living- and 
curious instrument, which was before voiceless and silent, 
sends forth its sounds of harmony, as soon as it is swept by 
outward influences. But this, it will be noticed, is a gener- 
al statement; the meaning may not be perfectly obvious, and 
it will be necessary to descend to some particulars. 
There are certain elementary notions, which seem to be 
involved in, and inseparable from our very existence, such 
as self, identity, &c. The supposition would be highly un- 
reasonable, that we can exist for any length of time, without 
possessing them. It is certain that these notions are among 
the earliest, which men form ; and yet cautious and judi- 
cious inquirers into the mind have expressed the opinion, 
that even these do not arise, except subsequently to an im- 
pression on the organs of sense. 
Speaking of a being, whom, for the sake of illustration, he 
supposes to be possessed of merely the two senses of hear- 
ing and smelling, Mr. Stewart makes this remark.-"Let us 
suppose then a particular sensation to be excited in the mind 
of such a being. The moment this happens he must necessa- 
rily acquire the knowledge of two facts at once ; that of the 
existence of the sensation, and that of his own existence, as a sen- 
tient being."* This language clearly implies, that the no- 
tions of existence and of person or self are attendant upon, 
and subsequent to an affection of the mind, caused by an im- 
pression on the senses. In his Essays he still more clearly 
and decisively advances the opinion, that the mind is origi- 
nally brought into action through the medium of the senses, 
and that human knowledge has its origin in this way. 
"All our simple notions, (he says, Essay III,) or, in other 
words, all the primary elements of our knowledge are either 
presented to the mind immediately by the powers of con- 
sciousness and perception, or they are gradually unfolded in 
the exercise of the various faculties, which characterize the 
human understanding. According to this view of the subject, 
the sum total of our knowledge may undoubtedly be said to 
originate in sensation, inasmuch as it is by impressions from 
* Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. I, ch. 1. See also §• 5 of 
this Work. 62 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 
without that consciousness is first awakened, and the differ- 
ent faculties of the understanding put in action."* 
Perhaps this subject, however, will always remain in 
some degree of doubt; and we have merely to say, that of 
the various opinions, which have been advanced in respect 
to it, we give the preference to that which has been refer- 
red to, as supported by Stewart, De Gerando, and other 
judicious writers, without any disposition to assert its infal- 
libility. The mind appears at its creation to be merely an 
existence, involving certain principles, and endued with cer- 
tain powers, but dependent for the first and original devel- 
opement of those principles and the exercise of those powers 
on the condition of an outward impression. But after it has 
once been brought into action, it finds new sources of thought 
and feeling in itself. 
§. 38. Our first knowledge in general of a material or external origin. 
If we know not how a single leaf is formed, and arc baf- 
fled when we attempt to explain the growth even of a blade 
of grass, it is not surprising, that we should fail of absolute 
certainty in explaining the first cause of the mind's action, 
and the history of the first feeling, to which it gives birth. 
But whatever may be true of the first mental exercise, 
whether its existence be dependent on the condition of some 
external impression on the senses or not, it may be shown 
beyond doubt, that during the early period of life the connec- 
tion of the mind with the material world is particularly close, 
and that far the greater portion of its acts and feelings can 
be traced to that source. 
I,-What has been said will, in the first place, be found 
agreeable to each one's individual experience. If we look 
back to the early periods of life, we discover not merely, that 
our ideas are then comparatively few in number, but that 
far the greater proportion of them are suggested by external 
objects. They are forced upon us by our immediate wants ; 
they have relation to what we ourselves see, or hear, or 
touch ; and only a small proportion arc internal and abstract. 
As we advance in years, susceptibilities and powers of the 
*View8, similar to those of Mr. Stewart, are maintained by De Geran- 
do in a Memoir, entitled, De la Generation des Connoisances Humaines. IN GENERAL. 
63 
mind are brought into exercise, which have a less intimate 
connection with things external ; and thoughts from within 
are more rapidly multiplied, than from without. We have 
in some measure exhausted that which is external, and as 
the mind, awakened to a love of knowledge and a conscious- 
ness of its powers, has at last been brought fully into action, 
by means of repeated affections of the senses, a new world, 
(as yet in some degree a terra incognita,) projects itself 
upon our attention, where we are called upon to push our 
researches and gratify our curiosity. This is the general 
experience, the testimony which each one can give for him- 
self. 
In the second place, what has been said finds confirmation 
in what we observe of the progress of the mind in infants and 
children generally. The course of things, which we observe 
in them, agrees with what our personal consciousness and re- 
membrance, as far back as it goes, enables us to testify with 
no little confidence in our own case. No one can observe the 
operations of the mind in infants and children, without being 
led to believe, that the Creator has instituted a connection 
between the mind and the material world, and that the great- 
er portion of our early knowledge is from an outward source. 
To the infant its nursery is the world. The first ideas of 
the human race are its particular conceptions of its nurse and 
mother ; and the origin and history of all its notions may be 
traced to its animal wants, to the light that breaks in from 
its window, and to the few objects in the immediate neigh- 
borhood of the cradle and hearth. When it has become a few 
years of age, there are other sources of information, other 
fountains of thought, but they are still external and material. 
The child then learns the topography of his native village ; 
he explores the margin of its river, ascends its flowering hills ; 
and penetrates the seclusion of its vallies. His mind is full 
of activity ; new and exalting views crowd upon his percep- 
tions , he beholds, and hears, and handles ; he wonders, and 
is delighted. And it is not till after he has grasped the ele- 
ments of knowledge, which the outward world gives, that he 
retires within himself, compares, reasons, and seeks for caus- 
es and effects. 
It is in accordance with what has now been stated of the 64 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 
tendencies of mind in children, that we generally find them in- 
structed by means of sensible objects, or by pictures of such 
objects. When their teachers make an abstract statement to 
them of an action or event, they do not understand it; they 
listen to it with an appearance of confusion and vacancy, for 
the process is undoubtedly against nature. But show them 
the objects themselves, or a faithful picture of them, and in- 
terpret your abstract expressions by a reference to the object 
or picture, and they are observed to learn with rapidity and 
pleasure. The time has not yet arrived for the springing up 
and growth of thoughts of an internal and abstract origin. 
§. 39. Further proof of the beginnings of knowledge from external causes. 
In the third place, the history of language is a strong proof 
of the correctness of the position, that the mind is first 
brought into action by means of the senses, and acquires its 
earliest knowledge from that source. At first words are few 
in number, corresponding to the limited extent of ideas. The 
vocabulary of savage tribes, (those for example, which inhab- 
it the American continent,) is in general exceedingly limited. 
The growth of a language corresponds to the growth of mind; 
it extends itself by the increased number and power of its 
words, nearly in exact correspondence with the multiplica- 
tion and the increased complexity of thought. Now the his- 
tory of all language teaches us, that words, which were in- 
vented and brought into use one after another in the gradual 
way just mentioned, were first employed to express external 
objects, and afterwards were used to express thoughts of an 
internal origin. Some writer remarks, that among the Bos- 
chuanas of South Africa, who live in a parched and arid coun- 
try, the word pulo, which literally signifies rain, is the only 
term they have to express a blessing or blessings. But there 
may be blessings internal as well as external, goods and joys 
of the mind as well as of the body ; still in the language of 
these Africans, it is all rain ; the blessings of hope, and peace, 
and friendship, and submission, and ail other modes of intel- 
lectual and sentient good, are nothing but rain. 
There are thousands of instances of this kind. Almost all 
the words in every language, expressive of the susceptibilities 
and operations of the mind, may be clearly shown to have IN GENERAL. 
65 
had an external origin and application, before they were ap- 
plied to the mind. To imagine in its literal signification im- 
plies the forming of a picture ; to impress conveys the idea 
of leaving a stamp or mark, as the seal leaves its exact like- 
ness or stamp on wax ; to reflect literally means to turn 
back, to go over the ground again : &c. These words can- 
not be applied to the mind in the literal sense ; the nature of 
the mind will not admit of such an application ; the inference 
therefore is, that they first had an external application. 
Now if it be an established truth, that all language has a 
primary reference to external objects, and that there is no 
term, expressive of mental acts, which was not originally 
expressive of something material, the conclusion would seem 
to be a fair one, that the part of our knowledge, which has 
its rise by means of the senses, is, as a general statement, 
first in origin. And the more so, when we combine with 
these views the considerations, which have been previously 
advanced. 
§. 40. The same subject further illustrated. 
And, in the fourth place, it is not too much to say, that 
all the observations, which have been made on persons, who 
from their birth, or at any subsequent period, have been 
deprived of any of the senses, and all the extraordinary facts, 
which have come to knowledge, having a bearing on this 
inquiry, go strongly in favor of the views which have been 
given. It appears, for instance, from the observations, 
which have been made in regard to persons, who have been 
deaf until a particular period, and then have been restored 
to the power of hearing, that they have never previously 
had those ideas, which naturally come in by that sense. If 
a person has been born blind, the result is the same ; or if 
having the sense of sight, it has so happened, that he has 
never seen any colors of a particular description. In the 
one case, he has no ideas of colors at all, and in the other, 
only of those colors, which he has seen.-It may be said 
perhaps, that this is what might be expected, and merely 
proves the senses to be a source of knowledge, without 
necessarily involving the priority of that knowledge to what 
has an internal origin. But then observe the persons refer- 
red to a little further, and it will be found, as a general state- 66 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 
meat, that the powers of their minds have not been unfold- 
ed ; they lay wrapt up in a great measure in their original 
darkness ; no inward light springs up to compensate for the 
absence of that, which in other cases bursts in from the out- 
ward world. This circumstance evidently tends to confirm 
the principle we are endeavoring to illustrate. 
Of those extraordinary instances, to which we alluded, 
as having thrown some light on the history of our intellect- 
ual acquisitions, is the account, which is given in the Me- 
moirs of the French Academy of Sciences for the year 1703, 
of a deaf and dumb young man in the city of Chartres. At 
the age of three and twenty, it so happened, to the great 
surprise of the whole town, that he was suddenly restored 
to the sense of hearing, and in a short time he acquired the 
use of language. Deprived for so long a period of a sense, 
which in importance ranks with the sight and the touch, un- 
able to hold communion with his fellow beings by means of 
oral or written language, and not particularly compelled, as 
he had every care taken of him by his friends and relations, 
to bring his faculties into exercise, the powers of his mind 
remained without having opportunity to unfold themselves. 
Being examined by some men of discernment, it was found 
that he had no idea of a God, of a soul, of the moral merit 
or demerit of human actions ; and what might seem to be 
yet more remarkable, he knew not what it was to die ; the 
agonies of dissolution, the grief of friends, and the ceremo- 
nies of interment being to him inexplicable mysteries. 
Here we see how much knowledge a person was deprived 
of, merely by his wanting the single sense of hearing ; a 
proof that the senses were designed by our Creator to be the 
first source of knowledge, and that without them the facul- 
ties of the soul would never become operative. 
§. 41. Subject illustrated from the case of James Mitchell. 
But the foregoing is not the only instance of this sort, 
which ingenious men have noticed and recorded. In the 
Transactions of the Royal Society in Edinburgh, (Vol. vii. 
Pt. 1.,) is a Memoir communicated by Dugald Stewart, 
which gives an account of James Mitchell, a boy born deaf 
and blind. The history of this lad, who labored under the IN GENERAL. 
67 
uncommon affliction of this double deprivation, illustrates 
and confirms all, that has been above stated. He made what 
use he could of the only senses which he possessed, those of 
touch, taste, and smell, and gained from them a number of 
ideas. It was a proof of the diligence, with which he em- 
ployed the limited means, which were given him, that he 
had by the sense of touch thoroughly explored the ground 
in the neighborhood of the house where he lived, for hun- 
dreds of yards. But deprived of sight, of hearing, and of in- 
tercourse by speech, it was very evident to those, who obser- 
ved him, as might be expected, that his knowledge was in 
amount exceedingly small. He was destitute of those per- 
ceptions, which are appropriate to the particular senses, of 
which he was deprived ; and also of many other notions of 
an internal origin, which would undoubtedly have arisen, if 
the powers of the mind had previously been rendered fully 
operative by means of those assistances, which it usually 
receives from the bodily organs. Such instances as these, 
however they may at first appear, are extremely important. 
They furnish us with an appeal, not to mere speculations, 
but to fact. And it is only by checking undue speculation, 
and by continually recurring to facts, that our progress in 
this science will become sure, rapid, and delightful.* 
§. 42. Illustration from the case of Caspar Hauser. 
There is a recent instance, perhaps more decisive than 
has ever before occurred, and as melancholy, as it is deeply 
interesting. We refer to the case of Caspar Hauser. It ap- 
pears from all that can be gathered on the subject, that this 
unfortunate lad was from infancy confined in a low and small 
apartment, which he sometimes called a cage. No light 
ever entered this little prison. Till his release in the seven- 
teenth year of his age, he never saw the sky, nor the pleas- 
ant light of day, nor ever perceived any difference between 
day and night. Whenever he awoke from sleep, which was 
• The statements concerning the young man of Chartres are particular- 
ly examined in Condillac's Essay on the Origin of Knowledge at Section 
fourth of Part first. The interesting Memoir of Stewart has recently 
been republished in the third volume of his Elements of the Philosophy of 
the Human Mind. 68 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 
generally sound and at stated intervals, he found a loaf of 
bread and a pitcher of water near him. Sometimes the wa- 
ter was mixed with opium or some other intoxicating drug. 
Under the influence of this mixture, which was occasionally 
given him, he was suddenly cast into a profound slumber ; 
and when he afterwards awoke, he found that he had a clean 
shirt on, and that his nails had been cut. He never saw the 
face of the man, who changed his clothing, and brought him 
his food and drink. The only objects which he had to 
amuse himself with, were two wooden horses and several 
ribbons. These horses he believed to have a degree of life 
and sensibility. His only occupation was to move them back- 
wards and forwards by his side ; and to tie the ribbons upon 
them in various positions. While in his little prison he never 
heard a human voice, nor any other sound, except what he 
himself made in playing with his little wooden companions. 
Thus it was in a solitude and inactivity, little less than that 
of the grave, he spent his infancy, childhood, and youth. 
But it is unnecessary to go into all the particulars of this 
unfortunate young man's history. When he was released 
from his confinement in the year 1823, he was, as nearly as 
could be ascertained from the structure and developements 
of his body, about 17 years of age. And what was the 
condition of his mind ? He had no knowledge of language, 
excepting a few words, to which he seems to have attached 
scarcely any meaning. When he appeared helpless and 
alone in the streets of Nuremburg, the common questions of 
the police officers were put to him. What is your name ? 
What is your business ? Whence came you ? But he had no 
perception of their import. He heard without understand- 
ing ; he saw without perceiving ; the tears stood in his eye ; 
unintelligible sounds and sorrowful moans burst from his 
lips. He was entirely ignorant of all the common objects and 
occurrences of nature ; and of all the usual customsand con- 
veniences of life. Like the blind boy couched by Cheselden 
for the cataract, he was incapable of estimating the true di- 
rection and distance of things. The objects, which were 
presented to his notice, affected him as they do an infant, or 
a little child. He endeavored, for instance, to lay hold of all 
bright and glittering objects, just as a child docs ; and when IN GENERAL. 
69 
he could not reach them, or was forbidden to touch them, he 
cried. He was attracted by the brightness of an object; but 
he seemed incapable of distinguishing one object from anoth- 
er. When objects were brought very near to him, he gener- 
ally gazed at them with a stupid look, which only in particu- 
lar instances was expressive of curiosity and astonishment. 
He could not distinguish animated things from inanimate ; 
but ascribed a degree of life to all. He had no ideas of fam- 
ily, of relationship, and friendship, and would often ask for 
an explanation of what is meant by mother, brother, and 
sister. He had no moral or religious ideas ; and even the 
sentiments of modesty and shame, so deeply implanted in the 
human breast and so easily called into action, seem never to 
have been excited in his bosom. In a word, his mind was 
essentially an unintelligent blank; and this merely because 
it had been shut out from any connection with the outward 
world of men and nature. No basis had been laid for its op- 
erations ; the power destined to bring it into action had nev- 
er touched it ; it was like some desert place of earth, where 
the sun never shone, and the breeze never blew, and the 
rain never descended, that presents to the eye of the behold- 
er one unvaried surface of arid and withering desolation. 
§. 43. Of connatural or innate knowledge. 
The considerations of this chapter naturally bring us upon 
the question of innate or connatural knowledge. It was for- 
merly maintained by certain writers, that there are in the 
minds of men ideas and propositions, which are not acquired 
or taught at any time, or in any way, but are coetaneous 
with the existence of the mind itself, being wrought into, 
and inseparable from it. It was maintained, that they are 
limited to no one class, neither to the rich nor the poor, 
neither to the learned nor the ignorant, to no clime and to 
no country, but all participate in them alike. These propo- 
sitions and ideas, being coetaneous with the existence of the 
soul, and being there established at the commencement of its 
existence by the ordinance of the Deity, were regarded as 
the first principles of knowledge, and as the rules, by which 
men were to be guided in all their reasonings about natural 
and moral objects. 70 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 
From these innate and original propositions the following 
may be selected as specimens of the whole ;-(1) Of the nat- 
ural kind. The whole is greater than a part ; Whatever is, 
is ; It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at 
the same time and in the same sense.-(2) Of the moral 
kind, Parents must be honored ; injury must not be done ; 
Contracts should be fulfilled, &c. (3) Of the religious 
kind, There is a God ; God is to be worshipped ; God will 
approve virtue and punish vice. 
§, 44. The doctrine of innate knowledge not susceptible of proof. 
It will not be deemed necessary to spend much time on 
this subject, or to enter into any length of investigation. 
There seems to be an utter absence of all satisfactory evi- 
dence, that there is in men any amount of knowledge what- 
ever, answering to this description. The prominent argu- 
ment brought forward by the supporters of this doctrine, was 
this, that all mankind, without exception, and from the earli- 
est period of our being able to form an acquaintance with 
their minds, exhibit a knowledge of ideas and propositions of 
this kind, and that this universal knowledge of them cannot 
be accounted for, except on the ground of their being coeta- 
neous with the mind's existence, and originally implanted in 
it. Now if we admit that all men are acquainted with them 
and assent to them, this by no means proves them innate, so 
long as we can account for this acquaintance and this assent 
in some other way. It is granted by all, that the mind exists, 
that it is capable of action, and that it possesses the power 
or the ability of acquiring knowledge. If, therefore, in the 
exercise of this ability, which all admit it to have, we can 
come to the knowledge of what are called innate or connatu- 
ral ideas and propositions, it is unnecessary to assign to them 
another origin, in support of which no positive proof can be 
brought. 
But the truth is, that all men are not acquainted with the 
ideas and propositions in question, and especially do not ex- 
hibit such an acquaintance from the first dawn of their knowl- 
edge, as would be the case if they were connatural in the 
mind. The supposed fact, on which this argument is found- 
ed, is a mere assumption ; it has never been confirmed by IN GENERAL. 
71 
candid and careful inquiry, which ought to be done, before it 
is made use of as proof ; nor is it susceptible of such confirm- 
ation. 
§. 45. The doctrine tried by the idea of a God. 
Every enumeration of innate propositions embraces the fol- 
lowing, That all men have a notion of a God ; and undoubt- 
edly if there be any one, which has a claim to universality 
and early developement, it is this. But in point of fact we 
know that all men are not acquainted with this notion ; the 
testimony of travellers among uncivilized nations has been 
given again and again, that there is not such an universal 
acquaintance; but on the contrary savage tribes in differ- 
ent parts of the world are said to be destitute of it. There 
is also a class of unfortunate persons to be found in civilized 
and Christian nations, (we have reference to the deaf and 
dumb, those in the situation of the young man at Chartres,) 
who will throw light on this subject, if men will but take the 
pains to examine those, who have in no way received reli- 
gious instruction. There is reason to believe, that in many 
cases they will be found utterly without a knowledge of their 
Creator. 
Massieu was the son of a poor shepherd in the neigh- 
borhood of Bourdeaux. Destitute from birth of the sense of 
hearing, and as a natural consequence, of the power of speech, 
he grew up, and knew barely enough to enable him to watch 
his father's flock in the fields. Although his capacity was 
afterwards fully proved to be of the most comprehensive and 
splendid character, as it was not then drawn out and brought 
into action, he appeared in early life to be but little above an 
idiot. In this situation he was taken under the care of the 
benevolent Sicard, who was able, after great labor and in- 
genuity, to quicken by degrees the slumbering power of 
thought into developement and activity. Did his instructor 
suppose that Massieu was acquainted with the notion of a 
God ?-Far from it ; he had abundant evidence to the con- 
trary ; nor did he even undertake to teach him that vast idea 
for some time. He directed his attention at first to knowl- 
edge more obvious and accessible in its origin ; he led him, 
in perfect consistency with what is required by the nature 
and laws of the mind, by easy steps from one degree of knowl- 72 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 
edge to another, till he supposed him capable of embracing 
the glorious conception of a First Cause. Then he contrived 
to arouse his attention and anxiety; he introduced him to a 
train of thought, which would naturally bring him to the de- 
sired result ; he had previously taught him the relation of 
cause and effect; and on this occasion he showed him his 
watch, and by signs gave him to understand, that it implied 
a designer and maker ; and the same of a picture, a piece of 
statuary, a book, a building, and other objects, indicative of 
design. Then he held up before him a chain, showing him 
how one link was connected with and dependent on another; 
in this way he introduced into the mind of Massieu the com- 
plex notion ofa mutual dependence and concatenation of cau- 
ses. At last the full idea, the conception of a primary, self- 
existent, and self-energetic cause, the notion of a God came, 
like light from heaven, into his astonished and rejoicing soul. 
He trembled, says his historian, he was deeply affected, pros- 
trated himself, and gave signs of reverence and adoration. 
And when he arose, he uttered by signs also, for he had no 
other language, these beautiful words, which his instructor 
declared he should never forget, Ah I Let me go to my fath- 
er, to my mother, to my brothers, to tell them ofa God ; they 
know Him not.* 
Such facts and instances settle this question ; they prove, 
that the doctrine of inborn and connatural knowledge is un- 
founded ; and may we not add, that they are in perfect ac- 
cordance with a well known passage of the Apostle Paul ; 
"The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, 
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are 
made, even his eternal power and Godhead." 
§• 46. The discussion of this subject superseded and unnecessary 
It is an additional reason for not entering with more full- 
ness and particularity into this inquiry, that the doctrine of 
innate or connatural knowledge has been frequently discussed 
at length and refuted ; particularly by Gassendi and Locke, 
and more recently by De Gerando. This being the case, and 
public sentiment at the same time decidedly rejecting it, it 
* See the work of Sicard, entitled Cours D'Instruction d'un Sourd- 
Huet de Naissance, Chap. XXV. IN GENERAL. 
73 
cannot be supposed that every writer on the human mind is 
called upon to introduce the subject anew, to go over the 
train of argument, and slay a victim already thrice slain. 
Let us ask, Are we called upon at the present day to consider 
and refute every wild notion, which has ever been proposed ? 
On that ground we should not stop here ; we must follow 
Locke further, and undertake a confutation of the doctrine of 
Malebranche, that we see all things in God ; we must follow 
Reid in his labored and conclusive overthrow of the long es- 
tablished opinion, that we know nothing of the material 
world, except by means of filmy images or pictures, actually 
thrown off from outward objects, and lodged in the sensori- 
um. But such a course will be purposely avoided ; it would 
be alike toilsome and unsatisfactory ; it would be as unrea- 
sonable as to require from every author in Natural Philoso- 
phy a new confutation of the Alchemists, and to exact from 
every modern astronomer a like renewed discomfiture of the 
long since exploded theories of the heavenly motions. Mr. 
Locke himself seems willing to admit, that the discussion 
does not naturally and necessarily make a part of Mental 
Philosophy ; and gives us clearly to understand that it holds 
so conspicuous a place in his Essay, merely from the acci- 
dental circumstance of the prevalence in his own time of the 
error which he confuted. Accordingly when he prepared an 
abstract or abridgement of that work for Le Clerc's Bibliothe- 
que Universelie, he omitted the whole of the Book on innate 
ideas. 
Furthermore, the whole system of Mr. Locke, (and the 
same may be said of the views of Reid, Stewart, De Gerando, 
and Brown, who cannot be considered in the prominent out- 
lines of their doctrines as essentially differing from him,) is an 
indirect but conclusive argument against connatural knowl- 
edge. If the principles which they advance, be right, the 
doctrine of innate knowledge is of course wrong, and requires 
no direct refutation. 
§. 47. Further remarks on the rise of knowledge by means of the senses. 
Considering it, therefore, as settled, that there is no con- 
natural knowledge, we recur with increased confidence to the 
principle, which has been laid down in this chapter, that the 74 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE 
mind is first brought into action by the intermediation of the 
senses, and that the greater part of its earliest knowledge is 
from an external source. The considerations, that have been 
adduced in support of this doctrine, are obvious and weighty; 
they account with much probability for the beginnings of 
thought and feeling, and are entirely decisive of the charac- 
ter of our early acquisitions in general. The subject, howev- 
er, is still open to reflection, and if it were needful, might be 
placed in other lights. 
Let us then suppose a man entirely cut ofl from all out- 
ward material impressions, or what is the same thing, with 
his senses entirely closed. It is very obvious, and the in- 
stances already brought forward clearly prove, that he would 
be entirely deprived of that vast amount of knowledge, which 
has an immediate connection with the senses. But this is 
not all; there are other ideas, whose connection with the 
senses is less immediate, of which he would not fail to be de- 
prived, by being placed in the circumstances supposed. Even 
if he should possess the idea of existence, and of himself, as 
a thinking and sentient being, (although we cannot well imag- 
ine how this should be, independently of some impression on 
the senses,) still we have no reason to believe that he would 
know any thing of space, of motion, of succession, of dura- 
tion, of the place of objects, of time, &c. 
Now it will be noticed, that these are elementary thoughts 
of great importance ; such as are rightly considered essential 
to the appropriate action of the mind, and to its advancement 
in knowledge. What could he know of time, without a knowl- 
edge of day and night, the rising and setting sun, the changes 
of the seasons, or some other of its measurements I What 
could he know of motion, while utterly unable to form the 
idea of place ! And what could he know of place without the 
aid of the senses ! And under such circumstances, what rea- 
soning would he be capable of, further than to form the sin- 
gle proposition, that his feelings, whatever they might be, 
belonged to himself! 
Look at the subject as we will, we must at last come to 
the conclusion, that the connection of the mind with the ma- 
terial world by means of the senses is the basis, to a great 
extent at least, of our early mental history, and the only key, IN GENERAL. 
75 
that can unlock its explanation. A sketch of that part of the 
mind's history, without a reference to its relation to matter, 
would infallibly be found vague, imperfect, and false. Let 
it suffice then to add here, that man is what he is in fact, 
and what he is designed to be in the present life, only by 
means of this connection. He cannot free himself from it, 
if he would ; and if he should succeed in the attempt, it 
would only result in self prostration and imbecility. The 
forms of matter, operating through the senses, press, as it 
were, on the soul's secret power of harmony, and it sends 
forth the answer of its thought and feeling. The material 
creation where Providence has fixed our dwelling place, and 
this earthly tenement of our bodies form the first scene of 
the mind's developement, the first theatre of its exercises, 
where it puts forth and enacts the incipient part in the great 
drama of its struggles, growth, and triumphs. 
CHAPTER SECOND. 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
In tracing1 the history of that portion of human thought, 
which is of external origin, we have frequent occasion to 
make use of the words Sensation and Perception. The term 
sensation is not of so general a nature as to include every 
variety of mental state, but is limited to such as answer to a 
particular description. It does not appear, that the usage of 
language would forbid our speaking of the feelings of warmth 
and coldness and hardness, as well as of the feelings of love 
and benevolence and anger, but it would clearly forbid our 
using the term sensation with an application equally exten- 
sive. Its application is not only limited, but is fixed with a 
considerable degree of precision. 
Sensation, being a simple act or state of the mind, is 
unsusceptible of definition ; and this is one of its character- 
§. 48. Sensation a simple mental state originating in the senses. 76 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
istics. As this alone, however, would not separate it from 
many other mental states, it has this peculiarity to distin- 
guish it, that it is immediately successive to a change in 
some organ of sense, or at least to a bodily change of some 
kind. But it is evident that in respect to numerous other 
feelings this statement does not hold good. They are imme- 
diately subsequent, not to bodily impressions, but to other 
states of the soul itself. Hence it is, that while we speak of 
the sensations of heat and cold, hardness, extension, and the 
like, we do not commonly apply this term to joy and sorrow, 
hatred and love, and other emotions and passions. 
§. 49. AH sensation is properly and truly in the mind. 
Sensation is often regarded as something having a posi- 
tion, and as taking place in the body, and particularly in the 
organ of sense. The sensation of touch, as we seem to im- 
agine, is in the hand, which is the organ of touch, and is not 
truly internal ; the hearing is in the ear, and the vision in 
the eye, and not in the soul. But it will at once occur, that 
this supposition, however widely and generally it may be 
made, is altogether at variance with those essential notions, 
which we have found it necessary to form of matter. If the 
matter of the hand, of the eye, or ear, can have feeling in 
any degree whatever, there is no difficulty in the supposition, 
that the matter of the brain, or any other material substance 
can put forth the exercises and functions of thought. But 
after what has been already said on the subject of the mind's 
immateriality, this supposition is altogether inadmissible. All 
we can say with truth and on good grounds is, that the or- 
gans of sense are accessory to sensation and necessary to it, 
but the sensation or feeling itself is wholly in the mind. How 
often it is said the eye sees ; but the proper language is the 
soul sees, for the eye is only the organ, instrument, or min- 
ister of the soul in visual perceptions. 
"A man, (says Dr. Reid,) cannot see the satellites of Ju- 
piter but by a telescope. Does he conclude from this, that 
it is the telescope, that sees those stars ? By no means ; 
such a conclusion would be absurd. It is no less absurd to 
conclude, that it is the eye that sees, or the ear that hears. 
The telescope is an artificial organ of sight, but it sees not. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
77 
The eye is a natural organ of sight, by which we see ; but 
the natural organ sees as little as the artificial." 
Among other things illustrative of the correctness of what 
has been said, there is this consideration also. The opinion, 
that sensation is in the organ or some1 other material part 
and not in the soul, is inconsistent with the fundamental and 
indisputable doctrine of mental identity. "When I say, I see, 
I hear, I feel, (says the same judicious author,) this implies, 
that it is one and the same self that performs all these oper- 
ations. And as it would be absurd to say that my memory, 
another man's imagination, and a third man's reason may 
make one individual intelligent being ; it would be equally 
absurd to say, that one piece of matter seeing, another hear- 
ing, and a third feeling, may make one and the same percip- 
ient being."* 
Although the opinion, that sensation is not in the mind 
but in the body, is unfounded, it is perhaps not surprising, 
that such a belief should have arisen. If the hand be pal- 
sied, there is no sensation of touch ; if the ear be stopped, 
there is no sensation of hearing ; if the eye be closed, there 
is no vision ; hence it happens that when we have these sen- 
sations, we are led to think of the organ or part of the bodily 
system, with the origin of which they are connected. When 
we feel a pain arising from an external cause, it is a natural, 
and often a useful curiosity, which endeavors to learn the 
particular place in the body which is affected. This, which 
we are generally able to ascertain, always arrests our atten- 
tion more or less. In this way we gradually form a very 
strong association ; and almost unconsciously transfer the 
place of the inward sensation to that outward part, with 
which we have so frequently connected it in our thoughts. 
Although this is clearly a mere fallacy, the circumstance of 
its being a plausible and tenacious one renders it the more 
necessary to guard against it. 
§. 50. Sensations are not images or resemblances of objects. 
But while we are careful to assign sensations their true 
place in the mind, and to look upon what is outward in the 
body as merely the antecedents or causes of them, it is a mat-> 
* Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay II. 78 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
ter of some consequence to guard against a danger directly 
the reverse of that which has been remarked on. We are 
apt to transfer to the sensation, considered as existing in the 
mind, some of those qualities which belong to the external 
object. But in point of fact our sensations are by no means 
copies, pictures, or images of outward objects ; nor are they 
representations of them in any material sense whatever ; nor 
do they possess any of their qualities. 
It is true, we often think it otherwise ; constantly occupi- 
ed with external objects, when in the act of contemplation 
we retire within the mind, we unwarily carry with us the 
form and qualities of matter, and stamp its likeness on the 
thought itself. But the thought, whatever it may by the 
constitution of our nature be the sign of, has no form, and 
presents no image analogous towhat are outwardly objects of 
touch and sight; nor has it form or image in any sense, which 
we can conceive of. When, therefore, we have an idea of 
some object as round, we are not to infer from the existence 
of the quality in the outward object, that the mental state 
is possessed of the same quality ; when we think of any 
thing as extended, it is not to be supposed, that the thought 
itself has extension ; when we behold and admire the varie- 
ties of color, we are not at liberty to indulge the presump- 
tion, that the inward feelings are painted over, and radiant 
with corresponding hues. There is nothing of the kind, and 
the admission of such a principle would lead to a multitude 
of errors. 
This subject is illustrated in the following manner by Dr. 
Reid, whom we have already had repeated occasion to refer 
to on the subject before us. "Pressing my hand with force 
against the table, I feel pain, and I feel the table to be hard. 
The pain is a sensation of the mind, and there is nothing that 
resembles it in the table. The hardness is in the table, nor 
is there any thing, resembling it in the mind. Feeling is ap- 
plied to both ; but in a different sense ; being a word com- 
mon to the act of sensation, and to that of perceiving by the 
sense of touch. 
"I touch the table gently with my hand, and I feel it to be 
smooth, hard, and cold. These are qualities of the table per- 
ceived by touch ; but I perceive them by means of a sensa- SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
79 
tion which indicates them. This sensation not being painful, 
I commonly give no attention to it. It carries my thought im- 
mediately to the thing signified by it, and is itself forgotten, 
as if it had never been. But by repeating it, and turning my 
attention to it, and abstracting my thought from the thing 
signified by it, I find it to be merely a sensation, and that it 
has no similitude to the hardness, smoothness, or coldness of 
the table which are signified by it. 
"It is indeed difficult, at first, to disjoin things in our atten- 
tion which have always been conjoined, and to make that an 
object of reflection which never was so before ; but some 
pains and practice will overcome this difficulty in those, who 
have got the habit of reflecting on the operations of their own 
minds."* 
§. 51. The connection between the mental and physical change not 
susceptible of explanation. 
External bodies operate on the senses, before there is any 
affection of the mind, but it is not easy to say what the precise 
character and extent of this operation is. We know, that 
some object capable of affecting the organ must be applied to 
it in some way either directly or indirectly, and it is a matter 
of knowledge also, that some change in the organ actually 
takes place ; but further than this, we are involved in uncer- 
tainty. All we can undertake to do at present is the mere 
statement of the facts, viz, the application of an external 
body, and some change in consequence of it in the organ of 
sense. 
Subsequently to the change in the organ, either at its ex- 
tremity and outward developement or in the brain, with which 
it is connected, and of which it may be considered as making 
a part, a change in the mind or a new state of the mind im- 
mediately takes place. Here also we are limited to the mere 
statement of the fact. We here touch upon one of those boun- 
daries of the intellect, which men are probably not destined 
to pass in the present life. We find ourselves unable to re- 
solve and explain the connection between mind and matter in 
this case as we do in all others. All we know, and all we can 
state with confidence is, that a mental affection is immediate- 
ly subsequent to an affection or change, which is physical. 
* Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay II. 80 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
Such is our nature, and such the appointment of Him who 
made it. 
§. 52. Of tho meaning and nature of perception 
We next come to the subject of perception, which is inti- 
mately connected with that of sensation. This term like 
many others admits of considerable latitude in its application. 
In common language we are not only said to have the power 
of perceiving outward objects, but also of perceiving the 
agreement or disagreement in the acts of the mind itself. 
Accordingly we perceive a tree in the forest or a ship at sea, 
and we also perceive that the whole is greater than a part, 
and that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
angles. But what we have to say here does not concern in- 
ternal perception, but merely that, which relates to objects 
exterior to the mind. 
Perception, using the term in its application to outward 
objects, differs from sensation, as a whole does from a part ; 
it embraces more. It may be defined, therefore, an affection 
or state of the mind, which is immediately successive to cer- 
tain affections of the organ of sense, and which is referred by 
us to something external as its cause. 
It will be recollected that the term sensation, when appli- 
ed to the mind, expresses merely the state of the mind with- 
out reference to any thing external, which might be the cause 
of it, and that it is the name of a truly simple feeling. Percep- 
tion on the contrary is the name of a complex mental state, 
including not merely the internal affection of the mind, but 
also a reference to the exterior cause. Sensation is wholly 
within ; but Perception carries us, as it were, out of ourselves, 
and makes us acquainted with the world around us. It is es- 
pecially by means of this last power, that material nature, in 
all its varieties of form and beauty, is brought within the 
range of our inspection. If we had but sensation alone, there 
would still be form and fragrance, and color, and harmony of 
sound, but it would seem to be wholly inward. The mind 
would then become not merely what Leibnitz supposed it to 
be, a mirror of the universe ; it would be to us the universe 
itself; we could know no otherworld, no other form of being. 
Perception prevents the possibility of such a mistake ; it un- 
deceives and dissipates the flattering notion, that all things are SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
81 
in the soul ; it leads us to other existences, and in particular 
to the knowledge of the vast and complicated fabric of the 
material creation. 
§. 53 Of the primary and secondary qualities of matter. 
From what has been said, it will be noticed, that sensa- 
tion implies the existence of an external material world as 
its cause, and that perception implies the same existence 
both as cause and object. As, therefore, the material world 
comes now so directly and closely under consideration, it 
seems proper briefly to advert to that subject. It is hardly 
necessary to say, that we are altogether ignorant of the sub- 
jective or real essence of matter. Our knowledge embraces 
merely its qualities or properties, and nothing more. With- 
out proposing to enter into a minute examination of them, it 
will be proper to recall to recollection here, that the quali- 
ties of material bodies have been ranked by writers under 
the two heads of Primary and Secondary. 
The PRiMaRY qualities are known by being essential to 
the existence of all bodies. They are extension, figure, di- 
visibility, and solidity ; and some writers have included mo- 
tion. They are called primary for the obvious reason, that 
all men embrace them in the notions which they form of 
matter, and that they are essential to its existence. All 
bodies have extension, all bodies have figure, all are capable 
of division, all possess the attribute of solidity. 
By solidity in bodies, (perhaps some would prefer the 
term resistance,) is to be understood that quality, by which 
a body hinders the approach of others, between which it is 
interposed. In this sense even water, and all other fluids 
are solid. If particles of water could be prevented from sep- 
arating, they would oppose so great resistance, that it would 
be impossible for any two bodies, between which they might 
be, to come in contact. This was shown in an experiment, 
which was once made at Florence. A quantity of water 
was enclosed in a gold ball, which on the most violent pres- 
sure could not be made to fill the internal cavity, until the 
water inside was forced through the pores. There is rea- 
son also for that part of the arrangement, which includes 
divisibility. We cannot conceive of a particle so small as 82 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
not to be susceptible of division. And to that small particle 
must belong not only divisibility, but the qualities of solidity, 
extension, and figure. 
§. 54. Of the secondary qualities of matter. 
The secondary qualities of bodies are of two kinds ; 
(1) Those, which have relation to the perceiving and sen- 
tient mind ; (2) Those, which have relation to other bodies. 
Under the first class are to be included sound, color, 
taste, smell, hardness and softness, heat and cold, roughness 
and smoothness, &c. When we say of a body it has sound, 
we imply in this remark, that it possesses qualities, which 
will cause certain effects in the mind; the term sound being 
applicable by the use of language both to the qualities of the 
external object, and to the effect produced within. When 
we say it has color, we always make a like reference to the 
mind, which beholds and contemplates it; and it is the same 
of the other secondary qualities of this description. 
The other class of secondary qualities, (or properties as 
they are not unfrequently termed,) those which have rela- 
tion to other material bodies, are exceedingly various and 
numerous. The material substance, which in relation to 
the mind possesses the qualities of sound and color, may pos- 
sess also in relation to other bodies the qualities or proper- 
ties of malleability, fusibility, solubility, permeability, and 
the like. 
§. 55. Of the nature of mental powers or faculties. 
We have spoken of Perception as a power of the mind, as 
well as a mental state or act. This two-fold use of the term 
is owing to the imperfection of language. The same term, 
at least in the English language, signifies both the result, and 
the corresponding power ; and oftentimes there is nothing 
but the connection to determine which is meant. But we 
have recurred to this subject here, merely for the purpose 
of suggesting the importance of keeping in recollection, that 
mental powers, (what are otherwise called faculties and not 
unfrequently susceptibilities,) are not distinct from the mind 
itself. They are only the ability of the mind to act in a par- 
ticular way. W'e apply the term also in other cases ; we 
speak of the power or faculty of the memory, of reasoning, SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
83 
of imagination, &c. Such expressions are found in all lan- 
guages, and cannot well be avoided. They are brief, and, 
on the whole, convenient representations of the various 
ways, in which the soul is capable of acting, or exerting 
itself. 
But while we keep in recollection, that powers or faculties 
are only the ability of the mind to act in a particular way, it 
is further to be noticed, that in many cases what are so cal- 
led are complex in their nature ; they are made up in their 
results of various simple feelings, and imply the exercise of 
more than one simple susceptibility. It is proper, therefore, 
to analyze them, and to become acquainted with their parts ; 
otherwise our notions will be confused, and often erroneous. 
Still we cannot wholly lay aside the expressions, which use 
and the wants of men have introduced; nor is this necessary, 
if we will but take the pains to explain the true nature of the 
operations, and of that ability of the mind, which they pro- 
fess to represent. If philosophers should undertake to intro- 
duce a whole new system of terms, (and the credit is due to 
Kant that there is not wanting a notable instance of this in 
modern times,) still it would be necessary to employ the old 
ones, in order to make them understood by mankind general- 
ly. As a general rule it is better to employ the common and 
acknowledged phraseology, only taking care to limit and ex- 
plain it so far as it may be Hable to misapprehension in con- 
sequence of a new and scientific application. " It looks too 
much like affectation, (says Locke, speaking of these forms 
of speech,) wholly to lay them by ; and philosophy itself, 
though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet when it appears in 
public, must have so much complacency, as to be clothed in 
the ordinary fashion and language of the qountry, so far as it 
can consist with truth and perspicuity." CHAPTER THIRD. 
THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 
§. 56. Nature and importance of the senses as a source of knowledge. 
It is desirable to keep clearly in the mind the precise re- 
lation of the senses to the origin, progress, and amount of 
our knowledge, and to possess if possible a correct under- 
standing of their true value. In a certain sense the posses- 
sion of the bodily organs, with which we are furnished, is 
not essential and pre-requisite to the possession of that 
knowledge, which we are accustomed to ascribe to them. 
There is nothing unwarrantable and unreasonable in the 
supposition, that the knowledge, which we now have by 
their means, might have been possessed without their aid, 
either immediately, or in some way altogether different. 
Their use and indispensableness in the acquisition of a cer- 
tain portion of what men are permitted to know, is a matter 
of arrangement and appointment on the part of our Maker. 
It is undoubtedly an evidence of the correctness of this re- 
mark, that the Supreme Being has a full acquaintance with 
all those outward, objects, which present themselves to our 
notice, without being indebted to any material instrumental- 
ity and mediation. He perceives in another way, or rather 
all knowledge is inherent in, and originally and unalterably 
essential to himself. 
It is not so, as we have reason to believe, with any other 
beings, and certainly not with man. Although a great part 
of his knowledge relates to material things, he is so formed, 
and his constitution is so ordered, that he is wholly depend- 
ent for it on the senses.-Deprive him of the ear, and all na- THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 
85 
ture becomes voiceless and silent ; deprive him of the eye, 
and the sun and moon withdraw their light, and the universe 
becomes darkened like sackcloth; deprive him of the sense 
of touch, and he is then entirely insulated, and as much cut 
off'from all communication with others, as if he were the on- 
ly being in existence. 
§. 57. Of the connection of the brain with sensation and perception. 
It may perhaps be asked, Whether these views are intend- 
ed to exclude the brain, as having a connection with the sen- 
ses in the results, which are here ascribed to them ? And 
this inquiry leads us to observe, (what has been before allu- 
ded to,) that the brain is a prominent organ in the material 
part of the process of sensation and of external perception. 
The senses evidently cannot be separated from the nervous 
system. But the substance, which is found in the nerves, 
excepting the coat in which it is enveloped, is the same as in 
the brain, being of the same soft and fibrous texture, and in 
continuity with it. As a general statement, when the brain 
has been in any way injured, the inward sensation, which 
would otherwise be distinct on the presentation of an exter- 
nal body, is imperfect. Also if the nerve be injured, or if its 
continuity be disturbed by the pressure of a tight ligature, 
the effect is the same ; a circumstance which goes to confirm 
the alleged identity of substance in the two. 
The brain, therefore, and whatever of the same substance 
is in continuity withit, particularly the nerves, constitute the 
sensorial organ, which, in the subordinate organs of taste, smell, 
sight, touch, and hearing, presents itself under different mod- 
ifications to external objects. On this organ, the sensorial, as 
thus explained, an impression must be made, before there can 
be sensation and perception. 
An impression, for instance, is made on that part of the 
sensorial organ called the auditory nerve, and a state of mind 
immediately succeeds, which is variously termed, according 
to the view in which it is contemplated, either the sensation, 
or the perception of sound. An impression is made by the 
rays of light on that expansion of the optic nerve, which forms 
what is called the retina of the eye, and the intellectual 
principle is immediately brought into that new position, which 86 
THE SENSES OF 
is termed visual perception or a perception of sight. The 
hand is impressed on a body of an uneven and rough surface, 
and immediately consequent on this application and pressure, 
is that state of mind, which is termed a sensation or percep- 
tion of roughness. 
§. 58. Order in which the senses are to be considered 
In considering those ideas, which we become possessed of 
by means of the senses, it is natural to begin with that sense, 
which will cause us the least difficulty in the analysis of its 
results, and to proceed to others successively, as we find 
them increasing in importance. It may not be altogether 
easy to apply this principle with strictness, but it will answer 
all the purpose, for which it is here introduced, if we consid- 
er the senses in the following order, the smell, taste, hearing, 
touch, and sight. 
The mind holds a communication with the material world 
by means of the sense of smelling. All animal and vegetable 
bodies, (and the same will probably hold good of other bodies, 
though generally in a less degree,) are continually sending 
out effluvia of great subtility. These small particles are rap- 
idly and widely scattered abroad in the neighborhood of the 
body from which they proceed. No percipient being can 
come within the circumference occupied by these continually 
moving and volatile atoms, without experiencing effects from 
it. 
§. 59. Of the sense and sensation of smell. 
The medium, through which we have the sensations and 
perceptions of smell, is the organ, which is termed the olfac- 
tory nerve, situated principally in the nostrils, but partly in 
some continuous cavities. When any odoriferous particles, 
sent from external objects, affect this organ, there is a certain 
state of mind produced, which varies with the nature of the 
odoriferous bodies. But we can no more infer from the sen- 
sation itself merely, that there exists any necessary connec- 
tion between the smell and the external objects, than that 
there exists a connection between the emotions of joy and 
sorrow and the same objects. It might indeed be suggested 
to us by the change in our mental states, that there must be 
some cause or antecedent to the change, but this suggestion SMELL AND TASTE. 
87 
would be far from implying the necessity of a corporeal cause. 
How then does it happen, that we are not merely sensible 
of the particular sensation, but refer it at once to some exter- 
nal object, to the rose or the honeysuckle ? In answer it may 
be remarked, if we had always been destitute of the senses 
of sight and touch, this reference never could have been 
made, but having been furnished with them by the beneficent 
Author of our being, we make this reference by experience. 
When we have seen the rose, when we have been near to it 
and handled it, we have uniformly been conscious of that state 
of mind, which we term a sensation of smell. When we have 
come into the neighborhood of the honeysuckle, or when it 
has been gathered and presented to us, we have been remind- 
ed of its fragrance. And thus, having learnt by experience, 
that the presence of the odoriferous body is always attended 
with the sensations of smell, we form the habit of attributing 
the sensations to that body as their cause. 
§. 60. Of perceptions of smell in distinction from sensations. 
The mental reference, spoken of in the last section, is 
made with almost as much promptness, as if it were necessa- 
rily involved in the sensation itself. It is at least so rapid, 
that we find ourselves utterly unable to mark the mind's pro- 
gress from the inward feeling to the conception of the out- 
ward cause. Nor is this inability surprising, when we con- 
sider, that we have repeated this process, both in this and in 
analogous cases, from our earliest childhood. No object has 
ever been present to us, capable of operating on the senses, 
where this process has not been gone through. The result 
of this long-continued and frequent repetition has been an 
astonishing quickness in the mental action ; so much so that 
the mind leaps outward with the rapidity of lightning, to be 
present with, and to comprehend the causes of the feeling 
within. 
This view, it will be seen, helps in illustrating the nature 
of perception, as distinguished from sensation. The outlines 
of that distinction have been already given ; and every one 
of the senses, as well as that now under consideration, will 
furnish proofs and illustrations of it. Accordingly when we 
are said to perceive the smell, or to have perceptions of the 88 
THE SENSES OF 
smell of a body, the rapid process, which has been described, 
is gone through, and the three things, which were involved 
in the definition of Perception already given, are supposed 
to exist ; (1) The presence of the odoriferous body and the 
affection of its appropriate organ ; (2) The change or sensa- 
tion in the mind; and (3) The reference of the sensation to 
the external body as its cause. 
§. 61. Of the sense and the sensation of taste. 
The tongue which is covered with numerous nervous 
papillae, forms essentially the organ of taste ; although the 
papillae are found scattered in other parts of the cavity of the 
mouth. The application of any sapid body to this organ im- 
mediately causes in it a change or affection ; and this is at 
once followed by a mental affection or a new state of the mind. 
In this way we have the sensations and perceptions, to which 
we give the names, sweet, bitter, sour, acrid, &c. 
Having experienced the inward sensation, the affections 
of the mind are then referred by us to something external as 
their cause. We do not however always, nor even generally 
distinguish the qualities, which constitute this cause, by sep- 
arate and appropriate designations ; but express them by the 
names, that are employed for the internal feeling, viz, sweet- 
ness, bitterness, sourness, &c. This reference of what is in- 
ternally experienced to its external cause, is very rapidly 
made ; so that we at once say of one apple it is sweet, and 
of another it is sour. Still it is to be kept in mind, that, in 
point of fact, it is subsequent, both in the order of nature 
and of time, to the mere sensation ; although we may not be 
able, in consequence of its rapidity, to mark distinctly the 
progress of the mental action from the one to the other. As 
in the case of smells, which have already been remarked 
upon, the reference is the result of our former experience. 
We say of one body, it is sweet, and of another, it is sour, 
because we have ever observed, that the mental states, in- 
dicated by those terms, have always existed in connection 
with the presence of those bodies. 
Whenever, therefore, we say of any bodies, that they are 
sweet, bitter, sour, or apply any other epithets, expressive 
of sapid qualities, we mean to be understood to say, that SMELL AM* TASTE. 
89 
such bodies are fitted in the constitution of things to cause in 
the mind the sensations of sweetness, bitterness, and sour- 
ness, or other sensations, expressed by denominations of taste. 
Or, in other words, that they are the established antecedents 
of such mental states, as there is, further than this, no ne- 
cessary connection between them. 
§. 62. Design and uses of the senses of smell and taste. 
It is not unprofitable to delay oftentimes, and contemplate 
the designs and uses, which nature has in view in her works* 
Although the sense of smell may appear, (and perhaps with 
sufficient reason,) to be of less importance, than the other 
senses, and other parts of the animal economy, it is not with- 
out its ends. There is evidently design in the position of the 
organ in reference to the effluvia, which are the direct sub- 
jects of its action, it being placed in the inside of a canal, 
where the air is continually forced in and out with every 
breath we draw. The organ is precisely adapted, both in 
its nature and its place, to its appointed medium of commu- 
nication with other bodies ; nor is this the only mark of design 
attending it. This sense is frequently a source of gratifica- 
tion ; and although it is less keen and powerful in men than 
in many inferior animals, it still has power enough to afford 
much assistance in this respect, that it often warns us of the 
presence of objects, which experience has found to be injuri- 
ous to us. The remark has been justly made, that the senses 
both of taste and smell are of great use in distinguishing bod- 
ies that cannot be distinguished by our other senses. They 
are peculiarly quick and exact in their judgments, especially 
in discerning, before we can ascertain it in any other way, 
the beginni ng and progress of those changes, which all bodies 
are constantly undergoing. 
But in both of these senses design and utility are discov- 
erable in reference to food in particular. While the sense of 
smell guards the entrance of the canal for breathing, the 
sense of taste has its station at the entrance of the alimentary 
canal. Hence the food, which we consume, undergoes the 
scrutiny of both ; an intentional and benevolent provision for 
protecting men and the animal creation generally against the 
introduction of what would be noxious to them. CHAPTER FOURTH- 
THE SENSE OF HEARING 
§. 63. Organ of the sense of hearing. 
Following the order which has been proposedy we are 
next to consider the sense of hearing. And in proceeding to 
the consideration of this subject, the remark is a very obvious 
one, that we should be unable to hear, if we had not a sense 
designed for and appropriate to that result. The air, when 
put strongly in motion, is distinctly perceived by the touch ; 
but no impression which it could make on that sense, would 
cause that internal feeling, which is termed a sensation of 
sound. Our Creator, therefore, has taken care, that these sen- 
sations shall have their own organ ; and it is obviously one of 
precise and elaborate workmanship. The ear is designedly 
planted in a position, where with the greatest ease it takes- 
cognizance of whatever is going on in the contiguous atmos- 
phere. When we examine it externally, we not only find it 
thus favorably situated, but presenting a hollowed and capa- 
cious surface, so formed as to grasp and gather in the undu- 
lations of air, continually floating and in motion around it. 
Without, however, delaying to give a minute description of 
the internal construction of the ear, which belongs rather to 
the physiologist, it will answer our present purpose merely to 
add, that these undulations are conducted by it through vari- 
ous windings, till they are brought in a state of concentration, 
as it were, against the membrane, called the tympanum. It 
is worthy of notice, that on the internal surface of this mem- 
brane, (the drum as it is popularly called,) there is a nerve 
spread out in a manner analogous to the expansion of the op- THE SENSE OF HEARING. 
91 
tic nerve at the bottom of the eye. Whether this nervous 
expansion be indispensably necessary to the result or not, it 
is certain that a pressure upon or affection of the tympanum 
by the external air is followed by a new state of the mind, 
known as the sensation or perception of sound. 
§. 64. Nature of sonorous bodies and the medium of the communication 
of sound. 
When we leave the bodily organ, and looking outward in- 
quire still further for the origin of the sensations, which we 
have by means of the ear, we find them attributable ultimate- 
ly to the presence and influence of the substances around us. 
Those undulations of air, which impinge upon the tympanum, 
and without which there is no sensation of sound, are caused 
by the vibrations or oscillations of the particles of certain 
bodies. The material substances, which have this quality are 
termed sonorous, as wood, brass, iron, &c ; but it exists in 
different bodies, in very various degrees. 
The quality of sonorousness, therefore, in any substance 
is properly a susceptibility of motion among its own parts. 
When it is forcibly struck, this motion exists first in itself, 
and is afterwards communicated to the circumambient air. 
The movement of the air, which is thus caused, is again com- 
municated, like the concentric waves of water agitated by a 
stone thrown into it, to other portions successively, till it 
reaches the ear. 
The air accordingly is the medium of communication be- 
tween the sonorous body, and the tympanum of the ear. It 
is true, that many solid bodies are good conductors of sound 
as well as the atmosphere ; but as portions of air, through 
which the vibratory motion must of course pass, are in all 
cases interposed between that organ and the sounding body, 
it is not necessary to dwell upon them here. It is sufficient 
for our present purpose merely to understand, that there is in 
every sounding body in the first place a vibratory motion 
among its own particles from some cause or other ; that this 
vibration or undulation is communicated from the sounding 
body to the air and from one portion of air to another, till it 
reaches the organ of hearing. Why the internal sensation 
should at once follow the completion of this process is another 92 
THE SENSE OF HEARING. 
inquiry, which we do not undertake to explain. We have be- 
fore us the antecedent and the consequent, the affection of 
the organ of hearing by an outward impulse, and the new 
mental state within ; but the reason of this invariable con- 
nection in two things, that are entirely distinct and different, 
is a matter beyond our limited comprehension. 
§. 65. Varieties of the sensation of sound. 
The sensations, which we thus become possessed of by the 
hearing, are far more numerous than the words and the forms 
of speech, having relation to them in different languages, 
would lead us to suppose. It will help to illustrate this sub- 
ject, if we recur a moment to the sense of taste. The re- 
mark has somewhere been made to this effect, and probably 
with much truth, that if a person were to examine five hun- 
dred different wines, he would hardly find two of them of pre- 
cisely the same flavor. The diversity is almost endless, al- 
though there is no language, which distinguishes each variety 
of taste by a separate name. It is the same in respect to the 
sensations of sound. These sensations exhibit the greatest 
variety, although the differences are too minute to be separ- 
ately and distinctly represented by language. 
These views will appear the less objectionable, when it is 
remembered, that sounds differ from each other both in the 
tone, and in the strength of the tone. It is remarked by Dr. 
Reid, that five hundred variations of tone may be perceived 
by the ear, also an equal number of variations in the strength 
of the tone ; making, as he expressly informs us, by a combi- 
nation of the tones and of the degrees of strength, more than 
twenty thousand simple sounds, differing either in tone or 
strength. 
In 31 perfect tone, a great many undulations of elastic air are 
required, which must be of equal duration and extent, and 
follow each other with perfect regularity. Each undulation is 
made up of the advance and retreat of innumerable particles, 
whose motions are all uniform in direction, force, and time. 
Accordingly there will be varieties also and shades of differ- 
.ence in the same tone, arising from the position and manner 
of striking the sonorous body, from the constitution of the 
elastic medium, and from the state of the orga.n of hearing. THE SENSE OF HEARING. 
93 
Different instruments, such as a flute, a violin, and a bass- 
viol may all sound the same tone, and yet be easily distin- 
guishable. A considerable number of human voices may 
sound the same note, and with equal strength, and yet there 
will be some difference. The same voice, while it maintains 
the proper distinctions of sound, may yet be varied many 
ways by sickness or health, youth or age, and other altera- 
tions in our bodily condition, to which we are incident. 
§. 66. Manner in which we learn the place of sounds. 
It is a fact worthy of notice in respect to sounds, that we 
should not know, previous to all experience on the subject, 
whether a sound came from the right or left, from above or 
below, from a smaller or a greater distance. And this will 
appear the less surprising, when we remember that the un- 
dulations of air are always changed from their original direc- 
tion by the channels and the windings of the ear, before they 
strike the tympanum. Abundant facts confirm this state- 
ment. 
Dr. Reid mentions, that once, as he was lying in bed, hav- 
ing been put into a fright, he heard his own heart beat. He 
took it to be some one knocking at the door, and arose, and 
opened the door oftenerthan once before he discovered, that 
the sound was in his own breast. Some traveller has relat- 
ed, that when he first heard the roaring of a lion in a desert 
wilderness, not seeing the animal, he did not know on what 
side to apprehend danger, as the sound seemed to him to pro- 
ceed from the ground, and to enclose a circle, of which he 
and his companions stood in the centre. 
It is by custom or experience, that we learn to distinguish 
the place of things, and, in some measure also, their nature, 
by means of their sound. It is thus that we learn, that one 
noise is in a contiguous room, that another is above our heads, 
and another is in the street. And what seems to be an evi- 
dence of this is, that when we are in a strange place, after 
all our experience, we very frequently find ourselves mistak- 
en in these respects. 
If a man born deaf were suddenly made to hear, he would 
probably consider his first sensations of sound, as originating 
wholly within himself. But in process of time we learn not 94 
THE SENSE OF HEARING. 
only to refer the origin of sounds to aposition above or below, 
to the right or left; but to connect each particular sound 
with a particular external cause, referringone to a bell as its 
appropriate external cause, another to a flute, another to a 
trumpet. 
We are naturally led to make a few remarks here in ex- 
planation of ventriloquism, a well known art, by which per- 
sons can so modify their voice, as to make it appear to their 
audience to proceed from different objects, distances, and di- 
rections. There is no peculiarity of structure in ventriloquists, 
as is often supposed ; except that the capacity of the chest 
and the lungs is sometimes found to be greater than usual. 
It is also true, that the power and activity of the muscles, 
connected with the organs of speech and with the chest and 
lungs, is considerably increased by frequent exercise. Nev- 
ertheless the great natural requisite on the part of the ven- 
triloquist is to be able to mimic sounds ; and he will be like- 
ly to succeed nearly in proportion to his skill in this particu- 
lar. The secret then of his acoustic deceptions, supposing 
him to be capable of exact imitation, will be sufficiently un- 
derstood by referring to the statement maintained in the pre- 
ceding section, viz. That, previous to experience, we are un- 
able to refer sounds to any particular external cause. 
The sound itself never gives us any direct and immediate 
indication of the place, or distance, or direction of the sonorous 
body. It is only by experience, it is only by the association 
of place with sound, that the latter becomes an indication of 
the former. Now supposing the ventriloquist to possess a 
delicate ear, which is implied in his ability to mimic sounds, 
he soon learns by careful observation the difference, which 
change of place causes in the same sound. Having in this 
way ascertained the particular modulation of sound, which, 
in accordance with the experience of men and the associations 
they have formed, are appropriate to any particular distan- 
ces, direction, or object, it is evident, whenever he exactly 
or very nearly imitates such modulations, that the sounds 
must appear to his audience to come from such distance, ob- 
ject, or direction. 
One part of the art, however, consists in controlling the 
§. 67. Application of these views to the art of ventriloquism. THE SENSE OF HEARING. 
95 
attention of persons present, and in directing that attention 
to some particular place by a remark, motion, or some other 
method. If, for instance, the sound is to come from under 
a tumbler or hat, the performer finds it important to have 
their attention directed to that particular object, which af- 
fords an opportunity for the exercise of all those associations, 
which they have formed with any sound coming from a very 
confined place. All, then, that remains for him to do, is, to 
give his voice a dull modulation and on a low key, which we 
know from our experience to be the character of confined 
sounds. Then there seems to be a voice speaking under a 
tumbler or hat ; and if any person should, either intentional- 
ly or unintentionally, lift these articles up, the ventriloquist 
immediately utters himself more distinctly and freely, like a 
person who had been very much confined, on being readmit- 
ted into the free and open air. It is also necessary, when 
his face is towards his auditors, that he should make use 
•chiefly of the muscles of his throat; an outward and visible 
moving of the lips would much weaken the deception. 
§. 68. Uses of hearing and its connection with oral language. 
Although, as in the cases just mentioned, the artifices of 
men may sometimes impose upon this organ and lead its de- 
cisions astray, it is one, in the ordinary calls for its exercise* 
of exceeding value. One of the distinguished benefits of the 
sense of hearing is, that, in consequence of it, we are ena- 
bled to hold intercourse with each other by means of spoken 
language, without which the advancement of the human 
mind must have inevitably been very limited. It is by 
means of speech, that we express our feelings to the little 
company of our neighbors and our own family ; and with- 
out it this pleasant and cheering intercourse must be almost 
entirely suspended. Not limited in its beneficial results to 
families and neighborhoods, it has been the medium of the 
transmission of thought from age to age, from generation to 
generation. So that in one age has been concentrated the 
result of all the researches, the combination of the wisdom 
of all the preceding. * 
"There is without all doubt," it has been observed, "a 
chain of the thoughts of human kind, from the origin of the 96 
THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
world down to the moment at which we exist, a chain not 
less universal than that of the generation of every being, 
that lives. Ages have exerted their influence on ages ; na- 
tions on nations ; truths on errors ; errors on truths." 
Whether oral language was an original invention of man, 
or whether in the first instance it was a power bestowed up- 
on him by his Creator and coeval with the human race, the 
ear must in either case have been the primary recipient.- 
The faculty of speech so necessary and so beneficial could 
not have existed, either by invention or by communication, 
without the sense of hearing. And hence it happens, that 
all those, who are born deaf, are without speech. Their in- 
ability to speak is not in general the result of a defect in the 
organs of speech, but because they cannot hear others, and 
thus imitate the sounds they utter. 
CHAPTER FIFTH. 
THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
§. 69. Of the sense of touch and its sensations in general. 
We are next to consider the sense of touch. The prin- 
cipal organ of this sense is the hand, although it is not limit- 
ed to that part of our frame, but is diffused over the whole 
body. The hand principally arrests our attention as the or- 
gan of this sense, because being furnished with various ar- 
ticulations, it is easily movable by the muscles, and can 
readily adapt itself to the various changes of form in the ob- 
jects, to which it is applied. 
The senses, which have hitherto been examined, arc 
more simple and uniform in their results than that of the 
touch. By the ear we merely possess that sensation, which 
we denominate hearing ; we have the knowledge of sounds, 
and that is all. By the palate we acquire a knowledge of 
tastes, and by the sense of smelling we become acquainted 
with the odors of bodies. The knowledge, which is direct- THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
97 
ly acquired by all these senses, is limited to the qualities, 
which have been mentioned. By the sense of touch, on the 
contrary, we become acquainted not with one merely, but 
with a variety of qualities or attributes, such as the following, 
heat and cold, hardness and softness, roughness and smooth- 
ness, resistance, extension, and figure ; and in particular, it is 
in the applications of this sense, that we find an occasion fur- 
nished for the origin of the antecedent and more general no- 
tion of externality. 
§. 70. Idea of externality suggested in connection with the touch 
If man were possessed of the sense of smell alone, it would 
be found, that the earliestelements of his knowledge consist- 
ed exclusively in sensations of odors. According however as 
these sensations were agreeable or disagreeable, he would 
acquire the additional ideas of pleasure and pain. And hav- 
ing experienced pleasure and pain, we may suppose, that this 
would subsequently give rise both to the feelings and the ab- 
stract conceptions of desire and aversion. But if he had no 
other sense, all these feelings would seem to him to be inter- 
nal, not only in their experience but their origin ; in other 
words, to be mere emanations from the soul itself; and he 
would be incapable of referring them to an external cause.- 
If he were possessed of the sense of hearing alone, the result 
would be similar ; his existence would then seem to consist es- 
sentially of sounds, as in the other case it would be made up 
of odors ; nor indeed by the aid of merely both these senses 
combined, would he be able to form an idea of externality or 
outness. 
But this idea is a most important one ; it is the connecting 
thought, which introduces us to an acquaintance with a new 
form of existence, different from that interior existence, which 
we variously call by the names, spirit, mind, or soul. This 
idea first arises in the mind, although it is not directly ad- 
dressed to that sense, by means of the touch. 
There is no question, that the other senses might of them- 
selves furnish a basis of considerable extent for the mental 
action. By means of their aid alone such a developemeut of 
the mind might take place, that we could perceive, think, 
compare, abstract, reason, and will. And, although under 98 
THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
such circumstances, every thing would seem to us to be inter- 
nal, yet we should probably find the mental action unembar- 
rassed and easy, and a source of pleasure. But after a time 
we decide to move the limbs in a particular direction, and to 
press the hand or some other part of the body through some 
hard and resisting substance. It is when we attempt to do 
any thing of this kind, which calls the sense of touch into ac- 
tion, that we find the wonted series of thoughts disturbed, 
the desire checked, and the volition counteracted. It is prob- 
ably at this precise position of the mind, with scarcely the in- 
terval of a momentary pause of wonder, that there arises viv- 
idly in the soul a new perception, a new thought, which we 
call the idea of externality or outness. It is the sense of 
touch which impinges upon the obstacle that stands in our 
way ; and no other sense admits of this peculiar application. 
It is thus the means of partially disturbing the previous con- 
nection and tendency of thought, and of giving occasion for the 
rise of the new idea, which is under consideration. And this 
idea, called into existence under these circumstances, be- 
comes associated with all those notions, which we subsequent- 
ly form of matter. It may be of some importance to add 
here, that we shall have occasion to refer to this idea airain 
under the head of Original Suggestion. It is to be remem- 
bered, that externality is not a direct object of the touch, as 
extension and hardness are, butthat the tactual sense simply 
furnishes the occasion, on which it is formed. 
§.71. Origin of the notion of extension, and of form or figure. 
The idea of extension has its origin by means of the sense 
of touch. When the touch is applied to bodies, where in the 
intermediate parts there is a continuity of the same substance, 
we necessarily form that notion. It is not however to be im- 
agined, that Extension, as it exists outwardly, and the corres- 
ponding notion in the mind actually resemble each other. So 
far from any imitation and copying from one to the other, or 
resemblance in any way, there is a radical and utter diversi- 
ty. As to outward, material extension, it is not necessary to 
attend to it here ; our business at present is with the corres- 
ponding inward feeling. Nor will it be necessary to delay 
even upon that ; the more we multiply words upon it, the THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
99 
more obscure it becomes. As it is a simple idea we cannot 
resolve it into others, and in that way make it clearer by de- 
fining it. We must refer in this case, as in others like it, to 
each one's personal experience. It will be better understood 
in that way, than by any form of words. 
The notion of extension is intimately connected with, and 
may be considered in some sort the foundation of that of the 
form or figure of bodies. Dr. Brown somewhere calls the 
Form of bodies their relation to each other in space. This is 
thought to afford matter for reflection, but when we consider 
that space, whatever it may be objectively or outwardly, ex- 
ists in the mind as a simple notion, and that the particular re- 
lation here spoken of is not pointed out, the remark may not 
be found to throw much light on the subject. Still we do not 
suppose, that any one is ignorant of what form is ; men must 
be supposed to know that, if they are thought to know any 
thing. All that is meant to be asserted here is, that the idea 
of extension is antecedent, in the order of nature, to that of 
form ; and that the latter could not exist without the other ; 
but that both nevertheless are simple, and both arc to be as- 
cribed to the sense of touch. 
§. 72. On the sensations of heat and cold. 
Among the states of mind, which are usually classed with 
the intimations of the sense under consideration, are those, 
which are connected with changes in the temperature of our 
bodies. Some writers, it is true, have been inclined to dis- 
sent from this arrangement, and have hazarded an opinion, 
that they ought not to be ascribed to the sense oftouch ; but 
Dr. Reid on the contrary, who gave to our sensations the 
most careful and patient attention, has decidedly assigned to 
them this origin. Among other remarks he has expressed 
himself on this subject to this effect. 
"The words heat and cold, (he remarks, Inquiry into 
the Human Mind, Chap. V,) have each of them two significa- 
tions ; they sometimes signify certain sensations of the mind, 
which can have no existence when they are not felt, nor can 
exist any where but in the mind or sentient being ; but more 
frequently they signify a quality in bodies, which, by the 
laws of nature, occasions the sensations of heat and cold in 100 
us; a qualily, which, though connected by custom so closely 
with the sensation, that we cannot without difficulty separate 
them; yet hath not the least resemblance to it, and may con- 
tinue to exist when there is no sensation at all. 
"The sensations of heat and cold are perfectly known, 
for they neither are, nor can be, any thing else than what we 
feel them to be ; but the qualities in bodies, which we call 
heal and cold are unknown. They are only conceived by us, 
as unknown causes or occasions of the sensations, to which 
we give the same names. But though common sense says 
nothing of the nature of the qualities, it plainly dictates the 
existence of them ; and to deny that there can be heat and 
cold when they are not felt, is an absurdity too gross to merit 
confutation. For what could be more absurd, than to say, 
that the thermometer cannot rise or fall, unless some person 
be present, or that the coast of Guinea would be as cold as 
Nova Zembla, if it had no inhabitants. 
" It is the business of philosophers to investigate by prop- 
er experiments and induction, what heat and cold are in bod- 
ies. And whether they make heat a particular element dif- 
fused through nature, and accumulated in the heated body, 
or whether they make it a certain vibration of the parts of 
the heated body ; whether they determine that heat and 
cold are contrary qualities, as the sensations undoubtedly are 
contrary, or that heat only is a quality, and cold its privation ; 
these questions are within the province of philosophy ; for 
common sense says nothing on the one side or the other. 
" But whatever be the nature of that quality in bodies 
which we call heat, we certainly know this, that it cannot in 
the least resemble the sensation of heat. It is no less absurd 
to suppose a likeness between the sensation and the quality, 
than it would be to suppose, that the pain of the gout resem- 
bles a square or a triangle. The simplest man, that hath 
common sense, does not imagine the sensation of heat, or any 
thing that resembles that sensation, to be in the fire. He on- 
ly imagines, that there is something in the fire, which makes 
him and other sentient beings feel heat. Yet as the name of 
heat, in common language, more frequently and more proper- 
ly signifies this unknown something in the fire, than the sen- 
sation occasioned by it, he justly laughs at the philosopher, 
THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 101 
THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
who denies that there is any heat in the fire, and thinks that 
he speaks contrary to common sense." 
§. 73. On the sensation of hardness and softness. 
"Let us next consider, (continues the same writer,) hard- 
ness and softness ; by which words we always understand 
real properties or qualities of bodies, of which we have a dis- 
tinct conception. 
"When the parts of a body adhere so firmly that it cannot 
easily be made to change its figure, we call it hard ; when 
its parts are easily displaced, we call it soft. This is the no- 
tion which all mankind have of hardness and softness : they 
are neither sensations, nor like any sensation ; they were 
real qualities before they were perceived by touch, and con- 
tinue to be so when they are not perceived : for if any man 
will affirm that diamonds were not hard till they were hand- 
led, who would reason with him ? 
"There is, no doubt, a sensation by which we perceive a 
body to be hard or soft. This sensation of hardness may 
easily be had, by pressing one's hand against a table, and 
attending to the feeling that ensues, setting aside, as much 
as possible, all thought of the table and its qualities, or of 
any external thing. But it is one thing to have the sensa- 
tion, and another to attend to it and make it a distinct ob- 
ject of reflection. The first is very easy ; the last, in most 
cases, extremely difficult. 
"W'eare so accustomed to use the sensation as a sign, 
and to pass immediately to the hardness signified, that, as 
far as appears, it was never made an object of thought, 
either by the vulgar, or by philosophers ; nor has it a name 
in any language. There is no sensation more distinct, or 
more frequent; yet it is never attended to, but passes through 
the mind instantaneously, and serves only to introduce that 
quality in bodies, which, by a law of our constitution, it sug- 
gests. 
There are indeed some cases, wherein it is no difficult mat- 
ter to attend to the sensation occasioned by the hardness of 
a body ; for instance, when it is so violent as to occasion con- 
siderable pain : then nature calls upon us to attend to it ; and 
then we acknowledge that it is a mere sensation, and can 102 
THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
only be in a sentient being-. If a man runs his head with vi- 
olence against a pillar, I appeal to him whether the pain he 
feels resembles the hardness of the stone ; or if he can con- 
ceive any thing like what he feels to be in an inanimate 
piece of matter. 
"The attention of the mind is here entirely turned toward 
the painful feeling ; and, to speak in the common language 
of mankind, he feels nothing in the stone, but feels a violent 
pain in his head. It is quite otherwise when he leans his 
head gently against the pillar ; for then he will tell you that 
he feels nothing in his head, but feels hardness in the stone. 
Hath he not a sensation in this case as well as in the other ? 
Undoubtedly he hath ; but it is a sensation which nature 
intended only as a sign of something in the stone ; and, ac- 
cordingly, he instantly fixes his attention upon the thing sig- 
nified ; and cannot, without great difficulty, attend so much 
to the sensation as to be persuaded that there is any such 
thing distinct from the hardness it signifies. 
"But however difficult it may be to attend to this fugitive 
sensation, to stop its rapid progress, and to disjoin it from 
the external quality of hardness, in whose shadow it is apt 
immediately to hide itself; this is what a philosopher by 
pains and practice must attain, otherwise it will be impossi- 
ble for him to reason justly upon this subject, or even to un- 
derstand what is here advanced. For the last appeal, in 
subjects of this nature, must be to what a man feels and per- 
ceives in his own mind." 
§. 74. Of certain indefinite feelings sometimes ascribed to the touch. 
In connection with these views on the sensations of touch, 
it is proper to remark, that certain feelings have been ascrib- 
ed to that sense, which are probably of a character too inde- 
finite to admit of a positive and undoubted classification. 
Although they clearly have their place in the general ar- 
rangement which has been laid down, with the states of mind 
which we are now considering; that is to say, are rather of 
an external and material, than of an internal origin ; still 
they do not so evidently admit of an assignment to a particu- 
lar sense. Those sensations to which we now refer, (if it 
be proper to use that term in application to them,) appear THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
103 
to have their origin in the human system considered as a 
whole, made up of bones, flesh, muscles, the senses, &c. 
rather than to be susceptible of being traced to any particular 
part. Of this description are the feelings expressed by the 
terms, uneasiness, weariness, weakness, sickness, and those 
of an opposite character, as ease, hilarity, health, vigor, &c. 
Similar views will be found to apply, in part at least, to 
the sensations, which we express by the terms hunger and 
thirst. These appear to be complex in their nature, includ- 
ing a feeling of uneasiness, combined with a desire to relieve 
that uneasiness. When we say that these views will apply 
in part to hunger and thirst, the design is to limit the appli- 
cation of them to the element of uneasiness. This elementary 
feeling undoubtedly has its origin in the bodily system, and 
therefore comes in this case under the general class of no- 
tions of an external origin ; but still it is not easy to say, 
that it should be arranged with our tactual feelings, which 
has sometimes been done. Every one must be conscious, it 
is thought, that the feeling of hunger does not greatly resem- 
ble the sensations of hardness and softness, roughness or 
smoothness or other sensations, which are usually ascribed 
to the touch. The cause of that peculiar state of the 
nerves of the stomach, which is antecedent to the uneasy 
feeling, involved in what is termed hunger, has been a sub- 
ject of difference of opinion, and does not appear to be well 
understood. If we were fully acquainted with this, we might 
perhaps be less at a loss where to arrange the feeling in 
question. 
§. 75. Relation between the sensation and what is outwardly signified. 
We here return a moment to the subject of the relation 
between the internal sensation and the outward object; and 
again repeat, that the mental state and the corresponding out- 
ward object are altogether diverse. This view holds good 
in the case of the secondary, as well as of the primary quali- 
ties of matter. Whether we speak of extension, or resist- 
ance, or heat, or color, or roughness, there are, in all cases 
alike, two things, the internal affection and the outward 
quality ; but they are utterly distinct, totally without like- 
ness to each other. But how it happens that one thing, 
which is totally different from another, can nevertheless 
give us a knowledge of that, from which it differs, it would 104 
THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 
be a waste of time to attempt to explain. Our knowledge 
is undoubtedly limited to the mere fact. 
This is one of those difficult, but decisive points in mental 
philosophy, of which it is essential to possess a precise and 
correct understanding. The letters, which cover over the 
page of a book, are a very different thing from the thought, 
and the combinations of thought, which they stand for. 
The accountant's columns of numerals are not identical with 
the quantities and their relations, which they represent. 
And so in regard to the mind ; all its acts are of one kind, 
and what they stand for is of another. The mind, in all its 
feelings and operations, is governed by its own laws, and 
characterizes its efforts by the essential elements of its own 
nature. Nothing which is seen or heard, nothing which is 
the subject of taste or touch or any other sense, nothing 
material which can be imagined to exist in any place or in 
any form, can furnish the least positive disclosure either of 
its intrinsic nature or of the mode of its action. 
What then is the relation between the sensation and the 
outward object, between the perception and the thing per- 
ceived ? Evidently that of the sign, and the thing signified. 
And as in a multitude of cases, the sign may give a knowl- 
edge of its object without any other grounds of such knowl- 
edge than mere institution or appointment, so it is in this. 
The mind, maintaining its appropriate action, and utterly 
rejecting the intervention of all images and visible represen- 
tations, except what are outward and material and totally 
distinct from itself both in place and nature, is notwithstand- 
ing susceptible of the knowledge of things exterior, and can 
form an acquaintance with the universe of matter. 
A misapprehension in this respect, the mistaken supposi- 
tion of the mind's either receiving actual filmy images from 
external objects, or being itself transformed into the likeness 
of such images, has been in times past the source of much 
confusion and contention. But that opinion, however prev- 
alent it may have been once, is mere hypothesis ; it has not 
the slightest well-founded evidence in its favor. Still we can 
reject it wholly from our belief, and from all influence on our 
belief, only by guarding against early associations, by a rigid 
self-inspection, and by carefully separating the material and 
the immaterial, the qualities of mind and of matter. CHAPTER SIXTH. 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
§. 75. Of the organ of sight and the uses or benefits of that sense. 
Of those instruments of external perception, with which 
a benevolent Providence has favored us, a high rank must be 
given to the sense of s'eeing. If we were restricted in the 
process of acquiring knowledge to the informations of the 
touch merely, how many embarrassments would attend our 
progress, and how slow it would prove! Having never pos- 
sessed sight, it would be many years before the most acute 
and active person could form an idea of a mountain or even 
of a large edifice. But by the additional help of the sense of 
seeing, he not only observes the figure of large buildings, but 
is in a moment possessed of all the beauties of a wide and 
variegated landscape. 
The organ of this sense is the eye. On a slight examina- 
tion the eye is found to be a sort of telescope, having its dis- 
tinct parts, and discovering throughout the most exquisite 
construction. The medium, on which this organ acts, are 
rays of light, every-where diffused, and always advancing, if 
they meet with no opposition, in direct lines. The eye like 
all the other senses not only receives externally the medium, 
on which it acts ; but carries the rays of light into itself; and 
on principles purely scientific refracts and combines them 
anew. 
It does pot however fall within our plan to give a minute 
description of the eye, which belongs rather to the physiolo- 
gist ; but such a description, with the statement of the uses 
of the different parts of the organ, must be to a candid and 106 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
reflecting mind a most powerful argument in proof of the ex- 
istence and goodness of the Supreme Being. How wonder- 
ful among other things is the adaptation of the rays of light 
to the eye! If these rays were not of a texture extremely 
small, they would cause much pain to the organ of vision, in- 
to which they so rapidly pass. If they were not capable of 
exciting within us the sensations of color, we should be de- 
prived of much of that high satisfaction, which we now take 
in beholding surrounding objects ; showing forth, wherever 
they are to be found, the greatest variety and the utmost 
richness of tints. 
§. 76. Statement of the mode or process in visual perception. 
In the process of vision, the rays of light, coming from va- 
rious objects and in various directions, strike in the first 
place on the pellucid or transparent part of the ball of the 
eye. 
If they were to continue passing on precisely in the same 
direction, they would produce merely one mingled and indis- 
tinct expanse of color. In their progress however through 
the chrystalline humour, they are refracted or bent from their 
former direction, and are distributed to certain focal points on 
the retina, which is a white, fibrous expansion of the optic 
nerve. 
The rays of light, coming from objects in the field of vis- 
ion, whether it be more or less extensive, as soon as they have 
been distributed on their distinct portions of the retina, and 
have formed an image there, are immediately followed by the 
sensation or perception, which is termed sight. The image, 
which is thus pictured on the retina, is the last step, which 
we are able to designate in the material part of the process in 
visual perception : the mental state follows, but it is not in 
our power to trace, even in the smallest degree, any physical 
connection between the optical image and the corresponding 
state of the mind. All that we can say in this case is, that 
we suppose them to hold to each other the relation of ante- 
cedent and consequent by an ultimate law of our constitution. 
77. Of the original and acquired perceptions of sight. 
In speaking of those sensations and perceptions, the origin 
of which is generally attributed to the sense of sight, it is ne- 
cessary to make a distinction between those, which are orig- THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
107 
inal, and those which are acquired. Nothing is properly 
original with the sense of sight but the sensations of color, 
such as red, blue, yellow. These sensations, (or perceptions, 
as they are otherwise called, when the internal feeling is 
combined with a reference to the external cause,) are exceed- 
ingly numerous. In this respect the intimations of the sense 
of sight stand on the same footing with those of taste and 
bearing ; although distinctive namd, in consequence of the 
difficulty of accurately separating and drawing the line be- 
tween each, are given only in a few cases. All the sensations 
of color are original with the sight ; and are not to be ascrib- 
ed to any other sense. 
A part however of that knowledge, which we attribute to 
the sight, and which has the appearance of being immediate 
and original in that sense, is not so. Some of its alleged per- 
ceptions are properly the results of sensations, combined not 
only with the usual reference to an external cause, but with 
various other acts of the judgment. In some cases the com- 
bination of the acts of the judgment with the visual sensation 
is carried so far, that there is a sort of transfer to the sight of 
the knowledge, which has been obtained from some other 
source. And not unfrequently, in consequence of a long and 
tenacious association, we are apt to look upon the knowledge 
thus acquired, as truly original in the seeing power. This 
will suffice perhaps as a statement of the general fact, while 
the brief examination of a few instances will help to the more 
thorough understanding of those acquired perceptions of the 
sight, which are here referred to. 
§. 78 The idea of extension not originally from sight. 
It is well known that there is nothing more common than 
for a person to say, that he sees the length or breadth of any 
external object ; that he sees its extent, &c. These expres- 
sions appear to imply, (and undoubtedly are so understood,) 
that extension is a direct object of sight. There is no ques- 
tion that such is the common sentiment, viz, that the outlines 
and surface, which bodies permanently expand and present to 
the view, are truly seen. An opinion different from this 
might even incur the charge of great absurdity. 
But properly the notion of extension, as we have already 108 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
seen, has its origin in the sense of touch. Being a simple and 
elementary thought, it is not susceptible of definition ; nor, 
when we consider extension as existing outwardly and mate- 
rially, can we make it a matter of description without running 
into the confusion of using synonymous words. But whatev- 
er it is, (and certainly there can be neither ignorance nor dis- 
agreement on that point, however much language may fail of 
conveying our ideas,) tht knowledge of it is not to be ascrib- 
ed originally to the sight. 
The notion of extension is closely connected with exter- 
nality. It is not possible to form the idea of extension from 
mere consciousness, or a reflection on what takes place with- 
in us. But making a muscular effort, and thus applying the 
touch to some resisting body, we first have the notion of out- 
ness ; and either from the same application of that sense, or 
when we have repeated it continuously on the same surface, 
we have the additional notion of its being extended or spread 
out. If a man were fixed immovably in one place, capable 
of smelling, tasting, hearing, and seeing, but without tactual 
impressions originating from a resisting body, he would never 
possess a knowledge of either. Having first gained that 
knowledge from the touch in the way just mentioned, he 
learns in time what appearance extended bodies, (which are 
of course colored bodies,) make to the eye. At a very early 
period, having ascertained that all colored bodies are spread 
out or extended, he invariably associates the idea of extension 
with that colored appearance. Hence he virtually and prac- 
tically transfers the knowledge obtained by one sense to 
another ; and even after a time imagines extension to be a 
direct object of sight, when in fact what is seen is only a sign 
of it, and merely suggests it. An affection of the sense of 
touch is the true and original occasion of the origin of this 
notion ; and it becomes an idea of sight only by acquisition 
or transference. 
§• 79. Of the knowledge of the figure of bodies by the sight. 
Views similar to those, which have been already advan- 
ced,xvill evidently apply to the figure of bodies. We acquire 
a knowledge of the figure or form of bodies originally by the 
sense of touch. But it cannot be doubted, that this knowl- THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
109 
edge is often confidently attributed to the sense of sight as 
well as the touch. Although there is reason to believe, that 
men labor under a mistake in this, it is not strange, when 
we trace back our mental history to its earlier periods, that 
such a misapprehension should exist. 
A solid body presents to the eye nothing but a certain 
disposition of colors and light. We may imagine ourselves 
to see the prominencies or cavities in such bodies, when in 
truth we see only the light or the shade, occasioned by them. 
This light and shade, however, we learn by experience to 
consider as the sign of a certain solid figure. A proof of 
the truth of this statement is, that a painter by carefully im- 
itating the distribution of light and shade, which he sees in 
objects, will make his work very naturally and exactly rep- 
resent not only the general outline of a body, but its promi- 
nencies, depressions, and other irregularities. And yet his 
delineation, which, by the distribution of light and shade, 
gives such various representations, is on a smooth and plain 
surface. 
It was a problem submitted by Mr. Molyneux to Mr. 
Locke, whether a blind man, who has learnt the difference 
between a cube and a sphere by the touch, can, on being 
suddenly restored to sight, distinguish between them, and 
tell, which is the sphere and which is the cube, by the aid 
of what may be called his new sense merely ? And the an- 
swer of Mr. Locke was, in agreement with the opinion of 
Molyneux himself, that he cannot. The blind man knows 
what impressions the cube and sphere make on the organ of 
touch, and by that sense is able to distinguish between them; 
but, as he is ignorant what impression they will make on the 
organ of sight, he is notable by the latter sense alone to tell, 
which is the round body, and which is the cubic. 
It was remarked that solid bodies present to the eye noth- 
ing but a certain disposition of light and colors.-It seems 
to follow from this, that the first idea, which will be convey- 
ed to the mind on seeing a globe, will be that of a circle, va- 
riously shadowed with different degrees of light. This im- 
perfect idea is corrected in this way. Combining the sug- 
gestions of the sense of touch with those of sight, we learn 
by greater experience what kind of appearance solid, convex 110 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
bodies will make to us. That appearance becomes to the 
mind the sign of the presence of a globe ; so that we have an 
idea of a round body by a very rapid mental correction, 
whereas the notion first conveyed to the mind is truly that of 
a plane, circular surface, on which there is a variety in the 
dispositions of light and shade. It is an evidence of the cor- 
rectness of this statement, that in paintings, plane surfaces, 
variously shaded, represent convex bodies, and with great 
truth and exactness. 
It appears then, that extension and figure are originally 
perceived, not by sight, but by touch. We do not judge of 
them by sight, until we have learnt by our experience, that 
certain visible appearances always accompany and signify 
the existence of extension, and of figure. This knowledge 
we acquire at a very early period in life, so much so, that 
we lose in a great measure the memory both of its commence- 
ment and progress. 
§. 80. Measurements of magnitude by the eye. 
What has been said naturally leads us to the considera- 
tion of magnitude. This is a general term for Extension, 
when we conceive of it not only as limited or bounded, but 
as related to and compared with other objects. Although 
we make use of the eye in judging of it, it is to be kept in 
mind, that the knowledge of magnitude is not an original 
intimation of the sight, but is at first acquired by the aid of 
touch. So well known is this, that it has been common to 
consider Magnitude under the two heads of tangible or real, 
and visible or apparent ; the tangible magnitude being al- 
ways the same, but the visible varying with the distance of 
the object. A man of six feet stature is always that height, 
whether he be a mile distant, or half a mile, or near at hand ; 
the change of place making no change in his real or tangible 
magnitude. But the visible or apparent magnitude of this 
man may be six feet or two feet, as we view him present 
with us and immediately in our heighborhood, or at two 
miles' distance ; for his magnitude appears to our eye great- 
er or less, according as he is more or less removed. 
In support of the doctrine, that the knowledge of magni- 
tude is not an original intimation of the sight, but is at first 
acquired by the aid of touch, we may remark, that, in judg- THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
111 
ing of magnitude by the sight, we are much influenced, not 
merely by the visual perception, but particularly by compar- 
ison with other objects, the size of which is known or sup- 
posed to be known. " I remember once, (says Dr. Aber- 
crombie, Intellec. Powers, Part II, Sect. 1.,) having occasion 
to pass along Ludgate Hill, when the great door of St. Paul's; 
was open, and several persons were standing in it. They 
appeared to be very little children ; but, on coming up to 
them, were found to be full-grown persons. In the mental 
process which here took place, the door had been assumed 
as a known magnitude, and the other objects judged of by 
it. Had I attended to the door being much larger than any 
door that one is in the habit of seeing, the mind would have 
made allowance for the apparent size of the persons ; and, 
on the other hand, had these been known to be full grown 
persons, a judgment would have been formed of the size of 
the door." 
Among the multitude of instances, which might be addu- 
eed in illustration of the doctrine under notice, the following 
statement, to be found in the seventh number of the Edin- 
burgh Journal of Science, is a somewhat striking one. In 
examining a dioramic representation of the inside of Roches- 
ter cathedral, which produced the finest effect, from the entire 
exclusion of all extraneous light and of all objects, excepting 
those on the picture itself, the writer of the statement refer- 
red to was struck with an appearance of distortion in the 
perspective, which he ascribed to the canvass not hanging 
vertically. Upon mentioning this to the gentleman, who 
«xibited the picture, he offered to walk in front of it, and 
strike its surface with the palm of his hand, to show that 
the canvass was freely suspended. Upon doing this, a very 
remarkable deception, or illusion rather, took place. As his 
hand passed along, it gradually became larger and larger, till 
it reached the middle, when it became enormously large. It 
then diminished, till it reached the other end of the canvass. 
As the hand moved towards the middle of the picture, it 
touched the parts of the picture more and more remote from 
the eye of the observer ; and consequently the mind refer- 
red the hand and the object in contact with it to the same 
remote distance ; and consequently gave it a fictitious mag- 112 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
nitude, corresponding with the visible figure it presented, 
combined with the supposition of its being placed at a dis- 
tance. (See Edin. Journal of Science, No. VII, p. 90, and 
Art. Science, Edin. Ency.) 
§. 81. Of objects seen in the mist and of the sun and moon in the horizon. 
In accordance with the above mentioned principle it hap- 
pens, that objects, seen by a person in a mist, seem larger 
than life. Their faint appearance rapidly conveys to the 
mind the idea of being considerably removed, although they 
are actually near to us. And the mind immediately draws 
the conclusion, (so rapidly as to seem a simple and original 
perception,) that the object having the same visible or appa- 
rent magnitude, and yet supposed to be at a considerable 
distance, is greater than other objects of the same class. So 
that it is chiefly the view of the mind, a law or habit of the 
intellect, which in this particular case gives a fictitious ex- 
pansion to bodies ; although it is possible, that the result may 
in part be attributed to a difference in the refraction of the 
rays of light, caused by their passing through a denser and 
less uniform medium than usual. 
These remarks naturally remind us of the well known 
fact, that the sun and moon seem larger in the horizon than 
in the meridian. Two reasons may be given for this appear- 
ance ; and perhaps ordinarily they are combined together.- 
(1) The horizon may seem more distant than the zenith, in 
consequence of intervening objects. We measure the dis- 
tance of objects in part by means of those that are scattered 
along between, and any expanse of surface, where there are 
no such intervening objects, appears to us of less extent than 
it actually is. Now if the rays of light form precisely the 
same image in the eye, but the source of them is supposed 
to be further off in the horizon than in the zenith, such have 
been our mental habits, that the object in the horizon will 
probably appear the largest. (2) Another reason of the 
enlarged appearance of the sun and moon in the horizon is, 
that the rays from them fall on the body of the atmosphere 
obliquely, and of course are reflected downwards towards the 
beholder, and subtend a larger angle at his eye. Hence, as 
we always see objects in the direction of the ray just before THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
113 
it enters the eye, if we follow the rays back in the precise 
direction of their approach, they will present to the eye the 
outlines of a larger object as their source, than they would 
if they had not been refracted. When the atmosphere is 
not clear, but unusual masses of vapor are accumulated in 
it, whether immediately around us or any where else in the 
direction of the rays, the refraction is increased, and the ob- 
ject is proportionally enlarged. This circumstance helps to 
explain the fact of the enlargement not being uniform, but 
sometimes greater and at others less. It may be added, that, 
on a principle practically the same with that of refraction, 
there will be an increased enlargement, when the disc of the 
sun or moon is seen through distant woods ; the rays being 
separated and turned out of their course by the trunks and 
branches. 
82. Of the estimation of distances by sight. 
We are next led to the consideration of distances as made 
known and ascertained by the sight. By the distance of ob- 
jects, when we use the term in reference to ourselves, we 
mean the space, which is interposed between those objects 
and our own position. It might be objected, that space inter- 
posed is only a synonymous expression for the thing to be de- 
fined. Nevertheless no one can be supposed to be ignorant 
of what is meant. Even blind men have a notion of distance, 
and can measure it by the touch, or by walking forward until 
they meet the distant object. 
The perception of distance by the sight is an acquired and 
not an original perception ; although the latter was universal- 
ly supposed to be the fact, until comparatively a recent period. 
All objects in the first instance appear to touch the eye ; 
but our experience has corrected so many of the representa- 
tions of the senses before the period, which we are yet able 
to retrace by the memory, that we cannot prove this by a ref- 
erence to our own childhood and infancy. It appears, howev- 
er, from the statement of the cases of persons born blind on 
the sudden restoration of their sight. " When he first saw, 
(says Cheselden, the anatomist, when giving an account of a 
young man, whom he had restored to sight by couching for 
the cataract,) he was so far from making any judgment 114 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
about distance, that he thought all objects touched his eye, 
as he expressed it, as what he felt did his skin; and thought 
no objects so agreeable as those, which were smooth and reg- 
ular, although he could form no judgment of their shape, or 
guess what it was in any object that was pleasing to him." 
This anatomist has further informed us, that he has 
brought to sight several others, who had no remembrance of 
ever having seen ; and that they all gave the same account 
of their learning to see, as they called it, as the young man 
already mentioned,although not in so many particulars ; and 
that they all had this in common, that having never had occa- 
sion to move their eyes, they knew not how to do it, and, at 
first, could not at all direct them to a particular object; but 
in time they acquired that faculty though by slow degrees.* 
Blind persons, when at first restored to sight, are unable 
to estimate the distance of objects by that sense, but soon ob- 
serving, that certain changes in the visible appearance of bod- 
ies always accompany a change of distance, they fall upon 
a method of estimating distance by the visible appearance. 
And it would no doubt be found, if it could be particularly ex- 
amined into, that all mankind come to possess the power of 
estimating the distances of objects by sight in the same way. 
When a body is removed from us and placed at a considera- 
ble distance, it becomes smaller in its visible appearance, its 
colors are less lively, and its outlines less distinct ; and we 
may expect to find various intermediate objects, more or few- 
er in number corresponding with the increase of the distance, 
showing themselves between the receding object and the 
spectator. And hence it is, that a certain visible appearance 
comes to be the sign of a certain distance. 
Historical and landscape painters are enabled to turn these 
* Some doubts have been raised from time to time of the correctness 
of Cheselden's experiments and inquiries here referred to. Fortunately 
Mr. Stewart has taken up the subject with his accustomed caution and 
candor in his Account of James Mitchell, a boy born Deaf and Blind. 
He shows to ample satisfaction, in a Note near the commencement of 
that Narration, that the facts, which have been brought forward in oppo- 
sition to Cheselden, may be satisfactorily explained, without any im- 
peachment of the correctness of his statements or the justness of his con- 
clusions from them. See additional confirmations of this subject in the 
life of Caspar Hauser. THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
115 
facts to great account in their delineations. By means of dim- 
ness of color, indistinctness of outline, and the partial inter- 
position of other objects, they are enabled apparently to throw 
back at a very considerable distance from the eye those ob- 
jects, which they wish to appear remote. While other ob- 
jects, that are intended to appear near, are painted vivid in 
color, large in size, distinct in outline, and are separated from 
the eye of the spectator by few or no intermediate objects. 
§. 83. Estimation of distance when unaided by intermediate objects. 
As we depend in no small degree upon intermediate ob- 
jects in forming our notions of distance, it results, that we 
are often much perplexed by the absence of such objects. 
Accordingly we find that people frequently mistake, when 
they attempt to estimate by the eye the length or width of 
unoccupied plains and marshes, generally making the extent 
less than it really is. For the same reason they misjudge of 
the width of a river, estimating its width at half or three 
quarters of a mile at the most, when it is perhaps not less 
than double that distance. The same holds true of other 
bodies of water ; and of all other things, which are seen by 
us in a horizontal position, and under similar circumstances. 
We mistake in the same way also in estimating the height 
of steeples, and of other bodies, that are perpendicular, and 
not on a level with the eye, provided the height be consider- 
able. As the upper parts of the steeple out-top the surround- 
ing buildings, and there are no contiguous objects with which 
to compare it, any measurement taken by the eye must be in- 
accurate, but is generally less than the truth. 
Hence perhaps it is, that a man on the top of a steeple ap- 
pears smaller to those below, than the same man would seem 
to the same person, and at the same distance on level ground. 
A man on the earth's surface, placed at the same distance, 
would probably appear nearly of his actual size. As we have 
been in the habit of measuring horizontal distances by the 
eye, we can readily form a nearly accurate opinion, whether 
a person be at an hundred feet distance, or more or less ; and 
the mind immediately makes an allowance for this distance, 
and corrects the first visual representation of the size of the 
person so rapidly that we do not remember it. But having 116 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
neverbeen in the habit of measuring perpendicular distances, 
the mind is at a loss, and fails to make that correction, which 
it would readily, and, as it were, intuitively make in the case 
of objects on level ground. The mistake, therefore, of his 
supposed nearness, combined with this perplexity, causes the 
comparative littleness of the man on the steeple. 
The fixed stars, when viewed by the eye all appear to be 
alike indefinitely and equally distant. Being scattered over 
the whole sky, they make every part of it seem like them- 
selves at an indefinite and equal distance, and, therefore, con- 
tribute to give the whole sky the appearance of the inside of 
a sphere. Moreover, the horizon seems to the eye to be fur- 
ther off than the zenith ; because between us and the former 
there lie many things, as fields, hills, and waters, which we 
know to occupy a great space ; whereas between us and the 
zenith there are no considerable things of known dimensions. 
And, therefore, the heavens appear like the segment of a 
sphere, and less than a hemisphere, in the centre of which 
we seem to stand. And the wider our prospect is, the 
greater will the sphere appear to be and the less the segment. 
§. 84, Of objects seen on the ocean, &,c. 
A vessel seen at sea by a person, who is not accustomed 
to the ocean, appears much nearer than it actually is ; and 
on the same principles as already illustrated. In his previous 
observations of the objects at a distance, he has commonly 
noticed a number of intermediate objects, interposed between 
the distant body and himself. It is probably the absence of 
such objects, that chiefly causes the deception, under which 
he labors in the present instance. 
In connection with what has been said, we are led to make 
this further remark, that a change in the purity of the air 
will perplex in some measure those ideas of distance, which 
we receive from sight. Bishop Berkeley remarks, while 
travelling in Italy and Sicily, he noticed, that cities and pala- 
ces, seen at a great distance, appeared nearer to him by sev- 
eral miles than they actually were. The cause of this he 
very correctly supposed to be the purity of the Italian and 
Sicilian air, which gave to objects at a distance a degree of 
brightness and distinctness, which, in the less clear and pure THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
117 
atmosphere of his native country, could be observed only in 
those towns and separate edifices, which were near. At home 
he had learnt to estimate the distances of objects by their ap- 
pearance ; but his conclusions failed him, when they came to 
be applied to objects in countries, where the air was so much 
clearer. And the same thing has been noticed by other 
travellers, who have been placed in the like circumstances. 
§. 85. Supposed feelings of a being called into existence in the full pos- 
session of his powers. 
In illustration of the principles, which have been brought 
forward in the successive consideration of the senses, we are 
tempted to introduce in this place a favorite passage of the 
celebrated Buffon. In the Natural History of that learned 
writer we have an account of the process, by which the full 
use of the sight and of the other external senses is acquired. 
He invents a delightful recital, and puts it in the mouth of 
our first parent ; and thus instructs us in the most abstruse 
subjects by an appeal to the imagination. 
" Let us suppose (says he) a man newly brought into ex- 
istence, whose body and organs are already perfectly form- 
ed, but who, awaking amidst the productions of Nature, is 
an utter stranger to every thing he perceives both from with- 
out, and from within. Of a man thus circumstanced what 
would be the first emotions, the first sensations, the first 
opinions ? Were he himself to give us a detail of his concep- 
tions at this period, how would he express them ? Might it 
not be in some measure as follows ? 
"Well do I recollect that joyful, anxious moment, when I 
first became conscious of my own existence. 1 knew not 
what I was, where I was, or whence I came. On opening 
my eyelids, what an addition to my surprise 1 The light of 
day, the azure vault of heaven, the verdure of the earth, the 
chrystal of the waters, all employed, all animated, and filled 
me with inexpressible delight. 
"At first, I imagined that all those objects were within 
me, and formed a part of myself. Impressed with this idea, 
I turned my eyes towards the sun, whose splendor instantly 
dazzled and over-powered me. Involuntarily I closed my 
eyelids, though not without a slight sensation of pain ; and, 118 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
during this short interval of darkness, I imagined that I was 
about to sink into nothing. 
" Full of affliction and astonishment, I had begun to pon- 
der on this great change, when, listening, I heard a variety 
of sounds. The whistling of the wind, and the melody of 
the grove formed a concert, of which the soft impression per- 
vaded the inmost recesses of my soul. I continued to listen ; 
nor could I banish the persuasion, that all this music was 
actually within me. 
" So much was I engrossed with this new kind of exist- 
ence, that I entirely forgot the light, that other part of my 
being, which I had known the first, till again I had opened 
my eyes. What joy to find myself once more in possession 
of so many brilliant objects ! The present pleasure surpas- 
sed the former, and for a time suspended the charming effect 
of sounds. 
" I turned my eyes upon a thousand different objects. 
These, which I still considered as a part of myself, I soon 
found that I could lose, and restore at pleasure ; and with a 
repetition of this new power I continued to amuse myself. 
" I had begun to see without emotion, and to hear without 
confusion, when a light breeze, of which the freshness com- 
municated a new sensation of pleasure, wafted its perfumes 
to me, and excited in me q^kind of additional self-love. 
"Agitated by all these different sensations, and impelled 
by the various pleasures of my new existence, I instantly 
arose, and in arising perceived myself moved along, as if by 
some unknown, some hidden power. 
" Hardly had I advanced one step, when the novelty of 
my situation rendered me, as it were, immovable. My sur- 
prise returned ; for I supposed that all the objects around me 
were in motion ; to them I ascribed that agitation, which I 
had myself produced by changing place ; and the whole cre- 
ation seemed once more to be in disorder. 
"I carried my hand to my head ; I touched my forehead ; 
I felt my whole frame. Then it was that I first conceived 
my hand to be the principal organ of my existence. All its 
informations were so distinct, so perfect, and so superior to 
what I had experienced from the other senses, that I employ- 
ed myself for some time in repeating its enjoyments. Every 119 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
part of my body, which I touched with my hand, seemed to 
touch my hand in turn, and actually gave back sensation for 
sensation. 
"It was not long before I perceived that this faculty was 
expanded over my whole frame, and before I began to discov- 
er the limits of my existence, which, at first, I had supposed 
of an immense extent, and diffused over all the objects I saw. 
"Upon casting my eyes upon my body, and surveying my 
own form I conceived it to be of a size so enormous, that all 
the objects, which had hitherto struck my eyes, seemed to 
be, in comparison, as so many luminous particles. I gazed 
upon my person with pleasure. I examined the formation of 
my hand, and all its motions ; and the former appeared to 
me more or less large, in proportion as it was more or less dis- 
tant from my eyes. On bringing it very near, it concealed, 
I found, almost every other object from my sight. 
"I began soon, however, to suspect that there was some 
fallacy in the sensation I experienced from the eye ; and I 
therefore resolved to depend, for information, upon the touch, 
which as yet had never deceived me. This precaution was 
highly serviceable. I renewed my motions, and walked for- 
ward with my face turned towards the heavens. Happen- 
ing to strike lightly against a palm tree, I was dismayed, and 
laid my hand, though not without fear, upon this extraneous 
body ; for extraneous I conceived it to be, as it did not re- 
turn sensation for sensation, as my former feelings had done. 
Now it was that, for the first time,. I perceived there was 
something external, something which did not form an actual 
part of my own existence. 
"From this new discovery I concluded, that I ought to 
form my opinion with respect to external objects, in the same 
manner as I had done with respect to the parts of my body. 
I resolved, therefore, to feel whatever I saw and vainly 
attempting to touch the sun, I stretched forth my arms, and 
found nothing but an airy vacuum. At every effort I made, 
as each object appeared to me equally near, from one fit of 
surprise I fell into another : nor was it till after an infinite 
number of trials, that I was enabled to use the eye as a guide 
to the hand, and that I perceived there were some objects 
more remote from me than others. 120 
THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 
"Amazed and mortified at the uncertainty of my state, 
and at the endless delusions to which I seemed to be subjec- 
ted, the more I reflected, the more I was perplexed. Fa- 
tigued and oppressed with thought, I seated myself beneath 
a tree, loaded with delicious fruit within my reach. On 
stretching forth my arm, the fruit instantly separated from 
the branches, and I seized it. To grasp in my hand an en- 
tire substance, which formed no part of myself, pleased me. 
When I held it up, its weight, though in itself trivial, seem- 
ed, however, like an animated impulse, to incline it to the 
earth. In conquering this resistance I found another and a 
greater pleasure. 
"I held the fruit near my eye, and I considered its form, 
and its colors. Its fragrance prompted me to carry it near- 
er and nearer, and with eagerness did I inhale that fragrance. 
The perfume invited my sense of tasting, which I found to 
be superior to that of smelling. What savour, what novelty 
of sensation, did I now experience ! Nothing could be more 
exquisite. What before had been pleasure, was now height- 
ened into luxury. The power of tasting gave me the idea 
of possession. I imagined that the substance of this fruit 
had become a part of my own substance, and that I was em- 
powered to transform things without me at will. 
"Charmed with the idea of this new power, and incited 
by the sensations I had already experienced, I continued to 
pluck the fruit ; nor did I think any labor too great for the 
satisfaction of my taste. At length, however, an agreeable 
languor stealing upon my senses, my limbs became heavy, 
and my soul seemed to lose its activity. My sensations, no 
longer vivid and distinct, presented to me only feeble and 
irregular images. In the instant, as it were, my eyes be- 
came useless, closed ; and my head„ no longer borne up by 
the strength of the muscles, sunk back, and found a support 
upon the verdant turf beneath." CHAPTER SEVENTH. 
OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
§. 86. By means of sensations we have a knowledge of outward things. 
In the third chapter of the Introduction it was remarked,- 
that the states of mind, to which operations upon or affec- 
tions of our senses give rise, are, by our very constitution, 
the occasions or grounds of belief; and that it is by means 
of the senses we have a knowledge, in particular, of the ex- 
ternal, material world. The new feelings, following an 
affection of the senses, are in some sense the occasions, on 
which the active and curious mind moves out of the world 
of its own spiritual and immaterial existence, and becomes 
acquainted with matter. It is somewhat here, as in the 
reading of a book. When we read a book, only certain col- 
ored marks or lines, arranged in a particular order, are di- 
rectly presented to our senses ; but we find them connected 
with new states of mind, utterly distinct from the direct im- 
pression which they make. A piece of paper, written over 
with such colored delineations, becomes to the soul a sign of 
the most various and exalted ideas ; and in like manner, such 
is the constitution of our mental nature, it is found to be the 
case, that certain new affections of the mind, provided they 
are caused by means of the senses, become the signs of vari- 
ous existences, which are wholly diverse from the feelings 
themselves. W'e experience the feelings, which all admit 
to be in themselves neither archetypes nor resemblances of 
any thing whatever, which is external to the soul ; and then 
at once we become acquainted with a vast multitude of out- 
ward objects. On the authority of such feelings as are im- 
mediately consequent on an affection of the senses, all man- 122 
OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
kind, if the evidence of their general conduct and of their 
express declarations is to be regarded, believe in outward 
objects, as having a distinct and real existence, as having 
forms, properties, and relations. 
Nevertheless, without denying the fact of this general re- 
liance on the senses as a ground of belief, an objection has 
been made to its being well placed. The objection, stated 
in a few words, is this; that our senses sometimes deceive 
US, AND LEAD US INTO MISTAKES. 
In support of the objection, such instances as the follow- 
ing are brought forward.-The sun and moon appear to the 
spectator on the earth's surface to be a foot or two in diame- 
ter, and a little more than half a mile high ; a strait stick, 
thrust into the water, appears to us crooked, as seen by the 
eye in that position ; a square tower at a distance is mista- 
ken for a round one ; a piece of ice for a stone ; a brass coin 
for a gold one. Nor are such mistakes to be ascribed solely 
to the sense of sight ; they are not unfrequently committed, 
when we rely on the intimations of the taste and smell, the 
touch and hearing. Various facts of the above kind have 
been brought forward to discredit the senses, and to prevent 
a reliance on them. It is not necessary to extend the enu- 
meration of them, as these will serve for a specimen of the 
whole. 
§. 88. The senses circumscribed or limited rather than fallacious. 
That there are some apparent grounds for the objection, 
which has been made to a full reliance on the testimony of 
the senses, it is not necessary to deny. It is nevertheless 
true, that the great mass of the alledged fallacies, which 
have been brought forward in opposition to such reliance, 
are susceptible of a satisfactory explanation. But before 
entering into particulars, it is requisite to make the general 
remark, that the senses are more properly circumscribed or 
limited than fallacious ; and that they lead us astray, not so 
much by their own direct action, as in consequence of our 
expecting too much of them. Now if we keep this in view, 
and moderate and chasten our expectations by the evidently 
limited nature of the senses, we shall find less to complain of. 
§. 87. Objection to a reliance on the senses. OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, 
123 
The imperfect examination of the senses, which we have 
just gone through, evinces the truth of this remark. It is the 
business, the appropriate function of the sense of smelling 
to give us a knowledge of the odors of bodies. When we 
have these sensations, we may be led from some principle of 
the mind to look for the cause of them, but nothing more ; 
we do not learn from it what the cause is. It is not pretend- 
ed, that this sense alone can give us the notion of an exter- 
nal odoriferous body. The sense of taste is equally limited 
with that of smell; but both, as far as they go, are grounds 
of knowledge and do not deceive. It might no doubt be said, 
that they may be diseased, and thus mislead us ; but the 
remarks of this section go on the supposition, that the sen- 
ses are in a sound state. When we come to the sense of 
hearing, we find, that the perceptions of sound have in part 
an acquired character. The reference of a particular sound 
to a particular external cause always implies the previous 
exercise of the touch, also the exercises of that principle of 
the mind, which is termed association, and of an act of the 
judgment. But hearing, when in a sound state, is always a 
ground of belief and knowledge, as far as the mere sensation 
of sound is concerned ; and so far can be most certainly 
trusted. 
It is the appropriate business of the sense of sight, against 
the testimony of which so many objections have been made, 
to render us acquainted with the colors of bodies. To say, 
therefore, that it leads us into errors in respect to solidity, 
extension, size, direction, or distance, is but very little, or 
rather nothing to the purpose. These are acquired percep- 
tions, and have their origin in another sense, that of touch. 
The visual sensations are in these cases mere signs of the 
knowledge, which we have from another source. When 
therefore, we separate what belongs to the sight from what 
belongs to the touch, and distinguish between them, it is im- 
possible to fix the charge of misrepresentation upon either. 
And hence on the question, Whether our senses mislead 
us, we are always to consider, to which of the senses the 
particular ideas under review appropriately belong. And in 
many cases when we are searching after truth, it becomes 
us to call in the aid of all the senses, and not to consult one 124 
OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
to the entire omission of the others. They all make parts 
of one great and wonderful system, and cannot be safely sep- 
arated. When they are in a sound state, when the ideas, of 
which they are the origin, are properly discriminated, and 
further, when the intimations of one sense are aided by those 
of another and by the guidance of the reasoning power, which 
clearly ought not to be excluded, we may then confidently 
expect to be led by them into the truth, so far as our Crea- 
tor designed, that it should be made known to us. 
§. 89. Some alledged mistakes of the senses owing to want of care. 
If the course, indicated at the close of the last section, 
were always followed, the mistakes, to which we are occa- 
sionally exposed, would be much less frequent. But even 
when we refer to all the senses, and combine with this refer- 
ence the deductions of reasoning, we may still err from want 
of care. Beyond all question some of the mistakes, ascribed 
to the senses, are owing to premature inferences from them ; 
to a want of caution, discrimination, and full inquiry. This 
particular view of the subject is illustrated as follows by Dr. 
Reid. "Many things called the deceptions of the senses 
are only conclusions rashly drawn from the testimony of the 
senses. In these cases the testimony of the senses is true, 
but we rashly draw a conclusion from it, which does not 
necessarily follow. We are disposed to impute our errors 
rather to false information than to inconclusive reasoning, 
and to blame our senses for the wrong conclusions we draw 
from their testimony. 
"Thus, when a man has taken a counterfeit guinea for a 
true one, he says his senses deceived him ; but he lays the 
blame where it ought not to be laid : for we may ask him, 
did your senses give a false testimony of the Color, or of the 
figure, or of the impression? No. But this is all that they 
testified, and this they testified truly. From these pre- 
mises you concluded that it was a true guinea, but this con- 
clusion does not follow ; you erred, therefore, not by relying 
upon the testimony of sense, but by judging rashly from its 
testimony. Not only are your senses innocent of this error, 
but it is only by their information that it can be discovered. 
If you consult them properly, they will inform you that what OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
125 
you took for a guinea is base metal, or is deficient in weight, 
and this can only be known by the testimony of sense. 
" I remember to have met with a man who thought the 
argument used by Protestants against the Popish doctrine of 
transubstantiation, from the testimony of our senses, inconclu- 
sive ; because, said he, instances may be given where sever- 
al of our senses may deceive us ; how do we know then that 
there may not be cases wherein they all deceive us, and no 
sense is left to detect the fallacy ? I begged of him to know 
an instance wherein several of our senses deceive us. I take,, 
said he, a piece of soft turf, I cut it into the shape of an apple 
with the essence of apples, I give it the smell of an apple ; 
and with paint, I can give it the skin and color of an apple. 
Here then is a body, which, if you judge by your eye, by your 
touch, or by your smell, is an apple. 
"To this I would answer, that no one of our senses de- 
ceives us in this case. My sight and touch testify that it has 
the shape and color of an apple ; this is true. The sense of 
smelling testifies that it has the smell of an apple: this is like- 
wise true, and is no deception. Where then lies the decep- 
tion? It is evident it lies in this, that because this body 
has some qualities belonging to an apple, I conclude that it is 
an apple. This is a fallacy, not of the senses, but of incon- 
clusive reasoning." * 
There are other instances where the subject might be 
placed in a true light. It is well known, (to take an illustra- 
tion not unfrequently referred to by writers,) that the vibra- 
tions of a pendulum are affected by its geographical position,, 
the latitude where it is. Before this fact was ascertained, a 
person might readily have employed a pendulum of a given 
length as a measure of comparative duration at two distant 
points on the globe's surface. And when he has done this, 
he might have been disposed to declare on the authority of 
his senses and personal observation, that two portions of time, 
measured in different latitudes, were the same, although they 
were in fact different. 
But here comes the question, Are his senses to blame for 
this mistake ? Not at all. The testimony of the senses and 
of observation, as far as it went was correct. The mistake 
* Reid's Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II. 126 
OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
is evidently to be attributed to erroneous deduction. The 
conclusion was bottomed on the great and undoubted princi- 
ple in reasoning, that the laws of nature are uniform. But 
then there were various assumptions in this particular case, 
viz, that the earth is circular and not a spheroid, that the 
same quantity of the attractive force of the earth operates on 
the pendulum at every point in the earth's surface, &c. Here 
is the foundation of the mistake ; in certain facts precipitate- 
ly assumed as grounds of reasoning, and in the deductions 
from them, and not in the senses. 
§. 90. Of mistakes in judging of the motion of objects. 
" Many false judgments, (it is further remarked by Dr. 
Reid,) that are accounted deceptions of sense, arise from our 
mistaking relative motion for real or absolute motion. These 
can be no deceptions of sense, because by our senses we per- 
ceive only the relative motions of bodies ; and it is by reason- 
ing that we infer the real from the relative which we per- 
ceive. A little reflection may satisfy us of this. 
"It was before observed, that we perceive extension to be 
one sensible quality of bodies, and thence are necessarily led 
to conceive space, though space be of itself no object of sense. 
When a body is removed out of its place, the space which it 
filled remains empty till it is filled by some other body, and 
would remain if it should never be filled. Before any body 
existed, the space which bodies now occupy was empty 
space, capable of receiving bodies, for no body can exist where 
there is no space to contain it. There is space therefore 
wherever bodies exist, or can exist. 
"Hence it is evident that space can have no limits. It is 
no less evident that it is immovable. Bodies placed in it 
are movable, but the place where they were cannot be 
moved ; and we can as easily conceive a thing to be moved 
from itself, as one part of a space brought nearer to, or re- 
moved further from another. 
" This space, therefore, which is unlimited and immova- 
ble, is called by philosophers absolute space. Absolute, or real 
motion, is a change of place in absolute space. 
"Our senses do not testify the absolute motion or absolute 
rest of any body. When one body removes from another, OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
127 
this may be discerned by the senses; but whether any body 
keeps the same part of absolute space, we do not perceive by 
our senses. When one body seems to remove from another, 
we can infer with certainty that there is absolute motion, but 
whether in the one or the other, or partly in both is not 
discerned by sense. 
" Of all the prejudices which philosophy contradicts, I 
believe there is none so general as that the earth keeps its 
place unmoved. This opinion seems to be universal, till it is 
corrected by instruction, or by philosophical speculation. 
Those, who have any tincture of education are not now in dan- 
ger of being held by it, but they find at first a reluctance to 
believe that there are antipodes ; that the earth is spherical, 
and turns round its axis every day, and round the sun every 
year. They can recollect the time when reason struggled 
with prejudice, upon these points, and prevailed at length, 
but not without some effort. 
" The cause of a prejudice so very general is not unwor- 
thy of investigation. Butthat is not our present business. 
It is sufficient to observe, that it cannot justly be called a fal- 
lacy of sense ; because our senses testify only the change of 
a situation of one body in relation to other bodies, and notits 
change of situation in absolute space. It is only the relative 
motion of bodies that we perceive, and that we perceive tru- 
ly. It is the province of reason and philosophy, from the re- 
lative motions which we perceive, to collect the real and ab- 
solute motions which produce them. 
" All motion must be estimated from some point or place 
which is supposed to be at rest. We perceive not the points 
of absolute space, from which real and absolute motion must 
be reckoned ; and there are obvious reasons that lead man- 
kind in a state of ignorance, to make the earth the fixed place, 
from which they may estimate the various motions they per- 
ceive. The custom of doing this from infancy, and of using 
constantly a language which supposes the earth to be at rest, 
may perhaps be the cause of the general prejudice in favor 
of this opinion. 
" Thus it appears, that if we distinguish accurately be- 
tween what our senses really and naturally testify, and the 
conclusions, which we draw from their testimony by reason- 128 
OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
ing, we shall find many of the errors, called fallacies of the 
senses, to be no fallacy of the senses, but rash judgments, 
which are not to be imputed to our senses." 
§. 91. Of mistakes as to the distances and magnitude of objects. 
One class of the fallacies by means of the sensesis made up 
of those errors we commit in our perceptions of the distance 
of objects. Our sight, it is said, often represent objects to 
be near which are distant, and objects to be distant, which 
are near. That we often form erroneous judgments as to 
the distance of objects, is true ; but it is a mistaken sentiment, 
which ascribes these erroneous opinions to the misrepresen- 
tations of the sight in itself considered. 
Take the case of the sun and moon. Those heavenly 
bodies, as they come under the cognizance of the sight, ap- 
pear to be very small, but in point of fact are known to be 
very large. Still in this very instance, (although this is one 
•of the cases most frequently referred to by the expositors of 
the alledged weaknesses and errors of the senses,) it cannot 
be shown, that there is any deception practised upon us by 
that sense. It has sufficiently appeared, that extension, fig- 
ure, the magnitude, and the distance of bodies are not direct 
objects of sight, and that our notions of them are not origi- 
nal in that sense, but are acquired. While, therefore, we 
have a direct acquaintance with colors by means of sight, it 
happens that, in estimating the distance of objects by the 
same sense, we are obliged to call in the aid of the intima- 
tions of the touch, and to make use also of comparison and 
judgment. And hence we are able to fix on this general 
principle, that the apparent magnitude of an object will vary 
with its distance. It is clear, therefore, that there is no 
deception practised upon us. When by such calculations as 
we are able to make, we have ascertained the distance of the 
sun and moon, then every one is satisfied, that their apparent 
magnitude or their appearance to the eye is just such as it 
should be ; and that the eye gives us precisely the same 
representation as in any other instance of visible objects pre- 
sented to it. It gives such a view of the object as it was de- 
signed to give ; and teaches us here the same as it teaches 
us constantly. OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
129 
II,-Another class of errors are those of magnitude. The 
notions, which we form on that subject also, are acquired, 
and not original. We judge objects to be great or small in 
comparison with ourselves or with one another ; and not in 
consequence of any thing, which is directly and immediately 
perceived in the objects themselves. We might call many 
objects small, which happened to be of the size of a particular 
diamond, and yet not inconsistently speak of the diamond it- 
self as a very large one ; and this for the simple reason, that 
our notions of large and small are not absolute but relative, 
and are formed by repeated acts of comparison. If there 
were but one object in creation beside ourselves, and if we 
could not reason from ourselves to that object, we could not 
possibly form any notion of its magnitude as distinct from the 
mere idea of extension. It is very clear our senses could not 
of themselves authorize us to speak of such an object as large 
or small. Nor could it be done by reasoning, inasmuch as 
there are supposed to be no other objects, with which to com- 
pare it. These few remarks and illustrations can hardly 
fail to evince, that such mistakes, as may exist in regard to 
the distance and magnitude of objects, are not exclusively at- 
tributable to the senses. 
§. 92. The senses liable to be diseased. 
There is one respect, however, in which it is perhaps true, 
that we can speak with propriety of deceptions, arising from 
the cause now under consideration. The body as a whole 
being liable to be diseased, the senses, as a part of the physi- 
cal system, are of course not exempted from this liability. As 
a mere question of fact, it cannot be deemed a matter of 
doubt, that the senses are often physically disordered ; and 
at such times all persons are liable to be led astray by them. 
What is sweet to persons ordinarily, may appear bitter to one 
with a diseased palate ; what is white to the mass of man- 
kind may appear of a yellow hue to one, whose organ of sight 
is diseased ; the physical condition of the sense of touch may 
be so perverted as to lead the diseased person to imagine he 
is made of glass or feathers instead of flesh and blood. 
But it is surely enough to say, in respect to cases of this 
kind, that such is the condition of humanity, the sad but com- 130 
OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
mon allotment of mankind. What principle in our mental con- 
stitution is not liable to be perverted? What susceptibility is 
not liable to find its action suspended ? In our general con- 
duct we rely, and very correctly, on the memory, but the laws 
of memory may be disorganized by what may be termed a 
mental disease. We rely with equal readiness on the reason- 
ing power ; no one doubts, that its conclusions are a ground 
of belief. But of what value is reasoning, when uttered in 
the ravings of a madman, or when drawing its conclusions in 
a lunatic asylum ? It follows, therefore, if the senses de- 
ceive us in the case we are now attending to, the fault, if 
such it is to be considered, is not an exclusive one. It be- 
longs to other parts of our nature also, not excepting its no- 
blest and most trust-worthy powers. And if we must reject 
the testimony of the senses, simply because they are liable to 
be diseased, we must, for the same reason, and in consisten- 
cy with ourselves, reject the testimony of memory, of reason, 
and even of consciousness. 
§. 93. On the real existence of a material world. 
It will be noticed, that, in what has been said, we have 
taken for granted the actual existence of an external material 
world. Certain it is, that no man, who has the ordinary con- 
stitution of a man, can doubt the reality of such an external 
material creation. All external nature is operating upon us 
from the very moment of our birth ; and giving origin, con- 
sistency, and strength to this belief. The resistance, which 
bodies present to the touch, when that sense is impressed up- 
on them by the agency of the muscles, gives occasion for the 
distinct and important idea of externality ; and with this 
idea, the senses soon enable us to associate others, as exten- 
sion, color, form, and all material qualities and properties. 
In this way we become acquainted with what we call the 
outward world. And we are now prepared to assert explicit- 
ly, that this supposed outward world has an actual and inde- 
pendent existence. 
But an objection is made here. It may be said that the 
mere fact of our having ideas of externality, extension, color, 
and the like, does not necessarily involve and imply the true 
and actual existence of those things which they represent, or OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, 
131 
of which they are supposed and believed to be the effect. In 
other words we may possess certain internal affections, and 
attribute them to something external and material as their 
cause ; and we may truly and sincerely believe the reality of 
such a cause, while in point of fact it does not exist ; and con- 
sequently, our conviction of a truly existing material world 
may be a self-imposition and delusion. On this view of our 
exclusion from any satisfactory knowledge of a material 
world, which is not so singular as not to have had some acute 
advocates, a few remarks are to be offered. 
§. 94. Doctrine of the non-existence of matter considered. 
The first remark, which we have to make, concerns the 
mere fact of belief. We have already made the declaration 
with confidence, that no man, who has the ordinary constitu- 
tion of a man, can doubt of the reality of external material 
things. It is no presumption to assert, that the belief of the 
reality of an external cause of our sensations is universal. 
This is the common feeling, the common language of all man- 
kind. Those, who deny the propriety of relying on the ev- 
idence of the senses for the existence of the material world, 
and who deny such existence, should explain this belief. 
That such a belief exists, cannot be denied ; that it is a false 
belief, an unfounded conviction, ought not to be lightly as- 
serted. It wars too much, as even a slight examination 
would suffice to show, with the sentiments of man's moral 
and religious constitution. 
It is to be acknowledged with gratitude, that the great 
mass of mankind fully believe in the existence of the Deity, 
a being of perfect truth as well as benevolence. But to cre- 
ate man so that he should be irresistibly led to believe in the 
existence of a material world, when it did not exist, to create 
him with high capacities of thought, feeling, and action, and 
then to surround him with mere illusive and imaginary ap- 
pearances, does not agree with that notion of God, which we 
are wont to entertain. Mr. Stewart, in speaking of the met- 
aphysical inquiries of Des Cartes, observes, that his reason- 
ings led him to conclude, that God cannot possibly be suppos- 
ed to deceive his creatures; and. therefore, that the intima- 
tions of our senses and the decisions of our reason are to be 132 
OF RELIANCE ON TI E SENSES. 
trusted to with entire confidence, wherever they afford us 
clear and distinct ideas of their respective objects. 
In the second place, it will undoubtedly be admitted that 
the sensations, which have been spoken of, have an existence. 
This existence, it is true, is wholly internal ; but still the sim- 
ple fact remains that they exist; our consciousness most de- 
cisively teaches us so. But it has been laid down as a prima- 
ry truth, a first principle, that there is no beginning or change 
of existence -without a cause. This is an elementary princi- 
ple, placed as far above all objection and scepticism as any 
one can be, and evidently preliminary to the full exercise of 
reasoning. 
And where then is the cause of these internal effects ? 
What man, who denies the existence of the material world, 
is able to indicate the origin of these results? If, yielding to 
the suggestions of our nature and the requisitions of our be- 
lief, we seek for a cause external to ourselves, we find a sat- 
isfactory explanation ; otherwise we may expect to find none 
of any kind. 
§. 95. The senses as much grounds of belief as other parts of our con- 
stitution. 
Furthermore, it must be admitted, as has already been 
particularly stated and shown, that there are certain original 
sources or grounds of belief in our constitution. To say oth- 
erwise would be to loosen and destroy the foundations of all 
knowledge, whether that knowledge has relation to matter 
or mind. But what evidence is there, that there are such 
original sources of belief, or that any one thing in particular 
is the foundation of such belief more than any other thing ? 
The answer is, our own internal consciousness and conviction, 
and this merely ; we arc conscious of belief, and are able to 
trace it to the occasions which give it rise. 
Now if we carefully examine our minds, wre shall find, 
that the intimations from the senses as effectually cause be- 
lief, as any other source of evidence whatever. Our con- 
sciousness, our internal conviction tells us, that our belief is 
as decisively regulated by the perceptions, derived through 
the senses, as by oar intuitive or inductive perception ; and 
that they are as much a ground of knowledge. We assert OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. 
133 
this with confidence ; therefore, if the senses are not a ground 
of belief and knowledge, the way is fairly open for unlimited 
scepticism on all subjects. It will in this case be impossible 
to fix upon any thing whatever, which is to be received as 
evidence, and men must give up all knowledge of intellect 
as well as matter, and will be at once released from all mor- 
al obligation. 
§. 96. Opinions of Locke on the testimony of the senses. 
As the satisfactory understanding of this subject is of much 
practical importance, we shall close what has been said upon 
it by some passages from Mr. Locke.-"If after all this, (he 
says in the Fourth Book of his Essay,) any one will be so 
skeptical as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that all we 
see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole 
being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long 
dream, whereof there is no reality ; and therefore will ques- 
tion the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any 
thing ; I must desire him to consider, that, if all be a dream, 
then he doth but dream that he makes the question ; and so 
it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him. 
But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this 
answer, that the certainty of things existing in rerum natura, 
when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only 
as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition 
needs. For our faculties being suited not to the full extent 
of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge 
of things, free from all doubt and scruple ; but to the preser- 
vation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the 
use of life; they serve to our purpose well enough, if they 
will but give us certain notice of those things which are con- 
venient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle 
burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame, by 
putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something 
existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to 
great pain : which is assurance enough, when no man requires 
greater certainty to govern his actions by than what is as 
certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleas- 
es to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be 
barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy ; 
by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into 134 
HABITS OF SENSATION 
a certainty greater than he could wish, that it is something 
more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as 
great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure 
or pain, i. e. happiness or misery ; beyond which we have no 
concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an assur- 
ance of the existence of things without us is sufficient to di- 
rect us in the attaining the good, and avoiding the evil, which 
is caused by them ; which is the important concernment we 
have of being made acquainted with them." 
CHAPTER EIGHTH. 
HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 
There is an important law of the mental constitution, 
known as the law of Habit, which may be described in gen- 
eral terms as follows ; That the mental action acquires facility and 
strength from repetition or practice. The fact, that the facility 
and the increase of strength, implied in habit, is owing to 
mere repetition, or what is more frequently termed practice, 
we learn, as we do other facts and principles in relation to 
the mind, from the observation of men around us, and from 
our own personal experience. And as it has hitherto been 
found impracticable to resolve it into any general fact or 
principle more elementary, it may justly be regarded as 
something ultimate and essential in our nature. 
The term Habit, by the use of language, indicates the fa- 
cility and strength, acquired in the way which has been 
mentioned, including both the result, and the manner of it. 
As the law of habit has reference to the whole mind of man, 
the application of the term, which expresses it, is of course 
very extensive. We apply it to the dexterity of wmkmen, 
in the different manual arts, to the rapidity of the account- 
ant, to the coup d'ceil or eye-glance of the military engineer, 
to the tact and fluency of the extemporaneous speaker, and 
§. 97. General view of the law of habit and of its applications. AND PERCEPTION. 
135 
in other like instances. We apply it also in cases, where 
the mere exercise of emotion and desire is concerned ; to the 
avaricious man's love of wealth, the ambitious man's passion 
for distinction, the wakeful suspicions of the jealous, and 
the confirmed and substantial benevolence of the philanthro- 
pist. 
It is remarkable, that the law under consideration holds 
good in respect to the body, as well as the mind. In the 
mechanical arts, and in all cases, where there is a corporeal, 
as well as mental effort, the effect of practice will be found 
to extend to both. Not only the acts of the mind are quick- 
ened and strengthened, but all those muscles, which are at 
such times employed, become stronger and more obedient to 
the will. Indeed the submission of the muscular effort to 
the volition is oftentimes rendered so prompt by habit, that 
we are unable distinctly to recollect any exercise of volition, 
previous to the active or muscular exertion. It is habit, 
which is the basis of those characteristic peculiarities, that 
distinguish one man's hand-writing from another's ; it is 
habit, which causes that peculiarity of attitude and motion, 
so easily discoverable in most persons, termed their gait ; it 
is habit also, which has impressed on the muscles, immedi- 
ately connected with the organs of speech, that fixed and 
precise form of action, which in different individuals gives 
rise, in part at least, to characteristics of voice. The habit 
in the cases just mentioned is both bodily and mental, and 
has become so strong, that it is hardly possible to counteract 
it for any length of time. The great law of Habit is appli- 
cable to all the leading divisions of our mental nature, the 
Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will ; and as we advance 
from one view of the mind to another, we shall have repeat- 
ed occasion to notice its influence. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we shall limit our remarks to Habit, considered in 
connection with the Sensations and Perceptions. 
§. 98. Of habit in relation to the smell. 
We shall consider the application of the principle of Habit 
to the senses in the same order, which has already been obser- 
ved. In the first place, there are habits of Smell.-This sense, 
like the others, is susceptible of cultivation. As there are 136 
HABITS OF SENSATION 
some persons, whose power of distinguishing' the difference 
of two or more colors is feeble ; so there are some, who are 
doubtful and perplexed in like manner in the discrimination 
of odors. And as the inability may be overcome in some 
measure in the former case, so it may be in the latter. The 
fact, that the powers of which the smell is capable are not 
more frequently brought out and quickened, is owing to the 
circumstance that it is not ordinarily needed. It sometimes 
happens, however, that men are compelled to make an un- 
common use of it, when by a defect in the other senses they 
are left without the ordinary helps to knowledge. It is then 
we see the effects of the law of Habit. It is stated in Mr. 
Stewart's Account of James Mitchell, who was deaf, sight- 
less, and speechless, and of course strongly induced by his 
unfortunate situation to make much use of the sense we are 
considering, that his smell would immediately and invariably 
inform him of the presence of a stranger, and direct to the 
place where he might be ; and it is repeatedly asserted, that 
this sense had become in him extremely acute. "It is re- 
lated, (says Dr. Abercrombie.) of the late Dr. Moyse, the 
well-known blind philosopher, that he could distinguish a 
black dress on his friends by its smell." 
In an interesting account of a deaf, dumb, and blind girl 
in the Hartford Asylum recently published, statements are 
made on this subject of a similar purport.-" It has been ob- 
served, (says the writer,) of persons, who are deprived of a 
particular sense, that additional quickness or vigor seems to 
be bestowed on those which remain. Thus blind persons are 
often distinguished by peculiar exquisiteness of touch, and 
the deaf and dumb, who gain all their knowledge through 
the eye, concentrate, as it were, their whole souls in that 
channel of observation. With her, whose eye, ear, and 
tongue are alike dead, the capabilities both of touch and 
smell are exceedingly heightened. Especially the latter 
seems almost to have acquired the properties of a new sense, 
and to transcend the sagacity even of a spaniel." Such is 
the influence of habit on the intimations of the sense under 
consideration. 
The same law is applicable to the Taste. We see the re- 
§. 99. Of habit in relation to the taste. AND PERCEPTION. 
137 
suits of the frequent exercise of this sense in the quickness, 
which the dealer in wines discovers in distinguishing the fla- 
vor of one wine from that of another. So marked are the 
results in cases of this kind, that one is almost disposed to 
credit the story, which Cervantes relates of two persons, 
who were requested to pass their judgment upon a hogshead, 
which was supposed to be very old and excellent. One of 
them tasted the wine and pronounced it to be very good, 
with the exception of a slight taste of leather, which he per- 
ceived in it. The other, after mature reflection and exami- 
nation, pronounced the same favorable verdict, with the ex- 
ception of a taste of iron, which he could easily distinguish. 
On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the bottom 
an old key with a leathern thong tied to it. 
Another practical view of this subject, however, presents 
itself here. The sensations, which we experience in this and 
other like cases, not only acquire by repetition greater nice- 
ness and discrimination, but increased strength ; (and per- 
haps the increased strength is in all instances the foundation 
of the greater power of discrimination.) On this topic we 
have a wide and melancholy source of illustration. The bib- 
ber of wine, and the drinker of ardent spirits readily ac- 
knowledge, that the sensation was at first only moderately 
pleasing, and perhaps in the very slightest degree. Every 
time they carried the intoxicating potion to their lips, the 
sensation grew more pleasing, and the desire for it waxed 
stronger. Perhaps they were not aware that^this^process 
was going on in virtue of a great law of humanity ; but they 
do not pretend to deny the fact. They might indeed have 
suspected at an early period, that chains were gathering 
around them, whatever might be the cause; but what objec- 
tion had they to be bound with links of flowers ; delightful 
while they lasted, and easily broken when necessary ! But 
here was the mistake. Link was added to link ; chain was 
woven with chain, till he, who boasted of his strength, was 
at last made sensible of his weakness, and found himself a 
prisoner, a captive, a deformed, altered, and degraded slave. 
There is a three-fold operation. The sensation of taste 
acquires an enhanced degree of pleasantness ; the feeling of 
uneasiness is increased in a corresponding measure, when 138 
HABITS OF SENSATION 
the sensation is not indulged by drinking; and the desire, 
which is necessarily attendant on the uneasy feeling, becomes 
in like manner more and more imperative. To alleviate the 
uneasy feeling and this importunate desire, the unhappy 
man goes again to his cups, and with a shaking hand pours 
down the delicious poison. What then ? He has added a 
new link to his chain ; at every repetition it grows heavier 
and heavier, till that, which at first he bore lightly and 
cheerfully, now presses him like a coat of iron, and galls like 
fetters of steel. There is a great and fearful law of his na- 
ture_bearing him down to destruction. Every indulgence is 
the addition of a new weight to what was before placed upon 
him, thus lessening the probability of escape, and accelerat- 
ing his gloomy, fearful, and interminable sinking. We do 
not mean to say, that he is the subject of an implacable des- 
tiny, and cannot help himself. But it would seem that he 
can help himself only in this way ; by a prompt, absolute, 
and entire suspension of the practice in all its forms, which 
has led him into this extremity. But few however have the 
resolution to do this ; the multitude make a few unwilling 
and feeble efforts, and resign themselves to the horrors of 
their fate. 
Some years since there was a pamphlet published in Eng- 
land, entitled the Confessions of a Drunkard. The state- 
ments made in it are asserted on good authority to be authen- 
tic. And what does the writer say ?-"Of my condition 
there is no hope that it should ever change ; the waters 
have gone over me ; but out of the black depths could I be 
heard, I would cry out to all those who have but set a foot in 
the perilous flood. Could the youth, to whom the flavor of 
his first wine is delicious as the opening scenes of life, or the 
entering upon some newly discovered paradise, look into my 
desolation, and be made to understand what a dreary thing 
it is, when a man shall feel himself going down a precipice 
with open eyes and a passive will,-to see his destruction, 
and have no power to stop it, and yet to feel it all the way 
emanating from himself; to perceive all goodness emptied 
out of him, and yet not be able to forget a time when it was 
otherwise ; to bear about the piteous spectacle of his own self 
ruins :-could he see my fevered eye, feverish with the last AND PERCEPTION. 
139 
night's drinking, and feverishly looking for this night's repe- 
tition of the folly ; could he feel the body of the death out of 
which I cry hourly, with feebler and feebler outcry, to be 
delivered, it were enough to make him dash the sparkling 
beverage to the earth in all the pride of its mantling tempta- 
tion."* 
There is undoubtedly a natural difference in the quick- 
ness and discrimination of hearing. This sense is more acute 
in some than in others ; but in those, who possess it in much 
natural excellence, it is susceptible of a high degree of culti- 
vation. Musicians are a proof of this, whose sensibility to 
the melody and concord of sweet sounds continually increas- 
es with the practice of their art. 
This increase of sensibility in the perceptions of hearing 
is especially marked and evident, when uncommon causes 
have operated to secure such practice. And this is the state 
of things with the Blind. The readers of Sir Walter Scott 
may not have forgotten the blind fiddler, who figures so con- 
spicuously with verse and harp in Red Gauntlet ; a charac- 
ter sufficiently extraordinary, but by no means an improbable 
exaggeration. The blind necessarily rely much more than 
others on the sense of hearing. By constant practice they 
increase the accuracy and power of its perceptions. Shut 
out from the beauties that are seen, they please themselves 
with what is heard, and greedily drink in the melodies of 
song. Accordingly music is made by them not only a solace, 
but a business and a means of support; and in the Institu- 
tions for the Blind this is considered an important depart- 
ment of instruction. 
Many particular instances on record and well authenticated 
confirm the general statement, that the ear may be trained 
to habits, and that thus the sensations of sound may come to 
us with new power and meaning. It is related of a celebra- 
ted blind man of Puiseaux in France, that he could determine 
the quantity of fluid in vessels by the sound it produced 
while running from one vessel into another. "Dr. Rush, (as 
the statement is given in Abercrombie's Intellectual Powers,) 
relates of two blind young men, brothers, of the city of Phil- 
§. 100. Of habit in relation to the hearing. 
* London Quarterly Review, Vol. XXVII, p. 130. 140 
HABITS OF SENSATION 
adelphia, that they knew when they approached a post in 
walking across a street, by a peculiar sound which the ground 
under their feet emitted in the neighborhood of the post ; 
and that they could tell the names of a number of tame pig- 
eons, with which they amused themselves in a little garden, 
by only hearing them fly over their heads." Dr. Saunder- 
son, who became blind so early as not to remember having 
seen, when happening in any new place, as a room, piazza, 
pavement, court, and the like,' gave it a character by means 
of the sound and echo from his feet; and in that way was 
able to identify pretty exactly the place, and assure himself 
of his position afterwards. A writer in the First Volume of 
the Manchester Philosophical Memoirs, who is our authori- 
ty also for the statement just made, speaks of a certain blind 
man in that city as follows ;-"I had an opportunity of re- 
peatedly observing the peculiar manner, in which he arran- 
ged his ideas, and acquired his information. Whenever he 
was introduced into company, I remarked that he continued 
some time silent. The sound directed him to judge of the 
dimensions of the room ; and the different voices, of the num- 
ber of persons that were present. His distinction in these 
respects was very accurate ; and his memory so retentive, 
that he was seldom mistaken. I have known him instantly 
recognize a person, on first hearing him, though more than 
two years had elapsed since the time of their last meeting. 
He determined pretty nearly the stature of those he was con- 
versing with, by the direction of their voices ; and he made 
tolerable conjectures respecting their tempers and disposi- 
tions, by the manner in which they conducted their conver- 
sation." 
§. 101. Of certain universal habits based on sounds. 
There are certain habits of hearing, (perhaps we should 
say classes of habits,) which all men, by the aid of the oth- 
er senses, combined with that of the judgment, form at an 
early period of life. The first class of habits here referred 
to are those, which have relation to the particular cause and 
the distance of sounds. The manner, in which we learn 
these, has been pointed out in a previous section. (§. 66.) 
The mere sensations of sound are entirely a distinct thing from 
the ideas of cause, place, and direction, which we generally AND PERCEPTION. 
141 
combine with them. Owing to frequent repetition from early 
life, this combination is effected so rapidly, that we are una- 
ble to retrace the successive steps of the process, and the 
whole seems to be involved in a single sensation. Perhaps 
it may be said, that the effect of repetition, (that is to say, 
the habit,) has a more direct and special relation to the act 
of judgment, which combines the reference with the sensa- 
tion, than to the sensation itself. However that may be, it 
may still be proper to speak of habits of hearing in the res- 
pect now under consideration, when we remember, that the 
reference has been so long and closely interwoven with the 
sensation, as to be apparently and practically, though not 
really identical with it. 
In respect to spoken language also, our habits are so labo- 
riously and deeply founded, that we may almost consider our- 
selves as having a new sense superadded to that of hearing. 
In our ordinary conversation with others, we seem to hear 
the whole of what is said ; nothing is lost as we imagine. 
But that this is not the fact, and that we are sustained in such 
cases not wholly by an actual sensation of sound, but in part 
at least by an acquired power of habit, is evident from this. 
When we hear proper names, whether of persons, places, or 
natural objects, pronounced for the first time, we often hesi- 
tate in respect to them ; are not certain that we possess the 
syllables intended to be conveyed; and ask for the repetition 
of them. We experience the same difficulty and uncertainty, 
as every one must have known who has tried it, when we 
hear a person read or converse in a foreign language. But 
when the conversation is in our own language, and relates to 
persons and objects we are acquainted with, it is altogether 
different, as has already been intimated. But what is the 
ground of the difference? Why are we perplexed in one case, 
and not in the other ? In our intercourse with others in 
conversation it almost constantly happens, (at least as much 
so as on any other occasions,) that the ear catches nothing 
but imperfect syllables, half-uttered words, sounds jumbled 
and commingled together ; but we are nevertheless not com- 
«nonly at a loss and perplexed, as in the cases before men- 
tioned. By the aid of judgment and the power of conception, 
whose action has in this case by long repetition formed itself 142 
HABITS OF SENSATION 
into a prompt and decisive habit, we at once separate these 
confused elements, supply the breaks in their connection, fill 
up the deficiencies, and make out a continuous and significant 
whole. And yet this is done so rapidly, and is so common, 
that in most cases we imagine there is nothing more than the 
pure and unmixed sensation. 
§. 102. Application of habit to the touch. 
The sense of touch like the others may be exceedingly im- 
proved by habit. The more we are obliged to call it into use, 
the more attention we pay to its intimations. By the frequent 
repetition, therefore, under such circumstances, these sensa- 
tions not only acquire increased intenseness in themselves ; 
but particularly so in reference to our notice and remembrance 
of them. But it is desirable to confirm this, as it is all other 
principles from time to time laid down, by an appeal to facts, 
and by careful inductions from them. 
Diderot relates of the blind man of Puiseaux mentioned in a 
former section, that he was capable of judging of his distance 
from the fire-place by the degree of heat, and of his approach 
to any solid bodies by the action or pulse of the air upon his 
face. The same thing is recorded of many other persons in 
a similar situation ; * and it may be regarded as a point well 
established, that blind people, who are unable to see the large 
and heavy bodies presenting themselves in their way as they 
* It is a singular circumstance, that something similar to what is here 
stated of the ability of blind men to discover the nearness or distance of 
objects by changes in the resistance of the atmosphere, has been noticed 
by the naturalist, Spallanzani, in respect to bats. He discovered that 
bats, when perfectly blinded and afterwards set at liberty, had the extra- 
ordinary faculty of guiding themselves through the most complicated 
windings of subterraneous passages, without striking against the walls, 
and they avoided with great skill, cords, branches of trees, and other ob- 
stacles, placed by design in their way. 
This ability is probably owing to an extreme delicacy in the wing, which 
is of a very large size in proportion to that of the animal, and is covered 
with an exceedingly fine net-work of nerves. The bat, as it strikes the 
air with its wing, receives sensations of heat, cold, and resistance, and, in 
consequence is enabled to avoid objects, which would otherwise obstruct 
its flight, apparently in the same way that blind persons perceive a door 
ora wall by a change in the temperature or in the resistance of the air. AND PERCEPTION. 
143 
walkabout,generally estimate their approach to them by*the 
increased resistance of the atmosphere. A blind person, 
owing to the increased accuracy of his remaining senses, es- 
pecially of the touch, would be better trusted to go through 
the various apartments of a house in the darkness of mid- 
night, than one possessed of the sense of seeing without any 
artificial light to guide him. 
In the celebrated Dr. Saunderson, who lost his sight in 
very early youth, and remained blind through life, although 
he occupied the professorship of mathematics in the English 
University of Cambridge, the touch acquired such acuteness, 
that he could distinguish, by merely letting them passthrough 
his fingers, spurious coins, which were so well executed as to 
deceive even skilful judges who could see.* 
The case of a Mr. John Metcalf, otherwise called Blind 
Jack, which is particularly dwelt upon by the author of the 
Article in the Memoirs just referred to, is a striking one. 
The writer states, that he became blind at an early period ; 
but,-notwithstanding, followed the profession of a waggoner 
and occasionally of a guide in intricate roads, during the night, 
or when the tracks were covered with snow. At length he 
became a projector and surveyor of highways in difficult and 
mountainous districts; an employment, for which one would 
naturally suppose a blind man to be but indifferently qualified. 
But he was found to answer all the expectations of his employ- 
ers, and most of the roads over the peak in Derbyshire in 
England were altered by his directions. Says the person, 
who gives this account of Blind Jack, " I have several times 
met this man with the assistance of a long staff traversing the 
roads, ascending precipices, exploring vallies, and investiga- 
ting their several extents, forms, and situations, so as to an- 
swer his designs in the best manner." 
In the interesting Schools for the Blind, which have recent- 
ly been established in various parts of the world, the pupils 
read by means of the fingers. They very soon learn by the 
touch to distinguish one letter from another, which are made 
separately for that purpose of wood, metals, or other hard 
materials. The printed sheets which they use are conformed. 
* Memoirs of the Manchester Philos. Society, Vol. I, p. 164. 144 
HABITS OF SENSATION 
to their method of studying them. The types are much larg- 
er than those ordinarily used in printing ; the paper is very 
thick, and being put upon the types while wet, and power- 
fully pressed, the letters on it are consequently raised, and ap- 
pear in relief. The pupils, having before leant to distinguish, 
one letter from another, and also to combine them into sylla- 
bles and words, are able after a time to pass their fingers 
along the words and sentences of these printed sheets, and 
ascertain their meaning with a good degree of rapidity. 
Perhaps it may occasion some surprise, when we add, that 
men may not only read by the touch, but may even find a 
substitute for the hearing in that sense. Persons, who were 
entirely deaf, have in some instances discovered a percep- 
tion of the proportion and harmony of sounds. 
" It will scarcely be credited, (says an English writer, 
speaking of one in that situation,) that a person thus circum- 
stanced should be fond of music ; but this was the fact in the 
case of Mr. Arrowsmith. He was at a gentleman's glee club, 
of which I was president at that time, and, as the glees were 
sung, he would place himself near some article of wooden fur- 
niture, or a partition, door, or window shutter, and would fix 
the extreme end of his finger nails, which he kept rather long, 
upon the edge of some projecting part of the wood, and there 
remain until the piece under performance was finished, all 
the while expressing, by the most significant gestures, the 
pleasure he experienced from the perception of musical sounds. 
He was not so much pleased with a solo, as with a pretty full 
clash of harmony ; and if the music was not very good, or I 
should rather say, if it was not correctly executed, he would 
show no sensation of pleasure. But the most extraordinary 
circumstance in this case is, that he was most evidently de- 
lighted with those passages, in which the composer displayed 
his science in modulating the different keys. When such pas- 
sages happened to be executed with precision, he could 
scarcely repress the emotions of pleasure which he received 
within any bounds ; for the delight he evinced seemed to 
border on extacy."* 
• London Quarterly Review, Vol. XXVI, p. 404. AND PERCEPTION. 
145 
§. 103. Other striking instances of habits of touch. 
The power of the touch will increase in proportion to the 
necessity of a reliance on it. The more frequent the resort 
to it, the stronger will be the habit ; but the necessity of this 
frequent reference to it will be found to be peculiarly great, 
where a person is deprived of two of his other senses. It is 
noticed of James Mitchell, whose case has been already re- 
ferred to, that he distinguished such articles as belonged to 
himself from the property of others by this sense. Although 
the articles were of the same form and materials with those 
of others, it would seem, that he was not at a loss in identify- 
ing what was his own. It will be recollected, that he could 
neither see nor hear, and was of course speechless. He was 
obliged therefore to depend chiefly on the touch. This sense 
was the principal instrument he made use of in forming an 
acquaintance with the strangers, who frequently visited him. 
And what is particularly remarkable, he actually explored 
by it, at an early period, a space round his father's residence 
of about two hundred yards in extent, to any part of which 
he was in the practice of walking fearlessly and without a 
guide, whenever he pleased. 
It is related of the deaf and blind girl in the Hartford Asy- 
lum, that it is impossible to displace a single article in her 
drawers without her perceiving and knowing it; and that 
when the baskets of linen are weekly brought from thelaun- 
dress, she selects her own garments without hesitation, how- 
ever widely they may be dispersed among the mass. This 
is probably owing, at least in great part, to habits of touch, 
by means of which the sense is rendered exceedingly acute. 
Diderot has even gone so far as to conjecture, that per- 
sons, deprived of both sight and hearing, would so increase 
the sensibility of touch as to locate the seat of the soul in the 
tips of the fingers. 
§. 104. Habits considered in relation to the sight. 
The law of habit affects the sight also. By a course of 
training this sense seems to acquire new power. The 
length and acuteness of vision in the mariner, who has long 
traversed the ocean, has been frequently referred to. "A 
writer in the North American Review, (July 1833,) says he 
once knew a man in the Greek island of Hydra, who was ac- 146 
HABITS OF SENSATION 
customed to take his post every day for thirty years on the 
summit of the island, and look out for the approach of ves- 
sels ; and although there were over three hundred sale be- 
longing to the island, he would tell the name of each one, as 
she approached, with unerring certainty, while she was still 
at such a distance as to present to a common eye only a con- 
fused white blur upon the clear horizon." There are numer- 
ous instances to the same effect, occasioned by the situations 
in which men are placed, and the calls for the frequent ex- 
ercise of the sight. The almost intuitive vision of the skill- 
ful engineer is beyond doubt in most cases merely a habit. 
He has so often fixed his eye upon those features in a coun- 
try, which have a relation to his peculiar calling, that he 
instantly detects the bearing of a military position, its sus- 
ceptibility of defence, its facilities of approach and retreat, 
&c. 
No man is born without the sense of touch, but many are 
born without the sense of hearing; and wherever this is the 
case, we are entitled to look for habits of sight. Persons un- 
der such circumstances naturally and necessarily rely much 
on the visual sense, whatever aids may be had by them 
from the touch. Hence habits ; and these imply increased 
quickness and power, wherever they exist. It is a matter of 
common remark, that the keenness of visual observation in 
the deaf and dumb is strikingly increased by their peculiar 
circumstances. Shut out from the intercourse of speech, 
they read the minds of men in their movements, gestures, 
and countenances. They notice with astonishing quickness, 
and apparently without any effort, a thousand things which 
escape the regards of others. This fact is undoubtedly the 
foundation of the chief encouragement, which men have to 
attempt the instruction of that numerous and unfortunate 
class of their fellow beings. They can form an opinion of 
what another says to them by the motion of the lips ; and 
sometimes even with a great degree of accuracy. That this 
last however is common, it is not necessary to assert ; that 
it is possible, we have the testimony of well authenticated 
facts. In one of his letters, Bishop Burnet mentions to this 
effect the case of a young lady of Geneva. "At two years 
old (he says) it was perceived, that she had lost her bearing. AND PERCEPTION. 
147 
and ever since, though she hears great noises, yet hears 
nothing of what is said to her ; but by observing the motion 
of the lips and mouths of others, she acquired so many 
words, that out of these she has formed a sort of jargon in 
which she can hold conversation, whole days, with those 
who can speak her language. She knows nothing of what 
is said to her, unless she sees the motion of their lips that 
speak to her ; one thing will appear the strangest part of 
the whole narrative. She has a sister with whom she has 
practised her language more than with any body else, and 
in the night, by laying her hand on her sister's mouth, she 
can perceive by that what she says, and so can discourse 
with her in the dark." (London Quarterly Review, Vol. 
xxiv, p. 399.) 
Such are the views, which have been opened to us, in con- 
sidering the law of habit in connection with the senses ; and 
we may venture to say with confidence, that they are ex- 
ceedingly worthy of notice. There are two suggestions, 
which they are especially fitted to call up. They evince the 
striking powers of the human mind, its irrepressible energies, 
which no obstacles can bear down. They evince also the 
benevolence of our Creator, who opens in the hour of misery 
new sources of comfort, and compensates for what we have 
not, by increasing the power and value of what we have. 
§. 105. Sensations may possess a relative, as well as positive increase of 
power. 
There remains a remark of some importance to be made 
in connection with the general principle, which has been 
brought forward, and as in some measure auxiliary to it; for 
it will help to explain the more striking instances of habits, if 
any should imagine, that the fact of mere repetition is not 
sufficient to account for them. Our sensations and percep- 
tions may acquire not only a direct and positive, but a rela- 
tive and virtual increase of power. 
This remark is thus explained. We shall hereafter see 
the truth of an important principle to this effect, that there 
will be a weakness of remembrance in any particular case in 
proportion to the want of interest in it. Now hundreds and 
thousands of our sensations and perceptions are not remem- 148 
HABITS OF SENSATION 
bered, because we take no interest in them. Of course they 
are the same, relatively to our amount of knowledge and our 
practice, as if they had never existed at all. But when we 
are placed in some novel situation, or when in particular we 
are deprived of any one of the senses, the pressure of our ne- 
cessities creates that interest, which was wanting before. 
Then we delay upon, and mark, and remember, and inter- 
pret a multitude of evanescent intimations, which were for- 
merly neglected. The senses thus acquire a very considera- 
ble relative power and value. And in order to make out a 
satisfactory explanation of some instances of habits, it is per- 
haps necessary, that this relative increase should be added 
to the direct and positive augmentation of vigor and quick- 
ness, resulting from mere repetition or exercise. 
Hitherto it has been our chief object to examine habits in 
their relation to the senses separately ; it is proper also to 
take a general view of them, as formed and modified by the 
particular callings and employments of men. Habits of per- 
ception are frequently formed under such circumstances, 
where all the senses are not only possessed, but where they 
exist with their ordinary aptitudes and powers. In conse- 
quence of the habits, which he has been called upon to form 
by his particular situation, a farmer of a tolerable degree of 
experience and discernment requires but a slight inspection, 
in order to give an opinion on the qualities of a piece of land, 
and its suitableness for a settlement. A skillful printer will 
at once notice every thing of excellence or of deficiency in 
the mechanical execution of a printed work The same 
results are found in all, who practice the fine arts. An expe- 
rienced painter at once detects a mannerism in coloring, com- 
binations and contrasts of light and shade, and peculiarities 
of form, proportion, or position, which infallibly escape a 
person of more limited experience. 
Dr. Reid speaks on this subject in the following character- 
istic manner. "Not only men, but children, idiots, and 
brutes acquire by habit many perceptions which they had 
not originally. Almost every employment in life hath per- 
ceptions of this kind that are peculiar to it. The shepherd 
§. 106. Of habits as modified by particular callings or arts. AND PERCEPTION. 
149 
knows every sheep of his flock, as we do our acquaintance, 
and can pick them out of another flock one by one. The 
butcher knows by sight the weight and quality of his beeves 
and sheep before they are killed. The farmer perceives by 
his eye, very nearly the quantity of hay in a rick, or of corn 
in a heap. The sailor sees the burden, the built, and the dis- 
tance of a ship at sea, while she is a great way off. Every 
man, accustomed to writing, distinguishes acquaintances by 
their handwriting, as he does by their faces. And the paint- 
er distinguishes, in the works of his art, the style of all the 
great masters. In a word, acquired perception is very differ- 
ent in different persons, according to the diversity of objects 
about which they are employed, and the application they be- 
stow in observing them."* 
§. 107. The law of habit considered in reference to the perception of 
the outlines and forms of objects. 
Before leaving the subject of Habit, considered as influen- 
cing Sensation and Perception, there is one other topic, which 
seems to be entitled to a brief notice; we refer to the manner, 
in which we perceive the outlines and forms of bodies. In 
discussing the subject of Attention, Mr. Stewart, in connec- 
tion with his views on that subject, introduces some remarks 
in respect to vision. He makes this supposition, That the 
eye is fixed in a particular position, and the picture of an ob- 
ject is painted on the retina. He then starts this inquiry ; 
Does the mind perceive the complete figure of the object at 
once, or is this perception the result of the various perceptions 
we have of the different points in the outline ? He holds 
the opinion, that the perception is the result of our percep- 
tions of the different points in the outline, which he adopts as 
naturally consequent on such views, as the following. The 
outline of every body is made up of points or smallest visible 
portions ; no two of these points can be in precisely the same 
direction ; therefore, every point by itself constitutes just as 
distinct an object of attention to the mind, as if it were separ- 
ated by some interval of empty space from all the other points. 
The conclusion, therefore, is, as every body is made up of 
parts, and as the perception of the figure of the whole ob- 
• Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, Chap. VI, §. 20. 150 
HABITS OF SENSATION 
ject implies a knowledge of the relative situation of the differ- 
ent parts with respect to each other, that such perception is 
the result of a number of different acts of attention. 
But if we adopt this view of Mr. Stewart, it is incumbent 
upon us to show how it happens, that we appear to see the 
object at once ? The various facts, which have been brought 
forward in this chapter, appear to furnish us with a solution 
of this question. The answer is, that the acts of perception 
are performed with such rapidity, that the effect with respect 
to us is the same, as if it were instantaneous. A habit has 
been formed ; the glance of the mind, in the highest exercise 
of that habit, is indescribably quick ; time is virtually annihi- 
lated ; and separate moments are to our apprehension of 
them crowded into one. 
Some persons will probably entertain doubts of Mr. Stew- 
art's explanation of the manner, in which we perceive the 
outlines of objects ; but there are various circumstances, 
which tend to confirm it. When we look for the first time 
on any object, which is diversified with gaudy colors, the 
mind is evidently perplexed with the variety of perceptions 
which arise ; the view is indistinct, which would not be the 
case, if there were only one, and that an immediate percep- 
tion. And even in paintings, which are of a more laudable 
execution, the effects at the first perception will be similar. 
But there is another fact, which comes still more directly to 
the present point. We find, that we do not have as distinct an 
idea, at the first glance, of a figure of an hundred sides, as we 
do of a triangle or a square. But we evidently should, if the 
perception of visible figure were the immediate consequence 
of the picture on the retina, and not the combined result of 
the separate perceptions of the points in the outline. When- 
ever the figure is very simple, the process of the mind is so 
very rapid, that the perception seems to be instantaneous. 
But when the sides are multiplied beyond a certain number, 
the interval of time necessary for these different acts of atten- 
tion becomes perceptible. We are then distinctly conscious, 
that the mind labors from one part of the object to another, 
and that some time elapses before we grasp it as a whole. 
§. 108. Notice of some facts which favor the above doctrine. AND PERCEPTION. 
151 
§. 109. Additional illustration of Mr. Stewart's doctrine. 
These views and illustrations are still further confirmed 
by some interesting and perhaps more decisive facts. In 1807 
Sir Everard Home, well known for his various philosophical 
publications, read before the Royal Society an account of two 
blind children, whom he had couched for the cataract. One 
of these was John Salter. Upon this boy various experi- 
ments were made, for the purpose among other things of as- 
certaining, whether the sense of sight does originally, and of 
itself alone, give us a knowledge of the true figure of bodies. 
Some of the facts elicited under these circumstances have a 
bearing upon the subject now before us. In repeated instan- 
ces, on the day of his restoration to sight, the boy called 
square and triangular bodies, which were presented to the vis- 
ual sense merely, round. On a square body being presented 
to him, he expressed a desire to touch it. "This being refus- 
ed, he examined it for some time, and said at last, that he 
had found a corner, and then readily counted the four corners 
of the square ; and afterwards when a triangle was shown 
him, he counted the corners in the same way ; but in doing 
so his eye went along the edge from corner to corner, naming 
them as he went along." On the thirteenth day after the 
cataract was removed, the visual power he had acquired was 
so small, that he could not by sight tell a square from a circle, 
without previously directing his sight to the corners of the 
square figure as he did at first, and thus passing from corner 
to corner and counting them one by one. It was noticed, 
that the sight seemed to labor slowly onward from one point 
and angle to another, as if it were incapable of embracing the 
outline by a simultaneous and undivided movement. The 
process, however, became more and more easy and rapid, un- 
til the perception, which at first was obviously made up of 
distinct and successive acts, came to be in appearance, (and 
we must suppose it was only in appearance), a concentrated 
and single one. 
It was the same with Caspar Hauser. It is remarked by 
his biographer, that whenever a person was introduced to 
him, (this was probably soon after his release from his prison,) 
he went up very close to him, regarded him with a sharp 
staring look, and noticed particularly each distinct part of his 152 
MUSCULAR HABITS. 
face, such as the forehead, eyes, nose, mouth, and chin. He 
then collected and consolidated all the different parts of the 
countenance, which he had noticed separately and piece by 
piece, into one whole. And it was not till after this process, 
that he seemed to have a knowledge of the countenance or 
face, in distinction from the parts of the face. 
CHAPTER NINTH. 
MUSCULAR HABITS. 
§. 110. Instances in proof of the existence of muscular habits. 
From habits, considered as affecting the senses, the transi- 
tion is easy to muscular habits. On this subject therefore 
we shall now offer a few remarks. Of the fact, that such 
habits exist, it is presumed no doubt can be generally enter- 
tained. Muscular habits may be detected in the gait and in 
the speech of men generally ; they are found with specific 
characteristics in particular classes of men ; every mechanic 
forms them, and they vary in their aspect with his particular 
business. Hence the enlarged and powerful neck of the port- 
er, the strong and brawny arm of the blacksmith, and the par- 
ticular habitudes of all their movements. 
But we will not delay on this part of the subject any 
farther than to point out one or two familiar instances. 
Every man's hand-writing is a striking instance, and a 
proof of Muscular Habit. In acquiring that art, the muscles 
have undergone a complete system of instruction. That in- 
struction and training they practically and punctually regard 
ever afterwards ; so much so that we can tell a man's wri- 
ting, to which we are accustomed, almost as readily as we re- 
cognize the man himself when we see him. Again, walk- 
ing is an instance and illustration of muscular habits. The MUSCULAR HABITS. 
153 
process of walking is an easy one ; but it is made so by a hab- 
it, founded upon a long and difficult training ; and every man 
has his particular habit or method of walking. We see evi- 
dence, that habit is involved in walking, in children, who ob- 
viously do not walk by mere instinct; but learn to do it by 
repeated experiments made upon the muscles of motion. 
Not long since a singular fact came to the knowledge of the 
writer, which confirms this remark. A man was accidentally 
thrown from his cart ; and the wheel of the cart passed over 
his neck, and injured his spine. For six weeks he was desti- 
tute of the power of sensation and motion. About that time, 
his sensation was restored ; and the various parts of the body 
were again subjected to the general control of the will. But 
he could not walk, nor use his arms to any profitable purpose, 
not because he was destitute of the voluntary and muscular 
power ; but because he unexpectedly found himself at a loss 
to determine what particular muscles to employ, in order to 
produce the desired result. If he wished, for example, to 
use an extensor muscle in the arm or leg, he was just as like- 
ly to use a flexor, as the one he intended. In other words, 
he was about as likely to bend his arm, or to turn his leg in 
or out as to straighten them ; and it was only by repeated 
experiments he could ascertain the particular muscles, which 
he wished to use. In every thing relating to bodily action, 
he was thrown back into the condition*of early childhood ; 
and it was not till after a long and tedious process of experi- 
menting on the numerous muscles of motion, that he was en- 
abled to walk and to labor, as he was accustomed to do before 
his injury. There are, then, muscular habits, as well as hab- 
its of sensation and perception. But the subject of these 
habits is introduced here, although the train of thought seemed 
naturally to lead to it, not so much for its own sake, as in 
consequence of its connection with Volition. 
§. 111. Muscular habits regarded by some writers as involuntary. 
It seems to have been the opinion of some writers, (among 
others of Drs. Reid and Hartley,) that bodily or muscular 
habits operate in many cases without design and volition on 
the part of the person, who has formed them ; and that as 
they are without any attendant thought, without any pre- 154 
MUSCULAR HABITS. 
ceding mental operation, such bodily acts are to be considered 
as purely mechanical or automatic. They endeavor to ex- 
plain and confirm their views by the instance of a person, 
learning to play on the harpsichord. When a person first be- 
gins to learn, it is admitted by all, that there is an express 
act of volition, preceding every motion of the fingers. By de- 
grees the motions appear to cling to each other mechanically; 
we are no longer conscious of volitions, preceding and gov- 
erning them. In other words, there is nothing left but the 
motions ; there is no act of the mind ; the performance, ad- 
mirable as it is, has the same character and the same merit 
with that of the action of a well-contrived machine. 
§. 112. Objections to the doctrine of involuntary muscular habits. 
In replying to these views, it may be safely admitted, that, 
in playing the harpsichord and some other musical instru- 
ments, we have not always a distinct remembrance of voli- 
tions, and consequently the muscular effort has sometimes the 
appearance of being independent of the will. But this mere 
appearance is not sufficient to command our assent to the 
doctrine advanced by these writers, until the four following 
objections be set aside. 
(1.) The supposition, that the acts in question are auto- 
matic is unnecessary. If it be true, as there is so much 
reason to believe, that Habit is a general law of our nature, 
then it may be regarded as applicable not only to the muscu- 
lar efforts, but to the preceding volitions themselves. It is 
implied in this view, (supposing it to be a correct one), that 
such volitions may be very rapid, so as scarcely to arrest our 
attention a moment. Now the natural result of such slight 
attention will be, that they will exist and pass away without 
being remembered. These considerations are sufficient to ex- 
plain the mere appearance, which is admitted to exist, but 
which Reid and Hartley attempt to explain by an utter deni- 
al of the putting forth of volitions at all. But if this be the 
case, then the supposition, that the acts in question are auto- 
matic and involuntary, is an unnecessary one. 
(2.) The most rapid performers are able, when they 
please, to play so slowly, that they can distinctly observe 
every act of the will in the various movements of the fingers. MUSCULAR HABITS. 
155 
And when they have checked their motions so as to be able 
to observe the separate acts of volition, they can afterwards 
so accelerate those motions, and of course so diminish the 
power, (or what may be regarded as the same thing, the time 
of attending to them,) that they cannot recal the accompany- 
ing volitions. This is the rational and obvious supposition, 
that there is notan exclusion of volitions, but an inability to 
recollect them, on account of the slight degree of attention. 
Any other view necessarily implies an inexplicable jumble of 
voluntary and involuntary actions in the same performance. 
(3.) If there be no volitions, the action must be strictly 
and truly automatic ; that is, it must, from the nature of the 
case, be the motion of a machine. It must always go on in- 
variably in the same track, without turning to the right hand 
or to the left. If this be the case in playing the harpsichord, 
which is by no means probable, it is certainly not in some 
other instances of habits. It must be supposed, that there is 
as much rapidity of volition put forth by the rope-dancer, the 
equilibrist, the equestrian actor of the circus, &c. as by the 
player on the harpsichord. Now if it be admitted, that the 
ordinary steps of the singular and surprising feats they per- 
form are familiar to them, still the process is evidently not 
an invariable one. It may be pronounced impossible for them 
to perform experiments, which agree in every particular with 
preceding experiments. They are necessarily governed in 
their volitions and movements by a variety of circumstances, 
which arise on every particular occasion, and which could 
not be foreseen. Hence the muscular movements in these 
cases, being controlled by the will, are not mechanical ; and 
as we have abundant reason to believe them often .not less 
rapid in the performance, than the muscular movements are 
in playing the harpsichord, why should we consider these 
last mechanical and not voluntary ? 
(4.) If the hypothesis of Reid and Hartley be true, then 
there is some general tendency or principle in our nature, by 
which actions originally voluntary are converted into mechan- 
ical actions. Nor will it be easy to show, why this principle 
should not extend further than mere bodily movements. It 
will be the result of this tendency to wrest all those powers 
which it reaches, whether bodily or mental, from the control 156 
CONCEPTIONS. 
of the will. In other words, when we consider the extent of 
its application, and its wonderful results, wherever it applies, 
we must conclude, that this principle will infallibly make men 
machines, mere automatons, before they have lived out half 
their days. Such are some of the objections to the doc- 
trine, that muscular habits are involuntary. 
CHAPTER TENTH. 
CONCEPTIONS. 
§. 113. Meaning and characteristics of conceptions. 
We are now led, as we advance in the general subject of 
intellectual states of external origin, to contemplate the 
mind in another view, viz, as employed in giving rise to what 
are usually termed conceptions. Without professing to pro- 
pose a definition in all respects unexceptionable, we are enti- 
tled to say in general terms, that this name is given to any 
re-existing sensations whatever, which the mind has felt at 
some former period, and to the ideas, which we frame of ab- 
sent objects of perception. Whenever we have conceptions, 
our sensations and perceptions are replaced, as Shakspeare 
expresses it, in the "mind's eye," without our at all consider- 
ing at what time, or in what place they first originated. In 
other words, they are revived or recalled, and nothing more. 
Using, therefore, the term conceptions to express a class 
of mental states, and in accordance with the general plan, 
having particular reference in our remarks here to such as 
are of external origin, it may aid in the better understanding 
of their distinctive character, if we mention more particular- 
ly, how they differ both from sensations and perceptions, and 
also from remembrances, with which last some may imagine 
them to be essentially the same. 
I,-Conceptions differ from the ordinary sensations and 157 
CONCEPTIONS. 
perceptions in this respect, that both their causes and their 
objects are absent. When the rose, the honeysuckle, or 
other odoriferous body is presented to us, the effect, which 
follows in the mind, is termed a sensation. When we after- 
wards think of that sensation, (as we sometimes express it,) 
when the sensation is recalled even though very imperfect- 
ly, without the object which originally caused it being pres- 
ent, it then becomes, by the use of language, a conception. 
And it is the same in any instance of perception. When, in 
strictness of speech, we are said to perceive any thing, as a 
tree, a building, or a mountain, the objects of our perceptions 
are in all cases before us. But we may form conceptions of 
them, they may be recalled and exist in the mind's eye, howev- 
er remote they may be in fact, both in time and place. 
II,-They differ also from remembrances or ideas of mem- 
ory. We take no account of the period, when those objects, 
which laid the foundation of them, were present; whereas 
in every act of the memory there is combined with the con- 
ception a notion of the past. Hence as those states of mind, 
which we call conceptions, possess these distinctive marks, 
they are well entitled to a separate name. 
Conceptions are regulated in their appearance and disap- 
pearance by the principles of Association, which will be ex- 
plained hereafter. Whenever at any time we may use the 
phrase "power of conception" or " faculty of conception," 
nothing more is to be understood by such expressions than 
this, that there is in the mind a susceptibility of feelings or 
ideas possessing the marks, which we have ascribed to this 
class. 
One of the striking facts in regard to our conceptions isr 
that we can far more easily conceive of the objects of some 
senses than of others. He, who has beheld the pyramids of 
Egypt and the imposing remains of Grecian temples, or has 
visited among nature's still greater works the heights of 
the Alps and the cataract of Niagara, will never afterwards 
be at a loss in forming a vivid conception of those interesting 
objects. The visual perceptions are so easily and so distinct- 
ly recalled, that it is hardly too much to say of them, that 
they seem to exist as permanent pictures in the mind. It is 
§. 114. Of conceptions of objects of sight. 158 
CONCEPTIONS. 
related of Carsten Niebuhr, a well known traveller in the 
East, that, in extreme old age, after he had become blind, he 
entertained his visitors with interesting details of what he 
had seen many years before at Persepolis ; describing the 
walls, on which the inscriptions and bas-reliefs of which he 
spoke were found, just as one would describe a building, 
which he had recently visited. His son, who has given an 
account of his life, remarks in connection with this fact, 
"we could not conceal our astonishment. He said to us, 
that, as he lay blind upon his bed, the images of all that he 
had seen in the East were ever present to his soul ; and it 
was therefore no wonder that he should speak of them as of 
yesterday. In like manner there was vividly reflected to 
him in the hours of stillness, the nocturnal view of the deep 
Asiatic heavens, with their brilliant host of stars, which he 
had so often contemplated ; or else their blue and lofty vault 
by day ; and this was his greatest enjoyment." 
There seems to be less vividness in the conceptions of 
sound, touch, taste, and smell ; particularly the three last. 
Every one knows, that it is difficult in ordinary cases to recal 
with much distinctness a particular pain, which we have for- 
merly experienced, or a particular taste, or smell. The fact, 
that the perceptions of sight are more easily and distinctly 
recalled than others, may be thus partially explained. 
Visible objects or rather the outlines of them are complex ; 
that is, they are made up of a great number of points or very 
small portions. Hence the conception, which we form of 
such an object as a whole, is aided by the principles of asso- 
ciation. The reason is obvious. As every original percep- 
tion of a visible object is a compound made up of many 
parts, whenever we subsequently have a conception of it, the 
process is the same ; we have a conception of a part of the 
object, and the principles of association help us in conceiving 
of the other parts. Association connects the parts together ; 
it presents them to the mind in their proper arrangement, 
and helps to sustain them there. 
We are not equally aided by the laws of association in 
forming our conceptions of the objects of the other senses. 
When we think of some sound, taste, touch, or smell, the 
object of our conception is either a single detached sensation, CONCEPTIONS. 
159 
or a series of sensations. In every such detached sensation 
of sound, taste, touch, or smell, whether we consider it at its 
first origin or when it is subsequently recalled, there is not 
necessarily that fixed and intimate association of the parts, 
which we suppose to exist in every visual perception, and 
which must exist also in every conception of objects of sight, 
which subsequently takes place. Accordingly our concep- 
tions of the latter objects arise more readily, and are more 
distinct, than of the others.-There is a greater readiness 
and distinctness also, when there is a series of sensations and 
perceptions of sight, for the subsequent visual conceptions 
are aided by associations both in time and place; but the 
recurrence of other sensations and perceptions is aided only 
by associations in time. 
§. 115. Of the influence of habit on our conceptions. 
It is another circumstance worthy of notice in regard to 
conceptions, that the power of forming them depends in 
some measure on habit. A few instances will help to 
illustrate the statement, that what is termed Habit may ex- 
tend to the susceptibility of conceptions ; and the first to be 
given will be of conceptions of sound. Our conceptions of 
sounds are not in general remarkably distinct, as was intima- 
ted in the last section. It is nevertheless true, that a per- 
son may by practice acquire the power of amusing himself 
with merely reading written music. Having frequently as- 
sociated the sounds with the notes, he has at last such a 
strong conception of the sounds, that he experiences, by 
merely reading the notes a very sensible pleasure. It is for 
the same reason, viz, because our conceptions are strength- 
ened by repetition or practice, that readers may enjoy the 
harmony of poetical numbers without at all articulating the 
words. In both cases they truly hear nothing ; there is no 
actual sensation of sound ; and yet there is a virtual enunci- 
ation and melody in the mind. It seems to be on this princi- 
ple we are enabled to explain the fact, that Beethhoven com- 
posed some of his most valued musical pieces after he had be- 
come entirely deaf; originating harmonic combinations so 
profound and exquisite as to require the-nicest ear as a test, 
at the very time he was unable to hear any thing himself. 160 
CONCEPTIONS. 
§. 116. Influence of habit on conceptions of sight. 
That our power of forming conceptions is strengthened by 
habit is capable of being further illustrated from the sight. 
A person, who has been accustomed to drawing, retains a 
much more perfect notion of a building, landscape, or other 
visible object, than one who has not. A portrait painter, or 
any person, who has been in the practice of drawing such 
sketches, can trace the outlines of the human form with very 
great ease ; it requires hardly more effort from them than to 
write their names.-This point may also be illustrated by 
the difference which we sometimes notice in people in their 
conceptions of colors. Some are fully sensible of the differ- 
ence between two colors when they are presented to them, 
but cannot with confidence give names to these colors when 
they see them apart, and may even confound the one with 
the other. Their original sensations and perceptions are sup- 
posed to be equally distinct with those of other persons ; but 
their subsequent conception of the colors is far from being 
so. This defect arises partly at least from want of practice ; 
that is to say, from the not having formed a habit. The per- 
sons, who exhibit this weakness of conception, have not 
been compelled by their situation, nor by mere inclination, to 
distinguish and to name colors so much as is common.. 
§. 117. Of the subserviency of our conceptions to description. 
It is highly favorable to the talent for lively description, 
when a person's conceptions are readily suggested and are 
distinct. Even such an one's common conversation differs 
from that of those, whose conceptions arise more slowly, and 
are more faint. One man, whether in conversation or in 
written description, seems to place the abject, which he wish- 
es to describe, directly before us ; it is represented distinct- 
ly and to the life. Another, although not wanting in a com- 
mand of language, is confused and embarrassed amid a mul- 
titude of particulars, which, in consequence of the feebleness 
of his conceptions, he finds himself but half acquainted with ; 
and he, therefore, gives us but a very imperfect and confused 
notion of the thing, which he desires to make known. 
It has been by some supposed, that a person might give 
a happier description of an edifice, of a landscape, or other CONCEPTIONS. 
161 
object, from the conception than from the actual perception 
of it. The perfection of a description does not always con- 
sist in a minute specification of circumstances ; in general the 
description is better, when there is a judicious selection of 
them. The best rule for making the selection is, to attend to 
the particulars, that make the deepest impression on our 
own minds, or, what is the same thing, that most readily and 
distinctly takes place in our conceptions.-W'hen the object 
is actually before us, it is extremely difficult to compare the 
impressions, which different circumstances produce. When 
we afterwards conceive of the object, we possess merely the 
outline of it ; but it is an outline made up of the most striking 
circumstances. Those circumstances, it is true, will not im- 
press all persons alike, but will somewhat vary with the de- 
gree of their taste. But when with a correct and delicate 
taste any one combines lively conceptions, and gives a de- 
scription from those conceptions, he can hardly fail to succeed 
in it. And accordingly we find here one great element of 
poetic power. It is the ability of forming vivid conceptions, 
which bodies forth 
•'The forms of things unknown ; the poet's pen 
"Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing 
"A local habitation and a name." 
§. 118. Of conceptions attended with a momentary belief. 
Our conceptions are sometimes attended with belief; 
when they are very lively, we are apt to ascribe to them a 
real outward existence, or believe in them. We do not un- 
dertake to assert, that the belief is permanent; but a number 
of facts strongly lead to the conclusion, that it has a momen- 
tary existence. 
(1.) A painter, in drawing the features, and bodily form of 
an absent friend, may have so strong a conception, so vivid 
a mental picture, as to believe for a moment that his friend is 
before him. After carefully recalling his thoughts at such 
times and reflecting upon them, almost every painter is ready 
to say, that he has experienced some illusions of this kind. 
"We read, (says Dr. Conolly,) that, when Sir Joshua Rey- 
nolds, after being many hours occupied in painting, walked 
out into the street, the lamp-posts seemed to him to be trees. 162 
CONCEPTION'S. 
and the men and women moving- shrubs." It is true, the illu- 
sion is in these cases very short, because the intensity of con- 
ception, which is the foundation of it, can never be kept up 
long when the mind is in a sound state. Such intense con- 
ceptions are unnatural. And, further, all the surrounding ob- 
jects of perception, which no one can altogether disregard for 
any length of time, tend to check the illusion and terminate it. 
(2.) When a blow is aimed at any one, although in sport, 
and he fully knows it to be so, he forms so vivid a conception 
of what might possibly be the effect, that his belief is for a 
moment controlled, and he unavoidably shrinks back from it. 
This is particularly the case, if the blow approaches the eye. 
Who can help winking at such times ? It is a proof of our be- 
lief being controlled under such circumstances, that we can 
move our own hands rapidly in the neighborhood of the eye, 
either perpendicularly or horizontally ; and at the same time 
easily keep our eyelids from motion. But when the motion is 
made by another, the conception becomes more vivid, and a 
belief of danger inevitably arises. Again, place a person on 
the battlements of a high tower ; his reason tells him he is in 
no danger ; he knows he is in none. But after all he is 
unable to look down from the battlements without fear ; his 
conceptions are so exceedingly vivid as to induce a momen- 
tary belief of danger in opposition to all his reasonings. 
(3.) When we are in pain from having struck our foot 
against a stone, or when pain is suddenly caused in us by any 
other inanimate object, we are apt to vent a momentary rage 
upon it. That is to say, our belief is so affected for an instant, 
that we ascribe to it an accountable existence, and would 
punish it accordingly. This is observed particularly in chil- 
dren and in Savages. It is on the principle of our vivid con- 
ceptions being attended with belief, that poets so often ascribe 
life, and agency, and intention to the rains and winds, to 
storms, and thunder, and lightning. How natural are the 
expressions of King Lear, overwhelmed with the ingratitude 
of his daughters, and standing with his old head bared to the 
pelting tempest ! 
"Nor rain, wind, thunder, fire are my daughters ; 
"I tax not you, ye elements, with unkindness ; 
"I never gave you kingdoms, called you children." CONCEPTIONS. 
163 
(4.) There are persons, who are entirely convinced of the 
folly of the popular belief of ghosts and other nightly appari- 
tions, but who cannot be persuaded to sleep in a room alone, 
nor go alone into a room in the dark. Whenever they hap- 
pen out at night, they are constantly looking on every side ; 
their quickened perceptions behold images, which never had 
any existence except in their own minds, and they are the 
subjects of continual disquiet and even terror. " It was 
my misfortune, (says Dr. Priestly,) to have the idea of dark- 
ness, and the ideas of invisible malignant spirits and appari- 
tions very closely connected in my infancy ; and to this day, 
notwithstanding I believe nothing of those invisible powers, 
and consequently of their connection with darkness, or any 
thing else, I cannot be perfectly easy in every kind of situa- 
tion in the dark, though I am sensible I gain ground upon 
this prejudice continually." 
In all such cases we see the influence of the prejudices of 
the nursery. Persons, who are thus afflicted, were taught in 
early childhood to form conceptions of ghosts, visible hob- 
goblins, and unearthly spirits ; and the habit still continues. 
It is true, when they listen to their reasonings and philosophy, 
they may well say they do not believe in such things. But 
the effect of their philosophy is merely to check their belief; 
not in ten cases in a thousand is the belief entirely overcome. 
Every little while, in all solitary places, and especially in the 
dark, it returns, and when banished returns again ; otherwise 
we cannot give an explanation of the conduct of these per- 
sons. 
' §. 119. Conceptions which are joined with perceptions. 
The belief in our mere conceptions is the more evident 
and striking, whenever they are at any time joined with our 
perceptions.-A person, for instance, is walking in a field, in 
a foggy morning, and perceives something, no matter what it 
is ; but he believes it to be a man, and does not doubt it. In 
other words,, he truly perceives some object, and, in addition 
to that perception, has a mental conception of a man, attend- 
ed with belief. When he has advanced a few feet further, 
all at once he perceives, that what he conceived to be a man 
is merely a stump with a few stones piled on its top. He 
perceived at first, as plainly or but little short of it, that 164 
CONCEPTIONS. 
it was a stump, as in a moment afterwards ; there were 
the whole time very nearly the same visible form and the 
same dimensions in his eye. But he had the conception of a 
man in his mind, at the same moment, which overruled and 
annulled the natural effects of the visual perception ; the con- 
ception being associated with a present visible object acquired 
peculiar stength and permanency, so much so that he truly 
and firmly believed that a human being was before him. 
But the conception has departed ; the present object of per- 
ception has taken its place, and it is now impossible for him 
to conjure up the phantom, the reality of which he but just 
now had no doubt of. 
In his Voyage of Discovery to the Arctic Regions, Capt. 
Ross mentions an incident, illustrative of the power and 
fruitfulness of our conceptions, when upheld by the actual 
presence of objects. It will be recollected, that the immense 
masses of ice, which are found floating in the polar seas, often 
display a variety of the most brilliant hues. Speaking of one 
of these ice-bergs as they are called, which he early fell in 
with, and which was about forty feet high and a thousand 
feet long, ''imagination, he says, painted it in many gro- 
tesque figures ; at one time it looked something like a white 
lion and horse rampant, which the quick fancy of sailors, in 
their harmless fondness for omens, naturally enough shaped 
into the lion and unicorn of the king's arms, and they were 
delighted accordingly with the good luck it seemed to augur." 
One of the numerous characters, whom Sir Walter Scott 
has sketched with so much truth to nature, speaks of himself 
as being banished, on a certain occasion, to one of the sandy 
keys of the West Indies, which was reputed to be inhabited 
by malignant demons. This person, after acknowledging he 
he had his secret apprehensions upon their account, remarks, 
"in open daylight, or in absolute darkness, I did not greatly 
apprehend their approach ; but in the misty dawn of the 
morning, or when evening was about to fall, I saw, for the 
first week of my abode on the Key, many a dim and undefi- 
ned spectre,-now resembling a Spaniard, with his capa 
wrapped around him, and his huge sombrera as large as an 
umbrella upon his head,-now a Dutch sailor, with his rough 
cap and trunk hose,-and now an Indian Cacique, with his CONCEPTIONS. 
165 
feathery crown and long lance of cane. I always approached 
them, but whenever I drew near, the phantom changed into 
a bush, or a piece of drift-wood, or a wreath of mist, or some 
such cause of deception." 
But it is unnecessary to resort to books for illustrations of 
this topic. Multitudes of persons have a conceptive facility 
of creations, which is often troublesome and perplexing; es- 
pecially in uncommon situations, and in the night. And in 
all cases this tendency is greatly strengthened, whenever it 
can lay hold of objects, the outlines of which it can pervert 
to its own purposes. In instances of this kind, where the 
conceptions are upheld, as it were, by present objects of per- 
ception, and receive a sort of permanency from them, noth- 
ing is better known, than that we often exercise a strong 
and unhesitating belief. These instances, therefore, can 
properly be considered as illustrating and confirming the 
views in the preceding section. 
§. 120. Of our conceptions at tragical representations. 
These observations suggest an explanation, at least in 
part, of the effects, which are produced on the mind by ex- 
hibitions of fictitious distress. In the representation of trag- 
edies, it must be admitted, that there is a general conviction 
of the whole being but a fiction. But, although persons enter 
the theatre with this general conviction, it does not always 
remain with them the whole time. At certain peculiarly 
interesting passages in the poet, and at certain exhibitions 
of powerful and well timed effort in the actor, this general 
impression, that all is a fiction, fails. The feelings of the 
spectator may be said to rush into the scenes ; he mingles 
in the events ; carried away and lost, he for a moment be- 
lieves all to be real, and the tears gush at the catastrophe 
which he witnesses. The explanation, therefore, of the 
emotions felt at the exhibition of a tragedy, such as indigna- 
tion, pity, and abhorrence, is, that at certain parts of the ex- 
hibition we have a momentary belief in the reality of the 
events, which are represented. And after the illustrations 
which have been given, such a belief cannot be considered 
impossible. The same explanation will apply to the emo- 
tions, which follow our reading of tragedies when alone, or 166 
SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS 
any other natural and affecting descriptions. In the world 
of conceptions, which the genius of the writer conjures up, 
we are transported out of the world of real existence, and for 
a while fully believe in the reality of what is only an incan- 
tation. 
CHAPTER ELEVENTH. 
SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS OF MENTAL STATES. 
§. 121. Origin of the distinction of simple and complex. 
In looking at our thoughts and feelings, as they continu- 
ally pass under the review of our internal observation, we 
readily perceive, that they are not of equal worth ; we do 
not assign to them the same estimate ; one state of mind is 
found to be expressive of one thing only, and that thing, 
whatever it is, is precise, and definite, and inseparable ; 
while another state of mind is found to be expressive of, and 
virtually equal to many others. And hence we are led, not 
only with the utmost propriety, but even by a sort of neces- 
sity, to make a division of the whole body of our mental 
affections into the two classes of simple and complex. Na- 
ture herself makes the division ; it is one of those character- 
istics, which give to the mind, in part at least, its greatness ; 
one of those elements of power, without which the soul could 
not be what it is, and without a knowledge of which it is 
difficult to possess a full and correct understanding of it in 
other respects. 
§. 122. Nature and characteristics of simple mental states. 
We shall first offer some remarks on those mental states, 
which are simple, and shall aim to give an understanding of 
their nature, so far as can be expected on a subject, the 
clearness of which depends more on a reference to our own 
personal consciousness, than on the teachings of others. 
Let it be noticed then, in the first place, that a simple OF MENTAL STATES. 
167 
idea cannot be separated into parts.-It is clearly implied 
in the very distinction between simplicity and complexity, 
considered in relation to the states of the mind, that there 
can be no such separation, no such division. It is emphatic- 
ally true of our simple ideas and emotions, and of all other 
simple states of the mind, that they are one and indivisible. 
Whenever you can detect in them more than one element, 
they at once lose their character of simplicity and are to be 
regarded as complex, however they may have previously ap- 
peared. Inseparableness consequently is their striking char- 
acteristic ; and it may be added, that they are not only in- 
separable in themselves, but are separate from every thing 
else. There is nothing, which can stand as a substitute for 
them where they are, or represent them where they are not; 
they are independent unities, constituted exclusively by the 
mind itself, having a specific and positive character, but nev- 
ertheless known only in themselves. 
§. 123. Simple mental states not susceptible of definition. 
Let it be observed, in the second place, that our simple no- 
tions cannot be defined.-This view of them follows neces- 
sarily from what has been said of their oneness and insepar- 
bleness, compared with what is universally understood, by 
defining. In respect to definitions, it is undoubtedly true, 
that we sometimes use synonymous words, and call such use 
a definition ; but it is not properly such. In every legitimate 
definition, the idea, which is to be defined, is to be separated, 
as far as may be thought necessary, into its subordinate 
parts ; and these parts are to be presented to the mind for 
its examination, instead of the original notion, into which 
they entered. This process must be gone through in every 
instance of accurate defining ; this is the general and author- 
ized view of definition ; and it is not easy to see, in what 
else it can well consist. 
But this process will not apply to our simple thoughts 
and feelings, because if there be any such thing as simple 
mental states, they are characterized by inseparableness and 
oneness. And, furthermore, if we define ideas by employing 
other ideas, we must count upon meeting at last with such 
as shall be ultimate, and will reject all verbal explanation ; 168 
SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS 
otherwise we can never come to an end in the process.-So 
that the simple mental affections are not only undefinable in 
themselves ; but, if there were no such elementary states of 
mind, there could be no defining in any other case ; it would 
be merely analysis upon analysis, a process without comple- 
tion, and a labor without end ; leaving the subject in as 
much darkness, as when the process was begun. 
When we speak of simple ideas and feelings, and a person, 
in consequence of our inability to define them, professes to 
be ignorant of the terms we use, we can frequently aid him 
in understanding them, by a statement of the circumstances 
as far as possible, under which the simple mental state exists. 
But having done this, we can merely refer him to his own 
senses and consciousness, as the only teachers, from which 
he can expect to receive satisfaction. 
§. 124. Simple mental states representative of a reality 
A third mark or characteristic of simple mental states, is, 
that they always stand for or represent a reality.-In oth- 
er words, no simple idea is, in its own nature, delusive or 
fictitious ; but always has something precisely corresponding 
to it. It is not always so with complex ideas ; these, as 
Mr. Locke justly gives us to understand, are sometimes chi- 
merical. That is to say ; the elements of which they are 
composed, are so brought together and combined as to form 
something, of which nature presents no corresponding reali- 
ty. If, for instance, a person had an idea of a body, yellow, 
or of some other color, malleable, fixed, possessing in a word 
all the qualities of iron or of gold, with this difference only, 
of its being lighter than water, it would be what Mr. Locke 
terms a chimerical idea ; because the combination of the 
elements here exists only in the human mind, and notin na- 
ture ; the thing has no outward or objective reality. The 
words centaur, dragon, and hypogriff, which are the well 
known names for imaginary beings possessing no actual ex- 
istence, are expressive of chimerial complex ideas. These 
ideas have nothing corresponding to them. But it is not so 
with the simple states of the mind. If it were otherwise, 
since in our inquiries after truth we naturally proceed from 
what is complex to what is simple, there would be no sure OF MENTAL STATES. 
169 
foundation of knowledge. Whenever, in our analysis of a 
subject, we arrive at truly simple ideas, we have firm foot- 
ing ; there is no mistake, no delusion. Nature, always faith- 
ful to her own character, gives utterance to the truth alone. 
But man, in combining together the elements, which nature 
furnishes, does not always avoid mistakes. 
§. 125. Origin of complex notions and their relation to simple. 
Our simple states of mind, which we have thus endeavor- 
ed to explain, were probably first in origin. There are rea- 
sons for considering them as antecedent in point of time to 
our complex mental states, although in many cases it may not 
be easy to trace the progress of the mind from the one to the 
other. The complex notions of external material objects 
embrace the separate and simple notions of resistance, ex- 
tension, hardness, color, taste, and others. As these elemen- 
tary perceptions evidently have their origin in distinct and 
separate senses, it is but reasonable to suppose, that they 
possess a simple, before they are combined together in a com- 
plex existence. Simple ideas, therefore, may justly be re- 
garded as antecedent in point of time to those, which are com- 
plex, and as laying the foundation of them. 
Hence we see, that it is sufficiently near the truth, and 
that it is not improper, to speak of our complex ideas, as de- 
rived from, or made up of simple ideas. This is the well 
known language of Mr. Locke on this subject ; and when we 
consider how much foundation there is for it in the constitu- 
tion and operations of the human mind, there is good reason 
for retaining it. Although purely simple states of the 
mind are few in number, vast multitudes of a complex nature 
are formed from them. The ability, which the mind posses- 
ses of originating complex thoughts and feelings from ele- 
mentary ones, may be compared to our power of uniting to- 
gether the letters of the alphabet in the formation of sylla- 
bles and words. 
§. 126. Supposed complexness without the antecedence of simple feelings. 
It is possible, that some persons may object to the doc- 
trine proposed in the last section, that complex mental states 
are subsequent in point of time to those, which are simple ; 170 
SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS 
and may be inclined to adopt the opinion, that some at least 
of our complex notions are framed at once and immediately, 
whenever an occasion presents itself, and are not necessari- 
ly dependent on the prior existence of any other feelings. 
When the eye, for instance, opens on a wide and diversified 
landscape, they suppose the whole to be embraced in one 
complex mental state, the formation of which is not gradual 
and susceptible of measurement by time, but is truly instan- 
taneous. When we direct our attention to objects of less 
extent, as a portrait, a landscape or historical painting, they 
imagine it to be still more evident, that the complexity of 
mind, corresponding to the complexity of the object, is a re- 
sult without any antecedent process. Without doubt what 
has now been said is in some instances apparently the case ; 
but this appearance, (for we cannot speak of it as any thing 
more than such,) is susceptible of an obvious explanation, 
without an abandonment of the general principle which has 
been laid down. No one is ignorant, that the mind often 
passes with exceeding rapidity along the successive objects 
of its contemplation. This rapidity may in some cases be 
so great, that no foundation will be laid for remembrance ; 
and of course in such cases the complex feeling has the ap- 
pearance of being formed without the antecedence of other 
simple feelings. Often the eye glances so rapidly over the 
distinct parts of the portrait, the historical painting, or even 
the wide landscape, that we are utterly unable in our recol- 
lection to detect the successive steps of its progress. There 
naturally seems, therefore, to be but one view, instead of 
distinct and successive glancings of the mind from hill to hill, 
from forest to forest, and from one verdant spot to another, 
prior to the supposed one and instantaneous comprehension 
of the whole. But there is much reason for saying, that this 
oneness of comprehension is in seeming and appearance 
only, and not in fact. (See §. §. 107-109.) 
§. 127. The precise sense in which cornplexness is to be understood. 
But while we distinctly assert the frequent complexness 
of the mental affections, it should be particularly kept in 
mind, that they are not to be regarded in the light of a ma- 
terial compound, where the parts, although it may some- OF MENTAL STATES. 
171 
times appear to be otherwise, necessarily possess no higher 
unity than that of juxtaposition, and of course can be literal- 
ly separated from each other, and then put together again. 
There is nothing of this kind ; neither putting together, nor 
taking asunder, in this literal and material sense.-But if our 
thoughts and feelings are not made up of others, and are not 
complex in the material sense of the expressions, what then 
constitutes their complexness ? This inquiry gives occasion 
for the important remark, that complexness in relation to the 
mind is not literal, but virtual only. What we term a com- 
plex feeling is in itself truly simple, but at the same time it 
is equal to many others ; and is complex only in that sense. 
Thought after thought, and emotion, following emotion, pas- 
ses through the mind ; and as they are called forth by the 
operation of the laws of association, many of them necessa- 
rily have relation to the same object. Then there follows a 
new state of mind, which is the result of those previous feel- 
ings, and is complex in the sense already explained. That 
is to say, it is felt by us to possess a virtual equality to those 
separate antecedent thoughts and emotions. Our simple 
feelings are like streams coming from different mountains, 
but meeting and mingling together at last in the common 
centre of some intermediate lake; the tributary fountains 
are no longer separable ; but have disappeared, and become 
merged and confounded in the bosom of their common rest- 
ing place. Or they may be likened to the cents and dimes 
of the American coinage, tens and hundreds of which are 
represented by a single eagle ; and yet the eagle is not divi- 
ded into a hundred or thousand parts, but has as much unity 
as the numerous pieces, for which it stands. 
The language, which expresses the composition and com- 
plexity of thought, is, therefore, to be regarded as wholly 
metaphorical, when applied to the mind, and is not to be ta- 
ken in its literal meaning. We are under the necessity of 
employing in this case, as in others, language which has a 
material origin, but we shall not be led astray by it, if we 
carefully attend to what has been said, and endeavor to aid 
our conception of it by a reference to our internal experi- 
ence. 172 
SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS 
§. 128. Illustrations of analysis as applied to the mind. 
The subject of the preceding section will be the better 
understood by the consideration of Analysis as applicable to 
the mind. As we do not combine literally, so we do not un- 
tie or separate literally ; as there is no literal complexness, 
so there is no literal resolution or analysis of it. Neverthe- 
less we have a meaning, when we speak of analyzing our 
thoughts and feelings. And what is it? What are we to un- 
derstand by the term analysis ? 
Although this subject is not without difficulty, both in the 
conception, and in the expression of it, it is susceptible of 
some degree of illustration.-It will be remembered, that 
there may be analysis of material bodies. The chemist an- 
alyzes, when he takes a piece of glass, which appears to be 
one substance, and finds, that it is not one, but is separable 
into silicious and alkaline matter. He takes other bodies, 
and separates them in like manner ; and whenever he does 
this, the process is rightly called analysis. 
Now we apply the same term to the mind ; but the thing 
expressed by it, the process gone through, is not the same. 
All we can say is, there is something like this. We do not 
resolve and separate a complex thought, as we do a piece of 
glass, or other material body into its parts ; we are utterly 
unable to do it, if we should seriously make the attempt; 
every mental state is in itself and in fact simple and indivisi- 
ble, and is complex only virtually. Complex notions are the 
results, rather than the compounds of former feelings ; and 
though not literally made up of parts, have the relation to 
them, winch any material whole has to the elements compo- 
sing it ; and in that particular sense may be said to compre- 
hend or embrace the subordinate notions. Mental analysis 
accordingly'concerns merely this relation. We perform such 
an analysis, when, by the aid of our reflection and conscious- 
ness, we are able to indicate those separate and subordinate 
feelings, to which, in our conception of it, the complex men- 
tal state is virtually equal. 
The term government, for instance, when used in refer- 
ence to the mental perception of the thing thus named, ex- 
presses a complex state of the mind ; we may make this men- 
tal state, which is in fact only one, although it is virtually OF MENTAL STATES. 
173 
more than one, a subject of contemplation ; and we are said 
to analyze it, when we are able to indicate those separate 
and more elementary notions, without the existence and an- 
tecedence of which, it could not have been formed by the 
mind. We do not literally take the complex state in pieces, 
but we designate other states of mind, which, every one's 
knowledge of the origin of thought convinces him, must have 
preceded it, such as the ideas of power, right, obligation, 
command, and the relative notions of superior and inferior. 
§. 129. Complex notions of external origin. 
The doctrine of simplicity and complexness of mental states 
is applicable, in both its forms, to the Intellective and Sensi- 
tive parts of our nature ; in other words, there maybe a com- 
plex affection or passion, as well as a complex perception. 
The acts of the Will, the other great Division of the mental 
nature, are always simple. When we consider the subject in 
reference to the intellect alone, we may add further, that 
there is complexity of the Intellect, both in its internal and 
external action ; and it seems proper, in this connection, to 
say something, in particular, of complex notions of external 
origin. 
What we term our simple ideas are representative of the 
parts of objects only. The sensations of color, such as red, 
white, yellow ; the original intimations from the touch, such 
as resistance, extension, hardness, and softness, do not, in 
themselves considered, give us a knowledge of substances, 
but only of the parts, attributes, or elements of substances. 
Accordingly the ideas which we have of the various objects 
of the external world, are, for the most part, complex. We 
speak of a house, a tree, a flower, a plant, a mineral, an ani- 
mal ; and in none of these cases are the ideas which we have 
simple ; but on the contrary, embrace a considerable number 
of elements. 
§. 130. Of objects contemplated as wholes. 
In point of fact, the various external objects, which come 
under our notice, are presented to us as wholes; and as such, 
(whatever may havebeen the original process leading to that 
result,) we very early contemplate them.-Take for instance 
a loadstone. In their ordinary and common thoughts upon 174 
SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS 
it, (the result probably of some antecedent and very early 
training,) men undoubtedly contemplate it as a whole ; the 
state of mind, which has reference to it, embraces it as such. 
This complex notion, like all others which are complex, is vir- 
tually equal to a number of others of a more elementary char- 
acter. Hence, when we are called upon to give an account 
of the loadstone, we can return no other answer than by an 
enumeration of its elements. It is something, which has 
weight, color, hardness, power to draw iron, and whatever 
else we discover in it. 
We use the term gold. This is a complex term, and im- 
plies a complexity in the corresponding mental states. But if 
we use the word gold, or any other synonymous word, in the 
hearing of a man who has neither seen that substance, nor 
had it explained to him, he will not understand what is meant 
to be conveyed. We must enter into an analysis ; and show, 
that it is a combination of the qualities of yellowness, great 
weight, fusibility, ductility, &c. We look upward to the sun 
in the heavens. But what should we know of that great ag- 
gregate, if we could not contemplate it in the elements of 
form and extension, of brightness and heat, of roundness and 
regularity of motion ?-All the ideas, therefore, which we 
form of external objects considered as wholes, are complex ; 
and all such complex notions are composed of those which 
are simple. 
§. 131. Something more in external objects than mere attributes or 
qualities. 
But it is to be anticipated, that we shall expose ourselves 
here to be pressed by certain inquiries. It will be said per- 
haps, that this makes the whole visible creation a mere con- 
gregation, (susceptible undoubtedly of being arranged into 
classes, but after all, a mere congregation,) of attributes, 
qualities, or properties. What we behold yonder, it will per- 
haps be alledged as an illustration of the objection, is mere 
greenness, resistance, hardness, form, &c. but nothing more ; 
it is not a tree. In the firmament there is brightness and 
heat and roundness, and uniformity of motion, but that is all; 
we mistake when we suppose there is a reality, an actual sun. 
In a word, this view of external objects brings us back to one 
of the fundamental doctrines of Pyrrho, that there is nothing OF MENTAL STATES. 
175 
external to us but certain uniform appearances, which are 
mistaken for existences and realities without being so. 
It is perhaps enough to say in regard to this objection, that 
we reject the idea of its being rightfully applied to ourselves, 
because we do not hesitate to admit and assert the truth of 
an existence, (however difficult it may be to the mind fully 
to conceive of it,) independently of these qualities; in other 
words, that there is something more, in point of fact, than 
what is outwardly exhibited. On a careful examination of 
our feelings we shall probably find it impossible even to con- 
ceive of a quality without a subject, or an attribute without 
some object to which it belongs. We believe, (and we can- 
not help believing,) that there must necessarily be some foun- 
dation, some basis, which is the support of such attributes and 
qualities. We may not be able to tell precisely what it is ; 
we may not have it in our power to describe or define it; but 
still it exists. The quality, therefore, and the existence, to 
which it belongs, the outward accessible presentation and the 
subjective nature or essence are not, in the view of the mind, 
identical. (See§. §. 93-96.) 
It will then perhaps be asked, WThy do we not direct our 
attention at once to the true subjective existence, to matter 
itself, and not delay upon its appendages ? The answer is, 
we cannot ; the mind has its limits. It might be asked with 
the same reason, why we do not look directly into the exis- 
tence and essence of the Deity, instead of studying Him in 
his works and intermediate manifestations ? It might be ask- 
ed, why we do not directly contemplate the existence and es- 
sence of the mind instead of studying it in its attributes and 
operations ? The answer in all these cases is the same, viz, 
that we are unable to do it. And yet we believe in the exis- 
tence and reality of a God, although we know him only 
through his manifestations and attributes. We believe in the 
existence and reality of the human mind, although the direct 
subject of our knowledge is not the mind itself, but merely its 
attributes and operations. It is the same in regard to the 
material world. The qualities and properties of bodies are 
the signs or marks, which are immediately presented to our 
notice. They form the occasion, on which the mind, by its 
power of original suggestion, assures us of something more 176 
SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS 
than the signs, which immediately fall under our notice. This 
something, which we cannot help regarding as an actual and 
independent reality, we call variously a material subject, ma- 
terial existence, matter, &c. Nor is the idea, which we form 
of matter, to be regarded as an indistinct one, although, being 
simple, each one must depend for the clearness of his percep- 
tion of it on himself. 
132. Imperfections of our complex notions of external objects. 
Although the mind of man is to be regarded, in the great 
ordering and constitution of things ; as in some important 
sense the representative of the material universe, it must still 
be acknowledged to be a very imperfect one. It is as true in 
nature as in religion, that we know only in part. Men have no 
doubt been always advancing in knowledge, but when we 
compare our present acquisitions with our former ignorance, 
we may well anticipate, that the progress of the future will 
lay the foundation of another comparison, not so flattering to 
the present generation. This view will not only apply to 
knowledge in the mass ; but will hold goad, on a smaller scale, 
of every complex notion which we form. Take for in- 
stance the complex idea of Gold. The thought is understood 
to be the representative of the thing. But is it in this case a 
true one? If we should admit it to be so, as far as it goes, still 
it is evidently not a full or perfect one ; nor can we regard it 
as such without suffering ourselves to be led into error. In 
the complicated notion, to which men agree in giving that 
name, we combine the simple ideas of yellowness, weight, 
hardness, malleability, and perhaps others ; but it is only 
reasonable to suppose, that no person combines, in his concep- 
tion of it, all its properties. 
Philosophy may justly boast of her achievements, without 
pretending that nature has made a revelation of all her se- 
crets. Can any man explain the mode of the connection be- 
tween mind and matter ? This connection is obviously a se- 
cret not yet cleared up. Can any man assert positively what 
that cohesion or attraction is, which holds together the parts 
of gold, iron, and other material bodies ? That is a subject 
also, on which nature has reserved to herself something fur- 
ther to say. One body impinging upon another puts it in mo- 177 
OF MENTAL STATES. 
tion ; and in our wisdom we give it a name ; we call it motion 
by impulse. But can any man tell what motion is ? Still 
more can he point out, how motion passes from one body to 
another, when the particles of those bodies come in contact, 
if indeed there can be any actual contact ? Such are the 
doubts, that press upon us, wherever we turn our eyes. But 
this is not said to discourage inquiry. The first step in lay- 
ing a good and broad foundation is to be fully sensible of our 
ignorance, and of the mind's limits. 
CHAPTER TWELFTH. 
ABSTRACTION. 
§. 133. Abstraction implied in the analysis of complex ideas. 
The remarks, which have been made, in the course of 
the foregoing chapter, on the analysis and examination of 
our Complex Intellectual states, naturally lead to the consid- 
eration of another subject in some respects intimately con- 
nected with that topic. When we have once formed a com- 
plex notion, (no matter at what period, in what way, or of 
what kind,) it not unfrequently happens that we desire, for 
various reasons, to examine more particularly some of its 
parts. Very frequently this is absolutely necessary to the 
full understanding of it. Although undoubtedly its elemen- 
tary parts once came under review, that time is now long 
past ; it has become important to institute a new inspection, 
to take each simple notion involved in it, and examine it by 
itself. And this is done by means of the process of Abstrac- 
tion, and in no other way. 
By the aid of that process, our complex notions, however 
comprehensive they may be, are susceptible, if one may be 
allowed so to speak, of being taken to pieces, and the ele- 
mentary parts may be abstracted or separated from each 
other; that is, they are made subjects of consideration apart 178 
from other ideas, with which they are ordinarily found to be 
associated. And hence, whenever this is the case in respect 
to the states of the mind, they are sometimes called abstrac- 
tions, and still more frequently are known by the name of 
ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
For the purpose of distinctness in what we have to say, 
they may be divided into the two classes of Particular and 
General ; that is to say, in some cases the abstraction relates 
only to a single idea or element, in others it includes more. 
• General Abstract Ideas, (or the notions which we form 
of Genera and Species,) will form a distinct subject of con- 
sideration. 
ABSTRACTION. 
§. 134. Instances of particular abstract ideas. 
We shall proceed, therefore, to remark here on Particular 
abstractions. Of this class the notions, which we form of 
the different kinds of colors, may be regarded as instances. 
For example we hold in our hand a rose ; it has extension, 
color, form, fragrance. The mind is so deeply occupied with 
the color, as almost wholly to neglect the other qualities. 
This is a species of abstraction, although perhaps an imper- 
fect one, because, when an object is before us, it is difficult, 
in our most attentive consideration of any particular quality 
or property, to withdraw the mind wholly from the others. 
When, on the contrary, any absent object of perception occurs 
to us, when we think of or form a conception of it, our 
thoughts will readily fix upon the color of such object, and 
make that the subject of consideration, without particularly 
regarding its other qualities, such as weight, hardness, taste, 
form, &c. We may also distinguish in any body, (either 
when present or still more perfectly when absent,) its solidi- 
ty from its extension, or we may direct our attention to its 
weight, or its length, or breadth, or thickness, and make any 
one of these a distinct object in our thoughts. 
And hence, as it is a well known fact, that the properties 
of any body may be separated in the view and examination 
of the mind, however closely they may be connected in their 
appropriate subjects, we may lay down this statement in re- 
spect to the states of the mind before us ; viz. When any 
quality or attribute of an object, which docs not exist by it- 
self, but in a state of combination, is detached by our minds ABSTRACTION. 
179 
from its customary associates, and is considered separately, 
the notion we form of it becomes a particular abstract idea. 
The distinctive mark of this class is, that the abstraction 
is limited to one quality. It should perhaps be particularly 
added, that the abstraction or separation may exist mentally, 
when it cannot take place in the object itself. For instance, 
the size, the figure, length, breadth, color, &c. of a building 
may each of them be made subjects of separate mental con- 
sideration, although there can be no real or actual separation 
of these things in the building itself. If there be any one of 
these properties, there must necessarily be all. 
§. 135. Mental process in separating and abstracting them. 
The manner of expressing ourselves on the subject of our 
abstract notions, to which we have been accustomed, is apt 
to create and cherish a belief in the existence of a separate 
mental faculty, adapted solely to this particular purpose. 
But the doctrine of a power or faculty of abstraction, which 
is exclusive of other mental susceptibilities, and is employed 
solely for this purpose, does not appear to be well founded. 
It will convey an impression nearer the truth to speak of the 
process, rather than the power of abstraction. The fol- 
lowing statement will be sufficient to show, how those of the 
first class, or particular abstract ideas are formed. 
Although our earliest notions, whether they arise from the 
senses or are of an internal origin, are simple, existing in an 
independent and separate state, yet those simple thoughts 
are very soon found to unite together with a considerable 
degree of permanency, and out of them are formed complex 
states of mind. Many are in this way combined together in 
one, and the question is, how this combination is to be loos- 
ened, and the elementary parts are to be extracted from their 
present complexity? 
In answer it may be said, that, in every case of separa- 
ting a particular abstract idea, there must necessarily be a 
determination, a choice, an act of the will. This voluntary 
state of mind must concern the previous complex mental 
state, when viewed in one respect, rather than another ; or 
what is the same thing, it will concern one part of the com- 180 
ABSTRACTION. 
plex idea rather than another. So that we may truly and 
justly be said to have not only a desire, but a determination 
to consider or examine some part of the complex idea more 
particularly than the others. When the mind is in this man- 
ner directed to any particular part of a complex notion, we 
find it to be the fact, that the principle of association, or 
whatever principle it is, which keeps the other parts in their 
state of union with it, ceases, in a greater or less degree, to 
operate and to maintain that union ; the other parts rapidly 
fall off and disappear, and the particular quality, towards 
which the mind is especially directed, remains the sole sub- 
ject of consideration. That is to say, it is abstracted, or be- 
comes an abstract idea. If for example we have in mind 
the complex notion of any object, a house, tree, plant, flower, 
and the like, but have a desire and determination to make 
the color, which forms a part of this complex notion, a partic- 
ular subject of attention, the consequence is, that, while the 
quality of color occupies our chief regard, the other qualities 
will disappear, and no more be thought of. If we determine 
to examine the weight or extension of an object, the result 
will be the same ; in other words, the extension, weight, col- 
or, &c. becoming distinct and exclusive objects of attention, 
will be abstracted. 
This, in the formation of particular abstract ideas, seems 
to be the process of the mind, and nothing more ; viz. The 
direction of an act of the will to a particular part of a com- 
plex notion, and the consequent detention of the part, to- 
wards which the mental choice is directed, and the natural 
and necessary disappearance, under such circumstances, of 
the other parts. 
§. 136. Of generalizations of particular abstract mental states. 
The terms generalizing and generalization are often 
found applied to the states of mind under consideration. 
When we have made any quality of a body a distinct and sep- 
arate subject of attention, we may further regard it as belong- 
ing to one or more objects, according as we find such to be 
the fact, or otherwise. What is chiefly meant, therefore, 
when we speak of the generalizing of this class of abstract ABSTRACTION. 
181 
notions, is that, in our experience of things, we observe 
them to be common to many subjects. We find whiteness to 
be a quality of snow, of chalk, of milk, and of other bodies ; 
and whenever with the simple abstract notion of whiteness 
we connect in our thoughts the additional circumstance of 
its not being limited to one body but the property of many, 
the term may be said to be generalized. And this seems to 
be all, that can be properly understood by generalization, 
when applied to the states of mind now before us. 
§. 137. Of the importance and uses of abstraction. 
The power of Abstraction, as it has sometimes been called, 
is by no means an unimportant one, even when limited to 
the separation of the particular or simple elements of thought. 
"A carpenter, (says Kames,* speaking of the great utility 
of abstraction,) considers a log of wood with regard to hard- 
ness, firmness, color, and texture ; a philosopher, neglecting 
these properties, makes the log undergo a chemical analysis, 
and examines its taste, its smell, and component principles ; 
the geometrician confines his reasoning to the figure, the 
length, breadth, and thickness ; in general, every artist, ab- 
stracting from all other properties, confines his observations 
to those, which have a more immediate connection with his 
profession. 
Besides its well-known uses in the various forms of reas- 
oning, (particularly demonstrative reasoning,) abstraction is 
greatly subservient to the exertions of a creative imagination, 
as they appear in painting, architecture, poetry, and the oth- 
er fine or liberal arts. The poet and the painter are sup- 
plied with their materials from experience; without having 
received ideas from some source, they never could have prac- 
tised their art. But if they do not restrict themselves to mere 
imitation, they must combine and modify the ideas which they 
have, so as to be able to form new creations of their own. 
But every such exertion of their powers presupposes the ex- 
ercise of abstraction in decomposing and separating actual 
conceptions, and in forming them anew. The power of ab- 
straction, therefore, may justly be considered as a character- 
istic of the great masters in the liberal arts. From how many 
• Elements of Criticism, Vol III. Appendix. 182 
GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
delightful forms in nature, and how many ideal temples, con- 
templated for a long time in the mind's eye, must the genius, 
that planned the Parthenon, have abstracted each form of 
beauty and excellence of proportion ! From how many for- 
ests, both seen and imagined, and fields of bloom, and rivers 
and waterfalls, must the mind, that conceived the Garden of 
Paradise Lost, have drawn the sounds that delight the ear, 
and the colors that are pleasant to the sight ! 
CHAPTER THIRTEENTH. 
GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
§. 138. General abstract notions the same with genera and species. 
. We proceed, in connection with the remarks of the last 
chapter, to the consideration of general abstract ideas ; a 
subject of no little interest, and which has frequently been 
thought to be attended with no small difficulty. 
General Abstract notions are not only different in conse- 
quence of embracing a greater number of elementary parts, 
from those which are particular, but are also susceptible of 
being distinguished from the great body of our other complex 
notions. The idea for example, which we form of any in- 
dividual, of John, Peter, or James, is evidently a complex 
one, but it is not necessarily a general one. The notion, 
which we frame of a particular horse, or of a particular tree 
is likewise a complex idea, but not a general one. There 
will be found to be a clear distinction between them, although 
it may not be perfectly obvious at first. General abstract 
ideas are our notions of the classes of objects, that is, of Gen- 
era and Species. They are expressed by general names, 
without, in most cases, any defining or limitation, as when 
we use the words animal, man, horse, bird, sheep, fish, GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
183 
tree, not to express any one in particular of these various 
classes, but animals, men, horses, &c. in general. 
139. Process in classification or the forming of genera and species. 
Now if our general abstract ideas, so far as they relate to 
external objects, are truly notions of species and genera, it 
will aid us in the better understanding of them, if we briefly 
consider, how species and genera are formed. Men certainly 
find no great practical difficulty in forming these classifications, 
since we find that they do in fact make them in numberless 
instances, and at a very early period of life. They seem to 
be governed in the process by definite and uniform mental 
tendencies. What then, in point of fact, is the process in 
classification? It is obvious, in the first place, that no classi- 
fication can be made without considering two or more objects 
together. A number of objects, therefore, are first presented 
to us for our observation and inquiry, which are to be exam- 
ined first in themselves, and then in comparison with each 
other. We will take a familiar scene to illustrate what takes 
place. 
We suppose ourselves to stand on the bank of a navigable 
river ; we behold the flowing of its waters, the cliffs that 
overhang it, the trees that line its shore, the boats and boat- 
men on its bosom, the flocks and herds, that press down to 
drink from its waves. With such a scene before us, it is to 
be expected, that the mind will rapidly make each, and all of 
these the subjects of its contemplation ; nor does it pursue 
this contemplation and inquiry far, without perceiving certain 
relations of agreement or difference. Certain objects before 
it are felt to be essentially alike, and others to be essentially 
different; and hence they are not all arranged in one class, 
but a discrimination is made, and different classes are forpied. 
The flocks and herds are formed into their respective'classes. 
The tall and leafy bodies on the river's bank, although they 
differ from each other'in some respects, are yet found to agree 
in so many others, that they are arranged together in another 
class, and called by the general name of tree. The living, 
moving, and reasoning beings, that propel the boats on its 
waters, form another class, and are culled man. And there 184 
is the same process, and the same result in respect to all 
other bodies coming within the range of our observation. 
GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
§. 140. Early classifications sometimes incorrect. 
It has been intimated, that, in making these classifications, 
men are governed by definite and uniform mental tendencies ; 
still it must be acknowledged, that mistakes are sometimes 
committed, especially in the early periods of society, and in 
all cases where the opportunities of examination and compari- 
son are imperfect. When man first opens his eyes on nature, 
(and in the infancy of our race, he finds himself a novice, 
wherever he goes,) objects so numerous, so various in kind, 
so novel and interesting, crowd upon his attention; that, at- 
tempting to direct himself to all at the same time, he loses 
sight of their specifical differences, and blends them together, 
more than a calm and accurate examination would justify. 
And hence it is not to be wondered at, that our earliest clas- 
sifications, the primitive genera and species, are sometimes 
incorrectly made. 
Subsequently, when knowledge has been in some measure 
amassed, and reasoning and observation have been brought 
to a greater maturity, these errors are attended to ; individu- 
als are rejected from species, where they do not properly be- 
long, and species from genera. The most savage and igno- 
rant tribes will in due season correct their mistakes, and be 
led into the truth. 
§. 141. Illustrations of our earliest classifications. 
We are naturally led to introduce some circumstances 
here, which throw light on this part of our subject. What 
we wish to illustrate is the simple fact, that men readily per- 
ceive the resemblances of objects, and exhibit a disposition to 
classify them in reference to such resemblance. The first 
case, which we shall mention in illustration of this, is that of 
Caspar Hauser. The principal objects, which Caspar had to 
amuse himself with in his prison, were two little wooden 
horses, which in his entire ignorance he believed to be pos- 
sessed of life and sensibility. After the termination of his 
imprisonment, his biographer informs us, that to "every ani- 
mal he met with, whether quadruped or biped, dog, cat, goose, 
or fowl, he gave the name of horse." GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
185 
In the year 1814, Pitcairn's Island, a solitary spot in the 
Pacific ocean, was visited by two English cruisers. Two of 
the young men, that belonged on the island, and whose knowl- 
edge was of course exceedingly limited, came on board one of 
the vessels. The youths, (says the Narrative,) were greatly 
surprised at the sight of so many novel objects ; the size of 
the ship ; the guns, and every thing around them. Observ- 
ing a cow, they were at first somewhat alarmed, and expres- 
sed a doubt, whether it was a huge goat, or a horned hog, 
these being the only two species of quadrupeds they had ever 
seen." 
The English navigator Cook, in going from New Zealand 
to the Friendly Islands,lighted on an Island, called Wateeoo. 
" The inhabitants, (he says), were afraid to come near 
our cows and horses, nor did they form the least conception 
of their nature. But the sheep and goats did not surpass the 
limits of their ideas, for they gave us to understand, they 
knew them to be birds." 
Captain Cook informs us, that these people were acquaint- 
ed with only three sorts of animals, viz. dogs, hogs, and birds. 
Of hogs and dogs they had probably never known more than 
one variety or class, and had never been led to suspect, that 
there was, or could be any other. But having noticed a 
great variety of birds in their forests and waters, they had 
undoubtedly found it necessary before this period, not only 
to give a general name expressive of all birds, but also to 
classify some of the subordinate varieties. This people, 
therefore, not unnaturally, although we do not pretend to say 
with much discrimination, applied the term birds to the 
sheep and goats of the English. They knew not but there 
might be some new class of birds, which they had not hith- 
erto noticed ; and they saw no insuperable objection, in the 
size of the sheep and goats, to this disposition of them, what- 
ever other objection they might, on a further examination, 
have subsequently found. 
§. 142. Of the nature of general abstract ideas. 
The notions, which are thus formed in all cases of classi- 
fication, are commonly known, in the Treatises having rela- 
tion to these subjects, as General Abstract ideas. And they 186 
GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
are no less numerous than the multiplied varieties of objects, 
which are found to exist every where around us. It is thus, 
that we form the general notions of animal and of all the 
subordinate species of animals ; of tree and its numerous va- 
rieties ; of earths, and minerals, and whatever else is capa- 
ble of being arranged into classes. 
We may apply these views not only to natural objects, 
but to forms and relations of a very different character. The 
word Triangle is the name of a general abstract idea. Great 
exceptions, however, have been taken to certain incautious 
expressions of Mr. Locke on this point. He asserts, that it 
requires some pains and skill to form the general idea of a 
triangle, and gives the following reason ; "for it must neith- 
er be oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, 
nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once," &c. This 
language is undoubtedly open to criticism, and in truth has 
not failed to receive a full share. The correct view seems to 
be this. The word triangle is not only the name of a class, 
but of a very general class; it is the name of a Genus, em- 
bracing all those figures, which agree in the circumstance of 
being bounded by three strait lines meeting one another so 
as to form three angles. A figure having any other form, 
(in other words not exhibiting a resemblance or similarity in 
this respect,) is excluded from the Genus ; but it is still so 
extensive, taken in the sense just now mentioned, as to in- 
clude all figures whatever of that name. Now there arc- 
embraced within the genus, as in numerous other cases, sub- 
ordinate classes, which are distinguished by their appropri- 
ate names, viz. the class of acute-angled triangles, that of 
right-angled triangles, of obtuse-angled triangles, &c. 
But it is to he noticed, that the general idea, whatever 
objects it may be founded upon, does not embrace every 
particular, which makes a part of such objects. When we 
look at a number of men, we find them all differing in some 
respects, in height, size, color, tone of the voice, and in oth- 
er particulars. The mind fixes only upon those traits or 
properties, with which it can combine the notion of resem- 
blance ; that is to say, those traits, qualities, or properties, 
in which the individuals are perceived to be like, or to re- 
semble each other. The complex mental state, which em- GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
187 
braces these qualities and properties, and nothing more, 
(with the exception of the superadded notion of other bodies 
having resembling qualities,) is a General Abstract idea. 
And hence the name. Such notions are called abstract, 
because, while embracing many individuals in certain re- 
spects, they detach and leave out altogether a variety of 
particulars, in which those individuals disagree. If there 
were not this discrimination and leaving out of certain parts, 
we never could consider these notions, regarded as wholes, 
as otherwise than individual or particular. They are call- 
ed general, because, in consequence of the discrimination 
and selection which has just been mentioned, they embrace 
such qualities and properties as exist not in one merely, but 
in many. 
The difference, therefore, between the complex notion, 
which we form of any particular object, and the general com- 
plex feeling now under consideration's truly this ; the latter 
combines together fewer particulars, but unites with such, 
as it does combine together, the additional notion of resem- 
blance, which implies as its basis the comparison of a num- 
ber of objects, and is perhaps the distinguishing circum- 
stance. Hence it must be allowed, that there is no out- 
ward object precisely corresponding to the general notion, 
which we form. The mind takes into view only a division 
or part of any one object, combining with this select view, 
the notion of other objects, and the relation of resemblance, 
in respect to such division or part. 
If it should be asked, By virtue of what principle is this 
discovery of a resembling relation made ? The answer is, 
(and it is the only one which can be given,) that there is in 
the mind an original tendency or susceptibility, by means of 
which, whenever we perceive different objects together, we 
are instantly, without the intervention of any other mental 
process, sensible of their relation in certain respects. 
§. 143. Objections sometimes made to the existence of general notions. 
It is proper briefly to notice an objection sometimes made, 
viz. that it is not possible for us to have such general notion 
at all, because there is nothing outward, which the general 
notion or idea precisely corresponds to. This objection goes 188 
GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
too far. It would seem even to lead to the conclusion, that 
we can have no complex idea of any kind, neither particular 
nor general. It cannot be pretended, that even our complex 
notions of particular objects correspond precisely to those ob- 
jects. The ideas, which we form of a particular house, tree, 
or plant, or any other individual object, are often erroneous 
in some respects, and probably always imperfect. But they 
are not, for that reason, to be regarded as false and chimeri- 
cal, and to be rejected as having no foundation in nature. 
We will suppose ourselves to have been acquainted in 
former years with a particular elm ; we have looked upon it 
a thousand times ; and it is familiar to us as any of our most 
cherished remembrances. At this great distance of time and 
place we form an idea, a conception, a notion of it, but it 
cannot be presumed to be a perfect or complete one. It can- 
not be pretended, that we have a notion not only of the 
trunk, but of every leaf and of the form of every leaf, and of 
every branch, and its intertwinings with every other branch; 
that it exists in our minds precisely, and in every respect, 
the same as it exists on the spot, where it grows. If there- 
fore general abstract ideas are to be rejected, because they 
embrace only parts of those objects, which are ranked under 
them, we must on the same grounds reject and deny also 
our Complex notions of individual objects; but this probably 
no one is prepared to do. 
§. 144. The power of general abstraction in connection with numbers, &c. 
The ability, which the mind possesses of forming general 
abstract ideas, is of much practical importance ; but wheth- 
er it be the characteristical attribute of a rational nature or 
not, as some have supposed, it is not necessary now to in- 
quire. It is not easy to estimate the increase of power, 
which is thus given to the action of the human mind, partic- 
ularly in reasoning. By means of general abstract proposi- 
tions, we are able to state volumes in a few sentences ; that 
is to say, the truths, stated and illustrated in a few general 
propositions, would fill volumes in their particular applica- 
tions. But it is enough here to refer to a single circumstance 
in illustration of the uses of this power. 
Without the ability of forming general notions, we should GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
189 
not be able to number, even in the smallest degree. Before 
we can consider objects as forming a multitude, or are able 
to number them, it seems necessary to be able to apply to 
them a common name. This we cannot do, until we have 
reduced them to a genus ; and the formation of a genus im- 
plies the power, (or process rather,) of abstraction. Conse- 
quently, we should be unable without such power to number. 
How great then is the practical importance of that intel- 
lectual process, by which general abstractions are formed !- 
Without the ability to number, we should be at a loss in all 
investigations where this ability is required ; without the 
power to classify, all our speculations must be limited to par- 
ticulars, and we should be capable of no general reasoning. 
§. 145. Of general abstract truths or principles. 
There are not only general abstract ideas, but abstract 
truths or principles also of a general nature, which are deserv- 
ing of some attention, especially in a practical point of view. 
Although enough has already been said to show the impor- 
tance of abstraction, it may yet be desirable to have a more 
full view of its applications. 
The process, in forming general truths or principles of an 
abstract nature, seems to be this. -We must begin undoubt- 
edly with the examination and study of particulars ; with in- 
dividual objects and characters, and with insulated events. 
We subsequently confirm the truth of whatever has been as- 
certained in such inquiry, by an observation of other like 
objectsand events. We proceed from one individual to anoth- 
er, till no doubt remains. Having in this way arrived at 
some general fact or principle, we thenceforward throw aside 
the consideration of the particular objects on which it is found- 
ed, and make it alone, exclusively and abstractly, the subject 
of our mental contemplations. We repeat this process again 
and again, till the mind, instead of being wholly taken up 
with a multitude of particulars, is stored with truths of a gen- 
eral kind. These truths it subsequently combines in trains 
of reasoning, compares together, and deduces from them oth- 
ers of still wider application. 
What has been said leads us to observe, that there is a 
146. Of the speculations of philosophers and others. 190 
characteristical difference between the speculations of men of 
philosophic minds and those of the eommon mass of people^ 
which is worthy of some notice. The difference between the 
two is not so much, that philosophers are accustomed to car- 
ry on processes of reasoning to a greater extent, as this, that 
they are more in the habit of employing general abstract ideas 
and general terms, and that, consequently, the conclusions 
which they form are more comprehensive. Nor are their 
general reasonings, although the conclusions at which they 
arrive seem in their particular applications to indicate wonder- 
ful fertility of invention, so difficult in the performance as is 
apt to be supposed. They have so often and so long looked 
at general ideas and general propositions, have been so accus- 
tomed, as one may say, to contemplate the general nature of 
things, divested of all superfluous and all specific circumstan- 
ces, that they have formed a habit ; and the operation is per- 
formed without difficulty. It requires in such persons no 
greater intellectual effort, than would be necessary in skilful- 
ly managing the details of ordinary business. 
The speculations of the great bulk of mankind differ from 
those of philosophers in being, both in the subjects of them 
and in their results, particular. They discover an inability 
to enlarge their view to universal propositions, which embrace 
a great number of individuals. They may possess the power 
of mere argument, of comparing propositions together which 
concern particulars, and deducing inferences from them to a 
great degree ; but when they attempt to contemplate general 
propositions, their minds are perplexed, and the conclusions, 
which are drawn from them, appear obscure, however clearly 
the previous process of reasoning may have been expressed. 
GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
§. 147. Of different opinions formerly prevailing-. 
The subject of general abstract ideas, of which we have 
given a summary view, excited very considerable interest 
during the Scholastic ages ; and different opinions have pre- 
vailed concerning them, not only at that period, but more or 
less down to the present time. It is perhaps not necessary 
in most cases, and for most persons to plunge deeply into the 
history of philosophical opinions. A knowledge of the truth, 
when it is once found, is in general of far greater consequence, GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
191 
than an acquaintance with the prolonged and conflicting dis- 
cussions which led to it. The disputes, however, on the top- 
ic of general abstractions so widely prevailed, and excited so 
much interest and effort, that it seems to be necessary to give 
a short sketch of them. 
In this discussion there have been three parties, viz. the 
Realists, the Nominalists, and the Conceptualists. 
§. 148. Of the opinions of the Realists. 
Those, who go under this name, held, that general abstract 
ideas have a real and permanent existence independently of 
the mind. Of a man, of a rose, of a circle, and of every spe- 
cies of things, they maintained, that there is one original form 
or archetype, which existed from eternity, before any individ- 
uals of the species were created. Its residence they seem to 
have assigned somewhere in the Eternal Mind itself, with 
this restriction, that its own existence is otherwise independ- 
ent, and that it has its appropriate being, nature, and efficien- 
cy. Inherently endued with life and activity, it seeks to re- 
veal itself in the visible and tangible figures of creation. Ac- 
cordingly this original model or archetype becomes the pat- 
tern, according to which the individuals of all species are in 
the most important respects fashioned. The archetype, 
which is understood to embrace only the outlines or generic 
features of things, becomes an object of perception to the hu- 
man intellect, whenever by due abstraction we discern it to 
be one and the same in all the individuals of the species. 
Such was the doctrine of the Realists, which in its most 
essential respects was very widely received from the time of 
Plato and Aristotle down to the commencement of the 12th 
century. But since that period, excepting a few ineffectual 
attempts, which have been made from time to time to revive 
it, it has fallen into as general disrepute, on the ground of its 
being too hypothetical, and not sufficiently sustained by facts. 
§. 149. Of the opinions of the Nominalists. 
About the commencement of the 12th century, Roscelinus, 
the instructor of Abelard, whose name occupies so conspicu- 
ous a place in the history of Scholastic learning, proposed a 
new hypothesis. He maintained, not only that there are no 192 
GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
original forms or archetypes, such as had been asserted to 
exist by the Realists, but that there are no universal abstract 
ideas of any kind. On the contrary, it seems to have been 
his opinion, as well as the sentiment of those, who have sub- 
sequently approved of this doctrine, that nothing can be cal- 
led general or universal but names, and that even to them 
universality can be ascribed only virtually, and not in the 
strict and literal sense of the term.-That is, the names are 
in the first instance given to individuals, but when any indi- 
uals are specified, the nature of the mind is such, that we nat- 
urally and immediately think of other individuals of the same 
kind. So that the names are in fact particular, although ow- 
ing to the operation of the principle of association, the prac- 
tical effect is the same as if it were otherwise, and hence the 
epithets "general" and "universal" are applied to them. 
This opinion in respect to general ideas and names, or some 
doctrine essentially of this description, has found many ad- 
vocates from the days of Roscelinus and Abelard to those of 
Berkeley and Hume. 
Those, who hold to the actual existence of general abstract 
ideas, which are not permanent archetypes independent of 
the mind, but only states of the mind, have generally been 
called Conceptualists. We have already given what we sup- 
pose to be the true mental process in the formation of such 
ideas. Whether we can have such ideas is best decided by 
each one's personal experience ; and when the examination 
of his internal experience is conducted with care, it can hard- 
ly be doubted, in what way such a question will be generally 
answered. 
As far as the Realists are concerned, the mere statement 
of their doctrine is sufficient at the present day to ensure its 
immediate rejection. The question lies then between the 
Nominalists, and those who have commonly been called Con- 
ceptualists ; and if there be insuperable objections to the doc- 
trine of the former, that of the latter enhances its claims on 
our adoption. Some of the objections to the sentiment of 
Roscelinus and those who have thought with him are forcibly 
summed up in the following passage from Brown's Philosophy 
of the Mind. (Leet, xlvi, xlvii.) 
§. 150. Of the opinions of the Conceptualists. GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
193 
"Of that rigid Nominalism, which involves truly no mixture 
of Conceptualism or of the belief of those feelings of relation 
for which I have contended, but denies altogether the exist- 
ence of that peculiar class of feelings, or states of mind which 
have been denominated general notions, or general ideas, 
asserting the existence only of individual objects perceived, 
and of general terms that comprehend these, without any 
peculiar mental state denoted by the general term, distinct 
from those separate sensations or perceptions which the par- 
ticular objects, comprehended under the term, might individ- 
ually excite,-it seems to me that the very statement of the 
opinion itself is almost a sufficient confutation, since the very 
invention of the general term, and the extension of it to cer- 
tain objects only, not to all objects, implies some reason for 
this limitation,-some feeling of general agreement of the 
objects included in the class, to distinguish them from the ob- 
jects not included in it, which is itself that very general no- 
tion professedly denied.* As long as some general notion of 
circumstances of resemblance is admitted, I see very clearly 
how a general term may be most accurately limited-; but if 
this general notion be denied, I confess that I cannot discover 
any principles of limitation whatever. Why have certain 
objects been classed together, and not certain other objects, 
when all have been alike perceived by us ; and all, therefore, 
if there be nothing more than mere perception in the process, 
are capable of receiving any denomination which we may 
• It is proper to remark, in introducing this passage from Dr. Brown, 
that this acute writer is to be considered as expressing himself too strongly, 
w hen he asserts, as he does near the close of it, that the feeling of resem- 
blance is all, that the general name truly designates. Possibly he meant 
to convey by this assertion nothing more than this, that the feeling of re- 
semblance is the prominent and distinguishing circumstance in the no- 
tions expressed by general names ; since, in another passage, he speaks 
of general terms being "invented to express all that multitude of objects, 
which agree in exciting one common feeling of relation, the relation of a 
certain similarity." If that were not his intention, then we are to con- 
sider his views as correct only so far as they go. The feeling of resem- 
blance is a prominent circumstance ; but there is something more than 
this. Whenever we form a complex notion, which is both general and 
abstract, we combine the feeling of resemblance, the existence of w'hich 
Dr. Brown has so clearly demonstrated, with the notion of those proper- 
ties, which are found to be possessed in common. 194 
GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
please to bestow on them? Is it arbitrarily and without any 
reason whatever, that we do not class a rose-bush with birds, 
or an elephent with fish? and if there be any reason for these 
exclusions, why will not the Nominalist tell us what that 
reason is-in what feeling it is found-and how it can be 
made accordant with his system ? Must it not be that the 
rose-bush and a sparrow, though equally perceived by us, do 
not excite that general notion of resemblance which the term 
bird is invented to express-do not seem to us to have those 
relations of a common nature, in certain respects, which lead 
us to class the sparrow and the ostrich, however different in 
other respects, as birds ; or the petty natives of our brooks 
and rivulets with the mighty monsters of the deep, under 
one general and equal denomination ? If this be the reason, 
there is more in every case, than perception, and the giving 
of a general name ; for there is a peculiar state of mind-a 
general relative feeling-intervening between the perception 
and the invention of the term, which is the only reason that 
can be assigned for that very invention." 
§. 151. Further remarks of Brown on general abstractions. 
" Can the Nominalist then assert, that there is no feelimr 
of the resemblance of objects, in certain respects, which thus 
intervenes between the perception of them as separate ob- 
jects, which is one stage of the process, and the comprehen- 
sion of them under a single name, which is another stage of 
the process,-or must he not rather confess, that it is merely 
in consequence of this intervening feeling we give to the num- 
ber of objects their general name, to the exclusion of the 
multitudes of objects to which we do not apply it, as it is in 
consequence of certain other feelings, excited by them indi- 
vidually, we give to each separate object its proper name, to 
the exclusion of every other object ? To repeat the process, 
as already described to you, we perceive two or more objects, 
-we are struck with their resemblance in certain respects. 
We invent a general, name to denote this feeling of resem- 
blance, and we class under this general name, every particu- 
lar object, the perception of which is followed by the same 
feeling of resemblance, and no object but these alone. If this 
be a faithful statement of the process,-and for its fidelity I OF ATTENTION. 
195 
may safely appeal to your consciousness,-the doctrine of the 
Nominalists is not less false than that of the Realists. It is 
false, because it excludes that general feeling of resemblance, 
-the relative suggestion,-which is all that the general 
name itself truly designates, and without which, therefore, it 
never would have been invented ; while the doctrine of the 
Realists is false, by inserting in the process those supposed 
separate entities, which form no part of it. The one errs, as 
I have already said by excess, the other by deficiency." 
CHAPTER FOURTEENTH. 
OF ATTENTION. 
§, 152. Of the general nature of attention. 
Without considering it necessary to speak of attention 
as a separate intellectual power or faculty, as some may be 
inclined to do, it seems to be sufficient to say, that attention 
expresses the state of the mind, when it is steadily directed, 
for a length of time, to some object of sense or intellect, ex- 
clusive of other objects. When we say, that any external 
object, or any subject of thought, which is purely internal, 
receives attention, it seems to be the fact, as far as we are 
able to determine, that the intellect is occupied with the sub- 
ject of its attention, whatever it is, for a certain period, and 
that all other things are, for the time being, shut out. In 
other words, the grasp, which the perceptive power fixes 
upon the object of its contemplations, is an undivided, an un- 
broken one. But this does not appear to be all. There 
is not only a distinct and exclusive mental perception ; but 
also an act of the will, directing, condensing, and confining 
the perception. So that, in all cases of attention, the act of 
the mind may be regarded as a complex one, involving not 
only the mere perception or series of perceptions, but also 196 
OF ATTENTION. 
an act of the will, founded on some feeling of desire or senti- 
ment of duty. It is the act of the will, prompted in general 
by the feeling of desire or interest, which keeps the mind 
intense and fixed in its position. 
§. 153. Of different degrees of attention. 
In agreement with this view of the subject, we often speak 
of attention as great or small, as existing in a very high or a 
very slight degree. When the view of the mind is only mo- 
mentary, and is unaccompanied, as it generally is at such 
times, with any force of emotion or energy of volitive action, 
then the attention is said to be slight. When, on the contra- 
ry, the mind directs itself to an object or series of objects 
with earnestness, and for a considerable length of time, and 
refuses to attend to any thing else, then the attention is said 
to be intense. 
We commonly judge at first of the degree of attention to a 
subject from the length of time, during which the mind is 
occupied with it. But when we look a little further, it will 
be found, that the time will generally depend upon the strength 
and permanency of the attendant emotion of interest. And 
hence both the time and the degree of feeling are to be re- 
garded in our estimate of the power of attention in any par- 
ticular case ; the former being the result, and, in some sense, 
a measure of the latter. 
Of instances of people, who are able to give but slight at- 
tention to any subject of thought, who cannot bring their 
minds to it with steadiness and power, we every where find 
multitudes, and there are some instances, where this ability 
has been possessed in such a high degree as to be worthy of 
notice. There have been mathematicians, who could inves- 
tigate the most complicated problems amid every variety and 
character of disturbance. It was said of Julius Caesar, that, 
while writing a despatch, he could at the same time dictate 
four others to his secretaries ; and if he did not write him- 
self, could dictate seven letters at once. The same thing is 
asserted also of the emperor Napoleon, who had a wonderful 
capability of directing his whole mental energy to whatever 
came before him.* 
• Segur's History of the Expedition to Russia, Bk. VII, ch. IS. OF ATTENTION. 
197 
The chess-player Philidor could direct three games of 
chess at the same time, of one of which only he required oc- 
cular inspection, the moves of the other two being announc- 
ed to him by an assistant. The moves of the chess-men 
formed the subject, about which his thoughts were employ- 
ed, and such was the intensity of interest and such the pow- 
er of the will, that the mind found no difficulty in dwelling 
upon it to the entire exclusion of other subjects, and for a 
considerable length of time. 
§. 154. Dependence of memory on attention. 
There seems to be no doctrine in mental philosophy more 
clearly established than this, that memory depends on atten- 
tion ; that is, where attention is very slight, remembrance is 
weak, and where attention is intense, remembrance continues 
longer.-There are many facts, which confirm this statement. 
(1) In the course of a single day persons, who are in the 
habit of winking, will close their eyelids perhaps thousands 
of times, and as often as they close them, will place them- 
selves in utter darkness. Probably they are conscious at 
the time both of closing their eyelids and of being in the 
dark, but as their attention is chiefly taken up with other 
things, they have entirely forgotten it. (2) Let a person 
be much engaged in conversation, or occupied with any very 
interesting speculation, and the clock will strike in the room 
where he is, apparently without his having any knowledge of 
it. He hears the clock strike as much as at any other time, 
but, not attending to the perception of sound and having his 
thoughts directed another way, he immediately forgets. 
(3) In the occupations of the day, when a multitude of 
cares are pressing us on every side, a thousand things es- 
cape our notice ; they appear to be neither seen nor heard, 
nor to affect us in any way whatever. But at the stillness 
of evening, when anxieties and toils are quieted, and there is 
a general pause in nature, we seem to be endued with a new 
sense, and the slightest sound attracts our attention. Shak- 
speare has marked even this. 
"The crow doth sing as sweetly as the lark 
"When neither is attended ; and, I think, 
"The nightingale, if she should sing by day, 
"When every goose is cackling, would be thought 
"No better a musician than the wren." 198 
OF ATTENTION. 
It is on the same principle, that people, dwelling in the 
vicinity of waterfalls, do not appear to notice the sound. 
The residents in the neighborhood even of the great Cataract 
of Niagara are not seriously disturbed by it, although it is an 
unbroken, interminable thunder to all others. The reason 
in all these cases is the same, as has already been given. 
There is no attention, and no remembrance, and of course 
virtually no perception. 
(4) Whenever we read a book, we do not observe the 
words merely as a whole, but every letter of which they are 
made up, and even the minute parts of these letters. But it 
is merely a glance ; it does not for any length of time occupy 
our attention ; we immediately forget, and with great difficul- 
ty persuade ourselves that we have truly perceived the let- 
ters of the word. The fact, that every letter is in ordinary 
cases observed by us, may be proved by leaving out a letter 
of the word, or by substituting others of a similar form. We 
readily in reading detect such omissions or substitutions. 
(5) An expert accountant can sum up, almost with a sin- 
gle glance of the eye, a long column of figures. The opera- 
tion is performed almost instantaneously, and yet he ascer- 
tains the sum of the whole with unerring certainty. It is im- 
possible, that he should learn the sum without noticing every 
figure in the whole column, and without allowing each its 
proper worth ; but the attention to them was so very slight, 
that he is unable to remember this distinct notice. 
Many facts of this kind evidently show, as we think, that 
memory depends upon attention or rather upon a continuance 
of attention, and varies with that continuance. 
§. 155. Of exercising attention in reading. 
If attention, as we have seen, be requisite to memory, 
then we are furnished with a practical rule of considerable 
importance. The rule is, Not to give a hasty and careless 
reading of authors, but to read them with a suitable degree 
of deliberation and thought.-It is the fault of some persons, 
that they are too quickly weary, that they skip from one 
author to another, and from one sort of knowledge to another. 
It is true, there are many things to be known ; we would not 
have a person limit himself entirely to one science, but it is OF ATTENTION. 
199 
highly important, that he should guard against that rapid and 
careless transition from subject to subject, which has been 
mentioned. 
I fwe are asked the reason of this direction, we find a 
good and satisfactory one in the fact referred to at the head 
of this section, that there cannot be memory without atten- 
tion, or rather that the power of memory will vary with the 
degree of attention. By yielding to the desire of becoming 
acquainted with a greater variety of departments of knowl- 
edge, than the understanding is able to master, and, as a 
necessary consequence, by bestowing upon each of them only 
a very slight attention, we remain essentially ignorant of 
the whole. 
The person, who pursues such a course, finds himself una- 
ble to recall what he has been over ; he has a great many 
half-formed notions floating in his mind, but these are so ill 
shaped and so little under his control as to be but little bet- 
ter than actual ignorance. This is one evil result of reading 
authors and of going over sciences in the careless way, which 
has been specified, that the knowledge thus acquired, if it 
can be called knowledge, is of very little practical benefit, in 
consequence of being so poorly digested, and so little under 
control. 
But there is another and perhaps more serious evil. This 
practice greatly disqualifies one for all intellectual pursuits. 
To store the mind with new ideas is only a part of education. 
It is at least a matter of equal importance, to impart to all 
the mental powers a suitable discipline, to exercise those that 
are strong, to strengthen those that are weak, and to main- 
tain among all of them a suitable balance. An attentive and 
thorough examination of subjectsis a training up of the mind 
in both these respects. It furnishes it with that species of 
knowledge, which is most valuable, because it is not mixed 
up with errors ; and, moreover, gives a strength and consis- 
tency to the whole structure of the intellect. Whereas, 
when the mind is long left at liberty to wander from object to 
object without being called to account and subjected to the 
rules of salutary discipline, it entirely loses at last the 
ability to dwell upon the subjects of its thoughts, and to 
examine them. And when this power is once lost, there is 
but little ground to expect any solid attainments. 200 
OF ATTENTION. 
§• 156. Alledged inability to command the attention 
We^are aware, that those, who, in accordance with these 
directions, are required to make a close and thorough exami- 
nation of subjects, will sometimes complain, that they find a 
great obstacle in their inability to fix their attention. They 
are not wanting in ability to comprehend ; but find it difficult 
to retain the mind in one position so long, as to enable them 
to connect together all the parts of a subject, and duly esti- 
mate their various bearings. When this intellectual defect 
exists, it becomes a new reason for that thorough examina- 
tion of subjects, which has been above recommended. It has 
probably been caused by a neglect of such strictness of 
examination, and by a too rapid and careless transition from 
one subject to another. 
Attention, it will be recollected, expresses the state of 
the mind, when it is steadily directed for some time, whether 
longer or shorter, to some object of sense or intellect, exclu- 
sive of other objects. All other objects are shut out ; and 
when this exclusion of every thing else continues for some 
time, the attention is said to be intense Now it is well 
known, that such an exclusive direction of the mind cannot 
exist for any long period, without being accompanied with a 
feeling of desire or of duty. In the greatest intellectual ex- 
ertions, not the mere powers of judging, of abstracting, and 
of reasoning, are concerned ; there will also be a greater or 
less movement of the feelings. And it will be found, that no 
feeling will effectually confine the minds of men in scientific 
pursuits, but a love of the truth. 
Mr. Locke thought, that the person, who should discover 
a remedy for wandering thoughts, would do great service to 
the studious and contemplative part of mankind. We know 
of no other effective remedy, than the one just mentioned, a 
love of the truth, a desire to know the nature and relations 
of things, merely for the sake of knowledge. It is true, that 
a conviction of duty will do much ; ambition and interest 
may possibly do more ; but when the mind is led to deep in- 
vestigations by these views merely, without finding some- 
thing beautiful and attractive in the aspect of knowledge it- 
self, it is likely to prove a tiresome process. The excellency, 
therefore, of knowledge, considered merely in light of its be- DREAMING. 
201 
ing suited to the intellectual nature of man, and as the ap- 
propriate incentive and reward of intellectual activity, ought 
to be frequently impressed. "I saw D'Alembert, (says a 
recent writer,) congratulate a young man very coldly, who 
brought him a solution of a problem. The young man said, 
'I have done this in order to have a seat in the Academy.' 
'Sir,' answered D'Alembert, with such dispositions you never 
will earn one. Science must be loved for its own sake, and 
not for the advantage to be derived. No other principle will 
enable a man to make progress in the sciences I "* 
CHAPTER FIFTEENTH. 
DREAMING. 
§. 157. Definition of dreams and the prevalence of them. 
Among numerous other subjects in mental philosophy, 
which claim their share of attention, that of Dreaming is en- 
titled to its place ; nor can we be certain, that any other will 
be found more appropriate to it than the present, especially 
when we consider, how closely it is connected in all its forms 
with our sensations and conceptions. And what are Dreams ? 
It approaches perhaps sufficiently near to a correct general 
description to say, that they are our mental states and opera- 
tions while we are asleep. But the particular views, which 
are to be taken in the examination of this subject, will not 
fail to throw light on this general statement. 
The mental states and exercises, which go under this 
name, have ever excited much interest. It is undoubtedly 
one reason of the attention, which the subject of our dreams 
has ever elicited among all classes of people, that they are so 
prevalent; it being very difficult, if not impossible, to find a 
person, who has not had more or less of this experience. Mr. 
* Memoires of Montlosier, Vol. I, p. 59, as quoted in Mackintosh's Ethi- 
cal Philosophy. Sect. VII. 202 
DREAMING. 
Locke, however, tells us of an individual, who never dream- 
ed till the twenty sixth year of his age, when he happened to 
have a fever, and then dreamed for the first time. Plutarch 
also mentions one Cleon, a friend of his, who lived to an ad- 
vanced age, and yet had never dreamed once in his life, and 
remarks, that he had heard the same thing reported of 
Thrasymedes. 
Undoubtedly these persons dreamed very seldom, as we 
find that some dream much more than others ; but it is pos- 
sible, that they may have dreamed at some time and entirely 
forgotten it. So that it cannot with certainty be inferred 
from such instances as these, that there are any, who are 
entirely exempt from dreaming. 
§. 158. Connection of dreams with our waking thoughts. 
In giving an explanation of dreams, our attention is first 
arrested by the circumstance, that they have an intimate re- 
lationship with our waking thoughts. The great body of our 
waking experiences appear in the form of trains of associa- 
tions ; and these trains of associated ideas, in greater or less 
continuity, and with greater or less variation, continue when 
we are asleep. Condorcet, (a name famous in the history 
of France,) told some one, that, while he was engaged in ab- 
struse and profound calculations, he was frequently obliged 
to leave them in an unfinished state, in order to retire to rest; 
and that the remaining stepsand the conclusion of his calcu- 
lations have more than once presented themselves in his 
dreams. Franklin also has made the remark, that the 
bearings and results of political events, which had caused 
him much trouble while awake, were not unfrequently un- 
folded to him in dreaming. Mr. Coleridge says, that, as 
he was once reading in the Pilgrimage of Purchas an account 
of the palace-and garden of the Khan Kubla, he fell into a 
sleep, and in that situation composed an entire poem of not 
less than two hundred lines ; some of which he afterwards 
committed to writing. The poem is entitled Kubla Khan, 
and begins as follows. 
" In Xanadu did Kubla Khan 
" A stately pleasure-dome decree ; 
" Where Alph, the sacred river, ran DREAMING. 
203 
"Through caverns measureless to man 
"Down to a sunless sea. 
It is evident from such statements as these, which are 
confirmed by the experience of almost every person, that our 
dreams are fashioned from the materials of the thoughts 
and feelings which we have while awake ; in other words 
they will, in a great degree, be merely the repetition of our 
customary and prevailing associations. So well understood 
is this, that President Edwards, who was no less distinguish- 
ed as a mental philosopher than as a theologian, thought it 
a good practice to take particular notice of his dreams, in or- 
der to ascertain from them what his predominant inclinations 
were. 
But while we are to look for the materials of our dreams 
in thoughts which had previously existed, we further find 
that they are not beyond the influence of those slight bodily 
sensations, of which we are susceptible even in hours of 
sleep. These sensations, slight as they are, are the means 
of introducing one set of associations rather than another.- 
Dugald Stewart relates an incident, which may be consider- 
ed an evidence of this, that a person, with whom he was ac- 
quainted, had occasion, in consequence of an indisposition, to 
apply a bottle of hot water to his feet when he went to bed, 
and the consequence was, that he dreamed he was making 
a journey to the top of mount ^Etna, and that he found the 
heat of the ground almost insupportable. There was once a 
gentlemen in the English army, who was so susceptible of 
audible impressions, while he was asleep, that his compan- 
ions could make him dream of what they pleased. Once, in 
particular, they made him go through the whole process of a 
duel, from the preliminary arrangements to the firing of the 
pistol, which they put into his hand for that purpose, and 
which, when it exploded, waked him. 
A cause of dreams closely allied to the above is the varie- 
ty of sensations, which we experience from the stomach, 
viscera, &c. Persons, for instance, who have been for a 
long time deprived of food, or have received it only in small 
quantities, hardly enough to preserve life, will be likely to 
have dreams, in some way or other directly relating to their 
§. 159. Dreams are often caused by our sensations. 204 
DREAMING. 
condition. Baron Trenck relates, that being almost dead 
with hunger, when confined in his dungeon, his dreams eve- 
ry night presented to him the well filled and luxurious tables 
of Berlin, from which, as they were presented before him, he 
imagined he was about to relieve his hunger. " The night 
had far advanced, (says Irving, speaking of the voyage of 
Mendez to Hispaniola,) but those, whose turn it was to take 
repose, were unable to sleep from the intensity of their thirst ; 
or if they slept, it was to be tantalized with dreams of cool 
fountains and running brooks." 
The state of health also has considerable influence, not 
only in producing dreams, but in giving them a particular 
character. The remark has been made by medical men, that 
acute diseases, particularly fevers, are often preceded and in- 
dicated by disagreeable and oppressive dreams. 
§.160. Explanation of the incoherency of dreams. (1st cause.) 
There is frequently much of wildness, inconsistency, and 
contradiction in our dreams. The mind passes very rapidly 
from one object to another ; strange and singular incidents 
occur. If our dreams be truly the repetition of our waking 
thoughts, it may well be inquired, How this wildness and in- 
consistency happen? 
The explanation of this peculiarity resolves itself into two 
parts. The first ground or cause of it is, that our dreams 
are not subjected, like our waking thoughts, to the control 
and regulation of surrounding objects. While we are awake, 
our trains of thought are kept uniform and coherent by the 
influence of such objects, which continually remind us of our 
situation, character, and duties ; and which keep in check any 
tendency to reverie. But in sleep the senses are closed ; the 
soul is accordingly in a great measure excluded from the ma- 
terial world, and is thus deprived of the salutary regulating 
influence from that source. 
In the second place, when we are asleep, our associated 
trains of thought are no longer under the control of the will. 
We do not mean to say, that the operations of the will are 
suspended at such times, and that volitions have no existence. 
§. 161. Second cause of the incoherency of dreams. 205 
On the contrary, there is sufficient evidence of the continu- 
ance of these mental acts, in some degree at least ; since vo- 
litions must have made a part of the original trains of thought, 
which are repeated in dreaming; and furthermore, we are 
often as conscious of exercising or putting forth volitions 
when dreaming, as of any other mental acts, for instance, 
imagining, remembering, assenting, or reasoning. When we 
dream, that we are attacked by an enemy sword in hand, 
but happen as we suppose in our dreaming experiences, to 
be furnished in self defence with an instrument of the same 
kind, we dream, that we will to exert it for our own safety 
and against our antagonist, and we as truly in this case put 
forth the mental exercise which we term volition, as, in any 
other, we exercise remembrance, or imagine, or reason in 
our sleep. 
Admitting, however, that the will continues to act in sleep, 
it is quite evident, that the volitions, which are put forth by 
it, have ceased to exercise their customary influence in re- 
spect to our mental operations. Ordinarily we are able, by 
means of an act of the will, to fix our attention upon some 
particular part of any general subject, which has been sug- 
gested, or to transfer it to some other part of such subject, 
and thus to direct and to regulate the whole train of mental 
action. But the moment we are soundly asleep, this influ- 
ence ceases, and hence, in connection with the other cause 
already mentioned, arise the wildness, incoherency, and con- 
tradictions, which exist. 
A person while he is awake has his thoughts under such 
government, and is able, by the direct and indirect influence 
of volitions, so to regulate them, as generally to bring them 
in the end to some conclusion, which he foresees and wishes 
to arrive at. But in dreaming, as all directing and govern- 
ing influence, both internal and external, is at an end, our 
thoughts and feelings seem to be driven forward, much like 
a ship at sea without a rudder, wherever it may happen. 
DREAMING. 
§. 162. Apparent reality of dreams. (1st cause.) 
When objects are presented to us in dreams, we look upon 
them as real ; and events, and combinations and series of 
events appear the same. We feel the same interest and re- 206 
DREAMING. 
sort to the same expedients, as in the perplexities and en- 
joyments of real life. When persons are introduced, as form- 
ing a part in the transactions of our dreams, we see them 
clearly in their living attitudes and stature ; we converse 
with them, and hear them speak, and behold them move, as 
if actually present. 
One reason of this greater vividness of our dreaming con- 
ceptions and of our firm belief in their reality seems to be 
this. The subjects, upon which our thoughts are then em- 
ployed, occupy the mind exclusively. We can form a clearer 
conception of an object with our eyes shut, than we can with 
them open, as any one will be convinced on making the ex- 
periment ; and the liveliness of the conception will increase 
in proportion, as we can suspend the exercise of the other 
senses. In sound sleep, not only the sight, but the other 
senses also may be said to be closed; and the attention is 
not continually diverted by the multitude of objects, which 
arrest the hearing and touch, when we are awake. It is, 
therefore, a most natural supposition, that our conceptions 
must at such times be extremely vivid and distinct. At §. 
118, we particularly remarked upon conceptions or those ideas 
which we have of absent objects of perception, which pos- 
sess this vividness of character. And it there appeared, that 
they might be attended with a momentary belief even when 
we are awake. But as conceptions exist in the mind when 
we are asleep in a much higher degree distinct and vivid, 
what was in the former case a momentary, becomes in the 
latter a permanent belief. Hence every thing has the ap- 
pearance of reality ; and the mere thoughts of the mind are 
virtually transformed into persons, and varieties of situation, 
and events, which are regarded by us in precisely the same 
light as the persons, and situations, and events of our every 
day's experience. 
§. 163. Apparent reality of dreams. (2nd cause.) 
A second circumstance, which goes to account for the 
fact that our dreaming conceptions have the appearance of 
reality is, that they are not susceptible of being controlled, 
either directly or indirectly, by mere volition. We are so 
formed as almost invariably to associate reality with what- 
ever objects of perception continue to produce in us the same DREAMING. 
207 
effects. A hard or soft body, or any substance of a particu- 
lar color, or taste, or smell, are always, when presented to 
our senses, followed by certain states of mind essentially 
the same ; and we yield the most ready and firm belief in the 
existence of such objects. In a word, we are disposed from 
our very constitution to believe in the existence of objects of 
perception, the perceptions of which do not depend on the 
will, but which we find to be followed by certain states of 
the mind, whether we choose it or not. But it is to be 
recollected that our dreaming thoughts are mere concep- 
tions ; our senses being closed and shut up, and external ob- 
jects not being presented to them. This is true. But if we 
conclude in favor of the real existence of objects of percep- 
tion, because they produce in us sensations independently of 
our volitions, it is but natural to suppose, that we shall be- 
lieve in the reality of our conceptions also, whenever they 
are in like manner beyond our voluntary control. They are 
both merely states of the mind ; and if belief always attends 
our perceptions, wherever we find them to be independent of 
our choice, there is no reason why conceptions, which are 
ideas of absent objects of perception, should not be attended 
with alike belief under the same circumstances.-And essen- 
tially the same circumstances exist in dreaming ; that is, a 
train of conceptions arise in the mind, and we are not con- 
scious at such times of being able to exercise any direction 
or control whatever over them. They exist, whether we will 
it or not; and we regard them as real. 
§. 164. Of our estimate of time in dreaming. 
Our estimate of time in dreaming differs from that when 
awake. Events, which would take whole days or a longer 
time in the performance, are dreamt in a few moments. So 
wonderful is this compression of a multitude of transactions 
into the very shortest period, that when we are accidentally 
awakened by the jarring of a door, which is opened into the 
room where we are sleeping, we sometimes dream of depre- 
dations by thieves, or destruction by fire, in the very instant 
of our awakening. "A friend of mine, (says Dr. Abercrom- 
bie,) dreamed that he crossed the Atlantic, and spent a fort- 
night in America. In embarking on his return, he fell into 208 
DREAMING. 
the sea ; and having awoke with the fright, discovered that 
he had not been asleep above ten minutes." Count Laval- 
lette, who some years since was condemned to death in 
France, relates a dream, which occurred during his imprison- 
ment, as follows. "One night, while I was asleep, the clock 
of the Palais de Justice struck twelve, and awoke me. I 
heard the gate open to relieve the sentry ; but I fell asleep 
again immediately. In this sleep, I dreamed that I was 
standing in the Rue St. Honore, at the corner of the Rue de 
1'Echelle. A melancholy darkness spread around me ; all 
was still, nevertheless a low and uncertain sound soon arose. 
All of a sudden, I perceived at the bottom of the street, and 
advancing towards me, a troop of cavalry, the men and hor- 
ses, however, all flayed. This horrible troop continued pas- 
sing in a rapid gallop, and casting frightful looks on me. 
Their march, I thought, continued for five hours ; and they 
were followed by an immense number of artillery-waggons, 
full of bleeding corpses, whose limbs still quivered ; a disgust- 
ing smell of blood and bitumen almost choked me. At length, 
the iron gate of the prison shutting with great force, awoke 
me again. I made my repeater strike ; it was no more than 
midnight, so that the horrible phantasmagoria had lasted no 
more than two or three minutes-that is to say, the time ne- 
cessary for relieving the sentry and shutting the gate. The 
.cold was severe and the watchword short. The next day, 
the turnkey confirmed my calculations." 
Our dreams will not unfrequently go through all the par- 
ticulars of a passage of the Alps, or of a military expedition 
to Moscow, or of a circumnavigation of the globe, or of other 
long and perilous undertakings, in a less number of hours, 
than it took weeks, or months or even years in the actual 
performance of them. We go from land to land, and from 
city to city, and into desert places ; we experience transitions 
from joy to sorrow, and from poverty to wealth ; we are oc- 
cupied in the scenes and transactions of many long months ; 
and then our slumbers are scattered, and behold, they are 
the doings of a fleeting watch of the night ! 
This striking circumstance in the history of our dreams is 
generally explained by supposing, that our thoughts, as they 
successively occupy the mind, are more rapid, than while we DREAMING. 
209 
are awake. But their rapidity is at all times very great ; so 
much so, that, in a few moments, crowds of ideas pass 
through the mind, which it would take a long time to utter, 
and a far longer time would it take to perform all the trans- 
actions which they concern. This explanation, therefore, is 
not satisfactory, for our thoughts are oftentimes equally rap- 
id in our waking moments. 
The true reason, we apprehend, is to be found in those 
preceding sections, which took under examination the appa- 
rent reality of dreams. Our conceptions in dreaming are 
considered by us real ; every thought is an action ; every 
idea is an event; and successive states of mind are succes- 
sive actions and successive events. He, who in his sleep 
has the conception of all the particulars of a military expedi- 
tion to Moscow, or of a circumnavigation of the globe, seems 
to himself to have actually experienced all the various and 
multiplied fortunes of the one and the other. Hence what 
appears to be the real time in dreams, but is only the appa- 
parent time, will not be that, which is sufficient for the mere 
thought, but that, which is necessary for the successive 
actions. 
"Something perfectly analogous to this may be remarked, 
(says Mr. Stewart), in the perceptions we obtain by the sense 
of sight.* When I look into a shew-box, where the decep- 
tion is imperfect, I see only a set of paltry daubings of a few 
inches in diameter ; but if the representation be executed 
with so much skill, as to convey to me the idea of a distant 
prospect, every object before me swells in its dimensions, in 
proportion to the extent of space, which I conceive it to occu- 
py, and what seemed before to be shut within the limits of 
a small wooden frame, is magnified, in my apprehension, to 
an immense landscape of woods, rivers, and mountains." 
165. Of the senses sinking to sleep in succession. 
It is true as a general statement, that in sleep the mind 
ceases to retain its customary power over the muscular 
movements of the system ; and all the senses are at such 
times locked up, and no longer perform their usual offices. 
The effect upon the senses is such that it seems to be proper 
* Stewart's Elements. Chapter on Dreaming, 210 
DREAMING. 
to speak of them as individually going to sleep, and awaking 
from sleep. It remains, therefore, to be observed, that there 
is considerable reason to suppose, that the senses fall asleep 
in succession. Fora detailed explanation and proof of this 
singular fact, reference must be had to Cullen, and particu- 
larly to Cabanis, a French writer on subjects of this nature ; 
but the conclusions, at which they arrive on this particular 
point, may be here stated.* 
The sight, in consequence of the protection of the eye- 
lids, ceases to receive impressions first, while all the other 
senses preserve their sensibility entire ; and may, therefore, 
be said to be first in falling asleep. The sense of taste, ac- 
cording to the above writers, is the next, which loses its sus- 
ceptibility of impressions, and then the sense of smelling. 
The hearing is the next in order, and last of all comes the 
sense of touch. Furthermore, the senses are thought to 
sleep with different degrees of profoundness. The senses of 
taste and smelling awake the last; the sight with more diffi- 
culty than the hearing, and the touch the easiest of all. 
Sometimes a very considerable noise does not awake a per- 
son, but if the soles of his feet are tickled in the slightest de- 
gree, he starts up immediately. 
Similar remarks are made by the writers above referred 
to, on the muscles. Those, which move the arms and legs, 
cease to act when sleep is approaching, sooner than those, 
which sustain the head; and the latter before those, which 
support the back. And here it is proper to notice an ex- 
ception to the general statement at the commencement of 
this section, that the mind in sleep ceases to retain its power 
over the muscles. Some persons can sleep standing, or walk- 
ing, or riding on horseback ; with such we cannot well avoid 
the supposition, that the voluntary power over the muscles 
is in someway retained and exercisedin sleep.-These state- 
ments are particularly important in connection with the facts 
of somnambulism ; only admit, that the susceptibility of the 
senses, and the power of the muscles may remain even in 
part while we are asleep, and we can account for them. We 
know, that this is not the caseina vast majority of instances; 
but that it does sometimes happen, is a point, which seems at 
last to be sufficiently well established. 
*Rapports du Physique et du Moral De L'Homme, Mem. jc. DREAMING. 
211 
§. 166. General remarks on cases of somnambulism. 
With the general subject of dreaming, that of Somnambu- 
lism is naturally and intimately connected. Somnambulists, 
as the term itself indicates, are persons, who are capable of 
walking and of other voluntary actions while asleep.* Of 
such persons many instances are on record, and of some a 
particular account is given. The accompanying instance in 
the note, will help to illustrate the nature of somnambulism. 
Other instances, hardly less striking, might be repeated, but 
they have been too often narrated, and are of too frequent 
recurrence, to require it. 
I, A number of things may be said in explanation of 
somnambulism. The somnambulist, in the first place, is in 
all cases dreaming, and we may suppose in general, that the 
* The following is an instance of somnambulism, which recently took 
place, of an extraordinary character.-A farmer in one of the counties of 
Massachusetts had employed himself, for some weeks in winter, thrashing 
his grain. One night as he was about closing his labors, he ascended a 
ladder to the top of the great beams in the barn, where the rye, which he 
was thrashing was deposited, to ascertain what number of bundles remain- 
ed unthrashed, which he determined to finish the next day. The ensuing 
night, about two o'clock, he was heard by one of the family to arise and 
go out. He repaired to his barn, being sound asleep and unconscious of 
what he was doing, set open his barn doors, ascended the great beams of 
the barn where his rye was deposited, threw down a flooring, and com- 
menced thrashing it. When he had completed it, he raked off the straw, 
and shoved the rye to one side of the floor, and then again ascended the 
ladder with the straw and deposited it on some rails, that lay across the 
great beams. He then threw down another flooring of rye, which he 
thrashed and finished as before. Thus he continued his labors until he 
had thrashed five floorings, and on returning from throwing down the 
sixth and last, in passing over part of the hay-mow, he fell off, where 
the hay had been cut dow n about six feet, on to the lower part ofit, which 
awoke him. He at first imagined himself in his neighbor's barn, but after 
groping about in the dark a long time, ascertained that he was in his 
own, and at length found the ladder, on which he descended to the floor, 
closed his barn doors which he found open, and returned to his house. 
On coming to the light he found himself in such a profuse perspiration} 
that his clothes were literally wet through. The next morning on going 
to his barn, he found that he had thrashed, during the night, five bushels 
of rye, had raked the straw off in good order, and deposited it on the 
great beams, and carefully shoved the grain to one side of the floor, with- 
out the least consciousness of what he was doing until he fell from the hay. 212 
DREAMING. 
dream is one, which greatly interests him. After he has 
awaked, the action he has passed through, appears, in his 
recollection of it, to be merely a dream, and not a reality. 
"A young nobleman, (says Dr. Abercrombie,) living in the 
citadel of Breslau, was observed by his brother, who occupied 
the same room, to rise in his sleep, wrap himself in a cloak, 
and escape by a window to the roof of the building. He there 
tore in pieces a magpie's nest, wrapped the young birds in 
his cloak, returned to his appartrnent, and went to bed. In 
the morning he mentioned the circumstances as having oc- 
curred in a dream, and could not be persuaded that there 
had been any thing more than a dream, till he was shown 
the magpies in his cloak." And this is noticed to be com- 
monly the fact. What has been done has the appearance of 
being a dream. And there is no doubt that the mind of the 
somnambulist is in that particular state, which we denomi- 
nate dreaming. 
H, In the second place, those volitions, which are a 
part of his dreams, retain their power over the muscles, 
which is not the fact in the sleep and the dreaming of the 
great body of people. Consequently, whatever the som- 
nambulist dreams, is not only real in the mind, as in the case 
of all other dreamers, but his ability to exercise his muscles 
enables him to give it a reality in action. Whether he dream 
of writing a letter, of visiting a neighbor's house of cutting 
and piling wood, of thrashing his grain, or ploughing his 
field, (acts which have at various times been ascribed to the 
somnambulist,) his muscles are faithful to his vivid mental 
conceptions, which we may suppose in all cases closely con- 
nected with his customary labors and experiences, and fre- 
quently enable him to complete what he has undertaken,, 
even when his senses are at the same time closed up. 
But the inquiry arises here, how it happens, while, in 
most cases, both senses and muscles lose their power, in 
these, on the contrary, the muscles are active, while the sen- 
ses alone are asleep ? In reference to this inquiry, it must 
be acknowledged, that it is involved at present in some un- 
certainty, although there is much reason to anticipate, that 
it may hereafter receive light from further investigations and 
knowledge of the nervous system and functions. There is DREAMING. 
213 
a set of nerves, which are understood to be particularly con- 
nected with respiration, and which appear to have nothing 
to do with sensation and with muscular action. There is 
another set, which are known to possess a direct and impor- 
tant connection with sensation and the muscles. These last 
are separable into distinct filaments, having separate func- 
tions ; some being connected with sensation merely, and 
others with volition and muscular action. In sensation, the 
impression, made by some external body, exists at first in 
the external part of the organ of sense, and is propagated 
along one class of filaments to the brain. In volition and 
voluntary muscular movement, the origin of action, as far as 
the body is concerned, seems to be the reverse, commencing 
in the brain, and being propagated along other and appropri- 
ate nervous filaments to the different parts of the system. 
Hence it sometimes happens, that, in diseases of the nervous 
system, the power of sensation is, in a great measure, lost, 
while that of motion fully remains ; or, on the contrary, the 
power of motion is lost, while that of sensation remains. 
These views help to throw light on the subject of somnambu- 
lism. Causes, at present unknown to us, may operate, 
through their appropriate nervous filaments, to keep the mus- 
cles awake, without disturbing the repose and inactivity of 
the senses. A man maybe asleep as to all the powers of ex- 
ternal perception ; and yet be awake in respect to the capa- 
bilities of muscular motion. And aided by the trains of asso- 
ciation, which make a part of his dreams, may be able to 
walk about and to do many things without the aid of the 
sight and hearing. 
§• 167. Further illustrations of somnambulism. 
Ill, Further, we are not to forget here a remark on 
the sleep of the senses, a subject already briefly alluded to ; 
and which is an exception to the general statement then 
made in regard to them. Both in somnambulism and in or- 
dinary cases of dreaming the senses are not always entirely 
locked up ; many observations clearly show, that it is possi- 
ble for the mind to be accessible through them, and that a 
new direction may be given in this way to a person's dreams 
without awaking him. Hence somnambulists may sometimes 214 
DREAMING. 
have very slight visual perceptions ; they may in some slight 
measure be guided by sensations of touch ; all the senses 
may be affected in a small degree by their appropriate ob- 
jects, or this may be the case with some and not with others, 
without effectually disturbing their sleep. These facts 
will be found to help in explaining any peculiar circumstan- 
ces, which may be thought not to come within the reach of 
the general explanation which has been given. 
IV, But this is not all. There are some cases, which 
are not reached by the statements hitherto made. There 
are not only slight exceptions to the general fact, that som- 
nambulists, like persons in ordinary sleep, are insensible to 
external impressions, but occasionally some of a marked and 
extraordinary character. There are a few cases, (the recent 
instance of Jane Rider in this country is one,) where per- 
sons, in the condition of somnambulism, have not only pos- 
sessed slight visual power, but perceptions of sight increased 
much above the common degree. In the extraordinary nar- 
rative of Jane Rider, the author informs us, that he look two 
large wads of cotton, and placed them directly on the closed 
eyelids, and then bound them on with a black silk handker- 
chief. The cotton filled the cavity under the eyebrows, 
and reached down to the middle of the cheek, and vari- 
ous experiments were tried, to ascertian whether she could 
see. In one of them a watch inclosed in a case was hand- 
ed to her, and she was requested to tell what o'clock it was 
by it ; upon which, after examining both sides of the watch, 
she opened the case, and then answered the question. She 
also read, without hesitation, the name of a gentleman, writ- 
ten in characters so fine, that no one else could distinguish 
it at the usual distance from the eye. In another paroxysm, 
the lights were removed from her room, and the windows so 
secured that no object was discernible, and two bookstjwere 
presented to her, when she immediately told the titles of 
both, though one of them was a book which she had never 
before seen. In other experiments, while the room was so 
darkened, that it was impossible, with the ordinary powers of 
vision, to distinguish the colors of the carpet, and her eyes 
were also bandaged, she pointed out the different colors in 
the hearth rug, took up and read several cards lying on the DREAMING. 
215 
table, threaded a needle, and performed several other things, 
which could not have been done without the aid of vision."* 
Of extraordinary cases of this kind, it would seem, that 
no satisfactory explanation, (at least no explanation which is 
unattended with difficulties,) has as yet been given. 
• As quoted in Dr. Oliver's Physiology, Chap. 30. DIVISION FIRST. 
THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING. 
INTELLECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MIND. 
PART SECOND. 
INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. CHAPTER FIRST. 
INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
§. 168. The soul has fountains of knowledge within. 
We have traced the history of the mind thus far with 
continued and increased satisfaction, because we have been 
guided solely by well known facts, without any desire of ex- 
citing wonder by exaggeration, and with no other feeling 
than that of knowing the truth. With cautious endeavors 
not to trespass upon those limits, which the Creator himself 
has set to our inquiries, we have seen the mind placed in the 
position of a necessary connection with the material world 
through the medium of the senses, and in this way awakened 
into life, activity, and power. Inanimate matter seems to 
have been designed and appointed by Providence as the 
handmaid and nurse of the mind in the days of its infancy ; 
and for that purpose to have been endued with form, fra- 
grance, and color. Material eyes were given to the soul, 
(not made a part of its nature, but assigned to it as an instru- 
mental and auxiliary agent,) that it might see ; and material 
hands, that it might handle ; and hearing, that it might 
hear. By means of these and other senses we become ac- 
quainted with whatever is visible and tangible, and has out- 
line and form ; but there are also inward powers of percep- 
tion, hidden fountains of knowledge, which open themselves 
and flow up in the remote and secret places of the soul. 
In other words, the soul finds knowledge in itself, which nei- 
ther sight, nor touch, nor hearing, nor any other sense, nor 
any outward forms of matter could give. 
" The natural progress of all true learning, (says the au- 220 
INTERNAL ORIGIN 
thor of Hermes,) is from sense to intellect." Having begun 
with the senses, and first considered the sensations and ideas 
which we there receive, weare next to enter more exclusive- 
ly into the mind itself, and to explore the fruitful sources of 
knowledge, which are internal. And in thus doing, it is a 
satisfaction to know, that we are treading essentially in the 
steps of Mr. Locke, whose general doctrine, undoubtedly is, 
that a part of our ideas only may be traced to the senses, 
and that the origin of others is to be sought wholly in the in- 
tellect itself. 
§• 169. Declaration of Locke that the soul has knowledge in itself. 
After alluding to the senses, as one great source of knowl- 
edge, "the other fountain, (saith Locke,) from which experi- 
ence furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the percep- 
tion of the operation of our own minds within us, as it is em- 
ployed about the ideas it has got ; which operations, when 
the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the un- 
derstanding with another set of ideas, which could not be 
had from things without, and such are perception, thinking, 
doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the 
different actings of our own minds, which, we being con- 
scious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive 
into our understandings ideas as distinct, as we do from bo- 
dies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man 
has wholly within himself. And though it be not sense, as 
having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very 
like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. 
But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this Reflection ; the 
ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting 
on its own operations within itself." 
It is perhaps necessary to remark here, that we introduce 
this passage from Mr. Locke, merely in support of the gener- 
al doctrine, without wishing to intimate a full approbation of 
the manner, in which he has applied it in its details. What 
we say now concerns the general question ; and in reference 
to that question, the passage just referred to is undoubtedly 
weighty in itself, as well as in consequence of the great repu- 
tation and acknowledged discernment of its author. It is un- 
.doubtedly the doctrine of Mr. Locke, that our knowledge OF KNOWLEDGE. 
221 
begins with Sensation ; in other words, that impressions, 
made on the bodily system, are the first occasions, so far as 
we are able to judge, of bringing the mind into action. But 
it does not follow from this, (and the passage just quoted 
shows, that Mr. Locke did not suppose it thus to follow,) that 
sensation is the only source of knowledge. There is undenia- 
bly something distinct from sensation ; thoughts, which have 
an interior origin, and cannot be represented by anything ex- 
ternal ; ideas, which are based upon the succession, relation, 
and infinite of things, and not upon what is fixed, tangible, 
and measurable ; or which are the representatives and ex- 
ponents of what is mental, rather than of what is material. 
§. 170. Opinions of Cudworth on the subject of internal knowledge. 
We may properly introduce here a quotation or two from 
another great authority, nearly contemporaneous with Mr. 
Locke, that of Dr. Cud worth, a name which is acknowledged 
to rank deservedly high among those, that are most close- 
ly associated with exalted wisdom and virtue. Let us how- 
ever be again reminded, that our whole object here is to es- 
tablish the general position, that there is knowledge of a 
purely internal, as well as of an external origin ; and that, 
therefore, a reference to writers for that purpose does not 
necessarily involve an approbation of, or a responsibility for 
their opinions any farther than they relate to the particular 
object in view. The posthumous work, from which these 
extracts are made, is understood to have been written in re- 
ply to Mr. Hobbes, who held the opinion, that all our 
thoughts of whatever kind are only either direct, or trans- 
formed and modified sensations. And, therefore, the state- 
ments made in it, being called forth under such circumstan- 
ces, must be supposed to have been carefully meditated, and 
on that ground, among others, are entitled to much weight. 
"That oftentimes, (says Cudworth,)* there is more taken 
notice of and perceived by the mind, both in the sensible ob- 
jects themselves, and by occasion of them, than was impress- 
ed from them, or passively received by sense ; which there- 
fore must needs proceed from some inward active principle 
in that which perceives, I shall make it further appear by 
some other instances. 
* Immutable Morality, Book IV, Chap. II, §. 14. 222 
INTERNAL ORIGIN 
"For, first, let a brute and a man at the same time be 
made spectators of one and the same artificial statue, picture, 
or landscape ; here the brute will passively receive all that 
is impressed from the outward object upon sense by local 
motion, as well as the man, all the several colors and figures 
of it ; and yet the man will presently perceive something in 
this statue or picture, which the brute takes no notice of at 
all, viz. beauty, and pulchritude, and symmetry, besides the 
liveliness of the effigies and portraiture. The eye of the 
brute being every jot as good a glass or mirror, and perhaps 
endued with a more perspicacious sense or power of passive 
perception, than that of a man. 
"Or again, let both a man and a brute at the same time 
hear the same musical airs, the brute will only be sensible of 
noise and sounds ; but the man will also perceive harmony in 
them, and be very much delighted with it ; nay, even enthu- 
siastically transported by it. Wherefore the brute perceiv- 
ing all the sounds as well as the man, but nothing of the har- 
mony, the difference must needs arise from some inward 
active principle or anticipation in the man, which the brute 
hath not." 
171. Further remarks of the same writer on this subject. 
"But I shall yet further illustrate this business, (says this 
learned writer near the conclusion of the same chapter,) that 
the mind may actively comprehend more in the outward ob- 
jects of sense, and by occasion of them, than is passively re- 
ceived and impressed from them, by another instance. Sup- 
pose a learned written or printed volume held before the eye 
of a brute-creature or illiterate person ; either of them will 
passively receive all that is impressed upon sense from those 
delineations ; to whom there will be nothing but several 
scrawls or lines of ink drawn upon white paper. But if a 
man, that hath inward anticipations of learning in him, look 
upon them, he will immediately have another comprehension 
of them than that of sense, and a strange scene of thoughts 
presently represented to his mind from them ; he will see 
heaven, earth, sun, moon and stars, comets, meteors, ele- 
ments, in those inky delineations ; he will read profound theo- 
rems of philosophy, geometry, astronomy in them, learn a OF KNOWLEDGE. 
223 
great deal of new knowledge from them that he never under- 
stood before, and thereby justly admire the wisdom of the 
composer of them. Not that all this was passively stamped 
upon his soul by sense from those characters ; (for sense, as 
I said before, can perceive nothing here but inky scrawls, 
and the intelligent reader will many times correct his copy, 
finding erratas in it ;) but because his mind was before fur- 
nished with certain inward anticipations, that such charac- 
ters signify the elements of certain sounds, those sounds, 
certain notions or cogitations of the mind ; and because he 
hath an active power of exciting any such cogitations within 
himself, he reads, in those sensible delineations, the passive 
stamps or prints of another man's wisdom or knowledge upon 
them, and also learns knowledge and instruction from them, 
not as infused into his mind from those sensible characters, 
but by reason of those hints and significations thereby propo- 
sed to it, accidentally kindled, awakened, and excited in it; 
for all, but the phantasms of black inky strokes and figures, 
arises from the inward activity of his own mind. Wherefore 
this instance in itself shows, how the activity of the mind 
may comprehend more in and from sensible objects, than is 
passively imprinted by them upon sense. 
"But now, in the room of this artificial book in volumes, 
let us substitute the book of nature, the whole visible and 
material universe, printed all over with the passive charac- 
ters and impressions of divine wisdom and goodness, but leg- 
ible only to an intellectual eye ; for to the sense both of man 
and brute, there appears nothing else in it but as in the other, 
so many inky scrawls, i. e. nothing but figures and colors ; 
but the mind and intellect, which hath an inward and active 
participation of the same divine wisdom that made it ; and 
being printed all over with the same archetypal seal, upon 
occasion of those sensible delineations represented to it, and 
taking notice of whatsoever is cognate to it, exerting its own 
inward activity from thence, will not only have a wonderful 
scene and large prospect of other thoughts laid open before it, 
and variety of knowledge, logical, mathematical, metaphysi- 
cal, moral, displayed ; but also clearly read the divine wis- 224 
INTERNAL ORIGIN 
dom and goodness in every page of this great volume, as it 
were written in large and legible characters."* 
§. 172. Writers who have objected to the doctrine of an internal source 
of knowledge. 
But it ought not to pass unnoticed, that there have been 
writers who have objected to the doctrine of an internal 
source of knowledge in distinction from that knowledge, 
which is outward, and is dependent, not only for its occasion, 
but for its very nature, on the senses. It was the opinion, 
among others, of Mr. Hobbes, who preceded Locke, and was 
not without merit as a metaphysician, that all our knowledge 
might be traced to the senses, and that of course no other 
origin of it need be sought. " The original of all thoughts, 
(says that writer, Leviathan, ch. I,) is that, which we call 
sense. There is no conception in a man's mind, which hath 
not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the or- 
gans of sense." This was the opinion also of his contempo- 
rary, Gassendi, who was his particular friend and correspon- 
dent ; and at a still later period, of Condillac. The latter 
supported his views at length, and with much ingenuity, par- 
ticularly in his Treatise on Sensations. 
These writers appear to have maintained, as a general 
statement, that we have no simple ideas, but such as exist in 
the mind directly by means of the senses. As they further 
• Many other writers, as Stewart, Degerando, Brown, Coleridge, and 
Cousin, advocate this general doctrine. Kant himself, whatever obscuri- 
ty may rest on other articles of his metaphysics, is clear upon this. He 
evidently gives us to understand, that the mental operations themselves, 
although the senses are the first occasions of those operations, furnish a 
new set of notions, which cannot directly be traced to any thing external. 
Der Zeit nach geht also keine Erkenntniss in uns vor der Erfahrung 
vorher, und mit dieser fangt alle an. Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Er- 
kenntniss mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht 
eben alle aus der Erfahrung. Denn es kdnne wohl seyn, dass selbst un- 
sere Erfahrungserkenntniss ein Zusammengesetztes aus demsey, was wir 
durch Eindriicke empfangen, und dem, was unser eigenes Erkenntnissver- 
•miigen, (durch sinnliche Eindriicke bloss veranlasst,) aus sich selbst her 
giebt, welchen Zusatz wir von jenern Grundstoffe nickt eher unterscheid- 
en, als bis lange Uebung uns darauf aufmerksam, und zur Absonderung 
desselbeu geschiktgemacht hat. Kant's Critik der reinen Vernunft, Ein- 
leitung, I. OF KNOWLEDGE. 
225 
maintained, that those of a complex nature are composed, 
not merely virtually but literally, of such as are simple, they 
consequently consider them in the light of combined and 
transformed sensations. Such appears to be the general out- 
line of their doctrine, although it has its obscurities and per- 
plexities, as might be expected in consequence of being 
essentially ill-founded. " If we consider, (says Condillac,) 
that to remember, to compare, to judge, to distinguish, to 
imagine, to be astonished, to have abstract ideas, to have 
ideas of number and duration, to know truths, whether gen- 
eral or particular, are but so many modes of being attentive ; 
that to have passions, to love, to hate, to hope, to fear, to 
will, are but so many different modes of desire ; and that at- 
tention, in the one case, and desire, in the other case, of which 
all these feelings are modes, are themselves, in their origin, 
nothing more than modes of sensation, we cannot but con- 
clude that sensation involves in itself all the faculties of the 
soul." * 
This sentence in its evident meaning, and as it is under- 
stood both by its author and his commentators, is clearly at 
variance with the doctrine of Locke, and entirely cuts off 
what has been variously termed the internal, reflex, or sub- 
jective source of our knowledge. According to the doctrine 
of Hobbes and Condillac every thing may be traced back to 
the senses, not merely as its occasion, but as its direct or at 
least its essential cause ; every thing becomes tangible and 
material ; we are utterly unable to form a conception even of 
the invisible and glorious Deity, except under such an ap- 
pearance, as the imagination, dealing with sensible images 
alone, can picture forth from the gross and limited materials 
of the earth. And in the same way every other idea, how- 
ever spiritual and whatever it may relate to, must be capable 
of being followed back to some archetype in outward, mate- 
rial existences. The mind may separate, and modify, and 
combine sensible ideas or images, but can never get above 
them ; there is a portion of earthliness in every possible 
thought. It must, therefore, be obvious, that the tenden- 
cy of this system is to degrade the mind ; not only, to limit 
the range, but to depress the character of its powers. It 
* Traitc des Sensations, Pt. I, ch. 7, §. 2. 226 
INTERNAL ORIGIN 
may be said, however, that the propriety of receiving it does- 
not depend so much upon its tendency, as upon the direct 
evidence, which may be brought in its support, in which it 
is found to be utterly deficient. 
In order to have a clear understanding- of the particular 
topic before us, let us briefly advert to certain general views 
already more or less attended to, having a connection with 
it. In making the human soul a subject of inquiry, it is an 
obvious consideration, that a distinction may be drawn be- 
tween the soul, Contemplated in itself, and its acts,or states, 
or the knowledge which it possesses. The inquiry, there- 
fore, naturally arises, Under what circumstances the acquisi- 
tion of knowledge begins? 
Now this is the very question, which has already been con- 
sidered ; nor can it be deemed necessary to repeat here the 
considerations, which have been brought up in reference to 
it. It is enough to express our continued reliance on the 
general experience and testimony of mankind, so far as it is 
possible to ascertain them on a subject of so much difficulty, 
that the beginningsof thought and knowledge are immediate- 
ly subsequent to certain affections of those bodily organs, 
which we call the senses. In other words, were it not for 
impressions on the senses, which may be traced to objects 
external to them, our mental capabilities, whatever they 
may be, would in all probability have remained folded up, 
and have never been redeemed from a state of fruitless 
inaction. 
Hence the process, which is implied in the perception of 
external things, or w'hat is commonly termed by Mr. Locke 
sensation, may justly be considered the occasion or the intro- 
ductory step to all our knowledge. But it does not follow 
from this, nor is it by any means true, that the whole amount 
of it in its ultimate progress is to be ascribed directly to the 
same source. All that can be said with truth, is, that the 
mind receives the earliest part of its ideas by means of the 
senses, and that, in consequence of having received these 
elementary thoughts, all its powers become rapidly and fully 
operative. 
§. 173. Knowledge begins in the senses, but has internal accessions. OF KNOWLEDGE. 
227 
And here we come to the second great source of knowl- 
edge. The powers of the mind being thus fairly brought 
into exercise, its various operations then furnish us with 
another set of notions, which, by way of distinguishing them 
from those received through the direct mediation of the sen- 
ses, may be called, in the language of Mr. Locke, ideas of 
reflection, or, to use a phraseology embracing all possible 
cases, ideas of internal origin. 
These two sources of human thought, the Internal and 
External, however they may have been confounded by some 
writers, are entirely distinct. The ideas, which arise in the 
mind, solely from the fact of the previous existence of certain 
mental operations, could not have been suggested by any 
thing which takes place in the external world, independently 
of those operations. Of this last class, some instances, with 
illustrations of the same, may properly be mentioned here. 
§. 174. Instances of notions, which have an internal origin. 
Among other notions, which are to be ascribed to the 
second great source, are those, expressed by the terms, 
thinking, doubting, believing, and certainty.-It is a mat- 
ter of internal observation, (that is, of consciousness or of 
reflection, which are synonymous with internal observation,) 
that the mind does not, and cannot for any length of time 
remain inactive. Hence there is occasion given for the ori- 
gin of that idea, which we denominate thinking. The notion, 
which we thus denominate, is framed by the mind under 
these circumstances ; the name is given, and nobody is igno- 
rant as to what is meant. But then it is to be marked that 
its origin is wholly internal ; it is not an object of touch, or 
taste, or sight ; it is to be ascribed to the mind itself alone 
and to its inherent activity, unaided by the senses, or by any 
thing operating upon them. 
Again, in the examination of some topic, which is propos- 
ed for discussion, a proposition is stated with little or no evi- 
dence attending it, and the mind, in reference to that propo- 
sition, is brought into a position, to which we give the name 
of doubling. It is by no means easy, or rather itis impossible, 
to trace this idea directly to the senses. All we can say of 
it, is, that if has its origin within, and necessarily exists im- 228 
INTERNAL ORIGIN 
mediately subsequent to certain other mental states, of which 
we are conscious. 
But then in this very instance, if the evidence be consid- 
erably increased, the mental estimation, which we form, is 
altered in regard to it, and to this new state of the mind we 
give the name of belief or believing. And in case the evidence 
of the proposition is of a higher and more decided character, 
there then arises another state of the mind, which we de- 
nominate certainty. 
The ideas of right and wrong, of unity and number, of 
time and space, order, proportion, similitude, truth, wisdom, 
power, obligation, succession, cause, effect, and many others, 
have a like origin ; at least there are none of them to be as- 
cribed directly and exclusively to the senses. It is cheer- 
fully granted, that, in determining this point, it is proper to 
refer to the common experience of mankind, and to rely upon 
it. But it is believed in all these instances, (certainly in the 
most of them,) such a reference will be amply decisive. 
Let it then be left to the candid internal examination of 
each individual, to determine, Whether a distinction be not 
rightly drawn between the origin of these ideas, and that of 
those, which we attribute to the senses, such as red, blue, 
sweet, fragrant, bitter, hard, smooth, loud, soft, extended, 
&c. ? On this question, it is thought, that, in general, there 
can be but one answer, although some writers, through the 
love of excessive simplification, have been betrayed into 
error in regard to it. 
Hence it is distinctly to be kept in mind, that there are 
two sources of thought and knowledge. An affection of the 
senses by means of external objects is the immediate occa- 
sion of one portion ; the constitution of the mind and its ope- 
rations are the occasions or source of the other. Those no- 
tions, which can be ascribed directly to any one of the senses 
as their specific source, and not merely as an indirect and 
general occasion of their origin, are External, while all oth- 
ers seem to be entitled to be called Internal. And yet, it 
will be recollected, that we have found it necessary to treat 
of some notions under the general head of External Knowl- 
edge, not precisely corresponding to the view now given. 
The mental states, which we now have reference to, were OF KNOWLEDGE. 
229 
found, however, to be so closely connected, in their origin, 
with the exercise of the senses, or with some other affection 
of the bodily system, (such as the idea of externality, the 
uneasy feeling of hunger, thirst, &c.) as to come under con- 
sideration somewhat more naturally there, than in any sub- 
sequent part of our inquiries. 
§. 175. Imperfections attendant on classifications in mental philosophy. 
The remarks just made naturally lead us to embrace this 
opportunity to suggest a caution, applicable to the subject of 
Classification in mental philosophy in general. It will be re- 
collected, that the first general arrangement of the states of 
the mind was into the three great Divisions of Intellectual, 
Sensitive, and Voluntary. Beginning with the intellectual 
part of our nature, we found our intellections susceptible of 
being divided into those of an External, and those of an In- 
ternal origin ; and have hitherto directed our inquiries with 
a reference to this division. Now the remark we would 
make is, that the classifications just referred to, and all other 
general classifications in mental philosophy, although they 
may be theoretically and philosophically true, are neverthe- 
less not always easy and satisfactory in their application. As 
the mind begins to operate in all its parts, and in all its rela- 
tions, nearly simultaneously, (and certainly at a very early 
period of life,) the history of its multiplied acts and feelings 
becomes very much interwoven and perplexed. In the mat- 
ter of Classification, therefore, nothing more is to be expected 
than a general outline, approximating as nearly as possible to 
an expression of what is conceived to be the truth ; our in- 
quiries are to be directed by such general outline so far as 
can be done consistently with the often involved and compli- 
cated nature of the mental operations ; but after all, the 
value of our investigations will depend essentially and chief- 
ly on the accuracy of the details. 
We make these remarks here because some, who assent 
to the general arrangement, may perhaps imagine, that they 
see reason for an alteration in the disposition of the subordi- 
nate parts. And we readily admit, that cases are to be 
found, where it is somewhat difficult to determine, under 
what general head particular thoughts are to be placed, and 230 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
particular mental exercises and associations are to be arran- 
ged. But if, as before intimated, the outlines of the system 
be generally correct or nearly so, and the details, although 
they may sometimes be wrongly placed relatively to such 
outlines, be given with accuracy, not much will be found, 
which there will be occasion to object to. 
CHAPTER SECOND. 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
§. 176. Import of suggestion, and its application in Reid and Stewart. 
Some of the cases of thought and knowledge, which the 
mind becomes possessed of in itself, without the direct aid of 
the senses, are to be ascribed to Suggestion. This word, in 
its application here, is used merely to express a simple, but 
important fact ; viz. That the mind, by its own activity and 
vigor, gives rise to certain thoughts. Without any mixture 
of hypothesis, or any qualifying intimation whatever, it gives 
the fact, and that is all. The use of this word, as applicable 
to the origin of a portion of human knowledge, is distinctly 
proposed by Dr. Reid. In his Inquiry into the Human Mind, 
(chap. II, §. 7,) he speaks of certain notions, (for instance, 
those of existence, mind, person, &c.) as the "judgments of 
nature, judgments not got by comparing ideas, and perceiving 
agreements and disagreements, but immediately inspired by 
our constitution." Pursuing this train of thought, he further 
remarks ; " It is incumbent on those, who think that these 
are not natural principles, [that is, notions called forth within 
us, independently of reasoning,j to show, how we can other- 
wise get the notion of mind, and its faculties. Again, imme- 
diately after, he ascribes those notions, which cannot be at- 
tributed directly to the senses on the one hand, nor to the ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
231 
reasoning power on the other, to an internal or mental Sug- 
gestion, as follows. "I beg leave to make use of the word 
suggestion, because I know not one more proper, to express 
a power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped 
the notice of philosophers, and to which we owe many of 
our simple notions which are neither impressions nor ideas, 
as well as many original principles of belief. I shall endea- 
vor to illustrate by example, what I understand by this word. 
We all know, that a certain kind of sound suggests immedi- 
ately to the mind, a coach passing in the street ; and not on- 
ly produces the imagination, but the belief, that a coach is 
passing. Yet there is here no comparing of ideas, no percep- 
tion of agreements or disagreements, to produce this belief; 
nor is there the least similitude between the sound we hear, 
and the coach we imagine and believe to be passing. 
"It is true that this suggestion, [referring to the illustra- 
tion he had just given,] is not natural and original ; it is the 
result of experience and habit. But I think it appears, from 
what hath been said, that there are natural suggestions ; 
particularly, that sensation suggests the notion of present 
existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does 
now exist ; that memory suggests the notion of past exist- 
ence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time 
past ; and that our sensations and thoughts do also suggest 
the notion of a mind, and the belief of its existence, and of 
its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is, 
that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature suggests 
to us the notion of a cause, and compels our belief of its exis- 
tence. And in like manner, as shall be shown when we come 
to the sense of touch, certain sensations of touch, by the 
constitution of our nature, suggest to us extension, solidity, 
and motion, which are nowise like to sensations, although 
they have hitherto been confounded with them." We 
find similar sentiments in various other places. 
Mr. Stewart also, in his Philosophical Essays, speaks of 
certain mental phenomena, as attendant upon the objects of 
our consciousness, and as suggested by them. The notions 
•of time, number, motion, memory, sameness, personal identi- 
ty, present existence, &c. he ascribes neither to the external 
world on the one hand, nor to the internal mental operations, 232 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
of which we are conscious, on the other, except so far as 
they are the occasions, on which the mind brings them out, or 
suggests them from its own inherent energy. Of the no- 
tion of duration for instance, he would say, I do not see it, 
nor hear it, nor feel it, nor become acquainted with it by 
means of any other of the senses ; nor am I conscious of it, 
as I am of believing, reasoning, imagining, &c. but it is sug- 
gested by the mind itself; it is an intimation absolutely es- 
sential to the mind's nature and action. 
It will be noticed that Dr. Reid has not limited the use of 
the word Suggestion, exclusively to those ideas, the occa- 
sions of which are purely internal. Nor was this necessary. 
Those cases, however, where suggestion is brought into ex- 
ercise by occasions chiefly external, (as, for instance, in 
forming the notions of externality, space, and motion,) are 
comparatively few in number. As a general statement, the 
occasions of its exercise are either wholly of an interior na- 
ture, or with only a slight mixture of outward circumstances. 
§. 177. Ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, and personal identity. 
We shall now mention a few ideas which have this origin, 
without undertaking to give a complete enumeration of them. 
Existence. Among the various notions, the origin of 
which naturally requires to be considered under the head of 
Suggestion, is that of Existence. What existence is in itself, 
(that is to say, independenly of any existent being,) it would 
be useless to inquire. Using the word as expressive of a 
mental state, it is the name of a purely simple idea, and can- 
not be defined. The history of its rise is briefly this. Such 
is our nature, that we cannot exist, without having the no- 
tion of existence. So that the origin of the idea of existence 
is inseparable from the mere fact, that we have a percipient 
and sentient nature. An insentient being may exist, with- 
out having any such idea. But man, being constituted 
with powers of perception, cannot help perceiving that he is 
what he is. If we think, then there is something, which has 
this capability of thought ; if we feel, then there is not only 
the mere act of feeling, but something also which puts forth 
the act. 
II,-Mind. The origin of the notion of Mind is similar to ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
233 
that of existence. Neither of them can be strictly and prop- 
erly referred to the senses. We do not see the mind, nor is 
it an object of touch, or of taste, or of any other sense. Nor, 
on the other hand, is the notion of mind a direct object of 
the memory, or of reasoning-, or of imagination. The notion 
arises naturally, or is suggested from the mere fact, that the 
mind actually exists, and is susceptible of various feelings 
and operations. The same may be said of all the distinct 
powers of the mind, such as the power of perception., of mem- 
ory, of association, of imagination, of the will ; not of the acts 
or exercises of these powers, it will be noticed, but of the pow- 
ers themselves. That is to say, they are made known to us, 
considered abstractly and as distinct subjects of thought, not 
by direct perception, either inward or outward, but by spon- 
taneity or suggestion. We say, not by direct perception, be- 
cause there is something intermediate between the power 
and the knowledge of it, viz, the act or exercise of the pow- 
er, which is the occasion of the knowledge of the power itself. 
The principle of Original Suggestion, availing itself of this 
occasion, gives us a knowledge of the distinct susceptibilities 
of the mind, just as it does of the mind as a whole. 
Ill,-Similar remarks, as far as spontaneity is concerned, 
will apply to the notions, (whether we consider them as sim- 
ple or complex,) of self-existence and personal identity. 
At the very earliest period they flow out, as it were from the 
mind itself; not resulting from any prolonged and laborious 
process, but freely and spontaneously suggested by it. This 
is so true that no one is able to designate either the precise 
time or the precise circumstances, under which they origi- 
nate ; for they spring into being under all circumstances. 
We cannot look, or touch, or breathe, or move, or think with- 
out them. These are products of our mental nature too es- 
sential and important to be withheld, or to be given only on 
rare and doubtful occasions ; but are brought into existence 
in all times and places, and under all the varieties of action 
and feeling.- (See, in connection with this section, §.§. 4.5.6.) 
§. 178. Origin of the idea of externality. 
In giving an account of the origin of ideas, it is proper, in 
this connection, to refer to the notion of outwardness or exter- 234 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
nality. Outwardness, although it is involved in every thing 
which the senses have a connection with, is, nevertheless, 
not a direct subject of the senses. Asin other cases of ideas 
of internal origin, we do not, in strictness of speech, smell it, 
or taste it, or see it, or hear it, or touch it ; and yet there is 
nothing, which we see, taste, hear, or touch, of which exter- 
nality is not predicable. The simple fact is, that the senses, 
(or rather in this case one of them, that of touch,) furnish 
the occasion, (not the thing itself, but simply the occasion,) on 
which the Intellect, in virtue of its own spontaneity of action, 
gives us a knowledge of it. We have already had opportuni- 
ty, (§. 70,) to speak of this idea as a most important one ; as 
the connecting thought which introduces to us a new mani- 
festation of existence, different from that interior existence, 
which we variously call by the names, spirit, mind, or soul. 
It is evident, if we could not form the idea of externality, ev- 
ery thing which is the subject of mental experience, would 
seem to be wholly internal, mere modifications of the inward 
or mental being. It is this idea, taken in connection with the 
circumstances of its origin, which solves what has sometimes 
been considered a great mystery. The question is often ask- 
ed, how is it possible that the mind should pass over from the 
circle of its own existence, the limits of its own actual per- 
sonality, into the region and the knowledge of things, wholly 
different from itself. If we will interrogate nature, and rest 
satisfied with her responses, the matter is simple. It is the 
power, that gives us a knowledge of Mind, and uniting mind 
with its operations gives us the idea of Personality, and com- 
bining the present with the past originates the idea and the 
conviction of Personal Identity, which assures us also of out- 
wardness, of an externality inconsistent with the assump- 
tion of all things into our own nature ; the power, overlooked 
too often and still more frequently estimated too lightly, of 
Original Suggestion. Nature has implanted within us this 
spontaneity of thought, this intuitive directness of perception; 
and thus taken care to furnish important elements of knowl- 
edge, which could be possessed in no other way. 
§. 179. Idea of matter or material existence. 
It is here also that we find the basis of our conception of 
matter or material existence, when considered in distinction ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
235 
from the mere outward presentations or attributes of matter. 
The connection, which we have with the material world by 
means of the senses, makes us acquainted with whatever is 
strictly appropriate to those senses, such as color, taste, 
hardness or softness, extension, &c. When, for instance, we 
look on a piece of wood or any other of those material bodies, 
by which we are surrounded, an impression is made on the 
organ of vision, and we have the sensation, or, as we some- 
times express it, the idea of color. By applying the hand to 
the wood, we learn the penetrability or impenetrability, the 
softness or hardness of the mass which we hold. By moving 
the hand from one point to another in the mass, we are in- 
formed of the continuity or extension of its parts. But it 
does not appear, that tve are able by means of the senses 
alone, to carry our inquiries beneath the surface of the body 
in such a way or to such a degree as to become directly ac- 
quainted with that inferior something, whatever it is, which 
is the basis or support of these qualities. The external or 
sensible Intellect, (that is the intellect operating by means of 
the senses,) furnishes simply the occasion of the idea of matter 
or material existence ; while the internal or pure Intellect, 
(that is, the intellect independent of the senses,) acting upon 
that occasion, and availing itself of its power of Original 
Suggestion, brings into existence and realizes the idea itself. 
This is the simple statement of the fact; but it appears 
to be abundantly authenticated by the common experience 
of men. That, which is outward and operates upon the sen- 
ses, that which we taste and see and handle, is presented to 
us, (in other words we regard it,) in the light of an attribute 
or quality, rather than of substance. But the very idea of 
a quality or attribute implies, as the antecedent condition of 
its own existence, an object or subject, to which it belongs. 
The idea of such a subject or object, is, under these circum- 
stances, (that is to say, when any thing presents itself to our 
notice in the aspect of an attribute or quality,) not only natu- 
rally and necessarily suggested to us, but it obviously com- 
pels our belief. As we have already had occasion to remark, 
(§. 131,) we believe, and we cannot help believing, that there 
is some basis, some foundation, which is the support of the 
various attributes and qualities, which are presented to our 236 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
senses ; just as we have the idea and believe in the existence 
of a God, although we know nothing of his interior essence 
or nature, but only of his manifestations, attributes, or oper- 
ations ; or as we have the idea of Mind suggested to us and 
fully believe in the existence of mind, although mind is en- 
tirely inaccessible in itself, and is made known wholly by 
those various acts of which we are conscious, such as per- 
ceiving, remembering, reasoning, willing, and the like. 
§. 180. Origin of the idea of motion. 
The idea of Motion, one of those with which we are most 
early and familiarly acquainted, is of internal and suggestive 
origin. Motion does not appear to be addressed directly to 
the senses. We can see things in nation ; but not motion 
itself; we can touch things in motion ; but motion itself is 
not accessible and knowable by that sense, nor by any other. 
When bodies move from each other, this new state of things 
is always indicated by a change in the appearance of the re- 
spective bodies, such as increased dimness of color, diminish- 
ed size, obscurity in the outline, &c. The relation of things, 
considered in regard to mere position, is disturbed and altered 
also. Under these circumstances the idea of motion is natu- 
rally and necessarily suggested. And it exists with all that 
degree of definiteness and distinctness, which is necessary 
for our present purposes. 
§. 181. Of the nature of unity and the origin of that notion. 
Another important notion, properly entitled to a considera- 
tion here, is that of unity. We shall decline attempting- to 
explain the nature of unity, for the simple reason that noth- 
ing is more easy to be understood ; every child knows what 
is meant by One. And how can we explain it, if we would ? 
We can explain a hundred by resolving it into parts ; we can 
explain fifty or a score by making a like separation of the 
whole number into the subordinate portions, of which it is 
made up ; but when we arrive at unity, we must stop, and 
can go no further. 
It is true, attempts have been made to define it, but like 
many other such attempts, they have proved futile. Unity 
has been called a thing indivisible in itself^ and divided from every ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
237 
thing else. But this makes us no wiser. Is it any thing more 
than to say, that the unity of an object is its indivisibility ? 
Or in other words that its unity is its unity ? 
As the idea of unity is one of the simplest, so it is one of 
the earliest notions which men have. It originates in the 
same way, and very nearly at the same time, with the no- 
tions of existence, self-existence, personal identity, and the 
like. When a man has a notion of himself, he evidently 
does not think of himself as two, three, or a dozen men, but 
as one. As soon as he is able to think of himself as distinct 
from his neighbor, as soon as he is in no danger of mingling 
and confounding his own identity with that of the multitude 
around him, so soon does he form the notion of unity. It ex- 
ists as distinct in his mind, as the idea of his own existence 
does ; and arises there immediately successive to that idea, 
because it is impossible, in the nature of things, that he 
should have a notion of himself as a twofold or divided 
person. 
Unity is the fundamental element of all enumeration. By 
the repetition or adding of this element, we are able to form 
numbers to any extent. These numbers may be combined 
among themselves, and employed merely as expressive of 
mutual relations, or we may apply them, if we choose, to all 
external objects whatever, to which we are able to give a 
common name.-(See §. 144.) 
§. 182. Nature of succession, and origin of the idea of succession. 
Another of those conceptions, which naturally offer them- 
selves to our notice here, is that of succession. This term, 
(when we inquire what succession is in itself,) is one of gen- 
eral application, expressive of a mode of existence, rather 
than of existence itself; and in its application to mind in par- 
ticular, expressive of a condition of the mind's action, but not 
of the action itself, which that condition regulates. It is cer- 
tainly a fact too well known to require comment, that our 
minds exist, at different periods, in successive states ; that 
our thoughts and feelings, in obedience to a permanent law, 
follow each other in a train. This is the simple fact. And 
the fact of such succession, whenever it takes place, forms 
the occasion, on which the notion or idea of succession is 238 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION, 
suggested to the mind. Being a simple mental state, it is not 
susceptible of definition ; yet every man possesses it, and 
every one is rightly supposed to understand its nature. 
Accordingly it is not necessary to refer the origin of this 
idea to any thing external. It is certain, that the sense of 
smell cannot directly give us the idea of succession, nor the 
sense of taste, nor of touch. And we well know, that the 
deaf and dumb possess it, not less than others. The blind 
also, who have never seen the face of heaven, nor beheld 
that sun and moon, which measure out for us days and 
months and years, have the notion of succession. They feel, 
they think, they reason, at least in some small degree, like 
other men ; and it is impossible, that they should be without 
it. The origin, therefore, of this notion is within ; it is the 
unfailing result of the inward operation to call it forth, how- 
ever true it may be, that it is subsequently applied to out- 
ward objects and events. 
§• 183. Origin of the notion of duration. 
There is usually understood to be a distinction between 
the idea of succession, and that of duration, though neither 
can be defined. The idea of succession is supposed to be 
antecedent in point of time to that of duration ; (we speak 
now of succession and duration relatively to our conception 
of them, and not in themselves considered.) Duration must 
be supposed to exist antecedently to succession in the order 
of nature ; but succession is the form, in which it is made to 
apply to men ; and is, therefore, naturally the occasion, on 
which the idea of it arises in men's minds. Having the no- 
tion of succession, and that of personal or self-existence, a 
foundation is laid for the additional conception of permanen- 
cy or duration ; in other words, it naturally arises in the 
mind, or is suggested, under these circumstances. 
As we cannot, according to this view of its origin, have 
the notion of duration without succession, hence it happens, 
that we know nothing of duration when we are perfectly 
asleep, because we are not then conscious of those intellectu- 
al changes which are involved in succession. If a person 
could sleep with a perfect suspension of all his mental opera- 
tions from this time until the resurrection, the whole of that 
period would appear to him as nothing. Ten thousand years ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
239 
passed under such circumstances would be less than a few 
days or even hours. 
That the notion of succession, (we do not say succession it- 
self, but only our notion or idea of it,) is antecedent to, and is 
essential to that of duration, is in some measure proved by 
various facts. There are on record a number of cases of re- 
markable somnolency, in which persons have slept for weeks 
and even months. One of the most striking is that of Samu- 
el Chilton, a laborer of Tinsbury near Bath in England. On 
one occasion, in the year 1696, he slept from the ninth of 
April to the seventh of August, about seventeen weeks, be- 
ing kept alive by small quantities of wine poured down his 
throat. He then awoke, dressed himself, and walked about 
the room, "being perfectly unconscious, that he had slept 
more than one night. Nothing, indeed, could make him be- 
lieve, that he had slept so long, till, upon going to the fields, 
he saw crops of barley and oats ready for the sickle, which 
he remembered were only sown when he last visited them."* 
In the Proceedings of the French Royal Academy of Sci- 
ences in 1719, there is also a statement illustrative of the sub- 
ject under consideration, to the following effect. There 
was in Lausanne a nobleman, who, as he was giving orders 
to a servant, suddenly lost his speech and all his senses. 
Different remedies were tried, but, for a very considerable 
time, without effect. For six months he appeared to be in a 
deep sleep, unconscious of every thing. At the end of that 
period, however, resort having been had to certain surgical 
operations, he was suddenly restored to his speech, and the 
exercise of his understanding. When he recovered, the ser- 
vant, to whom he had been giving orders, happening to be 
in the room, he asked him if he had done what he had or- 
dered him to, not being sensible, that any interval, except 
perhaps a very short one, had elapsed duringhis illness.f 
*The publication, from which this statement is taken, and which con- 
tains others of similar import, refers to Frazer's Magazine as its authority. 
f The Academy received this statement from Crousaz, Mathematical 
Professor at Lausanne, and author of a Treatise on Logic, &c. Per- 
sons, suddenly attacked by delirium and afterwards restored, exhibit the 
same unconsciousness and ignorance of the intermediate lapse of time.- 
See Abercrombie's Intellectual Philosophy, Section on Insanity. 240 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
§. 184. Of time and its measurements, and of eternity. 
When duration is estimated or measured, we then call it 
Time. Such measurements, as every one is aware, are 
made by means of certain natural, or artificial motions. The 
annual revolution of the sun, (using language in accordance 
with the common apprehensions on the subject,) marks off 
the portion of duration, which we call a year ; the revolution 
of the moon marks off another portion, which we call a 
month ; the diurnal revolution of the sun gives us the period 
of a day ; the movements of the hands over the face of a 
clock or watch give the diminished durations of hours and 
minutes. This is time, which differs from duration, only in 
the circumstance of its being measured. 
What we call Eternity is only a modified or imperfect 
time ; or rather time not completed. We look back over the 
months and days and years of our former existence ; we look 
forward and onward, and behold ages crowding on ages, and 
time springing from time. And in this way we are forcibly 
led to think of time unfinished, of time progressive but never 
completed ; and to this complex notion we give the name of 
Eternity. 
§. 185. Marks or characteristics of time. 
To this notice of the origin of the notion of time, it will 
not be improper to add, as it is one of great importance, some 
of its marks or characteristics. (1) Time, (meaning by 
the term duration as existing in succession, and as suscepti- 
ble of being measured,) is strictly and properly predicable on- 
ly of finite beings, and not of the Supreme Being. It is evi- 
dent, that, in its application to the human mind, time be- 
comes a law or fixed condition of the mental action, a restric- 
tion placed upon it, a sort of veil, which would hide knowl- 
edge from us, were it not that it is drawn up gradually, and 
lets it in by degrees. But it is equally evident that there can 
be no law of this nature restricting the Divine Mind. Those 
multiplied facts and events, which are brought one after 
another before the minds of men, in consequence of their 
limited mental constitution, are spread out at once before the 
Divine Mind, as on a map. Whether past, present, or fu- 
ture, they are embraced and comprehended in a single 
glance. In this respect there is not the slightest analogy be- ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
241 
tween the Supreme Mind, and the minds of men. (2) 
Time is not susceptible of any visible or outward representa- 
tion, as might be expected, if its origin had been external in- 
stead of internal. It is true, we apply language to time, 
which would imply, if strictly interpreted, that it has exten- 
sion or length. We speak of a long, or short time, as if it were 
actually susceptible of material measurement. But this is 
owing partly to certain casual associations, and partly to the 
imperfection of language, and not to any thing in the nature 
of time itself. (See the chapter on Casual Associations.) 
(3) Time, as it exists in our mental apprehension and in 
its relation to the intellect, is inseparable from events. What- 
ever event has taken place, whether it be some act of men 
or some occurrence in nature, although we are ignorant of 
the hour of the day, or the month, we cannot possibly con- 
ceive of it, independently of time. This is a fixed immutable, 
and ultimate condition of all our perceptions, so far as they 
regard events. That is to say ; we cannot think of them ; 
we cannot conceive of them as existing or taking place out 
of time. (4) Time, in its specific and appropriate nature, 
is indestructible, while the human soul remains the same it 
now does. It is not within the limits of human capability to 
contemplate events as the Supreme Being does, at once and 
simultaneously ; but it can be done in succession alone ; nor 
have we reason to suppose that it will ever be otherwise. It 
is true, the Angel shall at last appear, standing on the land 
and the sea, and shall swear, that time shall be no longer ; 
yet the time, which the angel of the Apocalypse is destined 
thus to abolish, is only that, which is measured by these 
stars, this moon, and the revolutions of this earth. As long 
as the human soul exists, in whatever part of the universe, 
there must at least be, not only duration, but duration as ex- 
isting in succession, unless the nature of the soul be funda- 
mentally changed. 
§. 186. The idea of space not of external origin. 
Another of those notions, the origin of which we propose 
to consider under the head of Suggestion, is the idea of 
space Perhaps it will be asked, why we have disregard- 
ed in this instance the authority and example of Mr. Locke, 242 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
who has ranked it with the notions of External origin, or in 
his own phraseology, with those which come into the mind 
by the way of sensation. And certainly it might be expected, 
that we should assent to that arrangement, if it could be defi- 
nitely shown to us, which of the senses it is to be ascribed to. 
But it is obvious, that this cannot easily be done. 
If it were of external origin, if it could properly be said to 
come into the mind by the way of sensation, we should be 
able to make such a reference of it. But let us inquire. It 
will evidently not be pretended, that the notion of space is to 
be ascribed to the senses of taste, of smell, or of hearing. 
And can it be ascribed to the sense of touch ? Is? it a matter 
of feeling ? A single consideration will suggest a satisfactory 
answer. It will certainly be acknowledged, that we can 
have no knowledge, by the sense of touch, (with the single 
exception perhaps of the ideas of heat and cold, which are 
sometimes ascribed to it,) of any thing which does not pre- 
sent some resistance. The degree of resistance may greatly 
vary, but there will be always some. But no one will under- 
take to say, that resistance is a quality of space, or enters in 
any way into his notion of it. 
Nor are there less obvious objections to regarding it as a 
direct object of sight. The sense of sight gives us no direct 
knowledge of any thing but of colors ; all other visual percep- 
tions are original in the sense of touch, and are made the 
property of the sight by transference. No one certainly ever 
speaks of space as red, or white, or of any other color, or 
conceives of it as such. 
There is another consideration, adverse to ascribing the 
idea of space to the senses, applicable equally to the sight 
and the touch. Every thing, coming within the cognizance 
of those two senses, (with the exception already alluded to,) 
has form, limits, bounds, place, &c. But the idea, to which 
we are now attending, is utterly exclusive of every thing of 
this nature ; it is not susceptible of circumscription and figure. 
So far from it, when we escape beyond the succession of cir- 
cumscribed and insulated objects, we have but just entered 
within its empire. If we let the mind range forth beyond the 
forms immediately surrounding us, beyond the world itself, 
beyond all the systems of worlds in the universe ; if we stand ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
243 
in our conception on the verge of the remotest star, and look 
downward and upward ; it is then the idea of space rushes 
upon the mind with a power before unknown. These con- 
siderations clearly lead to the conclusion, that the notion of 
space is not susceptible of being ascribed directly to sensation 
in any of its forms, and is not, in the proper sense of the 
terms, of external origin. It may perhaps be maintained, 
that we shall find an adequate account of its origin, if we 
combine the aid of abstraction with sensation. It is admit- 
ted, that by the sense of touch we have a knowledge of the 
extension of bodies, which includes, when it is contemplated 
under different views, length, breadth, height, &c. But still 
it does not appear, how abstraction, applied to extension, or 
any thing included in extension, can give us space. It is evi- 
dent, that the abstract notion which we form of the length 
of a body, is different from the one in question. And if we 
abstract height or breadth, these also come short of givingus 
space. If we could abstract height, length, and breadth at 
once, and then combine them together, we should not even 
then have space, but on the contrary a solid body. 
187. The idea of space has its origin in suggestion. 
What then shall we say of the origin of the notion of 
space ? When pressed on this point, we have but one answer 
to give ; it is the natural offspring of the mind ; it is a crea- 
tion of the soul, wholly inseparable from its elementary con- 
stitution and action ; an intimation, coming from an interior 
and original impulse. The opinion of Cousin, (not to men- 
tion that of others of a like import,) closely approximates to 
this statement. After criticising upon Locke, as Mr. Stewart 
had done before him, and asserting the futility of pretending 
to derive this notion directly from the senses, he adds as fol- 
lows ; contraire Video d' espace nous est donnee, a V occasion 
de r idee de corps, par la pensee, V entendement, I' esprit, la raison, 
enjin par une puissance autre que la sensation."* 
It remains to be added, that, while we cannot directly 
refer the notion in question to the senses, we cannot even 
state with certainty any particular occasion on which it arises, 
for we have the notion at a period further back than we can 
* L'Histoire de la Philosophic, Tome II, Dix-septieme Le^on. 244 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
remember. On this point, however, it is undoubtedly true, 
that we may advance opinions more or less probable.-It is, 
for instance a supposition not altogether worthless, that mo- 
tion may have been the original occasion of the rise of this 
idea. At an early period we moved the hand, either to grasp 
something removed at a little distance, or in the mere play- 
ful exercise of the muscles, or perhaps we transferred the 
whole body from one position to another; and it is at least 
no impossibility, that on such an occasion the idea of space 
may have been called forth in the soul. 
But there is another supposition, still more entitled to no- 
tice, the one referred to in the above quotation from Cousin. 
Our acquaintance with external bodies, by means of the sen- 
ses, may have been the occasion of its rise, although the sen- 
ses themselves are not its direct source. It is certain, that 
we cannot contemplate any body whatever, an apple, a rose, 
a tree, a house, without always finding the idea of space a 
ready and necessary concomitant. We cannot conceive of a 
body which is no-where. So that we may at least date the 
origin of the idea of space, as early as our acquaintance with 
any external body whatever. In other words, it is a giftof 
the mind, made simultaneously with its earliest external per- 
ceptions. 
§. 188. Characteristic marks of the notion of space. 
What has been said has prepared the way for the better 
understanding of the characteristic marks of space, as it exists 
in the mind's view of it. Of these marks there are four, which 
will help to distinguish it. (1) Like duration or time, 
space is not capable of being visibly represented. The re- 
marks, which have already been made, clearly evince this. 
Nothing can be visibly represented, which does not come 
within the direct range and cognizance of the senses, as 
space does not. (2) It has no form nor limits. This might 
perhaps be considered as naturallyresuiting from the charac- 
teristic first mentioned. And besides we may safely appeal 
here to general experience, and assert without hesitation, 
that no man limits space in his conception of it, nor is it even 
in his power so to do. 
(3) It is absolute and necessary. We speak of a thing as 
absolute which is not dependent on another, and is unaltera- ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
245 
ble. This is not the case with any thing whatever, which 
we become acquainted with by means of the direct agency 
of the senses. All such bodies are constantly changing, and 
there is no difficulty in the supposition, that they may all be 
struck out of existence. But it is impossible for us to asso- 
ciate the idea of non-existence with space. It is unalterably 
the same. But there is evidently nothing unalterable, which 
is not naturally and necessarily so. It is on this' ground, 
therefore, that we assign to space the characteristic of being 
absolute and necessary. (4) A fourth characteristic is, 
that it is the condition of the existehc^fof all bodies ; that is 
to say, it is impossible for us to conceive of a body without 
associating the notion of space with it. We are so constitu- 
ted that what we understand by space is utterly inseparable, 
from every thing outward, which has outlines and form. So 
that we may truly say of space, that it is the condition of the 
existence of all bodies, at least relatively to ourselves. And 
hence, as it is internally conceived of, it becomes a great law 
of the mind, modifying and limiting all its outward percep- 
tions. We cannot conceive of objects out of space, any more 
than we can conceive of events out of time. It is true, the 
poet Gray represents Milton, as having, in his Paradise Lost, 
scaled the limits, which time and space impose on human 
conceptions ; the flaming bounds, as he calls them. But this 
is only the license and fiction of a poet. If that should ever 
happen, which he has so sublimely imagined, and men should 
ever break through those great and unalterable barriers, 
which God has erected between himself and inferior intelli- 
gences, we might well anticipate the result, which the same 
glowing fancy has indicated ; 
"They saw, but blasted with excess of light, 
"Closed their eyes in endless night." 
§. 189. Of the origin of the idea of power. 
Under the head of Suggestion the idea of power properly 
belongs. Every man has this notion ; every one feels too, 
that there is a corresponding reality ; in other words, power 
is not only a mere subject of thought, but has, in some impor- 
tant sense, a real existence. And we may add, that every 
one knows, although there is somewhere a great original 246 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
fountain of power, independent of all created beings, that he 
has a portion, (small indeed it may be, but yet a portion,) of 
the element of power in his own mind, and in his own per- 
son. There is indeed a Power, unexplored and invisible, 
which has reared the mountains, which rolls the ocean, and 
which propels the sun in his course ; but it is nevertheless 
true, that man, humble as he is in the scale of rational and 
accountable beings, possesses, as an attribute of his own na- 
ture, an amount of real efficiency, suited to the limited sphere, 
which Providence has allotted him. This is a simple state- 
ment of the fact. Power goes handin hand with existence, 
intelligence, and accountability. There is no existence, ei- 
ther intelligent or unintelligent, without power, either in the 
thing itself, or in something else which sustains it. There is 
no accountable existence without power, existing in and par- 
ticipating in such existence, and constituting the basis of its 
accountability. 
But the principal question here is, not what power is in 
itself, nor whether man possesses power in fact, but under 
what circumstances the notion or idea of power arises in the 
human mind. The occasions of the origin of this idea, so 
far as we are able to judge, appear to be threefold. 
(1) All cases of antecedence and sequence in the natural 
world. We are so constituted, that in connection with such 
cases of antecedence and sequence, we are led at a very ear- 
ly period of life, to frame the proposition and to receive it as 
an undeniable truth, that there can be no beginning or change 
of existence without a cause. This proposition involves the 
idea of efficiency or power. (2) The control of the will 
over the muscular action. We are so constituted, that 
whenever we will to put part of the body in motion, and 
the motion follows the volition, we have the idea of power. 
(3) The control of the will over the other mental powers. 
Within certain limits and to a certain extent there seems to 
be ground for supposing, that the will is capable of exercis- 
ing a directing control over the mental, as well as over the 
bodily powers. And whenever we are conscious of such 
control being exercised, whether it be greater or less, occa- 
sion is furnished for the origin of this idea. It is then called 
forth or suggested. It is not seen by the material eye ; nor ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
247 
reached by the sense of touch ; but emerging of itself from 
the mind, like a star from the depths of the firmament, it 
reveals itself distinctly and brightly to the intellectual vision. 
§. 190. Origin of the idea of the first or primitive. 
The mind, satisfied with nothing short of the elements 
and foundations of knowledge, seeks, in its inquiry, into the 
origin and causation of things, not only for the element of 
Power, but also for the first cause, the antecedent which 
has no other antecedent, the primitive. Whenever we see 
a thing, we are naturally led to think of, and to inquire for 
the beginning of that thing. There is a sort of natural con- 
sanguinity of events, an unalterable tie, which binds the 
present with the past; and the past with that which is still 
further back in the depths of time. The thing, the event, 
the fact, (whatever exists or takes place,) calls for that to 
which it is related, the antecedent and basis of its own exist- 
ence, in the language of Scripture, as "deep calls to deep." 
Hence the idea of the Primitive. This important notion, 
(which we variously express by the words first, original, 
beginning, and the like,) originates in the Intellect, rather 
than in Sense ; and in that particular form of intellectual ac- 
tivity, which we denominate Suggestion. It is obvious, while 
we can see or hear or touch any thing which is an object of 
the outward senses, we cannot, with strict propriety and truth 
of speech, be said to touch or see its antecedence, or primi- 
tiveness. In fact, there is only one object, and that no oth- 
er than the Supreme Being himself, to whom this idea, with 
absolute truth or strictness, will apply at all. We lookat the 
works of man, and the works of nature ; every thing which 
has form or activity ; the sun, the moon, the stars, the ocean, 
the forests. But the mind, not satisfied with the perception 
of the thing, looks still further for its cause, its effective ante- 
cedent, the foundation of its existence. It inquires, who 
reared the forest, who rolls the ocean, who made the sun. 
The mind itself, therefore, suggests the notion of something 
which goes before, of priority ; and, advancing under the 
impulses of its own nature, it proceeds from step to step, 
from star to star, from existence to existence, till it finds the 
absolute Primitive in that great Being, who involves in the 248 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION, 
fact of his Supremacy, not only the subordination, but the sub- 
sequence of all things else. And it is to be kept in mind, that 
it is found there, not as a matter of outward, but of inward 
perception ; revealed, not to the understanding, perceiving 
through the restricted instrumentality of the senses, but to 
the understanding, perceiving in the intuitive light of its own 
spontaneous action. 
§. 191. Of the ideas of right and wrong. 
Right and Wrong also are conceptions of the pure Under- 
standing ; that is, of the Understanding operating in virtue 
of its own interior nature, and not as dependent on the sen- 
ses. We are constituted intellectually in such a manner, 
that, whenever occasions of actual right or wrong occur, 
whenever objects fitted to excite a moral approval or disap- 
proval are presented to our notice, the ideas of right and 
wrong naturally and necessarily arise within us. In respect 
to these ideas or intellections, (if we choose to employ an ex- 
pressive term partially fallen into disuse,) Cudworth, Stew- 
art, Cousin, and other writers of acknowledged discernment 
and weight, appear to agree in placing the origin of them 
here. And this arrangement of them is understood to be im- 
portant, in connection with the theory of Morals. If these 
ideas originate in the pure intellect, and are simple, as they 
obviously are, then each of them necessarily has its distinc- 
tive nature ; each of them is an entity by itself; and it is im- 
possible to conceive of them as identical or interchangeable 
with each other. They are as truly unlike as our concep- 
tions of unity and time, or of space and power. And if this is 
true of our ideas of right and wrong, it is not less so of right 
and wrong themselves. In other words, right can never be- 
come wrong, nor wrong, right; they are placed forever apart, 
each occupying its own sphere ; and thus we have a founda- 
tion laid for the important doctrine of the immutability of 
moral distinctions. "The distinction between right and 
wrong, (says Cousin, Psychology, Chap. 5,) may be incor- 
rectly applied, may vary in regard to particular objects, and 
may become clearer and more correct in time, without ceas- 
ing to be with all men the same thing at the bottom. It is 
an universal conception of Reason, and hence it is found in all original suggestion. 
249 
languages, those products and faithful images of the mind.- 
Not only is this distinction universal, but it is a necessary 
conception. In vain does the reason, after having once re- 
ceived, attempt to deny it, or call in question its truth. It 
cannot. One cannot at will regard the same action as just 
and unjust. These two ideas baffle every attempt to com- 
mute them, the one for the other. Their objects may 
change, but never their nature." 
§. 192. Origin of the ideas of moral merit and demerit. 
Closely connected with the ideas of right and wrong are 
the ideas of moral merit and demerit. In the order of na- 
ture which is sometimes called the logical order,) the ideas 
of right and wrong come first. Without possessing the ante- 
cedent notions of right and wrong, it would be impossible for 
us to frame the ideas of moral merit and demerit. For what 
merit can we possibly attach to him, in whom we discover 
no rectitude ; or what demerit in him, in whom we discover 
no want of it ! Merit always implies virtue as its antecedent 
and necessary condition, while demerit as certainly implies 
the want of it or vice. Although the ideas of merit and de- 
merit, in consequence of being simple, are undefinable, there 
can be no doubt of their existence, and of their being entire- 
ly clear to our mental perception ; and that they furnish a 
well-founded and satisfactory basis for many of our judgments 
in respect to the moral character and conduct of mankind. 
§ 193. Of other elements of knowledge developed in Suggestion. 
In giving an account of the ideas from this source, we have 
preferred as designative of their origin the term suggestion, 
proposed and employed by Reid and Stewart, to the word 
reason, proposed by Kant and adopted by Cousin and some 
other writers, as, on the whole more conformable to the pre- 
valent usage of the English Language. In common parlance 
and by the established usage of the language, the word 
reason is expressive of the deductive, rather than of the sug- 
gestive faculty ; and if we annul or perplex the present use 
of that word by a novel application of it, we must introduce 
a new word to express the process of deduction. Wheth- 
er we are correct in this or not, we shall probably find 250 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
no disagreement or opposition in asserting, not only the ex- 
istence, but the great importance of the intellectual capabili- 
ty, which we have been considering. The thing, and the 
nature of the thing, is undoubtedly of more consequence than 
the mere name. 
In leaving this interesting topic, we would not be under- 
stood to intimate, that the notions of existence, mind, per- 
sonal identity, unity, succession, motion, duration, power, 
and the others which have been mentioned, are all, which 
Suggestion furnishes. It might not be easy to make a com- 
plete enumeration ; but in giving an account of the genesis 
of human knowledge, may we not ascribe the ideas of truth, 
freedom, design or intelligence, necessity, fitness or congrui- 
ty, reality, order, plurality, totality, immensity, possibility, 
infinity, happiness, reward, punishment, and perhaps many 
others to this source ? In particular may we not assign 
here, (such is the doctrine and one of the excellencies of the 
system of Kant,) the abstract conceptions of Beauty and De- 
formity ? It is true, that we feel the Beautiful and its oppo- 
site by the inward Sensibilities, as we shall have occasion to 
notice and explain, when we come to that interesting view 
of the mind. But is it not true also, that we conceive or have 
an idea of it by the intellect ? We may not be able to tell 
what the beautiful is, but does not the intellect, by a spon- 
taneous and effective intimation, assure us of the fact of its 
existence ? And if there is a Beautiful, is there not also a 
Deformed, and of course a fixed and immutable distinction 
between them ? Could we have a distinct idea of the Beau- 
tiful without an idea of the Deformed, any more than we 
could have an idea of Right without an idea of Wrong? Our 
opinions as to what is in fact beautiful may vary in a given 
case ; but that does not prove the absence of the reality, nor 
alter the essentials of its nature. It is a common remark, 
that religion is practically no religion to those who have no 
faith in it; so the Beautiful is practically annihilated to those 
who have not the power of perceiving it ; but independent of 
the circumstance of its being perceived or not, it is the Beau- 
tiful still ; like the sweet song of the bird in the desert, the 
same in itself, though there is no one to hear it, and rejoice 
in it. So that we cannot but assent to those who assert, ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
251 
that the foundations of ^Esthetics, (that is, the science of the 
Beautiful as applied to nature and the arts,) are firm ; not 
depending upon variable circumstances, but substantiated by 
the permanency of nature. And hence it has happened, that 
what was beautiful and pleasing to mankind four thousand 
years ago, is beautiful and pleasing still, simply because 
Beauty in nature, like Rectitude in morals, is, in the element 
and substance of its constitution, indestructible and invaria- 
ble. The idea of the Beautiful, as thus explained, is made 
known by Suggestion. 
§. 194. Suggestion a source of principles as well as ideas. 
One remark more remains to be made. Original Sugges- 
tion is not only the source of ideas, (and particularly of ideas 
fundamental and unalterable,) but also of principles. The 
reasoning faculty, which in its nature is essentially compara- 
tive and deductive, must have something to rest upon back 
of itself, and of still higher authority than itself, with which, 
as a first link in the chain, the process of deduction begins. 
It is the suggestive intellect, which is the basis of the action 
of the comparing and deductive intellect. Of those elemen- 
tary or transcendental propositions, which are generally ac- 
knowledged to be prerequisites and conditions of the exercise 
of the deductive faculty, there are four particularly worthy 
of notice. (1) There is no beginning or change of exist- 
ence without a cause. (2) Matter and mind have uni- 
form and permanent laws. (3) Every quality supposes a 
subject, a real existence, of which it is a quality. (4) 
Means, conspiring together to produce a certain end, imply 
intelligence. The first of these propositions is the basis of 
all those reasonings, which are employed to prove the exist- 
ence of God from the light of nature, besides having other 
important applications in regard to any thing and every thing 
that is past. The second is essential to the continuance of 
our existence and our activity, inasmuch as it lays the foun- 
dation of all foresight into the future, and of the important 
consequences dependent upon such foresight. The third 
gives us a knowledge of mind and matter, the mental and 
material world, in distinction from their mere attributes and 
operations ; assuring us of a substance or actuality of exist- 252 
ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. 
ence, as well as of the manifestations or signs of existence. 
By means of the fourth we are enabled to conduct the diffi- 
cult and important process of separating the two great do- 
mains of matter and mind, detecting indications of intelli- 
gence under material forms, and assigning both to mind and 
matter their appropriate sphere and responsibilities. 
These great truths are made known, not by deduction, nor 
by direct experience, but by a spontaneous and original inti- 
mation of the Suggestive intellect. As they are not the crea- 
tions of a process of reasoning, so they are not destructible 
by such a process. They stand imbedded in the mind's struc- 
ture, and cannot be overthrown, without a subversion of the 
essential elements of our mental nature. (For further re- 
marks on two of these elementary propositions, see the Chap, 
on Primary Truths.) 
CHAPTER THIRD. 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
195. Consciousness the 2nd source of internal knowledge ; its nature. 
The second source of that knowledge, which, in distinc- 
tion from sensations and external perceptions, is denominated 
Internal, is consciousness. By the common usage of the 
language, the term Consciousness is appropriated to express 
the way or method, in which we obtain the knowledge of 
those objects, which belong to the mind itself, and which do 
not, and cannot exist independently of some mind. Imagin- 
ing and reasoning are terms, expressive of real objects of 
thought; but evidently they cannot be supposed to exist, in- 
dependently of some mind which imagines and reasons. 
Hence every instance of consciousness may be regarded as 
embracing in itself the three following distinct notions at 
least; viz., (1) The idea of self or of personal existence, CONSCIOUSNESS. 
253 
which we possess not by direct consciousness but by sugges- 
tion, expressed in English by the words self, myself, and 
the personal pronoun I ; (2) some quality, state, or operation 
of the mind, whatever it may be ; and (3) a relative percep- 
tion of possession, appropriation, or belonging to. For in- 
stance, a person says, I am conscious of love, or of anger, 
or of penitence. Here the idea of self or of personal exist- 
ence is expressed by the pronoun I; there is a different men- 
tal state, and expressed by its appropriate term, that of the 
affection of anger, &c ; the phrase, conscious of, expresses 
the feeling of relation, which instantaneously and necessarily 
recognizes the passion of anger as the attribute or property 
of the subject of the proposition. And in this case, as in all 
others where we apply the term under consideration, con- 
sciousness does not properly extend to any thing, which has 
an existence, extraneous to the conscious subject or soul itself. 
§. 196. Further remarks on the proper objects of consciousness. 
As there are some things, to which Consciousness, as the 
term is usually employed, relates, and others, to which it 
does not, it is proper to consider it in this respect more fully. 
(1) As to those thoughts, which may have arisen, or 
those emotions, which may have agitated us in times past, 
we cannot with propriety be said to be conscious of them at 
the present moment; although we may be conscious of that 
present state of mind, which we term the recollection of them. 
(2) Again, Consciousness has no direct connection with 
such objects, whether material or immaterial, as exist at the 
present time, but are external to the mind, or in other words 
have an existence independent of it. 
For instance, we are not, strictly speaking, conscious of 
any material existence whatever ; of the earth which we 
tread, of the food which nourishes us, of the clothes that pro- 
tect, or of any thing else of the like nature, with which we 
are conversant; but are conscious merely of the effects they 
produce within us, of the sensations of taste, of heat and 
cold, of resistance and extension, of hardness and softness, 
and the like. 
(3) This view holds also in respect to immaterial things, 
even the mind itself. We are not directly'conscious, using 254 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
the term in the manner which has been explained, of the ex- 
istence even of our own mind, but merely of its qualities and 
operations, and of that firm belief or knowledge of its exist- 
ence, necessarily attendant on those operations. "According 
to the common doctrine, (says Mr. Stewart, Philos. Essays, 
I, ch. I.) of our best philosophers, it is by the evidence of 
consciousness we are assured that we ourselves exist. The 
proposition, however, when thus stated, is not accurately 
true ; for our own existence is not a direct or immediate ob- 
ject of consciousness, in the strict and logical meaning of 
that term. We are conscious of sensation, thought, desire, 
volition; but we are not conscious of the existence of mind 
itself; nor would it be possible for us to arrive at the knowl- 
edge of it (supposing us to be created in the full possession of 
all the intellectual capacities that belong to human nature) if 
no impression were ever to be made on our external senses. 
The moment that, in consequence of such an impression, a 
sensation is excited, we learn two facts at once ;-the exist- 
ence of the sensation, and our own existence as sentient 
beings : in other words, the very first exercise of my con- 
sciousness necessarily implies a belief, not only of the pre- 
sent existence of what is felt, but of the present existence of 
that which feels and thinks ; or (to employ plainer language) 
the present existence of that being which I denote by the 
words Zand myself. Of these facts, however, it is the former 
alone of which we can properly be said to be conscious, 
agreeably to the rigorous interpretation of the expression. 
The latter is made known to us by a Suggestion of the un- 
derstanding consequent on the sensation, but so intimately con- 
nected with it, that it is not surprising that our belief of both 
should be generally referred to the same origin." 
§. 197. Consciousness a ground or law of belief. 
Consciousness, as was remarked in the Introduction to 
this Work, is a ground or law of belief; and the belief, 
attendant on the exercise of it, like that which accompanies 
the exercise of Original Suggestion, is of the highest kind. 
It appears to be utterly out of our power to avoid believing 
beyond a doubt, that the mind experiences certain sensa- 
tions, or has certain thoughts, or puts forth particular CONSCIOUSNESS. 
255 
intellectual operations, whenever in point of fact that is the 
case. We may be asked for the reason of this belief, but we 
have none to give, except that it is the result of an ultimate 
and controlling principle of our nature ; and hence that noth- 
ing can ever prevent the convictions, resulting from this 
source, and nothing can divest us of them. 
Nor has the history of the human mind made known any 
instances, that have even the appearance of being at vari- 
ance with this view, except a few cases of undoubted insani- 
ty. A man may reason against Consciousness as a ground 
and law of belief, either for the sake of amusing himself or 
of perplexing others, but when he not only reasons against it 
as such, but seriously and sincerely rejects it, it becomes 
quite another concern ; and such an one has by common con- 
sent broken loose from the authority of his nature, and is 
truly and emphatically beside himself. It will be impossible 
to find a resting-place, where such a mind can fix itself and 
repose ; the best established truths and the wildest and most 
extravagant notions will stand nearly an equal chance of be- 
ing either rejected or received ; fancy and fact will be con- 
founded and mingled together ; and the whole mind will ex- 
hibit a scene of chaotic and irretrievable confusion. 
§. 198. Instances of knowledge developed in consciousness. 
It would be no easy task to point out the numerous states 
of mind, the ideasand emotionsand desires and volitions,, 
which come within the range and cognizance of Conscious- 
ness ; nor is there any special reason, connected with any 
object we have in view at present, why such a full enumera- 
tion should be attempted. A few instances will suffice to 
show, how fruitful a source of experience and of knowledge 
this is. 
I,-All the various degrees of belief are matters of Con- 
sciousness. We are so constituted, that the mind necessari- 
ly yieldsits assent, in a greater or less degree, when evidence 
is presented. These degrees of assent are exceedingly vari- 
ous and multiplied, although only a few of them are express- 
ed by select and appropriate names ; nor does it appear to be 
necessary for the ends of society, or for any other purpose, 
that it should be otherwise. Some of them are as follows ; 256 
CONSCIOUSNESS. 
doubting, assenting, presumption, believing, disbelieving, pro- 
bability, certainty, &c. 
II,-The names of all other intellectual acts and opera- 
tions, (not the names of the intellectual Powers, which, like 
the mind itself, are made known to us by Suggestion, and are 
expressed by a different class of terms, but simply of acts and 
operations,) are expressive of the subjects of our Consciousness. 
Among others, the terms, perceiving, thinking, attending, 
conceiving, remembering, comparing, judging, abstracting, 
reasoning, imagining. 
Ill,-Consciousness, considered as a source of knowledge, 
includes likewise all our emotions and desires, (every thing, 
in fact, which really and directly comes within the range of 
the sensitive or sentient part of our nature,) as the emo- 
tions of the beautiful, the grand, the sublime, the ludicrous ; 
the feelings of pleasure, and pain, and aversion ; of hope and 
joy, of despondency and sadness, and a multitude of others. 
It will be noticed, that this statement applies to the emo- 
tions or feelings merely, and not to the abstract conceptions, 
(for instance, the abstract ideas of Beauty and Deformity,) 
of which such emotions may furnish the occasion. Abstract 
ideas do not represent the direct, but only the suggested sub- 
jects of our knowledge. 
IV,-Here also originates our acquaintance with the com- 
plex emotions or passions. A man bestows a benefit upon 
us, and we are conscious of a new complex feeling, which 
we call gratitude. Another person does us an injury ; and 
we are conscious of another and distinct feeling, which we 
call anger. In other words, we feel, we know, that the pas- 
sion exists, and that it belongs to ourselves ; and it is the 
same of jealousy, hatred, revenge, friendship, sympathy, 
the filial and parental affections, love, &c. 
V,-All the moral and religious emotions and affections, 
regarded as subjects of internal knowledge, belong here ; 
such as approval, disapproval, remorse, humility, repentance, 
religious faith, forgiveness, benevolence, the sense of depen- 
dence, adoration. When we consider, that the mind is 
constantly in action, that, in all our intercourse with our fel- 
low-beings, friends, family, countrymen, and enemies, new 
and exceedingly diversified feelings are called forth, that eve- RELATIVE SUGGESTION, 
257 
ry new scene in nature, and every new combination of events 
have their appropriate results in the mind, it will be readily 
conjectured, that this enumeration might be carried to a 
much greater extent. What has been said will serve to indi- 
cate some of the prominent sources for self-inquiry on this 
subject. 
CHAPTER FOURTH. 
RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. 
199. Of the susceptibility of perceiving or feeling relations. 
It is not inconsistent with the usage of our language to 
say, that the mind brings its thoughts together, and places 
them side by side, and compares them. Such are nearly the 
expressions of Mr. Locke, who speaks of the njind's bringing 
one thing to and setting it by another, and canning its view 
from one to the other. And such is the imperfect nature of 
all arbitrary signs, that this phraseology will probably con- 
tinue to be employed, although without some attention it 
will be likely to lead into error. Such expressions are evi- 
dently of material origin, and cannot be rightly interpreted, 
in their application to the mind, without taking that circum- 
stance into consideration. When it is said, that our thoughts 
are brought together, that they are placed side by side and 
the like, probably nothing more can be meant than this, 
that they are immediately successive to each other. And 
when it is further said, that we compare them, the meaning 
is, that we perceive or feel their relation to each other in 
certain respects. 
The mind, therefore, has an original susceptibility or pow- 
er, corresponding to this result ; in other words, by which 
this result is brought about ; which is sometimes known as 
its power of relative suggestion, and at other times, the 
same thing is expressed bv the term judgment, although the 258 
RELATIVE SUGGESTION 
latter term is sometimes employed with other shades of mean- 
ing. " With the susceptibility of Relative Suggestion, 
(says Dr. Brown, Leet. 51,) the faculty of judgment, as that 
term is commonly employed, may be considered as nearly 
synonymous ; and I have accordingly used it as synonymous 
in treating of the different relations that have come under 
our review." Degerando, in his treatise on the Origin of 
Human Knowledge, Pt. II, Chap. 2d, has a remark nearly to 
the same effect. " Le judgment nous fournit de nombreux 
secours ; combien d'idees de relation n' avons nous pas ? Le 
judgment seul peut, en comparant les objets, nous en faire 
decouvrir les rapports.11 
We arrive here, therefore, at an ultimate fact in our men- 
tal nature ; in other words we reach a principle so thorough- 
ly elementary that it cannot be resolved into any other. 
The human intellect is so made, so constituted, that, when it 
perceives different objects together, or has immediately suc- 
cessive conceptions of any absent objects of perception, their 
mutual relations are immediately felt by it. It considers 
them as equal or unequal, like or unlike, as being the same 
or different in respect to place and time, as having the same 
or different causes and ends, and in various other respects. 
§. 200. Occasions on which feelings of relation may arise. 
The occasions, on which feelings of relation may arise, 
are almost innumerable. It would certainly be no easy task 
to specify them all. Any of the ideas, which the mind is 
able to frame, may either directly, or indirectly, lay the 
foundation of other ideas of relation, since they may in gen- 
eral be compared together ; or if they cannot themselves be 
readily placed side by side, may be made the means of bring- 
ing others into comparison. Butthose ideas, which are of 
an external origin, are representative of objects and their 
qualities ; and hence we may speak of the relations of things, 
no less than of the relations of thought. And such relations 
are every where discoverable. 
We behold the flowers of the field, and one is fairer than 
another ; we hear many voices, and one is louder or softer 
than another ; we taste the fruits of the earth, and one fla- 
vor is more pleasant than another. But these differences of OR JUDGMENT. 
259 
sound and brightness and taste could never be known to us 
without the power of perceiving relations. Again, we see 
a fellow being ; and as we make him the subject of our 
thoughts, we at first think of him only as a man. But then 
he may at the same time be a father, a brother, a son, a cit- 
izen, a legislator ; these terms express ideas of relation. 
§. 201. Of the use of correlative terms. 
Correlative terms, are such terms, as are used to express 
corresponding ideas of relation. They suggest the relations 
with great readiness, and by means of them the mind can be 
more steadily, and longer, and with less pain, fixed upon the 
ideas, of which they are expressive. The words father and 
son, legislator and constituent, brother and sister, husband 
and wife, and others of this class, as soon as they are named, 
at once carry our thoughts beyond the persons who are the 
subjects of these relations, to the relations themselves. 
Wherever, therefore, there are correlative terms, the rela- 
tions may be expected to be clear to the mind. 
The word, citizen, is a relative term, but there being no 
correlative word, expressing a precisely corresponding rela- 
tion, we find it more difficult to form a ready conception of the 
thing signified, than of subject, which has the correlatives, 
ruler and governor. It is hardly necessary to remind any 
one, that the relation is something different from the things 
related. The relations are often changing, while the subjects 
of them remain the same. A person may sustain the relation 
and the name of a father to-day ; but the inroads of death 
may on the morrow deprive him of his offspring, and thus 
terminate that character, which the relative term, father, 
expresses. 
§. 202. Ofthe great number of our ideas of relation. 
Mr. Locke has somewhere made a remark to this effect, 
that it would make a volume to describe all sorts of relations, 
and with good reason ; since they are as numerous, as that 
almost endless variety of respects, in which all our ideas and 
all other subjects of knowledge may be compared together. 
With the single idea of man how many others are connected 
in consequence of the various relations, which he sustains. 260 
RELATIVE SUGGESTION 
He may, at one and the same time, be a father, brother, 
son, brother-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend, enemy, sub- 
ject, general, judge, patron, townsman, servant, master, pos- 
sessor, superior, inferior, greater, smaller, older, younger, 
wiser, contemporary, like, unlike, together with sustaining a 
variety of other relations too numerous to be mentioned. 
Such is the number of relations, that it is found difficult to 
reduce them to classes ; and probably no classification of 
them, which has been hitherto proposed, exhausts them in 
their full extent. The most of those, which it will be neces- 
sary to notice, may be brought into the seven classes of re- 
lations of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY, of DEGREE, of PROPORTION, 
of place, of time, of possession, and of cause and EFFECT. 
§. 203. Of relations of identity and diversity. 
The first class of ideas of relation, which we shall pro- 
ceed to consider, are those of identity and diversity. 
Such is the nature of our minds, that no two objects can be 
placed before us essentially unlike, without our having a per- 
ception of this difference. When, on the other hand, there 
is an actual sameness in objects contemplated by us, the 
mind perceives or is sensible of their identity. It is not 
meant by this, that we are never liable to mistake ; that the 
mind never confounds what is different, nor separates what 
is the same ; our object here is merely to state the general 
fact. 
Two pieces of paper, for instance, are placed before us, 
the one white, and the other red ; and we at once perceive, 
without the delay of resorting to other objects and bringing 
them into comparison, that the colors are not the same. We 
immediately and necessarily perceive a difference between a 
square and a circle, between a triangle and a parallelogram, 
between the river and the rude cliff that overhangs it, the 
flower and the turf from which it springs, the house and the 
neighboring hill, the horse and his rider. 
Whatever may be the appearance of this elementary per- 
ception at first sight, it is undoubtedly one of great practical 
importance. It has its place in all forms of reasoning, as the 
train of argument proceeds from step to step ; and in Demon- 
strative reasoning in particular, it is evident, that without it OR JUDGMENT. 
261 
we should be unable to combine together the plainest propo- 
sitions. 
204. Of axioms in connection with relations of identity and diversity. 
The remark at the close of the last section will be better 
understood, on a little further explanation. The statement 
was, that without the relative perceptions or suggestions of 
identity and diversity, (otherwise denominated perceptions 
of agreement and disagreement,) we should be incapable of 
demonstrative reasoning. Such reasoning, as is well known, 
is carried on by the help of axioms. And accordingly we 
generally find a number of axioms placed at the head of geo- 
metrical treatises, and of other treatises involving geometri- 
cal principles, such as the following ; Things equal to the 
same are equal to one another ; If equals be added to equals, 
the wholes are equal ; The whole is greater than a part ; 
Things, which are double of the same, are equal to one an- 
other ; Things, which are halves of the same, are equal to 
one another ; Magnitudes, which coincide with one another, 
(that is, which exactly fill the same space,) are equal to one 
another, &c. 
It will be admitted, (and we shall see it perhaps more 
clearly, when we again have occasion to revert to this sub- 
ject,) that demonstrative reasoning implies a constant refer- 
ence to such axioms ; that its advancement through the suc- 
cessive series of propositions is by means of their aid. But 
it is too evident to require remark, that these axioms are 
nothing more than particular instances of the relative sugges- 
tion of identity and diversity expressed in words. It is the 
perceptions of agreement and disagreement, actually arising 
in the mind, and not the mere verbal expression of them, 
which form the true cement and bond of the successive links, 
and impart consistency and strength to the whole chain. 
§. 205. (II.) Relations of degree and names expressive of them. 
Another class of those intellectual perceptions, which are 
to be ascribed to the Judgment, or what we term more ex- 
plicitly the power of relative suggestion, may properly 
enough be named perceptions of relations of Degree. Such 
perceptions of relation are found to exist in respect to all such 
objects, as are capable of being considered as composed of 262 
RELATIVE SUGGESTION 
parts, and a» susceptible in some respects, of different de- 
grees. We look, for instance, at two men ; they are both 
tall ; but we at once perceive and assert, that one is taller 
than the other. We taste two apples ; they are both sweet; 
but we say that one is sweeter than another. That is to say, 
we discover, in addition to the mere perception of the man 
and the apple, a relation, a difference in the objects in certain 
respects. 
There are terms, in all languages, employed in the expres- 
sion of such relations. In English a reference to the particu- 
lar relation is often combined in the same term, which expres- 
ses the quality. All the words of the comparative and su- 
perlative degrees, formed by merely altering the termination 
of the positive, are of this description, as whiter, sweeter, 
wiser, larger, smaller, nobler, kinder, truest, falsest, holiest, 
and a multitude of others. In other cases, (and probably the 
greater number,) the epithet, expressive of the quality, is 
combined with the adverbs more and most, less and least. But 
certainly we should not use such terms, if we were not pos- 
sessed of the power of relative suggestion. We should ever 
be unable to say of one apple, that it is sweeter than another, 
or of one man that he is taller than another, without consid- 
ering them in certain definite respects, and without perceiv- 
ing certain relations. So that, if we had no knowledge of 
any other than relations of Degree, we should abundantly see 
the importance of the mental susceptibility under review 
considered as a source of words, and of grammatical forms in 
language. 
Although relations of degree are discoverable more fre- 
quently in comparative and superlative adjectives than any 
where else, they may sometimes be detected also in abstract 
nouns, which have the appearance of being entirely positive, 
and not unfrequently in adjectives of the positive form.-Let 
it be considered, as one instance among many others, what 
we mean, when we say of a person, He is an aged man. 
Although the epithet has the positive form, we al ways tacitly 
compare the age of the subject of it with that of others, of 
people in general, and place the particular number of years, 
to which he may have attained, by the side of that period, 
§. 206. Relations of degree in adjectives of the positive form. OR JUDGMENT. 
263 
which we are in the habit of regarding as the ordinary term 
of man's pilgrimage. It is the same, when we say of any 
person, that he is young. He is then, by a tacit mental re- 
ference, considered as falling far short of an assumed period, 
an approximation to which gives to another person the repu- 
tation of age. 
Buffier, whose remarks are generally entitled to great 
weight, happily illustrates this subject as follows.* "If 
we should, for example, never have seen or heard of any hill 
or mountain of greater height than a quarter of a mile, as 
might happen to some of the inhabitants of the Low Coun- 
tries, a mountain a mile high would appear a considerable 
one to such people ; but this mountain would be looked upon 
as inconsiderable and trifling to the people of the Alps, who 
are accustomed to see mountains of much greater height. 
This example is so striking, that there is no necessity for any 
other to make us sensible of the nature of relations that are 
founded on an arbitrary idea, formed either by accident and 
occasion, or by our own fancy ; as, if I should take it into 
my head, without any foundation, that pearls are generally 
an inch in diameter, I must in that case, look upon all the 
pearls we have in France as very small. 
"What has been here said of greatness is manifestly appli- 
cable to all the other qualities of long, broad, happy, unhappy, 
convenient, inconvenient, easy, difficult, rich, poor, good, bad, excel- 
lent, and many others of a similar nature, that have no deter- 
minate sense, but by a relation founded on an arbitrary 
and accidental idea formed within our own minds. A man 
thought himself miserable in having a slight head-ache : be- 
ing afterwards seized with a giddiness and violent swimming 
in the head, the first reflection that occurred to him was, how 
happy he was when he had only his first head-ache. We here see 
that the arbitrary idea, on which the comparison and relation 
are founded, changes the signification, and in a manner the 
nature, of the qualities of happy and miserable." 
§. 207. (III.) Of relations of proportion. 
Among other relations, which are discovered to us by the 
power of judgment or relative suggestion, are those of pro- 
* First Truths of Pere Buffier, Part n, Chap, xxvui. 264 
RELATIVE SUGGESTION 
portion ; a class of relations, which are peculiar in this, that 
they are felt only on the presence of three or more objects of 
thought. They are discoverable particularly in the compari- 
son of numbers, as no one proceeds far in numerical combi- 
nations without a knowledge of them. On examining the 
numbers two, three, four, twenty, twenty-seven, thirty-two, 
nine, five, eight, and sixteen, we feel certain relations exist- 
ing among them ; they assume a new aspect, a new power 
in the mental view. We perceive, (and we can assert, in ref- 
erence to that perception,) that three is to nine as nine to 
twenty seven ; that two is to eight as eight to thirty two ; 
that four is to five as sixteen to twenty, &c. 
And when we have once felt or perceived such relation 
actually existing between any one number and others, we 
ever afterwards regard it as a property inseparable from that 
number, although the property had remained unknown to us, 
until we had compared it with others. We attach to num- 
bers, under such circumstances, a new attribute, a new pow- 
er, the same as we do, under similar circumstances, to all the 
other subjects of our knowledge. There are many proper- 
ties, for instance, of external bodies, which were not known 
to us at first, but as soon as they are discovered, they are of 
course embraced in the general notion which we form of 
such bodies, and are considered as making a part of it. And 
pursuing the same course in respect to numbers, if, on com- 
paring them with each other, we perceive certain relations 
never discovered before, the circumstance of their sustaining 
those relations ever afterwards enters into our conception of 
them. 
Other feelings or perceptions of relation arise, when we 
contemplate the place or position of objects. Our minds are 
so constituted, that such perceptions are the necessary results 
of our contemplations of the outward objects, by which we 
are surrounded. Perhaps we are asked, What we mean by 
position or place ? Without professing to give a confident 
answer, since it is undoubtedly difficult by any mere form of 
words fully to explain it, we have good grounds for saying 
that we cannot conceive of any body as having place, with- 
out comparing it with some other bodies. If, therefore, hav- 
§. 208. (IV.) Of relations of place or position. OR JUDGMENT. 
265 
ing two bodies fixed, or which maintain the same relative po- 
sition, we can compare a third body with them, the third 
body can then be said to have place or position. 
This may be illustrated by the chess-men placed on the 
chess-board. We say, the men are in the same place, al- 
though the board may have been removed from one room to 
another. We use this language, because we consider the 
men only in relation to each other and the parts of the board, 
and not in relation to the room or parts of the room. 
Again, a portrait is suspended in the cabin of a ship ; the 
captain points to it, and says to a bystander, that it has been 
precisely in the same place this seven years. Whereas in 
point of fact it has passed from Europe to Africa, from Africa 
to America, and perhaps round the whole world. Still the 
speaker uttered no falsehood, because he spoke of the por- 
trait, (and was so understood to speak of it,) in relation to 
the ship and particularly the cabin ; and not in relation to 
the parts of the world, which the ship had visited. Such 
instances show that place is relative. 
Hence we may clearly have an idea of the place or position 
of all the different parts of the universe, considered separate- 
ly, because they may be compared with other parts ; although 
we are unable to form any idea of the place or position of the 
universe considered as a whole, because we have then no 
other body with which we can compare it. If it were possi- 
ble for us to know all worlds and things at once, to compre- 
hend the universe with a glance, we could not assert, with 
all our knowledge of it, that it is here, or there, or yonder, 
or tell where it would be. 
But if place express a relative notion, then it follows, that 
all words, which involve or imply the place or position of an 
object, are of a similar character. Such are the words, high 
and low, superior and inferior, (when used in respect to the 
position of objects,) near and distant, above and beneath, 
further, nearer, hither, yonder, here, there, where, beyond, 
within, around, without, and the like. 
§. 209- (V.) Of relations of time. 
Another source of relative perceptions or judgments is 
time. Time holds nearly the same relation to duration, as 266 
RELATIVE SUGGESTION 
position does to space. The position or place of objects is 
but space marked out and limited ; time, in like manner, is 
duration set off into distinct periods ; and as our notions of 
the place of bodies are relative, so also are our conceptions 
of events considered as happening' in time. It is true, that 
the notions of duration and space are in themselves original 
and absolute ; they are made known to us by Original, rather 
than by Relative Suggestion ; but when they are in any way 
limited, and events are thereby contemplated in reference to 
them under the new forms of place and time, certain new 
conceptions arise, which are relative. 
All time is contemplated under the aspect of past, present, 
or future. We are able chiefly in consequence of the revolu- 
tions of the heavenly bodies, to form a distinct notion of por- 
tions of time, a day, a month, a year, &c. ; we can contem- 
plate events, not only as existing at present, but as future or 
past. But always when we think or speak of events in time, 
(in other words when we speak of the date of events,) there 
is a comparison, and a perception of relation. 
What, therefore, is the import of our language, when we 
say, the independence of the North American colonies was 
declared, July fourth, 1776. The meaning of these expres- 
sions may be thus illustrated. We assume the present year, 
1836, as a given period and reckon back to the year, one, 
which coincides with the birth of our Savior ; then the year, 
1776, expresses the distance between these two extremes, 
viz. one, and eighteen hundred, thirty six. This seems to 
be all we learn, when we say the Independence of the Uni- 
ted States was declared at the period above mentioned. 
Again, we obviously mean the same thing, and convey the 
same idea, whether we say that the Savior was born in the 
year one, of the Christian era, or, in the year, 4004, from the 
creation of the world. But, in the last case, the year, 4004, 
expresses the distance between these two extremes, viz, the 
beginning of the world and the present time ; while, in the 
first instance, the event itself forms the beginning of the 
series. So that all dates appear to be properly classed 
under the head of ideas of relation ; and also all names what- 
ever, which are in any way expressive of the time of events, 
as a second, a minute, day, week, hour, month, year, cycle, 
yesterday, to-morrow, to day, &c. OR JUDGMENT. 
267 
§. 210. (VI.) Of relations of possession. 
Another class of relations may be called relations of pos- 
session. Every one knows, that not unfrequently, in his 
examination of objects, there arises a new feeling, which is 
distinct from, and independent of the mere conceptions of the 
objects themselves; and which, as it differs from other feel- 
ings of relation, may be termed the relation of possession or 
belonging to. This is one of the earliest feelings, which hu- 
man beings exercise. When we see the small child grasping 
its top and rattle with joy, and disputing the claims of anoth- 
er to a share in them, we may know that he has formed the 
notion of possession. It is not only formed in early life, but 
experience fully shows, that it loses neither activity nor 
strength by the lapse of years. 
The application of the Judgment, or that power, by which 
we perceive the relations of things, is frequently in this partic- 
ular form ; and we find here a fruitful source of words. The 
whole class of possessive pronouns, which are to be found in 
all languages, have their origin here ; such as mine, thine, 
your, his, her, &c. The relation of possession is embodied 
also in the Genitive case of the Greeks, Latins, Germans, and 
whatever other languages express relations in the same way; 
in the construct state of nouns in the Hebrew and the other 
cognate dialects ; and in the preposition of, which is the sub- 
stitute for the genitive termination in English, and the arti- 
cles de, du, de'l, and de la in French. 
The verbs to be in English, esse in Latin, etre in French, 
(and the same may undoubtedly be said of the corresponding 
verb of existence in all languages,) are often employed to ex- 
press the relation of possession or belongingto. To say that 
the rose is red or the orange yellow is as much as to say, 
that the qualities of yellowness and redness are the posses- 
sion of, or belong to the rose and orange. But it will be ob- 
served that the relation is not indicated by the name of the 
subject, nor by the epithet expressive of its quality, but by 
the verb which connects the subject and predicate. And 
similar remarks will apply to some other verbs. 
This class of relations is involved in many complex terms, 
which imply definite qualities and affections of mind, as 
friend, enemy, lover, hater, adorer, worshipper. These terms 268 
RELATIVE SUGGESTION 
not only indicate certain individuals, to whom they are ap- 
plied, but assert the existence of certain mental affections as 
their characteristics, and as belonging to them. 
§. 211. (VII.) Of relations of cause and effect. 
There are relations also of Cause and Effect. We will 
not delay here to explain the origin of the notions of cause 
and effect any further than to say, that the notion of cause, 
as it first exists in the mind, includes nothing more than in- 
variable antecedence. When the antecedence to the event, 
or the sequence of whatever kind, is our own volition, (and 
probably in a single other case, see §. 189,) we have the 
new idea of power. The idea of invariable antecedence, 
therefore, which of course supposes some sequence, when it 
is combined with that of Power, constitutes the full notion of 
cause. When the sequence is found invariably to follow, 
and its existence cannot be ascribed to any thing else, it is 
called the effect. Accordingly men usually give the name 
of events, of occurrences, or facts, to those things, which from 
time to time fall under their notice, when they are consider- 
ed in themselves. They are the mere facts, the mere events, 
and nothing more. But when, in the course of their further 
experience, such events are found to have certain invariable 
forerunners, they cease to apply these terms, and call them, 
in reference to their antecedents, effects. And in like man- 
ner the antecedents are called causes, not in themselves con- 
sidered, but in reference to what invariably comes after. 
Cause and effect, therefore, have certainly a relation to 
each other ; it is thus that they exist in the view of the mind 
and in the nature of things, however true it may be, that 
men are unable to trace any physical connection between 
them. We cannot conceive of a cause, if we exclude from 
the list of our ideas the correlative notion of effect, nor, on 
the other hand, do we call any thing an effect without a ref- 
erence to some antecedent. These two notions, therefore, 
involve or imply the existence of each other ; that is, are 
relative. 
212. Of complex terms involving the relation of cause and effect. 
The suggestion of the relation of Cause and Effect exists 
on occasions almost innumerable ; and in all languages gives OR JUDGMENT. 
269 
a character to a multitude of words. This relation is embo- 
died, for instance, in a multitude of names which are expres- 
sive of complex objects, such as printer, farmer, sculptor, 
warrior, writer, poet, manufacturer, painter. 
This may be thus illustrated. When we look at any in- 
teresting piece of statuary, the sight of it naturally suggests 
its author. But when our mind is thus directed from the 
statue to the sculptor, it is evident we do not think of him as 
we do of a thousand others, but we combine with the con- 
ception of the individual a reference to what he has done. 
We unite with the mere complex notion of man that of a 
cause, and this combination evidently alters its character) 
making it relative instead of absolute. In like manner 
when we look at a fine portrait or historical painting we are 
naturally reminded of the artist, whose ingenuity has been 
displayed in its proportions and coloring. But the word 
painter, which we apply to him, expresses not merely the 
man, but comprises the additional notion of the relation of 
cause, which he holds to the interesting picture before us. 
§. 213. Remarks on instituted or conventional relations. 
Perhaps we may be thought not to have completed this 
subject, without remarking, that there are certain complex 
terms, expressive of what Mr. Locke calls instituted or con- 
ventional relations. As the epithets indicate, which are ap- 
plied to them, they are not permanent, but are dependent 
on the will, agreement, or appointment of men ; such as citi- 
zen or burgher, governor, judge, senator, general, legislator, 
&c. Accordingly a citizen is one, who has a right to the 
privileges of civil society in a certain place ; that is to say, 
is the subject of some government, to the principles of whose 
organization and authority he is supposed to have consented, 
in the expectation of receiving its protection. A general is 
one, who has the power to command an army with the vari- 
ous powers incidental to it; the right being delegated to 
him by the choice and consent of the government of the 
country. 
But it is obviously unnecessary to stop for the purpose of 
considering the innumerable and constantly changing rela- 
tions of this kind. They assume the most multiplied shapes; 270 
RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 
not taking their character from any one fixed and definite 
principle of the mind, but embracing a complication of quali- 
ties both absolute and relative. There are other complex 
names, involving various relations which chiefly differ from 
the conventional relations, in being natural and more perma- 
nent, such as father, son, brother, sister, nephew, &c. 
§. 214. Connection of relative suggestion or judgment with reasoning. 
It may be profitable to notice here the connection, which 
relative suggestion has with reasoning in general. The sug- 
gestions of relation, (or elementary judgments, as they may 
perhaps properly be called,) are, in some respects, to a train 
of reasoning, what parts are to the whole. But they evident- 
ly do not of themselves include all the parts in a train of rea- 
soning, and are distinguished by this peculiarity, that their 
office, in a great measure, is to connect together other subor- 
dinate parts in the train. In the combination of numbers, 
and in the various applications of demonstrative reasoning, 
the relations of proportion and the relations of identity and 
diversity, (otherwise called of agreement and disagree- 
ment,) find a conspicuous place. Moral reasoning embraces 
all kinds of relations, those of degree, time, place, possession, 
and cause and effect, as well as of agreement and disagree- 
ment, and of proportion. Relative feelings, sometimes of one 
kind and sometimes of another, continually unfold them- 
selves, as the mind advances in argument. So that, although 
there are elements in reasoning besides perceptions of rela- 
tion, it is evident that it cannot advance independently of 
their aid. Facts may be accumulated, having close and de- 
cisive relations to the points to be proved, but those facts 
can never be so bound together as to result in any decisive 
conclusion, without a perception and knowledge of the rela- 
tions. CHAPTER FIFTH. 
ASSOCIATION. (I) PRIMARY LAWS. 
§. 215. Reasons for considering this subject here. 
In giving an account of the internal origin of knowledge, 
we might be expected to proceed directly from Relative Sug- 
gestion to a consideration of the Reasoning power, which is 
one of the most effective and fruitful sources of intellectual 
perception. By means of this power, we are enabled to 
combine and compare the ample materials, furnished by orig- 
inal SUGGESTION, CONSCIOUSNESS, and RELATIVE SUGGESTION, 
and thus to develope in the mind new elements of thought, 
and to cast light on the darkened places in the field of truth. 
But there are powers of the mind, subordinate to the reason- 
ing power and essential to its action, which may with propri- 
ety be first considered ; particularly Association and Memory. 
Other persons perhaps, in examining the various parts of the 
mind, would propose, for the consideration of these powers, 
some other place ; but we see no valid objection to consider- 
ing them here. On the contrary, they have comparatively 
so little to do with what has gone before, and so much to do 
with what comes after, and in particular are so essential to 
every process of ratiocination, that this seems to be their ap- 
propriate position. As Association is presupposed and invol- 
ved in memory, as well as in reasoning, we naturally begin 
with that principle first. 
§• 216. Meaning of association and illustrations 
Our thoughts and feelings follow each other in a regular 
train. Of this statement no one needs any other proof, than 272 
ASSOCIATION. 
his individual experience. We all know, not only that our 
minds are susceptible of new states, but what is more, that 
this capability of new states is not fortuitous, but has its 
laws. Therefore, we not only say, that our thoughts and 
feelings succeed each other, but that this antecedence and 
sequence is in a regular train. To this regular and establish- 
ed consecution of the states of the mind, we give the name 
of MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 
Illustrations of this important principle, which exerts an 
influence over the emotions and desires as well as over the 
thoughts, are without number. Mr. Hobbes relates, in his 
political treatise of the Leviathan, that he was once in com- 
pany, where the conversation turned on the English Civil 
War. A person abruptly asked, in the course of the conver- 
sation, what was the value of a Roman denarius ? Such a 
question, so remote from the general direction of the conver- 
sation, had the appearance not only of great abruptness, but 
of impertinence. Mr. Hobbes says, that, on a little reflec- 
tion, he was able to trace the train of thought, which sug- 
gested the question. The original subject of discourse natur- 
ally introduced the history of king Charles ; the king natur- 
ally suggested the treachery of those, who surrendered him 
up to his enemies ; the treachery of these persons readily in- 
troduced to the mind the treachery of Judas Iscariot ; the 
conduct of Judas was associated with the thirty pieces of sil- 
ver, and as the Romans occupied Judea at the time of the 
crucifixion of the Savior, the pieces of silver were associated 
with the Roman denarii. 
When I was travelling through the wilds of America, 
(says the eloquent Chateaubriand,) I was not a little sur- 
prized to hear, that I had a countryman established as a res- 
ident, at some distance in the woods. I visited him with 
eagerness, and found him employed in pointing some stakes 
at the door of his hut. He cast a look towards me, which 
was cold enough, and continued his work, but the moment I 
addressed him in French, he started at the recollection of 
his country, and the big tear stood in his eye. These well 
known accents suddenly roused, in the heart of the old man, 
all the sensations of his infancy. 
* Chateaubriand's recollections of Italy, England-* nd America. (I) PRIMARY LAWS. 
273 
The emperor Napoleon, whose present cares might be 
supposed to have greatly weakened the chain of thought and 
feeling, that bound him to the past, is said to have once ex- 
pressed himself thus. "Last Sunday evening, in the general 
silence of nature, I was walking in these grounds, [of Alalmai- 
wn.] The sound of the church-bell of Ruel fell upon my ear, 
and renewed all the impressions of my youth. I was pro- 
foundly affected, such is the power of early associations."* 
Such illustrations, which appeal to every one's conscious- 
ness in confirmation of their truth, show what association is. 
§. 217. Of the general laws of association. 
In regard to Association, all that we know is the fact, that 
our thoughts and feelings, under certain circumstances, ap- 
pear together and keep each other company. We do not un- 
dertake to explain, why it is, that association, in the circum- 
stances appropriate to its manifestation, has an existence. 
We know the simple fact ; and if it be an ultimate principle 
in our mental constitution, as we have no reason to doubt 
that it is, we can know nothing more. 
Association, as thus understood, has its laws. By the 
Laws of association, we mean no other than the general de- 
signation of those circumstances, under which the regular 
consecution of mental states, which has been mentioned, oc- 
curs. The following may be named as among the Primary, 
or more important of those laws, although it is not necessary 
to take upon us to assert, either that the enumeration is 
complete, or that some better arrangement of them might not 
be proposed, viz., resemblance, contrast, contiguity in time 
and place, and cause and effect. 
§. 218. Re»emblance the first general law of association. 
New trains of ideas and new emotions are occasioned by 
Resemblance; but when we say, that they are occasioned in 
this way, all that is meant is, that there is a new state of 
mind, immediately subsequent to the perception of the re- 
sembling object. Of the efficient cause of this new state of 
mind under these circumstances, we can only say, the Crea- 
tor of the soul has seen fit to appoint this connection in its 
* Scott's Life of Napoleon, vol. m. chap, xxxiv. 274 
ASSOCIATION. 
operations, without our being able, or deeming it necessary 
to give any further explanation. A traveller, wandering in 
a foreign land, finds himself in the course of his sojournings 
in the midst of aspects of nature not unlike those, where he 
has formerly resided, and the fact of this resemblance be- 
comes the antecedent to new states of mind. There is dis- 
tinctly brought before him the scenery, which he has left, 
his own woods, his waters, and his home. The enterpris- 
ing Lander, in giving an account of one of his excursions in 
Africa, expresses himself thus : "The foliage exhibited every 
variety and tint of green, from the sombre shade of the mel- 
ancholy yew to the lively verdure of the poplar and young 
oak. For myself, I was delighted with the agreeable ramble ; 
and imagined that I could distinguish among the notes of the 
songsters of the grove, the swelling strains of the English 
skylark and thrush, and the more gentle warbling of the 
finch and linnet. It was indeed a brilliant morning, teeming 
with life and beauty ; and recalled to my memory a thousand 
affecting associations of sanguine boyhood, when I was 
thoughtless and happy. " 
The result is the same in any other case, whenever there 
is a resemblance between what we now experience, and 
what we have previously experienced. We have been ac- 
quainted, for instance, at some former period with a person 
whose features appeared to us to possess some peculiarity, a 
breadth and openness of the forehead, an uncommon expres- 
sion of the eye, or some other striking mark ;-to-day we 
meet a stranger in the crowd, by which we are surrounded, 
whose features are of a somewhat similar cast, and the re- 
semblance at once vividly suggeststhe likeness of our old ac- 
quaintance. 
Nor is the association, which is based upon resemblance,, 
limited to objects of sight. Objects, which are addressed to 
the sense of hearing, are recalled in the same way. 
"How soft the music of those village bells, 
"Falling at intervals upon the ear. 
"With easy force it opens all the cells 
"Where memory slept. Wherever I have heard 
"A kindred melody, the scene recurs, 
J'And with it all its pleasures and its pains." (I) PRIMARY LAWS. 
275 
§. 219. Resemblance in every particular not necessary. 
It is not necessary that the resemblance should be com- 
plete in every particular, in order to its being a principle or 
law of association. It so happens, (to use an illustration of 
Brown,*) that we see a painted portrait of a female counte- 
nance, which is adorned with a ruff of a peculiar breadth and 
display ; and we are, in consequence, immediately reminded 
of queen Elizabeth. Not because there is any resemblance 
between the features before us and those of the English sov- 
ereign, but because in all the painted representations, which 
we have seen of her, she is uniformly set off with this pecu- 
liarity of dress, with a ruff like that, which we now see. 
Here the resemblance between the suggesting thing and that 
which is suggested, is not a complete resemblance, does not 
exist in all the particulars, in which they may be compared 
together, but is limited to a part of the dress. 
That a single resembling circumstance, (and perhaps one 
of no great importance,) should so readily suggest the com- 
plete conception of another object or scene, which is made 
up of a great variety of parts, seems to admit of some expla- 
nation in this way. We take, for example, an individual ;- 
the idea which we form of the individual is a complex one, 
made up of the forehead, eyes, lips, hair, general figure, 
dress, &c. These separate, subordinate ideas, when combi- 
ned together and viewed as a whole, have a near analogy to 
any of our ideas, which are compounded, and are capable of 
being resolved into elements more simple. When, therefore, 
we witness a ruff of a size and decoration more than ordina- 
ry, we are at once reminded of that ornament in the habili- 
ments of the British queen ; and this on the ground of Resem- 
blance.-But this article in the decorations of her person is 
the foundation of only one part of a very complex state of 
mind, which embraces the features and the general appear- 
ance. As there has been a long continued co-existence of 
those separate parts, which make up this complex state, the 
recurrence to the mind of one part or of one idea is necessa- 
rily attended with the recurrence of all the others. 
§. 220. Of resemblance in the effects produced. 
Resemblance operates, as an associating principle, not 
* Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind, Leet. xxxv. 276 
ASSOCIATION. 
only when there is a likeness or similarity in the things 
themselves, but also when there is a resemblance in the e/- 
fects, which are produced upon the mind. The ocean, for 
instance, when greatly agitated by the winds, and threatening 
every moment to overwhelm us, produces in the mind an 
emotion, similar to that, which is caused by the presence of 
an angry man, who is able to do us harm. And in conse- 
quence of this similarity in the effects produced, it is some- 
times the case that they reciprocally bring each other to our 
recollection. 
Dark woods, hanging over the brow of a mountain, cause 
in us a feeling of awe and wonder, like that, which we feel, 
when we behold, approaching us, some aged person, whose 
form is venerable for his years, and whose name is renowned 
for wisdom and justice. It is in reference to this view of the 
principle, on which we are remarking, that the following 
comparison is introduced in Akenside's Pleasures of the Im- 
agination. 
"Mark the sable woods, 
"That shade sublime yon mountain's nodding brow ; 
"With what religious awe the solemn scene 
"Commands your steps! As if the reverend form 
"Of Minos or of Numa should forsake 
"The Elysian seats, and down the embowering glade 
"Move to your pausing eye." 
As we are so constituted, that all nature produces in us 
certain effects, causes certain emotions, similar to those, 
which are caused in us in our intercourse with our fellow- 
beings, it so happens that, in virtue of this fact, the natural 
world becomes living, animated, operative. The ocean is 
in anger ; the sky smiles ; the cliff/rowns; the aged woods are 
venerable; the earth and its productions are no longer a dead 
mass, but have an existence, a soul, an agency. We see 
here the foundation of metaphorical language ; and it is here, 
that we are to look for the principles, by which we are to 
determine the propriety or impropriety of its use. 
§. 221. Contrast the second general or primary law 
Contrast is another law or principle, by which our suc- 
cessive mental states are suggested ; or, in other terms, when 
there are two objects, or events, or situations of a character (I) PRIMARY LAWS. 
277 
precisely opposite, the idea or conception of one is immedi- 
ately followed by that of the other. When the*discourse is 
of the palace of the king, how often are we reminded, in the 
same breath, of the cottage of the peasant ! And thus it is, 
that wealth and poverty, the cradle and the grave, and hope 
and despair, are found, in public speeches and in writings, so 
frequently going together, and keeping'each other company. 
The truth is, they are connected together in our thoughts by 
a distinct and operative principle ; they accompany each 
other, certainly not because there is any resemblance, in the 
things thus associated, but in consequence of their very 
marked contrariety. Darkness reminds of light, heat of cold, 
friendship of enmity ; the sight of the conqueror is associated 
with the memory of the conquered, and when beholding men 
of deformed and dwarfish appearance, we are at once led to 
think of those of erect figure or of Patagonian size. Contrast, 
then, is no less a principle or law of association, than resem- 
blance itself. 
Count Lemaistre's touching story, entitled from the scene 
of its incidents, the leper of Aost, illustrates the effects of 
the principle of association now under consideration. Like 
all persons, infected with the leprosy, the subject of the dis- 
ease is represented as an object of dread no less than of pity 
to others, and while he is an outcast from the society of men, 
he is a loathsome spectacle even to himself. But what is the 
condition of his mind? What are the subjects of his thoughts?' 
The tendencies of his intellectual nature prevent his thinking 
of wretchedness alone. His extreme misery aggravates it- 
self by suggesting scenes of ideal happiness, and his mind 
revels in a paradise of delights, merely to give greater inten- 
sity to his actual woes by contrasting them with imaginary 
bliss.-"I represent to myself continually, (says the Leper,) 
societies of sincere and virtuous friends ; families, blessed 
with health, fortune, and harmony. I imagine, I see them 
walk in groves, greener and fresher, than these, the shade 
of which makes my poor happiness ; brightened by a sun 
more brilliant than that which sheds its beams on me ;-And 
their destiny seems to me as much more worthy of envy in 
proportion as my own is the more miserable." 
Association by contrast is the foundation of the rhetorical 278 
ASSOCIATION. 
figure of Antithesis. In one of the tragedies of Southern we 
find the following antithetic expressions. 
• "Could I forget 
"What I have been, I might the better bear 
"What I am destined to. I am not the first, 
"That have been wretched ;-But to think how much 
"I have been happier. 
Here the present is placed in opposition with the past, 
and happiness is contrasted with misery ; not by a cold and 
strained artifice, as one might be led to suppose, but by the 
natural impulses of the mind, which is led to associate togeth- 
er things that are the reverse of each other. 
§. 222. Contiguity the third general or primary law. 
Those thoughts and feelings, which have been connected 
together by nearness of time and place, are readily suggest- 
ed by each other ; and, consequently, contiguity in those 
respects is rightly reckoned, as another and third primary 
law of our mental associations. When we think of Pales- 
tine, for instance, we very readily and naturally think of the 
Jewish nation, of the patriarchs, of the prophets, of the Sa- 
vior, and of the apostles, because Palestine was their place 
of residence, and the theatre of their actions. So that this 
is evidently an instance, where the suggestions are chiefly 
regulated by proximity of place. When a variety of acts and 
events have happened nearly at the same period, whether in 
the same place or not, one is not thought of without the oth- 
er being closely associated with it, owing to proximity of 
time. If, therefore, the particular event of the crucifixion of 
the Savior be mentioned, we are necessarily led to think of 
various other events, which occurred about the same period, 
such as the treacherous conspiracy of Judas, the denial of 
Peter, the conduct of the Roman soldiery, the rending of the 
veil of the temple, and the temporary obscuration of the sun. 
The mention of Egypt suggests the Nile, the Pyramids, 
the monuments of the Thebais, the follies and misfortunes of 
Cleopatra, the battle of Aboukir. The mention of Greece is 
associated with Thermopylae and Salamis, the Hill of Mars 
and the Vale of Tempe, Illissus, the steeps of Delphi, Lyce- 
um, and the "olive shades of Academus." These, it will be (I) PRIMARY LAWS, 
279 
noticed, are associations on the principle of contiguity in 
place. But if a particular event, of great interest, is men- 
tioned, other events and renowned names, which attracted 
notice at the same period, will eagerly cluster around it. 
The naming of the American revolution, for instance, im- 
mediately fills the mind with recollections of Washington, 
Franklin, Morris, Greene, Jay, and many of their associates, 
whose fortune it was to enlist their exertions in the support 
of constitutional rights, not merely in the same country, (for 
that circumstance alone might not have been sufficient to 
have recalled them,) but at the same period of time.- 
It is generally supposed, and not without reason for it, 
that the third primary law of mental association, is more ex- 
tensive in its influence than any others. It has been remark- 
ed with truth, that proximity in time and place forms the 
basis of the whole calender of the great mass of mankind. 
They pay but little attention to the arbitrary eras of chronol- 
ogy ; but date events by each other, and speak of what hap- 
pened at the time of some dark day, of some destructive over- 
flow of waters, of some great eclipse, of some period of drought 
and famine, of some war or revolution. 
§. 223. Cause and effect the fourth primary law. 
There are certain facts or events, which hold to each 
other the relation of invariable antecedence and sequence. 
That fact or event, to which some other one sustains the re- 
lation of constant antecedence, is in general called an effect;- 
And that fact or event, to which some other one holds the 
relation of invariable sequence, has in general the name of a 
cause. Now there may be no resemblance in the things, 
which reciprocally bear this relation, there may be no con- 
trariety, and it is by no means necessary, that there should 
be contiguity in time or place, as the meaning of the term 
contiguity, is commonly understood. There may be cause 
and effect without any one or all of these circumstances. 
But it is a fact, which is known to every one's experience, 
that, when we think of the cause in any particular instance, 
we naturally think of the effect, and, on the ^contrary, the 
knowledge or recollection of the effect brings to mind the 
cause.-And in view of this well known and general experi- 280 
ASSOCIATION. 
ence, there is good reason for reckoning cause and effect 
among the primary principles of our mental associations. 
What we here understand by principles or lawswill be recol- 
lected, viz. The general designation of those circumstances, 
under which the regular consecution of mental states occurs. 
It is on the principle of Cause and Effect, that, when we 
see a surgical instrument or any engine of torture, we have a 
conception of the pain, which they are fitted to occasion. 
And, on the contrary, the sight of a wound, inflicted however 
long before, suggests to us the idea of the instrument, by 
which it was made. Mr. Locke relates an incident, which 
illustrates the statements made here, of a man, who was re- 
stored from a state of insanity, by means of a harsh and ex- 
ceedingly painful operation. "The gentleman, who was thus 
recovered, with great sense of gratitude and acknowledge- 
ment, owned the cure all his life after, as the greatest obliga- 
tion he could have received ; but whatever gratitude and 
reason suggested to him he could never bear the sight of the 
operator : that image brought back with it the idea of that 
agony which he suffered from his hands, which was too 
mighty and intolerable for him to endure." The operation 
of the law of Cause and Effect, in the production of new 
associations, seems to be involved in the following character- 
istic passage of Shakspeare, Henry IV, 2d pt. act. I. 
"Yet the first bringer of unwelcome news 
"Hath but a losing office ; and his tongue 
"Sounds ever after as a sullen bell, 
"Remember'd knolling a departed friend. CHAPTER SIXTH. 
ASSOCIATION. (II) SECONDARY LAWS. 
§. 224. Secondary laws and their connection with the primary. 
The subject of Association is not exhausted in the enu- 
meration and explanation of its Laws, which has thus far 
been given. Besides the primary laws, which have fallen 
under our consideration, there are certain marked and promi- 
nent circumstances, which are found to exert, in a greater or 
less degree, a modifying and controlling influence over the 
more general principles. As this influence is of a permanent 
character, and not merely accidental and temporary, the 
grounds or sources of it are called, by way of distinction, sec- 
ondary laws. 
These, which we are now to consider, will probably ap- 
pear at first sight to be more numerous than they are in fact. 
It is undoubtedly somewhat difficult to make out a just and 
unalterable designation of them. Nevertheless it is believed, 
that, on a careful examination, their multiplicity will be les- 
sened, and that they will be found to be but four in number ; 
viz, lapse of Time, degree of coexistent Feeling, repetition 
or Habit, and original or constitutional Difference in charac- 
ter. 
It must at once be obvious, that these principles, although 
holding a subordinate rank, give an increased range and 
power to the primary laws. It is not to be inferred from the 
epithet, by which they are distinguished, that they are, 
therefore, of a very minor, and inconsiderable importance. 
On the contrary, human nature without them, as far as we 
are canable of mdirinrr. would have assumed a sort of fixed 282 
ASSOCIATION. 
and inflexible form, instead of presenting those pleasing and 
almost endless diversities it now does. The primary laws 
are the great national roads, along which the mind holds its 
course ; the secondary are those cross roads, that intersect 
them from time to time, and thus afford an entrance into, and 
a communication with the surrounding country ; and yet all 
have a connection with each other ; and with all their turn- 
ings and intersections, concur at last in the ultimate desti- 
nation. 
The first of the four secondary laws, which we shall con- 
sider, is lapse of time. Stated more particularly, the law is 
this ; Our trains of thought and emotion are more or less 
strongly connected and likely to be restored, according as the 
lapse of time has been greater or less. 
Perhaps no lapse of time, however great, will utterly 
break the chain of human thought, and cause an entire ina- 
bility of restoring our former experiences ; but it appears evi- 
dent from observation, as much so as observation renders evi- 
dent in almost any case, that every additional moment of in- 
tervening time weakens, if it do not break and sunder the 
bond which connects the present with the past, and diminishes 
the probability of such a restoration. We remember many 
incidents, even of a trilling nature, which occurred to-day, or 
the present week, while those of yesterday or of last week 
are forgotten. But if the increased period of months and 
years throws itself between the present time and the date of 
our past experiences, our ancient joys, regrets, and sufferings, 
then how unfrequent is their recurrence, and how weak and 
shadowy they appear ! Increase the lapse of time a little 
further, and a dark cloud rests on that portion of our history ; 
less substantial than a dream, it utterly eludes our search, 
and becomes to us as if it had never been. 
There is, however, an apparent exception to this law, 
which should be mentioned. The associated feelings of old 
men, which were formed in their youth and the early part 
of manhood, are more readily revived than those of later 
origin. On this state of things in old men, two remarks 
are to be made. The first is, that the law under consider- 
ation fully, and unfailingly maintains itself in the case of 
§. 225. Of the influence of lapse of time. (II) SECONDARY LAWS. 
283 
aged persons, whenever the time is not extended far back. 
Events, which happened but a few hours before, are remem- 
bered, while there is an utter forgetfulness of those, which 
happened a few weeks or even days before. So far as this, 
the law operates in old men precisely as in others. The sec- 
ond remark is, that the failure of its operation in respect to 
the events of youth is caused, not by any actual inability in 
the secondary law before us, to blot out and diminish here 
as in other cases, but by the greater power of the combined 
action of two other laws, viz. Co-existent feeling, and Repe- 
tition or habit. Our early life, as a general statement, was 
the most deeply interesting, and is the most frequently recur- 
red to ; and in this way its recollections become so incorpo- 
rated with the mind as to hold a sort of precedence over our 
more recent experiences, and thrust them from their proper 
place. 
§. 226. Secondary law of repetition or habit. 
Another secondary law is repetition ; in other words, 
successions of thought are the more readily suggested in pro- 
portion as they are the more frequently renewed. If we ex- 
perience a feeling once, and only once, we find it difficult to 
recal it after it has gone from us, but repeated experience in- 
creases the probability of its recurring. Every schoolboy, 
who is required to commit to memory, puts this law to the 
test, and proves it. Having read a sentence a number of 
times, he finds himself able to repeat it out of the book, which 
he could not do with merely reading it once. 
The operation of this law is seen constantly in particular 
arts and professions. If men be especially trained up to cer- 
tain trades, arts, or sciences, their associations on those par- 
ticular subjects, and on every thing connected with them, are 
found to be prompt and decisive. We can but seldom detect 
any hesitancy or mistake within the circle, where their minds 
have been accustomed to operate, because every thought 
and process have been recalled and repeated thousands of 
times. With almost every thing they see or hear there is a 
train of reflection, connecting it with their peculiar calling, 
and bringing it within the beaten and consecrated circle. 
Every hour, unless they guard against it, hastens the pro- 
cess, which threatens to cut them off, and insulate them from ASSOCIATION. 
284 
the great interests of humanity, and to make them wholly 
professional. 
"Still o'er those scenes their memory wakes, 
"And fondly broods with miser care ; 
"Time but the impression stronger makes ; 
"As streams their channels deeper wear. 
§. 227. Of the secondary law of co-existent emotion. 
A third secondary law is co-existent emotion. It may 
be stated in other words as follows ; The probability, that 
our mental states will be recalled by the general laws, will in 
part depend on the depth of feeling, the degree of interest, 
which accompanied the original experience of them. 
Why are bright objects more readily recalled than faint 
or obscure ? It is not merely because they occupied more 
distinctly our perception, but because they more engaged 
our attention and interested us, the natural consequence of 
that greater distinctness. Why do those events in our per- 
sonal history, which were accompanied with great joys and 
sorrows, stand out like pyramids in our past life, distinct to 
the eye and immovable in their position, while others have 
been swept away, and cannot be found ? Merely because 
there were joy and sorrow in the one case, and not at all, or 
only in a slight degree, in the other; because the sensitive 
part of our nature combined itself with the intellectual ; the 
Heart gave activity to the operations of the understanding. 
We learn from the Bible that the Jews, in their state of 
exile, could not forget Jerusalem, the beloved and beautiful 
City. And why not ? How did it happen, that in their Cap- 
tivity they sat down by the rivers of Babylon, wept when 
they remembered Zion, and hung their harps on the willows? 
It was because Jerusalem was not only an object of thought, 
but of feeling. They had not only known her gates and 
fountains, her pleasant dwelling-places and temples, but had 
loved them. The Holy City was not a lifeless abstraction of 
the head ; but a sacred and delightful image, engraven in 
the heart. And hence it was, that in their solitude and sor- 
row, she arose and shone before them so distinctly, "the 
morning star of memory." (II) SECONDARY LAWS. 
285 
§. 228. Original difference in the mental constitution. 
The fourth and last secondary law of association is origi- 
nal DIFERENCE IN THE MENTAL CONSTITUTION.-This Law; it 
will be noticed, is expressed in the most general terms ; and 
is to be considered, therefore, as applicable both to the Intel- 
lectual and the Sensitive part of man. Itrequires according- 
ly to be contemplated in two distinct points of view. 
The law of original difference in the mental constitution 
is applicable, in the first place, to the Intellect, properly and 
distinctively so called ; in other words to the comparing, 
judging, and reasoning part of the soul. That there are dif- 
ferences in men intellectually, it is presumed will hardly be 
doubted, although this difference is perceptible in different 
degrees, and in some cases hardly perceptible at all. And 
these original or constitutional peculiarities reach and affect 
the associating principle, as well as other departments of in- 
tellectual action. The associations of the great mass of man- 
kind, (perhaps it may be entirely owing in some cases to the 
accidental circumstance of a want of education and intellect- 
ual developement,) appear to run exclusively in the channel 
of Contiguity in time and place. They contemplate objects 
in their nearness and distance, in their familiar and outward 
exhibitions, without examining closely into analogies and 
differences, or considering them in the important relation of 
cause and effect. But not unfrequently we find persons, 
whose minds are differently constructed, who exhibit a high- 
er order of perception. But even in these cases, we some- 
times detect a striking difference in the application of their 
intellectual powers. One person, for instance, has from 
childhood exhibited a remarkable command of the relations 
and combinations of numbers ; another exhibits in like man- 
ner an uncommon perception of uses, adaptions, and powers, 
as they are brought together, and set to work in the mechan- 
ic arts ; another has the power of generalizing in an uncom- 
mon degree, and having obtained possession of a principle in 
a particular case, which may appear to others perfectly and 
irretrievably insulated, he at once extends it to hundreds and 
thousands of other cases. In no one of these instances does 
the Associating power operate in precisely the same way, 
but exhibits in each a new.aspect or phasis of action. 286 
ASSOCIATION. 
It is perhaps unnecessary to delay here, for the purpose 
of confirming what has now been said, by a reference to the 
history of individuals. A slight acquaintance with literary 
history will show, that diversities of intellect, such as have 
been alluded to, and founded too in a great degree on pecu- 
liarities of the associating principle, have been frequent. 
How often had the husbandman seen the apple fall to the 
ground without even asking for the cause ? But when New- 
ton saw the fall of an apple, he not only asked for the cause, 
but having conjectured it, he at once perceived its applica- 
bility to every thing in like circumstances around him, to all 
the descending bodies on the earth's surface. And this was 
not all. Immediately expanding the operations of the princi- 
ple, which he had detected, from the surface of the earth to 
the stars of heaven, he showed its universality, and proved, 
that the most distant planet is controlled by the same great 
law, which regulates the particles of dust beneath our feet. 
Here was a mind, not merely great by toil, but constitu- 
tionally great and inventive ; a mind, which was regulated 
in its action, not by the law of mere contiguity in time and 
place, but by the more effective associating principles of An- 
alogy, and of Cause and Effect. 
§. 229. The foregoing law as applicable to the sensibilities. 
The law under consideration holds good, in the second 
place, in respect to original differences of emotion and passion, 
or, as it is more commonly expressed, of disposition. It will 
help to make us understood, if we allude briefly, in this part 
of the subject, to two different classes of persons. One of the 
descriptions of men, which we have now in view, is compos- 
ed of those, for such are undoubtedly to be found, who are 
of a pensive and melancholy turn. From their earliest life 
they have shown a fondness for seclusion, in order that they 
might either commune with the secrets of their own hearts, 
or hold intercourse, undisturbed by others, with whatever of 
impressiveness and sublimity is to be found in the works of 
nature. The other class are naturally of a lively and cheer- 
ful temperament. If they delight in nature, it is not in soli- 
tude, but in the company of others. While they seldom 
throw open their hearts for the admission of troubled thoughts. (II) SECONDARY LAWS. 
287 
they oppose no obstacle to the entrance of the sweet beams 
of peace and joy and hope. 
Now it is beyond question that the primary laws of asso- 
ciation are influenced by the constitutional tendencies, mani- 
fest in these two classes of persons ; that is to say, in the 
minds of two individuals, the one of a cheerful, the other of 
a melancholy or gloomy disposition, the trains of thought 
will be very different. This difference is finely illustrated in 
those beautiful poems of Milton, L'ALLEGRoand il penseroso. 
L'allegro or the cheerful man finds pleasure and cheerful- 
ness in every object which he beholds ;-The great sun puts 
on his amber light, the mower whets his scythe, the milk 
maid sings, 
"And every shepherd tells his tale 
"Under the hawthorn in the dale. 
But the man of a melancholy disposition, il penseroso, 
chooses the evening for his walk, as most suitable to the tem- 
per of his mind ; he listens from some lonely hillock to the 
distant curfew, and loves to hear the song of that ''sweet bird, 
That shun'st the noise of folly, 
"Most musical, most melancholy. 
Further ;-Our trains of suggested thoughts will be modi- 
fied by those temporary feelings, which may be regarded, as 
exceptions to the more general character of our dispositions. 
The cheerful man is not always cheerful, nor is the melan- 
choly man at all times equally sober and contemplative. 
They are known to exchange characters for short periods, 
sometimes in consequence of good or ill health, or of happy 
or adverse fortune, and sometimes for causes which cannot 
be easily explained. So that our mental stateswill be found 
to follow each other with a succession, varying not only with 
the general character of our temper and dispositions, but with 
the transitory emotions of the day or hour. 
All the laws of association may properly be given here in 
a condensed view. The primary or general laws are resem- 
blance, contrast, contiguity in time and place, and cause 
and effect. Those circumstances, which are found particu- 
larly to modify and control the action of these, are termed 
secondary laws, and are as follows, Lapse of time, Repetition 
or habit, Co-existent feeling, and Constitutional difference in 
mental character. 288 
ASSOCIATION. 
230. Of associations caused by present objects of perception. 
There remains another point of view, in which it seems 
proper, that the subject of association should be contempla- 
ted, before we leave it.-Asociated thoughts and emotions, 
when made to pass through the mind by some sound, which 
the ear has caught, by some object, which has met the eye, 
or any present object of perception whatever, are peculiarly 
vivid and strong. Associations, which do not admit any of 
our present perceptions as a part of the associated train, 
cannot but impress us, as being in some measure airy and un- 
substantial, however distinct. We deeply feel, that they 
are part of the experiences of departed days, and which, in 
departing from us, have become almost as if they had never 
been. But let them partake of our present experience, of 
what we now feel and know to exist, and they seem to gain 
new strength ; the remembrances are not only distinct, but 
what was airy and unsubstantial fades away, and they have 
life, and power, and form. 
How often, in the wanderings of life, are we led by some 
apparently accidental train of thought to the recollection of 
the residence of our early years and of the incidents which 
then occurred! The associations are interesting, but we find 
it difficult to make them permanent, and they are comparative- 
ly faint. But let there be connected with the train of thought 
the present sound of some musical instrument, which we then 
used to hear, and of our favorite tune, and it will be found 
that the reality of the tune blends itself with the airy concep- 
tions of the mind, and, while we kindle with an illusive rap- 
ture, the whole seems to be real. Some illustrations may 
tend to make these statements more clear, and to confirm them. 
It is related in one of the published Lectures of Dr. Rush, 
that an old native African was permitted by his master, a 
number of years since, to go from home in order to see a lion, 
that was conducted as a show through the state of New Jer- 
sey. He no sooner saw him, than he was so transported with 
joy, as to express his emotions by jumping, and dancing, and 
loud acclamations, notwithstanding the torpid habits of mind 
and body, superinduced by half a century of slavery. He 
had known that animal, when a boy in his native country, 
and the sight of him suddenly revived the memory of his ear- (II) SECONDARY LAWS, 
289 
ly enjoyments, his native land, his home, his associates, and 
his freedom. 
There is in the same writer another interesting instance 
of the power of association, in which he himself had a part, 
and which will be given in his own words. " During the 
time I passed at a country-school, in Cecil County, in Mary- 
land, I often went on a holiday, with my schoolmates, to see 
an eagle's nest, upon the summit of a dead tree in the neigh- 
borhood of the school, during the time of the incubation of 
that bird. The daughter of the farmer, in whose field this 
tree stood, and with whom I became acquainted, married, 
and settled in this city about forty years ago. In our occa- 
sional interviews, we now and then spoke of the innocent 
haunts and rural pleasures of our youth, and, among other 
things, of the eagle's nest in her father's field. A few years 
ago, I was called to visit this woman when she was in the 
lowest stage of a typhus fever. Upon entering her room, I 
caught her eye, and, with a cheerful tone of voice, said only, 
'TAe eagle's nest.' She seized my hand, without being able to 
speak, and discovered strong emotions of pleasure in her 
countenance, probably from a sudden association of all her 
early domestic connections and enjoyment with the words I 
had uttered.* From that time she began to recover. Sho 
is now living, and seldom fails, when we meet, to salute me 
with the echo of the 'eagle's nest.' " 
§. 231. Causes of increased vividness in these instances. 
From such illustrations it would seem to be sufficiently 
clear, that, whenever associated thoughts and emotions are 
connected with any present perceptions, they are peculiarly 
strong and vivid. They steal into all the secret chambers of 
the soul, and seemingly by some magic power impart a deep 
intensity to its feelings, and give to the fleeting world of 
memory the stability of real existence. There are two cau- 
ses, why such associated feelings should possess more than 
ordinary strength and vividness. 
(1) The particular train of thought and feeling, which is 
excited in the mind continues longer than in other cases, in 
consequence of the greater permanency and fixedness of the 
* Rush'd Introductory Lectures, xi. 290 
ASSOCIATION. 
present objects of perception, which either suggested the 
train or make a part of it. So long as the lion was permit- 
ted to remain in the sight of the aged African, so long with- 
out interruption was the series of delightful thoughts kept 
up within him. The bright images, which threw him into 
such raptures, and awoke stupidity itself, were not fleeting 
away with every breath, but remained permanent The 
sick lady of Philadelphia saw the physician, with whom she 
had been acquainted in the early part of life. By the men- 
tion of the eagle's nest, he vividly recalled the scenes of 
those young days. But it was the presence of the person, 
whose observation had given rise to the train of association, 
which contributed chiefly to keep it so long in her thoughts. 
Had it occurred merely from some accidental direction of her 
own mind, without any present object, which had made a 
part of it, no doubt her sufferings or other circumstances 
would soon have banished it. 
(2) The second cause of the increased vividness of asso- 
ciations, suggested by a present object of perception or com- 
bined with it, is this, viz. The reality of the thing perceived, 
(we do not profess to assert precisely in what manner it is 
done,) is communicated, in the illusions of the moment, to 
the thing suggested. The trees of the desert were the 
hiding place of the lion, when the African saw him in early 
life ; and now, after the lapse of so many years, he imagines, 
that, in the quickened eye of his mind, he beholds the for- 
ests of his native soil, because he has before him the proud 
and powerful animal, that crouched under their shade. And 
the presence of the monarch of the forest gives a reality not 
only to woods and deserts ; but by a communication of that, 
which exists to that, which is merely suggested, the whole 
group of his early experiences of whatever kind, so far as- 
they are recalled, virtually acquire a like truth and reality. CHAPTER SEVENTH. 
CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS. (I) INTELLECTUAL. 
§. 232. Association sometimes misleads our judgments. 
It seems to be important, in this portion of the history of 
the mind, to illustrate still further the operations of the great 
principle of Association. There are some cases, where the 
power of association so misleads us, that we cannot easily 
form a correct judgment of the true nature of things. Every 
object of thought, in order to be fully understood, ought to 
be so much in our power, that we may examine it separately 
from all other objects. Whenever, therefore, it happens 
from any circumstances, that the power of association so 
combines one object of thought with another, that the object 
cannot readily be looked at and examined by itself, it so far 
has the effect to perplex and hinder correct judgment. 
It will be found, when we look into our minds, that there 
exist a few associations or combinations of thought of this 
kind, which are obstinate and almost invincible. To explain 
the origin, and to correct the erroneous tendencies of all such 
connections of thought, although the number of such as we 
have now in view cannot be large, would occupy us too long. 
The examination of a few somewhat striking instances will, 
not only throw light on the philosophy of the mind in gener- 
al, but will be of some practical benefit. Other instances 
of casual association, which have a more intimate connec- 
tion with the Sensibilities than with the Intellect, will be 
more appropriately considered under that head. 
§. 233. Casual association in respect to the place of sensation. 
One of the casual associations of that extreme kind, which 292 
CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
we have now especial reference to, concerns the place or 
rather the supposed place of sensation. All sensation, it 
will not be forgotten, is in the mind. Whatever is inaminate 
or material can of course have no feeling. Nevertheless if a 
wound be inflicted on the hand or foot, we seem to experi- 
ence the sensation of pain in that particular place. When 
we merely bring the hand in contact with a warm or cold bo- 
dy, we even then assign a local habitation to the subsequent 
feeling, and it clearly seems to be, not in the mind, but in the 
hand. 
This reference of the sensation to the outward organ and 
place, instead of thinking of it as existing in the soul, is the 
result of an early and strong association. As the wound in 
the hand for instance is the cause of the painful feeling, the 
consequence is, that the sensation, and the place whence it 
arose, constantly go together in our thoughts. The re- 
sult of this connection, which has been repeated and contin- 
ued from our youth up, is, that we find it extremely difficult 
in latter life to separate them, even with the greatest effort. 
So difficult is it, that a soldier, whose arm or leg has been 
amputated, still speaks of feeling pain in those limbs, though 
they are now perhaps buried in the earth or the depths of 
the sea.-Count Segur, in giving an account of the great bat- 
tle of Borodino, observes of a certain wounded soldier, that he 
complained of suffering in the limbs which he no longer pos- 
sessed. And he immediately adds, (and there is no question 
probably as to the fact,)that this is a common case with mu- 
tilated persons. 
Although we are liable in these cases to be led into a mis- 
take, if we do not guard against it with care, it is perhaps an 
obvious remark, that the foundation of this liability to error 
is laid in our constitution for beneficent ends. It is not ordi- 
narily so important in a practical point of view, that we 
should attend to the internal feeling, as to the external part 
which is affected. An injury in the external senses, the 
muscles, or the limbs, if it be not attended to, soon affects 
other parts of the body and even life itself. Hence Provi- 
dence has put us in the way to form this strong and almost 
unconquerable mental habit, in order to secure protection, 
where it seems to be most urgently and frequently needed. (I) INTELLECTUAL. 
293 
§. 233. Connection of our ideas of extension and time. 
If we examine carefully our notions of Time, we shall find 
here also a casual association of long continuance and of 
great strength. It is believed to be the fact, that Time, as it 
exists in the apprehensions of most persons is regarded as 
something extended. It is not necessary to delay here to un- 
dertake a definition of time, to show what it is in the ab- 
stract, or to give a history of the notion which we form of it. 
Taking it for granted, that every one knows what is meant 
when we use that term, we merely assert here, that for some 
cause or other it is exceedingly difficult to think of it, except 
in the light of a modification of extension. The correctness 
of this remark may not perhaps appear perfectly obvious at 
first, but the expressions, which we apply to intervals of du- 
ration, are an evidence of its truth. 
We say before such a time or after such a time, the same 
as before or after any material object ; we speak of a long or 
short time with no more hesitation than of a long or short dis- 
tance, of a long or short bridge, or rail-way, or any other ob- 
ject of extension. We utter ourselves precisely in the same 
way we should do, if we were certain of having detected 
some real analogy between the two, between length and 
shortness in material substances, and what are called length 
and shortness in time. But it is not too much to say, that there 
is no such analogy, no such similitude ; nor is it worth while 
to anticipate, that we shall ever be able to detect such analo- 
gy or similitude, until we can in practice apply the measures 
of feet, ells, roods, &c. to hours, and days, and weeks. How 
then can it be accounted for, that we apply terms nearly in 
the same way, as if this were the case, and, as if such meas- 
urements could be made ? 
To this inquiry we are not prepared to return an answer, 
which we Can assert to be entirely satisfactory. It is proba- 
bly only another instance of that early and strong habit, 
which we have all formed, of transferring, in our thoughts, 
the material to the immaterial, and of contemplating what is 
abstract and invisible in the light of what is seen and tangi- 
ble. Mr. Stewart, however, is more definite in his explana- 
tion. He suggests that the strong association of these ideas 
has most probably arisen in this manner, viz. from our con- 
stantly measuring one of these quantities by the other. It is 294 
CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
the common method, as is well known, to measure time by 
motion, and motion is measured by extension. In an hour 
the hand of a clock moves over a certain space ; in two hours 
over double the space, and so on. And in this way he sup- 
poses we may have been gradually led to associate so strong- 
ly with the idea of time a conception, analagous to that of 
visible and material length. 
No doubt it is convenient to apply the terms "long" and 
"short," "before" and "after," and others similar, to Time. 
We could not well dispense with them. But it ought to be 
remembered, if we would have right notions of things,'that 
the application of those expressions has arisen, either from 
the mode in which we measure time, or from some other ac- 
cidental grounds of association, and that time and extension 
are essentially distinct in their nature. 
§. 234. Of high and low notes in music. 
We speak of high and low in reference to notes in music, 
the same as of the high or low position of material bodies. 
There is supposed to be some analogy between the relation, 
which the notes in the scale of music bear to each other, and 
the relation of superiority and inferiority in the position of 
bodies of matter. But it is impossible to prove the existence 
of such analogy, however generally it may have been sup- 
posed ; and the supposition itself of its existence has no 
doubt arisen from the casual association of ideas, which has 
acquired strength by lapse of time and by repetition. 
A proof of this association of ideas being purely accidental 
is that an association, the very reverse of this, was once 
prevalent. It is remarked in the preface to Gregory's edi- 
tion of Euclid's works, that the more ancient Greek writers 
considered the grave sounds as high, and the acute ones as 
low. The present mode of speaking on this subject is of more 
recent origin ; but at what time and in what way it was in- 
troduced cannot be asserted with confidence. In the preface 
just referred to, it is, however, observed, that the ancient 
Greek custom of looking upon the grave sounds as high and 
the acute as low, precisely the reverse of what is now com- 
mon, continued down until the time of Boethius. It has been 
conjectured with some ingenuity, that this connection or as- (I) INTELLECTUAL. 
295 
sociation of thought among the Greeks and Romans, for it 
was equally prevalent among both, might have been owing 
to the construction of their musical instruments. The 
string, which sounded the grave or what we call the low 
tone, it has been supposed, was placed highest, and that, 
which gave the shrill or acute, had the lowest place. If this 
conjecture could be ascertained to be well founded, it would 
strikingly show, from what very slight causes strong and 
permanent associations often arise. It is hardly necessary to 
observe, that it is important to examine the origin and pro- 
gress of such associations, in order that we may correct those 
erroneous and illusive notions, which will be found to be 
built upon them.* 
§. 235. Connection of the ideas of extension and color. 
There is no necessary connection between color, as the 
term is commonly employed by philosophers, and extension. 
The word color properly denotes a sensation in the mind ; 
the word extension, the quality of an external, material ob- 
ject. There is, therefore, no more natural connection, and 
no more analogy between the two, than there is between 
pain and solidity. And yet it so happens that we never 
have the sensation or idea of color without at the same time 
associating extension with it ; we find them, however differ- 
ent they may be in their nature, inseparable in our thoughts. 
This strong association is formed in consequence of our al- 
ways perceiving extension at the very time, in which the 
sensation of color is excited in the mind. The perception of 
the one, and the sensation of the other have been so long 
simultaneous, that we have been gradually drawn into the 
* It is not necessary for any purpose we have in view here to trace the 
origin of the association, but it is undoubtedly the fact, that we almost in- 
variably attribute the notion of highness or loftiness to those, who excell, 
or are particularly favored in any respects. We can hardly think of a 
nobleman, prince, or king, without creating for them an imaginary orbit 
somewhere in the upper sky, where they revolve far above the heads of 
ordinary mortals. Hence the expressions, High rank, High birth, Eleva- 
ted gbnius, Superior talents, &,c. and their opposites, Low rank, Inferior 
genius, and the like-(See Stewart's Essays, II, ch. Ill, Kaime's Criti- 
cism, Part VII, ch. IV.) 296 
CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
belief, that, on the one hand, all color has extension, and on 
the other, all extension has color. But what we call color 
being merely a state of the mind, it is not possible, that it 
should with propriety be predicated of any external material 
substances. Nor is it less evident, if color be merely a sen- 
sation or state of the mind, that matter can exist, and does 
exist without it. 
But what has been said will not satisfy all the queries, 
which may be started on this point, unless we remark also 
on the ambiguity in the word color. The view, which has 
been taken of the connection between color and extension, is 
founded on the supposition, that color denotes a sensation of 
the mind, and that merely. It seems to be supposed by some 
writers, that the word color has two meanings, and that it is 
thus generally understood ;-(1) It denotes that disposition, 
or arrangement, or whatever it may be, in the particles of 
matter, which not only causes the rays of light to be reflect- 
ed, but to be reflected in different ways ;-(2) It denotes 
that mental sensation, which follows, when the rays have 
reached the retina of the eye. When people use the term 
with this diversity of signification they can say with truth, 
that external bodies have color, and also that color is a sen- 
sation of the mind. It may be said also in the first sense of 
the term, which has been mentioned, that color has exten- 
sion, because particles of matter have extension. But it is 
not altogether evident, that people generally make this dis- 
tinction, although some may. There is great reason to think, 
that they commonly mean by the term the appearance of color 
or the sensation in the mind ; and they no doubt in general 
regard this appearance or sensation, as belonging to external 
objects, as being in some sense a part of those objects, and 
as having extension. How erroneous this supposition is, 
has already appeared ! 
236. Tendency of the mind to pass from the sign to the thing signified.. 
Mr. Stewart gives a reason for our inattention to the in- 
ternal sensation of color, (or color considered as an affection 
of the mind,) which is worthy of some notice. The principle, 
it will be observed, is a general one, applicable to other 
cases as well as this. "It is well known (he says) to be a (1) INTELLECTUAL. 
297 
general law of our constitution, when one thing is destined, 
either by nature or by convention, to be the sign of another, 
that the mind has a disposition to pass on as rapidly as possi- 
ble, to the thing signified without dwelling on the sign as an 
object worthy of its attention. The most remarkable of all 
examples of this occurs in the acquired perceptions of sight, 
where our estimates of distance are frequently the results of 
an intellectual process, comparing a variety of different signs 
together, without a possibility on our part, the moment after- 
wards, of recalling one single step of the process to our recol- 
lection. Our inattention to the sensations of color consider- 
ed as affections of the Mind, or as modifications of our own 
being, appears to me to be a fact of precisely the same des- 
cription ; for ail these sensations were plainly intended by 
nature to perform the offices of signs, indicating to us the fig- 
ures and distances of things external. Of their essential im- 
portance in this point of view, an idea may be formed, by 
supposing for a moment the whole face of nature to exhibit 
only one uniform color, without the slightest variety even of 
light and shade. Is it not self evident, that, on this supposi- 
tion,the organ of sight would be entirely useless, inasmuch 
as it is by the varieties of color alone that the outlines or visi- 
ble figures of bodies are so defined as to be distinguishable 
one from another ? Nor could the eye, in this case, give us 
any information concerning diversities of distance ; for all the 
various signs of it, enumerated by optical writers, presuppose 
the antecedent recognition of the bodies around us, as sepa- 
rate objects of perception. It is not therefore surprising, 
that signs so indispensably subservient to the exercise of our 
noblest sense, should cease, in early infancy, to attract notice 
as the subjects of our consciousness ; and that afterwards 
they should present themselves to the Imagination rather as 
qualities of Matter, than as attributes of Mind."* 
§. 237. Whether there be heat in fire, &c. 
The questions, whether there be heat in fire, coldness in 
snow, sweetness in sugar and the like, seems well suited to 
the inquisitive and nicely discriminating spirit of the Scho- 
lastic ages. Although well adapted to exercise the ingenuity 
* Stewart's Historical Dissertation, Pt. I, Sect. II, ch. 2. 298 
CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
of the Schools, they are far from being without some impor- 
tance in the more practical philosophy of later times. If 
these questions concern merely the matter of fact, if the in- 
quiry be, What do people think on these points ? It admits 
of different answers. But this is of less consequence to be 
known, than to know what is the true view of this subject. 
The following, there is much reason to think, is the view, 
which should be taken. If by heat, cold, and taste in bodies, 
we merely mean, that there is this or that disposition or mo- 
tion or attraction in the particles, then it must clearly be 
granted, that fire is hot, that snow is cold, and sugar is sweet. 
But if by heat is understood what one feels on the application 
of fire to the limbs, or if by sweetness is understood the sen- 
sation of taste, when a sapid body is applied to the tongue, 
&c. then fire has no heat, sugar no sweetness, and snow is 
not cold. These states of the mind can never be transform- 
ed into any thing material and external. The heat or the 
cold which I feel, and the different kinds of tastes are sensa- 
tions in the soul, and nothing else. 
§. 238. Whether there be meaning in words ? 
We say in our common discourse, that there is meaning- 
in words, that there is meaning in the printed page of an 
author ; and the language is perhaps sufficiently correct for 
those occasions, on which it is ordinarily employed. We do 
not deem it necessary to object to the common mode of speak- 
ing in this particular instance, nor to undertake to propose 
any thing better. But there is here an association of ideas, 
similar, both in its nature and its effects, to that existing be- 
tween extension and color already remarked upon. 
When objects external to us are presented to the sense of 
sight, there is immediately the sensation of some color. This 
sensation we have been so long in the habit of referring to 
the external object, that we speak and act, as if the color 
were truly in that object and not in ourselves ; in the lan- 
guage of D'Alembert, as if the sensation were transported 
out of the mind, and spread over the material substance. 
And it is not until we take some time to reflect, and until we 
institute a careful examination, that we become satisfied of 
our error. (T) INTELLECTUAL. 
299 
In the same way, when we look upon the page of an author, 
we say it has meaning, or that it is full of thought ; whereas 
in truth, in consequence of a long continued and obstinate 
association, of which we are hardly sensible ourselves, we 
transport the meaning or thought out of ourselves and spread 
it upon that page. The thought or meaning is in ourselves, 
but is placed by us, through the means of a casual but very 
strong association, in the written marks, which are before 
us. All the power, which the words have, results from con- 
vention, or, what is the same thing, exists in consequence of 
certain intellectual habits, formedin reference to those words. 
It is these habits, formed in reference to them, it is this men- 
tal correspondence, which gives these characters all their 
value; and without the mind, which answers to and which 
interprets them, they could be considered as nothing more 
than mere black strokes drawn upon white paper, and essen- 
tially differing in nothing from the zigzag and unmeaning de- 
lineations of a schoolboy on the sand. As all the beautiful 
varieties of color do not and cannot have an existence with- 
out the mind, which has sensations of them or perceives 
them, so words are useless, are unmeaning, are nothing with- 
out the interpretations of an intellect, that has been trained 
up so as to correspond to them. If it were otherwise, there 
would be meaning in the unknown inscriptions on the bricks 
and other fragments of antiquity, which are occasionally 
brought from the banks of the Euphrates ; there would be 
meaning in those hieroglyphic figures on the monuments of 
Egypt, which have hitherto, or at least until a very recent 
period, eluded the efforts to interpret them ; in neither case 
would they stare upon us with that unintelligent vacancy, 
which has so long characterized them. They are now with- 
out meaning, without life and intelligence, for this reason 
and this only, that the minds, which once corresponded to 
them, and which gave them life and intelligence, are no more. 
By association, therefore, we refer the meaning to the writ- 
ten characters or words, when in truth it is in the mind, and 
there alone. 
§. 239. Benefit of examining such connections of thought. 
It is of great importance to us to be able to separate ideas, 
which our situation and habits may have intimately combin- 300 
CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
ed together. To a person, who has this power in a consider- 
able degree, we readily give the credit of possessing a clear 
and discriminating judgment. And this mental characteris- 
tic is of great consequence not only in pursuing the study of 
intellectual philosophy, but in the conduct of life. It is in 
particular directly subservient to the power of reasoning, 
since all processes of reasoning are made up of successive 
propositions, the comparison of which implies the exercise of 
judgment. The associations of thought, which have been 
mentioned in this chapter, are so intimate or rather almost 
indissoluble, that they try and discipline the mind in this 
respect,-they teach it to discriminate. They are worthy to 
be examined, therefore, and to be understood, not only for 
the immediate pleasure, which they afford in the discovery 
of our errors ; but also because they have the effect of train- 
ing up one's powers to some good purpose. Let a person be 
accustomed to making such discriminations as are implied in 
fully understanding the instances in this chapter, and he ac- 
quires a readiness which is not easily outwitted ; he trains 
himself to such a quickness of perception in finding out what 
truly belongs to an object and what does not, as will not al- 
low him to be imposed upon by that confusion of ideas, which 
in so many cases distorts the judgments of the multitude. 
§. 240. Power of the will over mental associations. 
In view of what has been said in this and the former chap- 
ters the interesting inquiry naturally arises, What is the de- 
gree of influence, which we are able to exercise by mere vo- 
lition or will over associated trains of mental states ? In re- 
ply to this inquiry, an obvious remark is, that we cannot, by 
a mere direct and positive act of the will, call up or create 
such associated trains. What has already been said on the 
subject of laws of association involves, that their appearance 
and departure depends on other causes, than a mere uncon- 
ditional order or command. Furthermore, such is the na- 
ture of the volitive faculty, that we evidently can never will 
the existence of any thing without knowing what it is which 
we will or choose. This, viz. that the act of volition neces- 
sarily implies a perceived or known object of volition, requires 
no further proof than is contained in the proposition itself. (I) INTELLECTUAL. 
301 
Therefore the expressions, to will to have a certain thought 
or train of thought, clearly imply the present existence of 
that thought or train ; and consequently, there can be no 
such thing as calling up or originating thoughts by immedi- 
ate volition. 
To this view of the inefficiency of direct voluntary power, 
in the originating of our associated ideas and feelings, and to 
the argument in support of it, those mental efforts, which we 
term Recollection or intentional memory, have been brought 
up as an answer. In cases of intentional memory it will be 
said, an object or event is remembered, or, in other words, 
an idea or train of ideas is called up, by mere direct volition 
or choice. To this objection, may we not satisfactorily pro- 
pose this reply ? It is evident, before we attempt or make a 
formal effort to remember the particular circumstances of an 
event, that the event itself in general must have been the 
object of our attention. There is some particular thing in 
all cases of intentional remembrance, which we wish to call 
to mind, although we are totally unable to state what it is ; 
but we know, that it is somehow connected with some gen- 
eral event, which we already have in memory. Now by re- 
volving in mind the great facts or outlines of that event, it 
so happens, that the particular circumstance, which we were 
in search of, is called up. But certainly no one can say that 
this is done by a direct volition ;-so far from it, that nothing 
more is wanted to explain it, than the common principles of 
association. This statement is illustrated, whenever, in re- 
citing an extract which we had committed to memory, we 
are at a loss for the beginning of a particular sentence. In 
such a case we naturally repeat a number of times the con- 
cluding words of the preceding sentence, and very soon we 
recall the sentence, which was lost; not, however, by direct 
volition, but by association. 
§. 241. Association controlled by indirect voluntary power. 
But we would not be understood to say, that the will 
possesses no influence whatever, in the origination and con- 
trol of trains of thoughts ; its influence is very considerable, 
although it is not, as far as the origination of them is con- 
cerned, immediate and direct. (1) We have, in the first 302 
CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
place, the power of checking or delaying the succession of 
mental states. This power is always found to exist, when 
the direction of the mind towards a particular subject is at- 
tended with those feelings of desire or sentiments of duty, 
which are understood to be prerequisite, as a basis or foun- 
dation for the acts of the will. We are not, indeed, enabled 
by our power in this respect either directly to call up or to 
banish any one or any number of our thoughts. But the 
consequence is, a variety of trains of thought are suggested, 
which would not have been suggested, had it not been for the 
circumstance of the original train being delayed. Thus, in 
the course of our mental associations, the name of Sir Isaac 
Newton occurs ; we experience a strong emotion of inter- 
est ; we voluntarily check the current of our thoughts at that 
name, and we feel and are conscious, that we have within 
us the ability to do so. While we delay upon it, a variety of 
series of ideas occurs. At one moment, we think of eminent 
mathematicians and astronomers, for he himself was one ; at 
another, we think of those contemporaries, who were his par- 
ticular friends, whatever their rank in science, because they 
lived at the same time ; a moment after, our minds dwell up- 
on some striking incidents in his life or some marked features 
in his social or intellectual character;-and again, we may 
be led to think, almost in the same instant, of some proposi- 
tion or demonstration, which had once exercised his patience 
and skill. In consequence of delaying a few moments on the 
name or rather on the general idea of the man, these differ- 
ent trains of thought are presented. And this is not all. 
When these various trains of thought are brought before the 
mind, we can evidently fix our meditations upon one of them, 
if we have a desire to do it and choose to do it, in such a way 
and with such intensity as to result in the dismission and ab- 
sence of others. This is one way, in which, by an act of 
volition, we are able to exercise a considerable indirect pow- 
er in calling up associations, besides a power in regard to 
them, both direct and indirect, when they are thus brought 
into existence. 
§• 242. Further illustrations of indirect voluntary power. 
(2) We acquire, in the second place, great power over (I) INTELLECTUAL. 
303 
our associations by habit ; and, as no man ordinarily forms 
such habit without choosing and determining to form it, we 
have here another instance of the indirect power of volition. 
By the term Habit, when it is applied to our mental opera- 
tions, we mean in particular that facility or readiness, which 
they acquire by being frequently repeated. The conse- 
quence of repetition or frequent practice is, that certain as- 
sociations are soon very much strengthened, or that a facility 
in them is acquired. (See §. 97.) 
Striking instances of the effect of habit have been given 
in the course of this chapter, although it might perhaps be 
said in respect to the results involved in these cases, that they 
were forced upon us by our particular situation, rather than 
brought about by positive desire and choice. But there are 
other instances, to which this remark is not equally applica- 
ble. It is a well known fact, that almost any person maybe- 
come a punster or rhymer by taking the pains to form a hab- 
it, that is, by increasing the facility of certain associations 
by frequent repetition. If a person, for instance, makes it a 
practice to recall words, which have a similar sound, this 
particular form of association will by degrees be so strength- 
ened, that in the end it will be by no means difficult to secure 
the recurrence of such words. This is the true explanation 
of the power of rhyming. It is well known, that most per- 
sons, whether they possess poetical genius or not, may acquire 
this power, by continuing for a length of time their search af- 
ter words of a like termination. Again, if a public speaker 
has taken the pains to fix in his mind certain permanent prin- 
ciples, which are to guide him in the division and subdivision 
of his discourse, he acquires by practice a great readiness in 
respect to them, and immediately applies them to every sub- 
ject of debate. By means of the habit, which he has formed, 
he is not only enabled to resolve a subject into suitable parts, 
but to pass without hesitation or danger of mistake from one 
part of it to another ; whereas a person, who has not formed 
this habit, is perpetually at a loss ; he advances and retreats, 
goes over the ground again and again, and involves himself 
in inextricable confusion. 
These are instances, among many others, of power ac- 
quired by Habit ; and these habits are formed in obedience 304 
MEMORY. 
to an act of the Will; in other words, in conformity with a 
purely voluntary determination. (See, in connection with 
this subject, Stewart's Elements, Vol. I, ch. vi, pt. 2 ; His- 
torical Dissertation, Pt. I, §. ii, ch. 2 ; Brown's Lectures, 
XLI, XLII, XLIX, &c.) 
CHAPTER EIGHTH. 
MEMORY. 
§. 243. Remarks on the general nature of memory. 
In the further prosecution of our subject, we naturally 
proceed from Association to the examination of the Memory, 
inasmuch as the latter necessarily implies the antecedent ex- 
istence of the former, and in its very nature is closely allied 
to it. In reference to the great question of the Origin of hu- 
man Knowledge, the Memory, as has already been intimated, 
is to be considered a source of knowledge, rather in its con- 
nection with other mental susceptibilities, than in itself. It 
does not appear, how we could form any abstract ideas, bas- 
ed upon a knowledge of objects and classes of objects, with- 
out the aid of memory ; and it is well known, that its pres- 
ence and action is essentially involved in all the exercises of 
the reasoning power and of the imagination. Without delay- 
ing, however, on its connection with the origin of knowledge, 
we shall proceed to consider the susceptibility itself, both in 
its general nature, and in some of its peculiarities. 
Memory is that power or susceptibility of the mind, by 
which those conceptions are originated, which are modified 
by a perception of the relation of past time. Accordingly it 
is not a simple, but complex action of the intellectual princi- 
ple, implying, (1) a conception of the object, (2) a perception 
of the relation of priority in its existence. That is, we not 
only have a conception of the object, but this conception is MEMORY. 
305 
attended with the conviction, that it underwent the exami- 
nation of our senses, or was, in some way, perceived by us 
at some former period. 
When we imagine, that we stand in the midst of a for- 
est, or on the top of a mountain, but remain safe all the while 
at our own fireside, these pleasing ideas of woods, and of 
skies painted over us, and of plains under our feet, are mere 
conceptions. But when with these insulated conceptions, 
we connect the relation of time ; and they gleam upon our 
souls, as the woods, plains, and mountains of our youthful 
days ; then those intellectual states, which were before, mere 
conceptions, become remembrances. And the power, which 
the mind possesses of originating these latter complex states, 
is what usually goes under the name of the power or faculty 
of MEMORY. 
Memory, as explained in the preceding section, is aground 
or law of Belief. So far as we have no particular reason to 
doubt, that the sensations and perceptions in any given case 
are correctly reported in the remembrance, the latter con- 
trols our belief and actions not less than those antecedent 
states of mind, on which it is founded. Such is the constitu- 
tion of the human mind. (See §. 26.) It will be noticed, 
that, in asserting the natural dependence of beliefon memory, 
we guard it by an express limitation. It is only when we 
have no reason to doubt of our antecedent experiences being 
correctly reported in the remembrances, that our reliance on 
them is of the highest kind. It is the same here as in respect 
to the Senses and Testimony ; we confidently rely on the 
memory, but are not exempt from some degree of exposure 
to error from it ; although as in those cases, it is an expos- 
ure, which we are able to guard against with suitable care 
and pains. (See §§. 27. 28.) 
In what way, and in what particulars this caution and 
pains are to be exerted, it is not necessary minutely to detail 
here. One thing, however, seems to be in general certain, 
that we are not led into error by means of the memory igno- 
rantly, and without the ability to guard against it. Every 
man knows from a species of internal feeling, whether there 
be grounds for doubting his memory in any particular case or 
§. 244. Of memory as a ground or law of belief. 306 
MEMORY. 
not; for the same Consciousness, which gives him a knowl- 
edge of the fact of memory, gives him a knowledge of the de- 
gree also, in which it exists ; viz, whether in a high degree 
or low, whether distinct or obscure. If it be the fact that he 
finds reason for suspecting its reports, his reliance will either 
be diminished in proportion to this suspicion, or he will take 
means, if he be able to, to remove the grounds of such sus- 
picion. 
It cannot reasonably be anticipated, that any objection 
will be made to the doctrine of a reliance on memory, with 
the limitation which has now been mentioned. Without such 
reliance, our situation would be no better at least, than if we 
had been framed with an utter inability to rely on the Senses 
or on Testimony ; we could hardly sustain an existence ; we 
certainly could not derive any thing in aid of that existence 
from the experience of the past. 
The ability to remember is the common privilege of all, 
and, generally speaking, it is possessed in nearly equal de- 
grees. To each one there is given a sufficient readiness in 
this respect; his power of remembrance is such, as to an- 
swer all the ordinary purposes of life. But, although there 
is in general a nearly equal distribution of this power, we 
find a few instances of great weakness, and other instances 
of great strength of memory. 
It is related by Seneca of the Roman orator Hortensius, 
that, after sitting a whole day at public sale, he gave an ac- 
count from memory, in the evening, of all things sold, with the 
prices and names of the purchasers, and this account, when 
compared with what had been taken in writing by a notary, 
was found to be exact in every particular. 
The following is an instance of strength of memory some- 
what remarkable. An Englishman, at a certain time, 
came to Frederick the great of Prussia, for the express pur- 
pose of giving him an exhibition of his power of recollection. 
Frederic sent for Voltaire, who read to the king a pretty 
long poem, which he had just finished. The Englishman 
was present, and was in such a position, that he could hear 
every word of the poem ; but was concealed from Voltaire's 
notice. After the reading of the poem was finished, Freder- 
ic observed to the author, that the production could not be 
§. 245. Of differences in the strength of memory. MEMORY 
307 
an original one; as there was a foreign gentleman present, 
who could recite every word of it. Voltaire listened with 
amazement to the stranger, as he repeated word for word, 
the poem, which he had been at so much pains in composing; 
and giving way to a momentary freak of passion, he tore the 
manuscript in pieces. A statement was then made to him of 
the circumstances, under which the Englishman became ac- 
quainted with his poem, which had the effect to mitigate his 
anger, and he was very willing to do penance for the sudden- 
ness of his passion, by copying down the work from a second 
repetition of it by the stranger, who was able to go through 
with it, as before.* 
A considerable number of instances of this description are 
found in the recorded accounts of various individuals, but 
they may be considered as exceptions to the general features 
of the human mind, the existence of which it is difficult to 
explain on any known principles. They are probably origi- 
nal and constitutional traits ; and if such be the case, they 
necessarily preclude any explanation, further than what is 
involved in the mere statement of that fact. There are, 
however, some diversities and peculiarities of memory, less 
striking perhaps, than those just referred to, which admit a 
more detailed notice. 
* The following recent statement, and from a most unquestioned source, 
(Mr. Rhenius, Missionary in Southern India, year 1827,) discloses a te- 
nacity of memory not unlike the very striking instances above mention- 
ed, and which have been already so often quoted in other works. "I 
have lately witnessed, (says he,) a remarkable instance of a wonderfully 
retentive memory in a young Brahmin from Ramnad. Three days ago, 
a gentleman wrote a sentence in English, (of which language the Brah- 
min knew nothing,) containing 30 syllables: each syllable was numbered 
in order ; all the syllables with their numbers were told him ; notintheir 
proper order, but skipping from three to twenty, then to six, and so on ; 
when the whole sentence was finished, the Brahmin arranging the num- 
bers in his head in regular order, told the sentence word for word. To- 
day he wrote him an English sentence of sixty-nine syllables ; and pro- 
ceeded in telling him the numbers as before ; while this was going on, I 
wrote a sentence in Hebrew, containing fourteen syllables, telling him the 
numbers in the same skipping manner: while this was proceeding, he re- 
peated to us the sentence which he had heard three days ago: and when 
the numbers of the new English and Hebrew sentences were finished, he 
told us both of them in a regular order, as if he had read them from a 
book. This was certainly a prodigious memory, and astonished us all." 308 
MEMORY. 
§. 246. Of circumstantial memory, or that species of memory, which is 
based on the relations of contiguity in time and place. 
There is a species of memory, more than usually obvious 
and outward in its character,(which is based essentially upon 
the relations of Contiguity in time and place. In the ex- 
planation of this form or species of memory, it may be prop- 
er to recur a moment to the explanations on the general na- 
ture of memory, which have already been given. It will be 
kept in mind, that our remembrances are merely conceptions, 
modified by a perception of the relation of past time. Re- 
moving, then, the modification of past time, and the remain- 
ing element of our remembrances will be conceptions merely. 
Our conceptions, it will be recollected, cannot be called up 
by a mere voluntary effort, because to will the existence of 
a conception necessarily implies the actual existence of the 
conception already in the mind. They arise in the mind, 
therefore, in obedience to the influence of some of those prin- 
ciples of association, which have already been considered. 
And Memory, accordingly, will assume a peculiarity of as- 
pect, corresponding to the associating principle which pre- 
dominates. If it be based, for instance, on the law of Conti- 
guity, as it will deal chiefly with mere facts, and their out- 
ward incidents and circumstances without entering deeply 
into their interior nature, it will be what may be described, 
not merely as an obvious and practical, but, in particular, as 
a circumstantial memory. If it be based chiefly on the other 
principles, it may be expected to exhibit a less easy and flexi- 
ble, a less minute and specific, but a more philosophical char- 
acter. 
That species of memory, which is founded chiefly on the 
law of contiguity, and which is distinguished by its specifical- 
ness or circumstantiality, will be found to prevail especially 
among uneducated people, not merely artisans and other la- 
boring classes ; but among all those, in whatever situation 
of life, who have either not possessed, or possessing have 
not employed the means of intellectual culture. Every one 
must have recollected instances of the great readiness, exhi- 
bited by these persons, in their recollection of facts, places, 
times, names, specific arrangements in dress and in buildings, 
traditions, and local incidents. In their narrations, for in- MEMORY. 
309 
stance, of what has come within their knowledge, they will 
in general be found to specify the time of events ; not merely 
an indefinite or approximated time ; but the identical year, 
and month, and day, and hour. In their description of per- 
sons and places, and in their account of the dress and equi- 
page of persons, and of the localities and incidents of places, 
they are found to be no less particular. When we assert, 
however, that this species of memory, which from the pecu- 
liar aspect it exhibits may conveniently be designated as cir- 
cumstantial memory, is based upon the principle of Contigui- 
ty, we do not mean to intimate that its possessors are nat- 
urally destitute of the other associating principles, or that 
they necessarily possess them in a much lower degree than 
others. As compared with the principle of Contiguity, the 
principles of Resemblance or Analogy, of Contrast, and of 
Cause and Effect appear to-be more remote and inward, and 
less accessible by familiar and outward influences. Accor- 
dingly as a general statement, they imply, in their exercise, 
a greater degree of mental developement. And hence it nat- 
urally happens, that those persons, who have not possessed 
or have not employed the means of this developement, 
even if they are possessed of the principles themselves, avail 
themselves of those more obvious and easy helps to memory, 
which nature has placed within their reach. In other words, 
it is almost invariably the case, that they aim to strengthen 
their recollections of facts and events, by associating them 
with those things, which happened at the same time, or were 
proximate in position. And having by almost constant exer- 
cise greatly strengthened the tendency to those associations, 
which exist in consequence of mere contiguity, they can 
readily tell you not only the precise place, where any thing 
has happened, but almost every thing, which has happened 
in the immediate neighborhood ; not only the time, when the 
event occurred, but many other things, which occurred 
about the same period ; not only the person, but numberless 
particularities of dress, form, and position. 
§. 247. Illustrations of specific or circumstantial memory. 
The great masters of human nature, (Shakspeare among* 
others,) have occasionally indicated their knowledge of this 310 
MEMORY. 
species of memory. Mrs. Quickly, in reminding1 FalstafT of 
his promise of marriage, discovers her readiness of recollec- 
tion in the specification of a great variety of circumstances, 
under which the promise was made. Her recollection in the 
case was not a mere general remembrance of the solitary 
fact, but was in the manner of a witness in a court of justice, 
circumstantial. "Thou didst swear to me on a parcel-gilt 
goblet, sitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, 
by a sea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitsun week, when 
the prince broke thy head for likening him to a singing man 
of Windsor." The coachman in Cornelius Scriblerus gives 
an account of what he had seen in Bear-garden;-"Two 
men fought for a prize ; one was a fair man, a sergeant in 
the guards ; the other black, a butcher ; the sergeant had red 
trousers, the butcher blue ; they fought upon a stage about 
four o'clock, and the sergeant wounded the butcher in the 
leg." 
"In a certain village of Estramadura, (says the humble 
squire of the knight of La Mancha,) there lived a certain 
goat shepherd. I mean one that keeps goats ; and this shep- 
herd or goatherd, as the story goes, was called Lope Ruyz ; 
and it came to pass, that this Lope Ruyz fell in love with a 
shepherdess, whose name was Torralva ; which shepherdess, 
whose name was Torralva, was the daughter of a rich herds- 
man ; and this rich herdsman," &c. Don Quixote took ex- 
ception to Sancho's telling the story with so much particulari- 
ty ; but he frankly and honestly replied, that all the people 
in his country told stories in that manner, and he must tell 
it so, or not tell it at all. 
§. 248. Of philosophic memory, or that species of memory which is based 
on other relations than those of contiguity. 
There is another species of memory, clearly distinguisha- 
ble from the circumstantial memory, which may be describ- 
ed as the philosophic. This form of memory, relying but 
seldom on the aids of mere Contiguity, is sustained chiefly 
by the relations of Resemblance, Contrast, and Cause and 
Effect. The circumstantial memory, which deals almost ex- 
clusively with minute particulars, and especially with those 
which are accessible by the outward senses, admirably an- MEMORY. 
311 
swers the purpose of those persons, in whom it is commonly 
found. But mere contiguity in time and place, which is al- 
most the sole principle, that binds together facts and events 
in the recollection of those, whose powers are but imperfect- 
ly developed, possesses comparatively little value in the esti- 
mation of the philosopher. He looks more deeply into the 
nature of things. Bestowing but slight attention on what is 
purely outward and incidental, he detects with a discrimina- 
ting eye the analogies and oppositions, the causes and conse- 
quences of events. It would seem, that the celebrated Mon- 
taigne was destitute, perhaps in a more than common degree, 
of that form of reminiscence, which we have proposed to 
designate as the circumstantial memory. He says on a cer- 
tain occasion of himself, "I am forced to call my servants by 
the names of their employments, or of the countries, where- 
they were born, for I can hardly remember their proper 
names ; and if I should live long, I question whether I should 
remember my own name." But it does not appear, notwith- 
standing his inability to remember names and insulated facts,, 
especially if they related to the occurrences of common life, 
that he had much reason to complain of an absolute want of 
memory. His writings indicate his cast of mind, that he was 
reflective and speculative; and he expressly gives us to un- 
derstand, that he was much more interested in the study of 
the principles of human nature, than of outward objects. 
Accordingly the result was such, as might be expected, that 
his memory was rather philosophical, than circumstantial ; 
and more tenacious of general principles than of specific, 
facts. 
A man, whose perceptions are naturally philosophic, and 
whose remembrances consequently take the same turn, may 
not be able to make so rapid and striking advances in all 
branches of knowledge, as a person of different intellectual 
bias. Almost every department of science presents itself to 
the student's notice under two forms, the practical and theo- 
retical ; its facts and its rules of proceeding on the one hand, 
and its principles on the other. The circumstantial memo- 
ry rapidly embraces the practical part, seizing its facts and 
enunciating its rules, with a promptness of movement and a 
show of power, which throws the philosophic memory quite 312 
MEMORY. 
into the shade. But it is otherwise, when they advance into 
the less obvious and showy, but more fertile region of analo- 
gies, classification, and principles. On this topic Mr. Stew- 
art has some pertinent remarks. "A man destitute of genius, 
[that is to say, in this connection, of a naturally philosophic 
turn of mind,] may, with little effort, treasure up in his mem- 
ory a number of particulars in chemistry, or natural history, 
which he refers to no principle, and from which he deduces 
no conclusion ; and from his facility in acquiring this stock 
of information, may flatter himself with the belief, that he 
possesses a natural taste for these branches of knowledge. 
But they, who are really destined to extend the boundaries 
of science, when they first enter on new pursuits, feel their 
attention distracted, and their memory overloaded with facts, 
among which they can trace no relation, and are sometimes 
apt to despair entirely of their future progress. In due time, 
however, their superiority appears, and arises in part from 
that very dissatisfaction which they at first experienced, and 
which does not cease to stimulate their inquiries, till they 
are enabled to trace, amidst a chaos of apparently unconnect- 
ed materials, that simplicity and beauty which always char- 
acterize the operations of nature." 
§. 249. Further illustrations of philosophic memory. 
Mr. Stewart pursues this train of remark further, main- 
taining as a general thing, that a man of genius has his 
knowledge less at command, than those, who.are possessed 
of an inferior degree of originality ; and particularly in re- 
spect to those subjects, on which he has found his originality 
and invention most fertile. And in this connection he men- 
tions the case of Sir Isaac Newton in terms as follows. 
"Sir Isaac Newton, (as we are told by Dr Pemberton,) was 
often at a loss, when the conversation turned on his own dis- 
coveries. It is probable that they made but a slight impres- 
sion on his mind, and that a consciousness of his inventive 
powers prevented him from taking much pains to treasure 
them up in his memory.-Men of little ingenuity seldom for- 
get the ideas they acquire ; because they know that, when 
an occasion occurs of applying their knowledge to use, they 
must trust to memory and not to invention. Explain an MEMORY. 
313 
arithmetical rule to a person of common understanding, who 
is unacquainted with the principles of the science ; he will 
soon get the rule by heart, and become dexterous in the ap- 
plication of it. Another, of more ingenuity, will examine the 
principle of the rule before he applies it to use, and will 
scarcely take the trouble to commit to memory a process, 
which he knows he can, at any time, with a little reflection, 
recover. The consequence will be, that, in the practice of 
calculation, he will appear more slow and hesitating, than if 
he followed the received rules of arithmetic without reflection 
or reasoning. 
Something of the same kind happens every day in con- 
versation. By far the greater part of the opinions we an- 
nounce in it, are not the immediate result of reasoning on 
the spot, but have been previously formed in the closet, or 
perhaps have been adopted implicitly on the authority of oth- 
ers. The promptitude, therefore, with which a man decides 
in ordinary discourse, is not a certain test of the quickness of 
his apprehension ; as it may perhaps arise from those uncom- 
mon efforts to furnish the memory with acquired knowledge, 
by which men of slow parts endeavor to compensate for their 
want of invention ; while, on the other hand, it is possible 
that a consciousness of originality may give rise to a manner 
apparently embarrassed, by leading the person who feels it, 
to trust too much to extempore exertions." . 
§. 250. Of that species of memory called intentional recollection. 
There is a species or exercise of the memory, known as 
intentional recollection, the explanation of which renders 
it proper briefly to recur again to the nature of memory in 
general. The definition of memory, which has been given, 
is, that it is the power or susceptibility of the mind, by which 
those conceptions are originated, which are modified by the 
perception of the relation of past time. This definition neces- 
sarily resolves memory, in a considerable degree at least, into 
Association. But it will be recollected, that our trains of as- 
sociated thought are not, in the strict sense, voluntary ; that 
is, are not directly under the control of the will. They come 
and depart, (we speak now exclusively of their origination,) 
without its being possible for us to exercise any thing more, 314 
MEMORY. 
than an indirect power over them. (See §. 240.) It follows 
from these facts, that our remembrances also, which may be 
regarded in part as merely associated trains, are not, in the 
strict sense, voluntary ; or, in other words, it is impossible for 
us to remember in consequence of merely choosing to remem- 
ber. To will or to choose to remember anything implies, 
that the thing in question is already in the mind ; and hence 
there is not only an impossibility resulting from the nature of 
the mind, but also an absurdity, in the idea of calling up 
thought by a mere direct volition. Our chief power, there- 
fore, in quickening and strengthening the memory, will be 
found to consist in our skill in applying and modifying the 
various principles or laws of association. And this brings us 
to an explanation of what is called intentional memory or 
recollection ; a subject, which' was partly illustrated in the 
section above referred to. 
Whenever we put forth an exercise of intentional memory, 
or make a formal attempt to remember some circumstance, 
it is evident that the event in general, of which the circum- 
stance when recalled will be found to be a part, must have 
previously been an object of attention. That is, we remem- 
ber the great outlines of some story, but cannot, in the first 
instance give a complete account of it, which we wish to do. 
We make an effort to recall the circumstances not remember- 
ed in two ways. We may, in the/rsZ place, form different 
suppositions, and see which agrees best with the general out- 
lines ; the general features or outlines of the subject being 
detained before us, with a considerable degree of permanen- 
cy, by means of some feeling of desire or interest. This 
method of restoring thoughts is rather an inference of reason- 
ing, than a genuine exercise of memory. 
We may, in the second place, merely delay upon those 
thoughts, which we already hold possession of; and revolve 
them in our minds ; until, aided by some principie of associa- 
tion, we are able to lay hold of the particular ideas, for which 
we were searching. Thus, when we endeavor to recite 
what we had previously committed to memory, but are at a 
loss for a particular passage ; we repeat, a number of times, 
the concluding words of the preceding sentence. In this way, 
the sentence, which was forgotten, is very frequently recalled. MEMORY. 
315 
§. 251. Instance illustrative of the preceding, 
The subject of the preceding section will perhaps be more 
distinctly understood, in connection with the following illus- 
tration. Dr. Beattie informs us, that he was himself acquain- 
ted with a clergyman, who, on being attacked with a fit of 
apoplexy, w'as found to have forgotten all the transactions of 
the four years immediately preceding the attack. And yet 
he remembered as well as ever what had happened before 
that ^period. The newspapers, which were printed during 
the period mentioned, were read with interest, and afforded 
him a great deal of amusement, being entirely new to him. 
It is further stated, that this individual recovered by degrees 
all he had lost; so as after a while to have nearly or quite 
as full a remembrance of that period, as others. In this in- 
stance the power of the principles of association appears to 
have been at first completely prostrated by the disease, with- 
out any prospect of their being again brought into action, ex- 
cept by some assistance afforded them. This assistance, no 
doubt, was conversation, the renewed notice of various ex- 
ternal objects addressed to the senses, and reading. By 
reading old newspapersand by conversation, in particular, he 
occasionally fell upon ideas, which he had not only been pos- 
sessed of before, but which had been associated with other 
ideas, forming originally distinct and condensed trains of 
thought. And thus whole series were restored. Other 
series again were recovered by applying the methods of in- 
tentional recollection ; that is, by forming suppositions 
and comparing them with the ideas already recovered, or by 
voluntarily delaying upon and revolving in mind such trains 
as were restored, and thus rousing up others. Such, we can 
hardly doubt to have been, in the main, the process,by which 
the person, of whom we are speaking, recovered the knowl- 
edge he had lost. 
These views, in addition to what has now been said, may 
be illustrated also by what we sometimes observe in old men. 
Question them as to the events of early life; and at times 
they will be unable to give any answer whatever. But when- 
ever you mention some prominent incident of their young 
days, or perhaps some friend, on whom many associations 
have gathered, it will often be found, that their memory re- 316 
MEMORY. 
vives, and that they are able to state many things, in respect 
to which they were previously silent. 
§. 252. Remarks on the memory of the aged. 
In noticing the interesting aspects, which the memory 
presents to our consideration, it may be proper to delay a 
moment on the memory of the aged. . And here the leading 
remark is, that a weakness of memory, a slowness and ina- 
bility of recollection exists in such persons. This weakness 
of remembrance, which is so frequently observed in men of 
advanced age, appears to be owing to two causes, viz, the 
impaired state of the organs of perception, and a defect of 
attention. 
(I) Their organs of external perception are impaired. 
We find it difficult in consequence of the failure of their 
sense of hearing, to converse with people, advanced in years, 
and it requires a great effort, both on our part and theirs, to 
make them understand what we say. The most conclusive 
arguments, and flashes of wit, and rich strains of music have 
in a great measure ceased to attract their notice. There 
is a like failure of the sense of seeing also. They no longer 
take pleasure in the delightful aspects of creation. The wa- 
ving forest, the blooming field, the gay beams of the sun, all 
the charming varieties and aspects of nature, although they 
have not ceased to have charms for others, have but little, or 
none for them. In the language of an old Roman, when he 
wished to excuse himself from the acceptance of a public 
office, they are but the name aud shadow of what they once 
were; "umbram nomenque Publii Licinii relictum videlis; vires 
corporis affect®, sensus oculorum atque aurium hebetes, memoria labat, 
vigor animi obtusus." The natural and necessary consequence 
of this state of things is, that the ideas, which are let in by 
the senses, make but a very feeble impression, and are al- 
most immediately erased from the mind. 
(2) The second cause of the weakness of memory, of 
which old people complain, is a defect in attention. That 
mental state, to which we give the name of attention, al- 
ways implies, in a greater or less degree, an emotion of inte- 
rest ; and without some feeling of this kind, it does not well 
appear how it could exist. But the world, (including in the MEMORY. 
317 
term what is beautiful in nature, and what is important in 
the duties and callings of life,) has at last ceased to excite 
the emotions, which it formerly awakened. The aged are 
like the prisoner, released in the period of the French revo- 
lution, from the Bastile ; they find themselves, as it were, in 
a new creation, which passes before them with great indis- 
tinctness, and with which they feel but little sympathy. As 
their organs of external perception have failed them, and as 
there has also been a defect of attention, the memory, as a 
natural consequence, has become broken and powerless. 
It should, however, be remarked here, that, notwithstand- 
ing what has been said, aged people often recall, with great 
readiness and precision, the feelings and the incidents of their 
youth. The explanation of this striking trait in the memory 
of the aged, which we have already had occasion to notice in 
one of the chapters on Association seems to be this. As a 
general statement, our early feelings and associations are 
the strongest. That they should be so is not strange, since we 
have then entered on a state of things, which, in its essen- 
tial features, is new, and which, in all its diversities of duty, 
and pleasure and danger, attracts, and excites us by contin- 
ual novelty. Who can forget the plains where he wandered 
in early life ? Who can erase from his recollection the asso- 
ciates of those days of wonder, activity, and hope ? Who 
can obliterate from his heart his youthful toils, his sufferings, 
and his joys? These things remain, while others vanish. 
Such feelings, so deeply fixed in the mind, and bound togeth- 
er and made permanent by the strength of a mutual associa- 
tion, are frequently recalled ; they recur to the soul in the 
activity and bustle of life, and in those more favored mo- 
ments, when it is given up to silent and solemn meditations. 
The effect of this frequent recurrence can easily be imagined. 
The early impressions, which are the subjects of such recur- 
rence, become in time, if one maybe allowed the expression, 
a part of the mind itself; they seem to be woven into its ex- 
istence. Hence old men, who have no eye and no hearing 
for the events that are passing around them, repeat, with 
the greatest animation, the stories of scenes, and actions, and 
friendships of fifty years ago. 318 
MEMORY. 
§. 253. On the compatibility of strong memory and good judgment. 
It has sometimes been a question of considerable interest, 
whether the possession of a remarkably strong- memory is 
not inconsistent with entire soundness of judgment. This 
question has perhaps been suggested by the fact, that in 
some instances idiots and other persons not much above the 
condition of idiocy have been remarkable for memory. 
"I knew a fool, (says a recent writer,) who was placed under 
the charge of a elegyman in the country, as being utterly 
incapable of conducting himself in ordinary matters, (he was 
a young man of fortune, and did not need to work, except for 
his amusement,) and yet he could repeat every word of the 
clergyman's sermon, tell how many people were in the 
church, how any one that sat in a pew named to him was 
dressed, or who did or did not contribute to the poor. He 
could do that for any Sunday, if you gave him any hint of it ; 
last week, or last year, was all the same to him. His mem- 
ory was, in short, as perfect as memory could be ; but then 
he had no judgment in the using of it ; and so, when in com- 
pany, it often made him seem, and not unfrequently made 
other people feel, very ridiculous." * 
Throwing out of the question cases of original malforma- 
tion, such as idiocies, which properly have no place in it, it 
may be said without any hesitation that the connection be- 
tween a strong memory and a weak judgment, is not neces- 
sary, but merely accidental ; that is, is not the constitution 
of nature, but in general the result of circumstances. As it 
is an accidental state of things, and not any thing essential 
and permanent in our mental structure, we must look for its 
appropriate cause in erroneous mental discipline. It may 
well be supposed, that those, who possess strong memories, 
are not insensible of their superiority in this respect ; and 
the approbation, which they have received in consequence 
of it, encourages them to treasure up a dry collection of all 
facts, which will, in any way, bear repetition. Dates, 
names, genealogies, places, local incidents, traditional an- 
ecdotes, are all seized and retained with peculiar avidity. 
But too much intent upon outward incidents, the mere dates, 
names, and forms of things, such persons fail to inquire into 
* Mudie's Popular Guide, Sect. I. MEMORY. 
319 
their true nature ; they neglect other and more important 
forms of mental discipline ; and thus justly sustain the repu- 
tation of possessing a showy, rather than discriminating and 
sound knowledge. In instances of this description, the rela- 
tions, by which the suggested trains of thought are associa- 
ted, are the more slight and obvious ones, such as of time and 
place. But there are some exceptions to this unwise course ; 
individuals may be found, who, with an astonishing ability 
to recall the most unimportant incidents of daily occurrence, 
as well as the dry details of historical facts, combine the far 
more enviable ability of discriminating the true differences of 
things, of combining means for the attainment of ends, and of 
rightly estimating evidence in its various applications ; traits 
of mind, which are certainly to be included among the char- 
acteristics of sound judgment. 
§. 254. Marks of a good memory. 
The great purpose, to which the faculty of memory is 
subservient, is, to enable us to retain the knowledge, which 
we have from our experiences, for future use. The promi- 
nent marks of a good memory, therefore, are these two, viz, 
tenacity in retaining ideas, and readiness in bringing them 
forward on necessary occasions. 
First ; of tenacity or power of retaining ideas.-The im- 
pressions, which are made on some minds, are durable. 
They are like channels worn away in stone, and names en- 
graven in monumental marble, which defy the operation of 
the ordinary causes of decay, and withstand even the defa- 
cing touch of time. But other memories, which at first seem- 
ed to grasp as much, are destitute of this power of retention. 
The inscriptions, made upon them, are like characters writ- 
ten on the sand, which the first breath of wind covers over, 
or like figures on a bank of snow, which the sun shines upon, 
and melts. The inferiority of the latter description of memo- 
ry to the former must be obvious ; so much so as to require 
no comment. A memory, whose power of retaining is great- 
ly diminished, of course loses a great part of its value. 
Second ; of readiness or facility in bringing forward what 
is remembered. Some persons, who cannot be supposed 
to be deficient in tenacity of remembrance, appear to fail, in 320 
MEMORY. 
a confident and prompt command of what they remember. 
Some mistake has been committed in the*arrangement of 
their knowledge ; there has been some defect in the mental 
discipline ; or for some other cause, whatever it may be, 
they often discover perplexity, and remember slowly and in- 
distinctly. This is a great practical evil, which not only 
ought to be, but which can, in a great degree, be guarded 
against. 
It is true, that so great readiness of memory cannot ra- 
tionally be expected in men of philosophic minds as others ; 
for the reason that they pay but little or no attention to par- 
ticular facts, except for the purpose of deducing from them 
general principles. But it is no less true, that, when this 
want of readiness is such as to cause a considerable degree 
of perplexity, it must be regarded a great mental defect. 
And for the same reason a prompt command of knowledge is 
to be regarded a mental excellence. 
255. Directions or rules for the improvement of the memory. 
In whatever point of view the memory may be contem- 
plated, it must be admitted, that it is a faculty always secur- 
ing to us inestimable benefits. For the purpose of securing 
the most efficient action of this valuable faculty, and particu- 
larly that tenacity and readiness, which have been spoken 
of, the following directions may be found worthy of attention. 
(Z.)-Never be satisfied with a partial or half acquaintance with 
things. There is no less a tendency to intellectual, than to 
bodily inactivity ; students, in order to avoid intellectual toil, 
are too much inclined to pass on in a hurried and careless 
manner. This is injurious to the memory. "Nothing, (says 
Dugald Stewart,) has such a tendency to weaken, not only 
the powers of invention, but the intellectual powers in gener- 
al, as a habit of extensive and various reading without re- 
flection." Always make it a rule fully to understand what is 
gone over. Those, who are determined to grapple with the 
subject in hand, whatever may be its nature, and to become 
master of it, soon feel a great interest ; truths, which were 
at first obscure, become clear and familiar. The consequence 
of this increased clearness and interest is an increase of at- 
tention ; and the natural result of this is, that the truths are 
very strongly fixed in the memory. MEMORY. 
321 
(II,)- We are to refer our knowledge, as much as possible, to gener- 
al principles. To refer our knowledge to general principles 
is to classify it ; and this is perhaps the best mode of classifi- 
cation. If a lawyer or merchant were to throw all their pa- 
pers together promiscuously, they could not calculate on 
much readiness in finding what they might at any time want. 
If a man of letters were to record in a common-place book all 
the ideas and facts which occurred to him, without any 
method, he would experience the greatest difficulty in apply- 
ing them to use. It is the same with a memory, where there 
is no classification. Whoever fixes upon some general prin- 
ciple, whether political, literary, or philosophical, and collects 
facts in illustration of it, will find no difficulty in remember- 
ing them, however numerous ; when without such general 
principles the recollection of them would have been extreme- 
ly burdensome. 
(Ill,)-Consider the nature of the study, and make use of those 
helps, which are thus afforded This rule may be illustrated 
by the mention of some departments of science. Thus, in 
acquiring a knowledge of geography, the study is to be pur- 
sued, as much as possible, with the aid of good globes, charts, 
and maps. It requires a great effort of memory, and gener- 
ally an unsuccessful one, to recollect the relative extent and 
situation of places, the numerous physical and political divis- 
ions of the earth from the book. The advantages of study- 
ing geography with maps, globes, &c. are two. (1)-The 
form, relative situation, and extent of countries become, in 
this case, ideas, or rather conceptions of sight; such concep- 
tions, (§. 114,) are very vivid, and are more easily recalled to 
remembrance than others. 
(2) Our remembrances are assisted by the law of contigui- 
ty in place, (§. 222,) which is known to be one of the most 
efficient aids. When we have once, from having a map or 
globe before us, formed an acquaintance with the general 
visible appearance of an island, a gulf, an ocean, or a conti- 
nent, nothing is more easy than to remember the subordinate 
divisions or parts. Whenever we have examined, and fixed 
in our minds the general appearance or outlines of a partic- 
ular country, we do not easily forget the situation of those 
countries, which are contiguous. 322 
MEMORY. 
We find another illustration of this rule in the reading' of 
history. There is such a multitude of facts in historical 
writings, that to endeavor to remember them all is fruitless; 
and if it could be done, would be of very small advantage. 
Hence, in reading the history of any country, fix upon two 
or three of the most interesting epochs ; make them the sub- 
ject of particular attention ; learn the spirit of the age, and 
the private life and fortunes of prominent individuals ; in a 
word, study these periods not only as annalists, but as phi- 
losophers. When they are thus studied, the mind can hard- 
ly fail to retain them ; they will be a sort of landmarks ; and 
all the other events in the history of the country, before and 
afterwards, will naturally arrange themselves in reference to 
them. The memory will strongly seize the prominent pe- 
riods, in consequence of the great interest felt in them ; and 
the less important parts of the history of the country will be 
likely to be retained, so far as is necessary, by the aid of the 
principle of contiguity, and without giving them great atten- 
tion. Further, historical charts or genealogical trees of 
history are of some assistance for a similar reason, that maps, 
globes, &c. are in geography. 
This rule for strengthening the memory will apply also to> 
the more abstract sciences.-"In every science, (says Stew- 
art, Elements, ch. vi, §. 3,) the ideas, about which it is pe- 
culiarly conversant, are connected together by some associa- 
ting principle ; in one science, for instance, by associations 
founded on the relation of cause and effect ; in another, by 
the associations founded on the necessary relations of math- 
ematical truths." ' e* ■ • 
§. 256. Further directions for the improvement of the memory. 
(IV)-The order, in which things are laid up in the memorgy 
should be the order of nature. In nature every thing has its 
appropriate place, connections, and relations. Nothing is 
insulated, and wholly cut off, as it were, from everything 
else ; but whatever exists or takes place falls naturally into 
its allotted position within the great sphere of creation and 
events. Hence the rule, that knowledge, as far forth as pos- 
sible, should exist mentally or subjectively in the same order 
as the corresponding objective reality exists. The laws of MEMORY. 
323 
the mind will be found in their operation to act in harmony 
with the laws of external nature. They are, in some sense, 
the counterparts of each other. We might illustrate the 
benefits of the application of this rule by referring to almost 
any well digested scientific article, historical narration, poem, 
&c. But perhaps its full import will be more readily under- 
stood by an instance of its utter violation. 
A person was one day boasting, in the presence of Foote 
the comedian, of the wonderfid facility, with which he could 
commit any thing to memory, when the modern Aristophanes 
said he would write down a dozen lines in prose, which he 
could not commit to memory in as many minutes. The man 
of great memory accepted the challenge ; a wager was laid, 
and Foote produced the following.-"So she went into the 
garden to cut a cabbage-leaf to make an apple pie ; and at 
the same time a great she-bear, coming up the street, pops 
its head into the shop. What, no soap ? So he died, and 
she very imprudently married the barber ; and there were 
present the Piciniunies, and the Joblillies, and the Garyulies, 
and the grand Panjandrum himself, with the little round but- 
ton at the top ; and they all fell to playing catch as catch 
can, till the gunpowder ran out of the heels of their boots." 
-The story adds that Foote won the wager. And it is very 
evident that statements of this description, utterly disregard- 
ing the order of nature and events, must defy, if carried to 
any great length, the strongest memory. 
(V.)-The memory may be strengthened by exercise. Our 
minds, when left to sloth and inactivity, lose their vigor; 
but when they are kept in exercise, and, after performing 
what was before them, are tasked with new requisitions, it is 
not easy to assign limits to their ability. This seems to be 
a general and ultimate law of our nature. It is applicable 
equally to every original susceptibility, and to every combi- 
nation of mental action. In repeated instances we have had 
occasion to refer to its results both on the body and the mind. 
The power of perception is found to acquire strength and 
acuteness by exercise. There are habits of conception and 
of association, as well as of perception ; and we shall be able 
to detect the existence and operation of the same great prin- 
ciple, when we come to speak of reasoning, imagination, &c. 324 
MEMORY. 
As this principle applies equally to the memory, we are able 
to secure its beneficial results, by practising that repetition 
or exercise, on which they are founded. 
257. Of observance of the truth in connection with memory. 
Another help to the memory, which has seldom been no- 
ticed, and certainly not so much as its importance demands, 
is the conscientious and strict observance of the truth. It 
will be found on inquiry, that those, who are scrupulous in 
this respect, will be more prompt and exact in their recollec- 
tions, within the sphere of what they undertake to remem- 
ber, than others. A man of this description may possibly 
not remember so much as others ; for the same conscientious- 
ness, which is the basis of his veracity, would instinctively 
teach him to reject from his intellectual store house a great 
deal of worthless trash. But within the limits, which for 
good reasons undoubtedly he sets to his recollections, he will 
be much more exact, much more to be relied on, provided 
there is no original or constitutional ground of difference. It 
has been suggested in regard to Dr. Johnson, that his rigid 
attention to veracity, his conscientious determination to be 
exact in his statements, was the reason, in a considerable 
degree, that his memory was so remarkably tenacious and 
minute. And the suggestion is based in sound philosophy. 
If a man's deep and conscientious regard for the truth be 
such, that he cannot consistently with the requisitions of his 
moral nature, repeat to others mere vaguenesses and uncer- 
tainties, he will naturally give such strict and serious atten- 
tion to the present objects of inquiry and knowledge, that 
they will remain in his memory afterwards with remarkable 
distinctness and permanency. 
Among other means of aiding the memory, it is often re- 
commended to commit to writing the knowledge, which we 
acquire. This practice, if not carried too far, so as greatly 
to supersede the direct exercise of the memory, is attended 
with certain advantages, which justify an occasional resort- 
ing to it. (1) Often in the course of a person's opportuni- 
ties of reading and of intercourse with the world, he becomes 
acquainted with facts, with which he is unwilling to burden 
§. 258. Of committing to writing as a means of aiding memory. MEMORY, 
325 
his memory, and which he is equally unwilling to lose. Here 
it is proper to resort to this method, which, at the same time, 
leaves the memory free for other subjects, and retains what 
may be found at some future period important. (2) In the 
progress of a person's experience and investigations, he ar- 
rives at certain important conclusions ; for in literature, and 
in the departments of science, and in the philosophy of hu- 
man conduct, there are certain principles to be ascertained, 
which hold a first rank, and exert their influence on all collat- 
eral inquiries. The means or process, by which he arrived 
at them, is permitted to fade away from the mind, because 
he has no desire to remember it. But it may often be found 
desirable to call in the aid of writing in order to prevent the 
possibility of a like result with those important principles, 
which' he has established with no small labor. These occa- 
sional records will not only secure the great truths he has 
gained ; but will furnish land-marks of the gradual develope- 
ment of the mind, and profitable intimations concerning the 
laws, by which it is governed. 
§. 259. Of mnemonics or systems of artificial memory. 
We shall conclude these suggestions on the subject of 
aiding and improving the memory, by a remark or two on 
the method or system of mnemonics. By a system of 
mnemonics or of artificial memory is meant "a method of 
connecting in the mind things difficult to be remembered, 
with things easily remembered, so as to enable it to retain 
and recollect the former by means of the latter." The 
things easy to be remembered are short and simple verses, 
or the walls or compartments of a room, or grotesque pic- 
tures, and the like. Important facts are to be connected with 
these, in the expectation that the former will be remember- 
ed because the latter are. 
It is no doubt possible to give a temporary aid to the 
memory by such arbitrary arrangements ; by associating our 
ideas with a set of sounds, places, and images. Such assis- 
tance may occasionally be of some advantage to public 
speakers, and to persons, who are called to remember a large 
number of insulated facts. But there is reason to fear that 
the benefit is more than counterbalanced by burdening and 326 
MEMORY. 
distracting the memory with what is allowedly frivolous and 
perhaps ridiculous. However this may be, it is generally 
admitted to be the fact, that those systems, that are propos- 
ed for use at the present time, are too complicated for plans, 
which profess to render the acquisition of knowledge more 
easy. They can never be adopted into general use, unless 
they are rendered more simple ; nor do we apprehend, that 
a person, who follows the rules for strengthening and apply- 
ing the memory, which have been laid down in this chapter, 
will stand greatly in need of any other helps in recollecting 
most things, that will be useful and important. 
CHAPTER NINTH. 
DURATION OF MEMORY. 
§. 260. Restoration of thoughts and feelings, supposed to be forgotten. 
Before quitting the subject of Memory, there is another 
point of view, not wholly wanting in interest, in which it is 
susceptible of being considered ; and that is the permanency 
or duration of its power to call up its past experiences. It is 
said to have been an opinion of Lord Bacon, that no thoughts 
are lost, that they continue virtually to exist, and that the 
soul possesses within itself laws, which, whenever fully 
brought into action, will be found capable of producing the 
prompt and perfect restoration of the collected acts and feel- 
ings of its whole past existence. 
This opinion, which other able writers have fallen in 
with, is clearly worthy of examination, especially when we 
consider, that it has a practical bearing, and involves impor- 
tant moral and religious consequences. Some one will per- 
haps inquire, is it possible, is it in the nature of things, that 
we should be able to recall the million of little acts and feel- 
ings, which have transpired in the whole course of our lives ? 
Let such an inquirer be induced to consider, in the first place, DURATION OF MEMORY. 
327 
that the memory has its fixed laws, in virtue of which the 
mental exercises are recalled ; and that there can be found 
no direct and satisfactory proof of such laws ever wholly 
ceasing to exist. That the operation of those laws appears 
to be weakened, and is in fact weakened, by lapse of time, is 
admitted ; but while the frequency, promptness, and strength 
of their action may be diminished in any assignable degree, 
the laws themselves yet remain. This is the view of the 
subject, which at first obviously and plainly presents itself; 
and we may venture to add, is recommended by common ex- 
perience. 
It is known to every one, that thoughts and feelings 
sometimes unexpectedly recur, which had slumbered in for- 
getfulness for years. Days and months and years have roll- 
ed on ; new scenes and situations occupy us ; and all we felt 
and saw and experienced in those former days and years ap- 
pears to be clothed in impenetrable darkness. But suddenly 
some unexpected event, the sight of a waterfall, of a forest, 
of a house, a peculiarly pleasant and gloomy day, a mere 
change of countenance, a word, almost any thing we can im- 
agine, arouses the soul and gives a new and vigorous turn to 
its meditations. At such a moment we are astonished at the 
novel revelations which are made, the recollections which 
are called forth, the resurrection of withered hopes and per- 
ished sorrows, of scenes and companionships, that seemed to 
be utterly lost. 
"Lulled in the countless chambers of the brain, 
"Our thoughts are linked by many a hidden chain. 
"Awake but one, and lo, what myriads rise! 
"Each stamps its image, as the other flies. 
This is perhaps a faint exhibition of that perfect restora- 
tion of thought, which Bacon and other philosophic minds 
have supposed to be possible. But, if the statement be cor- 
rect, it is undoubtedly one circumstance among others in sup- 
port of that sentiment, although of subordinate weight. 
§. 261. Mental action quickened by influence on the physical system. 
The ability of the mind to restore its past experiences de- 
pends, in some degree, on the state of the physical system. 
It is well known that there is a connection existing between 328 
DURATION OF MEMORY. 
the mind and the body, and that a reciprocal influence is ex- 
ercised. It is undoubtedly true, that the mental action is or- 
dinarily increased or diminished, according1 as the body is 
more or less affected. And may not the exercise of the laws 
of memory be quickened, as well as the action of other pow- 
ers ? While it is admitted, that an influence on the body 
exerts an influence on the mind, may it not be true, that 
this general influence sometimes takes the particular shape of 
exciting the recollection, and of restoring long past events? 
There are various facts having a bearing, on this inquiry, 
and which seem to show, that such suggestions are not whol- 
ly destitute of foundation. It appears, for instance, from 
the statements of persons, who have been on the point of 
drowning, but have been rescued from that situation, that 
the operations of their minds were peculiarly quickened. In 
this wonderful activity of the mental principle, the whole 
past life, with its thousand minute incidents, has almost sim- 
ultaneously passed before them, and been viewed as in a 
mirror. Scenes and situations long gone by, and associates 
not seen for years, and perhaps buried and dissolved in the 
grave, came rushing in upon the field of intellectual vision, 
in all the activity and distinctness of real existence. 
If such be the general experience in cases of this kind, it 
confirms a number of important views; placing beyond 
doubt, that there is a connection between the mind and bo- 
dy ; that the mental operation is susceptible of being quick- 
ened ; and that such increase of action may be attributable, 
in part at least, to an influence on the body. The proximate 
cause of the great accelleration of the intellectual acts, in ca- 
ses of drowning, appears to be, (as will be found to be the 
fact in many other similar cases,) an affection of the brain. 
That is to say ; in consequence of the suspension of respira- 
tion, the blood is prevented from readily circulating through 
the lungs, and hence becomes accumulated in the brain. It 
would seem, that the blood is never thrown into the brain in 
unusual quantities without being attended with unusual men- 
tal affections. 
§. 262. Other instances of quickened mental action and of a restoration 
of thoughts. 
The doctrine, which has been proposed, that the mental DURATION Ob' MEMORY. 
329 
action may be quickened, and that there may be a restora- 
tion or remembrance of all former thoughts or feelings, is 
undoubtedly to be received or rejected in view of facts. The 
only question in this case as in others is, What is truth ? 
And how are we to arrive at the truth ? 
If the facts, which have been referred to, be not enough 
to enable one to form an opinion, there are others of a like 
tendency, and in a less uncertain form. A powerful disease, 
while at sometimes it prostrates the mind, at others imparts 
to it a more intense action. The following passage from a 
recent work, (although the cause of the mental excitement, 
in the instance mentioned in it, is not stated,) may properly 
be appealed to in this connection. " Past feelings, even 
should they be those of our earliest moments of infancy, nev- 
er cease to be under the influence of the law of association, 
and they are constantly liable to be renovated, even to the 
latest period of life, although they may be in so faint a state 
as not to be the object of consciousness. 
It is evident then, that a cause of mental excitement may 
so act upon a sequence of extremely faint feelings, as to ren- 
der ideas, of which the mind had long been previously un- 
conscious, vivid objects of consciousness. Thus it is record- 
ed of a female in France, that while she was subjected to 
such an influence, the memory of the Aniorican language, 
which she hadlost since she was a child, suddenly returned."* 
§. 263. Effect oa the memory of a severe attack of fever. 
We may add here the following account of the mental af- 
fections of an intelligent American traveller. He was travel- 
ling in the State of Illinois, and suffered the common lot of 
visitants from other climates, in being taken down with a bil- 
ious fever. "As very few live, (he remarks.) to record 
the issue of a sickness like mine, and as you have requested 
me, and as I have promised to be particular, I will relate 
some of the circumstances of this disease. And it is in my 
view desirable in the bitter agony of such diseases, that more 
of the symptoms, sensations, and sufferings should be record- 
ed than have been ; and that others, in similar predicaments, 
* Hibbert's Philosophy of Apparitions, Pt. IV, Chap. 5. 330 
DURATION OF MEMORY. 
may know, that some before them have had sufferings like 
theirs, and have survived them. 
"I had had a fever before, and had risen and been dressed 
every day. But in this, with the first day, I was prostrated 
to infantile weakness, and felt with its first attack, that it 
was a thing very different from what I had yet experienced. 
Paroxysms of derangement occurred the third day, and this 
was to me a new state of mind. That state of disease, in 
which partial derangement is mixed with a consciousness 
generally sound, and a sensibility preternaturally excited, I 
should suppose the most distressing of all its forms. At the 
same time that I was unable to recognize my friends, I was 
informed, that my memory was more than ordinarily exact and reten- 
tive^ and that I repeated whole passages in the different languages, 
which I knew, with entire accuracy. I recited, without losing or mis- 
placing a word, a passage of poetry, which I could not so repeat, after 
I had recovered my health," tyc. * 
§. 264. Approval and illustrations of these views of Coleridge. 
An opinion, favorable to the doctrine of the durability of 
memory, and the ultimate restoration of thought and feeling, 
is expressed in the Biographia Literaria of Coleridge, in an 
article on the Laws of association. In confirmation of it, the 
writer introduces a statement of certain facts, which became 
known to him in a tour in Germany in 1798, to the following 
effect. 
In a Catholic town of Germany, a young woman of four 
or five and twenty, who could neither read nor write, was 
seized with a nervous fever, during which she was incessant- 
ly talking Greek, Latin, and Hebrew, with much pomp and 
distinctness of enunciation. The case attracted much atten- 
tion, and many sentences, which she uttered, being taken 
down by some learned persons present, were found to be co- 
herent and intelligible, each for itself, but with little or no 
connection with each other. Of the Hebrew only a small 
portion could be traced to the Bible ; the remainder was that 
form of Hebrew, which is usually called Rabbinic. Ignorant, 
and simple, and harmless, as this young woman was known 
to be, no one suspected any deception ; and no explanation 
* Flint's Recollections of the Valley of Mississippi, Letter 14. DURATION OF MEMORY. 
331 
could for a longtime be given, although inquiries were made 
for that purpose, in different families, where she had resided, 
as a servant. 
Through the zeal, however, and philosophical spirit of a 
young physician, all the necessary information was in the 
end obtained. The woman was of poor parents, and at nine 
years of age had been kindly taken to be brought up by an 
old Protestant minister who lived at some distance. He was 
a very learned man ; being not only a great Hebraist, but ac- 
quainted also with Rabbinical writings, the Greek and Latin 
Fathers, &c. The passages, which had been taken down in 
the delirious ravings of the young woman, were found by the 
physician precisely to agree with passages in some books in 
those languages, which had formerly belonged to him. But 
these facts were not a full explanation of the case. It ap- 
peared on further inquiry, that the patriarchal protestant 
had been in the habit for many years of walking up and 
down a passage of his house, into which the kitchen door 
opened, and to read to himself with a loud voice, out of his 
favorite books. This attracted the notice of the poor and ig- 
norant domestic, whom he had taken into his family ; the 
passages made an impression on her memory ; and although 
probably for a long time beyond the reach of her recollection 
when in health, they were at last vividly restored, and were 
uttered in the way above-mentioned, in consequence of the 
feverish state of the physical system ; particularly of the 
brain. 
From this instance and from several others of the same 
kind, which Mr. Coleridge asserts can be brought up, he is 
inclined to educe the following positions or inferences. 
(1) Our thoughts may, for an indefinite time, exist in the same 
order, in which they existed originally, and in a latent or im- 
perceptible state. (2) As a feverish state of the brain, 
(and of course any other peculiarity in the bodily condition,) 
cannot create thought itself, nor make any approximation to 
it, but can only operate as an excitement or quickener to the 
intellectual principle; it is, therefore, probable, that all 
thoughts are, in themselves, imperishable. (3) In order 
greatly to increase the power of the intellect, he supposes it 
would require only a different organization of its material ac- 332 
DURATION OF MEMORY. 
companiment. (4) And, therefore, he concludes the book 
of final judgment, which, the Scriptures inform us, will at the 
last day be presented before the individuals of the human 
race may be no other, than the investment of the soul with 
a celestial instead of a terrestrial body ; and that this may be 
sufficient to restore the perfect record of the multitude of its 
past experiences. He supposes, it may be altogether consis- 
tent with the nature of a living spirit, that heaven and earth 
should sooner pass away, than that a single act, or thought, 
should be loosened and effectually struck off from the great 
chain of its operations. In giving these conclusions, the 
exact language of the writer has not been followed, but the 
statement made will be found to give what clearly seems to 
have been his meaning. 
§. 265. Applications of the principles of this chapter to education. 
Whether the considerations, which have been brought 
forward, lead satisfactorily to the conclusion of the duration 
of memory and of the possible restoration of all mental exer- 
cises, must of course be submitted to each one's private judg- 
ment. But on the supposition that they do, it must occur to 
every one that certain practical applications closely connect 
themselves with this subject. The principle in question 
has, among other things, a bearing on the education of the 
young ; furnishing a new reason for the utmost circumspec- 
tion in conducting it. The term education, in application to 
the human mind, is very extensive ; it includes the example 
and advice of parents, and the influence of associates, as well 
as more direct and formal instruction. Now if the doctrine 
under consideration be true, it follows that a single remark 
of a profligate and injurious tendency, made by a parent or 
some other person in the presence of a child, though forgot- 
ten and neglected at the time, may be suddenly and vividly 
recalled some twenty, thirty or even forty years after. It 
may be restored to the mind by a multitude of unforeseen cir- 
cumstances, and even those of the most trifling kind ; and 
even at the late period, when the voice, that uttered it, is si- 
lent in the grave, may exert a most pernicious influence. It 
may lead to unkindness ; it may be seized and cherished as 
a justification of secret moral and religious delinquencies ; it DURATION OF MEMORY. 
333 
may prompt to a violation of public laws ; and in a multitude 
of ways conduct to sin, to ignominy, and wretchedness. 
Great care, therefore, ought to be taken, not to utter unadvi- 
sed, false, and evil sentiments in the hearing of the young, in 
the vain expectation that they will do no hurt, because they 
will be speedily and irrecoverably lost. 
And for the same reason, great care and pains should be 
taken to introduce truth into the mind, and all correct moral 
and religious principles. Suitably impress, on the mind of a 
child, the existence of a God and his parental authority ; 
teach the pure and benevolent outlines of the Redeemer's 
character, and the great truths and hopes of the Gospel; and 
these instructions form essential links in the grand chain of 
memory, which no change of circumstances, nor lapse of time, 
nor combination of power can ever wholly strike out. They 
have their place assigned them; and though they may be 
concealed, they cannot be obliterated. They may perhaps 
cease to exercise their appropriate influence, and not be re- 
called for years ; the pressure of the business and of the 
cares of life may have driven them out from every prominent 
position, and buried them for a time. But the period of their 
resurrection is always at hand ; although it may not be pos- 
sible for the limited knowledge of man to detect the signs of 
it. Perhaps in the hour of temptation to crime, they come 
forth like forms and voices from the dead, and with more 
than their original freshness and power ; perhaps in the hour 
of misfortune, in the prison-house, or in the land of banish- 
ment, they pay their visitations, and impart a consolation, 
which nothing else could have supplied ; they come with the 
angel tones of parental reproof and love, and preserve the 
purity, and check the despondency of the soul. 
§. 266. Connection of this doctrine with the final judgment & a future life. 
There remains one remark more, of a practical nature, to 
be made. The views, which have been proposed in re- 
spect to the ultimate restoration of all mental experiences, 
may be regarded as in accordance with the Divine Word. 
It may be safely affirmed, that no mental principle, which, on 
a fair interpretation, is laid down in that sacred book, will be 
found to be at variance with the common experience of man- 334 
DURATION OF MEMORY. 
kind. The doctrine of the Bible, in respect to a future judg- 
ment, may well be supposed to involve considerations, rela- 
tive to man's intellectual and moral condition. In various 
passages, the Scriptures plainly and explicitly teach, that 
the Savior in the last day shall judge the world, and that all 
shall be judged according to the deeds done in the body, 
whether they be good or whether they be evil. But an ob- 
jection has sometimes been raised of this sort, that we can 
never feel the justice of that decision, without a knowledge of 
our whole past life, on which it is founded, and that this is 
impossible. It was probably this objection, that Mr. Cole- 
ridge had in view, when he proposed the opinion, that the 
clothing of the soul with a celestial, instead of a terrestrial 
body, would be sufficient to restore the perfect record of its 
past experiences. 
In reference to this objection to the scriptural doctrine of 
a final judgment, the remark naturally presents itself, that it 
seems to derive its plausibility chiefly from an imperfect view 
of the constitution of the human mind. It is thought, that 
we cannot be conscious of our whole past life, because it is 
utterly forgotten, and is, therefore, wholly irrecoverable. 
But the truth seems to be, that nothing is wholly forgotten ; 
the probability, that we shall be able to recall our past 
thoughts, may be greatly diminished, but it does not become 
wholly extinct. The power of reminiscence slumbers, but 
does not die. At the Judgment-day, we are entirely at liberty 
to suppose from what we know of the mind, that it will 
awake, that it will summon up thought and feeling from its 
hidden recesses, and will clearly present before us the perfect 
form and representation of the past. 
"Each fainter trace, that memory holds 
"So darkly of departed years, 
"In one broad glance the soul beholds, 
"And all, that was, at once .appears. CHAPTER TENTH. 
REASONING. 
Leaving the consideration of the memory, we are next to 
examine the power of Reasoning ; a subject of inquiry abun- 
dantly interesting in itself, and also in consequence of its be- 
ing one of the leading and fruitful sources of Internal knowl- 
edge. For our knowledge of the operations of this faculty, 
we are indebted, as was seen in a former chapter, to Con- 
sciousness, which gives us our direct knowledge of all other 
mental acts. But it will be remarked, that Reasoning is not 
identical with, or involved in Consciousness. If conscious- 
ness gives us a knowledge of the act of reasoning, the rea- 
soning power, operating within its own limits and in its own 
right, gives us a knowledge of other things. It is a source 
of perceptions and knowledge, which we probably could not 
possess in any other way. 
Without the aid of Original Suggestion, it does not appear, 
how we could have a knowledge of our existence ; without 
Consciousness we should not have a knowledge of our men- 
tal operations ; without Relative Suggestion or Judgment, 
which is also a distinct source of knowledge, there would be 
no Reasoning ; and, unassisted by Reasoning, we could have 
no knowledge of the relations of those things, which cannot 
be compared without the aid of intermediate propositions. 
The reasoning power accordingly is to be regarded as a new 
and distinct fountain of thought, which, as compared with 
the other sources of knowledge just mentioned, opens itself 
still further in the recesses of the Internal Intellect; and as 
§. 267. Reasoning a source of ideas and knowledge. 336 
REASONING. 
it is later in its developement, so it comes forth with propor- 
tionally greater efficiency. Accordingly Degerando, in his 
treatise entitled De la Generation des Connoissances, expressly 
and very justly remarks, after having spoken of judgment or 
Relative Suggestion asa distinct source of knowledge ; "The 
Reasoning faculty also serves to enrich us with ideas ; for 
there are many relations so complicated or remote, that one 
act of judgment is not sufficient to discover them. A series 
of judgments or process of reasoning is therefore necessary." 
But we would not be understood to limit the results of 
reasoning, considered as a distinct source of knowledge, to a 
few simple conceptions, such as the discovery, in a given 
case, of the mere relation of agreement or disagreement. It 
sustains the higher office of bringing to light the great princi- 
ples and hidden truths of nature ; it reveals to the inquisitive 
and delighted mind a multitude of fruitful and comprehensive 
views, which could not otherwise be obtained; and invests 
men, and nature, and events, with a new character. 
§. 268. Illustrations of the value of the reasoning power. 
The suggestions at the close of the last section are worthy 
of being considered in some particulars. It may be remark- 
ed, therefore, that the value of the Reasoning power is par- 
ticularly discoverable in two things, viz, in its flexibility, and 
in its growth or expansion. 
(1) When we speak of the flexibility of the reasoningpow- 
er, we mean to intimate the facility and perfect fitness, with 
which it can apply itself to the numerous and almost infinite- 
ly varied subjects of our knowledge. This remark is perhaps 
susceptible of illustration, by a slight reference to the instincts 
of the lower animals. Such instincts, according to the usual 
understanding of their nature, imply an original and invaria- 
ble tendency to do certain things, without previous fore- 
thought and deliberation. Accordingly it has been observed, 
that a bird, which has always been confined in a cage, will 
build, when suitable materials are furnished it, a nest precise- 
ly similar to those of its own kind in the woods. It places 
with the greatest ingenuity the sticks, leaves, and clay of its 
frail dwelling, without going through a long process of pre- 
vious training, and without incurring a debt to others for REASONING, 
337 
their assistance. But the instinct, in this and other analo- 
gous cases, is limited to its one definite object ; it discovers 
an utter inflexibility neither varying the mode of its action, 
nor extending its range so as to include other objects. 
But the reasoning faculty, altogether different in this par- 
ticular, applies itself to almost every thing. It is not easy 
to designate and limit the vast number of objects in nature, 
in events, and individual conduct, where it furnishes its aid 
and secures the most beneficial results. It is an instrument 
equally fitted to investigate things that are most diverse ; the 
mysteries of the mechanical arts and the problems of politi- 
cal philosophy ; the growth of a plant or flower, and the ob- 
scurities of the human intellect. 
(2) The excellency of the reasoning power is seen also in 
its expansion and growth. Instinct appears to be full and 
perfect at the very first opportunity of its exercise, but there 
are no such restricted bounds to reasoning. Though weak 
at first, it is endlessly progressive. It is seen distinctly at 
work in the child, that frames his miniature house of small 
sticks and blocks ; and in the architect, whose scientific 
views and exquisite labors have resulted in forming edifices, 
that attract a nation's admiration. It is discovered, in its in- 
cipient efforts, in the regulation of the sports of childhood ; 
but without changing the elements of its nature, it gradually 
enlarges itself to the capability of administering the affairs 
of an empire. 
§. 269. Definition of reasoning, and of propositions. 
Reasoning may be defined the mental process or opera- 
tion, whereby we deduce conclusions from two or more prop- 
ositions premised. A train of reasoning may be regarded, 
therefore, as a whole ; and as such, it is made up of separate 
and subordinate parts. These elementary parts are usually 
termed propositions ; and before we can proceed with ad- 
vantage in the further consideration of reasoning, it is neces- 
sary to go into a brief explanation of them. 
A proposition has been defined to be a verbal representa- 
tion of some perception, act, or affection of the mind. Ac- 
cordingly when we speak of a Proposition, we are usually 
understood to mean some mental perception or combination 338 
REASONING. 
of perceptions, expressed and laid out before us in words- 
Although such seems to be the ordinary meaning of the term, 
we may admit the possibility of propositions existing wholly 
in the mind, without being expressed in words. Mr. Locke 
expressly speaks of mental propositions, or those states of 
mind, where two or more ideas are combined together, pre- 
vious to their being embodied and set forth in the forms of 
language. 
The parts of the proposition are, (1) The subject, or 
that concerning which something is either asserted, or de- 
nied, commanded, or inquired ; (2) The predicate, or that 
which is asserted, denied, commanded, or inquired concern- 
ing the subject ; (3) The copula, by which the two other 
parts are connected. In these two propositions, 
Csesar was brave, 
Men are fallible, 
Men and Cues ar are the subjects ; fallible and brave are the 
predicates ; are and mas are the copulas. 
Propositions have been divided,-(1) Into simple or those,, 
whose subject and predicate are composed of single words, as 
in this, 
Benevolence is commendable ; 
(2) Into complex, or those, where the subject and predi- 
cate consist of a number of words, as in this, 
Faithfulness in religion is followed by peace of mind ; 
(3) Into modal, where the copula is qualified by some 
word or words, representing the manner or possibility of the 
agreement or discrepancy between the subject and predicate,, 
as in these, 
Men of learning can exert an influence ; 
Wars may sometimes be just. 
Propositions, more or less involved, are necessary parts 
in every process of reasoning. They may be compared to 
the separate and disjointed blocks of marble, which are des- 
tined to enter into the formation of some edifice ; the comple- 
ted process of reasoning is the edifice; the propositions are 
the materials. 
§. 270. Process of the mind in all cases of reasoning. 
Leaving the consideration of its subordinate parts or ele- 
ments, we are further to consider the general nature of rea- REASONING. 
339 
soning; in other words, we are to examine the character of 
the complex mental process involved in that term. The 
definition given of reasoning, it will be remembered, was, 
That it is the mental process, by which we deduce conclu- 
sions from two or more propositions premised. Hence there 
will be in every such process a succession of propositions, 
never less than two, and often a much greater number. 
The propositions often follow each other with much regular- 
ity ; and hence not unfrequently we consider the arrange- 
ment of them as entirely arbitrary. But this is a mistaken 
supposition. It is true, when a number of ideas or proposi- 
tions are presented nearly at the same time, the mind puts 
forth a volition, or exercises choice, in selecting one idea or 
proposition in preference to another. But the ideas or prop- 
ositions, from which the choice is made, and without the 
presence of which it could not be made, are not brought into 
existence by a direct volition, and, therefore, mere arbitrary 
creations ; but are suggested by the laws of association. 
As an illustration we will suppose an argument on the jus- 
tice and expediency of capital punishments in ordinary cases. 
The disputant first denies in general terms the right, which 
social combinations have assumed of capitally punishing of- 
fences of a slight nature. But before considering the cases 
he has particularly in view, he remarks on the right of capi- 
tal punishment for murder ; and admits, we will suppose, 
that the principle of self defence gives such a right. He then 
takes up the case of stealing, and contends, that we have no 
right to punish the thief with death, because no such right is 
given by the laws of nature ; for, before the formation of the 
civil compact, the institution of property, as a matter of civil 
and judicial regulation, was not known. He then considers 
the nature of civil society, and contends, that, in the forma- 
tion of the social compact, no such extraordinary power, as 
that of putting to death for stealing or other crimes of similar 
aggravation, could have been implied in that compact, be- 
cause it never was possessed by those, who formed it, &c. 
Here is an argument, made up of a number of propositions, 
and carried on, as may be supposed, to a very considerable 
length. And in this argument, as in all others, every propo- 
sition is, in the first instance, suggested by the laws of asso- 340 
REASONING. 
ciation ; it is not at all a matter of arbitrary volition. The 
disputant first states the inquiry in general terms ; he then 
considers the particular case of murder ; the crime of theft is 
next considered ; and this is examined, first, in reference to 
natural law, and, afterwards, in reference to civil law. 
And this consecution of propositions takes place in essential- 
ly the same way, as when the sight of a stranger in the 
crowd suggests the image of an old friend, and the friend 
suggests the village of his residence, and the village suggests 
an ancient ruin in its neighborhood, and the ruin suggests 
warriors and battles of other days. It is true, that other 
propositions may have been suggested at the same time, and 
the disputant may have had his choice between them, but 
this was all the direct voluntary power, which he possessed. 
A number of propositions are presented to the mind by the 
principles of association ; the person, who carries on the pro- 
cess of reasoning, makes his selection among them. But it 
is reasonable to inquire, How it happens, that there is such a 
suitableness or agreement in the propositions, as they are 
successively adopted into the train of reasoning ? And this 
seems to be no other than to inquire into the circumstances, 
under which the choice of them is made, or the grounds of 
the selection. 
Let it be considered, then, that in all arguments, whether 
moral or demonstrative, there is some general subject, on 
which the evidence is made to bear ; there is some point in 
particular to be examined. In reference to these general 
outlines we have a prevailing and permanent desire. This 
desire is not only a great help in giving quickness and strength 
to the laws of association ; but exercises also a very consid- 
erable indirect influence in giving an appropriate character 
to the thoughts, which are suggested by those laws. Hence 
the great body of the propositions, which are at such times 
brought up, will be found to have a greater or less reference 
to the general subject. These are all very rapidly compared 
by the mind with those outlines, in regard to which its feel- 
ings of desire are exercised, or with what we usually term 
the point to be proved. Here the mind, in the exercise of that 
271. Grounds of the selection of propositions. REASONING. 
341 
susceptibility of feelings of relation, which we have already 
seen it to possess, immediately discovers the suitableness or 
want of suitableness, the agreement or want of agreement 
of the propositions presented to it, to the general subject. 
This perception of agreement or disagreement, which is one 
of those relative feelings, of which the mind is from its very 
nature held to be susceptible, exists as an ultimate fact in our 
mental constitution. AH, that can profitably be said in rela- 
tion to it, is the mere statement of the fact, and of the cir- 
cumstances, under which it is found to exist.-Those propo- 
sitions, which are judged by the mind, in the exercise of that 
capacity which its Creator has given it, to possess a congrui- 
ty or agreement with the general subject or point to be prov- 
ed, are permitted by it to enter in, as continuous parts of the 
argument. And in this way a series of propositions rises up, 
all having reference to one ultimate purpose, regular, appro- 
priate, and in their issue laying the foundation of the differ- 
ent degrees of assent.-This explanation will apply not only 
to the supposed argument in the last section, which is an in- 
stance of moral reasoning, but will hold good essentially of 
all other instances of whatever kind. The difference in the 
various kinds of reasoning consists less in the mental process, 
than in the nature of the subjects compared together, and in 
the conditions attending them. 
§. 272. Reasoning implies the existence of antecedent or assumed 
propositions. 
In attempting to give some explanation of the reasoning 
power, it is to be remarked further, that reasoning, both in 
its inception and its prosecution, has this characteristic, that 
it necessarily proceeds, in a great degree, upon assumptions. 
As every deductive process implies a comparison of proposi- 
tions, there must of course be some propositions given, by 
the aid of which the comparison is prosecuted. There must 
be something assumed as known, by means of which to find 
out what is unknown. Accordingly assumed propositions, 
(either those which are known to be true, or for the purpo- 
ses of argument are regarded as such,) are always found at 
the commencement of the series ; and they are also introdu- 
ced frequently in its progress, particularly in Moral reason- 
ing. But the propositions, which are assumed, are not al- 342 
REASONING. 
ways expressed ; especially those, which, from the circum- 
stances of their being representative of elementary convictions 
of the understanding, are denominated primary truths. 
(See Chap. I. of the Introduction.) " In every process of 
reasoning, (says Abercrombie,) we proceed by founding one 
step upon another which has gone before it ; and when we 
trace such a process backwards, we must arrive at certain 
truths, which are recognized as fundamental, requiring no 
proof and admitting of none." 
But when we say, that reasoning proceeds upon assump- 
tions, it does not necessarily follow, that it proceeds upon 
propositions, which are unknown or doubtful. The proposi- 
tions, which are referred to, are assumed in reference to the 
reasoning power, and not in reference to other sources of 
knowledge, which the understanding possesses besides rea- 
soning. Whatever things are known by Original Suggestion, 
whatever are known by Consciousness, or by the direct com- 
munication of the Senses, or by undoubted Memory or Testi- 
mony, as they cannot be made clearer by reasoning, but ful- 
ly command our belief of themselves, are at once adopted by 
reasoning into its own processes, and employed as helps in 
eliciting the remote and unperceived truths, which it is in 
search of. But, as has been intimated, this adoption is not 
always a formal and acknowledged one ; but often silently, 
and by implication. No one would think of formally and re- 
peatedly enunciating, as he advances in an argument, the 
truth of his own existence, or of his personal identity ; and 
not much more would he think of enunciating that every ef- 
fect has its cause, or that nature is uniform in her operations, 
or that a combination of means conspiring to a particular end 
indicates intelligence ; truths, which are so essential and fa- 
miliar to the human intellect, that we daily base the most 
important conclusions upon them, while at the same time we 
scarcely think of their existence. 
§. 273. Of reasoning a priori. 
There are various methods of conducting ratiocination. 
One method of reasoning, for instance, is termed a priori. 
A priori reasoning, is that, whereby an effect is proved from 
a cause, whether that cause be directly proximate, or be re- REASONING. 
343 
mote. For instance, a nation is possessed of a well-ordered 
government and wise rulers. And we infer a priori, that 
justice will be carefully administered, and that there will be 
a high degree of harmony, security, and prosperity among 
the people. 
Under the results of this form of reasoning may be em- 
braced also any conclusion, which is ascertained and proved 
by something previously existing, whether such antecedent 
be a cause, in the proper sense of the term, or possess mere- 
ly an accidental priority. It embraces also those cases, 
where, in view of the correspondence and adaptation of 
things, which we so generally witness in the universe, we 
are impelled, by the consideration of the nature of one thing, 
to believe in the existence of something else corresponding 
to it. One of the various arguments, which has a bearing 
on the existence of God, is of this description. It is to this 
effect. We are so constituted that we naturally and neces- 
sarily form certain ideas, such as the ideas of space, time, 
and infinity ; and by the aid of these, we frame the addition- 
al ideas of unlimited space, and unlimited time, or immensity 
and eternity. These conceptions are Absolute or Uncondi- 
tioned ; in other words, we cannot possibly conceive of 
the opposite ; we cannot conceive of a state of things, where 
time and space are not ; so that in view of the human in- 
tellect, there is, and necessarily must be, both an eternity 
of duration, and illimitability of space ; which, however, we 
commonly express by the single terms, eternity and immen- 
sity. Nor are we at liberty to suppose, that the human in- 
tellect is deceived as to the results involved in the formation 
of these conceptions ; in other words, we are not at liberty 
to suppose, that it is led by its very constitution to form con- 
ceptions of what does not exist, and to which there is noth- 
ing corresponding. So that we may regard ourselves as fully 
and legitimately possessed of the fact or reality of eternity, 
and also of immensity or boundless space. It is obvious, that 
in this way we possess the knowledge of a state of things, 
which is adapted, and adapted exclusively to the nature of 
God. We naturally inquire, why should there be eternity, 
without an Eternal Being, of whom eternity is predicable ? 
Why should there be immensity of space, without an Omni- 344 
REASONING. 
present Being, who may occupy it? If there be no God, 
but nothing but limited finite beings, then there is, compara- 
tively speaking, an infinity of time and of space, which is un- 
occupied and unavailable. But as this is inconsistent with 
that harmony and adaptation of things, which we witness in 
every other case, we are led to infer a priori, that there is, 
and must be a God. 
A priori reasoning is more frequently made use of, than 
any where else, in the mathematics, and in all cases of de- 
monstration. The definitions, which are given, embrace 
general truths, from which other truths are evolved or 
brought out by a successive comparison of propositions. We 
say, for instance that a square is a figure, which has all its 
sides equal, and all its angles right angles. In this definition, 
there is not only involved equality of sides, but equality of 
angles. And it is evident, that if the definition were altered, 
and were so restricted as to exclude the notion of equality of 
angles, many properties, which are now demonstrated of the 
square would be unsusceptible of proof. In other words, 
(and it is the same of other analogous cases,) such proper- 
ties are deduced by an a priori process from the general no- 
tions involved in the definition of a square. 
§. 274. Of reasoning a posteriori. 
Another method of reasoning is termed a posteriori. A 
posteriori reasoning is that, by which either a cause is prov- 
ed from an effect ; or in more general terms, by which a con- 
clusion is proved by something posterior in time, whether it 
be properly an effect or not. For instance, (reversing one of 
the illustrations in the last section,) if justice is not properly 
administered among the people, and if discord and insecurity 
prevail, we infer a posteriori, that there is a deficiency in 
the constitution of the country or in the rulers, or in both.- 
It is narrated of Aristippus, the Cyreniac, that he was once 
shipwrecked on an unknown coast. As he was there wan- 
dering about on the desert shore, he discovered some geom- 
etrical diagrams traced in the sand. He immediately called 
out to his companions to be of good courage, as he saw the 
traces and evidences of human beings. In other words, rea- 
soning a posteriori or from effects to causes, and combining REASONING. 
345 
with that process the general principle, that a combination 
of means conspiring to a particular end indicates design, he 
did not hesitate to infer from what he had discovered, that 
the country either was, or had been inhabited. 
The a priori process, as we have already had occasion to 
see, is sometimes employed in proving the existence of God ; 
but still more frequently, and probably to better effect, the 
method of reasoning a posteriori. The idea of God is not 
simple but complex ; embracing in particular the two great 
elements of intelligence and power. Accordingly, in endea- 
voring to prove his existence from the works of nature, we 
assume, on the ground of their being original and necessary 
suggestions of the human intellect, the following propositions, 
(1) that there is no beginning or change of existence with- 
out a cause, and (2) that means conspiring to a particular 
end indicate design or intelligence. With these two proposi- 
tions given, we look at the multiplied works of nature, we 
contemplate them in their progress, harmony, and results ; 
and thus, reasoning a posteriori, from the consequent to the 
antecedent, from the effect to the cause, we infer the exist- 
ence of God. 
§. 275. Of reasoning a fortiori. 
Another process of ratiocination is denominated reasoning1 
a fortiori. This consists in deducing a proposition as true 
from another known or admitted proposition, the truth of 
which is less obvious, or less probable. Hence the applica- 
tion of the term a fortiori, which indicates, that the conclu- 
sion is clearer or stronger. Thus, if a man who merely robs 
on the highway is worthy of death, then a fortiori the mur- 
derer is deserving of the same punishment. Again, if he, 
who murders his enemy is worthy of death, still more is he, 
who commits parracide. We have an instance of this spe- 
cies of reasoning in the passage of the Apostle Paul, where 
he shows that the Almighty will not fail to bestow upon good 
men the necessaries of life. " He, that spared not his own 
Son, how shall he not with him freely give us all things." If 
he gave us the greater blessing of his Son, a fortiori he 
will give us such other inferior things, as may be necessary 
for us. 346 
REASONING. 
§. 276. Of differences in the power of reasoning. 
The faculty of reasoning exists in different individuals, in 
very different degrees. There is the same diversity here, 
which is found to exist in respect to every other mental sus- 
ceptibility and mental process. In some persons it is not 
even powerful enough to meet the ordinary exigencies of life, 
and hardly rescues its possessor from the imputation of idio- 
cy ; in others it elevates human nature, and bestows extraor- 
dinary grasp and penetration. And between the extremes 
of extraordinary expansion and marked imbecility, there are 
multitudes of distinct grades, almost every possible variety. 
This difference depends on various causes. (1) It will 
depend, in the first place, on the amount of knowledge, which 
the reasoner possesses. No man can permanently sustain 
the reputation of great ability in argument, without having 
previously secured a large fund of knowledge as its basis. 
And we may add, that no man can reason well on any given 
subject, unless he has especially prepared himselfin reference 
to that subject. All reasoning implies a comparison of ideas; 
or more properly a comparison of propositions, or offacts sta- 
ted in propositions. Of course, where there is no knowledge 
on any given subject, where there is no accumulation of facts, 
there can be no possibility of reasoning ; and where the 
knowledge is much limited, the plausibility and power of the 
argument will be proportionally diminished. 
That many persons speak on subjects, which are proposed 
to them, without having made any preparation, cannot be de- 
nied ; but there is a vast difference between noisy, incohe- 
rent declamation and a well wrought argument, made up of 
suitable propositions, following each other with a direct and 
satisfactory reference to the conclusion. In every case of 
reasoning, the mind passes successively along the various 
topics, involved in the argument ; and in so doing is govern- 
ed by the principles of association, as we have already had 
occasion to notice. But what opportunity can there possibly 
be for the operation of these principles, when the mind is 
called to fasten itself upon a subject, and to decide upon that 
subjet, without any knowledge of those circumstances, 
which may be directly embraced in it, or of its relations, and 
tendencies. REASONING. 
347 
(2) The power of reasoning will depend, in the second 
place, on the power of attention and memory. There are 
some persons, who seem to have no command of the atten- 
tion. Every thing interests them slightly, and nothing in a 
high degree. They are animated by no strong feeling ; and 
enter into no subject requiring long-continued and abstract 
investigation with a suitable intensity of ardor. A defective 
remembrance of the numerous facts and propositions, which 
come under review, is the natural consequence of this. And 
this necessarily implies a perplexed and diminished power of 
ratiocination. 
(3) A third ground of difference is diversity in the suscep- 
tibility of feeling relations. The remark has already been 
made, (§. 214,) that facts may be accumulated, having close 
and decisive relations to the points to be proved, but that 
they can never be so bound together as to result in any con- 
clusion, without a perception or feeling of those relations. 
But it is well known, whatever it may be owing to, that the 
relations of objects are much more readily and clearly per- 
ceived by some than by others. As, therefore, every train 
of reasoning implies a succession or series of relative per- 
ceptions, a defect in the power of relative suggestion neces- 
sarily implies a defect in the reasoning power. And on the 
other hand, a great quickness and clearness in the percep- 
tion of relations is necessarily attended, (other things being 
equal,) with an augmented efficiency of reasoning. 
§. 277. Of habits of reasoning. 
But whatever may be the mental traits, that render, in 
particular cases, the reasoning power more or less efficient, 
its efficacy will undoubtedly depend in a great degree, on 
Habit. The effect of frequent practice, resulting in what 
is termed a habit, is often witnessed in those, who follow any 
mechanic calling, where we find that what was once done 
with difficulty comes in time to be done with great ease and 
readiness. The muscles of such persons seem to move with 
a kind of instinctive facility and accuracy in the performance 
of those works, to which they have been for a long time ad- 
dicted. 
There is a similar effect of frequent practice in the increase 348 
REASONING. 
of quickness and facility in our mental operations ; and cer- 
tainly as much so in those, which are implied in reasoning 
as in any others. If, for instance, a person has never been 
in the habit of going through geometrical demonstrations, he 
finds his mind very slowly and with difficulty advancing from 
one step to another ; while on the other hand, a person, who 
has so often practiced this species of argumentation, as to 
have formed a habit, advances forward from one part of the 
train of reasoning to another with great rapidity and delight. 
And the result is the same in any process of moral reasoning. 
In the prosecution of any argument of a moral nature, there 
is necessarily a mental perception of the congruity of its sev- 
eral parts, or of the agreement of the succeeding proposition 
with that, which went before. The degree of readiness in 
bringing together propositions, and in putting forth such per- 
ceptions, will greatly depend on the degree of practice. 
278. Of reasoning in connection with language or expression. 
Language is the great instrument of reasoning. There 
may indeed be a deductive process, which is purely mental ; 
but in point of fact, this is seldom the case. In the use of 
language it is worthy of notice, that there is often a want of 
correspondence between the purely mental process in reason- 
ing and the outward verbal expression of it. When persons 
are called upon to state their arguments suddenly and in 
public debate, they often commit errors, which are at vari- 
ance with the prevalent opinion of their good sense and men- 
tal ability. This is particularly true of men, who are chiefly 
engagedin the ordinary business of life, or are in any situa- 
tion where there is a constant call for action. The conclu- 
sions, at which such persons arrive, may be supposed to be 
generally correct, but they frequently find themselves unable 
to state clearly and correctly to others the process of reason- 
ing, by which they arrived at them. Oliver Cromwell, the 
famous English Protector, is said to have been a person, to 
whom this statement would well apply. The complicated 
incidents of his life, and the perplexities of his situation, and 
his great success sufficiently evince, that he possessed a clear 
insight into events, and was in no respect deficient in under- 
standing ; but when he attempted to express his opinions in REASONING. 
349 
the presence of others, and to explain himself on questions 
of policy, he was confused and obscure. His mind readily 
insinuated itself into the intricacies of a subject, and while 
he could assert with confidence, that he had arrived at a sat- 
isfactory conclusion, he could not so readily describe either 
the direction he had taken, or the involutions of the journey. 
"All accounts, says Mr. Hume, agree in ascribing to 
Cromwell a tiresome, dark, unintelligible elocution, even 
when he had no intention to disguise his meaning ; yet no 
man's actions were ever, in such a variety of difficult cases, 
more decisive and judicious." 
Such instances are not unfrequent. Mr. Stewart some- 
where mentions the case of an English officer, a friend of 
Lord Mansfield, who had been appointed to the government 
of Jamaica. The officer expressed some doubts of his com- 
petency to preside in the court of chancery. Mansfield as- 
sured him, that he would not find the difficulty so great, as 
he imagined. "Trust, said he, to your own good sense in 
forming your opinions, but beware of stating the grounds of 
your judgments. The judgments will probably be right; the 
arguments will infallibly be wrong." 
The perplexity, which is so often experienced by men en- 
gaged in active life, in giving a prompt and correct verbal 
expression to the internal trains of thought, is probably owing 
in part to a want of practice of that kind, and in part to cer- 
tain mental habits, which they have been led, from their sit- 
uation, to form and strengthen. In a thousand emergencies 
they have been obliged to act with quickness, and at the 
same time with caution ; in other words, to examine subjects, 
and to do it with expedition. In this way they have acquir- 
ed exceeding readiness in all their mental acts. The conse- 
quence of this is, that the numerous minute circumstances, 
involved more or less in all subjects of difficult inquiry, are 
passed in review with such rapidity, and are made in so ve- 
ry small a degree the objects of separate attention, that they 
vanish, and are forgotten. Hence these persons, although 
the conclusion to which they have come be satisfactory, are 
unable to state to others all the subordinate steps in the ar- 
gument. Every thing has once been distinctly and fairly 
before their own minds, although with that great rapidity, 350 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
which is always implied in a habit ; but their argument, as 
stated in words, owing to their inability to arrest and embody 
all the evanescent processes of thought, appears to others 
defective and confused. 
CHAPTER ELEVENTH. 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
§. 279. Of the subjects of demonstrative reasoning. 
In the remarks, which have hitherto been made, the sub- 
ject of reasoning has been taken up in the most general point 
of view. The considerations, that have been proposed, are 
applicable, in the main, to reasoning in all its forms. But it 
is necessary, in order to possess a more full and satisfactory 
conception of this subject, to examine it under the two promi- 
nent heads of Moral and Demonstrative. 
There are various particulars, in which moral and demon- 
strative reasoning differ from each other ; the consideration 
of which will suggest more fully their distinctive nature. 
Among other things, demonstrative reasoning differs from 
any other species of reasoning in the subjects about which 
it is employed. The subjects are abstract ideas, and the ne- 
cessary relations among them. Those ideas or thoughts are 
called abstract, which are representative of such qualities 
and properties in objects as can be distinctly examined by 
the mind separate from other qualities and properties, with 
which they are commonly united. And there may be reck- 
oned, as coming within this class of subjects, the properties 
of numbers and of geometrical figures ; also extension, dura- 
tion, weight, velocity, forces, &c., so far as they are suscep- 
tible of being accurately expressed by numbers, or other 
mathematical signs. But the subjects of moral reasoning, 
upon which we are to remark hereafter more particularly, DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
351 
are matters of fact, including their connection with other 
facts, whether constant or variable, and all attendant circum- 
stances. That the exterior angle of a triangle is equal to 
both the interior and opposite angles, is a truth, which comes 
within the province of demonstration. That Homer was the 
author of the Iliad, that Xerxes invaded Greece, &c. are in- 
quiries, belonging to moral reasoning. 
§. 280. Use of definitions and axioms in demonstrative reasoning. 
In every process of reasoning- their must be at the com- 
mencement of it something to be proved ; there must also be 
some things either known, or taken for granted as such, with 
which the comparison of the proposition begins. The pre- 
liminary truths in demonstrative reasonings are involved in 
such definitions as are found in all mathematical treatises. 
It is impossible to give a demonstration of the properties of a 
circle, parabola, ellipse, or other mathematical figure, with- 
out first having given a definition of them. Definitions, 
therefore, are the facts assumed, the first principles in de- 
monstrative reasoning, from which by means of the subse- 
quent steps the conclusion is derived. We find something 
entirely similar in respect to subjects, which admit of the ap- 
plication of a different form of reasoning. Thus in Natural 
Philosophy, the general facts in relation to the gravity and 
elasticity of the air may be considered as first principles. 
From these principles in Physics are deduced, as consequen- 
ces, the suspension of the mercury in the barometer, and its 
fall, when carried up to an eminence. 
We must not forget here the use of axioms in the demon- 
strations of mathematics. Axioms are certain self-evident 
propositions, or propositions, the truth of which is discovered 
by intuition, such as the following ; " Things, equal to the 
same, are equal to one another "From equals take away 
equals, and equals remain." We generally find a number of 
them prefixed to treatises of geometry, and other treatises in- 
volving geometrical principles ; and it has been a mistaken 
supposition, which has long prevailed, that they are at the 
foundation of geometrical, and of all other demonstrative rea- 
soning. But axioms, taken by themselves, lead to no conclu- 
sions. With their assistance alone, it cannot be denied, that 352 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
the truth, involved in propositions susceptible of demonstra- 
tion, would have been beyond our reach. (See §. 204.) 
But axioms are by no means without their use, although 
their nature may have been misunderstood. They are prop- 
erly and originally intuitive perceptions of the truth, and 
whether they be expressed in words, as we generally find 
them, or not, is of but little consequence, except as a matter 
of convenience to beginners, and in giving instruction. But 
those intuitive perceptions, which are always implied in 
them, are essential helps ; and if by their aid alone we should 
be unable to complete a demonstration, we should be equally 
unable without them. We begin with definitions ; we com- 
pare together successively a number of propositions ; and 
these intuitive perceptions of their agreement or disagree- 
ment, to which, when expressed in words, we give the name 
of axioms, attend us at every step. 
§. 281. The opposites of demonstrative reasoning absurd. 
In demonstrations we consider only one side of a question; 
it is not necessary to do any thing' more than this. The first 
principles in the reasoning are given ; they are not only sup- 
posed to be certain, but they are assumed as such ; these are 
followed by a number of propositions in succession, all of 
which are compared together ; if the conclusion be a demon- 
strative one, then there has been a clear perception of cer- 
tainty at every step in the train. Whatever may be urged 
against an argument thus conducted is of no consequence ; 
the opposite of it will always imply some fallacy. Thus, the 
proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are not equal 
to two right angles, and other propositions, which are the op- 
posite of what has been demonstrated, will always be found 
to be false and also to involve an absurdity ; that is, are in- 
consistent with, and contradictory to themselves. 
But it is not so in Moral Reasoning. And here, therefore, 
we find a marked distinction between the two great forms of 
ratiocination. We may arrive at a conclusion on a moral 
subject with a great degree of certainty ; not a doubt may be 
left in the mind; and yet the opposite of that conclusion may 
be altogether within the limits of possibility. We have, for 
instance, the most satisfactory evidence, that the sun rose DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
353 
to-day, but the opposite might have been true without any in- 
consistency or contradiction, viz, That the sun did not rise. 
Again, we-have no doubt of the great law in physics, that 
heavy bodies descend to the earth in a line directed towards 
its centre. But we can conceive of the opposite of this with- 
out involving any contradiction or absurdity. In other 
words, they might have been subjected, if the Creator had 
so determined, to the influence of a law requiring them to 
move in a different direction. But on a thorough examination 
of a demonstrative process, we shall find ourselves unable to 
admit even the possibility of the opposite. 
§. 282. Demonstrations do not admit of different degrees of belief. 
When our thoughts are employed upon subjects, which 
come within the province of moral reasoning, we yield differ- 
ent degrees of assent ; we form opinions more or less proba- 
ble. Sometimes our belief is of the lowest kind ; nothing 
more than mere presumption. New evidence gives it new 
strength ; and it may go on from one degree of strength to 
another, till all doubt is excluded, and all possibility of mis- 
take shut out. It is different in demonstrations; the as- 
sent, which we yield, is at all times of the highest kind, and 
is never susceptible of being regarded as more or less. This 
results, as must be obvious on the slightest examination, from 
the nature of demonstrative reasoning, 
In demonstrative reasonings we always begin with cer- 
tain first principles or truths, either known, or taken for 
granted ; and these hold the first place, or are the founda- 
tion of that series of propositions, over which the mind suc- 
cessively passes, until it rests in the conclusion. In mathe- 
matics the first principles, of which we here speak, are the 
definitions. 
We begin, therefore, with what is acknowledged by all to 
be true or certain. At every step there is an intuitive per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement of the propositions, 
which are compared together. Consequently, however far 
we may advance in the comparison of them, there is no pos- 
sibility of falling short of that degree of assent, with which, 
it is acknowledged, that the series commenced. So that 
demonstrative certainty may be judged to amount to this. 354 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
W'henever we arrive at the last step or the conclusion of a se- 
ries of propositions, the mind in effect intuitively perceives the 
relation, whether it be the agreement or disagreement, coin- 
cidence or want of coincidence, between the last step or the 
conclusion, and the conditions involved in the propositions at 
the commencement of the series ; and, therefore, demonstra- 
tive certainty is virtually the same as the certainty of intui- 
tion. Although it arises on a different occasion, and is, 
therefore, entitled to a separate consideration, there is no 
difference in the degree of belief. 
§. 283. Of the use of diagrams in demonstrations. 
In conducting a demonstrative process, it is frequently the 
case, that we make use of various kinds of figures or dia- 
grams.-The proper use of diagrams, of a square, circle, tri- 
angle, or other figure, which we delineate before us, is to as- 
sist the mind in keeping its ideas distinct, and to help in com- 
paring them together with readiness and correctness. They 
are a sort of auxiliaries, brought in to the help of our intellec- 
tual infirmities, but are not absolutely necessary ; since de- 
monstrative reasoning, wherever it may be found, resembles 
any other kind of reasoning, in this most important respect, 
viz : in being a comparison of our ideas. 
In proof that artificial diagrams are only auxiliaries, and 
are not essentially necessary in demonstrations, it may be re- 
marked, that they are necessarily all of them imperfect. It 
is not within the capability of the wit and the power of man 
to frame a perfect circle, or a perfect triangle, or any other 
figure, which is perfect. We might argue this from our gen- 
eral knowledge of the imperfection of the senses ; and we 
may almost regard it as a matter, determined by experiments 
of the senses themselves, aided by optical instruments. 
"There never was, (says Cudworth,) a strait line, triangle, 
or circle, that we saw in all our lives, that was mathematical- 
ly exact, but even sense itself, at least by the help of micro- 
scopes, might plainly discover much uneveness, ruggedness, 
flexuosity, angulosity, irregularity, and deformity in them."* 
Our reasonings, therefore, and our conclusions will not 
apply to the figures before us, but merely to an imagined per- 
'Treatise concerning Immutable Morality, Bk. IV, Ch. 3. DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING, 
355 
feet figure. The mind can not only originate a figure internal- 
ly and subjectively, but can ascribe to it the attribute of per- 
fection. And a verbal statement of the properties of this im- 
agined perfect figure is what we understand by a definition, 
the use of which in this kind of reasoning in particular has 
already been mentioned. 
§. 284. Of signs in general as connected with reasoning. 
The statements in the last section will appear the less ex- 
ceptionable, when it is recollected, that in all cases reasoning 
is purely a mental process. From beginning to end, it is a 
succession of perceptions. Neither mathematical signs, nor 
words constitute the process, but are only its attendants and 
auxiliaries. We can reason without diagrams or other signs 
employed in mathematics, the same as an infant reasons, be- 
fore it has learnt artificial language. 
When the infant has once put his finger in the fire, he 
avoids the repetition of the experiment, reasoning in this 
way, that there is a resemblance between one flame and 
another, and that what has once caused him pain, will be 
likely under the same circumstances to cause the same sen- 
sation. When the infant sees before him some glittering toy, 
he reaches his hand towards it, and is evidently induced to 
do so by a thought of this kind, that the acquisition of the ob- 
ject will soon follow the effort of the hand, as it has a similar 
effort previously made. Here is reasoning without words ; 
it is purely internal; nevertheless no one will presume to 
say, that words are not great helps in reasoning. And thus 
in demonstrative reasoning, although diagrams, and numeri- 
cal and algebraic signs are assistances, they do not constitute 
the process ; nor can it be even said, that they are indispen- 
sably essential to it. 
" Some geometricians, (says Buffier, First Truths, Pt. I, 
Ch. 6,) are led into a palpable error, in imagining that things 
demonstrated by Geometry exist, out of their thought, exact- 
ly similar to the demonstration formed of them in their mind. 
They must be quickly sensible of their mistake, if they will 
but reflect a moment on the perfect globe, the imaginary 
properties of which are demonstrated in Geometry, though 
the thing itself has no real existence in nature. Geometry 356 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
shows nothing of the existence of things, but only what they 
are, supposing them to exist really such as they are conceiv- 
ed by the mind. And indeed, were all created things exist- 
ing annihilated, geometry would not lose a single point of its 
demonstrations ; the circle would still remain a round figure, 
of which all the points of the circumference would be equally 
distant from the centre." 
§. 2S5. Of the influence of demonstrative reasoning on the mental char- 
acter. 
A considerable skill in demonstrative reasoning is on a 
number of accounts desirable, although it cannot be denied, 
that very frequent practice and great readiness in it is not al- 
ways favorable ; so that it seems proper briefly to mention 
some of the effects, both propitious and unpropitious, on the 
mental character. 
(I) A frequency of practice in demonstrative reasoning 
greatly aids in giving one a ready command of his attention. 
And this is said for two reasons. First, because the subjects 
of such reasoning are not objects of the senses but immateri- 
al, are conceptions rather than existences, the abstractions 
of things rather than things themselves ; and consequently 
are not distinctly comprehensible without considerable effort. 
And second, because in this species of reasoning, the propo- 
sitions follow each other in such regular order and so closely, 
and so great is the importance of perceiving the agreement 
or disagreement of each succeeding one with that, which 
goes before ; that a careless, unfixed, and dissipated state of 
the mind seems to be utterly inconsistent with carrying on 
such a process with any sort of success to the conclusion. 
As, therefore, the strictest attention is here so highly neces- 
sary, the more a person subjects himself to this discipline, 
the more ready and efficient will be the particular application 
of the mind, to which we give that name. And we often 
find distinguished individuals in political life and in the prac- 
tice of the law, who are desirous of holding their mental 
powers in the most prompt and systematic obedience, impos- 
ing on themselves exercises in geometry and algebra for this 
purpose. 
(II) This mode of reasoning accustoms one to care and 
discrimination in the examination of subjects. In all dis- DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
357 
missions, where the object is to find out the truth, it is neces- 
sary to take asunder all the parts, having relation to the gen- 
eral subject, and bestow upon them a share of our considera- 
tion. And in general we find no people more disposed to do 
this than mathematicians ; they are not fond of reasoning, as 
Mr. Locke expresses it, in the lump, but are for going into 
particulars, for allowing every thing its due weight and noth- 
ing more, and for resolutely throwing out of the estimate all 
propositions, which are not directly and fully to the point.- 
It must further be said, as a general remark closely connect- 
ed with what has just been observed, that those departments 
of science, which require demonstrative reasoning, are pro- 
motive of a characteristic of great value,- a love of the truth. 
(Ill) Demonstrative reasoning, although this beneficial 
result is not exclusively appropriate to this mode of reason- 
ing, gives to the mind an increased grasp or comprehension. 
This result, it is true, will not be experienced in the case of 
those, who have merely exercised themselves in the study of 
a few select demonstrations ; it implies a familiarity of the 
mind with long and complicated trains of deductions. A 
thorough mathematician, who has made it a business to ex- 
ercise himself in this method of reasoning, can hardly have 
been otherwise than sensible of that intellectual comprehen- 
sion, or length and breadth of survey, which we have in 
view ; since one demonstration is often connected with 
another, much in the same way as the subordinate parts of 
separate demonstrations are connected with each other ; and 
he, therefore, finds it necessary, if he would go on with sat- 
isfaction and pleasure, to gather up and retain, in the grasp 
of his mind, all the general and subordinate propositions of 
a long treatise. 
§.286. Further considerations on the influence of demonstrative reasoning. 
But, on the other hand, there are some results of a very 
great attention to sciences, which require the exclusive ap- 
plication of demonstrative reasoning, of a less favorable kind. 
(1) An exclusive culture of demonstrative reasoning un- 
favorably affects the operations of the susceptibility of belief 
on all subjects out of the circle of the mathematical ; or per- 
haps we may say, in direct terms, that, out of that circle, it 358 
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
positively diminishes the power of belief. The exclusive 
mathematician has been accustomed to yield his assent to de- 
monstration only ; and it is but natural, that he should find 
some difficulty in being satisfied with any lower degree of 
evidence. This disposition to doubt will be, in some measure, 
experienced, even in the transition from pure to mixed math- 
ematics ; at least there will be an absence of that full and de- 
lighted satisfaction, which had hitherto been enjoyed. Still 
more will it be felt, when he is called upon to judge of events, 
and duties, and actions of common life, which do not admit of 
the application of demonstration. In a word, it has been 
supposed to unfit the mind in a considerable degree for accu- 
rate discriminations as to moral evidence on all subjects 
whatever, where that species of evidence is alone admissible; 
and also for fair and correct judgments in matters of taste. 
(II),-Again, it has been thought among other things, 
that this form of reasoning, when carried to a great length, 
has a tendency to render the mind mechanical. That is, 
while it increases its ability of acting in a given way, it di- 
minishes the power of invention, and prevents its striking out 
into a new path, different from that, which it has been in the 
habit of going over. And hence it is, that men of the strict- 
est virtue and the most powerful intellect have sometimes 
discovered an unexpected weakness, and made extraordina- 
ry mistakes, when placed in certain new situations. We 
may illustrate our meaning by one or two instances. The 
celebrated Turgot, who combined the purest moral senti- 
ments with the rarest intellectual endowments, was what 
may be termed a mathematical politician. History has re- 
corded the result. When the king of France called,J)im to 
direct the political concerns of the French empire, he deci- 
dedly failed, where half the talents and integrity had firmly 
held the helm amid political tempests. When called from 
the abstractions of science to deal with the realities of life, 
with the interests and prejudices and passions of mankind, 
mathematician and philosopher as he was, he found too late, 
that we cannot estimate the intellect as we can estimate 
the arc of a circle, and that the calculus, which can measure 
the motions of the stars, may not succeed in ascertaining the 
momentum and the obliquities of human nature. But La DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 
359 
Place, a far higher name on the list of eminent mathemati- 
cians, is an instance still more to our purpose. After the ac- 
cession of Napoleon to the first Consulship in France, La 
Place was appointed Minister of the Interior ; an office, 
which he held six weeks, and was then dismissed. "A Ge- 
ometrician of the first rank, (says Napoleon,) he did not reach 
mediocrity as a statesman. From the first, the Consuls be- 
came sensible that they had made a mistake in his appoint- 
ment. He never viewed any subject in its true light ; he 
was always occupied with subtilties ; his notions were all 
problematic, and he carried the spirit of the infinitely small in- 
to the administration." 
Such, on the whole, being the result of an exclusive at- 
tention to sciences which admit of demonstration alone, it is 
obvious when pursuing studies of that kind, that we should 
avail ourselves of the benefit resulting from other modes of 
mental discipline. Those, who aim at a perfect education, 
will not "canton out to themselves a little Goshen in the in- 
tellectual world," which is to receive all their labors, and 
leave the rest of the vast field of the mind to neglect, but 
will bestow a suitable share of culture on every part of it. CHAPTER TWELFTH. 
MORAL REASONING. 
§. 287. Of the subjects and importance of moral reasoning. 
Moral reasoning, which is the second great division or 
kind of reasoning, concerns opinions, actions, and events; 
embracing in general those subjects, which do not come 
within the province of demonstrative reasoning. The sub- 
jects, to which it relates, are often briefly expressed by say- 
ing, that they are mailers of fact; nor would this definition, 
concise as it is, be likely to give an erroneous idea of them. 
Skill in this kind of reasoning is of great use in the forma- 
tion of opinions concerning the duties, and the general con- 
duct of life. Some may be apt to think, that those, who have 
been most practised in demonstrative reasoning, can find no 
difficulty in adapting their intellectual habits to matters of 
mere probability. This opinion is not altogether well found- 
ed, as we have seen in the preceding chapter. Although 
that species of reasoning has a favorable result in giving per- 
sons a command over the attention, and in some other re- 
spects, whenever exclusively employed it has the effect in 
some degree to disqualify them for a correct judgment on 
those various subjects, which properly belong to moral reas- 
oning. The last, therefore, which has its distinctive name 
from the primary signification of the Latin mores, viz. man- 
ners, customs, &c. requires a separate consideration. 
§. 288. Of the nature of moral certainty. 
Moral reasoning causes in us different degrees of assent, 
and in this respect differs from demonstrative. In demon- 
stration there is not only an immediate perception of the re- MORAL REASONING.'' 
361 
lation of the propositions compared together ; but in'conse- 
quence of their abstract and determinate nature, there is also 
a knowledge or absolute certainty of their agreement or disa- 
greement. In moral reasoning the case is somewhat differ- 
ent. In both kinds we begin with certain propositions, 
which are either known or regarded as such. In both there 
is a series of propositions successively compared. But in 
moral reasoning, in consequence of the propositions not being 
abstract and fixed, and, therefore, often uncertain, the agree- 
ment or disagreement among them is in general not said to 
be known, but presumed ; and this presumption may be more 
or less, admitting a great variety of degrees. While, there- 
fore, one mode of reasoning is attended with knowledge ; the 
other can properly be said to produce in most cases only 
judgment or opinion. But the probability of such judgment 
or opinion may sometimes arise so high, as to exclude all rea- 
sonable doubt. And hence we then speak, as if we possessed 
certainty in respect to subjects, which admit merely of the 
application of moral reasoning. Although it is possible, that 
there may be some difference between the belief attendant 
on demonstration, and that produced by the highest proba- 
bility, the effect on our feelings is at any.rate essentially the 
same. A man, who should doubt the existence of the cities 
of London and Pekin, although he has no other evidence of 
it, than that of testimony, would be considered hardly less 
singular and unreasonable, than one who might take it into 
his head to doubt of the propositions of Euclid.-It is this 
very high degree of probability, which we term moral certainty. 
§. 289. Of reasoning from analogy. 
Moral reasoning admits of some subordinate divisions ; 
and of these, the first to be mentioned is reasoning from 
analogy.-The word, analogy, is used with some vagueness, 
but in general denotes a resemblance, either greater or less. 
Having observed a consistency and uniformity in the 
operations of the physical world, we are naturally led to pre- 
sume, that things of the same nature will be affected in the 
same way, and will produce the same effects ; and also that 
the same or similar effects are to be attributed to like causes. 
Analogical reasoning, therefore, is that mental process, by 362 
MORAL REASONING. 
which unknown truths or conclusions are inferred from the 
resemblances of things. 
The argument, by which Sir Isaac Newton establishes 
the truth of universal gravitation, is of this sort. He proves, 
that the planets in their revolutions are deflected towards the 
sun in a manner precisely similar to the deflection of the 
earth towards the same luminary ; and also that there is a 
similar deflection of the moon towards the earth, and of a 
body projected obliquely at the earth's surface towards the 
earth's centre. Hence he infers by analogy, that all these 
deflections originate from the same cause, or are governed 
by one and the same law, viz. the power of gravitation. 
This method of reasoning is applicable to the inquiry, 
Whether the planets are inhabited ? and furnishes the sole 
ground for the indulgence of such a supposition. We observe 
a resemblance in certain respects between Mars, Jupiter, 
Saturn, and other planets, and the earth. They all revolve 
around the sun, as the earth does, and all derive light from 
that source. Several of them are ascertained to revolve on 
their axis, and consequently, must have a succession of day 
and night. Some of them have moons, and all are subject 
to the law of gravitation. From these various similitudes 
we draw the conclusion by analogy, that those planets must 
be inhabited, like the earth. 
There are a variety of subjects, both speculative and prac- 
tical, in respect to which we may reason in this way ; and 
sometimes with considerable satisfaction. And among oth- 
ers, this method of reasoning finds a place in the arguments 
of persons in the practice of the law. An attorney, for in- 
stance, advocates a case, which does not fall within the pro- 
visions of existing statutes, and for which he finds in his au- 
thorities no exact precedent. He is, therefore, under the 
necessity of ascertaining, as far as possible, the analogy or 
resemblance between this case and others, which have been 
made the subject of judicial decisions ; and this analogy he 
makes the basis of his argument. 
§. 290. Caution to be used in reasoning from analogy. 
The remark remains to be made, that much care is ne- 
cessary in arguments drawn from this source, especially in 363 
MORAL REASONING. 
scientific investigations ; and they are in all cases to be re- 
ceived with some degree of distrust. The ancient anatomists 
are an instance of percipitate reasoning from analogy. Be- 
ing hindered by certain superstitions from dissecting the bo- 
dies of men, they endeavored to obtain the information they 
wanted by the dissection of those animals, whose internal 
structure was supposed to come nearest to that of the human 
body. In this way they were led into a variety of mistakes, 
which have been detected by later anatomists. It does not 
follow, because things resemble each other in a multitude of 
particulars, that this resemblance will be found in all others ; 
and we are, therefore, always to consider ourselves in dan- 
ger of pushing the supposition of similitude too far. 
The proper use of analogical reasoning seems to be, in all 
scientific inquiries, merely to illustrate and confirm truths, 
which are susceptible of proof from other sources of evi- 
dence, either by casting a direct additional light or by an- 
swering objections. A happy instance of this use of it is the 
work of Bishop Butler, entitled, " The Analogy of Religion, 
natural and revealed, to the Constitution and Course of na- 
ture." It is not the object of the writer to prove the truth 
of religion, but to answer some objections, which may be 
brought against its practical details and its principles by 
those, who, while they object to the Bible, still maintain the 
existence of a God. And this he does by proving, that the 
same objections exist to the providence of God in the natural 
world. There is an Analogy or resemblance in the two, viz. 
between the administration of God as made known in the 
Bible, and his administration of things as made known in 
the natural world; and if the objections, which are brought 
forward, will reject him from the authorship of what we term 
Religion, they will dethrone him also, for the same reason, 
from all authorship and direction in the ordinary economy of 
nature. 
§. 291. Of reasoning by induction. 
We now come to another method of moral reasoning, viz. 
by induction. Inductive reasoning is the inferring of general 
truths from particular facts, that have fallen under our obser- 
vation. Our experience teaches us, that nature is governed 
by uniform laws ; and we have a firm expectation, (whether 
it be an original principle of our constitution or whatever 364 
MORAL REASONING. 
may be the origin of it,) that events will happen in future, as 
we have seen them happen in times past. With this state of 
mind we are prepared to deduce inferences by induction. 
When a property has been found in a number of subjects 
of the same kind, and nothing of a contradictory nature ap- 
pears, we have the strongest expectation of finding the same 
property in all the individuals of the same class ; in other 
words, we come to the conclusion that the property is a gen- 
eral one. Accordingly we apply a magnet to several pieces 
of iron ; we find in every instance a strong attraction taking 
place ; and we conclude, although we have made the experi- 
ment with only a small number of the masses of iron actually 
in existence, that it is a property of iron to be thus affected 
by that substance, or that all iron is susceptible of magneti- 
cal attraction. This is a conclusion drawn by induction. 
The belief, which attends a well conducted process of in- 
ductive reasoning, bears a decided character ; it is moral 
probability of the highest kind, or what is sometimes termed 
moral certainty ; and is at least found to be sufficient for all 
practical purposes. We obtain all the general truths, relating 
to the properties and laws of material objects, in this way. 
And we thus not only acquire a knowledge of material ob- 
jects, but apply the same inductive process also in the in- 
vestigation of laws, which govern the operations of the 
mind. It is by experience or observing what takes place in 
a number of individuals, that we are able to infer the general 
law of association, viz., When two or more ideas have exist- 
ed in the mind in immediate succession, they are afterwards 
found to be mutually suggested by each other. It is the 
same in ascertaining other general laws of the mind. 
§. 292. Of the caution necessary in inductive processes 
Reasoning in this method requires the exercise of caution, 
no less than by analogy. It is especially liable to prove falla- 
cious, whenever our investigations have been marked with 
impatience, and our judgments are formed on a very small 
number of facts. 
When the number of examined instances is large, and the 
results are uniform, the conclusion amounts to moral certain- 
ty. But when the number of such instances is small, and the MORAL REASONING. 
365 
results are not altogether uniform, the judgments formed will 
possess a greater or less degree of probability, varying with 
circumstances.-And especially is the mind left in a state of 
vacillation and uncertainty, when results have repeatedly 
occurred under such circumstances, as to leave us at liberty 
to ascribe them to a diversity of causes. In such cases we 
find ourselves reduced to the necessity of resorting to what 
writers on this subject have termed instantize crucis.-The 
important and decisive method in Inductive Reasoning of 
instantize crucis was first laid down in the Novum Organum 
of Bacon, and has recently been happily illustrated in Play- 
fair's View of the Progress of Mathematical and Physical 
Science in the following terms. 
§. 293. Of instances or experiments in inductive reasoning termed 
instantiie crucis. 
"When the understanding is placed in equilibria, as it were 
between two or more causes, each of which accounts equally 
well for the appearances, as far as they are known, nothing 
remains to be done but to look out for a fact, which can be 
explained by the one of these causes, and not by the other ; 
if such a one can be found the uncertainty is removed, and 
the true cause is determined. Such facts perform the office 
of a cross, erected at the separation of two roads, to direct 
the traveller which he is to take, and, on this account, Bacon 
gave them the name of inslantice crucis. 
Suppose that the subject inquired into were the motion of 
the planets, and that the phenomena which first present 
themselves, or the motion of these bodies in longitude, could 
be explained equally on the Ptolemaic and the Copernican 
system, that is, either on the system which makes the Earth, 
or that which makes the Sun, the centre of the planetary 
motions, a cautious philosopher would hesitate about which 
of the two he should adopt, and notwithstanding, that one of 
them was recommended by its superior simplicity, he might 
not think himself authorized to give to it a decided prefer- 
ence above the other. If, however, he consider the motion 
of these bodies in latitude, that is to say, their digressions 
from the plane of the ecliptic, he will find a set of phenomena, 
which cannot be reconciled with the supposition that the 
earth is the centre of the planetary motions, but which re- 366 
ceive the most simple and satisfactory explanation from sup- 
posing that the sun is at rest, and is the centre of those mo- 
tions. The latter phenomena would therefore serve as in- 
stantiot crucis, by which the superior credibility of the Coper- 
nican system was fully evinced."* 
MORAL REASONING. 
§. 294. Of combined or accumulated arguments. 
When a proposition in geometry is given to be demonstra- 
ted, it sometimes happens, that two or more solutions may 
be offered leading to the same end. The theorem or the 
problem is one and the same, as also the conclusion ; but 
there may be more than one train of reasoning, more than 
one series of intermediate steps, connecting the proposition, 
which is to be investigated, with the result. But as the con- 
clusion in each of these different cases is certain, it does not 
strengthen it, although it may gratify curiosity, to resort to 
a different and additional process. 
It is not thus in moral reasoning. The great difference 
between the two kinds of reasoning, as before observed, is 
not so much in the mental process, as in the subjects, about 
which they are employed. Now as the subjects in moral 
reasoning are not of a purely abstract nature, and are, there- 
fore, often attended with uncertainty, our belief, when we 
arrive at the conclusion, is not always of the highest kind. 
More frequently it is some inferior degree of probability. 
Hence in any moral inquiry the more numerous the series of 
arguments, which terminates in a particular conclusion, the 
stronger will be our belief in the truth of that conclusion. 
Thus we may suppose a question to arise, Whether the 
Romans occupied the island of Great Britain at some period 
previous to the Saxon conquest? In reference to this inquiry 
a number of independent arguments may be brought forward; 
(1) The testimony of the Roman historians ; (2) The remains 
of buildings, roads, and encampments, which indicate a Ro- 
man origin ; (3) The coins, urns, &c. which have been dis- 
covered. Although these arguments are independent of each 
other, they all bear upon the same conclusion ; and being 
combined together, they very essentially increase the 
strength of our belief. 
* See Works of John Playfair, Esq. Edinburgh Edition, Vol. II, p. 105. CHAPTER THIRTEENTH, 
PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS IN REASONING. 
§. 295. Rules relating to the practice of reasoning. 
Various directions have been given by writers on Logic, 
(which, it may be remarked here, is only another name for 
whatever concerns the nature, kinds, and applications of 
reasoning,) the object of which is to secure the more prompt, 
accurate, and efficient use of the reasoning power. It is but 
natural to suppose, that some of these dialectical rules are of 
greater, and others of less value. Such as appeared to be of 
the least questionable importance are brought together, and 
explained in this chapter ; nor will this occasion any surprise, 
when it is recollected, that it has been the object of this 
Work throughout, not only to ascertain what the mental op- 
erations are, but by practical suggestions from time to time, 
to promote what is of a good, and prevent what is of a hurt- 
ful tendency in such operations. 
The directions now referred to have of course a more in- 
timate connection with Moral, than with Demonstrative rea- 
soning ; but this is a circumstance, which enhances, rather 
than diminishes their worth. The occasions, which admit 
and require the application of moral reasoning, being insep- 
arable from the most common occurences and exigencies of 
life, are much more numerous, than those of demonstrative 
reasoning. 
§. 296. Of being influenced in reasoning by a love of the truth. 
I. The first direction in relation to reasoning, which 
will be given, concerns the feelings, with which it is proper 
to be animated. It is this. In all questions, which admit of 368 
PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS 
discussion, and on which we find ourselves at variance with 
the opinions of others, we are to make truth our object. The 
opposite of a desire of the truth is a wish to decide the sub- 
ject of dispute in one way rather than another, independent- 
ly of a just consideration of the evidence. The foundation 
of such a preference of one result to another are in general 
the prejudices of interest and passion ; and these are the 
great enemies of truth. Whenever we are under their influ- 
ence, we form a different estimation of testimony and of oth- 
er sources of evidence from what we should do under other 
circumstances ; and at such times they can hardly fail to lead 
us to false results. This rule is important on all occasions 
of reasoning whatever, but particularly in public debate ; be- 
cause at such times the presence of others and the love of 
victory combine with other unpropitious influences to induce 
men to forget or to disregard the claims, which truth is 
always entitled to enforce. 
297. Care to be used in correctly stating the subject of discussion. 
II. Another rule in the prosecution of an argument is, 
that the question under debate is to be fairly and correctly 
stated. The matter in controversy may be stated in such a 
way as to include, in the very enunciation of it, something 
taken for granted, which must necessarily lead to a decision 
in favor of one of the opponents. But this amounts to beg- 
ging the question, a species of fallacy or sophism, upon which 
we shall again have occasion to remark. Sometimes the 
subject of discussion is stated so carelessly, that the true 
point at issue is wholly left out. It may be proper, therefore, 
in many cases to adopt the practice of special pleaders, and 
first to ascertain all the points, in which the opponents agree, 
and those in which they differ. And then they can hardly 
fail of directing their arguments to what is truly the subject 
of contention. 
In order that there may not be a possibility of misunder- 
standing here, dialecticians should aim to have clear ideas of 
every thing stated in the question, which has an intimate 
connection with the point at issue. Subordinate parts of the 
question and even particular words are to be examined. If, 
for instance, the statement affirm or deny any thing, in re- IN REASONING. 
369 
gard to the qualities or properties of material bodies, it is in- 
cumbent upon us to possess as clear ideas as possible, both of 
the object in general, and of those properties or qualities in 
particular. Similar remarks will apply to other subjects of 
inquiry of whatever kind. 
§. 298. Consider the kind of evidence applicable to the subject. 
HI. As one subject clearly admits of the application of 
one species of evidence, while another as clearly requires 
evidence of a different kind, we are thence enabled to lay 
down this rule, viz., We are to consider what kind of evi- 
dence is appropriate to the question under discussion. 
When the inquiry is one of a purely abstract nature, and 
all the propositions, involved in the reasoning-, are of the 
same kind, then we have the evidence of Intuition or intui- 
tive perception ; and the conclusion, for reasons already 
mentioned, is certain. In the examination of the proper- 
ties of material bodies, we depend originally on the evidence 
of the Senses , which gives a character and strength to our 
belief according to the circumstances, under which the ob- 
jects are presented to them. In judging of those facts in 
events and in the conduct of men, which have not come un- 
der our own observation, we rely on Testimony. This 
source of belief causes probability in a greater or less degree, 
according as the testimony is from one or more, given by a 
person, who understands th.e subject, to which it relates, or 
not, &c. And again, some subjects admit of the evidence 
of Induction, and in respect to others we have no other aids, 
than the less authoritative reasonings from Analogy. In 
other cases, the evidence is wholly made up of various inci- 
dental circumstances, which are found to have relation to 
the subject in hand, and which affect the belief in different 
degrees and for various causes. 
And hence as the sources of belief, as well as the belief 
itself, have an intimate connection with the subject before 
us, they ought to be taken into consideration. The evidence 
should be appropriate to the question. But if the question 
admit of more than one kind of evidence, then all are entitled 
to their due weight. 370 
1' R A CTICA L DIRECTIONS 
§. 299. Reject the aid of false arguments or sophisms. 
IV. There is a species of false reasoning, which we 
call a sophism. A sophism is an argument, which contains 
some secret fallacy, under the general appearance of correct- 
ness. The aid of such arguments, which are calculated to 
deceive, and are, in general, inconsistent with a love of the 
truth, should be rejected. 
(1) Ignoratio elenchi, or misapprehension of the ques- 
tion, is one instance of sophism. It exists when, from some 
misunderstanding of the terms and phrases that are employ- 
ed, the arguments advanced do not truly apply to the point 
in debate. It was a doctrine, for instance, of some of the 
early philosophic teachers of Greece, that there is but one 
principle of things. Aristotle, understanding by the word prin- 
ciple what we commonly express by the word element, at- 
tempted to show the contrary, viz, that the elements are not 
one but many, thus incurring the imputation of ignoratio 
elenchi ; for those, who held the doctrine, which was thus 
subjected to his animadversion, had reference not to the 
forms but the cause of things, not to any doctrine of elementa- 
ry material particles, but to the intellectual origin, the crea- 
tive mind, the Supreme Being, whom as the principle, (that 
is, as the beginning and the support of things,) they maintain- 
ed to be one.* 
(2) Petitio principii, or begging of the question, is 
another instance of sophism. This sophism is found, when- 
ever the disputant offers, in proof of a proposition, the propo- 
sition itself in other words. The following has been given 
as an instance of this fallacy in reasoning ;-A person at- 
tempts to prove that God is eternal, by maintaining, that his 
existence is without beginning and without end. Here the 
proof, which is offered, and the proposition itself, which is to 
be proved, are essentially the same.-When we are told, that 
opium causes sleep, because it has a soporific quality, or that 
grass grows by means of its vegetative power, the same thing 
is repeated in other terms. This fallacy is very frequently 
practised ; and a little care in detecting it would spoil many 
a fine saying, as well as deface many an elaborate argument. 
What is called arguing in a circle is a species of sophism Very 
* La Logique ou L'art de Penser, (Port Royale,) Part III, Chap. XIX. IN REASONING. 
371 
nearly related to the above. It consists in making two prop- 
ositions reciprocally prove each other. 
(3) Non causa pro causa, or the assignation of a false 
cause.-People are unwilling to be thought ignorant ; rather 
than be thought so, they will impose on the credulity of their 
fellow men, and sometimes on themselves, by assigning false 
causes of events. Nothing is more common, than this soph- 
ism among illiterate people ; pride is not diminished by defi- 
ciency of learning, and such people, therefore, must gratify 
it, by assigning such causes of events as they find nearest 
at hand. Hence, when the appearance of a comet is'follow- 
ed by a famine or a war, they are disposed to consider it as 
the cause of those calamities. If a person have committed 
some flagrant crime, and shortly after suffer some heavy dis- 
tress, it is no uncommon thing to hear the former assigned, 
as the direct and the sole cause of the latter.-This was the 
fallacy, which historians have ascribed to the Indians of Par- 
aguay, who supposed the baptismal ceremony to be thecause 
of death, because the Jesuit missionaries, whenever opportu- 
nity offered, administered it to dying infants, and to adults in 
the last stage of disease. 
(4) Another species of sophistry is called fallacia acci- 
dentis.-We fall into this kind of false reasoning, whenever 
we give an opinion concerning the general nature of a thing 
from some accidental circumstance. Thus the Christian re- 
ligion has been made the pretext for persecutions, and has in 
consequence been the source of much suffering; but it is a 
sophism to conclude, that it is, on the whole, not a great good 
to the human race, because it has been attended with this 
perversion. Again, if a medicine have operated in a particu- 
lar case unfavorably, or, in another case, have operated very 
favorably, the universal rejection or reception of it, in conse- 
quence of the favorable or unfavorable result in a particular 
instance, would be a hasty and fallacious induction of essen- 
tially the same sort. That is, the general nature of the 
thing is estimated from a circumstance, which may be wholly 
accidental. 
§. 300. Fallacia equivocationis or the use of equivocal terms and phrases. 
V. It is a further direction of much practical impor- 
tance, that the reasoner should be careful, in the use of lan- 372 
PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS 
guage, to express every thing with plainness and precision ; 
and especially never attempt to prejudice the cause of truth, 
and snatch a surreptitious victory by the use of an equivocal 
phraseology. No man of an enlarged and cultivated mind 
can be ignorant, that multitudes of words in every language 
admit of diversities of signification. There are found also in 
all languages many words, which sometimes agree with each 
other, and sometimes differ in signification, according to the 
connection in which they appear, and their particular appli- 
cation. There is, therefore, undoubtedly an opportunity, if 
any should be disposed to embrace it, of employing equivocal 
terms, equivocal phrases, and perplexed and mysterious com- 
binations of speech, and thus hiding themselves from the pen- 
etrating light of truth, under cover of a mist of their own 
raising. 
No man, whose sole object, is truth and justice, will re- 
sort to such a discreditable subterfuge. If in reasoning he 
finds himself inadvertently employing words of an equivocal 
signification, it will be a first care with him to guard against 
the misapprehensions, likely to result from that source. He 
will explain so precisely the sense in which he uses the 
doubtful terms as to leave no probability of cavilling and mis- 
take. 
And besides the invaluable reputation of a man of honor 
and justice, he will in this way realize results in respect to 
his own intellectual character of the most beneficial nature. 
The practice of verbal criticism, as it has been called, (that 
is, of discriminating readily and accurately the meaning of 
words,) will result in a habit, giving to the dialectician a 
vast power over his opponent, who has not been trained to 
the making of such nice discriminations. There will be a 
keenness of intellectual perception, which, while it helps to 
untie the perplexities of language, at the same time resolves 
the perplexities of thought ; separating meaning from mean- 
ing and dividing truth from falsehood in those cases, where 
at first sight it appeared to be impossible. But it is a power, 
which cannot be possessed without a laborious acquaintance 
with the purest writers and the ablest reasoners in a lan- 
guage ; together with a systematic and philosophic study of 
its origin, idioms, and general forms. And while it may be IN REASONING. 
373 
employed to the most beneficial purposes, it is far too formi- 
dable to be entrusted in the management of any one, who is 
not under the influence of that moral rectitude and that love 
of the truth, which have been so repeatedly insisted on. 
§. 801. On the sophism of estimating actions and character from the 
circumstance of success merely. 
VI. The foregoing are some of the fallacies in reason- 
ing, which have found a place in writers on Logic. To these 
might be added the fallacy or sophism, to which men are ob- 
viously so prone, of judging favorably of the characters and 
the deeds of others, from the mere circumstance of success. 
Those actions, which have a decidedly successful termination, 
are almost always applauded, and are looked upon as the re- 
sult of great intellectual forecast ; while not less frequently 
actions, that have an unsuccessful issue, are not only stig- 
matized as evil in themselves, but as indicating in their pro- 
jector a flighty and ill-balanced mind. The fallacy, how- 
ever, does not consist in taking the issues or results into con- 
sideration, which are undoubtedly entitled to their due place 
in estimating the actions and characters of men, but in too 
much limiting our view of things, and forming a favorable or 
unfavorable judgment from the mere circumstance of good 
or ill success alone. 
While there is no sophism, more calculated to lead astray 
and perplex, there is none more common than this ; so much 
so, that it has almost passed into a proverb, that a hero must 
not only be brave, but fortunate. Hence it is that Alexander 
is called Great, because he gained victories, and overran 
kingdoms ; while Charles XII of Sweden, who the most near- 
ly resembles him in the characteristics of bravery, persever- 
ence, and chimerical ambition, but had his projects cut short 
at the fatal battle of Pultowa, is called a madman. 
"Machiavel has justly animadverted, (says Dr. Johnson,) 
on the different notice taken by all succeeding times, of the 
two great projectors, Cataline and Csesar. Both formed the 
same project and intended to raise themselves to power by 
subverting the commonwealth. They pursued their design 
perhaps with equal abilities and equal virtue ; but Cataline 
perished in the field, and Csesar returned from Pharsalia with 374 
PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS 
unlimited authority ; and from that time, every monarch of 
the earth has thought himself honored by a comparison with 
Caesar ; and Cataline has never been mentioned, but that his 
name might be applied to traitors and incendiaries." 
In the same Essay* he happily illustrates this subject by 
a reference to the discovery of America, in the following 
terms.-"When Columbus had engaged king Ferdinand, in 
the discovery of the other hemisphere, the sailors, with whom 
he embarked in the expedition, had so little confidence in 
their commander, that after having been long at sea looking 
for coasts, which they never expected to find, they raised a 
general mutiny, and demanded to return. He found means 
to sooth them into a permission to continue in the same 
course three days longer, and on the evening of the third 
day descried land. Had the impatience of his crew denied 
him a few hours of the time requested, what had been his 
fate but to have come back with the infamy of a vain project- 
or, who had betrayed the king's credulity to useless expen- 
ses, and risked his life in seeking countries that had no exist- 
ence? how would those, that had rejected his proposals, have 
triumphed in their acuteness ; and when would his name 
have been mentioned, but with the makers of potable gold 
and malleable glass ? " 
Whenever the rules laid down have been followed, and 
conclusions have been formed with a careful and candid re- 
gard to the evidence presented, those opinions are to be as- 
serted and maintained with a due degree of confidence. It 
would evince an unjustifiable weakness to be driven from our 
honest convictions by the effrontery, or even by the upright, 
though misguided zeal of an opponent. Not that a person is 
to set himself up for infallible, and to suppose that new ac- 
cessions of evidence are impossible, or that it is an impossi- 
bility for him to have new views of the evidence already ex- 
amined. But a suitable degree of stability is necessary in 
order to be respected and useful ; and, in the case supposed, 
such stability can be exhibited without incurring the charge, 
which is sometimes thrown out, of doggedness and intoler- 
ance. 
§. 302. Of adherence to our opinions. 
• See the Adventurer, No. 99. IN REASONING. 
375 
It is further to be observed that we are not always to re- 
linquish judgments, which have been formed in the way 
pointed out, when objections are afterwards raised, which 
we cannot immediately answer. The person thus attacked 
can, with good reason, argue in this way ; I have once ex- 
amined the subject carefully and candidly ; the evidence, 
both in its particulars and in its multitude of bearings, has 
had its weight ; many minute and evanescent circumstances 
were taken into view by the mind, which have now vanished 
from my recollection ; I, therefore, do not feel at liberty to 
alter an opinion thus formed, in consequence of an objection 
now brought up, which I am unable to answer, but choose 
to adhere to my present judgment, until the whole subject, 
including this objection, can be re-examined. This reason- 
ing would in most cases be correct, and would be entirely 
consistent with that love of truth and openness to conviction, 
which ought ever to be maintained. 
§. 303. Effects on the mind of debating for victory instead of truth. 
By way of supporting the remarks under the first rule, 
we here introduce the subject of contending for victory mere- 
ly. He, who contends with this object, takes every advan- 
tage of his opponent, which can subserve his own purpose. 
For instance, he will demand a species of proof or a degree 
of proof, which the subject in dispute does not admit ; he 
gives, if possible, a false sense to the words and statements, 
employed by the other side ; he questions facts, which he 
himself fully believes and every body else, in the expectation 
that the opposite party is not furnished with direct and posi- 
tive evidence of them. In a word, wherever an opening 
presents, he takes the utmost advantage of his opponent, 
however much against his own internal convictions of right 
and justice. 
Such a course, to say nothing of its moral turpitude, ef- 
fectually unsettles that part of our mental economy, which 
concerns the grounds and laws of belief. The practice of 
inventing cunningly devised objections against arguments, 
known to be sound, necessarily impairs the influence, which 
such arguments ought ever to exert over us. Hence the re- 
mark has been made with justice, that persons, who addict 376 
PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS IN REASONING. 
themselves to this practice, frequently end in becoming scep- 
tics. They have so often perplexed, and apparently over- 
thrown what they felt to be true, they at last question the 
existence of any fixed grounds of belief in the human consti- 
tution, and begin to doubt of every thing. 
This effect, even when there is an undoubted regard for 
the truth, will be found to follow from habits of ardent dispu- 
tation, unless there be a frequent recurrence to the original 
principles of the mind, which relate to the nature and laws 
of belief. The learned Chillingworth is an instance. The 
consequences, to which the training up of his vast powers to 
the sole art of disputation finally led, are stated by Claren- 
don. "Mr. Chiilingworth had spent all his younger time 
in disputations and had arrived at so great a mastery, that 
he was inferior to no man in those skirmishes ; but he had, 
with his notable perfection in this exercise, contracted such 
an irresolution and habit of doubting, that by degrees he 
grew confident of nothing. Neither the books of his adver- 
saries nor any of their persons, though he was acquainted 
with the best of both, had ever made great impression on 
him. All his doubts grew out of himself, when he assisted 
his scruples with all the strength of his own reason, and was 
then too hard for himself." CHAPTER FOURTEENTH. 
IMAGINATION. 
§. 304. Imagination an intellectual process, closely related to reasoning. 
Leaving the subject of reasoning, we next proceed to the 
consideration of the Imagination; which, as well as the rea- 
soning power, obviously comes under the general head of the 
Intellect, rather than of the Sensibilities. It is true, we are 
apt to associate the exercises of the heart with those of the 
imagination, and undoubtedly we have some reason for doing 
so ; but in doing this we are liable, not merely to associate, 
but to identify and confound them. But they are in fact es- 
sentially different. An exercise of the Imagination, in itself 
considered, is purely an intellectual process. The process may, 
indeed, be stimulated and accelerated by a movement of the 
sensibilities ; there may be various extraneous influences op- 
erating either to increase or to diminish its vivacity and ener- 
gy ; but the process itself, considered separately from contin- 
gent circumstances, is wholly intellectual. So that he, who 
possesses a creative and well sustained imagination, may be 
said, with no small degree of truth, to possess a powerful in- 
tellect, whatever torpidity may characterize the region of 
the affections. 
The imagination is not only entitled to be ranked under 
the general head of the Intellect, in distinction from the Sen- 
sibilities ; but it is to be remarked further, which may per- 
haps have escaped the notice of some, that it possesses, es- 
pecially in the process or mode of its action, a close affinity 
with the reasoning power. It is a remark ascribed to 
D'Alembert, whose great skill in the mathematics would seem 378 
IMAGINATION. 
to justify his giving an opinion on such a subject, that the 
imagination is brought into exercise in geometrical processes ; 
which is probably true, so far as some of the mental acts in- 
volved in imagination, such as association and the perception 
of relations, are concerned. And in illustration of his views, 
he intimates in the same connection, that Archimedes the 
geometrician, of all the great men of antiquity, is best enti- 
tled to be placed by the side of Homer.* Certain it is, that, 
in some important respects, there is an intimate relationship 
between the powers in question, the deductive and imagina- 
tive. They both imply the antecedent exercise of the pow- 
er of abstraction ; they are both occupied in framing new 
combinations of thought from the elements already in posses- 
sion ; they both put in requisition, and in precisely the same 
way, the powers of association and relative suggestion. But 
at the same time, they are separated from each other and 
characterized by the two circumstances, that their objects are 
different, and that they operate, in part, on different materi- 
als. Reasoning, as it aims to give us a knowledge of the 
truth, deals exclusively with facts more or less probable. 
Imagination, as it aims chiefly to give pleasure, is at liberty 
to transcend the limits of the world of reality, and conse- 
quently often deals with the mere conceptions of the mind, 
whether they correspond to reality or not. Accordingly the 
one ascertains what is true, the other what is possible ; the 
office of the one is to inquire, of the other to create ; reason- 
ing is exercised within the limits of what is known and actu- 
al, while the appropriate empire of the imagination is the re- 
gion of the conjectural and conceivable. 
§. 305. Definition of the power of imagination. 
Without delaying longer upon the subject, which howev- 
er is not without its importance, of the place which imagina- 
tion ought to occupy in a philosophical classification of the 
mental powers, we next proceed to consider more particular- 
ly, what imagination is, and in what manner it operates. 
Imagination is a complex exercise of the mind, by means of 
which various conceptions are combined together, so as to 
form new wholes. The conceptions have properly enough 
*Stewart's Historical Dissertation. Prefatory Remarks. IMAGINATION. 
379 
been regarded as the materials, from which the new crea- 
tions are made ; but it is not until after the existence of 
those mental acts, which are implied in every process of im- 
agination, that they are fixed upon, detained, and brought 
out from their state of singleness into happy and beautiful 
combinations. 
Our conceptions have been compared to shapeless stones, 
as they exist in the quarry, which "require little more than 
mechanic labor to convert them into common dwellings, but 
that rise into palaces and temples only at the command of 
architectural genius." That rude, and little more than me- 
chanic effort, which converts the shapeless stones of the 
quarry into common dwellings, may justly be considered, 
when divested of its metaphorical aspect, a correct represen- 
tation of this mental property, as it exists among the great 
mass of mankind ; while the architectural genius, which cre- 
ates palaces and temples, is the well furnished and sublime 
imagination of poets, painters, and orators. 
We speak of imagination as a complex mental operation, 
because it implies, in particular, the exercise of the power of 
association in furnishing those conceptions, which are com- 
bined together ; also the exercise of the power of relative 
suggestion, by means of which the combination is effected. 
306. Process of the mind in the creations of the imagination. 
It may assist us in more fully understanding the nature of 
imagination, if we endeavor to examine the intellectual ope- 
rations of one, who makes a formal effort at writing, whether 
the production he has in view be poetical or of some other 
kind. A person cannot ordinarily be supposed to sit down 
to write on any occasion whatever, whether it involve a 
higher or less degree of the exercise of the imagination, with- 
out having some general idea of the subject to be written up- 
on already in the mind. The general idea, or the subject in 
its outlines, must be supposed to be already present. He, ac- 
cordingly, commences the task before him with the expecta- 
tion and the desire of developing the subject more or less ful- 
ly, of giving to it not only a greater continuity and a better 
arrangement, but an increased interest in every respect. As 
he feels interested in the topic which he proposes to write 
upon, he can of course, by a mere act of the will, although 380 
IMAGINATION. 
he might not have been able in the first instance to have 
originated it by such an act, detain it before him for a length 
of time. 
Various conceptions continue, in the mean while, to arise 
in the mind, on the common principles of association ; but as 
the general outline of the subject remains fixed, they all have 
a greater or less relation to it. And partaking in some mea- 
sure of the permanency of the outline, to which they have 
relation, the writer has an opportunity to approve some and 
to reject others, according as they impress him as being suit- 
able or unsuitable to the nature of the subject. Those, which 
affect him with emotions of pleasure, on account of their per- 
ceived fitness for the subject, are retained and committed to 
writing, while others, which do not thus affect and interest 
him, soon fade away altogether. Whoever carefully no- 
tices the operations of his own mind, when he makes an ef- 
fort at composition, will probably be well satisfied, that this 
account of the intellectual process is very near the truth. 
§. 307. Further remarks on the same subject. 
The process, therefore, stated in the most simple and con- 
cise terms, is as follows. We first think of some subject. 
With the original thought or design of the subject, there is a 
co-existent desire to investigate it, to adorn it, to present it 
to the examination of others. The effect of this desire, fol- 
lowed and aided as it naturally is at such times by an act of 
the will, is to keep the general subject in mind ; and, as the 
natural consequence of the exercise of association, various 
conceptions arise, in someway or other related to the gener- 
al subject. Of some of these conceptions we approve in con- 
sequence of their perceived fitness to the end in view, while 
we reject others on account of the absence of this requisite 
quality of agreeableness or fitness. 
For the sake of convenience and brevity we give the name 
of imagination to this complex state or series of states of the 
mind. It is important to possess a single term, expressive of 
the complex intellectual process ; otherwise, as we so fre- 
quently have occasion to refer to it in common conversation, 
we should be subjected, if not properly to a circumlocution, 
at least to an unnecessary multiplication of words. But 
while we find it so much for our convenience to make use of IMAGINATION. 
381 
this term, we should be careful and not impose upon our- 
selves, by ever remembering, that it is the name, neverthe- 
less, not of an original and independent faculty, which of it- 
self accomplishes all, that has been mentioned, but of a com- 
plex or combined action of a number of faculties. 
§. 308. Illustration from the writings of Dr. Reid. 
Dr. Reid (essay iv. ch. 4.) gives the following graphical 
statement of the selection, which is made by the writer from 
the variety of his constantly arising and departing concep- 
tions. "We seem to treat the thoughts, that present them- 
selves to the fancy in crowds, as a great man treats those 
[courtiers] that attend his levee. They are all ambitious of 
his attention. He goes round the circle, bestowing a bow 
upon one, a smile upon another ; asks a short question of a 
third, while a fourth is honored with a particular conference; 
and the greater part have no particular mark of attention, 
but go as they came. It is true, he can give no mark of his 
attention to those who were not there ; but he has a sufficient 
number for making a choice and distinction." 
§. 309. Grounds of the preference of one conception to another. 
A question after all arises, on what principle is the mind 
enabled to ascertain that congruity or incongruity, fitness or 
unfitness, agreeably to which it makes the selection from its 
various conceptions. The fact is admitted, that the intellec- 
tual principle is successively in a series of different states, or, 
in other words, that there are successive conceptions or ima- 
ges, but the inquiry still remains, why is one image in the 
group thought or known to be more worthy than any other 
image, or why are any two images combined together in 
preference to any two others ? 
The answer is, it is owing to no secondary law, but to an 
instantaneous and original suggestion of fitness or unfitness. 
Those conceptions, which, by means of this original power 
of perceiving the relations of things, are found to be suitable 
to the general outlines of the subject, are detained. Those 
images, which are perceived to possess a peculiar congruity 
and fitness for each other, are united together, forming new 
and more beautiful compounds. While others, although no 382 
directly voluntary power appears to be exercised over either 
class, are neglected and soon become extinct. But no ac- 
count of this vivid feeling of approval or disapproval, of this 
very rapid perception of the mutual congruity of the images 
for each other or for the general conception of the subject, 
can be given, other than this, that with such a power the 
original author of our intellectual susceptibilities has been 
pleased to form us. This is our nature ; here we find one of 
the elements of our intellectual efficiency ; without it we 
might still be intellectual beings, but it would be with the 
loss both of the reasoning power and of the imagination. 
IMAGINATION. 
§. 310. Illustration of the subject from Milton. 
What has been said can perhaps be made plainer, by con- 
sidering in what way Milton must have proceeded, in forming 
his happy description of the garden of Eden. He had form- 
ed, in the first place, some general outlines of the subject ; 
and as it was one, which greatly interested his feelings, the 
interest which he felt tended to keep the outlines steadily 
before him. If the feeling of interest was not sufficient to 
keep the general subject before the mind, he could hardly 
fail to detain it there, by adding the influence of a direct and 
decisive act of the will. Then the principles of association, 
which are ever at work, brought up a great variety of con- 
ceptions, having a relation of some kind to those general fea- 
tures ; such as conceptions of rocks, and woods, and rivers, 
and green leaves, and golden fruit. 
The next step was the exercise of that power, which we 
have of perceiving relations, which we sometimes denominate 
the Judgment, but more appropriately the susceptibility or 
power of Relative Suggestion. By means of this he was at 
once able to determine, whether the conceptions, which 
were suggested, were suitable to the general design of the 
description and to each other, and whether they would have, 
when combined together to form one picture, a pleasing 
effect. Accordingly those, which were judged most suitable, 
were combined together as parts of the imaginary creation, 
and were detained and fixed by means of that feeling of in- 
terest, and those acts of the will, which were at first exerci- 
sed towards the more prominent outlines merely ; while oth- IMAGINATION. 
383 
ers speedily disappeared from the mind. And thus arose an 
imaginary landscape, glowing with a greater variety and 
richness of beauty, more interesting and perfect in every re- 
spect, than we can ever expect to find realized in nature. 
§. 311. The creations of the imagination not entirely voluntary. 
From the explanation, which has been given of the opera- 
tions of the power under consideration, it will be seen, that 
in its actions it is subject tolimitations and restrictions. The 
opinion, that even persons of the most ready and fruitful im- 
agination can form new imaginary creations, whenever they 
choose, by a mere volition, however widely it may have pre- 
vailed, does not appear to be well founded. In accordance 
with what may be regarded as the common opinion, we will 
suppose, as an illustration of what we mean, that a person 
wills to imagine a sea of melted brass, or an immense body 
of liquid matter which has that appearance. The very ex- 
pressions, it will be noticed, are nugatory and without mean- 
ing, since the sea of brass, which the person wills to conceive 
of or imagine, is, by the very terms of the proposition, alrea- 
dy present to his thoughts. Whatever a person wills, or 
rather professes to will to imagine, he has, in fact, already 
imagined ; and, consequently, there can be no such thing as 
imaginations, which are exclusively the result of a direct act 
of the will. So that the powers of invention, although the 
influence of the indirect and subordinate action of the will 
may be considerable, must be aroused and quickened to 
their highest efforts in some other way. 
And this view admits of some practical applications. Men 
of the greatest minds, (great we mean in the walks of litera- 
ture,) are kept in check by the principles, which are involv- 
ed in the exercise of imagination. Genius, whatever capa- 
bilities we may attribute to it, has its laws. And it is true, 
in regard to every standard work of the imagination, that it 
is the result, not of an arbitrary and unexplainable exercise 
of that power, but of a multitude of circumstances, prompting 
and regulating its action ; such as the situation in life, early 
education, domestic habits, associates, reading, scenery, re- 
ligion, and the influence of local superstitions and traditiona- 
ry incidents. These are like the rain and sunshine to the 384 
IMAGINATION. 
earth, without which it necessarily remains in its original 
barrenness, giving no signs of vivification and beat^y. In 
the matter of creative power Bunyan will bear a comparison 
undoubtedly with Walter Scott; but Scott, in the situation 
in which he was placed and with the habits of thought and 
feeling which he cherished, could not have written the Pil- 
grim's Progress ; nor could Bunyan, on the other hand, have 
written the Heart of Mid Lothian ; not because eitherof them 
was destitute of the requisite degree of imagination, but be- 
cause the creations of the imagination always have a relation 
to circumstances, and are not the result of a purely arbitrary 
act of the will. 
It would be an easy matter and not without interest, to il- 
lustrate this fact in the operations of the mind, by a reference 
to the private history of those individuals, from whom the 
great works of literature have originated. But as this does 
not come within our plan, we will refer merely to a single in- 
stance. Moore relates, in his life of Lord Byron, that on a 
certain occasion he found him occupied with the history of 
Agathon, a romance by Wieland. And from some remarks 
made at the time, he seems to be of opinion, that Byron was 
reading the work in question as a means of furnishing sug- 
gestions to and of quickening his own imaginative powers. 
He then adds, " I am inclined to think it was his practice, 
when engaged in the composition of any work, to excite his 
vein by the perusal of others, on the same subject or plan, 
from which the slightest hint caught by his imagination, as 
he read, was sufficient to kindle there such a train of thought, 
as but for that spark had never been awakened." 
This is said of a distinguished poet. Painting is an art, 
kindred with poetry ; and both are based on the imagination. 
Accordingly the remarks which have been made, apply also 
to painting, and indeed to every other art, which depends es- 
sentially on the imaginative power. " Invention, (says Sir 
Joshua Reynolds,) is one of the great marks of genius ; but, 
if we consult experience, we shall find, that it is by being con- 
versant with the inventions of others, that we learn to in- 
vent; as by reading the thoughts of others, we learn to 
think. It is in vain for painters or poets to endeavor to in- 
§. 312. Illustration of the statements of the preceding section. IMAGINATION. 
385 
vent without materials on which the mind may work, and 
from which invention must originate. Nothing can come 
of nothing. Homer is supposed to have been possessed of all 
the learning of his time ; and we are certain that Michael 
Angelo and Raffaelle were equally possessed of all the know- 
ledge in the art, which had been discovered in the works of 
their predecessors."* 
§. 313. On the utility of the faculty of the imagination. 
We have proceeded thus far in endeavoring to explain the 
nature of imagination ; and we here turn aside from this 
general subject, for the purpose of remarking on the utility 
of this power. And this appears to be necessary, since there 
are some, who seem disposed to prejudice its claims in that 
respect. They warmly recommend the careful culture of the 
memory, thejudgment, and the reasoning power, but look 
coldly and suspiciously on the imagination, and would rather 
encourage a neglect of it. But there is ground for apprehen- 
ding, that a neglect of this noble faculty in any person, who 
aspires to a full developement and growth of the mind, can- 
not be justified either by considerations drawn from the na- 
ture of the mind itself, or by the practical results of such a 
course. 
In speaking on the utility of the imagination, it is certain- 
ly a very natural reflection, that the Creator had some design 
or purpose in furnishing men with it, since we find universal- 
ly, that he does nothing in vain. And what design could he 
possibly have, if he did not intend, that it should be employ- 
ed, that it should be rendered active, and trained up with 
a suitable degree of culture ? But if we are thus forced upon 
the conclusion, that this faculty was designed to be rendered 
active, we must further suppose, that its exercise was design- 
ed to promote some useful purpose. And such, although it 
has sometimes been perverted, has been the general result. 
No where is the power of imagination seen to better ad- 
vantage than in the Prophets of the Old Testament. Ifit be 
said that those venerable writers were inspired, it will still re- 
main true, that this was the faculty of the mind, which in- 
spiration especially honored by the use, which was made of 
•Discourses before the Royal Academy, VL 386 
IMAGINATION. 
it. And how many monuments may every civilized nation 
boast of, in painting, architecture, and sculpture, as well as 
in poetry, where the imagination, in contributing to the na- 
tional glory, has at the same time contributed to the na- 
tional happiness ! Many an hour it has beguiled by the new 
situations it has depicted, and the new views of human na- 
ture it has disclosed ; many a pang of the heart it has sub- 
dued, either by introducing us to greater woes which others 
have suffered, or by intoxicating the memory with its luxuri- 
ance and lulling it into a forgetfulness of ourselves ; many a 
good resolution it has cherished, and subtending, as it were, 
a new and wider horizon around the intellectual being, has 
filled the soul with higher conceptions, and inspired it with 
higher hopes. Conscious of its immortal destiny, and strug- 
gling against the bounds that limit it, the soul enters with 
joy into those new and lofty creations, which it is the prerog- 
ative of the imagination to form ; and they seem to it a con- 
genial residence. Such are the views, which obviously pre- 
sent themselves on the slightest consideration of this subject; 
and it is not strange, therefore, that we find in the writings of 
no less a judge than Addison, some remarks to this effect, 
that a refined imagination "gives a man a kind of property in 
every thing he sees, and makes the most rude, uncultivated 
parts of nature administer to his pleasures ; so that he looks 
upon the world, as it were, in another light, and discovers in 
it a multitude of charms that conceal themselves from the 
generality of mankind." 
§. 314. Works of imagination give different degrees of pleasure 
Disposed as we are, however, to maintain the high rank 
of the imagination as compared with other powers of the 
mind, and not only its high rank but its utility, we do not de- 
ny that different persons experience different degrees of plea- 
sure from that source. Poetry, for instance, is one of the re- 
sults of the imagination ; and although it is generally regard- 
ed as a highly pleasing as well as useful art, we nevertheless 
find, that all persons do not possess the same relish for its 
beauties. But the fault does not appear to be so much in 
the art, or the powers of imagination which give existence to 
the art, as in those to whom it is addressed. The pleasure, IMAGINATION. 
387 
which is felt by a reader of poetry, (and similar remarks will 
apply to other efforts of the imagination,) will in general de- 
pend upon two circumstances, (1) the liveliness of his own 
imagination, (2) the conformity of his experience to the 
things described. 
The pleasure, which is felt by a reader of poetry, will de- 
pend in part, in the first place, on the liveliness of his own 
imagination. In poems the different parts are only imper- 
fectly filled up ; some describe more minutely than others ; 
but the most minute describers only trace the outlines. 
These remain, therefore, to be filled up by the reader. But 
the ability to do this is found in very different degrees in dif- 
ferent persons ; some very rapidly and admirably finish the 
picture and others do not. The latter, consequently, remain 
in a considerable degree, unaffected, and perhaps condemn 
the poem as deficient in interest; while the former read it 
with great feeling and pleasure. 
The pleasure will depend, in the second place, on the 
conformity of the reader's experience to the things described. 
If the scene of the poem is laid in the country, and deals ex- 
clusively in the toils and sorrows and joys of country life, it 
would not be unreasonable to anticipate, that it might not ex- 
cite any decided interest in those, who never had any actual 
experience of that kind. It will probably be conceded, that 
few poems, and perhaps none, have met with a more favora- 
ble reception, and have touched more deeply the universal 
sensibility, than the Cotter's Saturday Night of Burns. It is 
certainly a most admirable picture of domestic life, such as 
may sometimes be found among a poor and virtuous peasant- 
ry, with its little touching incidents of joy and hope and 
grief, of friendship and religious faith. It can hardly fail to 
be pleasing to all, but how much more so to those, who had 
their birth and were brought up in the cottages of Scotland ; 
who trod in early life her rugged hills, and mingled in the 
rural toils of her peasantry ; and in whose bosoms every in- 
cident of the poem awakens some affecting recollections. 
Burns himself was by no means ignorant of the additional 
pleasure, which arises under these circumstances. "He was 
passionately fond, (says Dugald Stewart,) of the beauties of 
nature ; and I recollect once he told me, when I was admiring 388 
a distant prospect in one of our morning walks, that the sight 
of so many smoking cottages gave a pleasure to his mind, 
which none could understand, who had not witnessed like 
himself, the happiness and the worth which they contained."* 
While, therefore, we do not hesitate to assert the utility 
of the imagination and the adaptedness of its more success- 
ful creations to give a high degree of pleasure, we do not sup- 
pose, for the reasons mentioned in this section and for others 
which might be mentioned, that these views will answer 
equally well to the experience, or commend themselves equal- 
ly to the judgment of all. 
IMAGINATION. 
§. 315. Importance of the imagination in connection with reasoning. 
In remarking on the subject of the utility of the imagina- 
tion, there is one important point of view, in which it is ca- 
pable of being considered ; that of the relation of the imagi- 
nation to the other intellectual powers. And, among other 
things, there is obviously ground for the remark, that a vig- 
orous and well disciplined imagination may be made subser- 
vient to promptness, and clearness, and success in reasoning. 
The remark is made, it will be noticed, on the supposition of 
the imagination being well disciplined, which implies, that it 
is under suitable control ; otherwise it will rather encumber 
and perplex, than afford aid. 
Take, for instance, two persons, one of whom has cultiva- 
ted the reasoning power exclusive of the imagination. We 
will suppose him to possess very deservedly the reputation 
of an able and weighty dialectician ; but it will be obvious to 
the slightest observation, that there is, in one respect, a de- 
fect and failure ; there is an evident want of selection and 
vivacity in the details of his argument. He cannot readily 
appreciate the relation, which the hearer's mind sustains to 
the facts, which he wishes to present ; and accordingly with 
much expense of patience on their part, he laboriously and 
very scrupulously takes up and examines every thing, which 
can come within his grasp, and bestows upon every thing 
nearly an equal share of attention. And hence it is, that 
many persons, who are acknowledged to be learned, diligent, 
* See the Letter of Mr. Stewart in Currie's Life of Burns- IMAGINATION. 
389 
and even successful in argument, at the same time sustain 
the reputation, which is by no means an enviable one, of be- 
ing dull, tiresome, and uninteresting. 
Let us now look a moment at another person, who is not 
only a man of great powers of ratiocination, but has cultiva- 
ted his imagination, and has it under prompt and judicious 
command. He casts his eye rapidly over the whole field of 
argument, however extensive it may be ; and immediately 
perceives what facts are necessary to be stated, and what 
are not ; what are of prominent, and what of subordinate 
importance ; what will be easily understood and possess an 
interest, and what will be difficult to be appreciated, and will 
also lose its due value from a want of attraction. And he 
does this on the same principle, and in virtue of the same 
mental training, which enables the painter, architect, sculp- 
tor, and poet, to present the outlines of grand and beautiful 
creations in their respective arts. There is a suitableness 
in the different parts of the train of reasoning ; a correspon- 
dence of one part to another ; a great and combined effect, 
enhanced by every suitable decoration, and undiminished by 
any misplaced excrescence, which undoubtedly implies a per- 
fection of the imagination, in some degree, kindred with that, 
which projected the group of the Laocoon, crowned the hills 
of Greece with statues and temples, and lives in the works 
of renowned poets. The debater, who combines the highest 
results of reasoning with the highest results of the imagina- 
tion, throws the light of his own splendid conceptions around 
the radiance of truth ; so that brightness shines in the midst 
of brightness, like the angel of the Apocalypse in the sun. 
§. 316. Of misconceptions by means of the imagination. 
But while it is safe to admit, that the imagination may be 
made subservient to valuable purposes, it is no less true, that 
it may sometimes mislead us. The following are instances 
among others, where this is the result. 
Our admiration of the great may be reckoned a prejudice 
of the imagination. We are apt to suppose them possessed 
of personal attractions, and of the highest happiness ; and 
not only this, to invest them with every worthy moral attri- 390 
IMAGINATION. 
bute. "The misfortunes, (says a late writer,) of Mary, 
Queen of Scots, and of her descendant, Prince Charles Ed- 
ward, commanded the sympathy, the love, and the enthusi- 
asm of millions. In the cause of these princes, how many 
have joyfully sacrificed life, though neither of them was wor- 
thy or capable of reigning! How many labor still to blot out 
every stain from their memory ! And yet every individual, 
in the circle of his own private friends and acquaintances, 
can undoubtedly find many persons more distinguished for 
virtue, for good principles, for integrity of character, than 
the prince for whom he is willing to lay down his life ; but a 
friend, a private man, is invested with none of those attri- 
butes, always dazzling but often false, which are calculated 
to strike the imagination." 
Our imaginations mislead us also in respect to war, when- 
ever we contemplate it at a distance, and do not feel its ef- 
fects at our own fire-sides and homes. We delight to dwell 
upon the idea of mighty power which it suggests ; we recall 
to memory the homage and plaudits, which have been given 
to the brave ; we combine together conceptions of all, that 
is stirring in music, and brilliant in equipage. In a word, it 
is a kindling imagination, seizing upon some imposing circum- 
stances, that leads multitudes into deplorable mistakes as to 
the character of that great scourge of the human race. 
Again ; the power of imagination often gives a wrong coloring 
to future life. It is here as in some prospects in natural 
scenery, 
'Tis distance lends enchantment to the view. 
Whatever may be our present evils, we imagine there is 
good to come. We rush forward in the pursuit of it, like 
children, who set out with spirited emulation, expecting to 
grasp in their hands the splendors of the rainbow, that ap- 
pears to them to rest upon the neighboring hills. 
§. 317. Explanation of the above misrepresentations of the imagination. 
But how happens it, that this faculty, in these and other 
similar instances, sometimes misleads us? What explanation 
can,be given? The answer is, that the mind turns away 
with a natural aversion from whatever causes it pain or un- 
easiness ; delighting to dwell on the elements of beauty and IMAGINATION. 
391 
sublimity, and in general on all scenes, which excite in it 
pleasant emotions. As there is, therefore, more or less in 
all actual situations, which causes dissatisfaction, we shall 
always find in every condition in which we are placed, some- 
thing which detracts from what we imagine to be the sum of 
happiness. The evils, which are around us and near us, we 
must know ; our situation forbids an attempt at the conceal- 
ment of them. Every day forces the lesson of human adver- 
sity on our attention. But when we look abroad from the 
reality which exists at home, from the cares and sorrows, 
which are ever near at hand, to other scenes and prospects, 
we do not think of trial and disappointment, because we are 
not obliged to. We fix our attention upon those circumstan- 
ces, which appear most favorable, and interesting ; and con- 
sequently know nothing of the uneasiness and misery, which 
actually exist in the imaginary paradise of our creation. 
For instance, we are apt to associate, as has been remarked, 
with persons in very high stations in life, the ideas of unal- 
loyed happiness, of moral excellence, of manliness and beau- 
ty of form ; but while men in the most exalted stations have 
no less a share than others of bodily deformities and suffer- 
ing, they have still greater anxieties ; their hours of sorrow 
are often more numerous than those of any other class of 
persons. It was well inquired by King Henry in Shakspeare, 
"What infinite heart's ease must kings neglect, 
"That private men enjoy? 
"And what have kings, that privates have not too, 
"Save ceremony, save general ceremony? '' 
And under the direction of the same mental tendency, by 
which we are led to mark the elevations without noticing the 
depressions of the great men of the earth, we are led also to 
see the sublimities and hide from our sight the degradations 
and miseries of war, to behold the sunshine of the future, 
but no clouds. 
§. 318. Feelings of sympathy aided by the imagination. 
But where the imagination is not at liberty to fix itself ex- 
clusively upon pleasing circumstances, the results as to the 
degree of creative power are the same, although they are of 
a different kind. In the one case, it forms creations of beau-< 
ty, magnificence, sublimity ; in the other, it is equally effica- 392 
IMAGINATION. 
cious in combining images of gloom and suffering. Hence a 
quick and powerful imagination is no small aid in the exer- 
cise of the sympathetic feelings. Accordingly, when two 
men, (the one a person of imagination, the other not,) meet 
a poor man who has suddenly been reduced to poverty, they 
will be found to have different degrees of sympathy for him. 
The latter no doubt will pity the unfortunate man ; but the 
former will pity him more. He will think of his former situ- 
ation ; he will follow him to his dwelling ; he will see in his 
"prophetic eye" the tears of his family ; in a word, he will, 
as a general statement, have more feeling for all individuals 
in suffering, and consequently, be more likely to lend his aid 
to alleviate it. 
Thus, in Sterne's Sentimental Journey, he is led by some 
circumstance to think of a captive in one of the French State 
Prisons. He gives the reins to his imagination ; "and looks 
through the twilight of the grated door to take the picture.- 
I beheld, (says he,) his body half wasted with long expecta- 
tion and confinement, and felt what kind of sickness of the 
heart it is which arises from hope deferred. Upon looking 
nearer, I saw him pale and feverish. In thirty years, the 
western breeze had not fanned his blood. He had seen no 
sun, no moon, in all that time ; nor had the voice of friend 
or kinsman breathed through his lattice. His children 
But here my heart began to bleed, and I was forced to go on 
with another part of the portrait." 4 CHAPTER FIFTEENTH. 
COMPLEX IDEAS OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. 
§. 319. Of complex ideas of external origin. 
It will be recollected, that, in considering that portion of 
our knowledge which has an external origin, our mental 
states were examined in relation to their Simplicity and Com- 
plexness. The names of colors, as red, white, yellow, green, 
&c, were spoken of as being expressive of simple ideas, or rath- 
er of simple sensations. The character of simplicity belongs 
also to the original intimations of the touch, and to the origi- 
nal sensations of the hearing, smell, and taste. Other names, 
as loadstone, tree, sun, gold, and the like, were referred to, 
as expressive of complex notions. It was laid down, as char- 
acteristic of simple notions, that they are one and insepara- 
ble, while such as are complex embrace any number of sim- 
ple ideas more than one. 
But in respect to complex notions of an external origin, 
there is this further and obvious characteristic. When they 
are ascertained with suitable care, they are just what the 
forms of external nature have constituted them, being neither 
more nor less extensive. In our complex notions, for in- 
stance, of a loadstone, a tree, the sun, animal, man, horse, 
gold,&c, we embrace precisely what nature has allotted to 
the objects themselves ; that is to say, if our complex ideas 
in these particular cases be properly and fully formed. Na- 
ture, as she exists external to the mind, has placed a limit 
on combinations of this kind, which we are clearly not at 
liberty to disregard. 394 
COMPLEX IDEAS 
§. 820. Nature of complex ideas ofinternal origin. 
But in considering, as we do at present, that portion of 
our knowledge, which is not directly dependent on external 
objects, we are naturally led to remark on complex notions 
of internal origin. Complex ideas of this description are like 
all others, in being composed of elementary parts which are 
simple. Original Suggestion, Consciousness, Relative Sug- 
gestion, and the Reasoning power, which are the great sour- 
ces of internal knowledge, are all fountains of new simple 
views. A multitude of thoughts, unknown to the mind be- 
fore, arise from these various sources, which are not suscep- 
tible of being resolved into others more elementary. But 
while we cannot resolve, we are able to combine them in a 
variety of ways almost endless. 
But the prominent characteristic of the complex mental 
states now under consideration is not, that the elementary 
parts come, in a great degree, from these sources , it is rath- 
er the mind's agency in forming them. We are not limited, 
in the process of combination, by any precise complication of 
qualities in outward objects, which is the fact, in respect to 
complex notions of external origin ; but may bring together 
ideas of the same or of different kinds, and may form new 
wholes of every imaginable description. Such new notions, 
considered in reference to what they are in their complex 
state, are purely creatures of the mind, fashioned by the 
mind's choice, and capable of being altered, according to the 
mere dictates of that choice, into every degree of enlarge- 
ment and diminution, and into every novelty of aspect. 
It is on this ground chiefly, that they are characterized as 
being of internal, rather than of external origin. 
§. 821. Of complex notions formed by the repetition of the same thing. 
In some instances we find the same ideas repeated a 
greater or less number of times, and susceptible of enlarge- 
ment and variety by the mere addition or multiplication of 
itself. By means of such repetition we become possessed of 
various complex notions, which are distinguished from oth- 
ers, merely in being modifications of the same original 
thought, carried on to a greater or less extent, but without 
any intermixture of foreign materials. 395 
OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. 
Of the ideas of this class are such as are expressed hy the 
words, hour, day, week, month, and year; which are framed 
by the modification, and the adding together, as it were, of 
our elementary notions of time. Artificial measures of ex- 
tension, such as an inch, foot, yard, furlong, and mile, al- 
though they are based upon something which is directly ad- 
dressed to the outward senses, are nevertheless, in themselves 
considered, the arbitrary creations of the mind, and of course 
belong here. To this class also belong the complex ideas 
of number, as a dozen, a score, an hundred, a thousand, 
which are formed by the repeated addition of units, as far as 
the collections specified by those names. 
The origin of the elementary notion of unity or oneness 
was explained on a former occasion ; and it is not only one 
of the earliest, but one of the most distinct notions men have. 
This simple elementary idea lays the foundation of all the 
numerous and diversified combinations of numbers. And it 
is worthy of remark, that these combinations, although they 
are carried to a wonderful extent, are exceedingly distinct in 
the mind's conception of them ; so as to be but seldom con- 
founded with each other, or attended with any perplexity. 
There is, for instance, no confusion and indistinctness in the 
complex idea, expressed by the word million, although it 
might not be unreasonable to expect it, when we consider the 
vast number of subordinate parts embraced in it. But this 
is owing in part to certain facilities afforded to the mind by 
the numerical signs used, and by language in particular. 
322. Of the help afforded by names in the combination of numbers. 
A certain writer remarks on the skillful formation of the 
names of numbers, and on the assistance afforded by them, in 
the following terms. "And here we may take notice of a 
wonderful artifice made use of by the mind, to facilitate and 
help itself forward in its conceptions. For as the advance from 
number to number is endless, were they all to be distinguish- 
ed by different denominations that had no connexion or depen- 
dence one upon another, the multitude of them must soon 
overcharge the memory, and render it impossible for us to go 
any great way in the progress of numbering. For this rea- 
son it is so contrived, that the change of names is restrained 396 
COMPLEX IDEAS 
to a few of the first combinations, all the rest that follow be- 
ing1 marked by a repetition of the same terms, variously com- 
pounded and linked together. Thus thirteen is ten and 
three, fourteen, ten and four, and so on to twenty or two 
tens, when we begin again with one, two, &c. until we ad- 
vance to thirty, or three tens. In this manner the progres- 
sion continues ; and when we arrive at ten tens, to prevent 
confusion by a too frequent repetition of the same word, that 
sum is distinguished by the name of a hundred. Again, ten 
hundred is called a thousand, at which period the computa- 
tion begins anew, running through all the former combina- 
tions, as ten thousand, a hundred thousand, ten hundred 
thousand ; which last collection, for the reasons mentioned 
above, has the name of million appropriated to it. With this 
million, we can begin as before, until it is repeated a million 
of times ; when, if we change the denomination to billions, 
and advance in the same manner through trillions, quartil- 
lions, &c, the series may be carried on without confusion, to 
any length we please. 
This artful combination of names to mark the gradual in- 
crease of numbers, is perhaps one of the greatest refinements 
of the human understanding, and particularly deserves our 
admiration for the manner of the composition ; the several 
denominations being so contrived as to distinguish exactly 
the stages of the progression, and point out the distance from 
the beginning of the series. By this means it happens, that 
our ideas of numbers are of all others the most accurate and 
distinct ; nor does the multitude of units assembled together, 
in the least puzzle or confound the understanding." * 
§. 323. Instances of complex notions made up of different simple ideas. 
The instances, which have been given, will perhaps be 
sufficient in illustration of those complex notions, where the 
combination is limited to one original element. And we shall 
now proceed to the consideration of those cases, where the 
act of combining is of a more complicated kind ; and these 
are much more numerous than the others. Men are neces- 
* Duncan's Elements of Logic, Bk. I, Chap. 4.-The same subject 
is examined also and illustrated by Mr. Locke in that part of his Essay, 
which treats of Mixed Modes. OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. 
397 
sarily led, according to their manner of life, their situation 
and wants, to frame such permanent collections of simple 
ideas as experience has ascertained to be useful and neces- 
sary. They even frame such complex notions in many cases, 
without waiting to be guided by experience, but in anticipa- 
tion of what may possibly take place at some future time ; or 
frame them not unfrequently, as the mere exercise of inven- 
tion. Andas they advance in knowledge, and make improve- 
ments in the arts and sciences, they are necessarily led into 
complicated views of things, which would otherwise not of- 
fer themselves to their notice. 
A few instances will help to illustrate what has been said. 
The word theft is the name of a complex notion. It 
may perhaps be defined a change of property without the 
consent of the owner, and with fraudulent intentions on the 
part of the person who removes it. Consequently it embra- 
ces, among other ideas differing from each other, those of 
ownership, evil design, transference, and the withholding of 
consent. If, however, we fully and minutely resolve it into 
its parts, we shall undoubtedly find elements not purely of an 
internal kind. And it is proper to make the general remark 
here, which has already been in part anticipated, that very 
many complex notions embrace elements, a part of which are 
addressed to the senses, and are consequently of an external 
origin, while others have their origin wholly in the mind. 
But while the elements, in many cases of internal complex 
notions, are partly of external origin, the selection and ar- 
rangement of them is wholly a mental work. Accordingly 
while the complex terms gold, loadstone, iron, and others 
like them embrace just what nature has allotted to the ob- 
jects themselves, without the liability of increase or diminu- 
tion from the mere arbitrary choice of men ; the complex 
term theft, and all others like it includes, (whether it be 
more or less,) what the human mind has agreed upon, and 
assigned to it, and is liable to be modified from the same 
cause. The word legislation also is the name of a com- 
plex idea of internal origin, implying the existence of a num- 
ber of elements of thought, which are arbitrarily brought to- 
gether and united by the mind, such as the existence of civil 
society, the formation of government, the delegation of pow- 398 
COMPLEX IDEAS 
er to certain individuals, and the exercise of that power in 
the making of laws. The word treason implies the no- 
tions of country, government, law, obligation, agent, and vi- 
olation of law ; while patriotism, on the other hand, includes, 
in connection with the ideas of country, government, and 
law, the notions of obedience, respect, and love, and the dis- 
position to make great sacrifices, in consequence of such love. 
It is needless further to multiply instances in this place, 
since they make a great portion of every language, and will 
readily occur to the recollection. Notions thus formed, as 
they are the creations of the mind, are undoubtedly liable to 
be altered by it ; and are in fact not unfreqiiently so, although 
there is in general a good degree of permanency. The com- 
bination, it will be recollected, is not formed in the first in- 
stance without a good reason ; and while the circumstances, 
which at first required its formation, remain, the complex 
notion will be likely to remain also. And not only this ; 
there is a great security of the permanency of the complex 
notion in the mere name itself. The name is fixed upon the 
thought, as the seal upon the wax ; every time we see it, or 
have it brought to our notice in any other way, the precise 
combination of ideas, which makes up the complex notion, is 
suggested to the mind. Every repetition of this suggestion 
strengthens the bond of complexity, and diminishes the lia- 
bility of its being rent asunder, or altered in any way what- 
ever. 
§. 324. Not the same internal complex ideas in all languages. 
It is proper to repeat the remark here, that the origin of 
complex notionswill depend,in a great measure,on the situ- 
ation and the exigencies of men ; and that consequently the 
words, employed in different languages, will often fail of pre- 
cisely corresponding to each other. This is the natural and 
unavoidable result of the differences, which, in different 
countries, exist in customs, habits, scenery, occupations, 
modes of thinking, and political institutions. Every language, 
therefore, as a matter of necessity, has not only its own terms 
and idioms, expressive of the ordinary mass of ideas common 
to all men, but has some which are peculiar to itself, and to 
which there is nothing precisely corresponding in other lan- 
guages. Thus the words corban in the Hebrew, ostrakismos 399 
in the Greek, proscriptio in the Latin, and roturier in the 
French,* express ideas, to which most other nations find 
nothing precisely answering, and consequently, have no cor- 
responding words. 
This diversity will be manifest, not only in a few scatter- 
ing terms, but will more or less be characteristic of whole 
departments of science. If, for instance, we make the laws 
of a country the subject of our examination, we shall readily 
see, how mental perceptions and their combinations have 
been modified by circumstances ; and that terms are used, 
expressive of such peculiarities in the people's views, princi- 
ples, and practices, which cannot be understood without a 
particular study of their origin, and their applications. It is 
certainly not too much to say, that there are many langua- 
ges, in which an English book of law could not be written ; 
and many of those, who speak them, would be unable to un- 
derstand and appreciate it, if it could be. Their minds have 
not been cast in the mould of Englishmen ; they have not 
been trained, from the moment they were capable of any 
mental discrimination whatever, to the recognition of person- 
al rights, and the distinctions and rights of property. 
This suggests a remark on the changes, which take place 
in languages. It is well known, that there are frequent al- 
terations in the customs of a people, and also in their feelings 
and opinions, and hence there necessarily arise correspond- 
ing changes in the combinations of thought or ideas, and 
these must, in many cases, be expressed by new names. If 
people should be found unwilling or unable to invent new 
names for the expression of new complex ideas, they would 
evidently be subjected to great inconvenience. This may 
be seen if we deprive ourselves of the benefit of any complex 
terms, for instance, reprieve, appeal, inherit, adjudicate, legislate, 
and the like, and then attempt to converse on the subjects, 
where they naturally occur. 
OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. 
• "We have no English word, (says Hallam,) that expresses the sense 
of roturier. How glorious is this deficiency in our political language, 
and how different are the ideas suggested by commonner! " 400 
COMPLEX IDEAS 
§. 325. Origin of the complex notion of a Supreme Being. 
In connection with the views of this chapter, it is proper 
to add, that we find here, more properly than any where else, 
the origin of the notion of a God. We have already had oc- 
casion to assert, (§. 45,) that there is no ground for the posi- 
tion, that this idea is innate ; and it will not be deemed ne- 
cessary to repeat here the considerations on that subject 
which were then advanced. There is, in some important re- 
spects, a foundation for this idea in the mind, but it is intro- 
duced by degrees, and was not originally created there. 
The propriety of considering the formation of this complex 
notion in this place will at once be obvious. If there were 
any outward likeness of the Supreme Being, if he were ad- 
dressed to our senses in the shape of the sun, moon, or stars, 
or any thing else, which the eyes of men have seen or the 
hands of men have fashioned, this would not be the place to 
resume the consideration of this topic, but it should have been 
treated of under the head of notions of an External origin. 
But it is far otherwise ; God is a spirit, and his representative 
or that which corresponds to him in others, is not in outward 
nature, but in the inward contemplation. His image arises 
and shines in the intellects he has created ; and the emotions 
of the heart bow down and worship it. 
The idea of the Supreme Being is a complex one, made up 
of many subordinate parts, such as the ideas of wisdom, truth, 
justice, power, benevolence, and causation ; and all these en- 
larged and expanded to correspond with the notions of infini- 
ty. The mind gathers these subordinate conceptions from 
within and without ; from the works of nature and from its 
own structure, from the world of intellect and feeling, and the 
world of matter. Ranging abroad in the great creation both 
of the spiritual and the material handy-works of the Most 
High, it finds one elementary thought here and another 
there, and perceiving the necessity of their approach and 
union in one independent existence it is in this way that the 
vast and exalted conception we are considering results from 
their combination. OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. 
401 
It is probably owing to this method of its origin, that the 
complex notion of a Supreme Being is so different in different 
nations. Where the moral views of the people are wanting 
in elevation, and the notions they form of truth, wisdom, and 
justice in particular, are low and inadequate, the combined 
or complex notion of a God, which embraces these elementa- 
ry parts, will be depressed to a correspondence with its ele- 
ments. And on the other hand, wherever we find the per- 
ceptions of the human intellect, not only highly purified and 
enlightened by human culture, but raised and guided also by 
the Holy Scriptures, we shall find a comprehensive and tran- 
scendent idea of the Deity, correspondent, in some good de- 
gree, to the glorious reality it expresses. For such a Being, 
and thus distinctly revealed to us in the soul, "we may cher- 
ish, (in the words of Degerando,) the most august love which 
the heart of a creature can conceive ; adoration, mingled 
with gratitude and confidence, finding its true and inexhaus- 
tible object in the source of infinite perfection, in the image 
of an eternal Benefactor." DIVISION FIRST. 
THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING. 
INTELLECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MIND. 
PART THIRD. 
IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED INTELLECTUAL ACTION. CHAPTER FIRST. 
CONNECTION OF THE MIND AND BODY. 
§. 326. Disordered intellectual action connected with the body. 
Having completed our examination of the Intellect, so 
far as it presents itself to our notice in its more frequent and 
regular action, we now propose to conclude the subject, by 
giving some instances of intellectual states, which appear to 
take place in violation of its ordinary principles. Whatever 
anticipations we might have been disposed to form a priori, 
in relation to the action of the mind, it is a matter abundant- 
ly confirmed by painful experience and observation, that its 
operations are not always uniform ; and that in some cases, 
as we shall have occasion to see, it exhibits an utter and dis- 
astrous deviation from the laws, which commonly regulate 
it. The causes of these deviations it may not be easy al- 
ways, and in all respects, to explain ; but it is well under- 
stood, that they are frequently connected with an irregular 
and diseased condition of the body. There may be, and 
there undoubtedly are, other causes, more remote from com- 
mon observation, and more intimately connected with the 
interior nature and more secret springs of mental action ; 
but this does not preclude a distinct and particular attention 
to one so obvious, and by general concession so powerful as 
that which we now refer to. Accordingly it will be the ob- 
ject of the few remarks embraced in this Chapter, and as in- 
troductory in some degree to what follows on the subject of 
disordered intellectual action, to show by some statements 
and illustrations the connection existing between the body 
and mind, and the influence t«hey reciprocally exert. 406 
§. 327. The mind constituted on the principle of a connection with the 
body. 
CONNECTION OF THE 
In endeavoring to illustrate the subject of the intimate 
connection and the reciprocal influence of the mind and body, 
the first remark is, that the mind is evidently constituted on 
the principle of such a connection. Whatever expansion 
the mind may afterwards attain to, whatever greatness of 
power it may exhibit in the progress of its subsequent devel- 
opement, there is no doubt, that it possesses the seeds of its 
power and the elements of its expansion in the very begin- 
nings of its existence. They are there, although at first they 
do not manifest themselves. They have an existence, although 
they are in some sense invisible and unappreciable. They 
are not only in silence and in darkness ; but, in themselves 
considered and independently of aid from other sources, they 
appear to be destitute of any capability of quickening into 
action and bursting forth into light. 
And how does this happen? Evidently because the mind 
is constituted on the principle of a connection with the body. 
The human mind, (and this is probably true of every mind 
that is morally accountable,) exists in the threefold nature 
or threefold division of the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and 
the Will. The action of the Will depends upon the antece- 
dent action of the Sensibilities ; and that of the sensitive na- 
ture is based upon the antecedent action of the Intellect. 
The action of the Intellect or Understanding is twofold, Ex- 
ternal and Internal. And we have already endeavored, on a 
former occasion, to show, that the developement of the Ex- 
ternal Understanding is first in the order of time, as it is ob- 
viously first in the order of nature. It is here, so far as the 
mind is concerned, that we find the commencement of action; 
but it is well understood and is entirely undeniable, that all 
the action, which takes place here, takes place in connection 
with bodily action. The External intellect does not act nor 
is it capable of acting, although the mind is so constituted 
that the movement of all the other parts depends upon move- 
ment here, without the antecedent affection of the outward 
or bodily senses. 
In some remarks on this subject in a former chapter, we 
suggested, that the soul, considered in its relationship to ex- MIND AND BODY. 
407 
ternal objects, might be compared to a stringed instrument. 
That comparison may help to illustrate the subject here. In 
the essence of its own nature the soul is unseen and un- 
searchable, although it not only has an existence, but posses- 
ses the capacity and elements of mental harmony. But God 
has erected around it, unseen and intangible as it is, an out- 
ward structure of visible chords and artificial frame-work, such 
as the wonderful system of the nerves, the eye, the ear, and 
the senses generally. In accordance with this arrangement, 
the soul, although it has in itself the original and abundant 
source of harmony, will always be found, (such is the law or 
principle on which it is constituted,) to be utterly without 
music and without voice, until it is wakened into life and the 
utterance of appropriate sounds by an impulse communicated 
through the outward structure. The internal susceptibility 
must be interrogated through the openings of the exterior ed- 
ifice ; the tangible and visible chords must be smitten, before 
the required response will be yielded by the mysterious and 
invisible agent beneath them. These are the facts ; but 
as this topic has been particularly noticed upon a former oc- 
casion, we shall not further delay upon it here. 
The existence of the connection between the mind and 
body and of their influence upon each other appears, in the 
second place, from the effects, which are witnessed in old 
age. The effects of old age, it is true, are first experienced 
in the bodily system. The outward senses become blunted 
and dim ; the eye loses its keenness of sight ; the ear its 
quickness of hearing; the palate its nice discriminations of 
taste ; and in various other ways the whole bodily system 
shows the rapid diminution of its activity and power. But it 
is well known, since it is a matter of every day's observation, 
that these effects are not restricted to that part of the human 
system, where they first show themselves. The mind also 
is unfavorably affected, at the same time, and through the in- 
fluence of the same causes. 
These results, it is true, are not experienced, to a great 
extent, in the Internal Intellect, or that division of the intel- 
lect, which operates in the discovery of truth, independent 
§. 328. Illustration of the subject from the effects of old age. 408 
CONNECTION OF THE 
in a great measure of the outward senses ; nor in the inward 
or higher Sensibilities or that portion of the sensibilities 
which concerns itself with the morality and rectitude of 
things ; but they are seen and felt, perhaps we may say 
without a single exception, and in a high degree, in that de- 
partment of the mind, which we have proposed to desig- 
nate, in consequence of its depending in its action on the ex- 
ternal senses, as the External Intellect. As the senses, 
one after another are prostrated, this portion of the intellec- 
tive nature, which, as was noticed in the last section, was 
brought into action through their instrumentality, seems to 
fall and lie prostrate with them. It seems to be hardly less 
deaf and blind, hardly less sensible to the intimations of 
touch and taste, and to stand less in need of crutches to sup- 
port it than the bowed and superanuated body, which it had 
formerly employed as the medium of its activity. The higher 
departments of the soul, as has been intimated, remain es- 
sentially firm and unshaken ; but this, which has a particu- 
larly close connection with the bodily nature, and is based 
as it were upon a foundation of materiality, is neccessarily 
blunted and disordered in its action by the dislocation and 
breaking up of the earthly materials. 
§ 329. The connection of the bodily system with the mental shown from 
the effects resulting from diseases. 
In addition to what has been said it may be remarked fur- 
ther, in confirmation of the same general views, that violent 
corporeal diseases in youth and manhood, before any decays 
take place from age, often affect the powers of thought. Per- 
sons have been known, for instance, after a violent fever or 
violent attacks of some other form of disease, to lose entire- 
ly the power of recollection. Thucydides, in his account of the 
plague of Athens, makes mention of some persons, who had 
survived that disease ; but their intense bodily sufferings had 
affected their mental constitution so much that they had for- 
gotten their families and friends, and had lost all knowledge 
of their own former history. It is a singular fact also, that 
the result of violent disease is sometimes quite the reverse of 
what has now been stated. While in one case the memory 
is entirely prostrated, we find in others, that under the influ- 
ence of such attacks the memory is suddenly aroused, and re- MIND AND BODY. 
409 
stores the history of the past with a minuteness and vivid- 
ness unknown before. But both classes of cases confirm 
what we are now attempting to show, viz, the existence of 
a connection between the mind and body and a reciprocal in- 
fluence between them. 
§ 330. Shown also from the effects of stimulating drugs and gases. 
If there be not a close connection between the body and 
mind, and if there be not various influences propagated from 
one to the other, how does it happen that many things of a 
stimulating nature, such as ardent spirits and opium, strong- 
ly affect the mind, when taken into the system in considera- 
ble quantities? But without delaying upon the effects of 
drugs of this description, which unhappily can hardly fail to 
be noticed every day, we would instance particularly the re- 
sults, which are found to follow from the internal use of the 
nitrous oxide gas. This gas, when it is received into the 
system, operates in the first instance on the body. The ef- 
fect is a physical one. In particular, it quickens the circula- 
tion of the blood ; and also, as is commonly supposed increa- 
ses the volume of that fluid. But its effects, which are first 
felt in the body, are afterwards experienced in the mind ; 
and generally in a high degree. When it is inhaled in a con- 
siderable quantity, the sensations are more acute, the concep- 
tions of absent objects are more vivid, associated trains of 
thought pass through the mind with increased rapidity, and 
emotions and passions, generally of a pleasant kind, are exci- 
ted, corresponding in strength to the increased acuteness of 
sensations and the increased vividness of conceptions. 
There is another gas, the febrile miasma, which is found, 
on being inhaled, to affect the mind also, by first affecting 
the sanguineous fluid. But this gas diminishes, instead of 
increasing the volume of blood ; as is indicated by a small 
contracted pulse, and an increasing constriction of the capil- 
laries. As in the case of the nitrous oxide gas, the mental 
exercises are rendered intense and vivid by the febrile mias- 
ma ; but the emotions, which are experienced, instead of 
being pleasant, are gloomy and painful. The trains of 
thought, which are at such times suggested, and the crea- 
tions of the imagination are ah of an analogous character, 410 
CONNECTION OF THE 
strange, spectral, and terrifying.* We may add as a gen- 
eral remark here, that, whenever the physical condition of 
the brain, which is a prominent organ in the process of sen- 
sation and external perception, is affected, whether it be from 
a more than common fulness of the blood vessels or from 
some other cause, the mind itself will be found to be affect- 
ed also, and oftentimes in a high degree. 
§. 331. Influence on the body of excited imagination and passion. 
The powers of the mind are not only liable to be power- 
fully affected by certain conditions of the corporeal system, 
but the body also, on the other hand, even to the functions 
of the vital principle itself, is liable to corresponding affec- 
tions, superinduced by certain conditions of the mind. When 
the passions, for instance, are excited, particularly that of 
fear, the body at once feels the influence ; and instances have 
occurred, where, under the influence of the last named pas- 
sion, even death itself has followed. In the city of New 
York a few years since, a little child was left in the evening 
in the care of a maid servant, the mother having gone out 
As the child was disposed to be troublesome and to cry, after 
being placed at the usual time in bed in another room, the 
domestic resorted to the expedient of quieting it by making 
and placing before it the image of some frightful object. The 
fears of the little child were greatly excited, and when, in 
the latter part of the evening, the mother returned and went 
to the room, she found it dead ; its eyes being open and fixed 
with a singularly wild and maniac kind of stare on the fright- 
ful image, which the girl had so cruelly placed before it. 
In the time of the American Revolution, as the transaction 
was related by an officer who was present, a soldier, who had 
committed some crime, was condemned to be shot. He was 
finally pardoned without a knowledge of the pardon being 
communicated to him, since it was thought advisable that he 
should be made to suffer as much as possible from the fear 
of death. In accordance with this plan, he was led at the 
appointed time to the place of execution ; the bandage was 
placed over his eyes ; and the soldiers were drawn out, but 
were privately ordered to fire over his head. At the dis- 
* See Hibbert's Philosophy of Apparitions, Pt. II. ch. 1. MIND AND BODY. 
411 
charge of their muskets, although nothing touched him, the 
man fell dead on the spot. "A criminal was once senten- 
ced in England to be executed, when a college of physicians 
requested liberty to make him the subject of an experiment 
connected with their profession. It was granted. The man 
was told that his sentence was commuted, and that he was 
to be bled to death. On the appointed day several physi- 
cians went to the prison, and made the requisite preparations 
in Ins presence; the lancet was displayed, bowls were in 
readiness to receive the blood, and the culprit was directed 
to place himself on his back, with his arm extended, ready 
to receive the fatal incision. When all this was done, his 
eyes were bandaged. In the mean time, a sufficient quantity 
of lukewarm water had been provided ; his arm was merely 
touched with the lancet, and the water, poured slowly over it, 
was made to trickle down into the bowl below. One of the 
physicians felt his pulse, and the others frequently exchanged 
such remarks as, "He is nearly exhausted-cannot hold out 
much longer-grows very pale," &c. and in a short time the 
criminal actually died, from the force of imagination."* 
§. 332. This doctrine of use in explaining mental phenomena. 
These illustrations of the connection existing between the 
body and mind and of their influence on each other, are 
brought together here, in order to prevent the necessity of 
hereafter interrupting our examination of other subjects, by a 
particular recurrence to this. There might be a much more 
extended narration of facts, all tending to the same conclu- 
sion ; but we take it for granted, that it is unnecessary. We 
shall accordingly hereafter regard it as a settled principle, 
whenever a particular effect in the mind is ascribed to an in- 
fluence from the body, that such bodily influence is at least 
possible. We may perhaps mistake, in a given case, in as- 
signing the true corporeal cause ; but this will not imply, 
that there is no such thing as corporeal causes of mental ac- 
tion, or that such causes are inadequate to great effects. If 
we would understand the mind, we must also understand the 
body, not because they are identical, but because they are 
related. And for the same reason, if we would possess a 
sound mind, a mind capable of exertion corresponding to its 
*As the statement ig given in the Work, entitled Popular Superstitions. 412 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS 
capacity, we must endeavor to possess soundness of body. 
In another and future state of being, where the connection 
which now exists will be broken and the spiritual will be di- 
vorced from the material, it is possible that mental philoso- 
phy may be predicated on other principles ; but as matters 
now are, to attempt to explain the phenomena of the soul 
without a recognition of its relationship to the body is a vio- 
lation of fact and an absurdity in reason. 
CHAPTER SECOND. 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS OR APPARITIONS. 
§. 333. Of excited conceptions and of apparitions in general. 
Having prepared the way by what has been said on the 
connection existing between the mind and the body, we 
shall now proceed in the examination of the painfully interes- 
ting subject before us, by giving some instances and explana- 
tions of excited conceptions or apparitions. Conceptions, 
the considerations of which is to be resumed in the present 
chapter, are those ideas which we have of any absent object 
of perception. In their ordinary form they have already been 
considered in a former part of this Work. (See Chapter 
tenth, Part First.) But they are found to vary in a degree of 
strength ; and hence, when they are at the highest intensity 
of which they are susceptible, they may be denominated viv- 
ified or excited conceptions. They are otherwise called, 
particularly when they have their origin in the sense of sight, 
APPARITIONS. 
Apparitions, therefore, are appearances, which seem to be 
external and real, but which in truth have merely an interior 
or subjective existence ; they are merely vivid or excited con- 
ceptions. Accordingly there may be apparitions, not only of 
angels and departed spirits, which appear to figure more OR APPARITIONS. 
413 
large in the history of apparitions than other objects of 
sight; but of landscapes, mountains, rivers, precipices, festi- 
vals, armies, funeral processions, temples ; in a word, of all 
visual perceptions, which we are capable of recalling. Al- 
though there are excited conceptions both of the hearing and 
the touch, and sometimes though less frequently of the other 
senses, which succeed in reaching and controlling our belief 
with unreal intimations, those of the sight, in consequence of 
the great importance of that organ and the frequency of the 
deceptions connected with it, claim especial attention. 
§. 334. Of the less permanent excited conceptions of sight 
Excited conceptions, which are not permanent but have 
merely a momentary, although a distinct and real existence, 
are not uncommon. In explanation of these, there are two 
things to be noticed. 1. They are sometimes the result 
of the natural and ordinary exercise of that power of forming 
conceptions, which all persons possess in a greater or less de- 
gree. We notice them particularly in children, in whom the 
conceptive or imaginative power,so far as it is employed in 
giving existence to creations that have outline and form, is 
generally more active than in later life. Children, it is well 
known, are almost constantly projecting their inward concep- 
tions into outward space, and erecting the fanciful creations 
of the mind amid the realities and forms of matter, beholding 
houses, men, towers, flocks of sheep, clusters of trees, and 
-varieties of landscape in the changing clouds, in the wreath- 
ed and driven snow, in the fairy work of frost, and in the em- 
bers and flickering flames of the hearth. This at least was 
the experience of the early life of Cowper, who has made it 
the subject of a fine passage in the poem of the Task, 
" Me oft has fancy, ludicrous and wild, 
" Soothed with a waking dream of houses, towers, 
tl Trees, churches, and strange visages expressed 
*" In the red cinders, while, with poring eye, 
" I gazed, myself creating what I saw. 
Beattie too, after the termination of a winter's storm, 
places his young Minstrel on the shores of the Atlantic, to 
view the heavy clouds, that skirt the distant horizon ; 414 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS 
"Where, 'midst the changeful sceneryever new, 
"Fancy a thousand wondrous forms descries, 
"More wildly great than ever pencil drew, 
"Rocks, torrents, gulfs, and shapes of giant size, 
"And glittering cliffs on cliffs, and fiery ramparts rise. 
II. Again, excited conceptions, which are not permanent, 
are frequently called into existence in connection with some 
anxiety and grief of mind, or some other modification of men- 
tal excitement. A person, for instance, standing on the sea- 
shore, and anxiously expecting the approach of his vessel, 
will sometimes see the image of it, and will be certain for 
the moment, that he has the object of his anticipations in 
view, although in truth there is no vessel in sight. That is 
to say ; the conception, idea, or image of the vessel which it 
is evidently in the power of every one to form, who has pre- 
viously seen one, is rendered so intense by feelings of anxie- 
ty, as to be the same in effect, as if the real object were pres- 
ent, and the figure of it were actually pictured on the retina. 
It is in connection with this view, that we may probably 
explain a remark in the narrative of Mrs. Howe's captivity, 
who in 1775 was taken prisoner, together with her seven 
children by the St. Francois Indians. In the course of her 
captivity, she was at a certain time informed by the Indians, 
that two of her children were no more ; one having died a 
natural death, and the other being knocked on the head. "I 
did not utter many words, (says the mother,) but my heart 
was sorely pained within me, and my mind exceedingly troubled 
with strange and awful ideas, [meaning, conceptions or images.] 
I often imagined, for instance, that I plainly saw the naked car- 
cases of my children hanging upon the limbs of trees, as the 
Indians arc wont to hang the raw hides of those beasts, 
which they take in hunting." 
§. 335. Of the less permanent excited conceptions of sound. 
In regard to excited conceptions of sound, (we may re- 
mark incidentally, as we intend to confine ourselves chiefly to 
those of sight,) they are not, as was seen in a former part of 
this Work, (§. 114,) so easily called into existence and so viv- 
id, as visual conceptions. Consequently we have grounds 
for making a distinction and for saying, that only one of the 415 
OR APPARITIONS. 
remarks made in reference to the less permanent excited con- 
ceptions of sight will apply to those of sound. In other words, 
excited conceptions of sound, (those which appear and de- 
part suddenly without any permanent inconvenience to the 
subject of them,) originate in connection with a greater or 
less degree of mental excitement. Persons, for instance, 
sitting alone in a room, are sometimes interrupted by the 
supposed hearing of a voice, which calls to them. But in 
truth it is only their own internal conception of that partic- 
ular sound, which, in consequence of some peculiar mental 
state, happens at the moment to be so distinct, as to control 
their belief and impose itself upon them for a reality. This 
is probably the whole mystery of what Boswell has related 
as a singular incident in the life of Dr. Johnson, that while 
at Oxford he distinctly heard his mother call him by his 
given name, although she was at the very time in Litchfield. 
The same principle explains also what is related of Na- 
poleon. Previously to his Russian expedition, he was fre- 
quently discovered half-reclined on a sofa, where he remain- 
ed several hours, plunged in profound meditation. Some- 
times he started up, convulsively, and with an ejaculation. 
Fancying he heard his name, he would exclaim, Who calls 
me? These are the sounds susceptible of being heard at any 
time, in the desert air, which started Robinson Crusoe from 
his sleep, when there was no one on his solitary island but 
himself; 
"The airy tongues that syllable men's names, 
"On shores, in desert sands, and wildernesses. 
§. 336. First cause of permanently vivid conceptions or apparitions. 
Morbid sensibility of the retina of the eye. 
We have been led to see, particularly in a former chapter, 
(§. 118,) as well as in the preceding' part of this, that our 
conceptions or renovated ideas may be so vivid, as to affect 
our belief for a short time hardly less powerfully than the 
original perceptions. But as in the cases referred to, there 
was not supposed to be an unsound or disordered state of the 
body, this extreme vividness of conception was exceedingly 
transitory. There are other cases of a comparatively perma- 416 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS 
nent character, which are deserving of a more particular no- 
tice in the history of our mental nature. These last always 
imply a disordered state of the body, which we were led to 
see in the last chapter is often attended with very marked 
effects on the mind. 
In attempting to give an explanation of the origin of per- 
manently vivid conceptions, the first ground or cause of 
them, which we shall notice, is an unnatural and morbid 
sensibility of the retina of the eye, either the whole of the 
retina or only a part. This cause, it is true, is in some de- 
gree conjectural, in consequence of the retina being so situa- 
ted as to render it difficult to make it a subject of observa- 
tion and experiment. But knowing as we do that the ner- 
vous system generally is liable to be diseased, and that the 
disease of a particular portion is commonly productive of re- 
sults having relation to the object or uses of that portion, we 
may for this reason as well as for what we know directly and 
positively of the occasionally disordered affections of the op- 
tic nerve, give it a place in the explanations of the subject 
before us. In order to understand the applicability of this 
cause of permanently vivid conceptions or apparitions, it is 
necessary to keep in mind, that, in conceptions of visible ob- 
jects, there is probably always a slight sympathetic affection of 
the retina of the eye, analogous to what exists when the vis- 
ible object is actually present. In a perfectly healthy state 
of the body, including the organ of visual sense, this affec- 
tion of the retina is of course very slight. But under the in- 
fluence of a morbid sensibility, the mere conceptions of the 
mind may at times impart such an increased activity to the 
whole or a part of the retina as to give existence to visual 
or spectral illusions. 
There is an account given in a foreign Medical Journal, 
(the Medico-chirurgical Repertory of Piedmont,) of a young 
lady, who attended for the first time the music of an orches- 
tra, with which she was exceedingly pleased. She continu- 
ed to hear the sounds distinctly in their order for weeks and 
months afterwards, till, her whole system becoming dis- 
ordered in consequence of it, she died. Now we naturally 
suppose in this case, that the nerve of the tympanum of the 
ear, which both in a physiological point of view and in its OR APPARITIONS. 
417 
relation to the mind, corresponds to the retina of the eye, 
continued actually to vibrate or reverberate with the sound, 
although she was no longer within hearing of it. In other 
words, it was diseased ; it had become morbidly sensitive, 
and in this state was a source of action to itself, independent- 
ly of any outward cause. And as the mental state or sensa- 
tion of sound depends upon the actual condition of the audi- 
tory nerve, independently of the outward causes which may 
have been instrumental in producing that particular condition, 
we see how the sounds, which she at first heard for a few 
hours, continued for a number of months after to be genera- 
ted and repeated. And so in regard to the optic nerve. 
It may be so morbidly sensitive, that the mere conception of 
a man or of some other visible object may affect it as really 
and in the same way, as if the man were actually present to 
the sight. And if so, the individual, who is subject to this 
morbid affection, has the power in himself, of originating and 
sustaining the representation or pictures of objects, although 
no such objects are present. In other words, as these results 
depend upon the state of his physical system and not upon 
volition, he is properly said to be subject to Apparitions. 
We will only add in confirmation of what has been said, that 
in one of the most interesting cases of spectral illusions or 
apparitions, which has been published, the person, who was 
the subject of them, expressly states, that, for some hours 
preceding their occurrence, she had a peculiar feeling in the 
eyes, which was relieved as soon as they had passed away.* 
§. 337. 2nd cause of permanently excited conceptions or apparitions. 
Neglect of periodical blood-letting. 
But there are other causes of the mental states under con- 
sideration, which, in some respects at least, are not so close- 
ly and exclusively connected with the eye. One is the neg- 
lect of periodical blood-letting. The doctrine, that perma- 
nently excited conceptions or apparitions are attendant on a 
superabundance of blood, occasioned by this neglect, seems 
to be illustrated and confirmed by the actual and recorded 
experience of various individuals, as in the following instance. 
Nicolai, the name of the individual to whom the state- 
* Brewster's Natural Magic, Letter HL 418 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS 
ments here given relate, was an inhabitant of Berlin, a cele- 
brated bookseller, and naturally a person of a very vivid im- 
agination. He was neither an ignorant man, nor supersti- 
tious ; a fact, which some undoubtedly will esteem it impor- 
tant to know. The following account of the apparitions 
which appeared to him is given in his own words. "My 
wife and another person came into my apartment in the 
morning, in order to console me, but I was too much agitated 
by a series of incidents, which had most powerfully affected 
my moral feeling, to be capable of attending to them. On a 
sudden, I perceived, at about the distance of ten steps, a form 
like that of a deceased person. I pointed at it, asking my 
wife if she did not see it? It was but natural that she should 
not see any thing ; my question, therefore, alarmed her very 
much, and she immediately sent for a physician. The phan- 
tom continued about eight minutes. I grew at length more 
calm, and being extremely exhausted, fell into a restless 
sleep, which lasted about half an hour. The physician as- 
cribed the apparition to a violent mental emotion, and hoped 
there would be no return ; but the violent agitation of my 
mind had in some way disordered my nerves, and produced 
further consequences, which deserve a more minute des- 
cription. 
"At four in the afternoon, the form which I had seen in 
the morning re-appeared. I was by myself when this hap- 
pened, and being rather uneasy at the incident, went to my 
wife's apartment, but there likewise I was persecuted by 
the apparition, which, however, at intervals disappeared, 
and always presented itself in a standing posture. About 
six o'clock there appeared also several walking figures, which 
had no connection with the first. After the first day the 
form of the deceased person no more appeared, but its place 
was supplied with many other phantasms, sometimes repre- 
senting acquaintances, but mostly strangers ; those whom I 
knew were composed of living and deceased persons, but the 
number of the latter was comparatively small. I observed 
the persons with whom I daily conversed did not appear as 
phantasms, these representing chiefly persons who lived at 
some distance from me. 
" These phantasms seemed equally clear and distinct at OR APPARITIONS. 
419 
all times, and under all circumstances, both when I was by 
myself, and when I was in company, as well in the day as 
at night, and in my own house as well as abroad ; they were, 
however, less frequent when I was in the house of a friend, 
and rarely appeared to me in the street. When I shut my 
eyes, these phantasms would sometimes vanish entirely, 
though there were instances when I beheld them with my 
eyes closed, yet, when they disappeared on such occasions, 
they generally returned when I opened my eyes. I convers- 
ed sometimes with my physician and my wife of the phan- 
tasms which at the moment surrounded me ; they appeared 
more frequently walking than at rest, nor were they constant- 
ly present. They frequently did not come for some time, 
but always re-appeared for a longer or shorter period, either 
singly or in company, the latter, however, being most fre- 
quently the case. I generally saw human forms of both sex- 
es, but they usually seemed not to take the smallest notice 
of each other, moving as in a market-place, where all are 
eager to press through the crowd ; at times, however, they 
seemed to be transacting business with each other. I also 
saw several times people on horseback, dogs, and birds. All 
these phantasms appeared to me in their natural size, and as 
distinct as if alive, exhibiting different shades of carnation in 
the uncovered parts, as well as different colors and fashions 
in their dresses, though the colors seemed somewhat paler 
than in real nature. None of the figures appeared particu- 
larly terrible, comical, or disgusting, most of them being of 
an indifferent shape, and some presenting a pleasing aspect. 
The longer these phantoms continued to visit me, the more 
frequently did they return, while at the same time, they in- 
creased in number, about four weeks after they had first ap- 
peared. I also began to hear them talk; these phantoms 
sometimes conversed among themselves, but more frequently 
addressed their discourse to me ; their speeches were com- 
monly short, and never of an unpleasant turn. At different 
times there appeared to me both dear and sensible friends of 
both sexes, whose addresses tended to appease my grief, 
which had not yet wholly subsided: their consolatory speech- 
es were in general addressed to me when I was alone. 
Sometimes, however, I was accosted by these consoling 420 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS 
friends while I was engaged in company, and not unfrequent- 
ly while real persons were speaking to me. These consola- 
tory addresses consisted sometimes of abrupt phrases, and at 
other times they were regularly executed." 
§. 338. Methods of relief adopted in this case. 
These are the leading facts in this case, so far as the mere 
appearance of the apparitions is concerned. But as Nicolai, 
besides possessing no small amount of acquired knowledge, 
was a person of a naturally philosophic turn of mind, he was 
able to detect and to assign the true cause of his mental mal- 
ady. He was, it is to be remembered, in the first place, a 
person of a very vivid fancy, and hence his mind was the more 
likely to be affected by any disease of the body. A number 
of years before the occurrences above related, he had been 
subject to a violent vertigo, which had been cured by means 
of leeches ; it was his custom to lose blood twice a year, but 
previously to the present attack, this evacuation had been 
neglected. Supposing, therefore, that the mental disorder 
might arise from a superabundance of blood and some irreg- 
ularity in the circulation, he again resorted to the application 
of leeches. When the leeches were applied, no person was 
with him besides the surgeon ; but during the operation his 
chamber was crowded with human phantasms of all descrip- 
tions. In the course of a few hours, however, they moved 
around the chamber more slowly ; their color began to fade, 
until growing more and more obscure, they at last dissolved 
jnto air, and he ceased to be troubled with them afterwards.* 
§. 339. 3d cause of excited conceptions. Attacks of fever. 
In violent attacks of fever there are sometimes excited 
conceptions ; particularly those, which have their origin in 
the sense of sight, and are known by way of distinction under 
• Memoir on the Appearance of Spectres or Phantoms occasioned by 
Disease, with Psychological Remarks, read by Nicolai to the Royal Soci- 
ety of Berlin on the 28th of February 1799 ; as quoted by Hibbert, Pt. I, 
ch. 1.-Walter Scott, in his Demonology and Witchcraft, speaks of the 
apparitions of Nicolai as a leading case in this department of human 
knowledge. He also expresses the opinion, that many others have had 
the same experience with Nicolai, but have been deterred by various 
pauses from making it public. OR APPARITIONS. 
421 
the name of Apparitions. The conceptions, which the sick 
person has, become increased in vividness, until the mind, 
seeming to project its own creations into the exterior space, 
peoples the room with living and moving phantoms. There 
is a statement, illustrative of this view, in the fifteenth vol- 
ume of Nicholson's Philosophical Journal, a part of which 
will be here repeated. The fever in this instance, of which 
an account is given by the patient himself, was of a violent 
character, originating in some deep-seated inflammation, 
and at first affecting the memory, although not permanently. 
"Being perfectly awake, (says this person,) in full posses- 
sion of memory, reason, and calmness, conversing with those 
around me, and seeing without difficulty or impediment every 
surrounding object, I was entertained and delighted with a 
succession of faces, over which I had no control, either as to 
their appearance, continuance, or removal. 
" They appeared directly before me, one at a time, very 
suddenly, yet not so much so, but that a second of time might 
be employed in the emergence of each, as if through a cloud 
or mist, to its perfect clearness. In this state each face con- 
tinued five or six seconds, and then vanished, by becoming 
gradually fainter during about two seconds, till nothing was 
left but a dark opaque mist, in which almost immediately af- 
terwards appeared another face. All these faces were in the 
highest degree interesting to me for beauty of form, and for 
the variety of expression they manifested of every great and 
amiable emotion of the human mind. Though their atten- 
tion was invariably directed to me, and none of them seemed 
to speak, yet I seemed to read the very soul, which gave ani- 
mation to their lovely and intelligent countenances. Admi- 
ration and a sentiment of joy and affection when each face 
appeared, and regret upon its disappearance, kept my mind 
constantly rivetted to the visions before it ; and this state 
was interrupted, only when an intercourse with the persons 
in the room was proposed or urged," &c. The apparitions, 
which this person experienced, were not limited to phantasms 
of the human countenance, he also saw phantasms of books, 
and of parchment and papers containing printed matter. 
Nor were these effects exclusively confined to ideas, received 
from the sense of sight; at one time, he seemed to himself 422 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS 
to hear musical sounds. That is ; his conceptions of sound 
were so exceedingly vivid, it was in effect the same, as if he 
had really heard melodious voices and instruments. 
§. 340. 4th cause of apparitions and other excited conceptions. Inflam- 
mation of the brain. 
Apparitions, and excited conceptions in general, exist, in 
the fourth place, in consequence of inflammations and other 
diseases of the brain. We may infer from certain passa- 
ges which are found in his writings, that Shakspeare had 
some correct notions of the influence of a disordered condition 
of the brain on the mental operations. We allude among oth- 
ers to the passage, where in explanation of the apparition of 
the dagger, which appeared to Macbeth, he says, 
"A dagger of the mind, a false creation, 
"Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain. 
Whether the seat, or appropriate and peculiar residence 
of the soul, be in the brain or not, it seems to be certain, that 
this part of the bodily system is connected, in a very intimate 
and high degree with the exercises of the mind ; particular- 
ly with perception and volition. Whenever, therefore, the 
brain is disordered, whether by a contusion, or by a removal 
of part of it, by inflammation, or in other ways, the mind will 
in general be affected in a greater or less degree. It may 
indeed be said, that the immediate connection, in the cases 
which we now have reference to, is not between the mind 
and the substance of the brain, but between the mind and the 
blood, which is thrown into that part of the system. It is no 
doubt something in favor of this notion, that so large a portion 
of the sanguineous fluid finds a circulation there ; it being a 
common idea among anatomists, that at least one tenth of all 
the blood is immediately sent from the heart into the brain, 
although the latter is in weight only about the fortieth part 
of the whole body. It is to be considered also, that the ef- 
fects, which are wrought upon the mind by the nitrous oxide, 
and the febrile miasma gas, are caused by an intermediate in- 
fluence on the blood. On the other hand, it may be said that 
there cannot be a great acceleration of the blood's motion, or 
increase of its volume, without a very sensible effect on the 
cerebral substance. And, therefore, it may remain true, that OR APPARITIONS. 
423 
very much may be justly attributed to the increase of quanti- 
ty and motion in the blood, and still the brain be the proxi- 
mate cause of alterations in the states of the mind. 
§. 341. Facts having relation to the 4th cause of excited conceptions. 
But here we stand in need of facts, as in all other parts of 
this investigation. The following statement, selected from 
a number of others not less authenticated, can be relied on.* 
A citizen of Kingston-on-Hull had a quarrel with a drunk- 
en soldier, who attempted to enter his house by force, at an 
unseasonable hour. In this struggle the soldier drew his bay- 
onet, and striking him across the temples, divided the tem- 
poral artery. He had scarcely recovered from the effects of 
a great loss of blood on this occasion, when he undertook to 
accompany a friend in his walking match against time, in 
which he went forty-two miles in nine hours. He was elated 
by his success, and spent the whole of the following day in 
drinking, &c. 
The result of these things was an affection, probably an 
inflammation of the brain. And the consequence of this was 
the existence of those vivid states of mind, which are termed 
apparitions. Accordingly our shopkeeper, (for that was the 
calling of this person,) is reported to have seen articles of 
sale upon the floor, and to have beheld an armed soldier en- 
tering his shop, when there was nothing seen by other per- 
sons present. In a word, he was for some time constantly 
haunted by a variety of spectres or imaginary appearances ; 
so much so that he even found it difficult to determine,which 
were real customers, and which were mere phantasms of his 
own mind. The remedy in this case was blood-letting, and 
some other methods of cure, which are practised in inflamma- 
tions of the brain. The restoration of the mind to a less in- 
tense and more correct action was simultaneous with that 
of the physical system. 
§. 342. 5th cause of apparitions. Hysteria 
It is further to be observed, that people are not unfre- 
quently affected with apparitions in the paroxysms of the dis- 
ease known as hysteria or hysterics. For the nature of 
* See the Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal, Vol. vi. p. 288. 424 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS 
this disease, which exists under a variety of forms, and is of 
a character so peculiar as to preclude any adequate descrip- 
tion, in the narrow limits we could properly allot to it, the 
reader is referred to such books as treat of medical subjects. 
This singular disease powerfully agitates the mind ; and its 
effects are as various as they are striking. When the con- 
vulsive affections come on, the patient is observed to laugh 
and cry alternately, and altogether without any cause of a 
rational or moral nature ; so that he has almost the appear- 
ance of fatuity, or of being delirious. But apparitions or in- 
tensely vivid conceptions are among its most striking attend- 
ants. The subjects of it distinctly see every description of 
forms ; trees, houses, men, women, dogs, and other inferior 
animals, balls of fire, celestial beings, &c. We can without 
doubt safely refer to the experience of those, who have been 
much conversant with instances of this disease, in confirma- 
tion of this. 
The existence of the states of mind under consideration, 
might, without much question, be found, on further examina- 
tion, to connect itself with other forms of disease. The sub- 
ject is certainly worthy, whether considered in relation to 
science or to human happiness, of such further developements, 
as it is capable of receiving. 
§. 343. Of ghosts and other spectral appearances. 
In connection with what has been said in this Chapter, it 
may not be out of place to add something in explanation of 
ghosts and other spectral appearances, which occupy so con- 
spicuous a place in popular superstitions. Ghosts are 
partly apparitions, taking that term as it has been illustra- 
ted, and in part mental illusions, arising from not viewing 
objects aright. In respect to all appearances of this nature, 
remark, (1) That they are seen most frequently in the dark, 
hardly any one pretending to have seen them in the day 
time. And this is a circumstance altogether in favor of the 
idea, that they are in all cases, although they cannot all be 
referred to one cause, mere deceptions practised on us, either 
by means of the senses, or by means of an excited internal 
conception. In the dark, as we are exposed to a greater va- 
riety of dangers than at other times, our feelings are in conse- OR APPARITIONS. 
425 
quence excited in a greater or less degree, and, as there is a 
great dimness in the outlines of objects, they readily assume, 
when viewed under such circumstances, new, and various, 
and uncertain shapes. 
(2) Let it be observed, as another circumstance common- 
ly attending their visitations, that ghosts and other spectres 
are seen most frequently among people of very little mental 
cultivation, among the ignorant. Uninstructed minds are gen- 
erally the most credulous. If there were truly any beings in 
nature of this sort, and they were any thing more than imag- 
inary appearances, persons, who are well-informed and phi- 
losophic, would stand a chance equally good with others, of 
forming an acquaintance with them. From these two cir- 
cumstances we seem to be justified in the supposition, that 
many of these imaginary beings are the creations of a credu- 
lous and excited mind, viewing objects at an hour, when their 
outlines cannot be distinctly seen. 
§. 344. Other circumstances characteristic of their recurrence. 
(3) It is to be remarked further, that ghosts, whenever 
they present themselves, are found to agree very nearly" with 
certain previous conceptions, which persons have formed in 
respect to them. If, for instance, the ghost be the spirit of 
one, with whom we have been particularly acquainted, he 
appears with the same lineaments, although a little paler, 
and the same dress even to the button on his coat ; the 
dress, in general, however, is white, corresponding to the 
color of the burial habiliments ; so that they may be said to 
have a personal or individual, a generic, and, as some have 
maintained, a national character. " They commonly ap- 
pear, (says Grose, who has written on this subject,) in the 
same dress, they wore while living ; although they are some- 
times clothed all in white ; but that is chiefly the church- 
yard ghosts, who have no particular business, but seem to 
appear pro bono publico, or to scare drunken rustics from 
tumbling over their graves. Dragging chains is not the fash- 
ion of English ghosts, chains and black vestments being 
chiefly the accoutrements of foreign spectres seen in arbitra- 
ry governments." 
(4) This additional circumstance remains also to be no- 426 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS 
ticed, viz, wherever ghostly and spectral beings have come 
from the dead to the living, it has generally been found, that 
they were among the particular friends, although sometimes 
of the enemies of those, whom they came to see. This is 
very natural. It is our friends and enemies whom we think 
most of; much more than of those, to whom we are un- 
known, and towards whom our feelings are indifferent. A 
person, for instance, has lost a very near friend by death ; 
his soul is greatly distressed ; and amid the joys of life, which 
have now lost their charms, and amid its cares to which he 
turns with a broken heart, he incessantly recalls the image 
so endeared to him. What wonder then, that his imagina- 
tion, which, in the light of the day, was able to keep before 
itself the picture of the departed, should, in the stillness and 
shades of midnight, when remembrances multiply and feel- 
ings grow deeper and deeper, increase that picture to the 
size, and give to it the vivid form of real life ! These cir- 
cumstances justify us in ascribing the existence of that 
supposed class of beings called ghosts, (and we may include 
in the remark all spectres whatever,) to the two causes men- 
tioned at the commencement of this topic, viz. conceptions 
rendered inordinately intense, and objects actually seen, but 
under such circumstances as to be misrepresented to us. 
§. 345. Further illustrations and remarks on the same subject. 
The principles, laid down in this chapter, illustrate vari- 
ous incidents, hitherto considered very remarkable, which 
are to be found in history both ancient and modern. They 
help to illustrate, for instance, the alledged appearance of 
Caesar's ghost to Marcus Junius Brutus on the plains of Phil- 
ippi ; a circumstance which is the foundation of a passage in 
the play of Julius Caesar. 
"How ill this taper burns! Ha! who comes here? 
"I think it is the weakness of mine eyes, 
"That shapes this monstrous apparition- 
"It comes upon me ;-Art thou any thing? 
"Art thou some god, some angel, or some devil? 
Brutus was not only greatly fatigued at the time this ter- 
rific figure appeared to him, but his mind was exceedingly OR APPARITIONS. 
427 
anxious ; and we may, therefore, well suppose, that the spec- 
tral apparition was merely an internal excited conception. 
It is also worthy of inquiry, whether these views may not 
account in part at least, for a singular power of the Scotch 
Highlanders, called the second sight. Especially as they 
live in a dark, lonely, and mountainous country, and their 
feelings in consequence are not only likely to be quickened 
and impetuous, like their own mountain torrents, but to pos- 
sess a cast of melancholy. Such a state of feeling is favora- 
ble to the existence of excited conceptions or apparitions ; 
and apparitions, (that is, the seeing of things which are not 
present,) is implied in the exercise of the second sight. 
§. 346. Remarks of Walter Scotton the subject of ghost stories. 
As the interest of this subject is not limited to novelists 
and the writers of romance, but is practically and widely im- 
portant, we are induced to subjoin here a passage from a 
popular author, who is perhaps better qualified than almost 
any other writer to form a correct opinion on it. "There 
are many ghost stories, which we do not feel at liberty to 
challenge as impostures, because we are confident that those, 
who relate them on their own authority, actually believe 
what they assert, and may have good reason for doing so, 
though there is no real phantom after all. We are far, 
therefore, from averring that such tales are necessarily false. 
It is easy to suppose the visionary has been imposed upon 
by a lively dream, a waking revery, the excitation of a pow- 
erful imagination, or the misrepresentation of a diseased or- 
gan of sight ; and, in one or other of these causes, (to say 
nothing of a system of deception which may in many instan- 
ces be probable,) we apprehend a solution will be found for 
all cases of what are called real ghost stories. 
"In truth, the evidence with respect to such apparitions is 
very seldom accurately or distinctly questioned. A superna- 
tural tale is, in most cases, received as an agreeable mode of 
amusing society, and he would be rather accounted a sturdy 
moralist than an entertaining companion, who should employ 
himself in assailing its credibility. It would indeed be a sol- 
ecism in manners, something like that of impeaching the gen- 
uine value of the antiquities exhibited by a good-natured col- 428 
EXCITED CONCEPTIONS 
lector for the gratification of his guests. This difficulty will 
appear greater, should the company have the rare good for- 
tune to meet with the person who himself witnessed the 
wonders which he tells ; a well-bred or prudent man will, un- 
der such circumstances, abstain from using the rules of 
cross-examination practiced in a court of justice ; and if in 
any case he presumes to do so, he is in danger of receiving 
answers, even from the most candid and honorable persons, 
which are rather fitted to support the credit of the story 
which they stand committed to maintain, than to the pure 
service of unadorned truth. The narrator is asked, for ex- 
ample, some unimportant question with respect to the appa- 
rition ; he answers it on the hasty suggestion of his own im- 
agination, tinged as it is with belief of the general fact, and 
by doing so, often gives a feature of minute evidence which 
was before wanting, and this with perfect unconsciousness 
on his own part. It is a rare occurrence, indeed, to find an 
opportunity of dealing with an actual ghost-seer; such in- 
stances, however, I have certainly myself met with, and that 
in the case of able, wise, candid, and resolute persons, of 
whose veracity I had every reason to be confident. But in 
such instances, shades of mental aberration have afterwards 
occurred, which sufficiently accounted for the supposed appa- 
ritions, and will incline me always to feel alarmed in behalf 
of the continued health of a friend, who should conceive him- 
self to have witnessed such a visitation. 
" The nearest approximation, which can be generally 
made to exact evidence in this case, is the word of some in- 
dividual who has had the story, it may be, from the person 
to whom it has happened, but most likely from his family, or 
some friend of the family. Far more commonly, the narrator 
possesses no better means of knoweledge than that of dwel- 
ling in the country where the thing happened, or being well 
acquainted with the outside of the mansion in the inside of 
which the ghost appeared. 
" In every point the evidence of such a second hand re- 
tailer of the mystic story must fall under the adjudged case 
in an English court. The judge stopped a witness who was 
about to give an account of the murder, upon trial, as it was 
narrated to him by the ghost of the murdered person. "Hold, OR APPARITIONS. 
429 
sir," said his lordship ; "the ghost is an excellent witness, 
and his evidence the best possible ; but he cannot be heard 
by proxy in this court. Summon him hither, and I'll hear 
him in person ; but your communication is mere hearsay, 
which my office compels me to reject." Yet it is upon the 
credit of one man who pledges it upon that of three or four 
persons who have told it successively to each other, that we 
are often expected to believe an incident inconsistent with 
the laws of nature, however agreeable to our love of the 
wonderful and the horrible."* 
CHAPTER THIRD. 
IDIOCY. 
§. 347. Misfortune of an imperfect or disordered state of rnind. 
The mind, in its full and unbiased exercise, constitutes, 
more than any thing else which pertains to man, the attrac- 
tion and the dignity of his nature ; and obviously lays the 
foundation of his superiority over the irrational part of crea- 
tion. It follows, therefore, if there is truth in this remark, 
that, when the due exercise of the mental powers is perma- 
nently disturbed, or when there is naturally some deficiency 
in them, the beauty and dignity of his nature is essentially 
gone ; that ascendency, to which he would be otherwise en- 
titled is lost; and, with the exception of his erect form, there 
is scarcely a mark to distinguish him from the brute. Noth- 
ing can be a greater misfortune ; nothing can be more calam- 
itous, than those mental imperfections and disorders, of which 
we now propose to give some account. If there be any ob- 
ject whatever, which can arrest and fix the attention of men, 
and can elicit the tear of unfeigned compassion, it is an intel- 
lect disordered, a mind in ruins, the eclipse of that light of 
* Scott's Demonology and Witchcraft, Letter X, 430 
IDIOCY. 
the soul, which may truly be regarded, not merely as an 
emanation, but as a bright and glorious emanation from the 
Divine Mind. 
The evils, to which the mind is subject, are many, differ- 
ing in kind and degree, being hardly less numerous than the 
diseases of the body. Some of them have already been ex- 
amined under the head of excited conceptions ; but there 
is a class of mental evils still more disastrous, still more deep- 
ly seated, having their origin not so much in the bodily or- 
gans auxiliary to the mind, as in the imperfect or disturbed 
action of the mind itself. In endeavoring briefly to examine 
these inward evils, which are both numerous and complica- 
ted, we shall begin with an important, if not a particularly 
interesting exhibition of them in the form of Idiocy. 
§. 348. Of the degree of intellectual power possessed in idiocy. 
It will be proper in the first place, in entering upon this 
subject, to notice some of the marks or characteristics, which 
are commonly found to attach to a state of idiocy. And here 
the first remark is, that persons in this condition will always 
be found to have but few ideas of any kind whatever. This 
small number of ideas they are able, except in some extreme 
cases, to compare together, so far as to distinguish those, 
in which there are any striking differences. Such, however, 
is the general weakness, and at times the total incapacity of 
the power of relative suggestion, that the class of General 
Abstract ideas, which are of such a nature as always to im- 
ply the exercise of that power, are not only fewer in idiots 
than those of any other class, but are ill-defined and indis- 
tinct. The few ideas, which they actually possess, they are 
sometimes, but not always able to combine together, and to 
form from them some simple propositions. They have, how- 
ever, the power of deducing inferences from the comparison 
of a number of consecutive propositions, that is, by reasoning, 
only in a very small degree. Their great feebleness of rea- 
soning power is to be attributed partly to the fewness of the 
ideas and propositions, which they possess ; partly, to the 
dullness of their susceptibility of perceiving relations, the 
exercise of which is always implied in the comparison of 
propositions ; and partly, in some cases, to a great weakness IDIOCY. 
431 
of memory. We say in some cases, because idiots have occa- 
sionally been found, who, while they have been deficient in 
every other mental power, have still been remarkable for 
memory. There is one characteristic of idiocy, which very 
seldom fails ; and that is, an inability to give attention. We 
never, for instance, find an idiot, who can steadily attend to 
a long argument, and estimate the point and weight of its 
conclusion ; even if it be of such a simple nature, that he can 
understand the separate ideas and propositions involved in it. 
§. 349. Of the natural and moral sensibilities in idiocy. 
Such is the intellectual power, or rather want of intellect- 
ual power, which characterizes the condition of this unfortu- 
nate class of persons. If we pass from the Intellect into the 
region of the Sensibilities, we shall find them estranged, in 
an almost equal degree, from the common measure of human 
emotion and passion. In general they take but a little inter- 
est in the loves and hatreds, the joysand the sorrows of oth- 
ers, even of their near friends. They show no disposition to 
engage in the pursuits, which fire the hearts and prompt the 
efforts of all around them ; but appear to be lost, if one may 
use the expressions, in the abyss of their own fatuity. Their 
want of emotion, as well as the defect of thought, is indicated 
by a vacant gaze and a general absence of meaning and ex- 
pression in the countenance. 
If we pass from the natural to the moral sensibilities, we 
find it no better. Whatever injury the idiot may do, he is 
not, in general, regarded as accountable for it. In a multi- 
tude of cases, he is not capable of distinguishing right from 
wrong ; and consequently is not considered a proper subject 
of moral blame or approbation from others. Nor can it well 
be otherwise. Our moral nature is so constituted, that it 
necessarily acts in view of facts, knowledge, the deductions 
of reasoning. We cannot feel a thing to be right or wrong, 
unless we know something of the nature of the thing and of 
its relations. If a man has no knowledge, from the nature 
of the case he will have no conscience ; or rather there will 
be no developement, no exercise of the conscience. If a man 
of a sound mind sets fire to an inhabited house, he does 
wrong and is justly punishable, because he fully understands 432 
IDIOCY. 
the consequences of such an act; but the idiot, who does the 
same thing, is not treated as a wrong-doer and as punishable, 
simply because to estimate the consequences in such a case 
is beyond his capacity. The idiot, therefore, possesses, as a 
general thing, no conscience, because he has no adequate ba- 
sis for conscience to rest upon ; in other words, no adequate 
powers of perception and reasoning. This is a description 
of common cases in idiocy ; but there are gradations in this, 
as well as in all other mental weaknesses and disorders. 
§. 350. Of the origin and causes of idiocy. 
Idiotism is sometimes congenital or natural ; that is, the 
causes of it exist from the commencement of life. In many 
of these cases, there is a greater or less bodily mal-formation; 
the skull is of a size less than common, and there is a dispro- 
portion between the face and the head, the former being larg- 
er in proportion than the latter. The bones of the head are 
asserted by Dr. Rush to be preternaturally thick ; and the 
consequence of this is a diminution of the internal capacity 
of the cranium. "What appears most striking, (says Pinel, 
in giving an account of an idiot in the asylum, Bicetre,) is 
the extremely disproportionate extent of the face, compared 
with the diminutive size of the cranium. No traits of anima- 
tion are visible in his physiognomy. Every line indicates 
the most absolute stupidity. Between the height of the head, 
and that of the whole stature, there is a very great dispropor- 
tion. The cranium is greatly depressed, both at the crown 
and at the temples. His looks are heavy, and his mouth 
wide open. The whole extent of his knowledge is confined 
to three or four confused ideas, and that of his speech to as 
many inarticulate sounds."* 
From this instance, which is one of the lowest forms of 
idiocy, and from others, where there was a similar conforma- 
tion of the head, Pinel seems to be inclined to the opinion, 
that a mal-conformation of the head in particular is the 
cause of idiotism, when it exist from infancy. 
The absence or weakness of intellectual power, which is 
termed idiocy, is often found to exist from other causes. 
Men of great mental ability have sometimes sunk into the 
* Pinel's Treatise on Insanity, (Davis' Translation,) sect. hi. IDIOCY. 
433 
state of idiotism, in consequence of too great and long contin- 
ued application of the mind, a tasking of its powers beyond 
their greatest strength. Sometimes, on the contrary, the 
same results seem to have followed from too little applica- 
tion, especially when combined with a disrelish for social in- 
tercourse, which might have checked, and probably have 
prevented an entire prostration. The latter cause is thought 
to have co-operated in bringing on the fatuity of Dean Swift. 
It is obviously one of the great laws of the mind, that the 
progress or advancement of its powers is connected with a 
suitable degree of exercise. But Swift persisted in denying 
himself the relaxations of society, and thus lost the oppor- 
tunity both of acquiring a fund of new ideas, and of renova- 
ting his former stores of knowledge. His once vigorous mind 
collapsed into such weakness and ignorance, that he was at 
length confined in a hospital, which he had himself founded 
for idiots. Our countryman Franklin, on the contrary, con- 
tinued to employ himself, not only in reading and writing, 
but in conversation ; he felt a lively interest in the welfare 
of his friends, and in the progress of all public enterprizes 
and institutions, and at the period of his death, in the 85th 
year of his age, discovered no weakness and decay of mind. 
§. 351. Idiocy to be ascribed sometimes to the effects of age. 
Idiocy appears, in some cases, to be induced by mere old 
age. The senses at that period of life become dull ; the 
ideas received from them are less lively, than formerly ; the 
memory fails, and with it the power of reasoning ; and there 
is sometimes combined, with these unfavorable circumstan- 
ces, a want of interest in persons and events, a coldness and 
sluggishness of feeling, which perhaps cannot be considered 
altogether surprising at that period of life, but which is obvi- 
ously unpropitious to the preservation of mental energy. 
In referring to old age, however, in this connection, it is 
proper to modify this general statement by one or two re- 
marks. When idiocy is superinduced by the influences of 
old age, this result is found for the most part to take place in 
those persons only, in whom the External intellect alone has 
been cultivated. They have been so situated, being depriv- 
ed in early life of instruction and always deprived of the use 434 
IDIOCY. 
of books, that their minds have been exercised exclusively in 
connection with the senses. They know but very little more 
than what has been directly addressed to the touch, sight, 
and taste. The inward fountains of thought, original sug- 
gestion, consciousness, judgment, reasoning, are in a great 
degree sealed up. Consequently, when in extreme old age 
the outward senses are unable to perform their office, it is 
unavoidable, that the mind should sink back into a state of 
feebleness, exhibiting all the ordinary characteristics of 
idiocy. 
Further ; this state of the mind may be caused by various 
diseases, such as violent fevers, which at times suddenly dis- 
turb the mental powers, produce a temporary delirium, and 
then leave the faculties of the mind in a permanently torpid 
and inefficient condition. It may originate also in the abuse 
of ardent spirits, from great grief, from violent blows on the 
head, from sudden and great terror, &c. The idiocy, which 
is natural, and exists from infancy, has sometimes been dis- 
tinguished from that, which is brought on by the above-men- 
tioned and other causes in after life ; but the mental condi- 
tion being in both cases essentially the same, they may prop- 
erly be considered together in one view. 
§. 352. Illustrations of the causes of idiocy. 
Great and sudden terror was mentioned as one of the 
causes of idiocy. Very great and sudden excitements of any 
of the passions may produce the same effect. We know of 
no illustrations of this statement more striking, than the fol- 
lowing from the interesting work of Pinel on Insanity. 
"The feelings of individuals, endowed with acute sensibility, 
may experience so violent a shock, that all the functions of 
the mind are in danger of being suspended in their exercises 
or totally abolished. Sudden joy and excessive fear are 
equally capable of producing this inexplicable phenomenon. 
An engineer proposed to the committee of public safety, in 
the second year of the [French] republic, a project for a new 
invented cannon, of which the effects would be tremendous. 
A day was fixed for the experiment at Mendon ; and Robes- 
pierre wrote to the inventor so flattering a letter, that, upon 
perusing it, he was transfixed motionless to the spot. He IDIOCY. 
435 
was shortly afterwards sent to Bicetre in a state of complete 
idiotism. 
" About the same time, two young conscripts, who had 
recently joined the army were called into action. In the 
heat of the engagement, one of them was killed by a musket 
ball, at the side of his brother. The survivor, petrified with 
horror, was struck motionless at the sight. Some days after- 
wards he was sent in a state of complete idiotism to his fath- 
er's house. His arrival produced a similar impression upon 
a third son of the same family. The news of the death of one 
of the brothers, and the derangement of the other, threw this 
third victim into a state of such consternation and stupor as 
might have defied the powers of ancient or modern poetry to 
give an adequate representation of it. My sympathetic feel- 
ings have beemfrequently arrested by the sad wreck of hu- 
manity, presented in the appearance of these degraded be- 
ings; but it was a scene truly heart-rending to see the wretch- 
ed father come to weep over these miserable remains of his 
once enviable family." 
§. 353. Of restoration from a state of idiocy. 
Idiocy, so far as we have been able to learn, is considered 
incurable ; at least a restoration from it is more difficult and 
less probable than from the more common forms of insanity. 
This is especially true, when it is natural and congenital ; 
which is understood, as a general thing, to imply an imper- 
fect or deformed structure of the cerebral organ. And when 
it is otherwise, it cannot be denied that the encouragement to 
effort is small. One thing, however, ought to be done. The 
idiot should be instructed to the extent of his capacity, wheth- 
er more or less. Who knows but a faithful training within 
the narrow limits of his mental capability may arouse some 
dormant energy, may disentangle and adjust some disordered 
intellectual action, may open to his astonished apprehension 
some new fountain of thought, and thus produce a complete 
internal revolution. Such a result, as facts might be adduced 
to show, is not altogether hopeless ; although undoubtedly 
the preparatory efforts are such as to require a high degree 
of faith and patience. 
And here it might be inquired with some propriety, what 436 
IDIOCY. 
end Providence could have had in view in permitting the ex- 
istence of these unfortunate beings, except it be to try the 
faith and patience, to quicken the sensibilities, and to disci- 
pline the virtues of those, by whom they are surrounded. If 
there were no vice, and no suffering in the world, how could 
any of us know that we possess a nature, which would turn 
with horror from crime, or would melt with pity at misfortune. 
There is an interesting poem of Wordsworth, entitled the 
Cumberland Beggar. The whole business of the poor old 
man is to go from cottage to cottage, on his daily errands of 
want. In the decrepitude of age he advances so slow, that 
"the cottage curs, ere he have passed the door, will turn 
away weary of barking at him." But Wordsworth contends 
in the spirit of a philosopher as well as of a poet, that the old 
man, though wholly dependent upon others, is not without 
some benefit to mankind. He not only serves to remind the 
villagers, as he wanders in his poverty among them, of the 
past offices of kindness which they had shown him, and 
again to awaken, as he presents anew his decrepid form, the 
spirit of benevolence ; but he helps to quicken in their hearts 
the recollection of their own comparatively favored situation, 
and to keep more vividly alive the decaying sentiments of 
religious gratitude. This is the important office, which 
Providence assigns him ; and who will say that the idiot, a 
being still more degraded, still more capable of appealing to 
our sympathies, does less ! He stands a perpetual monitor, 
appointed in the wisdom of an inscrutable Superintendence, 
to teach us that man is what he is, not by his own volition, 
but by the gift of God, and to remind us individually of what 
we have more than others, and of what we are bound in pity 
and in duty to do for those who have less. 
"And while in that vast solitude, to which 
"The tide of things has led him, he appears 
"To breathe and live but for himself alone, 
"Unblam'd, uninjur'd, let him bear about 
"The good, which the benignant law of Heaven 
"Has hung around him ; and, while life is his, 
"Still let him prompt the unletter'd villagers 
"To tender offices and pensive thoughts. CHAPTER FOURTH. 
PARTIAL INSANITY. 
§. 354. Meaning of the term and kinds of insanity. 
The term Insanity, etymologically considered, indicates 
simply a want of soundness or want of health. In its appli- 
cation to the mind, it indicates an unsound or disordered 
state of the mental action. As the mind is complicated in 
its structure, existing as it were in various departments and 
subdivisions of departments, the disordered action may per- 
vade either the whole mind, or exist exclusively in some one 
of its departments. Accordingly Insanity naturally resolves 
itself into the two species of Partial Insanity and Total In- 
sanity ; and it is under these two general heads that we shall 
now proceed to consider it. 
Partial Insanity, which naturally comes first in order, is a 
disordered condition of one or more of the mental powers ; 
but which leaves the mind essentially free and undisturbed, 
in some of its departmentsand in some of its modes of action. 
The method, which we propose to pursue in the investiga- 
tion of this form of insanity, is to consider it as it exhibits it- 
self in the powers of the mind separately. And it is proper 
to add here, that we examine the subject of insanity at pre- 
sent, only so far as it may naturally be supposed to exist in 
connection with the Intellect, leaving the consideration 
of it, as it is occasionally found to exist in the Sensibilities 
and the Will to a future time. 
§. 355. Of disordered or alienated sensations. 
Beginning with the External Intellect, the power, which 
first presents itself to our notice, is Sensation. It is well 
known, that all the outward senses are liable to be disorder- 438 
PARTIAL LNSANITY. 
ed, and as the inward sensation corresponds to the condition 
of the outward or bodily organ, a disordered or irregular 
movement of the organ of sense necessarily communicates 
itself to the inward or mental state. A regular or healthy 
sensation always has reference to some outward cause, (we 
mean here outward even in reference to the organ of sense,) 
but a disease in the bodily organ disturbs this relation, and 
necessarily gives to the inward mental state the character, 
as compared with other sensations, of being unreal, visiona- 
ry, and deceptive. Not unreal and deceptive in itself, but 
because it intimates a relation which is obliterated, and tends 
to force upon our belief an outward cause, which has no ex- 
istence. 
There are diseased or disordered visual sensations, exist- 
ing in connection with a morbid condition of the visual organ ; 
but as this view of the subject was necessarily involved in 
some degree in what has already been said on the subject of 
excited conceptions or Apparitions, it is not necessary to en- 
large upon it here. There are also diseased or disordered 
sensations of touch. A single instance, out of multitudes like 
it, will serve both to illustrate and to confirm the remark. 
In the Natural Magic of Dr. Brewster is an account of a lady, 
(the case which we have already had occasion to refer to,) 
who was subject to spectral illusions, of whom it is expressly 
said, in connection with her remarkable mental affections, 
that she possesses "a naturally morbid imagination, so strong- 
ly affecting her corporeal impressions, that the story of any 
person having suffered severe pain by accident, or otherwise, 
will occasionally produce acute twinges in the corresponding 
part of her person. An account, for instance, of the amputa- 
tion of an arm will produce an instantaneous and severe sense 
of pain in her own arm." There are also, (and we might 
apply the statement to all the senses without exception,) dis- 
eased or disordered sensations of hearing. The celebrated 
Mendelsohn was frequently subject to the attacks of a violent 
species of catalepsis. And it happened, if he had recently 
heard any lively conversation, a loud voice apparently repea- 
ted to him, while in the fit, the particular words, which had 
been distinguished from others by being pronounced with an 
emphatic and raised tone of voice, and " in such a manner 
that his ear reverberated with the sound." PARTIAL INSANITY. 
439 
We naturally proceed from sensation to a power closely 
connected with it, that of External Perception. Indeed what 
has been said of sensation will apply in a considerable degree 
to the last mentioned power, because sensation naturally pre- 
cedes perception, and is always involved in it. But percep- 
tion, while it involves sensation, implies also something more, 
something additional ; it involves the reference of the inward 
mental state to the outward cause or object, and not unfre- 
quently implies also acts of comparison, by which it distin- 
guishes one cause from another. And particularly is this the 
case in respect to those perceptions, which are designated as 
acquired perceptions, in order to distinguish them from orig- 
inal. So that, in view of what has been said, it would seem 
to be the fact, in the first place, that when our sensations 
are disordered, our perceptions will be so likewise. But this 
is not all. In consequence of some interior cause, such as 
an inability to attend to a thing for any length of time or in- 
capacity of instituting comparisons, disordered and false ex- 
ternal perceptions will sometimes exist, when there appears 
to be no unsoundness in the sensations. 
Agreeably to these views we find, that persons, in whom 
the power of external perception is disordered from the first 
of the two causes just referred to, sometimes have percep- 
tions of color which do not accord with those of mankind 
generally, being entirely unable, for instance, to distinguish 
blue from green. Other persons, again, have no distinct 
perception of minute sounds ; and take no more pleasure in 
the harmonies of a musical composition of truly great merit, 
than they do in the most discordant screams. When the dis- 
ordered action of the perceptive power originates from the 
second cause, the subjects of it are apt to confound times, per- 
sons, and places. They mistake, for instance, their friends 
and relations for others ; and are at a loss as to the place 
where they are, although they may have been in it hundreds 
of times before. They exhibit particularly this species of 
alienated perception, when they attempt to read a book. 
They no doubt see the letters no less than others, but the 
action of the mind in other respects not being such as to per- 
mit them to dwell upon them, and compare and combine 
§. 356. Of disordered or alienated external perception. 440 
them into words, they are unable to read ; it is at least ex- 
ceedingly difficult. 
PARTIAL INSANITY. 
§. 357. Disordered state or insanity of original suggestion. 
When we pass from the External to the Internal intellect, 
from the region of sensation and external perception to the 
interior domain of Original Suggestion, to the convictions in- 
volved in Consciousness, to the important powers of Relative 
Suggestion, Memory, and Reasoning, we are introduced, in- 
deed, to a higher order of mental action, but we find no ex- 
emption from those disorders, to which the human mind in 
all its great departments is occasionally exposed. In re- 
gard to Original Suggestion, which comes first in order, a 
power, which deals with original ideasand principles merely, 
without professing to ascertain the relations existing among 
them, it must be admitted, that it does not give so frequent 
and decided indications of disordered action as we find else- 
where. Nevertheless this is sometimes the case. The con- 
viction, for instance, not only that we exist, but that we have 
personal identity, that we are now what we have been in 
times past in all that constitutes us rational and accountable 
beings, is obviously essential to a sound mind. But this ele- 
mentary and important conviction, which obviously does not 
rest upon judgment nor the deductions of reasoning, but upon 
the higher basis of original suggestion, is sometimes annul- 
led, either in whole or in part. To this head, so far as the 
conviction of the identity of the mind is concerned, we may 
refer the interesting case of the Reverend Simon Browne, an 
English clergyman, who fully believed for many years before 
his death that he had entirely lost his rational part or soul, 
and was the possessor merely of a corporeal or animal life, 
such as is possessed by the brutes. He was a man of mark- 
ed ability both in conversation and writing ; and this too, on 
all subjects not connected with his malady, after his partial 
alienation. But so entirely was he convinced of the absence 
and of the probably actual extinction of his own soul, that 
in a valuable Work, which he dedicated to the Queen of 
England, he speaks of it in the dedication as the Work of one, 
who "was once a man; of some little name ; but of no worth, 
as his present unparalleled case makes but too manifest ; for PARTIAL INSANITY. 
441 
by the immediate hand of an avenging God, his very think- 
ing substance has for more than seventeen years been gradu- 
ally wasting away, till it is wholly perished out of him, if it 
be not utterly come to nothing."* 
§. 358. Unsoundness or insanity of consciousness 
The basis of the various convictions or judgments of Con- 
sciousness, as that term is defined and illustrated by writers, 
is the antecedent idea and belief of personal identity. If this 
last conviction, therefore, be lost, as in the case mentioned 
in the last section, all that is involved in Consciousness goes 
with it. It is the business of Consciousness to connect the 
acts of the mind with the mind itself, to consolidate them as 
it were into one. But if, in our full belief, our mind is de- 
stroyed, if self or personality is obliterated, then it is clearly 
no longer within the power of consciousness to recognize our 
various acts of perception and reasoning as having a home 
and agency in our own bosoms. Self is destroyed ; and the 
mental acts, which are appropriate to self, are mere entities, 
floating about as it were in the vacuities of space, without 
the possibility of being assigned to any locality or ascribed 
to any cause. The instance, therefore, mentioned in the 
preceding section, which may be regarded as of a mixed 
kind, (that is to say, showing a perplexed action both of 
Original Suggestion and Consciousness,) will serve to illus- 
trate what is said here. Instances also have probably from 
time to time occurred, in which, although the conviction of 
personality and personal identity has remained, yet in the 
fixed belief of the insane person the bond of connection be- 
tween the mind and its powers has been dissolved ; and the 
memory perhaps, or the reasoning, or the imagination, which 
once belonged to himself, has been transferred by some mys- 
terious agency to an intellect more favored than his own. 
§. 359. Insanity of the judgment or relative suggestion. 
Pursuing- this subject in its connection with the powers of 
the Internal Intellect in the order, in which they presented 
themselves to our notice in the Second Part of this Work, 
and which seems to be essentially the order of nature, we 
* Conolly's Indications of Insanity, chap. X. 442 
PARTIAL INSANITY. 
next proceed to Relative Suggestion. The power of Relative 
Suggestion, like that of Original Suggestion, is exceedingly 
simple in its action ; being limited to the mere matter of per- 
ceiving relations ; but it is different in this respect, that while 
mental disorder but seldom reaches original suggestion, there 
is scarcely an instance of decidedly disordered intellect, in 
which relative suggestion, (that is to say, judgment in its sim- 
plest form,) is not affected in a greater or less degree. And 
this seems to be unavoidable. For relations always imply 
the existence of something else, of other objects. And if mis- 
takes, in consequence of a wrong mental action in other res- 
pects, exist in regard to those other things, whatever they may 
be, they necessarily either, annul or greatly perplex the re- 
sults of the power, by which such relations are perceived 
Besides this, the power, in its own nature and independently 
of perplexities from other sources, is liable to be, and is in 
fact, sometimes disordered. But as this subject is closely con- 
nected with that of reasoning, and as they reciprocally throw 
light upon each other, we shall say nothing further here. 
§. 360. Disordered or alienated association. Lightheadedness. 
The laws of the mind, the great principles which regulate 
its action, as well as its mere perceptions or states, may be 
disordered ; for instance, the law of association. The irreg- 
ular action of this important principle of our intellectual na- 
ture is sometimes greater ; at others less. There is one of 
the slighter forms of mental alienation from this cause, which 
may be termed lightheadedness ; otherwise called by Pinel, 
demence, and by Dr. Rush, dissociation. Persons, subject to 
this mental disease, are sometimes designated as 'flighty,' 
'hair-brained and when the indications of it are pretty de- 
cided, as a 'little cracked.' Their disorder seems chiefly 
to consist in a deficiency of the ordinary power over associa- 
ted ideas. Their thoughts fly from one subject to another 
with great rapidity ; and, consecpiently, one mark of this 
state of mind is great volubility of speech and almost con- 
stant motion of the body. This rapid succession of ideas and 
attendant volubility of tongue are generally accompanied with 
forgetfulness in a greater or less degree. And as the subject 
of this form of derangement is equally incapable of checking PARTIAL INSANITY. 
443 
and reflecting upon his present ideas, and of recalling the 
past, he constantly forms incorrect judgments of things. 
Another mark, which has been given, is a diminished sensi- 
bi.ity to external impressions. 
§. 361. Illustrations of this mental disorder. 
Dr. Rush in his valuable work on the diseases of the "Mi nd 
has repeated the account, which an English clergyman, who 
visited Lavater, the physiognomist, has given of that singu- 
lar character. It accurately illustrates this mental disorder. 
" I was detained, (says he,) the whole morning by the 
strange, wild, eccentric Lavater, in various conversations. 
When once he is set agoing, there is no such thing as stop- 
ping him, till he runs himself out of breath. He starts from 
subject to subject, flies from book to book, from picture to 
picture ; measures your nose, your eye, your mouth, with a 
pair of compasses ; pours forth a torrent of physiognomy up- 
on you ; drags you, for a proof of his dogma, to a dozen of 
closets, and unfolds ten thousand drawings; but will not let 
you open your lips to propose a difficulty ; and crams a solu- 
tion down your throat, before you have uttered half a sylla- 
ble of your objection. 
"He is as meagre as the picture of famine ; his nose and 
chin almost meet. I read him in my turn, and found little 
difficulty in discovering amidst great genius, unaffected piety, 
unbounded benevolence and moderate learning, much caprice 
and unsteadiness ; a mind at once aspiring by nature, and 
grovelling through necessity ; an endless turn to specidation 
and project ; in a word, a clever, flighty, good-natured, ne- 
cessitous man." 
The late professor Fisher of New Haven has likewise 
left a statement, illustrative of this inordinate mental aflec- 
tion. Like that of Nicolai, it is the more valuable in coming 
from a scientific man, as the narration is in consequence 
placed above any suspicion of mistake. It was in his case, 
however, not a permanent, but merely a temporary state of the 
mind, arising probably from some physical derangement. 
"To whatever subject (he says) I happened to direct my 
thoughts, my mind was crowded with ideas upon it. I seem- 
ed to myself able to wield the most difficult subjects with 
perfect ease, and to have an entire command over my own 444 
PARTIAL INSANITY. 
train of thought. I found myself wonderfully inventive ; 
scarce a subject presented itself in which I did not seem to 
myself to perceive, as it were by intuition, important im- 
provements. I slept but a( part of the night, my mind being 
intensely occupied with planning, inventing, &c. All the 
writing that I did was done in the utmost hurry. Ideas 
crowded upon me five times as fast as I could put down even 
hints of them, and my sole object was to have some memori- 
al by which they might be recalled. I was employed the 
whole time in the most intense meditation ; and at the same 
time, thinking never seemed to be attended with so little ef- 
fort. I did not experience the least confusion or fatigue of 
mind. My thoughts flowed with a rapidity that was prodi- 
gious ; and the faculties of association, memory, &c., were 
wonderfully raised. I could read different languages into 
English, and English into Hebrew, with a fluency which I 
was never before or since master of. During the whole 
time, though I was in a low state of health, I never felt the 
least pain or fatigue of body." 
§. 362. Of partial insanity or alienation of the memory. 
Among other exhibitions of partial insanity, using the 
terms in the manner already explained, we may include some 
of the more striking instances of weakened and disordered 
memory. Every other part of the intellect may be sound 
and regular in its action, (for it will be recollected that we 
confine ourselves here to the disorders of the intellect, 
without anticipating those of the Sensibilities and the Will,) 
the powers of perception, of association, of imagination, of 
reasoning, at least so far as they are able to act independent 
of the memory, while the action of the latter power is either 
essentially obliterated, or is the subject of strange and unac- 
countable deviations. From the plan of this work we are 
obliged to content ourselves with the briefest possible no- 
tices ; and can therefore only refer to one or two instances in 
illustration of what has been said. The instances of weak- 
ened and perverted memory are of three kinds ; (1) those 
where there is a general prostration, caused in various ways, 
such as grief and old age ; (2) those, where there is a sudden 
and entire prostration extending to particular subjects, or PARTIAL INSANITY. 
445 
hrough a particular period of time, generally caused by some 
udden and violent affection of the body ; and (3) those, 
where there is not so much an inordinate weakness or oblit- 
eration of the power under consideration, as a singularly per- 
verse and irregular action of it. It is probably not necessa- 
ry to say any thing of the first class. Of the second class is 
the case, mentioned by Dr. Beattie, of a gentleman, who, in 
consequence of a violent blow on the head, lost his knowl- 
edge of Greek, but did not appear to have lost any thing else- 
Another instance is that, mentioned by Dr. Abercrombie, of 
a lady, who in consequence of a protracted illness, lost the 
recollection of a period of about ten or twelve years ; but 
spoke with perfect consistency of things as they stood before 
that time. Of the third class is the case of a man, who al- 
ways called tobacco a hogshead ; and of another man, who, 
when he wanted coals put upon his fire always called for pa- 
per, and when he wanted paper called for coals ; and of 
another, who could not be made to understand the name of 
an object if it wras spoken to him, but understood it perfectly 
when it was written. These three cases will be found more 
particularly detailed in Dr. Abercrombie's Inquiries into the 
Intellectual Powers. A case perhaps still more interesting 
is found in Dr. Conolly's Indications of Insanity as follows. 
"A gentleman of considerable attainments, after long con- 
tinued attention to various subjects, found himself incapable 
of writing what he sat down to write ; and wishing to write 
a check could get no farther than the first two words ; he 
found that he wrote what he did not mean to write, but by 
no effort could he write what he intended. This impairment 
of his memory and attention lasted about half an hour, dur- 
ing which time his external senses were not impaired, but 
the only ideas which he had were such as the imagination 
dictated, without order, and without object. He knew also, 
during this time that when he spoke, the words he uttered 
were not the words he wished to utter. When he recover- 
ed, he found that in his attempt to write the check, he had, 
instead of the words 'fifty dollars, being one half-year's 
rate,' put down 'fifty dollars through the salvation of Bra.' " 
§. 363. Of the power of reasoning in the partially insane. 
It will be noticed, so far as we have gone in the examination 446 
PARTIAL INSANITY. 
of the subject of insanity, that we have considered the powers 
of the mind separately. Probably every power of the mind, 
but particularly those of the intellect, may become more or 
less disordered. Having considered sensation, perception, 
original suggestion, consciousness, judgment, association, and 
memory, we propose, as coming next in order, to examine 
the subject in its connection with the reasoning power. 
In some cases of insanity, there is a total inability of reason- 
ing. There is no power of attention, no power of compari- 
son ; and of course no ability in the mind to pass from the 
premises of an argument to the conclusion. We have alrea- 
dy had occasion to refer to the power of relative suggestion, 
by means of which comparisons are instituted. Whenever 
this power is disordered and fails to perform its office, such 
is the close connection between it and reasoning, the opera- 
tions of the latter are disturbed also. In such cases the ina- 
bility to reason is total ; that, is to say, it extends to all sub- 
jects alike. But it is more frequently the case, that the 
alienation of reasoning is not so extensive, but exists chiefly 
in relation to certain subjects, in respect to which the belief 
is affected. When the train of reasoning leads the person 
within the range of those particular subjects, whatever they 
are, we at once discover, that the intellect is disordered. 
And this view has led to the common remark, which is obvi- 
ously well founded, that the more common form of insane or 
alienated reason does not consist so much in the mode of con- 
necting propositions, and in the conclusions drawn from them, 
as in the premises. The insane person believes, for instance, 
that he is a king. Accordingly he reasons correctly in re- 
quiring for himself the homage, suited to a king, and in ex- 
pressing dissatisfaction on account of its being withheld ; but 
he commits an essential error in the premises, which assume, 
that he actually possesses that station. 
§. 364. Instances of the above form of insanity of reasoning. 
We have an instance of the form of insanity just mention- 
ed, in the character of Don Quixote. Cervantes represents 
the hero of his work, as having his naturally good under- 
standing perverted by the perusal of certain foolish, roman- 
tic stories falsely purporting to be a true record of knights PARTIAL INSANITY. 
447 
and deeds of chivalry. These books, containing the histo- 
ry of dwarfs, giants, necromancers, and other preternatural 
extravagance, were zealously perused, until the head of Don 
Quixote was effectually turned by them. Although he was 
thus brought into a state of real mental derangement, it was 
limited to the extravagancies, which have been mentioned. 
We are expressly informed, that in all his conversations and 
replies, he gave evident proofs of a most excellent understan- 
ding, and never "lost the stirrups," except on the subject of 
chivalry. On this subject he "was crazed." Accordingly 
when the barber and curate visited him on a certain occasion, 
the conversation happened to turn on what are termed reas- 
ons of state, and on modes of administrations ; and Don Quix- 
ote spoke so well on every topic, as to convince them, that 
he was quite sound, and had recovered the right exercise of 
his judgment. But something being unadvisedly said about 
the Turkish war, the Knight at once remarked with much 
solemnity and seriousness, that his majesty had nothing to 
do but to issue a proclamation, commrnanding all theknights- 
errant in Spain to assemble at his court on a certain day ; and 
allhough not more than half a dozen should come, among these one 
would be found, who would alone be sufficient to overthrow the whole 
Turkish power. 
When the subject of conversation turned upon war, which 
had so near a connection with shields, and lances, and all 
the associations of chivalry, it came within the range of his 
malady, and led to the absurd remark, which showed at once 
the unsoundness of his mind, notwithstanding the sobriety 
and good sense which he had just before exhibited. 
§. 365. Of readiness of reasoning in the partially insane. ' ' 
Those, who have been personally acquainted with the in- 
tellectual condition of the partially insane, have sometimes 
observed in them great quickness of thought in some little 
emergencies, and an unusual degree of cunning. When, for 
instance, an attempt has been made to seize and confine 
them, they steadily and promptly mark the motions of their 
pursuers ; they rapidly decypher their intentions from their 
countenance ; and cause them no small degree of perplexity. 
In particular it has been observed in some instances, that 448 
PARTIAL INSANITY. . 
they discover more fluency of expression, and rapidity of de- 
duction, than others of a perfectly sound mind, or than them- 
selves could have exhibited before their derangement. This 
singular fact is to be briefly explained. 
The unusual quickness of deduction and of expression, 
which has sometimes been noticed in partially insane persons, 
may be referred to two causes ; First, an uncommon excita- 
tion of the attention, and of all the intellectual powers ; And, 
secondly, a removal of those checks, which attend the sober 
and the rational in their reasonings. 
Some of the checks, which retard the process of reason- 
ing in the case of men, whose powers are in a good state, are 
these. (1) There is a distrust of phraseology, a fear of 
mistakes from the ambiguity and vagueness of language. 
The object of a rational man is supposed to be to arrive at 
truth, and not merely to gain a victory. He, therefore, feels 
anxious, not only to employ terms, which appear to himself 
proper, but which shall be rightly understood by his oppo- 
nent. But the irrational man, as might be expected, does 
not find himself embarrassed with considerations of this na- 
ture. (2) A second obstruction to facility and promptness 
in argumentation, in the case of the soberminded and ration- 
al, is this ; they fear that they may not be in possession of 
all those premises, on which the solution will be found in the 
event to depend. Many disputes are carried on without 
previously forming an acquaintance with those facts, which 
are necessarily and prominently involved. While disputants 
of sound minds have any suspicion on this point, and know 
not but it will be labor lost, they of course feel their interest 
in the dispute very much diminished. (3) The third cir- 
cumstance, to which reference was had, is this ; the influ- 
ence of certain feelings of propriety and of good sense, which 
ordinarily govern men in the full exercise of their powers. 
The disputant feels himself under obligations to profess a 
deference for his opponent ; it is due to the customary forms 
of society. He is sometimes restrained and embarrassed by 
what he considers due to those, who are present to hear the 
argument. He is particularly careful to say nothing foolish, 
absurd, or uncharitable. All these things weigh nothing 
with the insane person. He is not troubled about exactness PARTIAL INSANITY. 
449 
of expression, or the observance of ceremonies, but strange- 
ly rushes, as it were, upon the main points of the controver- 
sy, regardless of all minor considerations.* 
§. 366. Partial mental alienation by means of the imagination. 
Men of sensibility and genius, by giving way to the sug- 
gestions of a melancholy imagination, sometimes become 
mentally disordered. Not that we are authorized to include 
these cases as among the more striking forms of insanity ; 
they in general attract but little notice, although sources of 
exquisite misery to the subjects of them. But such are the 
extravagant dreams, in which they indulge ; such are the 
wrong views of the character and actions of men, which their 
busy and melancholy imaginations are apt to form, that they 
cannot be reckoned persons of truly sound minds. These in- 
stances, which are not rare, it is difficult fully to describe ; 
but their most distinguishing traits will be recognized in the 
following sketch from Madame de Stael's Reflections on the 
Character and Writings of Rousseau. 
After remarking that he discovered no sudden emotions, 
but that his feelings grew upon reflection, and that he became 
impassioned in consequence of his own meditations, she adds 
as follows. "Sometimes he would part with you, with all 
his former affection ; but if an expression had escaped you, 
which might bear an unfavorable construction, he would re- 
collect it, examine it, exaggerate it, perhaps dwell upon it tor 
a month, and conclude by a total breach with you. Hence 
it was, that there was scarce a possibility of undeceiving 
him ; for the light, which broke in upon him at once, was 
not sufficient to efface the wrong impressions, which had ta- 
ken place so gradually in his mind. It was extremely diffi- 
cult, too, to continue long on an intimate footing with him. 
A word, a gesture, furnished him with matter of profound 
meditation ; he connected the most trifling circumstances like 
so many mathematical propositions, and conceived his con- 
clusions to be supported by the evidence of demonstration. 
"I believe, (she further remarks,) that imagination was 
the strongest of his faculties, and that it had almost absorbed 
all the rest. He dreamed rather than existed, and the events 
* See Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. II, ch. hi. 450 
PARTIAL INSANITY. 
of his life might be said, more properly to have passed in his 
mind than without him : a mode of being, one should have 
thought, that ought to have secured him from distrust, as it 
prevented him from observation ; but the truth was, it did 
not hinder him from attempting to observe ; it only rendered 
his observations erroneous. That his soul was tender no 
one can doubt, after having read his works ; but his imagina- 
tion sometimes interposed between his reason and his affec- 
tions, and destroyed their influence ; he appeared sometimes 
void of sensibility ; but it was because he did not perceive 
objects such as they were. Had he seen them with our 
eyes, his heart would have been more affected than ours." 
§. 367. Insanity or alienation of the power of belief. 
The action of the various intellectual powers, which have 
been brought to view in this chapter, terminates in the caus- 
ation or production of Belief. In regard to that particular 
state of the intellect, which is denominated belief, it is obvi- 
ous, that in a sound mind it has a natural and determinate 
relation to all the various intellectual susceptibilities, both 
External and Internal. This relation is sometimes disturb- 
ed ; and the belief exists in a position, altogether unsustain- 
ed by the evidence which is presented. _ There are three 
classes of persons, in whom this state of mind, or, in other 
words, the faculty or susceptibility of belief, if we may be 
permitted so to call it, appears to be disordered. (1) The 
first class are those, who seem incapable of believing any 
thing, which they are required to believe on the testimony 
of others. They must see it with their own eyes ; they must 
hear it, or handle it for themselves ; they must examine it 
by square, rule, and compass. They remind one of the Sav- 
age, who complained, when something was proposed for his 
belief, "that it would not believe for him." The causes of 
this singular inability are worthy of more inquiry, than has 
hitherto been expended upon them. When it is very great, 
it is a mark of the approach or actual existence of idiocy 
(2) There is another class of persons, who plainly show a 
derangement of this power, by their readiness to believe 
every thing. No matter how incongruous or improbable a 
story is, it is received at once. They take no note of dates, PARTIAL INSANITY. 
451 
characters, and circumstances ; and as they find nothing too 
improbable to believe, they find nothing too strange, marvel- 
lous, and foolish to report. This state of mind is frequently 
an accompaniment of light-headedness. (3) There are 
other cases, where the alienation of belief is not general, but 
particular. There is nothing peculiar and disordered in its 
ordinary action, but only in respect to particular facts. That 
is, certain propositions, which are erroneous and absurd, are 
received by the disordered persons as certain ; and nothing 
can convince them of the contrary. One believes himself to 
be a king; another, that he is the prophet Mahomet; and 
various other absurdities are received by them as undoubt- 
edly true. On all other subjects they appear to be rational ; 
but the alienation or insanity of belief is evident, as soon as 
their cherished errors are mentioned. 
CHAPTER FIFTH. 
TOTAL INSANITY OR DELIRIUM. 
§. 368. Idea of total insanity or delirium. 
We finish what we have to say on the subject of the In- 
tellect, both in its regular and its disordered action, by a 
brief explanation of Total Insanity or Delirium. Partial in- 
sanity is so designated because it exists in one only or a 
small number of intellectual powers ; but total insanity, as 
the expression indicates, implies the perversion of all of 
them. It involves the idea of a total disorganization; of a 
chaotic mingling together of the mental elements, without 
regard to law or order ; perception, consciousness, associa- 
tion, memory, reasoning, all conflicting with themselves and 
with each other in one wild mass of irretrievable ruin. 
It may perhaps be intimated here, that the relation, which 
total insanity holds to partial insanity, precludes the necessi- 
ty of saying much on the former ; because we have only to 452 
unite the various evils which exist in partial insanity, in 
one mind, in order to constitute the idea and the reality of 
total insanity. There is undoubtedly some foundation for 
this suggestion ; but it is nevertheless true, that objects often 
assume a new character in virtue of the relations they sus- 
tain, and evils, which are great in themselves, may not only 
assume a new aspect but an increased aggravation by being 
associated with other evils. And this is true in insanity. So 
long as only a part of the mind is disordered, there is some 
hope, that the light which is unobscured may penetrate the 
darkness of the region, which is insane. At any rate, we 
may well suppose that the insanity of the mind is favorably 
modified and kept in check by the elements that still remain 
unperverted. But when the contagion has spread through 
the whole mass, when every modifying and conservative in- 
fluence is obliterated, the separate evils, which existed in the 
different departments and powers of the mind, are likely to 
become more intense, than they would otherwise be. 
TOTAL INSANITY 
§. 369, Of perception in cases of total or delirious insanity. 
We may illustrate the general views of the last section by 
a reference to the power of perception. It will be recollect- 
ed, that perception involves something more than mere sen- 
sation ; such as the reference of the sensation to the outward 
cause, and not unfrequently acts of judgment distinguishing 
one cause from another. Of course it follows, if the power 
of relative suggestion or judgment be disordered, as it is in 
all cases of delirum or total insanity, the disordered condi- 
tion of the power of perception will be likely to be increased. 
This is the case, in particular, in respect to what are 
called Acquired perceptions. In visual perception, for in- 
stance, all objects at first seem to touch the eye. Accord- 
ingly our estimate of distance by the sight is not, properly 
speaking, original knowledge, but acquired. What we term 
perception of distance is not a mere act of the eye, a mere 
visual apprehension ; but always presupposes certain prece- 
ding acts of the judgment. But in delirious insanity the 
power of judging is subverted and lost. Hence the delirious 
man necessarily mistakes in the perception of distance, and 
jt is no uncommon thing to find him attempting to throw OR DELIRIUM. 
453 
himself from the windows of an upper story, or down the 
brink of a precipice. Such attempts can be accounted for 
on no other supposition, than a mistake of sight, founded not 
so much on a false sensation, as on a false or perverted judg- 
ment, involved in the complex act of visual perception. . 
The same causes, which perplex his perceptions of distance, 
also confuse his notions of extension, of the form of bodies, 
and of the outlines of any object of sight whatever. 
§. 370. Of association in delirious insanity. 
In the form of insanity which is termed delirious, the 
principle of association is not unfrequently found to be great- 
ly affected. Rapidity of association was given, as a charac- 
teristic of that form of partial insanity, which was termed 
light-headedness or 'demence.' But in delirium it often ex- 
ists in a far more striking degree. In light-headedness, the 
direct and indirect influence, which is retained, and exercis- 
ed by the will over trains of thought, is only diminished ; in 
delirium it seems to be wholly annulled. Every new object, 
every new countenance, every noise heard in the room, 
where the delirious person is, or noises that are heard from 
without, indeed every thing, with which thoughts and feel- 
ings have been formerly associated, revives those ancient 
trains of mental acts. They are poured in upon him like a 
flood ; and it is easier to conceive than describe what a tu- 
multuous chaos the mind in such a condition must be. When 
we consider, that these uncalled for trains of thought are 
thrown in upon the maniac, when his system is in great ner- 
vous excitement, and that he is unable to resist or to regu- 
late the instantaneous transference of the mind from subject 
to subject, it is no wonder, that he should exhibit, as we 
often find that he does, much external agitation, wildness of 
countenance, violence of gestures, and outcries. 
§. 371. Illustration of the above section. 
The following account of the rapid mental transitions of 
an insane person in the New Bethlem Hospital, London, will 
go to confirm and illustrate what has been said. Like all 
characteristic sketches of insanity, it is a melancholy picture. 
Difficult as it is to conceive, that such an endless series of 454 
TOTAL INSANITY 
topics should be crowded into the mind in a space so short, 
it is only what is realized in all cases of delirious insanity, 
where a derangement of the laws of association is the promi- 
nent trait. "Wholly unlimited by the identities of time, 
place, or person, he instantly accommodates each to his fan- 
cy, and in a moment he is any where, and every where, and 
any body, by turns. At one time he imagines himself to be 
the Lord Chancellor, or, as he emphatically styles himself, 
'Young Baggs and no mortal tongue ever maintained the 
loquacity of the law, or talked with more incessant volubility, 
than his imaginary lordship. He would decide ten thousand 
causes in a day ; he would accuse, try, condemn, and execute 
whole nations in a breath. His language was as wild and 
far-fetched as his fancy was various ; topics of all kinds seem- 
ed to come tumbling into his mind, without order or connex- 
ion. Of every name he heard mentioned he instantly be- 
came the personal representative, and says, 'I am he thus 
he is by turns Bonaparte, the King, the Duke of Wellington, 
Lord Londonderry, the Persian Ambassador, Mr. Pope, Ho- 
mer, Srnollet, Hume, Gibbon, John Bunyan, &c. 
" He is successively a Hottentot, a Lascar, a Spaniard, a 
Turk, a Jew, a Scotsman. He has been in all situations and 
occupations of life, according to his own account ; a potboy 
at Hampstead, a shoeblack, a chimney-sweeper, an East In- 
dia Director, a kennel-raker, a gold-finder, an oyster-woman, 
a Jew cast-clothesman, a police justice, a judge, a keeper of 
Newgate, and, as he styles it, 'His Majesty's law iron-mong- 
er for the home department nay, he has even been Jack 
Ketch, and has hung hundreds ; he has been a soldier, and 
has killed thousands ; a Portuguese, and poniarded scores ; 
a Jew Pedlar, and cheated all the world ; a member of Par- 
liament for London, and betrayed his constituents ; a Lord 
Mayor, a bishop, an admiral, a dancing-master, a Rabbi, Gri- 
maldi in the pantomime, and ten thousand other occupations, 
that no tongue or memory but his own could enumerate. 
The specimen just given may serve as a sample of what is 
passing in his fancy." 
§. 872. Of the memory in connection with delirious insanity. 
The memory too, whatever perversions it may suffer in OR DELIRIUM. 
455 
partial insanity, is, as a general thing, still more unfavorably 
affected in delirium. The memory, it will be recollected, 
holds nearly the same relation to association, that perception 
does to sensation. That is to say, it embraces something 
more ; and this additional element is an act of the judgment, 
a process of comparison. If, therefore, the action of the 
judgment is annulled or greatly perplexed, as it always is in 
delirium, the malady of the memory, whatever it may hap- 
pen to be, is unquestionably increased by that circumstance. 
Under such circumstances the memory is not only like a ship 
without a rudder, (a comparison which is frequently employ- 
ed to illustrate its disordered action ;) but is coasting a shore, 
where there are no buoys or light-houses. The surrounding 
beacons of the mind are extinguished ; the landmarks, which 
nature had erected in other departments of the intellectual 
empire are obliterated ; and there is nothing exterior to it- 
self, to indicate either the mistakes or the certainties of its 
position. 
If we further examine the subject of total insanity in con- 
nection with the faculty of reasoning, we shall find results 
somewhat similar ; or perhaps even more marked, more un- 
favorable. In partial insanity, it is true, that the reasoning 
power is sometimes greatly impaired in every respect ; 
whether we consider the mere act of comparison, or the ele- 
ments which the act of comparison attempts to combine to- 
gether. But it is not unfrequently the case, that, in that 
form of insanity, the deductive power remains essentially 
sound, so far as the process, or act of comparing and combi- 
ning, is concerned ; and is erroneous in its results, merely in 
consequence of a mistake in the elements, which it employs. 
In other words, the error is not so much in the acts of com- 
parison, as in the propositions, which are compared together; 
the superstructure, in itself considered, is well enough, but 
the foundation is defective. But in total insanity or deli- 
rium there is, for the most part, neither the one nor the oth- 
er ; neither the basis of the building nor the materials and 
requisite powers, with which to erect it. 
All reasoning, it is obvious, must have something to start 
from ; some amount of knowledge, whether more or less, 
§. 373. Of the power of reasoning in total or delirious insanity. 456 
TOTAL INSANITY 
constituting its beginning, its antecedent position ; but in to- 
tal insanity, still more than in partial, the alienation, that 
pervades the mind, has infected and disordered the elements 
of thought, in addition to the inability of comparing them to- 
gether. The ability to compare implies a healthy condition 
of the powers of association and relative suggestion, both of 
which are disordered in delirium. Of course, the two great 
conditions of sound reasoning, viz, sound knowledge to begin 
with and unimpaired powers of comparison are wanting. 
Under these circumstances, we leave it to the reader to 
judge, whether we may not reasonably anticipate, that a dis- 
ordered condition of the reasoning power in total insanity 
will be more aggravated and hopeless than at other times. 
The statements, which have been made, sufficiently in- 
dicate, without our going further into the subject, the lead- 
ing peculiarities of mental action, which will be likely to at- 
tend a state of delirium or total insanity, in distinction from 
any other and lower form of disordered intellect. 
§. 374. Of the form of insanity called furor of madness. 
It is sometimes the case, that insanity of the intellectual 
powers, whether in whole or in part, is attended with a sort 
of dull and moping stupidity of the affections. The subject 
of it is averse to companionship, takes no interest in the ordi- 
nary concerns of life, and seems most to enjoy the little hap- 
piness which can be supposed to exist in his melancholy sit- 
uation, when most remote from the observation of others. 
But sometimes it is otherwise. The fountains of the inner 
deep are broken up. There are sorrows profound and inex- 
tinguishable, sometimes borne and uttered with a degree of 
calmness ; but not unfrequently venting themselves in impas- 
sioned expressions and furious acts. All the corporeal pow- 
ers of the maniac at such times are put to the test ; he makes 
war upon his own friends ; he attacks his keepers ; he as- 
saults the bars and windows of his prison ; and even turns, 
in the height of his uncontrolled vexation and anguish, upon 
his own person. It is this form of insanity, which is com- 
monly termed furor or madness ; and which we shall proba- 
bly find occasion to illustrate more particularly, when, as in OR DELIRIUM. 
457 
the progress of this Work, we shall be naturally led to do, we 
contemplate the subject in connection with the Sensibilities. 
§.*375. Of the causes of the different kinds of insanity. 
In regard to the causes of insanity, which it may be prop- 
er here briefly to refer to, they are generally understood, 
whether the insanity is partial or delirious, to be of two 
kinds, viz, moral, and physical. In the first place, all 
diseases, which violently affect the physical system, such as 
epilepsy, fevers, and apoplexy, also injuries of the brain, in- 
directly affect the mind, and may cause permanent insanity. 
It is worthy of remark also in regard to an insane state 
of the mind, that it is in some degree hereditary ; hence it is 
often said of particular families, that they are predisposed to 
insanity. The father, son, and grandson have not only been 
known to become successively insane, but the derangement 
has sometimes taken place in each case, in the same year of 
their life. 
II. There are also various moral causes of mental 
alienation. It has been caused, among other circumstances 
of a moral nature, by disappointed ambition. Disappointment 
in mercantile and other speculations, and in any ardent ex- 
pectations whatever, often has the same effect. Erroneous 
religious opinions, and great excitements of feeling on reli- 
gious subjects have contributed towards supplying lunatic 
hospitals. An unrestrained indulgence of any of the passions 
is found to be attended with the same results. 
As an illustration of what has been said, it may be added, 
that we find a fruitful source of mental derangement in the 
vicissitudes of political events. A recent writer in a French 
medical work says, that he could give a history of the politi- 
cal revolutions in France from the taking of the Bastille, down 
to the return of Bonaparte from Elba, by detailing the causes 
of certain cases of insanity.* It appears from reports from 
insane hospitals, that moral causes of insanity are more nu- 
merous than physical. But in many cases the influence of 
both is combined together. 
* Dictionaire des Sciences Medicales, Art. Folie, (Esquirol.) See also 
Des Causes Morales et Physiques des Maladies Mentales par F. Voisin j 
Influence des institutions politiques. 458 
TOTAL INSANITY 
§. 376. Of moral accountability in mental alienation. 
It is in some respects a difficult inquiry, Whether men, 
who are in a state of mental alienation, are morally account- 
able? Whether they are the subjects of merit or demerit? 
And if so, in what cases, and how far ? In determining 
these questions, there ought to be a distinction made between 
cases of partial insanity, where the mind is deranged only in 
part, and cases of delirium or total insanity. In the last, 
there is evidently no accountability. In the former instan- 
ces, a judgment should be formed from the circumstances of 
the particular case under consideration. 
Accordingly this may be laid down as a general rule in 
respect to this subject, and perhaps it is the only one which 
can be ; viz, Persons of an alienated mind, whether they be 
idiots or insane, are not to be considered accountable, are 
not subjects of praise or blame, whenever it appears, that the 
mental alienation extends to, and wholly annuls the power 
of correct judgment.. And this is the case with all persons, 
who are the subjects of total insanity. When the insanity 
is partial, it would seem to follow, therefore, that the first in- 
quiry should be, whether the action committed comes within 
range of the malady. For a person, who is insane on one 
subject merely, will probably be found to labor under a per- 
version of judgment in respect to that particular subject, no 
less than if the insanity were total or delirious. Consequent- 
ly, a distinction may be justly set up, although it will require 
much caution in doing it, between those actions, which can 
be clearly found within the limits of the person's insanity, 
and those which evidently fall without it. 
§. 377. Of the imputation of insanity to individuals. 
While the existence of insanity, so far as materially to af- 
fect the power of judging-, takes away accountability in whole 
or in part, it affects proportionally the relations which the 
subjects of it sustain to society. In all well organized com- 
munities it will be found to follow from the terms of the civil 
compact, that those, who exercise sovereignty, are bound to 
afford protection to the citizens in general, and to individuals 
in particular in certain cases. Hence they will be found to OR DELIRIUM. 
459 
have taken precautionary measures, the nature of which all 
are acquainted with, to protect the community against the 
injuries, which insane persons might commit, and also to alle- 
viate that unhappiness, which they necessarily bring, in a 
greater or less degree, on themselves and families. 
Accordingly it is implied in the imputation of insanity to 
individuals, by an act of the civil authorities, that the insane 
person is deprived of that ability of self government which is 
the common allotment of men ; that the strong bonds of 
friendship, of family, and of country, which once kept him in 
his appropriate station in society, are loosened ; and that he 
must find, in the substitution of the will and guardianship of 
the State, that oversight and protection, which he had lost 
by the alienation of his own. While all must admit the pro- 
priety of this course, where the circumstances of the case 
justly demand it, it must be conceded, that nothing can be 
more solemn and affecting, than such a public imputation of 
derangement, which, whether just or unjust, practically anni- 
hilates the civil and social character of man, and seals his 
degradation in these respects. It is a right, therefore, which 
ought not to be exercised but upon good grounds, and the 
exercise of which ought to be understood to require, and to 
imply a correct acquaintance with this difficult, but practical 
and important subject. And the more so, because there have 
been depraved individuals, who have endeavored to fasten 
the charge of insanity upon others from some interested mo- 
tives, in order to gratify malignant passions, or to control 
their persons or property. A suitable protection against the 
designs of such is to be had, not merely in the integrity of 
those, who are to judge in these cases, but in their acquaint- 
ance with the laws and tendencies of the mind. 
Before leaving this topic, one suggestion further remains. 
In forming an opinion as to the mental alienation of an indi- 
vidual, not only those particular facts are to be considered, 
which are supposed to indicate insanity, but they are to be 
estimated in connection with constitutional traits of charac- 
ter. That rapidity of association, that gay and heedless 
transition from subject to subject, which is natural in one, 
and occasions no surprise, would be regarded in another, as 460 
TOTAL INSANITY 
a positive indication of the disturbance of the mental powers. 
§. 378. Of the treatment of the insane. 
In closing this view of mental maladies, it is proper to make 
some suggestions on the treatment clue to those of our fellow 
beings, who are thus afllicted. It is no uncommon thing to 
see them treated with unkindness. Although they may not, 
in general, so readily perceive and so intensely feel, as oth- 
ers, the injuries they receive, any cruelty of treatment to- 
wards them is very unjustifiable in the authors of it. 
It is wrong on the general principle, that we are bound, 
not to cause and increase suffering unnecessarily in any case 
whatever, even in the animal creation. Men were designed 
to render each other happy, and not to increase each other's 
miseries. The poet Cowper uttered a sentiment, which finds 
a response in the bosoms of all kind and honorable men, 
when he declared he would not reckon in his list of friends, 
the man, who should needlessly set foot upon a worm. 
It is wrong also, on the principle, that we should do to 
others, as we ourselves wish to be done by. The person 
of an alienated mind may not be able to reason on the sub- 
ject of what is due him, but those, who possess rational pow- 
ers, can. They cannot fail to see the application of the Scrip- 
tural principle which has been mentioned, in the present in- 
stance. All persons whatever are subject to these mental 
evils ; and it is presumed, that no one would be easy in the 
anticipation of being left without care and assistance from 
others, when he should be unable to take care of himself. 
If, therefore, we take the ground, that persons in the state 
of idiocy, or of delirium, or of any of the forms of mental 
alienation, are not entitled to care and kindness, we are pos- 
sibly treasuring up for ourselves a retribution of a similar 
fearful character. 
Again ; ill treatment of cases of this kind is a tacit reflec- 
tion on the Supreme Being, which we cannot, without great 
self-ignorance, imagine ourselves authorized to make. He 
has in his wisdom permitted them to exist, as memorials of 
human weakness, and as useful comentaries on pride of in- OR DELIRIUM. 
461 
tellect; and perhaps also to give us an opportunity of exerci- 
sing the noble virtues of charity and humanity. We are, 
therefore, bound to receive the instructions they impart, and 
to exercise the virtues, which they give us an opportunity 
of exercising; otherwise, we cast contempt on Him, whose 
almighty hand orders the distinctions, and distributes the 
allotments both of bodily and intellectual life.