ARMY OBSERVERS’ REPORT 
OF 
OPERATION 
TASK FORCE 68, U.S.NAVY RESTRICTED 
ARMY OBSERVERS’ REPORT 
OF 
OPERATION 
HIGHJUMP 
TASK FORCE 68, U. S. NAVY 
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. 
SEPTEMBER 1 947 Distribution : 
OSW (2); WDGS Divs (5), except R&D (300); WDSS Divs (2); 
AAF (10); AGF (50); T (2); Dept (2); Base Comd (2); Def 
Comd (2); AAF Comd (5); Arm & Sv Bd (2); Adm Sv (2); 
Tech Sv (15); AMA (2); FC (1); PG (2); Ars (2); Div Eng (2); 
GH (1); RH (1); Disp (1); Sch (2), except Gen & Sp Sv Sch 
(5); USMA (5); Tng C (2); Class III Instls (1); A (5); CHQ 
(2); D (2); D (ATC) (2); D (A Tng Comd) (2); B (2); R (1); 
AF (5); W (2); G (1); Special distribution. 
For explanation of distribution formula, see TM 38-405. 
ii PREFACE 
This report represents the combined observations of Army personnel assigned to 
Task Force 68, Operation “HIGHJUMP”, Naval Antarctic Development Project, 
December 1946 to April 1947. The War Department responded willingly to a Navy 
invitation to send observers on this important expedition and increased its represen- 
tation to sixteen, ten more than originally allotted by the Navy. (The personnel 
included four men with prior Antarctic experience.) 
The Army cooperated with the Navy in respect to materiel items, particularly 
in regard to Ordnance vehicles and Quartermaster items of issue including special 
rations, tents, skis, stoves, sleeping bags, and cold weather clothing. 
The Army observers were primarily a cross-section representing Army Air Forces, 
Army Ground Forces, and some of the technical services. The combined background 
permitted a general coverage of primary Army interests, particularly in the fields of 
polar research, engineering, communications, personal health and protection, surface 
transportation, meteorology, photography, air operations, emergency rescue, and 
various fields of scientific research. 
By Navy request, the Army observers’ activity was to be segregated specifically 
from expedition operations. However, they asked for or accepted voluntary work 
assignments which would permit better opportunities for military observations. 
The Army personnel therefore had an active part in many operational activities 
including exploratory flights, air operations, base construction, photography, over- 
snow travel, meteorology, emergency rescue planning, training, scientific projects, 
and other activities. 
The Army observers were concentrated for the most part with the Central Group 
which operated on the Ross Shelf Ice, as there was little of concern to the Army in 
respect to ship movements and seaplane activity of the Eastern and Western Groups. 
The War Department issued no special instructions to its observers, but appointed a 
senior observer who was well qualified as to the broad interests of the Army in high 
latitude operations and thoroughly cognizant as to Antarctic conditions. The senior 
Army observer organized the observation team and clarified fields of responsibility. 
The trip to Antarctica aboard the U. S. S. Mount Olympus, Flagship of the Task Force, 
was spent in frequent conference to prepare for maximum utilization of observation 
opportunities in the Antarctic. The plan worked smoothly while on the ice permit- 
ting the observers to work independently with only occasional coordination with the 
senior observer. On the return, the observers held daily conferences and prepared 
iii necessary joint logs and reports by means of dictation into a wire recorder. The 
specific topics for which the observers were individually qualified and responsible 
were prepared separately. 
Within one week upon return to the United States the Army observation reports, 
in rough draft, including illustrations, were submitted to the War Department and 
were made available in most instances to the agencies primarily concerned. The 
publication of the combined Army observers’ report was purposely postponed until 
the Navy’s much larger report could have prior release. It is felt that the Army 
observers’ report, although it does not attempt to cover ship operations or problems of 
primary concern to the Navy, does contain many valuable independent observations 
from an Army viewpoint that do not constitute a duplication of the Navy’s “Report 
of Operation Highjump”. (U. S. Navy Antarctic Development Project 1947.) 
The Army’s combined observers’ report has in no manner attempted to evaluate 
or criticize the Navy’s Operation Highjump. It has been a conscientious effort to 
report the operation as planned and executed. Each contributor was requested 
to consider the operation in the light of the problems with which the Army would be 
faced, were it to undertake a similar project, and to make recommendations as to 
how difficulties could be obviated. 
The War Department is indebted to the Navy for including Army observers on 
Operation Highjump under the commendable leadership of Rear Admiral R. E, Byrd 
and Rear Admiral R. H. Cruzen. The Army observers, and those who have assisted 
in production of this report, are to be commended for the very valuable contribu- 
tions they have made to the War Department research and development program. 
H. S. AURAND 
Major General, GSG 
Director of Research & Development 
War Department General Staff 
IV CONTENTS 
Page 
PREFACE Hi 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION. 
Section I. Planning of Operation “HIGHJUMP” 1 
IE Activities of U. S. Army Observers 5 
HI. Narrative Account of Operation “HIGHJUMP” 13 
CHAPTER 2. ARMY INTEREST IN ANTARCTICA. 
Section I. Historical Comments 15 
II. Army Interest 16 
CHAPTER 3. ENGINEER OPERATIONS. 
Section I. Introduction 18 
II. Construction Equipment 25 
III. Cargo Handling and Unloading 30 
IV. Buildings and Shelters 34 
V. Utilities 41 
VI. Airstrips and Snow Tests 44 
VIE Recommendations 57 
CHAPTER 4. TRANSPORTATION. 
Section I. Introduction 64 
II. Cargo Carrier, M29C 66 
III. Tractors 70 
IV. Drawn Conveyances 78 
V. Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT) 81 
VI. Observations 96 
VII. Recommendations 99 
VIII. Comments by U. S. M. C. Observer 101 
CHAPTER 5. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS. 
Section I. R4D (C-47) Operations in the Antarctic 105 
II. Technical Observations 108 
III. Recommendations Ill 
IV. Log of L-5 in the Antarctic 113 
V. Comments on Air Operations by U. S. N. Observer 120 
VI. Air Operations Logs—Central, Eastern, and Western Groups 124 
CHAPTER 6. SEARCH AND RESCUE. 
Section T. Task Force 68 Search and Rescue Plan 129 
II. Aircraft Accidents 135 
III. Search and Rescue Equipment 145 
IV. Observations 154 
V. Recommendations 159 
VI. Plan and S. O. P. for Army Search and Rescue Unit in the Antarctic . . . 161 CHAPTER 7. MEDICAL. f°*‘ 
Section I. Plans, Objectives and Policies 168 
II. Technical Observations 176 
III. Environmental Sanitation 199 
IV. Survival and Rescue 208 
V. Recommendations 217 
VI. List of Medical Supplies Cached at “Little America III” 220 
VII. Comments on U. D. T. by U. S. N. Observer 222 
CHAPTER 8. COMMUNICATIONS (SIGNAL CORPS). 
Section I. U. S. S. Mount Olympus 223 
II. Airstrip Control Station 229 
III. Aircraft 245 
IV. Emergency Base Station 247 
V. Trail Party 249 
VI. Clothing 251 
VII. Observations 252 
VIII. Recommendations 255 
CHAPTER'9. COMMUNICATIONS (ACS). 
Section I. Plans and Objectives 259 
II. Observations ' 259 
III. Recommendations 263 
CHAPTER 10. PHOTOGRAPHY. 
Section I. Task Force Plan 265 
II. Personnel and Assignments 268 
III. Equipment 273 
IV. Operation of Equipment 273 
V. Cold Weather Problems 280 
VI. Recommendations 286 
VII. Comments by U. S. N. Observer 289 
CHAPTER 11. METEOROLOGY. 
Section I. Meteorological Plan 290 
II. Technical Observations 291 
III. Weather Processes Encountered 299 
IV. Recommendations 300 
CHAPTER 12. ANTARCTIC PLAN FOR SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION. 
Section I. Approaches to the Antarctic 324 
II. The International Scientific Plan 326 
III. joint Aerial Exploratory Program 327 
IV. The Antarctic Is Different 328 
V. Conclusion 328 
CHAPTER 13. COMBINED OBSERVERS' LOG 329 APPENDIX I. INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBSERVERS 374 
II. FACILITIES ASHORE AT LITTLE AMERICA 377 
III. QUARTERMASTER QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NAVY TASK 
FORCE 68 379 
IV. OPERATIONAL AND PLANNING DISCUSSION .... 386 
V. GLACIOLOGICAL STUDY OF BAY OF WHALES AREA . 391 
VI. MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NEVE SNOW 
SURFACES 394 
VII. CLOTHING AND FOOTGEAR EXPERIMENTS 397 
VIII. MAPS 399 
Page 
vii Top row: Maj, Crozier; Capt. Harrison/ Mr. Waite/ Dr. Siple/ Maj. Holcombe/ Capt. Wiener/ Lt. Col. Davis. Bottom row: T/5 Waltersdort; 
T/5 Shimberg/ Lt. Col. Love/ CWO Morency/ Mr. Davis/ Sgt. London/ Lt. Col. Johns 
Figure 1. Army observers assigned to U. S. Navy Task Force 68, Operation HIGHJUMP RESTRICTED 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
SECTION I. Planning of Operation "HIGHJUMP" 
1. Command of Project. 
The United States Navy’s “Antarctic De- 
velopment Project, 1947,” identified by the 
code word HIGHJUMP, was established by 
the Chief of Naval Operations to be carried 
out by Task Force 68 of the Atlantic Fleet. 
This force, commanded by Rear Admiral 
Richard H. Cruzen, was under the opera- 
tional and administrative control of the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. 
Technical control was retained by the Chief 
of Naval Operations and exercised through 
Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd, USN (Ret.), 
who was designated as the officer in charge 
of the project and during the conduct of 
operations exercised technical control. Tac- 
tical command at all times remained with 
the Commander Task Force 68. 
2. Assumptions. 
a. That ice conditions would permit access 
to the proposed operating areas. 
b. That weather conditions encountered 
would permit conduct of planned air and 
surface operations. 
c. That no vessels of the task force would 
spend the winter in the Antarctic. 
3. Objectives of Project 
a. To establish a temporary base and air- 
strip on the Ross Shelf Ice in the vicinity of 
Tittle America, Antarctica, and conduct 
systematic long range air exploration of the 
Antarctic Continent therefrom, and conduct 
naval operations and carry out specific proj- 
ects for training naval personnel, testing 
materials, and amplifying scientific knowl- 
edge of the Antarctic. 
b. To extend the area of exploration of the 
Antarctic Continent, utilizing aircraft based 
on tenders operating around the continental 
perimeter. 
c. To examine the limits and character of 
the ice belt surrounding the Antarctic Con- 
tinent and the coast line where accessible by 
surface ships. 
d. To carry out assigned naval and scien- 
tific projects in order to—- 
(1) Train personnel and test materiel in 
the frigid zones. 
(2) Explore the largest practicable area 
of the Antarctic Continent. 
(3) Determine the feasibility of establish- 
ing, maintaining, and utilizing bases in the 
Antarctic, and investigate possible base sites. 
(4) Develop techniques for establishing, 
maintaining, and utilizing bases on ice, with 
particular reference to later applicability of 
such techniques to operations in interior 
of ice caps where conditions are comparable 
to those in the Antarctic. 
(5) Amplify existing stores of knowledge 
of hydrographic, geographic, geological, me- 
teorological, and electromagnetic propagation 
conditions in the area. 
(6) Supplement objectives of the 1946 
NANOOK operation. 
765274—48— 
1 BAY OF WHALES AREA 
1947 
GEOGRAPHIC STUDY-BY PAUL A. SIPUE 
SKETCH MAP-BY JOHN ROSCOE 
ALL PHYSIOGRAPHIC FEATURES FORMED 
IN ICE-NO LAND AT LITTLE A M ER IC A 
Figure 2. Bay of Whales area, January 1947. 
2 4. Task Force Composition. 
Task Force 68 was subdivided into four 
task groups with the following locations and 
objectives: 
a. Central Group, The Central Group was 
composed of the following vessels: 
1 Communications Ship (ACC), the U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus (Flagship). 
1 Ice breaker, “wind class” (WAG), the 
U. S. C. G. C. Northwind. 
1 Ice breaker (AG), the U. S. S. Burton 
Island. 
2 Supply ships (AKA), U. S. S. Yancey and 
U. S. S. Merrick. 
1 Submarine (SS), U. S. S. Sennet. 
This task group was to proceed to the Bay of 
Whales, land and establish a temporary base 
and airstrip in the vicinity of Little America, 
conduct systematic long range air explora- 
tion and associated operations, carry out 
various training and test projects, and sup- 
port scientific investigations in the interests 
of amplifying our knowledge of the Antarctic. 
b. Western Group. The Western Group 
was composed of the following vessels: 
1 Seaplane tender (AV), the U. S. S. Curri- 
tuck. 
1 Tanker (AO), the U. S. S, Cacapon. 
1 Destroyer (DD), the U. S. S. Henderson. 
c. Eastern Group. The Eastern Group was 
composed of the following vessels: 
1 Seaplane tender, the U. S. S. Pine Island. 
1 Tanker, the U. S. S. Canisteo. 
1 Destroyer, the U. S. S. Brownson. 
This task group was to proceed to the vicinity 
of Peter I Island (69° S. latitude and 91° W. 
longitude) and from this location begin 
systematic air exploration of assigned areas 
of the continent and coast line. This area 
was to be covered by moving eastward along 
the continental perimeter, keeping just out- 
side of the ice pack. 
d. Carrier Group. In addition to the above 
one aircraft carrier, the U. S. S. Philippine 
Sea was to ferry the R4D aircraft and one 
H03S helicopter down to the limits of the 
ice pack from which point the R4D aircraft 
were to be flown southward over the Ross 
Sea to the airstrip on the ice shelf. The 
helicopter was to be carried within range of 
Little America aboard the ice breaker 
Northwind. 
5. General Concept of Operations after 
Arrival. 
The primary objectives of the expedition 
were: To explore and map by aerial recon- 
naissance and photography as much of the 
unexplored and unmapped portions of the 
interior as possible and certain unknown or 
improperly charted parts of the coast line; 
to test cold weather air operations from ice 
cap terrain with conventional wheel landing 
gear by constructing and using a matted 
airstrip; and to determine the feasibility of 
and develop techniques for establishing, 
maintaining, and utilizing air bases on ice. 
To these ends the various phases of the opera- 
tion were planned as follows: 
a. Base Site. The ice barrier was to be 
approached in the Bay of Whales area and a 
thorough investigation made to locate a 
feasible base site in that area. If the bay 
was found closed and the area unsuitable for 
landing, search was to be made along the 
barrier, aided by observation from the heli- 
copter carried aboard the U. S. C. G. G. 
Northwind. The site selected had to satisfy 
the following requirements: 
(1) The top of the barrier must be 
accessible from the ice, foot or bay ice. 
(2) The general area had to be one in 
which the ice showed minimal signs of a 
tendency to break off. 
(3) The terrain must present a level 
straightaway 1 mile long for the airstrip. 
b. Base Construction. The senior Civil En- 
gineer Corps officer was to be responsible 
for construction of the base and airstrip. 
All construction was planned to continue 
3 on a 24-hour basis. The following priorities 
were given to the various phases of establish- 
ing the base: 
(1) Priority One. Construct an access road- 
way from the ship’s side to a place of safety 
on top of the barrier, set up rigging to move 
cargo sleds from ship to barrier top, establish 
an emergency subsistence facility on the 
barrier top, and install communications for 
local control of unloading and construction. 
(2) Priority Two. Break a trail from the 
first supply and equipment depot on the 
barrier top (“place of safety” mentioned 
above) to the base camp site. 
(3) Priority Three. Erect a 300-man tem- 
porary tent camp. 
(4) Priority Four. Install air operating facil- 
ities such as quonset hut for service facilities, 
radio equipment, and the pierced plank 
landing mat 150 by 5,000 feet with parking 
area, fuel dump, and runway lights. 
(5) Priority Five. Erect 35-man emergency 
winter hut camp. 
(6) Priority Six. Special facilities for testing 
equipment under cold weather conditions. 
c. Carrier Group Operations. Upon comple- 
tion of the airstrip (estimated late January) 
two R4D aircraft were to be called from the 
carrier lying outside of the ice pack at about 
70° S. latitude and 175° W. longitude. 
These planes were to make the flight and 
test the landing strip before the balance of 
the R4D aircraft were called. The destroyer 
Henderson was to act as plane guard during the 
launching operation. After ferrying and 
launching the aircraft, no further role was 
planned for the carrier which was then to 
be released for return to the Canal Zone. 
The helicopter on the Philippine Sea was to 
be brought in to within flying distance of the 
base site aboard the U. S, C. G. C. Northwind. 
d. General Air Plan. (1) After the aircraft 
from the carrier had joined the central 
group the planes available at the main base 
would be the following: 
6 R4D (C-47)—based ashore. 
1 JA (G-64) on skis—based ashore. 
1 H03S (commercial type) helicopter— 
based ashore. 
2 J2F (amphibians)—one on U.S.G.G.C. 
Northwind and one on U.S.S. Burton Island. 
1 HOS (R~6) helicopter—based on the 
U.S.C.G.G. Northwind. 
1 H03S helicopter—based on the U.S.S. 
Burton Island. 
2 Or (L 5) based ashore. 
With this equipment systematic exploration 
within the limits of practicable flight by the 
specially modified R4D aircraft was to be 
carried out. The range of these aircraft with 
cabin tanks was estimated at 750 miles’ 
radius. It was intended to fly standard 
sector search tracks spaced so that adjacent 
plane tracks at the end of the sector would be 
no more than 60 miles apart. The planes 
were oxygen equipped and where possible 
were to fly at 10,000 feet altitude over the 
average terrain level while taking trime- 
trogon photographs. All R4D’s were to be 
modified to a combination ski-wheel landing 
gear. The smaller aircraft were earmarked 
for rescue and short range reconnaissance. 
(2) The Eastern and Western Task Groups 
each had available the following aircraft: 
3 PBM-5 seaplanes. 
1 HOS (R-6) heli- 
copter 
1 SOG seaplane 
1 H03S helicopter. 
Western—all on U. 
S. S. Currituck. 
Eastern—all on U. 
S. S. Pine Island. 
The helicopters and seaplanes were to be 
used for rescue and short range recon- 
naissance. The PBM aircraft were to be 
used in pairs to conduct exploration of as- 
signed areas. Each group was to move 
gradually in a direction away from the Ross 
Sea area along the continental perimeter. 
They were to concentrate on areas outside 
of a 750-mile circle from the Central 
Group’s base. Flights were to cover the 
coast line first in order to provide maximum 
geographical reference for succeeding flights 
4 into the interior. After photographing the 
coast line, flights were to be made into the 
interior up to 700 miles from the ships. 
General areas covered are indicated on map, 
appendix VIII. 
e. Withdrawal. When the season advanced 
to the more difficult weather of the Antarctic 
fall, making air operations unprofitable or 
impracticable (estimated late March) ships 
of the Central Group were to be loaded and 
cleared from the Ross Sea and the entire task 
force withdrawn from the Antarctic area for 
return to the United States. 
f. Emergency Base. It was planned that no 
personnel would remain in the Antarctic 
except to continue a rescue operation. If 
this became necessary the winter party of 
about 35 men and officers would be chosen 
insofar as possible from volunteers and would 
occupy the emergency camp mentioned 
above as fifth priority in the base construc- 
tion plan. If possible this camp was to be 
located so as to utilize the buildings left by 
the U. S. Antarctic Service Expedition in 
1941 (“3rd Byrd Expedition”). The com- 
plement of the emergency camp was planned 
to include one medical officer and one 
medical enlisted man. 
g. Scientific Research. As auxiliary activities 
many scientific projects were to be pursued 
in such fields as geology, meteorology, 
terrestrial magnetism, oceanography, radar 
propagation, etc. Certain of these projects 
were under the direction of civilian scien- 
tists from nonmilitary governmental agen- 
cies. 
SECTION II. Activities of U. S. Army Observers 
1. Personnel. 
The personnel serving as War Department 
observers on Operation HIGHJUMP, to- 
gether with the agencies they represented 
were as follows: 
Dr. Paul A. Siple, civilian, WDGS, Research 
and Development (Assistant to Admiral 
Byrd on technical matters). 
John N. Davis, Lt. Col., Inf., Infantry 
School (Airborne). 
Willis S. Johns, Lt. Col., A. C., AAF Com- 
munications. 
R. C. Love, Lt. Col., M. C., AAF, The Air 
Surgeon. 
James H. Holcombe, Maj., C. E., AAF, The 
Air Engineer. 
Dan Crozier, Maj., M. C., Brooke Army 
Medical Center. 
Mr. A. H. Waite, civilian, Chief Signal Corps 
and Signal Corps Engineering Laboratory. 
Murray A. Wiener, Capt., A. C., AAF 
Rescue Service. 
Chas. H, Harrison, Capt., A. C., AAF, 
Weather Service. 
Mr. Robert Davis, civilian, Strategic Air 
Command (radar mapping observer). 
S. A. London, 1st Sgt., AAF Rescue Service 
(paratrooper). 
A. J. L. Morency, C. W. O., Amphibious 
Engineers. 
In addition to the above, four U. S. Army 
enlisted photographers were on the expedi- 
tion as participants under Navy direction. 
They were: Cpl. J. M. Waltersdorf and 
Gpl. J. Shimberg, central group; Cpl. H. G. 
Foster, Western group; and Cpl. E. Zinberg, 
Eastern group. 
2. Policies of the Commander, Task Force 
68. 
The policies of the Commander Task 
Force 68 with reference to the activities of the 
Army observers were as follows: 
a. Army observers were not to participate 
5 in the operation or the projects set up for 
accomplishment by the Navy Department. 
Their capacity as observers only was main- 
tained except as requested by the task force 
staff. 
b. In order that the final report on HIGH- 
JUMP might be as complete and compre- 
hensive as possible, it was directed that ob- 
servers submit their official reports to or via 
the Task Force Commander. If desired, 
observers were given the choice of submitting 
advance copies of their reports to interested 
addressees. The Task Force Commander 
was to be informed of advance copies so 
distributed. 
c. Commanders were directed to furnish 
the Army group with all information and 
assistance possible in the furtherance of their 
mission. 
d. Complete photographic coverage of all 
aspects of the operation was planned, and 
any additional photographic work desired 
by Army observers was to be made available. 
3. Planning of Activities. 
Planning of observers’ activities was initi- 
ated after departure from Balboa, C. Z. 
Regular meetings of all Army personnel were 
scheduled three times a week, and plans 
were drawn up for coverage of all task force 
projects and activities. 
a. A master chart listing all major activi- 
ties and subdivisions thereof was prepared in 
such a way as to indicate the primary, 
secondary, and minor interests of each ob- 
server in the various phases of the operation. 
The master chart included official Navy test 
and research projects and in addition many 
routine phases of the operation which it was 
believed would yield valuable information. 
The medical officers submitted a jointly 
prepared outline of subjects to cover which 
became the medical section of the Army 
project list. 
b. It was decided that a final consolidated 
report to the War Department would be 
written on the return journey from material 
assembled by the various observers. Each 
Army observer wrote the sections for which 
he had been originally assigned and con- 
sidered best qualified. These assignments 
carried with them the responsibility for 
detailed observation and final preparation 
of material for the consolidated report. 
c. It was believed preferable that most 
Army observers live ashore from the earliest 
possible date in close contact with the opera- 
tion. Accordingly, a memorandum was sub- 
mitted to the Chief of Staff, Task Force 68 
requesting that this be authorized. Subse- 
quently the task force commander directed 
that during the early phase of unloading 
supplies and building the airstrip, only per- 
sonnel essential to the actual progress of the 
work would be quartered on the ice. All 
other personnel, both Navy and Army, were 
to sleep aboard ship. During this period 
the presence of these officers on the ice was 
to be permitted insofar as it did not place a 
burden on the shore party in erecting tent- 
quarters, expanding the mess to accommo- 
date them, etc. See Task Force Memoran- 
dum, this subject, appendix II. Exception 
to this policy in connection with the War 
Department observers was made in the case 
of Maj. Holcombe, Aviation Engineer ob- 
server, who was invited to assist by partici- 
pating in the operation in his field and was 
authorized to quarter ashore at any time at 
the discretion of the senior naval engineering 
officer. Other Army personnel were to be 
quartered ashore after the landing and con- 
struction phases. 
d. In view of the detailed and complete 
photo coverage of all kinds planned for the 
expedition it was the hope of the medical 
observers that a moving picture covering 
the medical support of the operation might 
be assembled. The privilege of requesting 
photographic coverage was extended to the 
Army group and a comprehensive list of 
medical subjects was submitted. 
6 e. It was foreseen that many of the data 
assembled by various observers would re- 
quire interpretation and correlation with 
the weather conditions prevailing when the 
observations were made. The AAF Weather 
Service observer was assigned the responsibil- 
ity for obtaining and recording daily informa- 
tion on temperature, wind, cloud cover, etc. 
4. Activities Ashore. 
Most Army observers made daily visits 
ashore until 23 January when tent quarters 
were made available and were occupied 
from that date until the shore party was 
evacuated on the U. S. C. G. C. Burton Island. 
Information was gathered principally 
through the medium of daily contact with 
personnel of the base camp. Press confer- 
ences were not attended by Army observers, 
with the exception of a few instances. Each 
air crew member was interrogated after all 
major flights. Engineering officers, crew 
chiefs, and line mechanics were also con- 
tacted on matters relating to their work 
activities. Permission was obtained from the 
base commander and senior officer of the 
flight echelon to attend aircrew briefings, and 
this was done whenever possible. Major 
Dan Crozier, M. C., and C. W. O. Anthony 
J. L. Morency were members of the party 
which made a week’s trip to the Rockefeller 
Mountains in tracked vehicles. 
5. Recommended Assignments of Army 
Observers. 
The following memorandum from Dr. 
Paul A. Siple, Senior War Department 
Observer, to Capt. R. S. Quackenbush, 
USN, Chief of Staff, Task Force 68, outlined 
the recommended assignments for the Army 
observers while with the Task Force on 
Operation Highjump: 
18 December 1946 
Aboard USS Mount Olympus 
MEMORANDUM TO: Capt. R. S. Quackenbush, U. S. N., Chief of Staff, 
Task Force 68, Operation “HIGHJUMP”. 
FROM: Dr. Paul A. Siple; Senior War Dept. Observer, U. S. 
Army. 
SUBJECT: Recommended assignments of Army Observer per- 
sonnel during phase I of Ice Operations (Prior to 
arrival of R4D aircraft). 
1. The following recommendations are summarized from detailed observa- 
tion plans now under preparation to be submitted at a later date. Army 
Observer personnel are sincerely interested in the success of Operation “HIGH- 
JUMP” and are willing, individually or collectively, to be of such assistance 
to the Task Force Commander as he might desire, insofar as they are capable, 
providing, of course, that such possible assignments permit ample opportunity 
to carry out observations of their specifically assigned fields by the War Depart- 
ment. The following list of Army Observer Personnel is given by name, showing 
individual primary interests and personal choice of location: 
A. Dr. Paul A. Siple, W. D. G. S.: 
(a) To be available at all times for advice as desired by the Officer 
in Charge and the Commanding Officer of Task Force 68, on subjects pertaining 
7 to Antarctic Geography, safety of personnel and general operations ashore, 
including scientific research program. 
(b) To be available to assist the Task Force Commander in selection 
of suitable safe sites for various operations on the ice. 
(c) To observe physical factors related to the construction of the airstrip. 
(d) When not occupied with (a), (b), and (c) above, to accompany 
members of the scientific group concerned with studies and surveys of the defor- 
mation of the Ross Shelf Ice. 
(e) To observe factors of human adaptations, acclimatization, accus- 
tomization, clothing protection, climatic effects and carry out personal experi- 
mentation on radical clothing designs. 
(f) To take such opportunities as may be provided to carry out visual 
observations from the air, to continue previous studies of the morphology of the 
glaciation of Antarctica and its general geographic structure. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) As desired by Admiral Cruzen. 
(2) At the airstrip camp. 
(3) With the bivouac camp for scientific group, planning to study 
ice deformation. 
(4) Aboard ship. 
B. Lt. Col. Robert C. Love, M. C.: 
(a) Primary interest concerns general and specific problems of aero- 
medical and general medical nature. This latter will include all phases of health, 
sanitation, preventive medicine, casualties, acclimatization, clothing protection, 
accustomization, psychological factors, fatigue and endurance, food and water 
supply, observation of medical facilities and methods used ashore, including 
evacuations, etc. In order to make these observations during phase I of the Ice 
Operations, prior to the arrival of the R4D aircraft, it is desired that Col. Love 
and Major Crozier, listed below, be permitted to live with the shore party, so 
that they may experience the actual living conditions on a twenty-four hour basis. 
To this end, they are both willing to accept physical assignments to maintain close 
contact with working and construction parties who are subjects of their observa- 
tions. It is assumed that if such assignments are made, they will be of such 
nature as to permit adequate time to make and record observations. Of special 
regard to Col. Love and Major Crozier, commuting from the ship daily will inter- 
fere with their personal acclimatization and accustomization, thus making poor 
observers and, as well, remove them for important hours each day from their 
subjects. 
(b) After the arrival of the R4D aircraft, Col. Love desires to transfer 
his primary interest to subjects of aero-medical nature, while Major Crozier 
will continue to have a primary interest in human and medical problems of 
shore based personnel, 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) At the airstrip camp. 
(2) Self-provided bivouac near the airstrip camp. 
(3) Aboard ship. 
8 C. Lt. Col. John N. Davis, Inf.: 
(a) Primary interest concerns all types of operations to be carried on 
ashore, especially landing and tracked vehicles’ performance; obsenations of 
Ordnance and Chemical Warfare tests, portable field communication equipment, 
and general utilization of manpower and techniques for meeting problems for 
operations of the Ice. He will be assisted in observations of performance of 
automotive vehicles and transportation problems by C. W. O. Anthony Morency, 
Ord., after Mr. Morency’s arrival on the Ross Shelf Ice. 
(b) Desires permission (verbally indicated to Task Force Commander) 
to make a short flight for the purpose of testing airborne troop type parachutes 
in vicinity of the base airstrip. Col. Davis will be assisted and joined in actual 
parachute jump by Ist/Sgt. Jack London, USAAF, ATG. 
(c) Included in Col. Davis’s field of interests covering observations for 
the Army Ground Forces are tests on landing force equipment, BUORD 
PROJECT 1 (i) and technique and principles of dog sledging. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) At airstrip base camp. 
(2) At ship 
D. Lt. Col. Willis S. Johns, Air Corps: 
(a) Primary field of interest is that of communications, including all 
aspects generally and many specifically. Some observations will be made 
jointly with Mr, Amory Waite, Signal Corps. Because of the nature of the first 
phase, being primarily communications between ship and shore, Lt. Col. Johns 
can probably best carry out his observations by living aboard ship, with occa- 
sional trips ashore. 
(b) After arrival of R4D aircraft, Lt. Col. Johns’ primary interest will 
shift to communication problems and tests related to the flight operations. 
(c) Of special interest are problems of task force organization and per- 
sonnel handling, commands, and assignments. 
(d) Observations to include general operations of aircraft, including 
cold weather techniques of flight preparations, aircraft performance, communi- 
cations, and navigation. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) Aboard ship. 
(2) At base camp after arrival of R4D aircraft. 
E. Major James H. Holcombe, Air Corps Engineer: 
(a) Observe and participate in construction of airstrip and advanced 
air base on Ross Shelf Ice. It has been indicated informally that Major Hol- 
combe’s services as an air engineer consultant and as an officer to assist in con- 
struction of the airstrip may be requested, and to this end he is willing to cooperate 
to the fullest extent. This would permit him to be billeted ashore where he can 
best observe while helping in his primary field of interest. 
(b) Observe tests, performance, and suitability of standard construction 
equipment, materials, vehicles, fuels, and lubricants. 
(c) Observe cargo handling and unloading. 
(d) Determine physical characteristics of possible future air base sites. 
9 (e) Observe demolition operations in icefields if such prove necessary, 
or are attempted for test purposes. If such procedure is contemplated. Majoi 
Holcombe would appreciate being placed on the ship most likely to carry out 
this work, providing that such temporary assignment would not interfere with 
other observation activities listed above, in order of their importance to this 
observer. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) At airstrip base camp. 
(2) Self-provided bivouac near airstrip base camp. 
(3) Aboard ship 
F. Major Daniel Crazier, M. C.: 
(a) Primary observation interests are the same as listed for Col. Love, 
with the exception that primary interest concerns ice based personnel. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) At airstrip base camp. 
(2) Self-provided bivouac near airstrip base camp. 
(3) Aboard ship. 
G. Capt. Charles H. Harrison, Air Corps: 
(a) Meteorological observations, analysis, interpretation, and predic- 
tions. To this end, it is understood that Capt. Harrison will work in close 
coordination with the meteorological program and is willing to assume such 
responsibilities as may be assigned to him in this field. 
(b) To observe and record physical characteristics of the environ- 
ment of Antarctic conditions which produce effects upon man, equipment, and 
operations. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) Aboard ship. 
(2) At the airstrip base camp. 
H. Capt. Murray A. Wiener, Air Corps: 
(a) To observe all aspects of search and rescue operations, including air, 
sea, and ice. These observations will include problems concerning communica- 
tion and aids, transportation study, to include land and ski-type aircraft, heli- 
copters, small boats, over-snow vehicles and utilization of dogs and sleds; 
evacuation and care of personnel and casualties, emergency equipment and use 
of equipment. 
(b) To offer assistance to the Task Force Commander and advice, as 
requested, based upon prior experience on above-mentioned subject and experi- 
ence gained on former polar expeditions. 
(c) To observe and record aspects of clothing protection and general 
personnel requirements for operations in Antarctica. 
(d) To aid scientific group, when not occupied with higher priority 
studies. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) At airstrip base camp. 
(2) Self-provided bivouac near airstrip base camp. 
10 (3) With bivouac camp for scientific group. 
(4) Aboard ship. 
I. Mr. Amory Waite, Signal Corps: 
(a) To observe installation, operation, and maintenance of all radio 
equipment, particularly as affected by cold weather and Antarctic environmental 
conditions. 
(b) To observe the same factors in regard to meteorological and photo- 
graphic materials and equipment. 
(c) To observe generally and specifically the technical performance of 
all types of communications, electrical and electronic equipment, batteries, and 
items of issue by the Signal Corps, as utilized by the Task Force. 
(d) To be available as desired by the Commanding Officer of the Task 
Force for advice and assistance on subjects listed above and general problems 
concerning Antarctica operations as previously experienced. 
(e) In the early phase of the operation, temperatures will not be suffici- 
ently low to make most of the desired observations listed above. He has there- 
fore offered his services to the scientific group studying the deformation of the 
shelf ice. As an alternate to this suggestion, Mr. Waite has suggested he accom- 
pany the ship, if approved, which will erect the automatic weather station, 
possibly at Coleman Island, to cover observations of meteorological equipment 
and communications. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) Bivouac camp with scientific survey party. 
(2) On ship, erecting automatic weather station and resultant shore 
party. 
(3) At airstrip base camp. 
(4) Aboard ship. 
J. C. W. 0. Anthony B. Morency, Amphibious Engineers: 
(a) To observe all phases automotive equipment and to assist Col. 
Davis in general observations of specific interest to U. S. Army Ground Forces. 
This is contingent upon his transfer from the U. S. S. Cacapon to the Mount 
Olympus and the Central Group. 
(b) His services based upon past Antarctic experiences are available as 
may be desired by the Task Force Commander. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) At airstrip base camp. 
(2) Aboard Mount Olympus. 
K. 1st Sgt. S. A. London, Air Corps: 
(a) To assist with observation program concerning search and rescue 
listed above under Capt. Wiener. 
(b) To assist the program of testing Army type paratroop equipment as 
listed above under Col. Davis. 
(c) Services available as so desired by Task Force Commander for search 
and rescue operations as based upon specific training under the Army Air Trans- 
11 port Command for this type of work, including parachuting, trail work, and dog 
driving and driving of over-snow vehicles. 
(d) When services not required as listed above, Sgt. London is available 
to assist scientific party studying deformation of shelf ice. 
CHOICE OF LOCATION: 
(1) Airstrip base camp. 
(2) Self-provided bivouac with scientific party. 
(3) Aboard ship. 
L, Pvts. J. Shimberg and J. M. Waltersdorf, Signal Corps: 
(a) Assigned to Photographic staff of Task Force 68. 
(b) To observe performance of photographic equipment and materials 
under operating conditions. 
(c) Maintain photographic record of subjects in official files of specific 
interest to the Army observation program. 
CHOICE OF LOG A T10N: 
(1) As determined by Chief, Photographic Staff. 
(2) Airstrip base camp. 
(3) Aboard ship. 
M. Mr. Robert L. Davis, Air Corps: 
(a) It is anticipated that Mr. Davis will join the Central Group from 
the U. S. S. Philippine Sea by accompanying Rear Admiral R. E. Byrd or by 
P2V’s. If in the latter case, he will have specific assignment of radar member 
of crew under Commander Davies. If in the former case, his interests will be 
as follows: 
(la) Observation and consultant on all aspects of radar and electronic 
equipment. 
(lb) Observation on all phases of high latitude aerial navigation, 
aerial photography, mapping, and interpretation. 
(lc) Observation on all phases of physical research and test performed 
by the Task Force. 
CHOICE OF LOG A TION: 
(1) With aviation detachment at airstrip base camp. 
(2) Aboard ship. 
PAUL A. SIPLE 
Senior War Dept. Representative 
12 SECTION III. Narrative Account of Operation 
<ITT' 1 ■ //* 
Jnignjump 
The flagship of the task force, U, S. S. 
Mount Olympus, sailed from Norfolk, Virginia, 
with the U. S. S. Pine Island, U. S. C. G. C. 
Northwind, and U. S. S. Browson on 2 Decem- 
ber 1946. The voyage of 5 days to the 
Panama Canal was uneventful. Transit of 
the Canal was made in the afternoon and 
early evening of Saturday, December 7th 
and shore leave in Balboa and Panama City 
was authorized over the week end. Depar- 
ture from the Canal Zone was made Decem- 
ber 10th, and the equator was crossed on the 
12th. The passage from latitude 40° S. to 
Scott Island (near 180° W. longitude and 
the Antarctic Circle) was relatively calm 
considering the reputation these waters have 
for extremely heavy weather. Naval foul 
weather gear was issued to all hands at 
about 45° S. but was used very little until the 
force turned south from Scott Island. Talks 
on subjects relating to living and operating 
on the Antarctic continent were given to 
both officers and men by personnel with 
experience on previous Byrd Expeditions. 
Training films on a wide variety of medical 
subjects were shown in the sick bay to 
medical and other interested personnel al- 
most every day between the equator and the 
Ross Sea. 
The first whales were sighted on Christmas 
day and the first iceberg the following day at 
about 60° S. latitude. 
The ports of departure and sailing dates of 
task force vessels and necessary refueling 
operations precluded all vessels’ making the 
trip in their assigned groups. Some vessels 
of the Eastern and Western Task Groups 
went almost direct to their assigned operating 
areas. Others met at Scott Island, and the 
final disposition by groups as planned was 
made subsequent to this rendezvous. In the 
vicinity of Scott Island a refueling operation 
was carried out, some personnel and equip- 
ment were exchanged between vessels, and 
the U. S. G. G, C. Northwind made an ice 
reconnaissance to the south. A relatively 
open area was found and after a day and a 
half at the island the central group turned 
southward on December 31st. Extremely 
heavy ice pack was encountered on the 
second day south of Scott Island. Many 
huge bergs of barrier ice were interspersed 
among large, closely adjacent floes of thick 
bay ice. Virtually no progress was made for 
5 days in this area—about 69° S. latitude. 
When the pack was finally cleared on De- 
cember 14th, 10 days more than planned for 
had been expended in reaching the barrier. 
The Bay of Whales was reached on the 
15th and on that day and the next, small 
reconnaissance parties were sent into the 
bay on the ice breaker to estimate the land- 
ing possibilities and locate a base site. On 
the 17th unfavorable wind and ice conditions 
for entering the bay prevailed. At about this 
time it was thought that operations ashore 
would have to be curtailed. First, due to the 
width and heaviness of the ice pack—the 
most extreme conditions ever reported in 
this area—an early freeze-up of the Ross Sea 
appeared likely. Second, the flagship and 
the two cargo vessels had received varying 
degrees of damage in the passage through the 
ice. For these reasons a tentative departure 
date of 5 February was considered. Having 
arrived 10 days later than planned, and with 
departure by the end of the first week in 
February a possibility, there remained only 
3 weeks for unloading, construction of the 
base, and shore based air operations. Ac- 
*For expanded daily activities, see Chapter 13 "Combined 
Observers’ Log." 
13 cordingly, the construction of the metal 
airstrip was deleted from the plan, although 
short sections were to be laid for testing pur- 
poses. The R4D aircraft would then fly from 
plain ice shelf surface and would all be on 
skis throughout the operation. 
The flagship entered the bay and tied up 
to the ice on January 22nd. Camp con- 
struction, including mess facilities was com- 
pleted and the camp fully occupied on the 
23rd of January. At this time work on the 
aviation facilities was accelerated, and by 
the 25th the Central Group was ready to 
receive the planes from the carrier. Weather 
conditions were not satisfactory at both the 
Philippine Sea and the Bay of Whales until the 
evening of 29 January, when the planes were 
called. The first two took off shortly before 
midnight and arrived at about 0500 hours on 
30 January. The others arrived the same 
day around noon. The ice breaker, return- 
ing from its rendezvous with the Philippine 
Sea, reported much improved ice conditions 
in the Ross Sea. Accordingly, it was de- 
cided to finish unloading the ships, leave a 
200-man air party ashore, escort the ships out 
through the pack, and send the ice breaker 
U. S. G. G. C. Northwind and U. S. S. Burton 
Island (the latter to arrive soon from the States) 
back to the bay for subsequent evacuation of 
the shore party. This plan had been con- 
sidered previously and now appeared feasible 
due to improved conditions in the ice pack. 
March 1st was set as the latest date for final 
evacuation of the shore party aboard the ice 
breakers. The ships departed the Bay of 
Whales on 6 February. 
In the meantime the R4D aircraft were 
modified by removal of the wheels to plain 
ski (retractable) landing gear, loading plans 
were modified in accordance with final oper- 
ational requirements, and aircrews made 
trial flights, checking out on the modified 
landing gear and JATO on plain snow sur- 
face. A trail party of seven men in two 
LVT’s (“alligators”) was prepared to journey 
southeast to approximately longitude 139° 
W. and latitude 82° S. to establish a weather 
observation point in support of the flights 
to be made. This party was out from 12 to 
19 February, reaching the Rockefeller Moun- 
tains 90 miles from the base camp. At mid- 
night on the 13th of February, the weather 
had cleared sufficiently to permit extended 
flying operations. Several days of clear 
weather followed, during which time most of 
the major flights were made. Up to 16 
February most flights were made with JATO, 
but thereafter most were made unassisted 
due to improvement in the surface of the 
strip. The last major flight took off late on 
the 21st and returned the 22nd of Febru- 
ary. Operations were discontinued with this 
flight and the camp closed on 23rd of Feb- 
ruary. The approximately 200 personnel 
left were evacuated on the U. S. S. Burton 
Island, and the majority of them were trans- 
ferred to the flagship after passing through 
the ice pack. 
On the return journey the vessels of the 
task force were routed both separately and 
in small groups so that various liberty ports 
were visited in Australia, New Zealand, and 
South America. The flagship passed through 
the Panama Canal on the 6th of April and 
arrived at Washington Navy Yard on 14th 
of April, completing a voyage of 22,000 
miles. 
14 CHAPTER 2 
ARMY INTEREST IN ANTARCTICA 
SECTION I. Historical Comments 
Navy Task Force 68 (Operation 
“NANOOK”) sailed into northern waters 
in the summer of 1946. Basically this opera- 
tion permitted a trial of ice breakers and 
other types of vessels maneuvering in the 
ice floes between Greenland and the Cana- 
dian archipelago. This operation served a 
useful purpose in addition to personnel 
training and tests of equipment. It trans- 
ported supplies and aided in the building of 
a weather station at Thule, Greenland, and 
other weather bases would have been con- 
structed in cooperation with the U. S. 
Weather Bureau, the Air Forces, and the 
Canadian government had not the speed 
of negotiations been so slow. At the end 
of the summer’s operation (1946) in the 
north, it was clear to the Navy that the task 
of training and testing its equipment in 
ice-filled waters would require a long, 
patient period, because of the impending 
darkness and treacherous ice-filled seas. 
Task Force 68 (“NANOOK”) returned to 
the United States in early fall 1946. The 
importance of continuing the “NANOOK” 
type operations was apparent to the Navy. 
It would be nearly 9 months before the Task 
Force could again return to the arctic 
waters safely. It therefore appeared desir- 
able, in the meantime, to utilize these 
same ships and partially trained personnel 
to carry out a similar operation in other 
ice-filled areas. Antarctica, from December 
to March, would fit ideally into this program 
and permit this same Task Force to return 
again to Arctic Seas in July 1947. 
It also appeared wise to the Navy to give 
its Task Force specific problems to carry out 
incidental to its normal polar problems and 
operations. These problems form an incen- 
tive which is both interesting, and at times 
sufficiently difficult to force the Task Force 
into conditions which give a battle-worthy 
test of equipment. Rear Admiral Richard 
E. Byrd conceived of a problem, namely 
exploration and scientific investigation of the 
world’s least known continent, Antarctica. 
Because of his long experience and leadership 
in the field of Antarctic exploration, he was 
logically selected as a personal representative 
of Fleet Admiral Nimitz to serve as officer 
in charge of the project designated as 
“HIGHJUMP”. The derivation of this 
name came from a whimsical change from a 
previous code name “POLE VAULT” 
which was somewhat too revealing at a 
time when the expedition’s plans were in the 
classified state ot preparation, thus implying 
at the start that flights would be made over 
the continent ot Antarctica, including the 
South Pole itself. Task Force 68 continued 
under its previously organized pattern with 
Rear Admiral Richard H. Cruzen in com- 
mand under the Commander in Chief of the 
Atlantic Fleet. Task Force 68 was inform- 
ally discussed as a possible joint Army-Navy 
Task Force; however, no formal discussions 
concerning the Navy’s Antarctic Operation 
were held with the War Department until 
after the Navy had decided to keep it strictly 
a Navy enterprise. The Navy invited six 
Army observers to join the expedition; how- 
15 ever, they later agreed that this number of 
Army personnel was too small for so large an 
operation and the number was increased to a 
total of 16. Army assignments included 
three lieutenant colonels, two majors, two 
captains, one warrant officer, five enlisted 
personnel, and three civilian representatives 
of the War Department. Four of the enlisted 
men were Signal Corps photographers as- 
signed to operational duties. Four of the 
Army observers were men with previous 
Antarctic experience, whose experience had 
been gained on previous Byrd Expeditions. 
Dr. Siple of the War Department, associate 
of Admiral Byrd on all of his previous 
Antarctic Expeditions, was asked for by 
name to assist the expedition leaders in an 
advisory capacity and was further designated 
by the War Department as the Senior War 
Department representative. 
SECTION II. Army Interest 
The following points are listed as the 
principal reasons why the Army considered 
that it had a basic interest in the Navy’s 
Antarctic Expedition: 
A. National defense requires that the 
United States military forces must become 
proficient and capable of carrying out war 
operations in areas of high latitude, a situa- 
tion in which the Army has had little or no 
experience. Antarctica is an unpopulated 
area with a wide diversity of conditions 
which would serve as a suitable proving 
ground with unlimited maneuvering areas. 
Seasonal timing permits the use of Antarctica 
for continuous operations when the Arctic 
area is in total darkness. 
B. Conditions comparable to those on other 
icecaps are represented in Antarctica with 
comparatively easy access to the sea. The 
use of Antarctica is not complicated seriously 
by questions of sovereignty prohibiting re- 
search and operations. 
G. There is so little known of Antarctica 
that incidental scientific investigations car- 
ried on by military forces are of a tremendous 
value toward unveiling the potentials of a 
continent largely opened up in recent years 
through the efforts of private United States 
citizens, even though no official claim to the 
territory by the United States Government 
has ever been made. There is no proof, 
to date, whether there are or are not mineral 
resources in the Antarctic which would be 
of value to this Nation. With the exception 
of the discovery of the basic mineral coal, 
the continent has been so little prospected 
that it is reasonable to assume from the 
meager geological information gleaned that 
mineral deposits in economic quantities 
probably do exist there. Although the prime 
responsibility of determining the potential 
value of Antarctica is not necessarily a 
responsibility of the Armed Forces, they 
are the best equipped Government agency 
to perform such investigations at a minimum 
cost incidental to its program of training and 
research and development. 
D. The isolation of Antarctica would per- 
mit greater opportunities for research and 
development and testing of long range 
military weapons without danger to popu- 
lation or interference with the sovereignty 
of other nations. It is also sufficiently 
isolated to permit reasonable security of 
operations, which might not be true of the 
Arctic. The principles involved in such 
operations could be worked out conveniently 
in the Antarctic in cooperation with nations 
16 most closely approaching the Antarctic con- 
tinent. These nations no doubt would 
welcome an international approach to the 
scientific unveiling of Antarctica. 
E. Although the Arctic Sea is a basin 
enclosed by a ring of land masses with a 
fenced-in ice pack which is subjected to 
melting temperatures in the summer, the 
Antarctic continent, by contrast, is roughly 
circular, lying mostly within the Antarctic 
Circle and surrounded by a reef of ice pack 
which breaks up and flows outward in the 
summer until it is subjected to melting in 
warmer waters. The ice pack character- 
istics are therefore not identical, but are 
sufficiently similar to promote a study of 
maneuvering of ships and other vehicles 
through or over the surface which can con- 
ceivably figure strongly in the condition 
of Arctic warfare. 
F. The average temperature for the Ant- 
arctic region is considerably lower than for 
the Arctic region, so that equipment which 
will stand up under the winter conditions 
of the Antarctic would generally be satis- 
factory for the coldest temperatures and 
conditions of the Arctic (actually the coldest 
surface temperatures recorded are those in 
Subarctic Siberia). The summer period in 
Antarctica rarely rises above freezing, which 
permits research work to be carried out at low 
temperatures under continuous conditions 
of daylight, thus permitting more rapid 
development than would be possible under 
the cold-dark conditions in the Arctic. 
Antarctica does not present summer Arctic 
conditions comparable to the tundra and 
muskeg country; however, in Alaska and 
through cooperation with Canada, wide 
areas of this nature are available for military 
investigation. Because of the difficult ap- 
proach to the Arctic icefields, research and 
development of military methods of opera- 
tions in these areas are greatly inhibited. 
The approach to Antarctica is much more 
open in this respect despite its greater 
distance from the United States. 
17 CHAPTER 3 
ENGINEER OPERATIONS 
SECTION I. Introduction 
1. General. 
This chapter is an account of Operation 
“Highjump” submitted by an observer from 
the Office of The Air Engineer who accom- 
panied the expedition. It summarizes engi- 
neering operations and conditions encoun- 
tered, presents problems of special interest 
to the Corps of Engineers, and makes 
recommendations. 
a. The staff work and planning of Bureau 
of Yards and Docks was directed by Com- 
mander G. O. Reinhardt, U. S. N. (CEC). 
They had only 3 months prior to the sailing 
date to draw up all plans and specifications, 
fabricate special items, organize the Seabee 
detachment, and assemble materiel and per- 
sonnel at the proper port of embarkation. 
b. The Seabee unit was charged with all 
construction work, cargo handling and un- 
loading, transportation, and messing while 
on the barrier ice. A 200-man temporary 
tent camp (fig. 3), two Quonset huts, three 
Wannigan Huts, three ski runways, and a 
PSP test strip were the main items con- 
structed or assembled. Snow conditions and 
characteristics were studied in relationship 
to its supporting power. Even though the 
study of snow mechanics has hardly started, 
a considerable amount was learned and one 
would be safe in stating that the loose granu- 
lated snow of the Antarctic can be compacted 
within 1 month’s time to carry the load of a 
C-47 on wheels without any wearing surface, 
such as PSP, on the runway. 
c. It was learned on the expedition that 
there are three main groups of items or 
subjects which should be given considerable 
thought and study—they are housing, trans- 
portation and construction equipment, and 
snow compaction. If the Army is contem- 
plating future operations in regions similar 
to the Antarctic, further development of 
these subjects is a necessity if the operations 
are to be successful. 
2. Staff Work and Planning 
It was not until the first of September 1946 
that the Staff Officer from Bureau of Yards 
and Docks was able to start organizing 
available data and planning for Operation 
“Highjump”. About the middle of Septem- 
ber the planning got underway on a large 
scale and in less than 4 weeks drawings and/or 
specifications were ready to leave Washing- 
ton, D. C. This meant that all equipment, 
other than standard items, had to be fabri- 
cated and brought to the ship’s side for 
loading in less than 6 weeks. The majority 
of this work was performed by the Advanced 
Base Depot, Construction Battalion Train- 
ing Center, Port Hueneme, California. Other 
items such as the c‘Go-devil” sleds were 
manufactured by private concerns. Two 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars was 
allotted by Bureau of Yards and Docks for 
all their supplies, labor, materials, pre- 
fabrication, etc. The rest of their total cost, 
which was approximately five times that 
large, was required to come from surplus 
property. At the time when the planning 
commenced there were no organized con- 
struction battalions available. The first of 
18 U. S. NAVY DEPARTMENT 
ATLANTIC FLEET 
TASK FORCE 68 
OPERATION HIGHJUMP 
1946-1947 
200 MAN TENT CAMP 
ROSS SHELF ICE 
RADM. RICHARD E. BYRD OINC 
RADM RICHARD H.CRUZEN TASK FORCE CDR. 
27 MARCH, 1947 
Figure 3. Map of 200-man tent camp on Ross Shelf Ice. 
19 November two officers, one warrant officer, 
and approximately 175 men were ordered 
to the unit at Port Hueneme, California. 
Of the entire enlisted personnel only about 
25 or 30 were Seabee personnel; the rest 
came from general service organizations and 
without construction knowledge other than 
that which they would normally receive 
while aboard ship. The month of November 
was spent organizing the unit, training, 
drawing clothing, etc. 
3. Responsibilities. 
The senior Civil Engineer Corps Officer 
(Commander C. O. Reinhardt) was to be 
responsible, subject to the military control of 
the senior officer present afloat, for all con- 
struction ashore and the discharge of cargo 
and its transportation from ship’s side to the 
base camp. Officers charged with the com- 
mand and operation of facilities ashore were 
to be responsible for advising Commander 
Reinhardt of their requirements and were to 
be available for consultation during the 
erection of facilities under their jurisdiction. 
He was to arrange for additional personnel 
from ships present through the Senior Officer 
Present afloat. 
a. Commander P. D. Davis was to super- 
vise all construction ashore and expedite 
the erection of facilities in accordance with 
the established priority. He was to be re- 
sponsible for the distribution of personnel and 
equipment assigned to construction and for 
supervision of construction. 'He was to be 
the Officer in Charge of the Construction 
Battalion Detachment and was to have the 
following Officers under his supervision: Lt. 
V. B. Peller (CEC) U. S. N., Capt. V. D. 
Boyd, U. S. M. G. (while working with con- 
struction equipment and transportation), 
Ens, C. B. Mallory, Chief Warrant Officer 
Ulan, and any other officers who might be 
attached for construction work, cargo han- 
dling, or transportation within the camp area. 
b. Lt. V. B. Peller was to coordinate the 
unloading of cargo and its movement to a 
position of safety at the foot of the barrier. 
He was to be responsible for discharging 
cargo at the maximum safe rate and for assur- 
ing that cargo would be discharged in accord- 
ance with the established priority. 
c. Capt. V. D. Boyd, U. S. M. C., was to 
report to Comdr. C. O. Reinhardt for ad- 
ministrative direction and was to be respon- 
sible for the operation of all equipment 
assigned, and for the movement of supplies 
and personnel from the ship’s side to the base 
camp. 
d. After the first stages of unloading cargo, 
Ens. C. B. Mallory and 12 men were to have 
the sole assignment of performing such tests 
as those which would not normally be run 
during construction. These men are not 
included in the Seabee unit, but were to 
work only for Bureau of Yards and Docks. 
e. Chief Warrant Officer Ulan, who has 
had considerable experience with construc- 
tion equipment, was to be the heavy equip- 
ment and transportation expert. 
/. Other officers were to be designated to 
supervise the storage of materials at the base 
camp, to assist in controlling the movement 
of supplies from the barrier to the base 
camp, and to assist in that construction which 
was deemed necessary. These officers were 
to be taken from the observer group and were 
to be those who were most interested in this 
phase of the expedition. 
4. Cargo Discharge. 
Immediately upon arrival the discharge 
of cargo was to have the highest priority. 
All personnel not required for the security of 
the Task Force were to be assigned to assist 
in the discharging of cargo and later in the 
construction of the base camp. All construc- 
tion and cargo handling was to be on a 24- 
hour basis. Personnel required for construc- 
tion were to be released from discharging 
20 RADM. RICHARD E. BYRD-OINC. 
RADM. RICHARD H. CRUZEN TASK FORCE CDR. 
27 MARCH 1947 
TASK FORCE 68 
OPERATION HIGHJUMP 
1946-1947 
EMERGENCY BASE RADIO 
AND 
LITTLE AMERICA III 
SCALE IN FEET 
U. S. NAVY DEPARTMENT 
ATLANTIC FLEET 
Figure 4. Emergency base radio and Little America ill. 
21 5 days, including tents, rations, and fuel, was to be 
unloaded and a cache established in a safe place. 
b. Priority Two. Ten days’ supply of diesel 
fuel and operating supplies for transportation 
and construction equipment. 
c. Priority Three. Communication equip- 
ment for local control of unloading and con- 
struction. 
d. Priority Four. Materials required for the 
erection of a 300-man temporary tent camp, 
including 10 days’ supply of fuel for heating 
and cooking, 10 days’ rations for 300 men, 
and medical supplies. 
e. Priority Five. Materials for construction 
of air operating facilities, including pierced 
plank, one Quonset hut, radio, GCA, GPM2, 
15-kw generator, aviation field lights, shop 
and maintenance equipment. 
/, Priority Six. Five days’ supply of avia- 
tion gasoline and operating supplies for air- 
craft, gasoline truck, oil truck, fire fighting 
equipment. 
g. Priority Seven. Initial supplies of diesel 
oil, aviation gasoline, rations, and other 
operating supplies were to be maintained at 
a constant level by daily replacement. 
h. Priority Eight. Daily replacement of 
shore stores of aviation gasoline, diesel fuel 
oil, and other operating supplies to maintain 
a safe reserve ashore. 
i. Priority Nine. Material and equipment 
required to erect a 35-man emergency 
winter hut camp. 
Note. Base radio and communication equipment 
to be discharged as soon as radio hut was erected. 
;. Priority Ten. Special gear submitted 
for test. 
k. Priority Eleven. Rations, fuel, and oper- 
ating supplies for 35-man emergency hut 
camp for 14 months to be discharged only 
in the event that it was necessary to occupy 
that camp. 
/. Priority Twelve. Duplicate aviation oper- 
ating supplies. 
Figure 5. Bay of Whales area looking at about 135° 
with camp area in background. Mess hall and 
motor pool to the right of tents. Base operations 
down and a little to left of tents. Beginning of PSP 
test strip above the far ship. (24 Jan 47) 
cargo as soon as possible. After cargo 
priorities 1, 2, and 3 had been discharged 
men were to be released in such numbers and 
skills as to enable the construction of facilities 
to keep pace with the rate of discharge of 
materials. Skilled personnel other than Sea- 
bees were to be released from both cargo 
handling and construction as soon as possible 
after facilities were available for any pro- 
jected operation. 
5. Cargo Discharge Priorities. 
Each ship was loaded so that it could be 
discharged in accordance with the established 
priority for equipment and materials ashore. 
All the cargo in the first six priorities was 
loaded on the U. S. S. Yancey with priorities 
seven through eleven on the U. S. S. Merrick. 
a. Priority One. Transportation and cargo 
handling materials and equipment (tractors, 
fork lifts, sleds, lashing, cargo slings, tarpau- 
lins, trail markers, slings, etc.). 
Note. As soon as possible after the first sleds were 
ashore, an emergency subsistence kit for 25 men for 
22 6. Construction Priorities. 
The following priorities were assigned to 
construction with the assumption that the 
two AKA’s and the AGC would be moored 
in the Bay of Whales from early January 
until all operations had been completed, 
first of March, and that communications 
and Flight Control would be handled by 
the U. S. S. Mount Olympus. 
a. Priority One. Construction of an access 
roadway from the ship’s side to a place of 
safety on top of the barrier, rigging to move 
cargo sleds from the ship to the top of the 
barrier, establishing an emergency subsistence 
facility on top of the barrier, and installing 
communications for local control of unload- 
ing and construction. 
b. Priority Two. Breaking a trail to the 
base camp. 
c. Priority Three. Erection of 300-man tem- 
porary tent camp. The facilities actually 
installed were to be sufficient to accommodate 
personnel actually ashore and were to be 
expanded to the ultimate 300-man camp as 
it became necessary to quarter additional 
personnel ashore. 
d. Priority Four. Installation of air opera- 
tion facilities. 
(1) Quonset hut for service facilities, 
(2) Radio equipment. 
(3) Pierced plank landing mat 150 by 
5,000 feet, with parking area, fuel dump, and 
runway lights. 
e. Priority Five. Erection of 35-man emer- 
gency winter hut camp. 
(1) Radio hut with additional insulation. 
(2) Power plant. 
(3) Radio antenna. 
(4) Galley and mess. 
(5) Quarters. 
(6) Connecting structures. 
(7) Additional insulation in huts. 
f. Priority Six. Special facilities for testing 
equipment under cold weather conditions, 
g. Of the items listed above the most 
difficult to be constructed was the runway. 
It was planned to first construct a parking 
area to determine the best method to use 
during this operation. Such materials and 
special designed equipment as calcium chlo- 
ride, snow drags, snow rollers, oil burners 
under a hood (snow melter), and dark 
objects (PSP) laid on the surface, were to 
be experimented with. After the most feasi- 
ble method had been found, and if time and 
personnel permitted, a 150 by 5,000 foot 
runway was to be constructed to accommo- 
date plane wheel loads of at least 60 pounds 
per square inch on the tire contact area. 
7. Collection of Data. 
A large part of the technical and scientific 
information which would normally be ob- 
tained by an engineering unit should be 
gathered from field experience of this unit 
in the construction operation. Additional 
tests which the Bureau of Yards and Docks 
wished to run were as follows: 
a. Field Loading Test. Purpose—To esti- 
mate the plane wheel load capacity of the 
‘‘pavement” which is understood to be either 
compacted snow or compacted snow covered 
with steel mat. 
b. Snow Penetration Test. Purpose—-To de- 
termine the supporting power of the com- 
pacted snow. 
c. Density in Place Test of Compacted Snow. 
Purpose—To determine the density of com- 
pacted snow at different depths. 
d. Field Shearing Tests. Purpose—To de- 
termine the in-place shearing resistance of 
compacted snow. 
e. Tests on Ice and Frozen Materials. Pur- 
pose—To determine the bending, shear, and 
compression characteristics of compacted 
snow and/or ice. 
f. Tests on Dry Chemical Fire Extinguishers. 
Purpose—To determine suitability of ex- 
tinguishers for use in extremely low tem- 
peratures. 
23 g. Test on “Little Giant Tractor Saw.” Pur- 
pose—To determine ability of subject saws 
to cut natural ice and snow into blocks. 
8. Operations. 
a. Due to the heavy ice pack the ships 
were not able to get through and start un- 
loading until 18 January. The two AKA’s 
and the AGG departed from the Bay of 
Whales on 6 February which resulted in 
their being available for unloading and 
assisting the expedition less than 3 weeks 
instead of the previously planned 8 or 9 
weeks. This necessitated the changing of 
unloading priorities to meet changed con- 
struction priorities which placed the con- 
struction of the 150- by 5,000-foot pierced 
steel plank runway last instead of immedi- 
ately after the construction of the tent camp. 
After inspection of Little America III, it was 
decided to enlarge and improve it instead of 
constructing an entirely new 35-man emer- 
gency winter camp. 
b. The operation plans for both loading 
and discharge of cargo, and construction of 
the base showed a considerable amount of 
staff work and gathering of information. 
They were well prepared, presented to sub- 
ordinates so that they were easily followed, 
and flexible enough to cope with the over-all 
change in plans of the Central Group. 
c. The general construction plans, even 
though priorities were changed, were fol- 
lowed throughout. Until such time as the 
ships left, construction work and unloading 
continued on a 24-hour basis, with the men 
quartering and messing on the ships which 
were moored in the Bay. Until 6 February 
the actual working hours were from about 
0700 to 1730, with an hour and a half for 
the noonday meal for the day shift. The 
actual working hours for the night shift were 
from about 1830 to 0530 the following day 
with 1hours for the midshift meal. The 
evening meal on 23 January was the first to 
be served in the camp and from this time on 
the men working in or near the camp area 
ate the midshift meal on the ice. 
9. Personnel. 
The Bureau of Yards and Docks was rep- 
resented by an excellent team of officers 
who planned and supervised their work. 
The staff was headed by an officer who was 
efficient and definitely gifted in that type 
of work and in gathering information from 
experiments which will be the basis for 
Antarctic construction for years to come. 
The other was especially qualified and 
efficient in the details of field construction 
and the handling of personnel. The effi- 
ciency with which the project was carried 
out reflects the cooperation between those 
responsible for its planning and those charged 
with its execution. Cdr. Davis was in charge 
of the day shift with Lt. Col. Partridge 
(U. S. M. C. observer) assisting in caching 
of cargo and construction of facilities, and 
Lt. Peeler and Ens. Mallory assisting in 
unloading cargo and transportation. Cdr. 
Reinhardt was in charge of the so-called 
night shift with Major Holcombe (U. S. A. 
observer) assisting in caching of cargo and 
construction of facilities, and Captain Boyd, 
U. S. M. G., and Chief W. O. Ulan assisting 
in unloading cargo and transportation. 
From time to time Capt. Wiener and other 
officers helped for short periods. 
a. Of the approximately 175 enlisted 
men, 15 held a chief’s (master sergeant) 
rating, one was in the motor pool, one 
similar to the 1st sergeant, one was master- 
at-arms, and the other 12 were on camp 
construction. The approximate distribution 
of personnel, including chiefs, was: 
Overhead 3 
Cooks and KP’s 24 
Repairmen and operators. ... 35 
Camp detail 106 
24 The camp detail personnel, plus additional 
personnel from the ships, did all construction 
work on the tent camp, Quonset and Wanni- 
gan huts, handling of cargo from the ship’s 
side up the barrier, and until it was properly 
cached, construction of the 35-man emer- 
gency winter camp, construction of the ski 
runway, and the test PSP runway. 
b. When the ships departed from the Bay 
of Whales on 6 February, the following en- 
listed personnel were left on the ice: 
Cooks and KP’s (24 hrs) 18 
Repairmen and operators (24 
hrs) 12 
Camp detail 16 
This camp detail was necessary to finish 
construction of connecting tunnels, etc., at 
the 35-man emergency camp and maintain 
the 200-man tent camp. 
c. Even though the majority of the Sea bee 
personnel were unskilled in construction 
work of this type, their efficiency was very 
high considering climatic conditions. It is 
believed this was due to their high morale 
which was maintained by excellent leader- 
ship and abundance of good and well pre- 
pared rations, 29 percent over and above the 
normal Navy ration. 
SECTION II. Construction Equipment 
1. Performance of Equipment. 
The main items of equipment which were 
used lived up to expectations even though 
they are by no means the answer for Antarc- 
tic work or transportation. They were D-6 
Caterpillar tractors, TD-9 International fork 
lift tractors, “Go-devil” sleds, QM 1-ton 
sleds, Weasels (Cargo Carrier—M29G), the 
wooden snow drag, and the pontoon snow 
drag. The efficiency of these items depended 
upon the hardness and supporting power of 
the snow, which was governed by the 
temperature and climatic conditions in that 
the higher the temperature the softer the 
snow became resulting in low efficiency, 
whereas the lower the temperature the 
harder the snow became, thus raising the 
efficiency of track-laying vehicles. Wheeled 
vehicles were out of the question and con- 
sidered not satisfactory for normal Antarctic 
use. 
2. Conditions Encountered. 
The vehicles on this operation encountered 
pressure ridges, shear cracks, crevasses up to 
3 feet across, slopes or grades up to 20 
degrees, surfaces from those that would 
support only a few pounds (2 to 4) per 
square inch to sea ice several years old, 
temperatures from 30° F. to — 22° F , and 
winds up to 38 knots. 
3. Tractor, D-6 Caterpillar. 
a. This tractor (fig. 6) was modified with 
the following: hardwood track extensions 
which decreased its bearing pressure from 
around 8 to about 5 pounds per square inch; 
winterized cabs which protected the opera- 
tors from low temperatures and strong winds; 
canvas winterized hoods for engine protec- 
tion; and track support blocks which re- 
placed the support rollers. The extensions 
lived up to expectations, even though they 
required replacing frequently. A number 
would break off at the edge of the grouser 
plates. Others would split, this being caused 
by the bending of the C washer which was 
used in securing the extensions. The cabs 
caused no noticeable trouble, but in time 
765274—48——3 
25 would have shown wear from vibration. 
The canvas hood shrank, becoming difficult 
to fasten properly. The track support blocks 
functioned as expected without giving any 
trouble. 
b. The tractor as manufactured gave very 
little trouble and only minor adjustments 
were necessary. All tractors were equipped 
with Hyster winches which proved very use- 
ful. All the D-6’s were used for the first 2 
weeks of the operation. All but three with 
extensions and one with a dozer blade were 
loaded back aboard ship on 5 February so 
that they could be returned to the States. 
The efficiency of this tractor was reduced 
considerably during high temperatures (20° 
to 30° F.) and soft neve. Later on when the 
temperature dropped and the surface would 
support more, the tractors with extensions 
functioned better. The tractors without ex- 
tensions operated satisfactorily on the bay 
ice even though at times it was hard to obtain 
a foothold; on the undisturbed snow at high 
temperature, the tractor without extensions 
was useless, but did manage to travel across 
undisturbed snow when the temperature was 
down to about —15° F. The tractor seemed 
to hold its footing better while traveling in 
reverse, i. e., while pulling heavy loads in a 
forward gear, the rear of the tractor often 
buried itself; whereas when pulling back- 
ward the tendency was not so great. All 
tractors either worked or idled 24 hours a 
day except for a period each day when they 
were being serviced. By the end of the 5- 
week period on the ice, the tractor hour me- 
ters averaged slightly over 500 hours. 
4. Tractor, D--7 Caterpillar. 
Only one of these was taken on the expedi- 
tion and it was loaded back aboard after 
2 weeks to return to the States. While in 
the Antarctic, it was used only as an anchor 
at the top of the barrier as explained in 
section III. No observations were made, 
but it is believed it would have performed 
very similarly to the D-6 tractor. 
5. Carrier, Cargo, M-29 (Weasel). 
This item was used without modification 
and proved very useful in that it was the 
only light piece of transportation on the 
ice with the exception of dog teams. It 
was used mainly for communications and 
to transport personnel. Occasionally small 
quantities of supplies were moved when it 
became necessary to expedite their move- 
ment. The two main difficulties that arose 
in the Antarctic that would not arise in 
another theatre of operations were— 
a. Track stiffness. 
b. The difficulty encountered while enter- 
ing, operating, or leaving the vehicle. 
After the vehicle had stood for some time 
it was difficult to start it moving smoothly 
Figure 6. Winterized D-6 caterpillar tractor. 
26 even though the engine had been idling. 
It seemed as though a heavy load was tied 
on behind and the engine was lacking 
power. After the vehicle had been traveling 
for some time it operated much more 
efficiently. It is believed this was caused by 
the rubber tracks becoming cold and stiff 
while standing and then loosening up as they 
were used. While in the Antarctic one is 
required to wear considerable clothing in 
order to remain comfortable. This makes it 
difficult to climb in and out of the amphib- 
ious Weasel and extremely difficult to 
operate with the close quarters around the 
steering brake levers, clutch, and accelerator. 
6. Forklift (Hughes-Keeman Model TD- 
9-T5C). 
Modifications for the two International 
tractor forklifts were the same as for the D-6 
tractors: hardwood track extensions, winter- 
ized cabs, winterized engine hood, and track 
support blocks. The modifications acted 
the same as those for the D-6 tractor. The 
main operational difficulty was met as the 
machine tried to turn or back around while 
moving cargo from the sleds to the cache, 
Figure 8. Track extension on D-7 caterpillar tractor, 
Figure 9. Wooden snow drag 
Figure 7. Escape hatch in winterized cab, D-7 
caterpillar tractor. 
Figure 10. Package shot (disassembled) wooden snow 
drag. 
27 which would be only a few feet. The track 
under the driving sprockets would often be- 
come buried, requiring help to get out. The 
operator had to be extremely careful to 
avoid disturbing the snow surface. Cargo 
handling equipment is extremely valuable 
in regions similar to those encountered. 
7. Go-Devil Sleds. 
This is a specially modified item of which 
20 were manufactured by the Michler Sleigh 
and Wagon Company, for Operation “High- 
jump”. It was the main cargo sled and was 
used throughout the stay on the ice, (See 
sec. III.) Even though it proved satisfac- 
tory, more changes can be made in its design. 
The over-all structure seems to be a little 
heavy for its pay load. The runner contact 
area is small, causing the sleds, when loaded, 
to sink with snow piling up in front of the 
entire sled. The undercarriage is not de- 
signed to keep the sled from becoming buried 
in soft snow as is the toboggan undercarriage 
of the QM l-ton sled. The side board re- 
cesses which were above the floor level of 
the sled made it difficult to secure large and 
awkward-shaped cargo and boxes. 
8. QM 1-Ton Sled. 
This sled was very satisfactory and when 
used in the manner for which it was designed 
gave little or no trouble. It is believed that 
a large runner contact area would help in 
Antarctic use. 
9. Snow Drags. 
Two types of drags were tested; the 
wooden snow drag, and the pontoon snow 
drag. The purpose of the wooden drag was 
to level the sastrugi, which it did very satis- 
factorily, even though a lighter drag could 
have been used to better advantage on soft, 
undisturbed, snow. As the snow became 
compacted it is possible that an even heavier 
one could have been used. The pontoon 
Figure 11. Steel snow drag (not used) 
Figure 12. Package shot (disassembled) steel snow 
drag. 
Figure 1 3. Package shot (disassembled) pontoon snow 
drag. 
28 drag was used to iron out the snow and leave 
a smooth finish which definitely expedited 
the construction of the three ski runways. 
The results with the pontoon drag are very 
similar to those with a steel wheeled roller 
on earth in that the top inch or two is well 
compacted with a “burnish” finish, leaving 
the snow farther down relatively undisturbed. 
10. Grader, MTZ, with 12-Foot Mold Board 
(Adams). 
This machine was not unloaded because 
it was believed it could not have been towed 
to the camp site. If runways are to be con- 
structed in areas similar to Antarctica some 
type of grading machine will be essential. 
11. Snow Surface Heater. 
This heater was unloaded, but due to cir- 
cumstances beyond control, was not tested. 
12. Other Items. 
a. The “Cle-track tractor” as used by the 
Air Corps to tow planes was taken on the 
expedition, but proved unsatisfactory due to 
Figure 15. Snow surface heater with extra burners. 
Figure 14. Compressor mounted (D-6 caterpillar 
tractor) For snow surface heater (40 cfm at 25 lb./ 
sq. in). 
Figure 16. Unloading cargo from ship direct onto 
“Go-devil” sled 
29 the rubber tracks which caused the same 
trouble as did the rubber tracks on the 
“Weasel”, plus the fact that they would not 
support the hard wooden track extensions. 
b. Wheeled vehicles such as truck 2b-, 
and 4-ton were unloaded, but are definitely 
not suited to the snow surface which will sup- 
port only a few pounds per square inch. All 
except a couple of Jeeps were reloaded 
aboard ships and returned to the States. 
SECTION III. Cargo Handling and Unloading 
1. Equipment. 
a. Standard stevedore equipment was used 
to discharge the cargo from the ships onto the 
bay ice which floated about 18 inches to 2 
feet above the water. This operation was 
carried on by the ships’ personnel and with 
priorities as requested by Commander Rein- 
hardt from day to day or whenever it became 
necessary. 
b. The “Go-devil” sled was used almost 
throughout for transporting supplies and 
equipment to the base camp. As D-6 trac- 
tors would return to within a hundred feet 
of the ship’s side with two or three sleds, a 
towline from the ship would pull a sled 
alongside, this being practiced so as to 
eliminate any danger of excess weight crack- 
ing the bay ice. The cargo was loaded 
direct from the ships onto the sleds and a 
tractor would tow them one at a time about 
1 mile to the foot of the barrier. The sleds 
were then hooked to a towline’ and pulled 
up the barrier slope by a tractor hauling on 
a cable, the cable running through snatch 
blocks at the top of the barrier. The D-7 
tractor with blade was used as an anchor. 
From this point the sleds were pulled to the 
proper cache by D-6 tractor with track 
extensions. 
2. Bridges. 
a. It was necessary to build two bridges 
between the ships and the barrier. One 
crossed a pressure ridge while the other 
crossed a sheer crack in which the two sides 
were moving in opposite directions at a rate 
of slightly over 4 feet per day. 
b. These two bridges were more or less 
of a standard type, the same as would span 
any deep crack in soft dirt. The bridges, 
being one vehicle wide, were constructed 
by placing 8- by 8-inch sills in one case and 
40-foot piling in another, across the ridge 
or crack. They were then tied together with 
Figure 17. Unloading lumber from ship directly onto 
“Go-devil” sled (lumber to be used to construct 
bridge across cracks in bay ice). Note tractor 
staying away from ship's side in order to pevent 
danger of cracking edges of ice. 
30 cable with approximately 1-foot spaces be- 
tween each sill. Three-inch flooring was 
well spiked, with treadways of 1-inch dun- 
nage going on top. PSP was placed on one 
of the bridges but soon became bent, which 
necessitated its removal. These bridges 
served their purpose and lasted until the ships 
departed from the Bay. Later on, about 
the last of February, when the time came to 
evacuate the camp, the bridge which 
crossed the sheer crack required replacing. 
During the time of our stay another crack 
developed about two-thirds up the barrier 
slope, but did not cause any great difficulty. 
Only one footbridge and one weasel bridge 
were necessary, 
3. Caches. 
The three main caches were: 
a. Near base operations which included all 
aircraft parts, equipment, fuel, etc. 
b. Near the mess hall and motor pool 
which included all Seabee supplies, equip- 
ment and fuel, housekeeping equipment, 
rations, etc. 
c. At Little America III which included 
rations, fuel, some construction material and 
those other supplies which were to complete 
the 35-man emergency camp. 
4. Cargo Segregation. 
Due to the large amount of cargo which 
arrived at the port late and was loaded 
aboard the ships during the last few days 
before leaving the States, all cargo was not 
stowed as set up in the Naval Operation 
Plan No. 2-46, which resulted in the segre- 
gation of supplies on the ice, causing some- 
what of a problem. This problem was 
Figure 18. Tamping snow on a bridge with a tractor. 
Figure 19. Bridge crossing crack in bay ice (PSP was 
put on top of one of the two bridges as wearing 
surface). 
Figure 20. Tractor without 
track extensions towing 
“Go-devil” sled loaded 
with supplies across bridge 
on bay ice. Note bend- 
ing of PSP. 
31 Figure 21. Damaged PSP on bridge which crossed 
crack in bay ice was later removed. 
Figure 24. Removing supplies from cache which had 
been covered during a blizzard. 
Figure 22. Footbridge and weasel bridge crossing 
crevasse which developed two-thirds of the way up 
barrier slope. 
Figure 25. Aviation gasoline tank on skis was used to 
refuel R4D’s (D-47’s). 
aggravated because of improper or incon- 
spicuous markings and the change in plans 
which required the ships to leave the Bay of 
Whales earlier than originally planned. A 
considerable number of man-hours was spent 
restacking boxes and looking through dumps 
Figure 23. Snowdrifts at aviation gasoline dump after a 
blizzard. 
32 Figure <26. Bay of Whales Area looking at about 315°. Mess hall and motor pool to left of tents,- base 
operations beyond and to right of tents. Roadway leading from tent area to the left leads to Little America 
ill (35-man winter emergency camp). 
for missing items. Occasionally a sled would 
arrive with some of its cargo going to each 
of the three dumps, resulting in “tying up” 
sleds which were required to transport more 
supplies, 
a. All fuel, 100-octane gasoline, 72-octane 
unleaded gasoline, aviation oil, motor oil, 
Diesel fuel, and kerosene were shipped in 
55-gallon drums, which were clearly marked. 
The aviation fuel and oil was cached half- 
way between base operations and the tent 
camp in piles of about 100 drums each with 
765274—48—4 
33 the piles being about 100 feet on center. 
The other main fuel cache, which was south- 
west of the tent camp and near the motor 
pool, was stored in the same manner. 
b. The smaller planes, OY (L-5) and JA 
(Norseman), taxied in between the piles for 
refueling. The gas for the R4D’s (C-47) 
was pumped from the drums into a tank sled 
and pulled by a D-6 tractor to the planes for 
refueling. 
c. All fuels were standard, the same as 
would be used on any cold weather operation 
within the continental United States, except 
the Diesel fuel which had a —40° F. pour 
point. Specifications USA 2-102, C AM 3, 
NGS X-4205. 
SECTION IV. Buildings and Shelters 
1. Temporary Tent Camp. 
The first construction to take place on the 
barrier was the erection of a 200-man 
temporary tent camp (figs. 27, 28, and 29). 
Fifty pyramidal tents were erected to house 
personnel, four officers or five men per tent, 
and were arranged in five rows, tents being 
approximately 40 feet on center and the 
rows 200 feet apart with the kitchen and 
mess hall being about 300 feet,on the exten- 
sion of the first row. Eleven other tents were 
erected around camp mostly at base opera- 
tions and were of the same type construction. 
a. At the time the tent camp was being 
erected the temperature was only slightly 
below freezing and the surface would hardly 
support the weight of a man on foot. Quite 
often an individual would sink down to his 
ankles, and if he stepped into an already 
disturbed area he would often go in up to 
his knees. For this reason, care was taken 
not to disturb that area which the tent 
would occupy. 
h. Eighteen pieces of 2- by 6-inch lumber 
12 feet long came bundled together so that 
one bundle would furnish the sills for one 
tent. The 2- by 6-inch pieces were scabbed 
together and placed flat on the snow so that 
there were nine 24-foot members lying ap- 
proximately 2 feet on center. After the first 
few tents this was changed to five sills 
lying 4 feet on center which were scabbed 
together with the remaining 2- by 6-inch 
pieces instead of 1-inch lumber. 
c. All floors had been prefabricated into 
4- by 8-foot sections and bound together so 
that one bundle made a complete floor. 
Figure 27, Tent camp area looking at about 315°. 
Latrines are between tent rows,- GPN lower right. 
Mess hall area to left of first row of tents; above 
mess hall area is Seabee cache area. Just beyond 
tents is aviation gas dump. In upper right corner 
of picture is base operations area and aviation 
supply cache. 
34 Figure 28. Tent camp area looking east. Motor pool, gasoline, and Diesel dump in foreground. 
The bundles for the 17- by 20-foot wall tents 
were the only ones that varied in number of 
floor sections in that they contained ten 
instead of the standard eight. These floor 
sections were placed so that the joists sup- 
porting the plywood flooring ran perpen- 
dicular to the sills and were 2 feet on center. 
Each section of flooring contained a loose 
2- by 4-inch piece, 8 feet long which was 
nailed on to the joist so that it extended out 
4 feet beyond the floor’s edge for outriggers, 
furnishing an anchor for the tent ropes. 
The tent was erected in the normal fashion 
with a tent stove being installed and ready 
for use. As is normal in any tent camp, 
inside frames, plywood doors of various 
types, etc., were added by the occupants. 
Some went further and put in ceilings and 
inside walls; anything to help as insulation 
and to make home more comfortable. 
d. The tent camp was adequate in this 
case and would be for any other operation of 
this kind, provided it is to be only for a very 
short period and will not encounter tempera- 
tures lower than from 0° F. to —10° F. 
2. Kitchen and Mess Hall. 
a. The kitchen and mess hall (fig. 32) were 
made up of three 17- by 20-foot wall tents, 
one pyramidal tent, and one 16- by 50-foot 
35 hospital tent all tied together. They were 
constructed in the same manner as were the 
living quarters with the exception that inside 
framework and doors were constructed by 
Seabee personnel. 
b. As one entered the pyramidal tent he 
picked up his metal tray and silverware, 
passed through the chow line at the far end 
of the tent where the field ranges were 
arranged in a line perpendicular to the line 
Figure 29. Officers’ row. Note snowdrifts which hove blown in between each tent/ note also that each tent 
has a different type entrance which was built by occupants. 
Figure 30. Floor panel bundles (one bundle was 
required per pyramidal tent). 
Figure 31. Assembling pyramidal tent floors. Note 
piles in background. Each is the required material 
for one pyramidal tent. 
36 Figure 32. Erecting mess hall and kitchen tents 
Figure 33. Detail refueling tent camp. Average 
pyramidal tent used 8.3 gallons per day. 
OPERATION HIGHJUMP 1946-1947 
ADVANCE BASE CAMP ROSS SHELF ICE 
GALLEY AND MESS HALL 
Figure 34. Advance base camp, Ross Shelf Ice: galley and mess hall. 
of entry, and on to the mess hall (men to the 
hospital tent on right, officers to the wall 
tent on the left). The actual kitchen reached 
from the back of the pyramidal tent (chow 
line) to the end of the first wall tent. The 
second wall tent, still farther back, sheltered 
a store or break-out room. About one- 
third of the officers’ wall tent was used as a 
37 range storage and repair room. The mess 
gear washing was done at the far end of the 
hospital tent. This construction and ar- 
rangement worked very satisfactorily. 
3. Headquarters Building. 
There was really no headquarters building 
for the base camp. The Seabees used a tool 
tent at first and later moved their tools, etc., 
to the motor pool tent. The standard 
Quonset hut (fig. 41) at base operations, 
which was erected with a little more diffi- 
culty than were the tents, carried on more 
administrative work in one of its corners than 
did the rest of the whole camp. 
4. Quonset Huts. 
a. The huts were also erected while tem- 
peratures were slightly less than freezing, 
which caused quite a problem in leveling and 
squaring the floor frame. In order to aid in 
this operation, 1-inch dunnage was first laid 
on about 2-foot centers and perpendicular to 
the 2- by 10-inch and 4- by 4-inch sills which 
went on top. After the floor frame (fig. 42) 
Figure 35. Mess hall and kitchen. 
Figure 36. Garbage pit in snow which was at far end 
of mess hall. All kitchen waste was dumped in this 
hole, which grew deeper as it was used. 
Figure 37. Digging hole for frozen food storage. 
Note snow being sawed into blocks for easier 
handling. 
38 Figure 38. Framework for frozen food storage house 
Figure 39. Storing food in frozen food storage house. 
Figure 40. Tarpaulin being pulled over framework of 
frozen food storage house. It was weighted down by 
putting dunnage and snow blocks on top 
Figure 41, Quonset hut floor at base operations just 
after a blizzard. 
had been assembled, it was trued by the use 
of an engineer’s chain and level, which took 
about four times as long as it would have 
under normal conditions. The other major 
difficulty in the erection was that the small 
nuts, bolts, and plates required bare hands 
to put into place. With the exception of 
these two difficulties, the latter hardly being 
an exception, the work progressed the same 
as it would have during any operation with 
the same temperature and wind conditions. 
The only difference between this hut and 
the standard Quonset hut is that there were 
two %-inch plywood floors which were sep- 
arated by 1-inch dunnage furring. Shortly 
after the hut had been completed a bliz- 
zard arose causing snow to blow in at the 
joint between the bulkhead and the cor- 
rugated sheet metal, leaving the snow lodged 
between the inner masonite wall and the 
outer corrugated sheets. Later heat from 
the inside of the building melted the snow 
causing the masonite to become wet and fall 
out of place. This incident could hardly be 
called a fault in the building design but 
should be credited to faulty construction. 
39 Figure 42. Floor frame assembly for Quonset hut. 
Note near left corner metal sills are resting on 4- 
by 4-inch members, which are resting on 2- by 
10-inch pieces, which are resting on and perpendicu- 
lar to floating dunnage foundation. 
Figure 43. Quonset hut at base operations under con- 
struction. Note inside wall of Quonset hut at 
far end, outside corrugated sheets on left end and 
insulation which goes between the two surfaces 
being applied in the middle of the building. 
b. A double hut 20 by 96 feet was erected 
at Little America III in very much the same 
fashion and encountering the same difficul- 
ties. This hut enlarged the old base so as to 
make it adequate if it became necessary to 
leave a party through the winter night. It 
had the following additions over and above a 
standard Quonset: 
(1) Double bulkheads approximately 4 
feet apart. 
(2) Double “Kima!” insulation between 
inner and outer walls. 
(3) Double floors, 3 inches apart, and so 
constructed that air circulated between them. 
(4) Waterproof paper and %-inch Celotex 
which was inside and separated from the 
metal outside wall by a dead air space. 
Once erected, it is suitable for Antarctic and 
Arctic use, but the difficulty encountered in 
constructing it warrants a different design. 
5. Wannigan Huts. 
Three prefabricated Wannigan huts having 
about 6-inch walls and inside dimensions of 
approximately 7 by 14 by 7 feet high with a 
door at one end, were taken on the expedition 
Figure 44, Looking southwest. Excavation for con- 
necting tunnel leading from double Quonset hut in 
background to Little America III, which is beneath 
the photographer who took the picture. 
40 Figure 45. Southwest end of double Quonset hut at 
Little America III (35-man winter camp) showing es- 
cape hatch, short connecting tunnel, and generator 
house on right end. 
Figure 46. Inside of Quonset hut at Little America 
III. Note gap in floor on right side so that warm air 
can circulate to the left and come up through cracks 
in center of floor (cracks not visible). 
to be used as sled houses to transport men to 
and from the airstrip so they might have a 
place to warm themselves while drinking 
their midshift coffee. Instead, the six sec- 
tions—two ends, two sides, one sled bottom, 
and a top—were bolted together without 
much difficulty and used as quarters for the 
three ranking officers. This type of structure 
is suitable for Antarctic and Arctic use. 
6. Construction Time Required. 
The construction of the 200-man tent 
camp required approximately 1,200 man- 
hours, the single Quonset hut at base 
operations required approximately 600 man- 
hours; and the double Quonset at Little 
America III required approximately 1,400 
man-hours. 
SECTION V. Utilities 
1. Water. 
Water requirements for the kitchen and 
mess hall were furnished by snow melters. 
Water for personal cleanliness, washing of 
clothes, etc., was obtained by the individuals 
concerned by using a bucket or large can and 
his own tent stove. The snow melters were 
protected on a wood floor with a tarpaulin 
windbreaker which was located about 100 
feet east and to the rear of the kitchen and 
adjacent to an area which had been marked 
off with flags and maintained free from 
contamination (figs. 47, 48, and 49). 
a. During the first couple of weeks, two 
Aeroil No. 98 Steam Thawing Units were 
used as melters, the steam lines were in- 
serted into a full G. I. can of snow and as the 
snow melted it was replenished until there 
was obtained a full 32 gallons of water. 
When the units were functioning properly 
it required from 10 to 15 minutes, depending 
upon the temperature, to produce 32 gallons 
of water. The heat for these melters was 
furnished by a gas generator type burner 
which used kerosene and did not prove to be 
entirely satisfactory, the main trouble being 
41 merits. The G. I. cans were maintained about 
one-third full of hot water. As snow was 
added and became water, it was dipped out 
and poured into a covered container which, 
when full, was carried by hand to the kitchen. 
This operation was carried on by two men 
using four heaters who started to work at 
about 8:00 a. m. and by 3:00 p. m. (no 
time out for lunch) had obtained 14 or 15 
32-gallon G. I. cans of water (448 to 480 
gallons), the kitchen and mess hall require- 
ments for 200 men (2.2 to 2.4 gal. per man 
per day). 
c. The snow which was porous and had a 
specific gravity of about 0,35 at the top, was 
usually cut into blocks and carried less than 
100 feet to the melters which were on the 
downwind side. Apparently, this snow had 
no mineral content and was free from harm- 
ful bacteria. The water was not chlorinated 
or treated in any way. Occasionally soot 
was found to be floating on the top of water 
cans, but did not hinder the production of 
potable water. 
2. Waste Disposal. 
Sanitation in the Antarctic where snow is 
extremely deep presents no problem so long 
as waste is not disposed of in snow melting 
areas. 
a. Three latrines for the men and one for 
officers were suitably located throughout the 
camp. They were housed within 16- by 
16-foot pyramidal tents and built similar to 
the ones for living quarters, with the boxes 
forming a U next to the back and two side 
walls. Urinals were not furnished and as a 
result conditions in front of tents became 
unsightly. 
b. Garbage was disposed of by dumping it 
into a hole which was started by pouring hot 
dishwater onto the snow. All kitchen waste 
was disposed of in this hole, which was about 
3 by 2 feet and became deeper the more it 
was used. 
Figure 47. Pontoon snow melter which was designed to 
be used at 35-man emergency winter camp. Note 
exhaust from internal combustion engine furnishes 
heat for melter. 
Figure 48. Inside snow melting shelter. Behind steam 
is Aeroil No. 98 Steam Thawing Unit. Man on 
left is holding steam pipe in G. I. can partly full of 
snow; man on right is pumping air into tank for 
burner which is bottom of steam thawing unit. 
that it required considerable time to start 
the burners, especially in lower temperatures, 
and they required an excess of maintenance. 
b. Army field immersion type heaters 
were used the majority of the time while on 
the ice and functioned properly without any 
mentionable trouble other than requiring 
a longer time to produce the water require- 
42 3. Heat. 
Two types of heaters were used to heat the 
tent camp. Each pyramidal tent was equip- 
ped with one Army tent stove, Model 1941, 
and the standard oil burner, the mess hall 
and Quonset huts used 60,000-B. t. u. space 
heaters most of which were manufactured by 
The American Gas Machine Company, 
Albert Lea, Minnesota. Housing facilities 
remained comfortable at all times, except 
that the tents during high winds with low 
temperatures were uncomfortable even 
though the stoves were red hot. This was 
no hardship. Heating on Operation “High- 
jump” was adequate. 
a. In order to reduce fire hazard, Diesel 
fuel instead of gasoline was used throughout 
and worked satisfactorily even though some 
of the stoves smoked at times. In case of 
the tent stoves, cleaning became necessary in 
about one-third of the cases. The average 
fuel consumption was about 8.2 gallons per 
day per tent stove and 125 gallons per day 
for the kitchen and mess hall (one tent stove, 
three 60,000-B. t. u. space heaters, and about 
seven kitchen ranges). 
b. Standard hand type 15-pound C02 fire 
extinguishers were used throughout without 
any noticeable difficulties. They were dis- 
tributed throughout the tent area so that 
one extinguisher served three tents, six or 
seven were around the kitchen as well as 
on the crash fire fighting sled. Others were 
placed around dumps and such places where 
they might be needed. No serious fires re- 
sulted although a number of tent poles 
became scored, with a couple of them 
collapsing. 
4. Electricity. 
The kitchen and mess hall were supplied 
electricity by two 5-kw., 120-v., single-phase 
generators driven by Wisconsin air-cooled 
motors which were housed in a tarpaulin 
.shack beside the kitchen. The generators 
Figure 49. Package shot (disassembled) snow melter. 
Figure 50. Two 5-kw. generators which were used for 
lighting kitchen and mess hall. Note they are resting 
on the base for a tarpaulin which was later erected. 
ran alternately in about 6-hour shifts and 
worked very satisfactorily. With the excep- 
tion of those tents which required electricity 
for special projects, no power was furnished 
within the tent area. Most occupants of 
tents modified their quarters with one or 
two plastic windows or skylights which pro- 
vided enough light for normal use. 
a. It was originally planned to use two 
75-kw. generators at the 3 5-man emergency 
winter camp, which was reconstructed at 
Little America III. Instead two, 25-kw., 
200- to 400-volt, 3-phase, GM generators, 
43 Model 1-398 driven by 1,200 r. p. m. GM 
Diesel engines Model 3016 were installed 
and until date of departure furnished power 
for the high frequency radios. These genera- 
tors were moved from the ship to the sites 
while still in the heavily constructed box- 
type house. 
h. It was not planned to use these gen- 
erators on the expedition other than to fur- 
nish power for six large reefers (675 cu. ft. 
each) which were constructed on the deck 
of the U. S. S. Merrick in order to furnish 
more cold storage space while en route to 
Antarctica. 
SECTION VI. Airstrips and Snow Tests 
1. Airstrip. 
An airstrip, as originally planned, was not 
constructed, although three ski runways 
were prepared as well as a 150- by 350-foot 
plus 45- by 455-foot pierced steel plank test 
strip. The R4D (C-47) planes operated off 
the ski runways very successfully and with 
less drag than normally would be encoun- 
tered with tires on concrete. 
2. PSP Test Strip. 
a. The PSP test strip (figs. 51, 52, 53, 54, and 
55) was laid in the following sequence: 
23 Jan 
24 Jan Laid 150 by 75 feet of PSP on undis- 
turbed snow. 
25 Jan Laid 150 by 75 feet of PSP on burlap 
which was on undisturbed snow. 
Laid 150 by 75 feet of burlap on un- 
disturbed snow. 
1 Feb 
3 Feb 
150 by 250 feet, 2 rounds with D-6 and 
snow drag over area where burlap 
had been. 
Laid 150 by 40 feet of PSP on partially 
compacted snow. 
Detail of about 15 men started breaking 
open bundles and established center 
line. 
Night shift started 1830 and finished 
0530 on the 25th. 
Inspection of mat at 2200 hours revealed 
that PSP on undisturbed snow settled 
about 1 % inches, whereas mat on 
burlap did not settle. Most settling 
took place between 1030 and 1430, 
while sun was out, with light winds. 
Later inspection revealed no more 
settling. 
Started to remove 150- by 75-foot section 
of burlap. 
Removed burlap. 
44 5 Feb Laid 150 by 160 feet of PSP on partially 
and compacted snow. 
6 Feb 
17 Feb 150 by 800 feet, 2 rounds with snow drag 
and D-6; 1 round with pontoon draa: 
and D-6. 
18 Feb 150 by 800 feet, 1 round with pontoon 
drag and D-6. 
Laid 40 by 180 feet of PSP on partially 
compacted snow. 
19 Feb Laid 40 by 275 feet of PSP on partially 
compacted snow. 
20 Feb Removed snow from 150- by 350-foot 
strip 
Runway extension had about 2 rounds 
with snow drag and 1 round with 
pontoon drag 
High was —8° F. witli 16-knot wind, 
7 men for 2){ hours! 114 sq. ft. 
13 men for 3){ hours [man-hour 
14 men for 6 hours equals 130 sq. 
ft./man-hour. 
Fork lift with 3-inch lumber as a dozer 
pushed the snow to the sides. 
b. The first 150 linear feet were laid about 
25 January when temperatures were rela- 
tively high (25° to 30° F.) and the following 
difficulties were encountered: 
(1) The small clips were difficult to handle 
in cold weather with gloves or mittens. 
(2) Care had to be taken not to disturb 
the surface when the mat was to be placed 
(same as for construction of camp). 
(3) The time required to carry each panel 
by hand from the runway shoulders to its 
final position was doubled, which was due 
to the soft neve. This work was performed 
mostly by the U. D. T. and ships’ personnel 
who had no previous training in this type of 
work. Later this mat required a dozer (for 
lift with 3-inch lumber as blade) to remove 
snow drifts which were caused by miscel- 
laneous bundles and odd pieces of PSP that 
were left within that area. 
c. When the 40- by 455-foot section was 
laid on partially compacted snow the only 
difficulty encountered was the handling of 
the small clips, temperatures being about 
— 10° F. with winds up to 16 knots. This 
Figure 51. Laying PSP on burlap which was laid on 
undisturbed snow. 
work was performed by about 13 Seabees 
from the motor pool whose morale was very 
high. During the 2-day period approxi- 
mately 125 square feet per man per hour were 
laid. 
45 Figure 52. Junction of PSP direct on undisturbed snow (left) and PSP on burlap which is on undisturbed snow on 
right. Twelve hours after junction was laid, mat on left had settled from IV2 to inches while mat on right 
did not settle at all. 
3. Ski Runways. 
The three ski runways were arranged more 
or less as an equilateral triangle, all work 
being performed by equipment, with no 
hand labor. The 4 days of construction for 
runway No. 1 (100 by 4,500 feet) started 
during the evening of 13 February and con- 
sisted of the following; 
Runway No. 1 {fig. 58) 
13 Feb 1 round, D-6 tractor pulling heavy 
drag. 
13 Feb 1 round, D-6 tractor only. 
1 round, D-6 tractor pulling light 
drag. 
1 round, D-6 tractor pulling T-7 
section of pontoon drag. 
14 Feb 1 round, D-6 tractor pulling light 
drag. 
1 round, D-6 tractor pulling pon- 
toon drag. (7% short tons, incl. 2 
bdls. PSP). 
15 Feb 1 round, D-6 tractor pulling pon- 
toon drag (a. m.). 
46 15 Feb 1 round, D-6 tractor pulling light 
drag (p. m.). 
16 Feb 1 round, D-6 tractor pulling pon- 
toon drag (a. m.). 
17 Feb 1 round, D-6 tractor pulling drag 
(far end only). 
1 round, D-6 tractor pulling pon- 
toon drag (far end only). 
The average temperature during this period 
was — 10°F. with winds at about 12 knots. 
Even after the first evening of work the sur- 
face furnished an adequate runway for skis. 
By 23 February this strip would almost sup- 
port an R4D (C-47) on wheels. Runways 
Nos. 2 and 3 were constructed alike in that 
their 2-day construction period started 15 
Figure 53. Same junction as in figure 52, showing that 
difference in elevation at this point is 2V2 inches. 
Figure 54. Cylindrical snow pillars were left standing 
from 1 V2 to 2V2 inches high as PSP, which had been 
laid direct on undisturbed snow, settled. They 
could be kicked over or scraped off very easily. 
Mat apparently did not settle any more after the 
first 36-hour period. 
Figure 55. PSP test strip after a blizzard. Note drifts 
which were caused by bundles and odd pieces of 
mat left within area. This shows the runway areas 
must be policed as work progresses. 
Figure 56. Tractor pulling pontoon drag on ski runway 
47 Figure 58. Ski runway No. 1 running east and west. 
Picture was made before ski runways Nos. 2 and 3 
were constructed. 
Figure 57. Track left after R4D (C-47), with wheels, 
had been towed from PSP test strip to ski runway 
No. 1. Tracks were almost waist deep in places. 
Figure 59. OY (L-5) taking off from PSP test strip. 
Note that very little snow is blown up by the 
propeller. 
Figure 60. OY (L-5) stuck in newly compacted snow 
at end of PSP test strip. 
February and consisted of only the following: 
1 round with a D-6 tractor pulling a wooden 
snow drag, and 2 rounds with a D -6 tractor 
pulling the pontoon drag. These were sat- 
isfactory for skis. 
4. Taxi, Take-Off, and Landing Tests. 
a. OT {Army L-5 on PSP, Subbase Partially 
Compacted, 20 Feb 47, -10° F., Wind 11 Knots. 
(1) Several landings and take-offs were 
made from the 40- by 455-foot end as well 
as taxiing on part of the 150-foot wide end. 
From all appearances no failure occurred. 
It is believed the weight was being carried 
by the mat instead of the snow base; there- 
fore, very little or nothing was learned. 
The props seemed to kick up very little snow 
from beneath the mat, although a little loose 
snow which was on top was blown back. 
(2) The plane taxied out over freshly com- 
pacted snow (2 rounds with D-6 tractor 
pulling snow drag, 1 round with D-6 
tractor pulling pontoon drag) which, due 
to the surface failure, took considerable 
48 power. When the plane tried to turn, 
one wheel went down and help was required 
to start plane moving again. 
b. OT {Army L—5) on Ski-Runway No. 7, 20 
Feb 47, +10°F, Wind 7 7 Knots. Several land- 
ings and take-offs were made with quite a 
bit of taxiing. With one exception no dam- 
age was noted. The surface acted the same 
as any prepared surface would be expected 
to act, except that tires could easily be 
skidded by applying brakes. Once for dem- 
onstration purposes, the plane taxied back 
and forth with one wheel skidding about 
80 percent of the time. The damage noted 
was on the first landing. As one of the tires 
touched the snow, it broke the surface, 
leaving a strip the tire’s width, about 10 
feet long and 1 to 2 inches deep, of loose 
Figure 61. OY (L-5) taxiing on ski runway No. 1 
Figure 62. R4D (C-47) taxiing on PSP test strip. 
Note that very little snow is blown up by the 
propellers. 
Figure 63. Indentations up to 2 inches left in PSP after 
R4D (C-47) taxied on test strip (PSP laid on 
undisturbed snow). 
Figure 64. R4D (C-47) stuck in partially compacted 
snow as it left PSP test strip. Fifty inches of mercury 
on both engines would not move plane. Note 
that no snow is blowing back as propellers rotate at 
high velocity. 
49 granulated snow that could be raked out by 
hand. The snow beneath this was still com- 
pacted and no breaking through was noted. 
Apparently compacted snow will not stand 
abrasion. The tire pressure during these 
tests was 13 pounds per square inch and the 
total weight of the plane was about 2,100 
pounds. 
c. R4D (C-47) 19,000 to 20,000 Pounds on 
PSP Test Strip, 22 Feb 47, T10°F., Wind 5 
Knots. (1) The plane taxied over the entire 
PSP test section. The mat which was laid 
on the burlap had the greatest failure. In 
places it was bent up to 2 or 3 inches. The 
mat which was placed on partially compacted 
snow bent to about 1 or 2 inches. This 
should show that, in this particular case, 
the tan and loosely knitted burlap acted as an 
insulator rather than a conductor, therefore 
losing the qualities which it was hoped it 
might possess. Had the burlap been canvas 
similar to that of tents, the results might have 
been slightly different, but it is still believed 
that best results would be obtained without 
using any material between the PSP and the 
snow. It was interesting to note that very 
little snow was picked up or blown out of 
place by the prop blast, even while both en- 
gines were pulling 50 inches of mercury. 
This also leads one to believe that no ma- 
terial similar to burlap is needed beneath 
the mat. It was also noted the tires had a 
tendency to skid easily where the mat was 
partially covered with snow. 
(2) After taxiing on the PSP had been 
completed the plane tried taxiing off the end 
of the mat test strip and onto the partially 
compacted snow, but without success. The 
plane immediately sank about three-fourths 
of the way to the hub. Fifty inches of mer- 
cury on both engines would not move the 
plane. Later on during the night two D-6 
tractors towed the plane over undisturbed 
snow to ski runway No. 1. This was accom- 
plished in the same manner that a plane 
would be dragged through any muddy held. 
At one time one of the wheels went down to 
the point that loose snow, which piled up in 
front of the wheel, touched the oil cooler at 
the bottom of the cowling. 
d. R4D (C-47) on Ski Runway No. 7, 23 Feb. 
47, +7° F., Wind 4 Knots. (1) The plane 
taxied about 100 feet before the left wheel 
went down. In trying to get out, the plane 
made about a 300-degree turn with the wheel 
going down to the hub. At times while 
Figure 65. R4D (C-47) tracks on ski runway No. 1 
which show that it was not evenly compacted. 
Figure 66. R4D (C-47) wheel after plane became stuck 
and had turned about 300°, using left wheel as 
pivot. 
50 Figure 67. R4D (C-47) taxiing on main camp road leading to mess hall. No failure whatsoever was noted in 
surface. 
Figure 68. Plane taxied into close quarters. Men 
pushing it backward while engines still running 
shows that there is very little drag between tires and 
surface. 
Figure 69. Chocks were required to keep R4D (C-47) 
from rolling down main roadway, which had very 
little slope. This shows that there is very little 
friction between tires and surface. 
51 taxiing the wheels would appear to ride on 
top, then one would break through and after 
running the engines up would come back on 
top. The surface definitely failed, but one 
could see that the minimum compaction for 
this type plane had almost been reached. 
(2) During the noonday meal hour, the 
plane was towed over a connecting road to 
the mess hall road. 
e. R4D {C-47) on Mess Hall Road, 2J Feb. 
47, +7° FWind 4 Knots. (1) The mess hall 
road was part of the main camp road leading 
from the ships to the camp and had traffic 
continuously from 18 January through 23 
February. The traffic consisted of every 
piece of equipment on the expedition, and 
no artificial compacting was done. There 
were occasional rounds with the snow drag 
which aided in keeping the area level. 
(2) The plane was taxied up and down the 
roadway without showing any signs of failure 
whatsoever. The only markings or tracks 
left were formed by the tire tread and the 
loose snow which was on the surface. Twice 
the plane taxied in too close to the flagpole 
and was easily pushed back around by eight 
or ten men. 
Figure 70. Plane with ski landing gear leaves from ski 
runway No. 1 for long mission. 
Figure 71. Ski track left by R4D on ski runway No. 1 
Tracks are not usually this distinct. 
Figure 72. Ski track as R4D (C-47) left ski runway 
No. 1. Note difference in track depth on runway 
and on shoulder. 
Figure 73. Tracks on ski runway No. 1 left by a Jeep 
as it started from a halt. 
52 'igure 74. R4D (C-47) with skis, parked on plywood 
covered with Diesel oil to prevent skis from freezing 
to surface. 
Figure 75. Removing 
snow sample for den- 
sity measurements. 
5. Snow Tests. 
a. In-place density measurements, Proctor 
needle tests, and field load test were made on 
the following areas: 
(1) Undistributed snow. 
(2) Mess hall roadway. 
(3) Snow after PSP had been removed. 
(4) Ski runways Nos. 1 and 2. 
During the short period on the snow, condi- 
tions varied from a soft sandlike consistency 
53 with hardly any supporting power (while 
temperatures were near freezing) to a dense 
hard crust which would allow a D-6 tractor 
to travel without track extensions (tempera- 
ture being near —10° F.). Due to circum- 
stances beyond control, controlled tests were 
not started until the first part of February; 
therefore, no data was obtained during the 
warmer days. 
b. The density measurements were made 
by weighing a carefully measured block of 
snow sawed from the neve. Successive seg- 
ments, 1 to 3 inches thick, were sawed from 
the block as it sat on the scale. The residue 
was again weighed and measured and the 
reduction in weight and volume was used to 
calculate the density of the segment which 
had been removed. When crusts were ob- 
served in a specimen, segments were cut so 
that one segment was composed entirely of 
the crust. It was found that compaction 
went to a depth of about 20 inches and that 
immediately after compaction the surface 
would not have the supporting power that 
it would after it had had a couple of days to 
freeze into place. Facilities were not avail- 
able to make a microscopic study of the 
crystal arrangement, but it is the belief of 
the observer that the original grains of snow 
were broken down into smaller ones and 
compressed and vibrated into place, leaving 
a more dense surface. 
c. In order to compare density measure- 
ments, the results of different tests were cal- 
culated and the value used in plotting specific 
gravity against depth. The average specific 
gravities for undisturbed snow, partially 
compacted snow (ski runways Nos. 1 and 3), 
DEPTH BELOW SURFACE IN INCHES 
UNDISTURBED SNOW (NEVE) 
9 FEB. 1947, TEMP. 11° F. 
ROADWAY IN CAMP 
8 FEB. 1947, TEMP. 19°F 
ROADWAY IN CAMP 
8 FEB, 1947, TEMP. 19° F. 
PREPARED RUNWAY NO. 1 
16 FEB. 1947, TEMP.-10°F. 
PREPARED RUNWAY NO. 3 
15 FEB. 1947, TEMP.-12°F.— 
SPECIFIC GRAVITY 
Figure 76. Comparison of density measurements 
54 DEPTH BELOW SURFACE IN INCHES 
UNDISTURBED SNOW 
22 FEB. 1947, TEMP. 11° F. 
16 FEB. 1947, TEMP. 11° F, 
9 FEB. 1947, TEMP. 11° F. 
USAS OBSERVATIONS 1940 
SPECIFIC GRAVITY 
Figure 77. Further comparisons of density measurements. 
55 and the mess hall road were used in plotting 
a graph. 
d. Insufficient data was obtained to de- 
termine the degree of correlation between 
the bearing power indicated by the load 
applied to the small area under the Proctor 
needle bearing plate and the actual bearing 
power of the snow surface under working 
conditions, but it did indicate that a tech- 
nique could be developed to utilize the 
Proctor needle to determine the uniformity 
of the results of any compacting operations 
and the relative bearing power of the snow. 
e. Direct loads were applied to the snow 
by means of hydraulic jack using a D-6 
caterpillar tractor to supply the load. The 
load was measured by means of a pressure 
Figure 78. Truing specimen for density measurement. 
figure 79. Weighing carefully measured specimen for 
density measurement. 
Figure 80. Running Proctor needle tests on snow after 
PSP had been removed. 
Figure 81. Field loading test 
using 50-ton jack and D-6 
caterpillar tractor on snow 
after PSP had been removed. 
56 gage. Knowing the pressure and the area calculated. The following table is a com- 
of the base of the jack (72.07 sq. in.), the parison of load supporting power, Proctor 
unit load in pounds per square inch was needle pressure, and density measurements. 
Proctor needle 
Specific gravity 
Load 
Location 
Lbs./sq. in. 
Ratio 
SP 
Rat.o 
Lbs. 
Lbs./sq. in. 
Ratio 
Undisturbed 
27 
1 
0.332 
1.0 
1,300 
18 
1 
Under PSP without burlap. . . 
55 
2 
0.335 
1 .Ox 
2,000 
25 
1.4 
Under PSP without burlap. . . 
49 
2 
0.335 
1,0x 
2,000 
25 
1.4 
Ski runway No. 3 
257 
10 
0 396 
1 2 
Ski runway No. 1 
855 
35 
0.432 
1.3 
*4,300 
60 
3.3 
Mess hall road 
1,905 
70 
0.469 
1.4 
13,000 
180 
10 
Note. Reasonable average va 
lues, utilizing all 
available data. 
*C-47 wheel load calculated 
as 60 Ib./sq. in. 
over base area of jack (72.07 sq. in.). 
SECTION VII. Recommendations 
1. General. 
The recommendations herein are based on 
assumption that an Army engineer aviation 
battalion would be given relatively the same 
task with the same period of time as was 
originally planned (24 hours per day for 8 
weeks). In many instances the recommen- 
dations will be in line with that which was 
practiced on this expedition. Others, of 
course, will be from experience gained by 
officers, men, and observers while carrying 
out the mission. 
2. Staff Work and Planning. 
a. It is recommended that planning be 
started far enough in advance to allow 
fabrication of special items and shipment, so 
that each unit will have ample time to 
familiarize itself with the items with which 
they are to work. 
b. The unit chosen for the operation 
should be a well organized and experienced 
one. 
c. It is recommended that the staff officer 
who is responsible for the planning be a 
member of the expedition. He will be able 
to note his own mistakes, and pass on to 
others to follow, more complete information 
as to how future operations should be planned. 
d. Plans should be flexible so that if at any 
time the over-all plan is changed, the 
operation could proceed uninterrupted. 
e. A large amount of extra small tools, 
such as hammers, saws, wrenches, etc., 
should be taken since they become lost or 
misplaced very easily in the soft snow. 
/. An extra amount of plywood, 2- by fl- 
inch, and 1-inch lumber should be taken, 
since additions must always be made. 
3. Construction Equipment. 
The most essential item for Antarctic work 
is specialized construction and transporta- 
tion equipment. A certain amount was 
learned during the short 4-week period on the 
ice and it is felt that some of the answers were 
obtained, but there is still far more to be 
learned. No one or two pieces of equipment 
will answer all purposes. Each piece will 
vary in design depending upon the job it has 
to do. Some of the purposes for which equip- 
ment must be designed are as follows: 
765274—48 5 
57 a. A heavy duty tractor or prime mover 
capable of pulling large quantities of supplies 
on sleds over great distances. The tractor 
should have living accommodations for its 
crew and should have a fuel capacity to carry 
it long distances. 
b. A tractor similar to the ones used on this 
expedition which would be used in and 
around camp and on hauls for relatively 
short distances should be designed with 
following modifications: 
(1) The power unit should need no changes 
other than a winterized hood. 
(2) A cab that will protect the operator 
from low temperature and high winds. 
(3) Tracks with a maximum unit bearing 
pressure of 3 pounds per square inch. 
(4) Long tracks in order to prevent rough 
riding while going over the sastrugi as well as 
to aid in going over small cracks and cre- 
vasses. 
(5) Attachable grouser plates, or some- 
thing to give the tractor a foothold while 
working on ice, 
(6) Winches on tractors are highly desir- 
able. 
(7) Correct the tendency of the tractor to 
mire itself while pulling heavy loads, possibly 
by moving the center of gravity forward. 
c. Some type of light, fast-moving trans- 
portation suitable for transporting small 
numbers of personnel, etc., as the truck, 
%-ton 4x4. It should have sufficient room 
to allow the operator to function properly 
while wearing bulky clothes and it should be 
easy to enter and leave. A winch on the 
front would be desirable. 
d. Some type of cargo handling equip- 
ment, similar to a crane is most desirable. 
It is believed that a tractor crane would have 
been more suitable than was the forklift 
in that it would not be required to move 
around as much while unloading cargo. 
The 5-ton crane (Byer’s Model 65), taken 
on this expedition, or one of its type would 
not be suitable in that the center of gravity 
is too high and there would have been a great 
danger of its tipping over in the soft snow. 
e. It is believed that compaction equip- 
ment will necessitate a complete change in 
design. It is felt that the tractor with the 
combination of weight and vibration did 
90 percent of the compacting on the expe- 
dition. Various types of rollers were not 
used enough to determine their usefulness, 
but the consensus is that they act similarly 
to the way they would while rolling washed 
gravel or sand. Some type of equipment 
mounted on tracks will vibrate the granulat- 
ed particles of snow into place, and after 
given time, the particles will freeze into 
position giving the desired results. Thought 
might be directed to something along the 
lines of a wagon, dirt or rock, bottom-dump, 
with a built-in vibrator and flat top so that 
weight could be added as the surface be- 
comes more compact. Something on the 
order of a combined pontoon drag and snow 
surface heater should be considered, but not 
for compaction in depth. 
/. Grading equipment will be necessary 
if airfields are to be built for extensive use 
by heavy planes. Several things have been 
Figure 82. Open snow roller. 
58 Figure 83. Modified sheepsfoot roller (not used). 
Figure 84. Closed snow roller which proved 
unsatisfactory. 
discussed such as a towed grader mounted 
on skis instead of wheels, and motorized 
graders 4x4 with large dual tires front and 
rear. The skis would have the disadvantage 
of side slippage, and attachable skis would 
have to be furnished the motorized grader 
to transport the machine to the compacted 
surface where it is to work. Personally, the 
observer would like to try the latter. Due 
to the belief that it would be easier to grade a 
runway after it is partially compacted it is 
felt that the motorized grader would be 
more satisfactory even if assistance had to 
be given by a tractor towing for the first 
few gradings. Once the surface became hard 
(before ready for planes) the grader could 
work as it normally would as well as travel 
back and forth to the motor pool under its 
own power. 
g. The main suggestion on the sleds is 
that the runner contact area be increased 
so that when fully loaded there will be a 
unit bearing pressure of from 2 to 3 pounds 
per square inch. This, of course, will present 
a problem in that the larger the runner 
area the harder it will freeze in when left 
standing, A runner might be designed for 
a higher unit bearing pressure so that shoes 
could be attached which would bring the 
unit bearing pressure down to that which is 
desired during high temperature when the 
neve is quite soft. The QM 1-ton sled, 
which is definitely a good one, could be 
supplied with a tarpaulin similar to those 
on trucks so that while transporting personnel 
they would be protected from wind and snow 
which is kicked up by the weasel or towing 
vehicle. The “Go-devil” sled, as used on 
this expedition, could be redesigned with a 
toboggan undercarriage so that, when mired, 
snow would not pile up in front. The 
side-board recess could be lowered in order 
to allow large and awkward-shaped cargo 
and boxes to rest flat on the bed. 
4. Cargo Handling and Unloading. 
a. Each unit should definitely check all 
items prior to leaving its home base or port. 
As before an invasion during the war years, 
the unit should assure itself that all items 
are present and that the boxes and crates 
have been properly and conspicuously 
marked with some color or symbol. 
b. Ships should be loaded in accordance 
with an established priority and with each 
unit’s supplies together, in order that one 
59 permanent or semipermanent building in 
regions similar to those in the Antarctic. 
This design should provide the following: 
(1) Rapid and easy assembly, possibly with 
clamps or some type of fastener other than 
small items such as nails and bolts which are 
hard to manipulate while wearing gloves or 
mittens. 
(2) Maximum insulation, yet the panels 
should be light enough to allow three or 
four men to handle with ease. 
(3) Panels or sections of such size and 
weight for minimum shipping weight and 
cubage. 
(4) Floating foundations. 
(5) Double floors with air circulation 
between the two. 
(6) Plenty of headroom in order to allow 
for double bunks. 
(7) Skylights or windows to provide light 
until such time as they become covered with 
snow. 
Figure 85. When camp was evacuated caches were 
left well marked with high poles and identification 
on top so that they may be found if needed for later 
expeditions. 
group may be unloaded without disturbing 
the others. 
c. Men and officers should be transported 
on the same ships as their supplies and equip- 
ment. 
d. During the first stages of the operation 
each unit should cache its own supplies; that 
is, engineer troops should unload their own 
supplies as they arrive at the camp site, air 
corps personnel should unload their supplies, 
etc., for all branches of the service and their 
units. Within each unit it would be advis- 
able for cooks and KP’s to cache their own 
kitchen supplies, mechanics unload their 
supplies, etc. This would familiarize each 
person with location of his supplies and how 
they are stored. 
5. Buildings and Structures. 
a. It is thought that the temporary camp 
construction could possibly have been a little 
more complete, even though it furnished 
adequate shelter. Inside framework and 
doors could have been erected by the Sea- 
bees which would in turn save individuals 
from taking time off to construct on their own. 
b. It is recommended that some new type 
of prefabricated building be designed for 
Figure 86. Early stages of crevasse in barrier slope 
Later it became about 5 feet wide in places. 
60 water could be continuously circulating to 
prevent freezing. For large or more per- 
manent types, heat could be supplied from 
the exhaust of an internal combustion engine 
as was planned for in the 35-man emergency 
winter camp. 
As a morale factor and for convenience 
it would be advisable to furnish electric 
lights to all tents and buildings. 
7. Airstrips and Snow Tests. 
The following recommendation for con- 
struction of an airstrip is by no means the 
cheapest or most expedient, but is a method 
which it is known will supply the needs. 
Future research and study of snow char- 
acteristics will undoubtedly develop tech- 
niques of construction which will enable 
units to prepare surfaces in less time and to 
carry heavier loads. The method suggested 
would probably not be carried out in its 
entirety, but would change as construction 
progressed, depending upon knowledge 
gained during this period. 
a. Suppose the specifications called for one 
runway 100 by 5,000 feet to accommodate 
C-47 type planes 1 month after starting date 
and heavier type planes later. Two areas 
side by side 500 by 7,000 feet each could be 
compacted by the use of tractors and drags 
running back and forth over the surface as 
was the method in compacting the ski run- 
ways. If a track laying type compactor 
were available it would aid considerably. 
In about 1 month the center 100 feet of these 
strips would be compacted to its maximum 
density, specific gravity of about 0.65 to 0.70 
at the surface down to about 0.40 or 0.45 at 
20 inches below the surface. It would be 
ready for C-47 type aircraft. The object of 
having two runways would be that while 
one was being used the other could be main- 
tained and worked for heavier type planes. 
The runways would then be strengthened by 
dozing snow from the ditch lines onto the 
100-foot center strip and compacting in the 
Figure 87. Looking up from down in a crevasse. 
Cracks such as these are obstacles which may be 
encountered. 
(8) Strength to withstand winds up to 100 
m. p. h., and snow and ice pressure which 
will be from the sides as well as from the top. 
c. If possible it would be advisable par- 
tially to compact the construction area be- 
fore erecting any buildings or even tents. 
This would enable the working parties to 
move around with greater ease, afford 
better footings for building, as well as 
keeping the construction area level. 
6. Utilities. 
a. Water supply is the only utility which 
requires serious thought. The area from 
which snow is to be taken should definitely 
be on the windward side of the entire camp 
area and must remain a restricted area so 
that it will not become contaminated. Some 
type of semiportable snow melter is needed. 
It should be designed so that the water will 
be maintained at a given level. The water 
from the time the snow enters the hopper 
until it is ready for use should be in closed 
containers and changed from the melter to 
storage tank through pipes in which the 
61 Figure £8 Crevasses such as these are encountered in the Antarctic. 
same manner. After this operation had been 
accomplished two or three times the run- 
ways should be capable of carrying the C-54 
type aircraft. 
b. Total construction time for this opera- 
tion should take approximately 6 weeks. Due 
to surface winds and snow the ditch lines 
would become filled by drifts affording addi- 
tional material which could be dozed up on- 
to the 100-foot center strip. It is thought 
that eventually the depth of compaction 
would become great enough to afford ade- 
quate bearing pressure for larger aircraft in 
the heavy bomber type group. The reason 
for compacting the 200-foot shoulders on 
both sides of the runways at beginning of 
construction is that the undisturbed neve will 
not otherwise support construction equip- 
ment. Due to the fact that after compaction 
the snow requires a period in which to re- 
freeze it might be well to bear in mind that 
doubling the construction force does not 
necessarily mean cutting construction time in 
half. 
62 c. Prefabricated landing mat should be 
available, even though it would not be 
planned to use it, due to the fact that once 
it is in place the depth of compaction could 
hardly be increased. It would also afford 
quite a problem in keeping the runway clean 
after blizzards, in that snow piles would ac- 
cumulate on each side of the runway which 
would cause drifts to grow larger the more 
the strip is cleaned. Even though a runway 
without a mat surface might show wear and 
become damaged during heavy operations 
it is believed that maintenance would be a 
relatively simple proposition. 
d. At this particular stage it is felt that the 
most important thing in connection with 
runway construction in regions similar to the 
Antarctic is that more experimental work be 
carried on similar to that which was carried 
on during Operation “Highjump.” The 
snow should be studied by constructing run- 
ways and performing such tests as those per- 
formed and planned to be performed on this 
operation. 
e. For more detailed information on this 
operation, it is suggested that the Navy’s 
BuDocks report on the operation “High- 
jump” be studied. 
63 CHAPTER 4 
TRANSPORTATION 
SECTION I. Introduction 
1. Plans and Objectives. 
The plans and objectives of Operation 
“Flighjump” in the field of Transportation 
are set forth in paragraph III-B, Annex “J”, 
Commander Task Force 68, Operation Plan 
No. 2-46, Projects: 
(1) Performance and tests of powered 
vehicles under Antarctic conditions. 
2. Scope. 
a. At the end of the shore based operations 
on the Antarctic Continent, the personnel 
who actually operated and maintained the 
motor vehicles used there returned to the 
United States in a different ship than that 
which carried the Army observers; hence, con- 
siderable valuable data which should logi- 
cally be contained in this chapter are not now 
available, but will undoubtedly be included 
in the final reports of Task Force 68. 
b. The time spent in the shore based phase 
was so short that it scarcely constituted a 
proper performance test for the vehicles con- 
cerned. The vehicles were placed ashore 
commencing about 18 January 1947, and 
final evacuation of the base camp was com- 
pleted on 23 February 1947, a period of only 
36 days. 
3. Vehicles. 
Powered vehicles placed ashore at the Bay 
of Whales for operational use and testing 
were as follows: 
a. Wheeled vehicles: 
8 Trucks, %-ton, 4x4 (Jeep). 
4 Trucks, 2%-ton, 6x6. 
1 Truck, 1%-ton, 4x2. 
b. Amphibious vehicles: 
8 Cargo carriers, M29C (Weasel). 
2 Landing vehicles, tracked. 
c. Tractors: 
10 Tractors, D-6. 
1 Tractor, D-7. 
2 Tractors, TD-9-6G (Fingerlift). 
3 Tractors, MC-1 (Cle-track). 
Note. The vehicles listed in a, b, and c above were 
all new vehicles. 
d. The following drawn conveyances were 
used and are considered in this report: 
20 sleds, 10-ton (Go-devil). 
8 sleds, Army, 1-ton. 
3 trailers, tank, 800-gallon capacity, mounted 
on skis. 
e. Also included were the following dogs 
and dog sleds: 
27 dogs and 4 dog sleds. 
4. Unloading Vehicles. 
The ships moored direct to the bay ice in 
the Bay of Whales, and all vehicles were 
unloaded direct onto the ice in the conven- 
tional manner by cargo slings. 
5. Surface Conditions Encountered. 
a. The bay ice in the Bay of Whales was 
covered by hard packed snow (neve) varying 
in thickness up to 18 inches. There were 
two tide cracks or crevasses in the bay ice 
which had to be crossed. These tide cracks 
64 were several feet wide and the interval was 
choked with pressure ice; the pressure ice in 
places was piled up 12 to 15 feet high over 
the tide cracks. These cracks were bridged 
for safety. Bulldozers pushed away the sur- 
plus pressure ice and the bridges were con- 
structed of planking, pierced planks (airfield 
matting) and other available materials. 
These bridges had to be constantly main- 
tained because of the heavy traffic over them 
and because of movement of the ice at the 
tide cracks. At the site selected for the as- 
cent of the barrier, the barrier was about 
70 feet high and sloped down to the bay ice 
at an angle of 20 degrees from horizontal. 
This slope was about 200 feet long (fig. 89). 
The slope consisted of hard packed, drifted 
snow, covered with soft snow. On this 
barrier incline there were later discovered two 
crevasses, originally only about 2 feet wide 
but later opening up to about 5 feet. In- 
itially these crevasses had been covered by a 
natural snow bridge which gave way under 
the pounding of heavy traffic. 
b. The top of the barrier was covered 
with neve snow which was considerably 
softer than that found on the bay ice. The 
surface in some places was smooth; in others 
it was crossed by ridges and hard snow 
(sastrugi) varying in height from 5 inches 
Figure 89. D-6 in reverse towing working party up barrier incline on five Army sleds. 
765274—48 6 
65 to several feet. The spacing and height of 
these ridges varied from day to day. The 
surface texture, bearing power, and other 
physical characteristics of the neve vary 
with temperature, wind, sun, and other 
climatic influences; thus, conditions of opera- 
tions may change within a few hours. The 
general surface contours of the Ross Ice 
Barrier in the vicinity of the Bay of Whales 
are quite gradual; slopes of over 10 to 15 
degrees are rare. The surface of the barrier 
contains many crevasses up to 10 feet wide 
and wider. These crevasses frequently are 
covered by a bridge of crusted snow which 
will give way under a heavy vehicle. Of 
the vehicles considered in this report only 
the LVT’s participated in an overland trail 
operation. Ability to cross crevasses must 
always be considered for a vehicle designed 
for Antarctic operations. 
6. Wheeled Vehicles. 
No wheeled vehicles were able to operate 
efficiently ashore. All had to be towed 
from shipside to motor park. The larger 
trucks were never able to operate, although 
the Jeeps were able to operate to a limited 
degree on well packed areas when equipped 
with heavy chains on all four wheels. The 
Jeeps were so unreliable, however, from a 
transportation standpoint that they were 
useless. The snow acted very much like 
soft sand, causing the wheels to dig out great 
holes when power was applied. Four of the 
Jeeps were equipped with power generator 
units and were finally towed to the top of the 
barrier and used as power generators for the 
air operations office. Wheeled vehicles of 
conventional type are entirely unsatisfactory 
for personnel or cargo carrying purposes in 
the Antarctic. 
SECTION II. Cargo Carrier, M29C 
1. General.* 
a. No trials were run in water, the Weasels 
operating exclusively on snow and ice 
throughout the operation. They were used 
as liaison vehicles and for towing the 1-ton 
Army (QM) sled. They were in almost con- 
tinuous operation and turned in a very 
creditable performance. They towed the 
Army sled with a 1 -ton load of cargo or per- 
sonnel with ease on the bay ice, up the bar- 
rier incline, and on top of the barrier itself. 
The principal complaint against the Weasel 
was that there were not enough of them. 
Eight Weasels could scarcely perform all the 
tasks desired of them. The demand for 
Weasels was never satisfied during the oper- 
ation. 
b. The following table shows the total 
number of miles of operation by each Weasel 
for the period 19 January 1947 to 23 Febru- 
ary 1947: 
Weasel No. Mileage 
1 1,464 
2 1,099 
3 1,201 
4 1,571 
5 Lost in crevasse—figures not available. 
6 38—Front suspension damaged and track 
broken shortly after landing. Never 
repaired or replaced. 
7 1,464 
8 1,027 
2. Method of Use. 
Init'ally Weasels were assigned to various 
individuals or departments for use. There 
were, however, more interested agencies than 
there were Weasels. This resulted in a 
*See TM 9—772 for general description and technical data 
concerning Cargo Carrier, M29C. 
66 Figure 90. Weasel in trouble in soft snow. 
Figure 91. Weasel comes in handy for photographic 
work. 
Figure 92. Weasel advertising cancer drive. Note 
QM 1-ton sled in rear. 
Figure 93. Photographic Weasel on airstrip. Note how 
tracks conform to irregularities of surface. 
bottleneck on these vehicles and controversy 
over the priority of the projects concerned. 
About 27 January 1947 the Weasels were 
placed in a common pool operated by the 
motor maintenance officer. Thereafter all 
requests for Weasels were handled by a dis- 
patcher, who, by coordinating individual 
requests, was able to maintain a much more 
efficient use of the vehicles. A scheduled 
“run” was instituted on a 30-minute basis 
between the ships, the base camp, and the 
airstrip. This greatly relieved the strain and 
operated as accommodation to observers, 
civilian scientists, correspondents, and other 
casuals. One exception to this arrangement 
was in the case of the Weasel permanently 
assigned to the camp surgeon. This Weasel 
remained on call at the air operations office 
near which the surgeon’s headquarters was 
located. This vehicle and an Army sled 
were used as an emergency ambulance and 
crash truck (fig. 94). The equipment in- 
cluded fire fighting equipment, stretchers, 
and other first aid and medical gear. This 
Weasel was the only one equipped with a 
radio. 3. Tracks. 
All Weasels were equipped with the con- 
ventional track. These tracks proved quite 
satisfactory in most respects. The only time 
a Weasel was deadlined because of track 
failure was in the case of one which was 
broken. However, it was noted that when 
a Weasel was parked on a rutted or uneven 
surface, wrinkles or ridges in the rubber 
belts would appear as the tracks conformed 
to the irregularities of the surface. After one 
or two hours in the same position, these 
wrinkles or ridges tended to stiffen in that 
position. It was feared that a break in the 
steel cables embedded in the rubber belts 
might occur if the vehicles were driven off 
immediately. It was therefore deemed ad- 
visable to move the Weasel a few feet 
forward and backward, repeating this move- 
ment several times until the wrinkles or 
ridges were ironed out. Further study into 
the possibility of cable breakage from these 
conditions is recommended. If such break- 
age might result, the feasibility of individual 
block type tracks with connectors might be 
investigated. 
4. Serviceability and Performance. 
a. Of the eight Weasels placed ashore on 
or about 19 January 1947, six were service- 
able and in operation when the base camp 
was evacuated on 23 February 1947. As 
stated previously, No. 6 was disabled after 
38 miles of operation by a broken track and 
a damaged support tube and carrier arm, 
resulting from a collision. As no spare parts 
were available this vehicle remained out of 
operation. No. 5 Weasel was lost in a tide 
crack, or crevasse, in the bay ice on 15 
February 1947. After the cargo ships de- 
parted on 6 February the bridges were not 
maintained and soon became unuseable due 
to ice movement. The driver of No. 5 
Weasel attempted to cross one of these 
crevasses near the bridge site. As the Weasel 
passed over the crevasse the pressure ice 
between the edges of the crevasse gave way 
and permitted the vehicle to drop into the 
water. For some reason the drain plugs had 
never been installed and the hull began to 
fill with water. Every effort was made to 
save the Weasel. Water was bailed out of 
the hull, planks and empty gas drums were 
lashed to the sides and eventually a tractor 
arrived at the scene. When the tractor 
arrived a cable was attached to the capstan 
of the Weasel and an attempt was made to 
drag the Weasel onto the bay ice This 
attempt failed when the capstan tore loose. 
The towing pintle could not be used be- 
cause by the time the tractor arrived the 
hull was almost full of water and the towing 
pintle was out of reach. Shortly thereafter 
the Weasel sank in over 200 fathoms of 
water. It is recommended that drain plugs 
be installed in all Weasels which have 
occasion to travel on bay ice. 
b. Two Weasels were temporarily disabled 
by damaged transmissions during the first 10 
days ashore. In one case a tooth was broken 
from the low range gear. A new tooth was 
built up by welding and filed as near to size 
as possible. This enabled the vehicle to 
resume operation to a limited degree; how- 
Figure 94. Weasel and 1-ton Army sled used at 
airfield as combination ambulance and crash 
truck. Note fire extinguishers. 
68 ever, the transmission could be shifted into 
low range gear only with difficulty, so to 
prevent further damage to this gear a lug 
was welded to the axle transmission lever in 
such manner that the transmission could not 
be shifted into low gear range. Thereafter 
the vehicle was limited to high range only. 
In the other case of a damaged transmission, 
the nature of the damage is not known, 
other than it rendered the vehicle inopera- 
tive. It was reliably reported that this trans- 
mission was replaced by the transmission of 
No. 6 Weasel (with the broken track). In 
any case the Weasel was placed back in 
operation. 
5. Transmissions. 
As stated in the paragraph above, two 
Weasels were disabled by damaged trans- 
missions although both were repaired or re- 
placed quickly and placed back in operation. 
The general opinion of most individuals who 
worked with the Weasel is that it has a weak 
transmission. However, when operated by 
a trained driver it appears the transmission 
seems to perform satisfactorily. Weasels on 
the operation were frequently driven by 
amateur drivers with little or no previous 
experience. It is possible that the two 
damaged transmissions were caused by inex- 
perienced drivers placing undue strain on 
the transmissions by selection of wrong gear 
range, clashing the gears in shifting, or 
“jerky” take-offs. 
6. Speed. 
Weasels operated at speeds up to an 
estimated 15 miles per hour both on the 
well packed roads and on the open snow 
of the bay ice and the barrier. It was a 
common tendency to drive the Weasel too 
fast, the speed being regulated more or less 
by the comfort of the driver and passengers. 
It is recommended that 10 miles per hour 
be considered as the maximum speed con- 
sistent with smooth operation. Beyond that 
speed the vehicle has a tendency to bob up 
and down quite forcibly from the axis of 
the drive sprockets. During this motion the 
rear part of the tracks maintains a more or 
less constant contact with the snow while 
the forward part of the tracks rises off the 
snow from a few inches to more than a foot. 
This “down buck” results in jolting the 
passengers and a jerking motion to a towed 
sled. It seems logical to assume that addi- 
tional strain is also placed on the tracks, 
track suspension, and power drive. It was 
observed that this “down buck” was more 
pronounced on uneven surfaces. Actually, 
there are no absolutely level surfaces in the 
Antarctic; even though a surface appears 
to be perfectly flat to the naked eye it is 
usually full of minor dips and swells. It is 
believed that the intermittent strain caused 
by high speeds over uneven surfaces causes 
a torque component to be built up which 
definitely aggravates the normal bobbing 
motion imparted to the vehicle in passing 
over these uneven surfaces. It is possible 
that if the drive sprockets were in front 
rather than in rear a smoother operation of 
this vehicle could be obtained. The feasi- 
bility of front drive should be investigated. 
7. Engine. 
There was no ignition trouble, no carbure- 
tor trouble, and no trouble with engine 
starting. S. A. E. 10 oil was used in the 
crankcase. Sixty percent prestone was used 
in the cooling system. The electrical system 
functioned normally. No differential failures 
were encountered. 
8. Feasibility of Use in Prolonged Opera- 
tions. 
No prolonged trips were made with the 
Weasels. The longest trip was to Little 
America I (1929), a distance of approxi- 
mately 12 miles. However, observations of 
the vehicle in operation indicate that it 
might be feasible for use in extended oper- 
69 a dons, limited only by fuel, oil, maintenance 
supplies, and extremely unfavorable terrain, 
especially wide crevasses. 
9. Drivers. 
There were regularly assigned drivers for 
each Weasel from the Seabee detachment. 
These drivers had had previous experience 
and were reasonably well trained. Flowever, 
quite frequently the Weasels would be oper- 
ated by individuals who had little or no 
previous experience. The performance of 
Weasels chauffeured by the regularly assigned 
drivers was much superior to that when 
chauffeured by amateurs. The chief char- 
acteristics of amateur driving were jerking 
the vehicle in starting off, selection of im- 
proper gears and driving range, a tendency 
to drive too fast and “lugging” the engine. 
10. Observations. 
Several observations were made concerning 
possible modification of the Weasel: 
a. The high sides of the hull resulting from 
its amphibious feature make it rather difficult 
for driver and passengers to enter and leave 
the vehicle. If the amphibious feature can 
be considered unnecessary for operation on 
the Antarctic mainland, a portion of the hull 
could be cut out and doors installed. 
b. Present side curtains provide scant 
visibility to the occupants. The feasibility 
of a rigid cab with glass or plexiglass windows 
should be investigated. 
c. None of the Weasels were equipped with 
defrosters for the windshield. Frost did not 
form on the windshield except when the side 
curtains were tightly fastened. For pro- 
longed trips in extremely low temperatures 
requiring the side curtains to be closely se- 
cured for warmth, a windshield defrosting 
unit is indicated. 
d. When traveling at moderate to high 
speeds, the tracks kick snow very forcibly 
over the towed sled. This is a most uncom- 
fortable sensation for personnel riding on the 
sled. The feasibility of some type of guard 
over the rear of the tracks to prevent this 
from occurring might be investigated. 
e. The driver was definitely handicapped 
by the narrow space between the right 
steering brake lever and the engine cover. 
With heavy clothes and shoes it was very 
difficult to reach the foot throttle and the 
driver’s leg was pinched by the steering 
brake. This space should be made wider to 
accommodate the bulkiness of Antarctic 
footgear. 
11. Conclusion. 
The Weasel proved to be a most satisfactory 
vehicle for operation on the Ross Ice Barrier. 
The expedition could have efficiently used 
more of these vehicles. The four chief fail- 
ures of these vehicles, i. e., one broken track, 
one vehicle lost in a crevasse, and two 
damaged transmissions, cannot be directly 
attributed to inherent weakness in the vehicle. 
SECTION III. Tractors 
1. General. 
Tractors were the mainstay of the shore 
based phase of the operation as far as trans- 
portation was concerned. Over 3,000 tons 
of cargo were moved from the ships to the 
airstrip, the base camp, and the 35-man 
emergency camp. The great bulk of this 
cargo was hauled by tractors. Except for 
the Cle-tracks, all tractors were found to 
perform with reasonable efficiency under all 
conditions encountered. 
70 2. Fingerlifts (Figs. 95, 96, 97, and 98). 
The two fingerlifts were so seldom used as 
transportation in the sense of towing drawn 
conveyances that they are considered in this 
report only from the standpoint of their 
performance under prevailing conditions 
in view of their similarity in many respects 
to the D-6 and D-7 tractors. The finger- 
lifts were equipped with wooden track ex- 
tensions and operated most efficiently both 
on the bay ice and on the barrier. They 
were extremely valuable in unloading cargo 
from sleds at the various caches. The 
fingerlifts were too light for some of the heavy 
loads they had to handle. The tracks on 
both fingerlifts became slightly sprung due 
to bending of the bogie and idler shafts. 
This was probably due to leverage exerted 
by the track extensions when heavy loads 
were lifted. Both fingerlifts continued opera- 
ting throughout the operation. 
Figure 95. Fingerlift distributing pierced plank on the 
airfield. 
Figure 96. Load of lumber and tarpaulins on fingerlift. 
Figure 97. Fingerlift digging out pierced plank buried 
in snow. 
Figure 98. Laying out cache with fingerlift, 
71 3. D 7 Tractor. 
The D-7 Tractor would probably have 
turned in a much more creditable perform- 
ance than it did, had it been given a proper 
trial. Its chief contribution to the trans- 
portation cause was in being used as an 
anchor or “deadman” (fig. 99) at the top 
of the barrier. The bulldozer blade was 
dropped and forced into the snow and two 
large timbers were thrust into the snow to 
assist in firmly anchoring the tractor. To 
the firmly anchored tractor were attached 
two snatch blocks. By means of a 1,200- 
foot length of cable operating through the 
snatch blocks a D-6 tractor at the base of 
the barrier was able to tow loaded sleds up 
the face of the barrier incline (fig. 101). 
The D-7 tractor was used as a “deadman” at 
the top of the barrier from 20 January 1947 
until the cargo-hauling from the ships was 
completed on 6 February 1947, when it 
was evacuated. The wooden track exten- 
sions provided for the D-7 were 60 inches 
long (fig. 102). Although not given a 
thorough test it was considered that these 
extensions were longer than necessary. 
4. D 6 Tractor. 
The 10 D-6 tractors were the work horses 
of the entire shore based operation, and from 
the transportation standpoint they were 
responsible for the success of the operation. 
5. Winterization. 
All the tractors had been winterized at 
Port Hueneme, California, prior to embarka- 
tion. This winterization included enclosing 
the driver’s compartment in a cab, covering 
the hood and radiator with sailcloth, 60 
percent prestone in the radiator, and winter 
oil (Naval equivalent of S. A. E. 10). In 
anticipation of traction difficulties in the 
snow, wooden track extensions were prepared 
for installation after the landing in Ant- 
artica (fig. 102). 
Figure 99. D-7 as "dcadman’’ for hauling loaded sleds 
up barrier. 
Figure 100. Looking down barrier incline. Tractor 
on bay ice is towing loaded sled up barrier w ith 
cable towing device. 
Figure 101. D-6 in reverse towing Norseman plane up 
the barrier. 
72 6. Cab. 
The driver’s cab was a wooden frame and 
top with safety plate glass puttied in in front 
and with plexiglass bolted in on the sides 
and rear. The door opened on the left side. 
The door was rather poorly made, especially 
the latch, which failed to hold the door 
closed until field expedients were utilized. 
The cab provided ample vision for the driver. 
Very little difficulty was experienced with 
glass frosting over but occasionally visibility 
would be lessened by snow or sleet. The 
plexiglass on the sides and rear would fre- 
quently tear loose from the bolts which 
secured it. An escape hatch 2 feet square 
was built into the top of the cab. All in all 
the cabs were satisfactory. Certainly a cab 
of some type is needed for Antarctic opera- 
tions. 
7. Track Extensions. 
All tractors could operate efficiently on the 
bay ice without track extensions, although 
occasionally one would stick from turning too 
sharply or in starting a heavy load (fig. 104). 
Tractors which operated exclusively on the 
Figure 103. Parked tractors. Note broken and missing 
track extensions. 
bay ice were therefore not equipped with 
track extensions. They were able to tow 
two Go-devil sleds each carrying 3 or 4 tons 
of cargo with ease. 
a. In general, none of the tractors could 
operate on top of the barrier without track 
extensions. The snow on the barrier was 
much softer and deeper than on the bay ice. 
After track extensions were installed a D-6 
tractor could tow three Go-devil sleds each 
carrying 4% tons of cargo with ease (fig. 105). 
All tractors operating on top of the barrier 
were therefore equipped with track ex- 
tensions. 
b. The incline from the bay ice to the top 
of the barrier was quite a different proposi- 
tion. The 20-degree incline approximately 
200 feet long proved to be a major obstacle. 
Tractors without track extensions were not 
able to climb this incline even without loads. 
Tractors with track extensions could climb 
the incline without a pay load but experi- 
enced the greatest difficulty in towing a 
single loaded Go-devil sled. When these 
initial attempts were made on 19 January 
1947 the snow on the incline was quite soft. 
The tractors tended to mire in on one side 
and corkscrew about at right angles to the 
Figure 102. Layout of track extensions, showing both 
60-inch and 30-inch types. D-6 tractors used only 
30-inch extensions on Operation Highjump. 
73 original direction, then being unable to 
resume the original direction. By reversing 
the tractor and pulling backward, better 
results were obtained. An experiment with 
two tractors in tandem, both pulling back- 
ward, proved that one Go-devil sled with 
2l/2 tons of cargo could be hauled up the 
incline. 
c. Before any appreciable amount of cargo 
had been hauled up the incline, the tractors 
had badly chewed up the surface, gouging 
out deep holes in the snow. This activity 
broke the natural snow bridge, or snow 
crust, over the two large crevasses which ran 
parallel to the barrier across the track. 
These crevasses were about 2 feet wide when 
discovered, but had widened out to about 
5 feet at the end of the operation. Hauling 
cargo witti tractors was suspended after 
one tractor bogged down in one of these 
crevasses and had to be towed out. Then 
the prearranged plan of using a cable 
towing device was used. The D-7 tractor 
was installed on top of the barrier as a 
deadman and by means of two pulleys 
attached to the deadman and 1,200 feet 
of wire cable, the loaded sleds were towed 
up the incline by a tractor operating on the 
bay ice. The crevasses were filled up with 
snow by bulldozers. This snow supported 
sleds and Weasels. Tractors were kept off 
the incline for some time because it was feared 
they would break through the snow filled 
crevasses. After the track had become firmly 
packed and smooth, tractors again resumed 
operation on the incline but only for towing 
the Army sled for personnel carrying. After 
the cable towing device was installed on 
20 January 1947, cargo hauling followed 
this pattern: tractors without track exten- 
sions towed loaded sleds from the ships to 
the base of the barrier; the loaded sleds 
were then detached and hauled to the top 
by the cable arrangement; at the top of the 
barrier the loaded sleds were towed to their 
destination by tractors with track extensions. 
Empty sleds were returned to the ships by a 
reverse process. 
d. The track extensions for the D-6 trac- 
tors were of oak, 30 inches long, 6 inches 
wide and 4 inches thick. They were secured 
to the tracks by two spring loaded C washer 
type connectors (fig. 106). A %-inch car- 
riage bolt through the 6-inch dimension 
about 2 inches from the inside end of the 
extension was installed to prevent splitting. 
The spring loaded connectors did not prove 
satisfactory. The washers came off, either 
Figure 104. D-6 in trouble on boy ice about to be 
winched out by another D-6. 
Figure 105. D-6 in reverse towing three Go-devil sleds 
each carrying 24 drums of gasoline. 
74 by breaking or sliding off the connectors, 
within a few hours of operating time. In 
addition snow tended to pack between the 
tracks and track extension in such manner 
as to throw individual track extensions out 
of line. This resulted in an uneven bearing 
surface and ultimate breakage. The con- 
tinuous maintenance thus imposed indicated 
another means of securing the track exten- 
sions to the tracks. Ordinary carriage bolts 
with a single nut were tried with consider- 
able success. This made the track extensions 
extremely rigid, lacking the flexibility given 
by the spring loaded connectors. One dis- 
advantage of the nut and bolt fastening was 
the difficulty in keeping the nut tight. The 
natural resiliency of the wood, freezing and 
thawing of ice between the track and track 
extension, and the vibration of the tractor 
caused the nuts to become loosened, when if 
not retightened they often came entirely 
disengaged from the bolt and resulted in lost 
or broken extensions. The extensions were 
checked and all nuts retightened about 
every 4 hours. The final solution was to use 
a lock nut on every bolt. After lock nuts 
were installed, inspection and maintenance 
of track extensions was reduced to once each 
12-hour shift. Some breakage of extensions 
resulted from the rigidity imposed by the nut 
and bolt fastening in passing over extremely 
uneven terrain or hard objects buried in the 
snow. Extreme pressure would thus be 
placed on one or two individual extensions 
and resulted in breakage. Sharp and fre- 
quent turning, especially on uneven surfaces, 
placed a great deal of horizontal strain on 
the track extensions and sometimes resulted 
in splitting. Track extensions of some type 
were definitely necessary for the successful 
Figure 106. Layout of hardware provided to secure 
track extensions to tractor. This type of fastener 
proved unsatisfactory and was replaced by ordinary 
nut and bolt. 
Figure 107. Track support blocks and hardware. 
Figure 108. Installation of track support block. 
75 operation of the tractors used on the expedi- 
tion. The feasibility of a flexible metal type 
of track extension should be investigated. 
8. Track Support Rollers. 
The track support rollers were removed 
from all D-6 tractors prior to leaving the 
United States. Previous experience indi- 
cated that ice and snow would accumulate 
around the rollers to a degree sufficient to 
interfere with efficient functioning of the 
tracks. Wooden track support blocks were 
used in lieu of the rollers on all tractors 
except the Cle-tracks 
9. Engine Starting. 
There was no difficulty in starting the 
engines due to low temperatures. The trac- 
tors were never stopped long enough to 
present a starting problem. During the 15- 
day cargo unloading phase they were in 
operation practically 24 hours a day. After 
the cargo unloading was completed and the 
tractors were relegated to routine duties 
within the base camp they were left idling 
when not in actual operation. 
10. Hours of Operation. 
Total hours of operation are available on 
only four D~6 tractors at this time. These 
four tractors were left in the base camp when 
the cargo ships left the Bay of Whales on 6 
February 1947. The following table shows 
Figure 109. Cle-track (without extensions) in reverse 
and Go-devil sled loaded with baggage. 
Figure 110. Cle-track equipped with extensions. 
Figure 111. Broken track on Clc-frack, showing 
extensions laid out. 
76 the actual hours of operation by these four 
tractors from 19 January to 23 February 
1947: 
work. They were brought along for similar 
use around the airfield constructed at Little 
America. These tractors were seldom used 
as transportation in the sense of towing drawn 
conveyances. They did not prove very 
satisfactory for operation in the snow. When 
track extensions had been installed (fig. 110) 
they could tow a loaded 1-ton Army sled, 
but could not be depended upon to tow a 
loaded Go-devil sled. After a few hard 
packed trails had been established some little 
use was derived from them in towing small 
pay loads about the camp and airfield. One 
Cle-track was equipped with all rubber 
tracks, one of which broke completely in two 
after a few days of operation and was never 
repaired or replaced (figs. Ill and 112). 
These tractors were underpowered and hand- 
icapped by being unable to operate at the 
high speeds for which they were designed. 
13. Effect of Temperature and Sunshine. 
a. Temperature very definitely affects the 
consistency of surface snow. For example, 
when the temperature was above zero degrees 
Fahrenheit D-6 tractors could not operate 
on the barrier without track extensions, 
whereas when temperatures of minus 10 
degrees were experienced these tractors could 
operate quite effectively over the same area 
without track extensions. 
b. Temperature and sunshine also affect 
the drawbar pull of loaded sleds. On warm, 
sunshiny days the drawbar pull of a loaded 
Go-devil sled was considerably less than for 
the same loaded sled on cold, overcast days. 
Thus on cold, overcast days, although the 
tractor itself operated more efficiently, it 
could not tow as large a pay load as on warm, 
sunshiny days. No specific data were com- 
piled on this matter but general observations 
bear it out. In unloading gasoline, for ex- 
ample, the loads placed on sleds would vary 
by as much as 6 drums due to changes in 
the weather. 
Hours of 
Hours of 
Tractor No. operation 
Tractor No. 
operation 
4102 505 
4059 
506 
3670 523 
4099 
520 
Average hours of operation 
514 
Average daily hours of operation 
14 
11. Maintenance. 
Maintenance on tractors was negligible 
except for minor adjustments, chiefly on 
master and steering clutches. The only 
major failure was one Cle-track which suf- 
fered a broken track after a few days of 
operation and was never repaired. (The 
Cle-track vehicles were of little value any- 
way.) Organizational maintenance was per- 
formed after each 12-hour shift. 
12. Cle-track Tractors. 
The three Cle-track tractors (fig. 109) were 
of the general type found around airfields 
and used for towing airplanes and general 
Figure 112. Abandoned Cle-track. Tools left about 
equipment in this manner are soon covered by drift 
snow and lost. 
77 SECTION IV. Drawn Conveyances 
1. Types Used. 
The following types of drawn conveyances 
were used: 
20 Go-devil sleds. 
8 Army sleds, 1-ton. 
3 Tank trailers, 800-gallon capacity, mounted 
on bobsleds. 
2. Go-devil Sled. 
a. The Go-devil sled was designed and 
manufactured by the Michler Sleigh and 
Wagon Company. The sled weighs 3tons, 
has a 10-ton load capacity, and is double 
ended. It has two runners of wood and 
welded steel box sheathed construction about 
10 inches wide with 3 inches of camber and 
a center height of 16 inches. The cargo 
deck is planked with oak timbers 12 inches 
wide and 6 inches thick, the loading platform 
being 8 feet wide and 13/2 feet long. It is 
equipped with a chain bridle and a steel 
drawbar. The drawbars were never used on 
this operation, the sleds being towed ex- 
clusively by the chain bridle. It has three 
stake pockets on each side and two on each 
end. It is altogether a sturdy, well con- 
structed sled (fig. 113). 
b. The Go-devil sleds were towed almost 
exclusively by the D-6 tractors except on 
the overland trail party to the Rockefeller 
Mountains when two of these sleds were 
drawn by LVT’s. Go-devil sleds trans- 
ported the bulk of the cargo unloaded from 
the ships to the base camp. 
c. With an estimated 8- to 10-ton load it 
was found that the runners cut into the neve 
of the Ross Ice Barrier sufficiently to permit 
the cargo platform to rest on the surface, 
thus materially increasing the drag. On 
relatively hard packed tracks this did not 
occur. However, it was discovered that with 
such a load, even on hard packed snow, this 
Figure 113. Attaching towing bridle of Go-devil sled 
to front of tractor. 
Figure 114. Pumping gas from drums to tank trailer. 
Note ski mounts. 
78 Figure 115. Loaded Go-devil sled and LVT ready for 
240-mile trip. 
Figure 116. Go-devil sled loaded for trip to Rockefeller 
Mountains. 
Figure 117. Army sled as cargo carrier 
Figure 118. Sideboards added to Army sled keep 
airplane cameras from falling off in transit. 
sled presented a major problem in moving 
off from a halt because of the runners’ freez- 
ing to the surface. A D-6 tractor could 
easily start a sled loaded with less than 3 
tons under similar circumstances. 
d. During the cargo unloading phase the 
loads placed on Go-devil sleds averaged 3 to 
4 tons each. A typical load was 24 drums 
of aviation gasoline on each sled. A D-6 
tractor could tow two sleds with such a load 
without difficulty. By reversing the tractor 
and towing backward, the D-6 tractor could 
tow three sleds thus loaded. The loads 
placed on the sleds were always limited by 
what the tractors could tow. The sleds 
could therefore have been of considerably 
lighter construction for use on this operation. 
e. When loaded sleds were being towed 
down grade and the tractor stopped or 
slowed down, the sleds would frequently 
run forward and strike the tractor. The 
sleds would also swing sidewise and slither 
79 all the way about coming up against the 
side of the tractor. No damage to tractor, 
sled, or cargo is known to have resulted 
from these incidents; however, damage could 
easily have occurred. It is believed the 
sleds would have towed much more docilely 
on down grades had the drawbars been in- 
stalled. 
/. In addition to cargo hauling the Go- 
devil sleds were used for personnel hauling. 
As many as 30 men could find accommoda- 
tion on each sled for the short runs about 
the area. 
g. At the end of the operation all the sleds 
were in excellent condition and showed 
little if any sign of wear. With one exception 
they were used only for local hauling in the 
immediate vicinity of the Bay of Whales: 
On the 240-mile round trip to the Rocke- 
feller Mountains one Go-devil sled was 
towed behind each of the two LVT’s (figs. 
115 and 116). These two sleds returned in 
first-class condition. 
3. Army Sled. 
a. This is the standard 1-ton Army sled 
designed for towing by cargo carrier M29 
and M29G. This sled was used almost ex- 
clusively for towing by Weasels. Both as 
a cargo and personnel carrier it proved to be 
most satisfactory (fig. 117). These sleds 
were not used as part of the bulk cargo 
carrying program. Since the Weasels were 
used so much as liaison vehicles, they could 
not be depended upon for scheduled caigo 
hauling. They were used, however, to haul 
special equipment and personnel (fig. 118). 
b. The Army sled is well constructed and 
sturdy. At the end of the operation, all 
Figure 119. Box built on Army sled for personnel 
protection. 
Figure 120. D-6 towing tank trailer. 
Figure 121. Tank trailer at aviation gas headed for the 
airstrip. 
80 sleds were still in first-class condition, ex- 
cept for the wooden slats on the cargo plat- 
form. A great many of these slats were 
broken or split. It is not known whether 
this breakage resulted from overloading, 
from improper loading and lashing, or from 
carelessness in dropping heavy items of 
cargo onto the loading platform. 
c. A large wooden box of plywood was 
built on one sled to shelter personnel while 
riding (fig, 119). The box was approxi- 
mately 4 feet wide, 8 feet long, and 5 feet 
high, closed on all sides except the rear. 
This box was left on the sled throughout the 
operation and used in transporting small 
working parties, especially for the long trip 
from base camp (Little America IV) to the 
emergency camp (Little America HI). 
d. The eye on the drawbar is too small to 
be attached to the pintle hook of the Go- 
devil sled. When such an arrangement was 
desired for the overland trail party to the 
Rockefeller Mountains, the eye had to be 
enlarged. It would be desirable for the eye 
on the drawbar of the Army sled to be of 
sufficient size that this particular sled could 
be attached to any type of pintle hook in 
common use. 
e. The space between the false deck and the 
slats of the loading platform tends to become 
packed with snow, thus increasing the weight 
of the sled. 
/. For hauling miscellaneous odds and ends 
of equipment for short distances without 
elaborate loading and lashing, sideboards 
of 2- by 6-inch lumber were built on the 
sleds to prevent the cargo from spilling in 
movement (fig. 118). 
g. The 800-gallon capacity gasoline tank 
trailer mounted on skis functioned satis- 
factorily (figs. 120 and 121). The capacity 
was not sufficient for refueling the airplanes, 
therefore it was necessary to tow a sled 
loaded with gasoline behind the tank trailer 
and pump from the sled to the tank trailer 
with an auxiliary pump. 
SECTION V. Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT) 
The following report on the operation of 
the two tracked landing vehicles used on 
Operation “Highiump,” the LVT3 and 
LVT4, is based on a report prepared by 
Marine Corps personnel, submitted to the 
Commandant, United States Marine Corps. 
PART 1 
Narrative of the Operation of the Landing Vehicles, 
Tracked, {3) and {4), Operation HIGH- 
JUMP 
The Marine detail assigned for the opera- 
tion of the LYT’s on Operation HIGHJUMP 
was composed of 1st Lt. Roger B. Thompson, 
M/Sgt. Ralph O. Inman, T/Sgt. George H. 
Bigelow, T/Sgt. James L. Thomas, Sgt. 
Ernest B. Hatch, Sgt. Dwight P. Smith, and 
Corp. Thomas A. Strock. 
One LVT3 was received on 26 November 
1946 with the following identification; 
Reg. No. C-91676 
Eng. No. Starboard—44077 
Eng. No. Port—44076 
This vehicle had been winterized previous 
to shipment from storage at Barstow, Cali- 
fornia. However, the tractor was completely 
rechecked and it was found that the port 
batteries and generator were not functioning 
correctly and minor repairs were made. 
The winterization of this particular vehicle 
consisted of using lighter weight oil (SAE 10) 
81 motor, and it was found necessary to reset 
the gap of all the spark plugs. 
Steps were welded onto the sides of the 
vehicle. The armor plate hatch directly in 
front of the driver was replaced with safety 
glass to increase the vision of the driver. 
Handles were welded on the overhead 
hatches for ease in opening. 
The LVT4 was equipped with one SCR 
508 radio, plus vehicular spare parts. 
By the 5th of December 1946 both LVT’s 
had been loaded aboard the U. S. S. 
Merrick, the LVT3 being loaded below the 
main deck in number 3 hatch, and the 
LVT4 on the square of number 4 hatch. 
The LVT3 being below decks could not be 
started during the southward trip but before 
the temperature reached a freezing point 
the bilges were drained to prevent their 
freezing. The LVT4, being accessible, was 
started and allowed to run for about an hour 
per week on the southward trip. 
A greater amount of time was consumed 
in traversing the ice pack than had been 
anticipated, and upon arrival in the Bay of 
Whales, Antarctica, a period of 6 weeks was 
left in which to unload the ships, establish 
a temporary tent camp for 300 men, a per- 
Figure 122. Checking over LVT the first day ashore. 
in the engines, transmissions, oil breathers, 
air cleaners, and power take-off. The liquid 
cooling system tested at 60 percent Prestone 
antifreeze solution and 40 percent water. 
Some minor changes were made at Port 
Hueneme, such as welding steps on the pon- 
toon armor plate, and mounting a Delco 
Remy “Little Joe” gasoline driven battery 
charger on the gunner’s platform. A tar- 
paulin was cut to fit the vehicle, and hooks 
were welded 18 inches apart on the lower 
outside of the sponsons in order to fasten the 
tarpaulin down securely to provide at least 
partial protection during inclement weather. 
This vehicle was equipped with one SCR 
508 and one TCS radio, plus vehicular spare 
parts. 
On 29 November 1946 one LVT4 was 
received from Barstow, California, with the 
following identification; 
Reg. No. G-61072 
Army No. USA 9139851 
Engine No. 46610 
Mfrs. Eng. No. 72747 
The winterization of it consisted of SAE 10 
mineral oil in the engine and air cleaners. 
The LVT4 was checked, and some minor 
work done, such as tightening the push-rod 
housings, rocker box covers, and the starter 
Figure 123. LVT4 after unloading cargo. Note how 
tracks are sunk in snow. 
82 manent 35-man emergency camp, plus an 
aviation operations center. Since explora- 
tory flights and work allied with them were 
of such high priority, many lesser projects 
were necessarily curtailed. 
Due to the fact that the LVT’s were 
considered to be an unknown factor, insofar 
as usefulness in the successful completion 
of the primary mission was concerned, they 
were given a low priority, and consequently 
were not immediately unloaded. 
On 20 January 1947, however, the FVT4 
was unloaded onto the bay ice in the Bay 
of Whales, and given a trial run which 
proved to be quite successful, except that 
after making two trips to the site of the 
300-man temporary camp it was decided that 
the vehicle was destroying the established 
routes of travel, especially going up the 
ramp of the barrier ice. Consequently, an 
order was given which restricted both LVT’s 
to the vicinity of the bay ice until the unload- 
ing of the ships was completed. The snow 
had practically no crust at this time and 
was very soft. The machine was operated in 
second gear except when more power was 
required. 
On 22 January it became necessary to 
remove the carburetor of the LVT4. The 
engine had shown a tendency to cut out or 
misfire on acceleration. This necessitated 
the raising of the engine at least a foot and 
one-half, which was accomplished by the 
use of timbers stacked up alongside the 
engine overhead opening, and a 3-inch steel 
pipe reinforced with a steel rod for a crossbar. 
For a chain hoist, the “track jack” of the 
LVT3 was used. After the carburetor was 
removed, it was discovered, as had been 
previously surmised, that the accelerator 
pump was not functioning due to having 
been stored for too long a period, and also 
that it was the older model which was made 
of brass, and the metal had become slightly 
corroded. After completely freeing the com- 
ponent parts of the pump, and thoroughly 
checking the rest of the carburetor, it was 
replaced, and the engine was remounted 
in its original position. 
Except for some leakage at this time 
around the rocker boxes and push rod hous- 
ings, the engine performance and accelera- 
tion was very good. This repair, although 
it sounds quite simple, consumed the better 
part of 2 days due to adverse conditions and 
the necessity to avoid frostbite from the com- 
bination of cold weather and gasoline. 
As much operating time as possible was 
put on the LVT4 from the 23 January to 
30 January, when the LVT3 was finally un- 
loaded. During that time, however, a bliz- 
zard and some bad weather limited the 
operations to some extent. 
As soon as the LVT3 was unloaded, and 
the spare parts had been removed from the 
cargo compartment, an attempt was made 
to ascertain the feasibility of ship to shore 
movement under conditions peculiar to this 
region. 
The air temperature was +6° F., and the 
water temperature was 29.5° F. 
A straight edged portion of the bay ice 
was selected which had a long approach of 
smooth, snow covered ice. The surface of 
the bay ice was approximately 1 % feet above 
the water line. The total thickness of the 
bay ice varied from 12 to 15 feet. 
The transmission selector lever was placed 
in high range, and the control differential 
lever in low range. The approach was made 
at about 10 miles per hour at a right angle 
to the ice edge. The bow of the vehicle was 
about 1 / feet lower than the stern at the 
moment of contact with the water. A slight 
amount of water was shipped over the bow, 
amounting to about 1 inch on the deck of the 
cargo compartment. This water was quickly 
disposed of by the bilge pumps. No great 
amount of shock was experienced going into 
the water. 
83 An attempt was then made to exit from 
the water onto the bay ice (fig. 124), The 
approach was made slowly to the straight 
edge of the ice and on contact the engines 
were accelerated (fig. 125). This resulted 
in the tracks’ digging into the edge and no 
appreciable rise was noted in the bow. 
A second approach was then made at ap- 
proximately 6 miles per hour. On this 
attempt the bow rose up to the top of the ice 
but the tracks cut into the edge until the 
hull bellied down (fig. 126). Two more 
attempts were made and on the third try the 
bow armor scab caught on the edge at the 
same time the tractor bellied down, making 
it impossible to back the vehicle away, or 
proceed further without aid from an outside 
source. It was finally pushed off by the 
LVT4, interposing a 4- by 4-inch timber 
approximately 22 feet in length between the 
two machines. 
For the fourth attempt, a 50-foot tow cable 
was used between the two machines, with 
the LVT4 on the bay ice being used as the 
prime mover. The LVT3 was towed ahead 
at about 7 miles per hour with the tracks 
stopped. On contact with the ice, the towed 
vehicle applied only sufficient power to the 
tracks to maintain contact and reduce drag 
until traction was gained. The LVT3 came 
up over the edge due to the tow of the LVT4 
(see fig. 127), and when its tracks had trav- 
eled less than one-half of their length the 
vehicle proceeded under its own power. 
This test required several hours and no 
unusual operating temperatures or condi- 
tions were noted. 
On 31 January during the operation of the 
tractors on the bay ice a “sinkhole” was 
encountered by the LVT3 which resulted 
in rendering the vehicle immobile. The 
port track went below the surface of the 
snow some 3 to 4 feet. This caused no par- 
ticular trouble, and the vehicle was extri- 
cated by towing it with the LVT4. 
On the second day of February the two 
LVT’s were utilized to transport high ex- 
plosives from the ship’s side to a point about 
1Y2 miles away on the bay ice. To reach the 
appointed location it was necessary to cross 
a high pressure ridge and also a tidal crack 
which was approximately 3 feet wide. Each 
vehicle carried a pay load of about 4% tons, 
and no trouble was encountered. 
It was decided on 3 February to conduct 
another landing test in view of the fact that 
Figure 124. LVT3 in the Bay of Whales before 
attempting to climb out on bay ice in background. 
Figure 125. LVT3 approaching bay ice to test 
feasibility of amphibious ship to shore operation. 
84 Figure 126. LVT3 fails to complete landing attempt and is about to receive a tow 
a better approach from the water was found. 
A spot was selected which had an “ice foot”, 
or tongue protruding from the front of the 
bay ice a distance of approximately 7 feet, 
and at a depth of about 3% feet below the 
surface of the water. The top of the bay 
ice was still about 1% feet above the water 
line. The entrance to the water was ac- 
complished in the same manner as in the 
previous test. 
To exit, an approach was made at about 
4 miles per hour, and the ice foot was easily 
attained. The tracks then broke down the 
top edge of the bay ice and dug in until the 
Figure 127. LVT3 is assisted ashore by LVT4. 
85 machine bellied down at an angle of 15 or 
20 degrees. The vehicle was then towed 
out, using the LVT4 as a prime mover. 
Just enough power was applied to overcome 
track drag until the LVT3 attained a more 
horizontal position, when it applied more 
power and proceeded on its own. 
No attempt was made to put any load in 
the cargo compartment of the vehicle during 
these tests. 
A conference was held during the first 
week in February by Rear Admiral R. E. 
Byrd, U. S. N. (Ret), the Base Camp Com- 
mander, Commander C. M. Campbell, 
U. S. N., and his staff. It was determined 
that an advance weather observation post 
and emergency aircraft fuel cache in the 
interior to the southeast was desirable. 
This was to be at a distance of approxi- 
mately 300 miles airline from the Bay of 
Whales, the exact latitude and longitude 
to be determined by the existing surface 
condition in the area. Captain V. D. Boyd, 
U. S. M. C., was designated as leader and 
navigator for the party to lay the proposed 
base. 
It was decided by Captain Boyd that an 
attempt should be made to use the LVT’s 
as prime movers for the trip. 
On 5 February, due to the scarcity of 
space on the last outward bound ship, 
Lt. Thompson was ordered ashore with 
only two of the original six enlisted personnel 
in the detail. Taking T/Sgt. Bigelow and 
T/Sgt. Thomas and the two LVT’s, they 
transferred to the 300-man temporary camp 
and began preparations for the inland trip. 
A 4- by 4-inch ridge pole was secured from 
the cab aft to the ramp of the LVT3. This 
had been previously provided in conjunction 
with the especially cut tarpaulin, thereby 
roofing over the cargo space for living quar- 
ters. (See fig. 128.) The cargo space of 
the LVT4 was covered over with plywood, 
and a tarpaulin lashed over it to keep the 
drift snow out. A plywood deck was also 
installed in each vehicle by cutting the ply- 
wood to shape and laying it in place. A 
hatch with a plastic window was installed 
in the center of the improvised roof just aft 
of the engine compartment in the LVT4, 
to permit access to the interior, and also to 
afford more light in that location. Cooking 
and eating facilities were installed in both 
vehicles, using Army “Yukon’- tent stoves 
having downdraft burners. These stoves 
were quite efficient, and used kerosene as 
fuel. Gasoline may be used, but it is more 
hazardous from the standpoint of hre, and 
is less efficient. Folding cots, mattresses, 
and sleeping bags were used for bunking. 
One of the most difficult preliminary 
problems, and at the same time one of the 
most important, was the “swinging” and 
adjusting of the magnetic compass. Only 
the LVT4 had a compass mounted, and 
fortunately it was of a good type. An 
unsuccessful attempt was made to mount 
a compass in the LVT3. With a magnetic 
variation of 104.5° east, plus the steel hull, 
the magnetic compass in the LVT4 oscillated 
a great deal. This was due to the weak 
Fisure 128. LVT3 and LVT4 just prior to departure 
on 240-mile round trip to Rockefeller Mountains. 
Note tarpaulin cover roofing on LVT on left. 
86 horizontal component of the earth’s terres- 
trial magnetism in the high latitude of the 
Bay of Whales area (78° 34' S.). It is 
generally conceded that the magnetic com- 
pass is much too unreliable to be used with 
safety in the higher latitudes. The magnetic 
compass in the case of the party under 
discussion was to be a secondary instrument, 
since it was planned to navigate with the 
astrocompass. The astrocompass uses the 
sun or other celestial body, and as it turned 
out there was so little sun that the greater 
part of the trip was navigated by dead 
reckoning, using the recorded mileage of 
the sledge-meters, and the magnetic compass 
in the LVT4. This proved to be quite 
a problem since the compass oscillated 
from 15° to 20° to each side of the desired 
heading. 
The cargo for the trip, including the weight 
of the sleds, amounted to a little over 8 % 
tons per vehicle. The LVT3 towed one so- 
called “Go-devil” sled, and the LVT4 one 
“Go-devil” sled plus one Army cargo sled of 
1-ton capacity. The Army cargo sled was 
fitted with a box to afford personnel protec- 
tion, and was towed at the rear. One man 
was stationed in the box, and from this 
position trail flags were placed at one- 
quarter mile intervals, to mark the trail for 
the return trip. The sledge meters were also 
towed from this sled. Emergency equip- 
ment in the way of tents, man-hauling sleds, 
skis, pack boards, alpine line, portable 
radio, and cooking gear was also loaded on 
this sled to be used in the event the party 
was forced to walk back. 
The following medical supplies were taken 
on the LVT trail trip into the interior: 
Medical officer’s kit, empty 1 
Units, plasma 3 
Units, albumin 3 
Package, bandaids 1 
Flashlight batteries 1 
Foot powder, can 1 
Tr. Benzoin (4 oz.) 1 
Camphor. Tinct. of Opium, 4 oz 1 
Sulfathiazole tablets, 7% gr 100 
Brandy, 2 oz 10 
Boric acid ointment, tubes 2 
Petrolatum, #1 1 
M. S. syrettes, gr. iss 25 
Chap sticks 12 
Tongue depressors 12 
CO detector ampoules 20 
Butyn Sulf. 2% and Metaphen, %oz, tubes 4 
Mercuric oxide, yellow, oint. % oz 4 
Catgut suture, plain #1, tube 4 
Silk suture, plain #0, tube 4 
APC tablets 100 
Phenobarb. gr. iss 100 
Ammonia ampoules—2 cc 4 
Ephedrine HC1 1:1000 1 
Opium and glycyrrhiza tablets 100 
Cascara sagrada gr. % tablets 50 
Cod. sulf. tablet gr. ){ 100 
Tr. iodine, 10-cc vial 6 
Tourniquet 1 
Safety pins, 1 package 2 
Gauze compress 2-in 6 
Gauze compress 1-in 2 
Canvas litter case 1 
Procaine HCl (syringe type) 8 
Adhesive tape, roll 2 in. by 3 yd 2 
Pencil 1 
Needle, surgical, curved, cutting 6 
Needle, surgical, tapered point 6 
Needle, surgical, cutting edge 6 
Hypodermic needle #23, 1-in 5 
Instrument case, pocket, surgical 1 
Hemostats, 1 plain, 1 rat 2 
Scalpel, with blade 1 
Forceps, tissue, toothed 1 
Shears, bandage 1 
Clinical thermometer 1 
Pkg. basswood splints 1 
Leg splint, Thomas 1 
Blankets 2 
Folding litter 1 
Gauze, plain 36 in. by 25 yd. bolt 1 
Battle dressings, Carlisle Model (Navy) 18 
Battle dressings, medium 2 
Bandage, cotton elastic, 3-in 1 
Triangular bandage 3 
Splint, wire ladder 1 
Bandage, gauze, 3-in. roll 10 
Gauze, compressed, plain 2% by in 4 
Cotton, absorbent, roll 1 
87 Before starting, some tests were conducted 
to determine the maximum practical load to 
haul on the “Go-devil” sleds with the LVT’s. 
These sleds had two runners which were 
double ended, and about 15 feet long. The 
runners were made of wood, encased in a 
welded steel sheathing. The width of the 
runners was 10 inches and center height of 16 
inches, with 3 inches of camber. The top 
was a wood construction of oak timbers, 4 
inches thick and 6 inches wide. The total 
top load area was 13% by 8 feet. The weight 
of these sleds was a little over 3% tons, with a 
capacity of 10 tons. They were towed by 
means of a chain bridle made of 1 -inch round 
steel bar, which weighed about 600 pounds. 
With a capacity load and an atmospheric 
temperature of plus 25° F., on a wind packed 
neve surface, the runners of this type sled 
sank to the full depth, thus causing the sled 
to be supported by its top planking. The 
LVT’s were able to tow the sleds in this 
fashion, but it put a strain on both the sled 
and the LVT. 
When the snow built up in front of the sled 
in a snow plow fashion, the LVT of course 
would bog down. The test load was gradu- 
ally decreased until it was determined that 
approximately 5 tons would be the optimum 
load for existing temperatures and surface 
conditions. This condition was taken to be 
the most adverse to be anticipated at that 
particular season of the year. 
The trail party personnel consisted of the 
following: 
Captain V. D. Boyd, U. S. M. G., leader and 
navigator. 
First Lieut. R. B. Thompson, U. S. M. G., 
second in command, and officer in charge 
of LVT operation and photography. 
Major Dan Crozier, U. S. A., medical officer 
and weather observer. 
Chief Warrant Officer A. J. L. Morency, 
U. S. A,, Army observer and assistant 
LVT driver. 
T/Sgt. J. L. Thomas, U. S. M. C., LVT4 
crew chief and maintenance. 
T/Sgt. G. H. Bigelow, U. S. M. C., LVT3 
crew chief and maintenance. 
T. W. McGovern, Aviation Radioman 
Second Class, U. S. N., communications. 
The party was divided into two groups. 
Lt. Thompson, Sgt. Bigelow, and Radioman 
McGovern were assigned to the LVT3; 
Captain Boyd, Major Crozier, Mr, Morencey 
and Sgt. Thomas were assigned to the 
LVT4. 
The LVT3, as previously stated, was 
equipped with a TCS radio in addition to 
the standard SCR 508 radio, and was the 
only means of communication with the base 
camp. Fortunately the TCS was very satis- 
factory, although beyond a distance of 50 
miles the whip antenna had to be replaced by 
a Marconi type dipole antenna cut to length 
for frequencies of 6430 and 4125 kilocycles, 
and having a horizontal wire of equal length 
as a counterpoise. (All radio antennae in the 
Antarctic must have a counterpoise since 
there is no ground near the surface of the ice 
and snow.) The boathooks of the LVT’s 
were used as masts for the antennae. Com- 
munications were conducted mostly by 
Figure 129. LVT's return after successfully completing 
240-mile trip. 
88 “CW”, as beyond 35 miles voice contacts 
were unreliable. The SCR 508 radios had 
been expected to be very useful in inter- 
vehicular communications, but actually 
proved to be useless due to the high noise 
level, and also the fact that several weak 
tubes showed up after departure from the 
camp. It was also noted that the micro- 
phones had a tendency to freeze due to 
breath moisture. It was difficult to use the 
ear phones as the particular type headgear 
issued was not fitted for them, and it was too 
cold to do without headgear. For inter- 
vehicular communications, standard arm 
and hand signals were finally reverted to and 
were found satisfactory. 
The vehicles traveled in echelon the entire 
trip (fig. 129) to avoid breaking through the 
natural snow bridges of crevasses, which 
may have been weakened by the first vehicle 
crossing them. 
The party departed on 12 February on the 
first leg of the journey to the Rockefeller 
Mountains, in King Edward the VII land, 
approximately 123 land miles to the east. 
The temperature was +20° F., and the snow 
surface smooth but fairly soft. The tracks 
of the vehicles cut in to a depth of about 
10 inches. 
The first day 22 miles were logged, 
with frequent stops to check the course 
due to the lack of sun and zero visibility. A 
so-called “white” condition prevails under 
overcast conditions in the Poiar regions due 
to the lack of a horizon to contrast one’s sur- 
roundings. The effect is similar to being 
suspended in a bowl of milk. This makes 
travel hazardous, and bearings extremely 
difficult to maintain, particularly in the 
absence of any landmarks such as mountains. 
Under such conditions, a yawning crevasse 
may be driven into without any foreknowl- 
edge of its presence. It was also possible to 
drive headlong into huge snowdrifts or 
“sastrugi.” 
It was on the first day’s travel that the 
LVT4 showed evidence of using an excessive 
amount of oil (7 gals. SAE 20 in 22 miles). 
However, the oil was not being burned, but 
“thrown” out through various joints and 
connections, such as the rocker box covers, 
and the push-rod housings. The oil pressure 
and temperature readings remained normal, 
so the condition did not cause any great 
alarm, but was a particular nuisance under 
the prevailing conditions. 
The visibility was still very poor on the 
second day, and the temperature +8° F. 
The surface was quite soft, and the LVT3 
became bogged down. (This was never 
definitely ascertained but it is believed that 
this was a “bridged over” crevasse.) It had 
to be towed out. In general it was rather 
heavy going. On this day’s run the party 
reached a position 66 statute miles east of the 
base. By this time it was estimated that the 
distance the LVT4 could travel would de- 
pend upon the available oil supply. 
The third day out the average temperature 
had dropped to —10° F. The surface snow 
was soft and fluffy, and about 10 inches deep. 
However the decreased temperature had 
hardened the undersurface, and travel was 
much easier. 
Visibility improved, and several good 
sights were taken with the astrocompass to 
check the course of travel. The engine of 
the LVT4 was using about 1 gallon of oil for 
each 2% miles made good. Attempts were 
made to improve this condition with the 
limited quantities of SAE 30 and SAE 50 oil 
on hand. These attempts were not highly 
successful. 
At 1300 on this day (15th of Feb.), the 
western end of the Rockefeller Mountains was 
reached. A distance of 108.6 statute miles 
was registered on the sledgemeters. A large 
crevasse was hit at this point by the LVT4, 
which was in the lead. It crossed safely due 
to its long tracks. The snow bridge over the 
765274—48 ' 
89 crevasse was crushed down, but did not 
break all the way through, so that the 
sleds were also towed safely across. The 
width of this crack was about 10 feet from 
wall to wall. A shorter vehicle would have 
undoubtedly crushed through this crevasse, 
even though it may have been lighter in 
weight. 
The fifth actual day away from the base 
being Sunday (16 Feb.), no travel was made. 
However, the day was spent giving the 
engine of the LVT4 a thorough inspection 
and tightening up. Particular attention was 
paid to the push rod housing, bushing nuts, 
and check nuts. These were found to be 
very loose, and upon tightening them, the 
packing was found to have deteriorated to 
the point where it was practically useless. 
All hands had a badly needed wash and 
shave. Visibility being extremely good, 
bearings were taken on several known moun- 
tain peaks, using the astrocompass, and the 
position was definitely determined. 
A complete reorganization of gear was 
made both on the sleds and in the tractor 
cargo spaces (living quarters). Captain 
Boyd and Major Crozier built entire new 
bunking facilities in the LVT4. Using avail- 
able lumber and the standard government 
cots, double bunks were constructed along 
the bulkheads of the rear of the cargo space 
for four men. This gave an added amount 
of space just aft of the engine and produced 
a much more comfortable atmosphere, in 
spite of the film of oil smoke which adhered 
to the clothing and bedding. With the 
exception of Mr. Morencey, no one could 
stand upright in this improvised living com- 
partment because of the low overhead. 
At this point of the trip a dispatch was 
received directing the party to return to the 
base camp, and informing them that the 
flight plans had been changed. Instructions 
were requested concerning the laying of an 
emergency cache at the base of Mt. Helen 
Washington, a few miles farther on, and an 
affirmative was received. During the night 
the temperature dropped to —25° F. 
The party departed at 2240 of the 17th 
for Mt. Helen Washington and arrived there 
at 0100 of the 18th without incident. The 
LVT4 was still using an excessive amount 
of oil. The distance traveled to this point 
was 123.6 statute miles. The cache of 
aviation gasoline, food, and emergency 
equipment was established. This cache was 
marked by a large red flag secured to the 
upright end of a piece of 4- by 8-inch 
lumber approximately 20 feet in length. 
After the cache was laid, the entire party 
boarded the LVT3 for a trip to the top of 
Mt. Helen Washington, which rises to an 
altitude of over 1,800 feet. The purpose of 
this trip was to collect geological samples, 
and to test the reaction of the vehicle on 
the hard ice of the glacier. The ascent was 
made in second and third gear with the 
transfer case in low range at an average 
speed of about 7 miles per hour. No diffi- 
culties were encountered in the ascent of 
the glacier. Near the very crest of the slope 
where the glacier ice joined the “fast ice” 
of the mountain, there existed a large 
crevasse covered by its natural bridge. 
The vehicle crossed this unseen crevasse, 
due to the length of the tracks, with 
only a good bump. It was not until the 
driver went back to investigate what caused 
the bump that the crevasse was discovered 
for its true size, being approximately 10 feet 
across and of unknown depth. 
A side trip was made across the face of the 
glacier to Mount Franklin, about 1 mile west 
of Helen Washington, to visit the site of a 
seismographic station established in 1940 by 
the U. S. Antarctic Service. 
At 0440 (18 Feb.) the party departed from 
the base of Mt. Helen Washington for the 
return trip to the Bay of Whales, and at 0900 
arrived at the 88-mile depot of fuel and food 
90 which had been laid on the way out. Upon 
arrival at this point all hands turned in. At 
2245 (18 Feb.) the party departed for the 
final run to the base camp at the Bay of 
Whales. This run of 88 miles was accom- 
plished in 17 hours, stopping only to pick up 
fuel which had been cached on the outward 
trip. It will be noted that much better time 
was made on the return trip. This was due 
in part to the fact that the party was retracing 
the original route under conditions of good 
visibility, and no stops had to be made for 
checking the course. 
The round trip totaled 245 statute miles. 
The LVT3 consumed 430 gallons of 72- 
octane gasoline and 2 quarts of oil; the 
LVT4, 480 gallons of 100-octane gasoline 
and 80 gallons of oil. The suspension sys- 
tems were both serviced after 45 hours of 
operation. The engine and power train on 
the LVT3 was checked and serviced every 
day and on long runs sometimes 2 to 3 times 
per day in order to avoid any major trouble. 
However, the right angle drives, control dif- 
ferential, and final drives used no oil during 
the entire trip. The LVT4, because of the 
leakage of oil in the engine, required con- 
stant attention and frequent additions of oil. 
On 23 February a trip from the base camp 
to the point on the bay ice where the U. S. S. 
Burton Island was moored, was attempted. 
Carrying 12 people the LVT3 successfully 
crossed the then enlarged crevasses in the 
“Barrier Ramp,” but in attempting to cross 
a tidal crack in the bay ice the vehicle 
crushed through the rotten edges and wedged 
itself into the crack (fig. 130). Had this 
vehicle not been of the amphibious type, it is 
quite certain it would have gone through the 
crack and sunk with all hands. While 
floating in the water it was impossible for the 
tractor to gain sufficient traction on the ice 
to pull itself out without some outside help. 
Using a D-6 bulldozer as a “deadman,” two 
50-foot lengths of 1-inch cable were attached 
Figure 130. The LVT3 crushes through rotten edges 
of tidal crack in bay ice. 
Figure 131. Practically clear now and going strong. 
Figure 132. LVT3 now safe on bay ice 10 to 15 feet 
thick. Note broken ice where vehicle was floating. 
Pressure ice in right foregound locates trace of 
crevasse (tide-crack). 
91 (fig. 131) one to each LVT track, and run out 
to the “headman.” With this source of 
traction and using reverse power, the LVT 
was slowly backed out under its own power 
(see fig. 132), the tracks acting as winches. 
This method is recommended only when the 
obstruction to be surmounted is not of 
sufficient height to cause the vehicle to tip 
beyond the point of balance. 
Various methods have been improvised to 
increase traction of these particular vehicles 
in difficult circumstances depending, of 
course, on the conditions involved. 
The two LVT’s were secured for storage 
on 23 February 1947 at the emergency base 
erected at the site of Little America III 
referred to as West Base Camp of the U. S. 
Antarctic Service Expedition of 1939-41. 
PART II 
Recommendations and Conclusions for the Improve- 
ment of Landing Vehicles, Tracked (LETT) 
for Polar Use 
1. Introduction. 
It is pointed out that this report on the 
performance of the LVT’s is based on work 
which was executed at the beginning of the 
most advantageous season of the year in the 
Bay of Whales area. From the last of Jan- 
uary to the first of November, the tempera- 
ture is sufficiently low to harden the surface 
and the subsurface of the wind-packed neve 
snow, which facilitates the operation of 
tracked vehicles. In general however, ve- 
hicles may be required to operate over a 
wide variety of surface conditions in the 
Antarctic. The surface may vary from ex- 
tremely hard ice to neve snow, which is 
quite comparable in consistency to coarse 
beet sugar. Under certain conditions it will 
not take any compaction, and compaction 
is generally attained only after long arduous 
efforts have been expended over a given 
area. Under normal conditions the neve 
snow found in the Polar regions is capable 
of supporting a load of only a few pounds 
per unit of area. The surface may be very 
smooth, or it may at times be broken up by 
hard ridges of wind packed snow called 
“sastrugi.” These ridges vary in height 
from a few inches to several feet. They 
generally run parallel, and indicate the direc- 
tion of the prevailing wind. The height and 
spacing of sastrugi may vary with existing 
wind conditions from hour to hour, or day 
to day depending on existing meteorological 
factors. 
2. Lubrication and Fuel. 
a. The LVT3 was winterized and main- 
tained with the following lubricants during 
the entire operation; SAE 10 oil in the en- 
gines, transmissions, oil breathers, air clean- 
ers, and power take-off. SAE 50 oil in the 
right angle drives, control differential, and 
internal final drives. The fuel used was 72- 
or 80-octane, depending on availability. No 
difference could be noted in performance 
between the two ratings. 
b. The LVT4 was winterized with SAE 10 
oil in the engine and air cleaners. The 
transmission, differential, and internal final 
drives were filled with SAE 50 oil. The fuel 
used in the engine of this vehicle was 100- 
octane aviation gasoline. 
c. The totals of fuel and lubricants versus 
hours of operation for the LVT’s 3 and 4 are 
as follows: 
LVT4 
LVT3 
Engine hours 
149 hrs. 30 
1 31 hrs. 
mins. 
Vehicle hours 
1 09 hrs. 50 
95 hrs. 
mins. 
Fuel 
1,400 gals. 
880 gals. 
Lubricating oil 
1 46 gals.. . 
2 qts. 
Grease 
10 lbs 
5 lbs. 
Average fuel consumed 
9.37 gal . . 
6.72 gals. 
per hour. 
Average oil consumed per 
.97 gal . . . 
.0153 qt. 
hour. 
92 d. No trouble was encountered with the 
grease seals on either tractor, and from that 
standpoint both vehicles were entirely satis- 
factory. However, it is recommended that 
low temperature nonchanneling types of 
grease be investigated for future cold weather 
operations. 
3. Rubber Components, Reliability and 
Weaknesses. 
Very few difficulties were encountered 
with either the LVT3 or the LVT4 insofar 
as the rubber components were concerned. 
Elasticity was well retained in the various 
rubber components of the suspension system. 
In the LVT4, however, due to the fact that 
the oil used was light weight, the neoprene 
seals of the “rocker boxes” and push rod 
housings failed and subsequently allowed 
a great deal of oil to escape from those 
particular places. In the LVT3, the only 
noticable change to rubber was the water- 
tight covering over the starter switches on 
the control panel, which became so stiff at 
times, they required some type of blunt 
instrument to depress them. 
4. Power Train. 
a. Starting and Operation of Engines. (1) As 
has been previously stated the temperatures 
encountered on this operation were not the 
extremes that might be expected at other 
times, and as a consequence little or no 
difficulties were experienced, especially with 
the LVT3. The LVT4 was being operated 
with a lighter weight oil than is customary 
or recommended and consequently gave no 
particular trouble in starting. 
(2) It is believed that should the LVT 
type vehicle be employed for extended 
periods in frigid zones, some type of engine 
preheater would be very necessary. 
(3) The Herman Nelson type of preheater 
is highly recommended, principally for the 
LVT3, since due to the construction of the 
vehicle the entire power train could be 
quickly and efficiently heated, thereby re- 
ducing the possibility of breakdowns in the 
field which would undoubtedly be encoun- 
tered should the forward portion of the 
power train be operated on standard weight 
oils without sufficient “warming up.” 
(4) Operator fatigue from constant gear- 
shifting in the LVT4 was experienced, in 
traversing rough, wind-blown surfaces or 
“sastrugi.” 
(5) The particular engine of the LVT4 
did not perform satisfactorily in relation to 
oil consumption; however, this was possibly 
due to the fact that it was a reconditioned 
engine, and had obviously been in storage 
a long period of time. Aside from the en- 
gine of the LVT4 no repairs were found 
necessary. 
(6) The LVT3 performed extremely well 
throughout the expedition with only minor 
adjustments to the engines, and no repairs to 
the remainder of the power train. The car- 
buretor “butterfly” valve on the port engine 
froze on one occasion, but required only a 
short time for freeing, and caused no damage 
or trouble. The tachometer flexible drive 
shaft parted, and although repaired (brazed), 
it parted again when the vehicles were out of 
range of any facilities. This, of course, pre- 
vented keeping the engines synchronized as 
well, perhaps, as they should have been, but 
caused no inconvenience or breakdowns. 
b. Electrical and Ignition Systems. (1) No 
difficulties were experienced with the 
ignition systems of either type of engine, with 
the exception of one magneto on the Con- 
tinental engine of the LVT4. It gave no 
serious trouble and still functioned in spite 
of being weak. 
(2) Storage batteries functioned as any 
storage battery will under cold weather con- 
ditions. A fully charged battery will not 
freeze at sub-zero temperatures, but an 
uncharged one will freeze at about -j-5° F. 
93 The efficiency of storage batteries drops very 
rapidly at sub-zero temperatures, and at a 
solution temperature of — 30° F. the battery 
becomes practically useless. At a solution 
temperature of +35° F. the battery will not 
accept a charge efficiently. Because of these 
factors, the batteries of the LVT3 required 
frequent chargings. The drain on them on 
the starboard side was very heavy due to the 
command radio equipment installed in the 
vehicle. It is recommended that in opera- 
tions of this kind, when additional radios or 
electrical equipment are installed, the instal- 
lation also of an auxiliary gasoline driven 
charger be made. 
c. Engine Cooling and Personnel Comfort. (1) 
The air cooling system of the LVT3 is not 
suitable for Antarctic or Arctic use as it now 
stands, principally because of the personnel 
factor. In damp climates this could prove to 
be not only uncomfortable, but highly injuri- 
ous to the operating personnel. As it is now 
equipped, the source of air for the cooling of 
the entire power train is in the direct vicinity 
of the driver of the vehicle. This, combined 
with the comparative inactivity of the driver 
during long hauls, will definitely decrease 
efficiency of personnel, and in time even 
incapacitate them, 
(2) It is recommended that the area in the 
vicinity of the driving compartment be sealed 
from air blast under the driver, and some type 
of outside adjustable air ducts for a source of 
air be incorporated in the LVT3 for this 
particular type of work. Other minor instal- 
lations would be necessitated in conjunction 
with this, such as defrosters on the vision 
ports, etc., but it is believed they would be 
relatively minor in scope. 
(3) The above change would facilitate the 
closing in of the vehicle in order to make it a 
livable machine, in the event it might be 
used for living quarters, hospital evacuation 
vehicle, and other uses of a like nature. 
5. Track and Suspension Systems. 
a. Mechanically the track and suspension 
systems of both vehicles functioned very well 
except that a wider track will be necessary 
in order to transport a load approaching 
maximum. For soft snow as well as the thick 
bottomless mud encountered in the northern 
regions, the surface bearing pressure must 
be reduced in order to operate the machine 
with dependability. Two to four pounds per 
square inch of bearing pressure with the 
vehicle loaded to capacity, would be the 
ideal for all types of snow operation in the 
Antarctic regions with the LVT’s. 
b. Due to the conditions encountered in the 
area, one of the most difficult problems rela- 
tive to the track and suspension system was 
the packing in and building up of snow and 
ice under the tracks along the top surface 
of the pontoons. This caused immobility 
of the support rollers to the extent that the 
forward support rollers on both sides of the 
LVT3 froze, and were worn flat within about 
1 hour. The necessity to clear the suspension 
system completely at every available oppor- 
tunity was not overlooked, but the above 
incident occurred during an interval between 
stops. There was also a noted amount of 
congestion around the return idler wheel, 
which caused an excessive but not a hazard- 
ous amount of wear to the rubber tires. 
c. The grousers on both types of tracks 
(LVT3 and LVT4) were constantly being 
packed with snow which would turn into 
hard ice due to the friction of the track and 
to the constant digging motion of the track 
into the surface. It was necessary to chip 
this ice out of the grousers frequently to 
prevent loss of traction. 
6. Hull and Components. 
a. The hull, basically, is the closest ap- 
proach to the type of vehicle needed for this 
use to be found in any of the present day 
military vehicles, but for a strictly cargo 
94 carrying vehicle it still needs to be lightened 
as much as possible. This can be done 
to some extent by the removal of all scab 
armor, but to obtain maximum efficiency a 
further reduction in vehicular weight would 
be highly desirable. It is recommended that 
the possible incorporation of some type of 
aluminum alloy be investigated to further 
reduce the weight of the LVT. 
b. In cold climates and under adverse 
conditions, an electrically operated ramp 
winch is highly desirable. This will not only 
save labor, but reduce the time needed for the 
raising of the ramp to a remarkable degree. 
c. If engine preheaters are installed in the 
LVT’s, it would be necessary to insulate the 
engine compartments, in order to maintain 
efficiency. 
d. Drain plugs for the crankcase and trans- 
missions should be made more accessible. 
A man wearing heavy cold weather garments 
finds it very difficult to gain access to these 
points, as well as the engine itself. In view 
of this it is recommended that some means 
be provided whereby the engines would be 
made more accessible. Inspection plates on 
the outboard sides of the engines, or a type of 
sliding tray unit for the engines would serve 
this purpose. 
e. In line with modifications on the present 
LVT3 for Arctic or Antarctic use, it is recom- 
Figure 134. Keeping track and rollers Free of ice and 
snow is important in the Antarctic. 
mended that the possibility of a pre-set 
friction type clutch arrangement on the 
power bilge-pumps be investigated. Al- 
though no trouble was encountered, it was 
only because great caution was exercised to 
prevent it. If the vehicle has been operating 
in water, and then allowed to stand idle only 
for a short time, it is very possible that water 
could freeze in the bilge pump and render it 
useless if the engines are started. 
7. Navigational Gear. 
a. Because of the difficulty to be experi- 
enced with the magnetic type compass in 
the higher latitudes, it is recommended that 
the installation of a gyrocompass of a non- 
precessing type be investigated. 
b. It is also recommended that considera- 
tion be given to the installation of some type 
of odometer to be used as an aid in naviga- 
tion over unmarked and unknown land or 
ice, for extended journeys. 
Figure 133. LVT running a surface penetration test 
95 8. Tools and Equipment. 
The tools with which the LVT’s are ordi- 
narily equipped are usually quite adequate, 
but when a small detail is sent out as an 
independent unit, some additional fifth eche- 
lon tools would be highly desirable. Also, 
for this type of use the pioneer tools should 
be added to. 
9. Conclusions. 
a. This report and the recommendations 
are not to be construed as condemning the 
Landing Vehicle, Tracked. It already has 
proven itself in the various fields for which 
it was primarily designed. Now it shows 
tremendous possibilities in another environ- 
ment. 
b. In its present form the LVT is not the 
ideal vehicle for Polar use. It is far too 
heavy per unit of area on its tracks. Further- 
more, there is very little personal comfort 
insofar as the operator is concerned. Reliable 
engine starting, due to the lack of engine 
preheating devices, would also cause con- 
siderable concern at low temperatures. In 
spite of these and many other faults, the 
vehicle is basically the best military vehicle 
available for carrying cargo, and to act as a 
prime mover for extended operations over 
a polar surface a great distance from a base. 
c. From a military standpoint, there are 
requirements for two distinct types of these 
amphibious vehicles for polar use: 
(1) One type to be used for cargo handling. 
(2) A combat type, armored and carrying 
weapons, or troops. 
From these might be evolved vehicles de- 
signated as mobile machine and repair 
shops, hospital units, administrative units, 
and many others requiring great mobility. 
d. Based on experience, the full track 
laying, front wheel drive type of vehicle is 
superior in snow covered areas. From this 
may be drawn the conclusion that if the 
vehicle is suitable for snow conditions, it 
also would be suitable for swamps and/or 
hard surfaced roads. 
e. The recommendations in summary in 
view of these tests are as follows: 
(1) Increase the width of the tracks. 
(2) Modify the engine cooling air intake 
method. 
(3) Manufacture a removable cowling or 
roof. 
(4) Install a nonprecessing gyro type 
compass. 
(5) Modify the suspension system for the 
clearance of ice. 
(6) Install a friction clutch on the bilge 
pump. 
(7) Install inspection plates on outboard 
sides of pontoons. 
(8) Install engine preheaters. 
The above recommendations are concerning 
the LVT3. It is further recommended that 
with the present type power train, the LVT4 
should not be used to any extent in the 
regions of higher latitude. 
SECTION VI. Observations 
1. Maintenance. 
a. Organization. The motor vehicle main- 
tenance establishment at Little America con- 
sisted of 1 warrant officer, 1 chief petty officer, 
and 10 mechanics. Maintenance was car- 
ried out during the cargo unloading phase on 
a 24-hour-a-day basis in two 12-hour shifts. 
The warrant officer and 5 mechanics com- 
prised one shift and the chief petty officer 
and the remaining 5 mechanics comprised 
the other shift. 
96 Figure 135. Maintenance work on carburetor being 
performed in open. 
Figure 136. Jeep engine after blizzard 
b. Equipment. 
1 Battery charger, powered with a small gas- 
oline engine. 
1 Greasing unit (Lincoln) mounted on a 
%-ton trailer, trailer mounted on skis. 
1 Welding unit (Hobart) 300-amp.; powered 
by a Chrysler gasoline motor, unit 
mounted on skis. 
A normal complement of hand tools. 
No grease racks or pits were constructed. 
c. Housing. (1) From 19 January 1947 
until 6 February 1947 the motor pool and 
maintenance shop was located at the base 
of the barrier near the lower terminal of the 
cable towing device. When the cargo ships 
left the Bay of Whales the motor park and 
maintenance shop were moved to the base 
camp on top of the barrier. 
(2) At the first location the only shelter 
was one pyramidal tent with an oil heater 
and a wooden floor. This tent served as a 
combination maintenance shop, dispatcher’s 
office, and headquarters of the transportation 
officer. All maintenance work on vehicles 
was performed in the open (figs. 135, 136, 
and 137). As the weather was relatively 
mild during this period no hardship on per- 
Figure 137. Maintenance on track 
extensions performed in open. 
sonnel occurred. The temperature never 
went below zero degrees Fahrenheit during 
this period. Much of the time delicate work 
could be performed barehanded for short 
periods of time without danger of freezing 
the hands. 
(3) At the second location in the base 
camp the housing consisted of one pyramidal 
tent with an oil heater and wooden floor, 
and one wooden shack, approximately 20 
765274—48 8 
97 feet by 10 feet, with a wooden floor and a 
canvas roof. The tent was used as head- 
quarters of the transportation officer and as 
a dispatcher’s office. The shack was heated 
by an oil burner and served as a tool shed 
and as shelter for vehicles requiring main- 
tenance. During this phase the weather 
began to turn colder. The lowest recorded 
temperature was —23° Fahrenheit. Hence, 
the very definite need for a sheltered area in 
which to perform motor maintenance, A 
large shelter, closed and heated, and capable 
of housing the largest type vehicle in use is 
desirable for maintenance activities. 
(4) At no time was any provision made for 
housing parked vehicles, even to the extent 
of covering them with tarpaulins. It would 
seem desirable to provide housing for vehicles 
if time, material, and labor are available for 
construction, which was not the case on this 
operation. However, the tractors, Weasels, 
and LVT’s did not suffer any apparent ill 
effects from being in the open and con- 
stantly exposed to the elements; whether this 
would hold true during the winter season is 
questionable. 
d. Spare Parts. Spare parts were limited 
to those of first and second echelon nature. 
No major replacement units were provided. 
Lack of replacement for major units per- 
manently deadlined only two vehicles: A 
Weasel and a Cle-track, both with broken 
tracks. It is recommended that a number 
of replacement units of third echelon nature 
be included in the supplies of any Antarctic 
operation. 
e. Conclusions. The personnel and equip- 
ment seemed adequate to maintain properly 
the vehicles used in the operation. The 
lack of replacement units did not seriously 
impair efficient maintenance as it turned out. 
The chief maintenance problem was in 
keeping the track extensions of the tractors 
properly secured to the tracks. Otherwise 
maintenance was for the most part limited 
Figure 138. Unmarked cache. 
to minor first and second echelon adjustments 
and repair. 
2. Storage of Fuels, Oils, and Lubricants. 
a. Containers. Included in the ships’ cargo 
and hauled to the top of the barrier for stor- 
age were hundreds of drums of fuels, oils, and 
lubricants. These included gasoline for mo- 
tor vehicles and airplanes, Diesel oil for the 
tractors and stoves, and other miscellaneous 
petroleum products. These drums were all 
properly marked according to their content, 
the markings also signifying the location of 
the cache in which they were to be stored. 
This type of marking is essential for Antarctic 
operations, because eventually all cached 
supplies are covered with snow, often to a 
depth of several feet. 
b. Caches. A recommended method for 
caching petroleum products is to line the 
barrels up on end in a double row with a 
98 12-foot pole stuck into the snow at each end 
of the row. The top of each pole will be so 
marked as to identify the one particular type 
of supplies cached, “72-octane gasoline” for 
example. Then if the cache becomes covered 
the poles will stick up out of the snow with 
the proper identification. Thus a detail 
looking for 72-octane gasoline can readily 
locate same by digging down at one end of 
the row. After taking out the required num- 
ber of drums the detail should then move the 
marking pole over to the new end of the row 
and the cache will still be properly marked 
and located for the next detail. Some of the 
petroleum caches on this operation were not 
stored and marked in this fashion (fig. 138). 
3. Tarpaulins. 
a. The trail party which made the trip to 
the Rockefeller Mountains made some inter- 
esting observations on the use of tarpaulins 
to protect the cargo of towed sleds. Initially 
heavy tarpaulins were spread over the cargo 
and lashed securely down as protection from 
snow. It was soon discovered that some 
snow would find its way under the tarpaulins 
on the trail in spite of every method of lash- 
ing. The rays of the sun reflecting from the 
tarpaulin would frequently melt the snow 
which collected on the tarpaulin, eventually 
resulting in ice. This freezing made the 
tarpaulins extremely difficult to handle. It 
frequently required two men from a half hour 
to an hour to roll back the tarpaulin in order 
to get at the cargo, or to readjust the tar- 
paulin over the load. The trail party made 
frequent stops to cache supplies. The difficul- 
ty encountered in handling the heavy, frozen 
tarpaulins soon discouraged their use and 
the tarpaulins were folded up and carried as 
cargo. 
b. It is recommended that some light, 
strong, water-resistant canvas be used in lieu 
of heavy tarpaulins for protecting loaded 
sleds, especially if the load must be gotten at 
frequently. The feasibility of installing brack- 
ets and bows on sleds to support a cover 
similar to that of a cargo truck should be 
investigated. 
4. Dogs and Dog Sleds. 
No report on transportation in the Ant- 
arctic would be complete without some men- 
tion of dogs and dog sleds. Twenty-seven 
dogs and four dog sleds were placed ashore 
at the Bay of Whales. The dogs did not play 
an important part in the operation, although 
they might have proven invaluable for rescue 
work had circumstances so required. Actual 
use of the dogs on Operation “Highjump” 
was generally limited to lending atmosphere 
and hauling seal meat for use as dog food. 
SECTION VII. Recommendations 
1. General. 
a. The question arises as to whether stand- 
ard construction or military vehicles should 
be used, with modification in some cases, or 
whether specialized vehicles should be de- 
signed for transportation in the Antarctic or 
in areas where similar conditions are en- 
countered. All vehicles used on Operation 
“Highjump” were standard construction or 
military vehicles. Of these, only the Weasel 
and LVT’s were able to operate satisfactorily 
under all conditions without modification. 
Observations indicate that some standard 
construction or military vehicles can be 
modified so as to operate efficiently in the 
Antarctic without drastic changes in design. 
99 b. It is recommended that the following 
general requirements be considered in the 
design of any vehicle for use in the Ant- 
arctic: 
(1) Heavy duty prime movers capable of 
moving heavy loads of cargo on sleds for 
long distances. These vehicles should pro- 
vide living accommodations for the normal 
operating crew. 
(2) Heavy duty prime movers for short, 
local hauls. 
(3) Light duty, fast vehicles for moving 
small quantities of material and personnel 
and for liaison and reconnaissance service. 
This type of vehicle is required in several 
sizes, roughly to fulfill the duties performed 
by the %-ton truck, the command and recon- 
naissance car, and the scout car in normal 
ground operations. 
(4) Ability to operate on snow and ice is 
the prime consideration for vehicles in the 
Antarctic. A few isolated mountain peaks 
project through the icecap; otherwise the 
entire interior is covered with ice or snow 
except for limited areas on the Palmer 
Peninsula which are relatively free of snow 
during the summer season. 
c. It is recommended that the following 
technical requirements be considered in the 
design of vehicles intended for use in the 
Antarctic: 
(1) Tracklaying vehicles are the only type 
of mechanized vehicle suitable for use in 
the Antarctic. 
(2) The maximum length of track bearing 
surface consistent with the size and weight 
of the vehicle is required for smooth opera- 
tion over uneven surfaces and to enable the 
vehicle to cross crevasses. 
(3) The drive sprockets should be in front 
to provide the most efficient operations. 
(4) Width of the tracks should be such that 
the ground pressure per square inch is less 
than 3 pounds. 
2. Wheeled Vehicles. 
No wheeled vehicles should be considered 
for transportation purposes in the Antarctic. 
3. Cargo Carrier, M29C (Weasel). 
a. A longer track is required for smoother 
operation over uneven terrain and to facili- 
tate crossing crevasses. 
b. The feasibility of front wheel drive 
should be investigated. 
c. The feasibility of individual track blocks 
with connectors should be investigated. 
d. If the vehicle is not to be used amphibi- 
ously, doors should be cut into the hull for 
easy access and an enclosed body provided 
for passenger comfort. 
e. The feasibility of replacing the present 
type spring with volute springs should be 
investigated. 
/. The space between the right steering 
brake lever and the engine cover should be 
widened to permit easy access to the foot 
throttle when wearing heavy boots or shoes. 
4. Tractors. 
a. The length of the tracks should be in- 
creased to facilitate travel on rough or 
crevassed areas, 
b. The width of the tracks should be in- 
creased to decrease the ground pressure per 
square inch to 3 pounds or less. If increasing 
the width of tracks is accomplished by track 
extensions, the feasibility of a flexible metal 
extension should be investigated. 
c. The support rollers should be replaced 
by a plate or wooden block to prevent snow 
and ice building up in the track mechanism. 
d. Ice type grousers should be used on all 
tractors in the Antarctic. 
e. Cabs should be provided to protect the 
operator. 
f. Each tractor should be equipped with a 
winch. 
g. In some instances an independent nig- 
gerhead would be desirable. 
100 h. The feasibility of front wheel drive 
should be investigated. All tractors on Op- 
eration “Highjump” performed more effi- 
ciently in reverse. 
i. The present power plant appears to be 
satisfactory. 
5. Sleds. 
a. The Go-devil sled should be higher off 
the ground to allow more clearance when 
operating in soft snow. 
b. The Go-devil sled could be considerably 
lightened for an operation like “Highjump”. 
c. The loading platform of the 1-ton Army 
sled should be improved. The present slats 
should be sturdier or else replaced by a 
solid deck. 
6. Landing Vehicle, Tracked. 
a. All surplus weight should be removed. 
Armor plate, for example, is unnecessary 
(military operations excepted). If not to 
be used amphibiously the hull could be 
lightened. 
h. The perforations now let into the 
front of the driver’s compartment to cool 
the differential should be eliminated and an 
Figure 139. Jeep almost snowed under by a blizzard. 
air scoop installed with a duct leading direct 
to the differential. The present system 
makes the driver’s compartment uncom- 
fortably cold. 
c. A windshield should be installed in the 
vision hatch of the driver’s compartment 
and the windshield equipped with a defroster. 
d. The tracks should be widened to de- 
crease the ground pressure per square inch. 
A 24-inch track should be satisfactory. 
SECTION VIII. Comments by U. S. M. C. Observer 
Captain Vernon D. Boyd, U. S. M. C., 
who was in charge of transportation opera- 
tions ashore and is a veteran of two previous 
Antarctic expeditions, made the following 
comments on transportation, vehicles, etc.: 
1. Types Required. 
From the standpoint of transportation the 
job must be divided into two general types 
or classes. We must be constantly aware of 
the fact that we must have transportation 
which can be used in small areas, plus trans- 
portation to be used for handling heavy 
cargo over long distances. By small areas is 
meant that transportation be available that 
cgn be used to handle cargo and possibly 
personnel in rather limited space—for in- 
stance, alongside a ship tied up at a dock or 
in the case of the Arctic regions, possibly a 
ship unloading direct onto ice. After an 
operation of this type is accomplished and 
the materiel has been unloaded by smaller 
types of transportation, to get it into the 
interior we must have a larger machine 
101 which must be used for more than one pur- 
pose. In the first class of machines, that 
which would be used over small distances, 
we would probably use tractors of the 
present commercial type and design similar 
to the D-6 class of caterpillar. I would not, 
however, recommend anything larger than 
the D-6, as that appears to be about the 
largest that can be used on the snow surface. 
Also, it must have certain track modifications 
to be used on any type of snow surface. 
Secondly, the machine which is most adapt- 
able for long-distance cargo and personnel 
handling will be a tracked vehicle of the type 
which the Marines used in the Pacific called 
the Landing Vehicle, Tracked, or LVT, 
This is strictly a cargo vehicle and has a hold 
which makes it a small boat. Therefore, it 
can be used as an amphibious vehicle, and 
it can land from shipside with cargo or with 
personnel and make landings on beach- 
heads, etc., and go on into the interior. 
For snow operations, however, as with all 
the other vehicles which we presently have, 
it must have some modifications to make it 
more adaptable. 
2. Vehicle Track Modifications. 
In regard to modifications, the width of 
the track seems to be the greatest problem. 
We have quite a number of vehicles that 
might be suitable, while not necessarily ideal, 
but due to the narrowness of the track they 
present a very great problem. This has been 
partially overcome by application of various 
modifications to make them wider. During 
the war we used extended end connectors 
on our tanks and vehicles of that type to give 
them a greater area of spread on the ground 
to hold the weight. These will work, but 
they are merely expedients. Tracks to be 
used in polar areas must be wider. We have 
tried to modify the tracks of commercial 
vehicles by the application of planks bolted 
through on the grousers and on the ground 
plates to make them wider. It works but 
it is not satisfactory. We must go into 
machines of wider tracks. 
3. Front Versus Rear Drive. 
Another thing that is very common, par- 
ticularly in the commercial type tractors, is 
the fact that they all have rear wheel drives. 
There are many arguments pro and con about 
this, but through years of operation on snow 
surfaces, and in my own experience, it was 
found that the rear wheel drives were the 
more impractical type, due to the fact that 
the machines build up a torque component 
on the rear axle which forces the rear of the 
tread down into the soft snow and the front 
of the machine up into the air. The rear end 
consequently digs itself down in. We have 
made some experiments in building plat- 
forms on the front end of the machine and 
loading them down with a couple of tons of 
coal to hold the front end down, but we still 
had the same results. We tried passing 
cables underneath the tractors and taking 
the drawbar pull from the front of the 
machine, thinking we could hold the front 
end down that way. That was not success- 
ful. It appears, on the surface at least, that 
the front wheel drive is really the only answer 
to vehicles for soft snow surface transporta- 
tion. 
4. Track Loading. 
In the matter of track width the practical 
load limits in pounds per square inch run 
from a minimum of about 2 pounds per 
square inch to an absolute maximum of 5 
pounds per square inch. When 5 pounds 
per square inch are exceeded then difficulty 
may be expected, as the machines seem to 
bury themselves, especially if they have the 
rear wheel drive. The higher limits can be 
used to better advantage with the front 
wheel drive. Now the matter of the lower 
limit. If too low a limit is established, in 
102 other words from 2 pounds on down, then 
the gripping factor of the track becomes less 
and less, and a point is reached where 
hauling or using a machine as a prime mover 
becomes impossible. 
5. Cargo Handling Machinery. 
There has been found a need from time to 
time for methods of handling cargo in the 
snow other than by manpower, and it has 
been discovered that the fingerlift is a very 
handy item provided it is not too big and 
heavy. In other words, we go right back to 
having a big heavy machine which might 
get stuck versus a lighter one. The tracks 
will have to be made sufficiently wide on a 
machine of this type so that when the load is 
put on the front end it will not bury itself. 
A small beam type crane is another item that 
can be used to great advantage, but it, too, 
must not be made too large in order to 
handle it easily on a snow surface. There 
are limits on all of these things due to the 
type of surface on which one operates. 
Another thing which is rather important and 
which was mentioned previously is the size 
of the machines to be used. In general it is 
better practice to use two smaller type 
machines which we know will operate 
rather than one big one about which there 
might be some question as to its operating 
efficiency. In other words, a small machine 
is less liable to get itself buried in and get 
into difficulty when handling heavy loads. 
It requires very little more fuel to haul four 
sleds, let us say, with two lighter tractors 
than three sleds with one big tractor. 
6. Cargo Sleds. 
The 1-ton quartermaster sled is a very nice 
item. It is limited because it is made of 
wooden construction and has to be treated 
with considerable care. It is not what 
might be termed an ideal type of sled for 
ship unloading since in an operation of that 
type, where cargo is being dropped from the 
ship’s side by booms, etc., the wooden type 
sled is liable to get crushed and the mortality 
rate runs high. For shipside unloading a 
very simple type of sled is needed—nothing 
big and heavy. A type of scoop or something 
on the order of a farmer’s stoneboat is nearer 
the ideal; it is low down so that men can 
work around it and lift cargo off and on 
without having to lift everything up 2 or 3 
feet to get it onto the sled. This can be made 
with an upturned steel plate in the front, with 
about half a dozen 3- by 12-inch or 3- by 8- 
inch planks bolted to them, internally braced 
with a cross bolt running through the full 
width, possibly with a couple of skids on the 
bottom to keep it from going sideways. A 
terrific amount of cargo can be handled on a 
sled of that type. There is no point in 
hauling 3/ tons of sled with 5 tons of cargo 
on it, when it could be done by putting 7 
tons of cargo on a sled which weighs 1% tons. 
7. Light, General Purpose Vehicles. 
In the matter of vehicles which are nearer 
the ideal for over-the-snow transportation, 
we come to the cargo-carrier M29C, or 
“Weasel”. This machine is probably the 
nearest approach to an ideal machine for 
over-the-snow travel for general purpose, 
reconnaissance, and errand-running. It takes 
the place of the “Peep”, or “Jeep”, as some 
people call it. However, there are several 
things that are wrong with this machine 
that need to be rectified to make it one that 
could be trusted for a longer journey and one 
which would have a lower mortality rate. 
In the first place, it is a rear wheel drive 
machine. Consequently, as it runs along, a 
torque component is built up which forces 
the front end of the machine up in the air and 
after it reaches its climax it falls and its nose 
drops down and then immediately rises up 
again, so that it has about the same action 
as a bucking bronco. Every time it pitches 
103 like this it throws a terrific strain on the trans- 
mission. The transmission of the machine ap- 
pears not to be too heavily constructed, and it 
is only a short time before teeth of the gears be- 
gin missing and all sorts of things happen to the 
inside of the transmission. They go bad in 
general. Another thing which seems to be 
weak on this vehicle is the tracks, plates, etc. 
They are held together by a steel band and 
rubber band combination which does not 
appear to be too satisfactory a method of 
bonding the individual plates together, par- 
ticularly in colder temperatures, since this 
combination of rubber and steel becomes 
very stiff and fractures are very likely to 
occur. Sometimes it is necessary in starting 
these machines in cold temperatures to rock 
them back and forth for several minutes to 
get the initial bend out of the tracks so that 
they will fall around the idlers and get going. 
8. Fuel. 
The matter of operation of motorized 
equipment for polar transportation is very 
little different from operation in any other 
part of the world. There are a few precau- 
tions which must be taken, however. One 
of the most important is in the matter of fuel. 
All fuel should be filtered very, very carefully 
and if possible run through a chamois skin or 
filter of that type to strain out all the mois- 
ture, particularly any snow which might have 
gotten into the drum while it was open. 
Another extremely important thing in cold 
weather is attempting, as far as possible, to 
keep the fuel tanks full or nearly full at all 
times. Fuel tanks have a tendency to sweat 
when only partially full, and a rind frost 
forms on the inside of the tank. As the 
vehicle progresses the slosh within the tank 
washes this rind down and in a short time it 
gets into the fuel. It is liable to lodge at 
the first elbow or bend in the fuel line, and 
in a short time the fuel line will be stopped up. 
9. Ignition Systems. 
The ignition system on gasoline operated 
vehicles is also very important, particularly 
to make starting easier. A great deal of 
attention should be paid to the clearances of 
spark plugs, ignition points, or distributor 
points, and the ignition system in general. 
Batteries have a tendency to run down very 
quickly. In colder weather the life of a 
battery is in general not quite as long as it is 
under normal operating conditions in tem- 
perate climates. Operation as a whole, how- 
ever, is very little different from anywhere 
else except for the personal discomfort 
involved. 
104 CHAPTER 5 
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS 
SECTION I. R4D (C-47) Operations in the Antarctic 
1. Airplanes Employed. 
The aircraft used by the Central Group 
on this expedition consisted of six C-47 
type aircraft (designated R4D’s by the Navy), 
one Norseman C-64 (Navy designation JA), 
and two L-5G aircraft (designated OY-1 
by the Navy). Helicopters were used by 
the ice breakers for reconnaissance. PBM 
type aircraft were used by the Eastern and 
Western Groups. Helicopters were also used 
by the Eastern and Western Groups. In 
addition to these aircraft the Coast Guard 
had at least two small biplanes (Navy J2F) 
which are standard equipment aboard their 
ice breakers. The remainder of the discus- 
sion is concerned primarily with the six 
C-47’s or R4D’s which flew from the U. S. S. 
Philippine Sea to Little America and then 
continued their operations from Little 
America. 
2. Special Equipment. 
The R4D’s were standard C-47 type 
aircraft as used by the Navy with certain 
exceptions in the way of special equipment. 
First, the aircraft were rigged for JATO. 
Second, they had a combination ski-wheel 
landing gear. This will be described later. 
Third, they were equipped with tri-netrogon 
cameras. In connection with this they had 
“gremlin” recorders, which were simply an 
05-A type camera photographing an alti- 
meter and a clock at regular intervals. 
Each aircraft carried two fuselage gasoline 
tanks. Each of the tanks was of 402-gallon 
capacity, identical to those already mounted 
within the wings. The total gasoline capac- 
ity of the aircraft was thus 1,608 gallons. 
Special equipment installed in the aircraft 
for this particular mission consisted of the 
following items: Two “bird-dogs,” which 
are a pair of radio directional finder equip- 
ments, connected through a single indicating 
panel with two needles, one red—one green, 
indicating each separate radio; an APS-4 
radar set, SCR-718 radar altimeter, APM-1 
radio altimeter, and 05-A radar recording 
camera which was jury mounted for the 
APS-4 radar. 
3. Flight Personnel. 
The standard crew that was used with 
these aircraft consisted of three rated naval 
pilots, one being the first pilot and com- 
mander, one being the co-pilot, and the third 
one the navigator. These men were all 
NATS (Naval Air Transport Service) pilots 
and had had considerable experience. In 
addition to these a radio operator and a 
photographer were carried. The three pilots 
of each aircraft all had obtained considerable 
flying experience with NATS upon runs 
where the radio aids were good. The result 
was that the navigation was not as good as it 
should have been for this type of a mission. 
Navigational training was given to these men 
on the way down aboard the Philippine Sea 
but they still were not thoroughly familiar 
with the grid system of navigation which is 
a prime requisite for any exploratory flying 
either in the Arctic or the Antarctic regions. 
105 4. Landing Gear. 
a. The landing gear set-up on the G-47’s 
consisted of standard wheels as used on all 
G-47’s with the addition of large skis. This 
large metal ski was mounted so that it 
straddled the wheel, the cut out portion of the 
ski surrounding the wheel (fig. 140). Im- 
mediately in front of the wheel hole in the 
ski was an additional cut so that when the 
ski retracted with the wheel the oil cooler of 
the engine could protrude through the ski. 
When in the retracted position the toe of the 
ski curved up around the cowling of the 
nacelle behind the propeller. The ski was 
fastened to the axle of the wheel and was 
retracted or lowered as the wheels were 
pulled up or let down. When in the fully 
down position one bungee shock cord and 
restraining cables were properly rigged, but 
during the time that the wheels and skis 
were coming up or going down these devices 
Figure 141. Tail ski-wheel combination. Note tail 
wheel protruding through ski. 
would be loose so that the ski would be free 
to tilt unless an additional restraining mech- 
anism was used. This restraining mechanism 
was built in the form of an airfoil. This air- 
foil was mounted upon the tail of the ski on 
an extension arm and served as a stabilizing 
influence to keep the ski in a level attitude 
during retracting or lowering. The ski was 
adjustable in relation to the wheel so that 
from 2 to 6 inches of wheel could be made to 
protrude through the bottom of the ski. The 
tail ski was mounted similarly with the small 
tail wheel protruding through the ski (fig. 
141). It had no stabilizing fin, however, as 
the tail wheel is nonretractable. 
b. There was much discussion aboard the 
Philippine Sea as to how much the wheels 
should protrude through the skis for the 
carrier take-off. One stand on this was that 
2 inches of protrusion would allow plenty of 
clearance for the skis, and even if the skis did 
touch the deck no damage would result, 
either to the deck or to the skis, as the deck is 
smooth and there would be very light loading 
on the skis. The other line of reasoning was 
that 4 to 6 inches of clearance should be 
allowed so the ski could not possibly touch 
the deck. The disadvantage of much wheel 
protruding would be felt more upon landing, 
Figure 140. C-47 ski-wheel combination. Note 
cut out portion of ski surrounding wheel 
106 especially if a light crusted snow were en- 
countered at the base. In this case the wheel 
would break through the crust, continually 
chopping holes, making the landing very 
rough, and increasing the drag of the wheel 
considerably. This also was not thought to 
be a serious point in actuality, as the drag on 
the wheel could not become excessive enough 
to cause the airplane to nose over. After 
considerable discussion the Commanding 
Officer of the Philippine Sea finally agreed 
that the amount of protrusion would be left 
to the individual pilot. This was done and 
they all chose approximately 2 inches of 
protrusion, being more concerned about the 
landing than they were about the take-off. 
5. Preparation for Take-Off. 
Because of the wing span of the airplanes 
the take-off could not be made using the full 
deck of the Philippine Sea. The wing tips 
would not pass the island of the ship without 
making the airplane run excessively close to 
the far (port) side of the deck. The take-off 
run was therefore started from the central 
elevator, or that portion of the flight deck 
which is the widest on the carrier. A bright 
orange line was painted at a slight diagonal 
from the middle of the elevator to the center 
of the forward end of the flight deck. This 
gave the pilots a guide which they could 
follow while traveling at a slight diagonal 
across the flight deck. The total take-off 
runway was approximately 400 feet. Two 
schools of thought existed on the use of the 
JATO. The first held that the engine 
should be revved up and at the time the 
wheel brakes were released the JATO should 
be ignited. This would get the plane off the 
deck of the carrier as soon as possible. The 
second insisted that the airplane should 
start its roll, possibly going halfway down the 
deck before the JATO was ignited. The 
first would give rapid take-off ability at the 
expense of using the JATO power almost 
completely before any airborne flight was 
obtained. The second system gave very 
good safety protection in case of an engine 
failure during the final part of the run or 
immediately after take-off before the air- 
plane would attain enough altitude and 
speed to have good single engine control for 
ditching. The airplanes could not return to 
the carrier once they took off. It should be 
added that the take-off characteristics of the 
aircraft, with the carrier causing at least 35 
knots of relative wind across the deck, would 
ordinarily be considered a safe procedure 
even without the assistance of JATO. The 
JATO was used as an added safety precau- 
tion in case of engine difficulties. This 
means that the second school was probably 
the safer in that during the first part of the 
run if the engines were not right there was 
still room to stop. With the first method, 
there would be no possibility of stopping in 
the event of trouble during the run with 
JATO in operation. 
6. Flight to Little America. 
The flight from the U. S. S. Philippine Sea 
was made safely by all aircraft. A 40- to 
43-knot relative wind was prevailing across 
the deck at the time of take-off. The first 
five aircraft all used the technique of letting 
the run start and then kicking off the JATO. 
All the take-offs were very nicely made and 
no concern was felt after the first one had 
taken off, showing that the procedure worked 
out as planned. The last aircraft, however, 
used the method of igniting the JATO before 
releasing the brakes and some concern was 
caused since the pilot forgot to release the 
brakes until considerable time after the 
JATO had been ignited. His take-off, how- 
ever, was made with no further difficulties 
and he was away adequately. The position 
of the U. S. S. Philippine Sea in relation to 
Little America was such that approximately 
a 4-hour flight was required. The first two 
107 aircraft took off' from the Philippine Sea and 
climbed to approximately 2,000 feet. They 
flew as a pair, holding from the Philippine Sea 
direct on the radio transmission from the 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus, which at that time 
was tied up in the Bay of Whales. The ice 
breaker U. S. G. G. C. Northwind was 
stationed about a third of the way between 
the U. S. S. Philippine Sea and the Bay of 
Whales and thus gave an intermediate radio 
direction. After numbers 1 and 2 aircraft 
had landed at Little America, numbers 3 
and 4 took off. A relatively short time 
thereafter numbers 5 and 6 took off. The 
flights of numbers 3 and 4 were as expected 
and went direct in to Little America. 
Numbers 5 and 6 encountered bad weather 
shortly before rendezvousing with the North- 
wind. Just after passing over the U. S. C. 
G. G. Northwind, number 6 airplane began 
experiencing radio trouble and very soon 
became lost. Number 5 aircraft reported 
losing number 6 almost immediately upon 
entering the overcast. Number 5 continued 
on until it found an open place and circled 
there for 20 minutes trying to get radio 
contact with number 6. During the trip 
from the Philippine Sea to the U. S. C. G. C. 
Northwind number 6 aircraft had not made a 
gyro precession check nor had it made a 
compass direction deviation chart. Either 
one of these would have allowed it to con- 
tinue on with its heading toward the Bay of 
Whales so that it would have had no diffi- 
culty picking up the ice barrier upon arrival 
there. Number 6 did, however, continue on 
in a guess direction, eventually found the 
barrier, and flew down the barrier until it 
came to Little America. The ski landings 
at Little America were fairly typical of any 
well made ski landing of an aircraft with the 
exception of number 5 airplane. The pilot 
did not realize that stopping at the end of 
the landing run would permanently stall the 
aircraft. An aircraft must keep taxiing to 
keep from freezing its skis to the surface. 
Number 5 stopped before turning around 
and became frozen to the surface. 
Note. The actual flight plans, the areas covered, and 
the photographs taken will be thoroughly covered by 
the Navy report of this mission. The operation of the 
Norseman was rather limited, being primarily a rescue 
vehicle. It was, used however, to give Navy pilots 
their required flying time. The airplane was damaged 
on several occasions so that it could not be used for 
the majority of the time that it was in the Antarctic. 
The helicopter operations in the Antarctic were 
quite impressive, giving a very fine demonstration of 
their ability to operate from small ships over ice pack 
for exploration or rescue purposes. The two heli- 
copters that were lost were both lost through pilot 
error and not through anything that is unique to the 
Antarctic in itself. The operation of the L-5 and the 
place for small aircraft in Antarctic exploration and 
in scientific support of an expedition are covered 
elsewhere. The use of a towed aircraft for long 
range exploration and for rescue is likewise covered 
separately. 
SECTION II. Technical Observations 
1. Aircraft Loading. 
At maximum total aircraft loading (about 
32,000 lbs.) the loading on the skis came to 
about 750 pounds per square foot. Ordi- 
narily 250 pounds per square foot is con- 
sidered about the right amount of loading on 
aircraft skis. The excessively high 750 
pounds per square foot loading on this 
particular design caused some concern. 
Therefore, on the trip down aboard the 
U. S. S. Philippine Sea, it had been planned 
that the wheels would be removed from the 
middle of the ski and an additional plate 
would be added in this area. The slot in the 
108 forward part of the ski had to be retained 
because of the oil cooler as noted above, so a 
plate was made that would cover up just the 
wheel hole itself. This plate had a turned 
up forward edge or toe just as on a normal 
ski. The addition of this plate would theo- 
retically lower the loading to approximately 
450 pounds per square foot if the distribution 
of loading on the ski remained the same. 
There was much discussion as to whether the 
balance of the ski would be changed, that is, 
whether the loading would be unevenly dis- 
tributed so the resultant 450 pounds per 
square foot loading was really not a true 
value. The wheels were removed from the 
aircraft and the additional area plate in- 
serted. The plate became a detriment 
rather than an aid, as the snow which accum- 
ulated in the front of the turned up part or 
the toe of this additional plate could not pass 
around to the side, and therefore just accum- 
ulated until the ski was pushing a pile of 
snow ahead of it. These plates were sub- 
sequently removed and the remainder of the 
R4D flights made with neither the plate 
nor the wheels—using only the original ski. 
2. Use of JATO. 
The first take-offs from Little America 
were made with the JATO, but as the surface 
became hardened with the colder weather 
the use of JATO was of no material advan- 
tage and it was abandoned. 
3. Stabilizer Arms. 
The stabilizer arms of the skis began breaking 
loose from their mountings after a fair amount 
of flying had been accomplished. The arm 
would break loose from the mounting on the 
inside, and then the other side would come 
loose. Two reasons were suggested for this 
failure. First, that vibration of the engines 
while airborne induced a continuous vibra- 
tion in the arms which eventually cracked 
the structure. Second, that the very high 
loading resulting from landings and take- 
offs on the rough surface pounded the arms 
until cracks started. The first developed as a 
result of the breakage of the first arm during 
an approach for landing at a high r. p. m. 
operation of the engine. The second was 
advanced because visual observation showed 
a great deal of hammering of the skis during 
landing. 
4. Skis. 
After cessation of operations at Little 
America it was noticed that some of the main 
skis were beginning to crack at the toe turn- 
up stiffening section. This was the result of 
the many landings on the ice shelf which 
were very rough and involved tremendous 
pounding. 
5. Parking Aircraft. 
To prevent the difficulties experienced in 
getting the heavy aircraft moving they were 
parked on oiled plywood anchored to the 
snow. This meant that an airplane would 
land and taxi to the plywood platforms, 
where it would stop. It could then be started 
under its own engine power with a slight 
amount of movement (of the tail, etc.), 
whereas if it were stopped on the snow 
surface, a great deal of difficulty was had in 
making the airplane move. It was also 
found advisable to drag a runway take-off 
area. This is more fully covered in the engi- 
neering report. 
6. Warming Engines. 
Cold weather air operations during the 
summer in the Antarctic are not materially 
different from cold weather operations in 
any part of the northern hemisphere where 
the temperatures range down to minus 20 or 
30° Fahrenheit. Herman-Nelson heaters, 
one for each nacelle, were used for starting 
(fig. 142). Inadequate covers were supplied. 
Some of these were fabricated aboard the 
109 was not as good as it had been hoped that it 
would be. The result was that no systematic 
set of gyro logs were made and no good navi- 
gational tries were had. There were only a 
few flights that attempted to go over the top 
of any bad weather to get on the other side 
of it. This was primarily because the navi- 
gation was not reliable enough to allow that 
to be done. The original plan had called for 
both GCA and GPN and UPN-Ts (portable 
radar navigation beacon) to be operated at 
the base. The GCA had to be removed to be 
evacuated on the Mount Olympus before it had 
a chance to be used. The GPN was retained 
and did help very materially in getting 
the aircraft in during periods of low visibility 
or near-blizzard conditions. The UPN-4’s 
had been planned as beacons for marking 
the ends of the landing strips. They were 
not used for this because maintexiance on the 
radar was not adequate. 
8. Icing. 
It had previously been claimed that no ic- 
ing would be met. This came from the situa- 
tion on previous expeditions where no flying 
was attempted unless CAVU conditions 
existed. With the advent of larger aircraft, 
flights were attempted with less insistence on 
perfect weather, and when conditions were 
not CAVU icing was encountered. This 
corresponds to experience in the northern 
parts of the world. 
9. Emergency Equipment. 
The emergency equipment which was 
pre-planned in the United States and that 
which was carried aboard the U. S. S. 
Philippine Sea was not acceptable by the 
command upon the ice. Thus, Dr. Siple 
and Captain Homey, U. S. N., had to replan 
and reassemble all the survival equipment 
and emergency rations. These are covered 
in chapters 6 and 7. The difference between 
the Arctic and the Antarctic or the North 
Figure 142. Herman-Nelson heaters are standard 
equipment. 
U. S. S. Philippine Sea on the way down. 
Ample covering would have materially aided 
in the starting of the engines. On a very 
cold day inadequate heating of the nacelle 
resulted in rupture of the lubricating oil 
lines upon starting. The standard heaters, 
properly maintained and properly used, 
make a very good method of warming the 
engines for starting. 
7. Navigation. 
The original navigational plan had de- 
pended upon having the U. S. S. Mount 
Olympus with its high powered transmitter 
as a homing aid. The original plan of the 
air operation assumed that flights would not 
be made beyond the range at which they 
could home on the Mount Olympus. This 
range actually was less than the range of the 
aircraft that had been used on previous 
expeditions to Antarctica. The U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus had to leave the bay, however, 
because of the bad ice conditions and was 
not available for this purpose. The naviga- 
tion then reverted to a sort of pilotage using 
mountains and the known landmarks pri- 
marily. A few of the pilots actually did use a 
good system of navigation, but the navigation 
110 Pole area and the South Pole area is very 
marked. The safety problems in the Antarc- 
tic are much different and in many respects 
more simple than those of the Arctic Ocean. 
Airplanes in distress can almost always 
find a place to crash land in the Antarctic, 
a place where the plane can be set down 
with relative safety. This is especially true 
if the navigation is good. The reasons for 
bailing out are much less valid than they 
would be in the north. The possibility of 
getting an airplane down with the structure 
mostly intact is very good. This also changes 
the aspect of the emergency equipment to 
be carried. 
10. Radius of Operations. 
In considering the range problem it must 
be realized that a 500-mile radius about 
Little America had already been well covered 
and that 800-mile flights had already been 
made into several areas. That meant that 
with a 1,900-mile total range, and an 800- 
mile radius of action with reserve, there was 
not a great deal of new territory that could 
be covered. It turned out that the amount 
of flying accomplished just about covered 
the territory that could be covered within 
800 miles. Had a normal year been met, 
however, it would have been advantageous 
to establish one or two staging bases which 
would have tremendously increased the 
area accessible to exploration. Especially 
would this create an opportunity to explore 
that area between the Ross Sea and the 
Weddell Sea, one of the big remaining 
question marks in the Antarctic. It would 
also allow one or two trips to be made on to 
the polar plateau or perhaps a more thorough 
investigation of the mountains running from 
the plateau toward the east. A trip or 
trips across the continent could have been 
accomplished in this manner. The problems 
concerning staging are, of course, consider- 
able. It is pointed out, however, that those 
bases could have been established and 
transcontinental flights could have been 
made. In this regard it was considered that 
flights could be made with two aircraft 
going out, landing, transferring all the fuel 
to one aircraft, and abandoning the other 
aircraft. Or, the refueling aircraft could 
have been flown home, A staging plan 
with radii up to 1,700 miles was considered, 
with 1,700 miles still leaving a safety margin 
with a single staging point. Another prob- 
lem which must be considered in this are 
the cold starting if aircraft are to be on the 
surface longer than the necessary refueling 
period. Two additional problems must be 
considered when it is extremely cold: The 
rescue problem would become more difficult 
and the navigation problem would also 
increase. 
SECTION III. Recommendations 
1. Recording Observations. 
It is recommended that for any future 
operation of this nature the planning and 
training be such that complete systematic 
recordings of the following instruments and 
procedures be made: 
a. The electric gyro and the vacuum gyro 
should have complete logs kept on every 
flight. This will materially aid the naviga- 
tion. 
b. The compass reading vs the grid head- 
ing should be systematically kept. This 
permits better navigation and also helps 
greatly to facilitate magnetic studies. 
c. The complete navigational log with all 
corrections should be kept as the flight is 
111 made. This allows reconstitution of the 
flight after the return to the base and thus 
helps with the placing of any observations 
and of the placing of geographic features. 
Only in this manner can good reconnais- 
sance photography be accomplished unless 
complete ground controls are used. 
d. A complete photo log should also be 
maintained. This also allows interpreta- 
tion, placing, and mapping of the picture. 
Systematic 05-A recordings should be made 
of the radar and of the radio and radar 
altimeters. These should be synchronized 
and perhaps synchronized with the visual 
camera so that complete understanding of 
all returns and of all the visual photographs 
can be attained after the mission is accom- 
plished. It is therefore recommended that 
careful preselection of crews be made before 
starting on a trip of this kind—to get men 
thoroughly competent to accomplish their 
job, to get men who are eager and who 
understand why flights should be made and 
why missions should be accomplished, men 
with a will to accomplish, not just men 
completing an assigned flight. It is sug- 
gested that a system of briefing should be 
instituted so that each man before each 
mission is given a detailed outline upon 
which are his designated duties, a detailed 
instruction of when camera should be turned 
on or when observation should be made, the 
amount of film to be exposed, the type of 
things to look for, and other data of this 
nature. By having each man responsible 
for certain assigned duties the loss of scientific 
information will be held to a minimum. 
2. Starting Engines. 
It is suggested that the following system of 
cold weather engine starting would materi- 
ally aid cold weather operations: the nacelle 
should be insulated internally and the air 
duct should be supplied with built-in covers 
so that when an engine is warm the air duct 
covers can be closed and the engine will stay 
warm without a lot of air circulating through 
it. This will also facilitate the original heat- 
ing of the engine when it is cold. A small, 
portable gasoline driven cranking heater 
unit could be designed for heating and start- 
ing engines. A small engine could be cooled 
with the oil from the large aircraft engine, 
thus heating the aircraft engine oil. The 
exhaust from the cranking unit can be used 
to heat the nacelle. A properly designed 
unit of this type would be a man-carried 
unit which a man would carry out to the 
wing and set in position with the spline of 
the cranking engine engaging the cranking 
shaft on the main engine, the positioning 
pins holding the cranking engine in position. 
The small engine would then be cranked 
and allowed to run for a short period, heating 
itself and heating part of the oil on the big 
engine. The aircraft engine would then be 
very slowly turned over by engaging a 
clutch between the little engine and the 
spline. While the big engine is allowed to 
warm up from heat of the little engine, it 
will turn faster and faster until eventually it 
is warm and ready to start. After the air- 
craft engine starts the cranking engine is 
moved to the next engine. The first engine 
started is thoroughly warmed up and then 
shut down while the second engine is started 
and warmed up, the insulated nacelle main- 
taining the heat in the first engine so that it 
will start with its regular electrical starter or 
with a very short push of the starting engine. 
3. Landing Gear. 
It is recommended that a thorough study 
of tracked type landing gear -be instituted. 
When considering Antarctic or neve or sas- 
trugi surface operations, wheels are at a big 
disadvantage in that any single small hole 
will stop the wheel and cause serious incon- 
venience or damage to the aircraft. Wheels 
also require well prepared, large runways. 
112 Wheels are not versatile; they can land only 
on prepared areas and these landings cannot 
be made away from base. Nor are skis as 
versatile as required for good operations in 
the Antarctic regions. When the toe of a 
ski strikes a ridge the whole ski must rise, 
thus raising the aircraft. This makes the 
ski a rough mechanism on rough terrain 
such as sastrugi. In addition to that, skis 
have a tendency to stick. Their use is lim- 
ited primarily to the type of surface for 
which they are designed. Tracks, on the 
other hand, could be used to fly from air- 
craft decks, could be used to fly from ordi- 
nary runways, and could land in snow or 
the neve as the case dictated. Being a flex- 
ible sort of structure any single bump is more 
or less absorbed by the track rather than 
transmitted to aircraft and this is a consider- 
able advantage when operating on sastrugi. 
SECTION IV. Log of L-5 in the Antarctic 
The following log covers the flying of the 
aircraft No. 120462, an L-5G (Army desig- 
nation) or OY-1 (Navy designation). The 
aircraft was a Navy furnished item for this 
expedition. The primary base for opera- 
tions was the Navy Gamp at Little America, 
known as Little America No. 4. The pilot 
on each of the flights was R. N. Davis. The 
flight log gives the history of each flight made 
from the Little America base at which the 
L-5 was assembled, after having been dis- 
mantled and crated aboard the Philippine Sea, 
brought to the barrier aboard the U. S. Coast 
Guard Cutter Northwind, and transported to 
the base camp on a Weasel-drawn sled. 
After assembly the L-5 was thoroughly 
checked, properly lubricated, and skis were 
fitted. The skis were of dural, manufactured 
by the Federal Ski Company. It should be 
noted that two sizes of skis are recommended 
by the Federal Ski Company for the L-5. 
The first recommendation is their smallest 
ski which is used on all small aircraft. The 
particular set here used was the next larger 
size and it proved to be a wise decision. 
The slight amount of additional weight is 
small in comparison to the advantages to be 
gained from having a longer, more substan- 
tial ski of greater bearing area. The log will 
explain why a steerable tail wheel is a very 
valuable adjunct to a light aircraft operating 
in the Antarctic. In all other respects the 
L-5, No. 120462 was a standard L-5G with 
no modification. The log now follows: 
10 Feb No passengers. Landings: None. 
Time in flight: None. 
The purpose of the test was to determine 
the functioning of the skis upon the surface 
of the snow then existing and to explore the 
abilities of the aircraft to taxi and to turn, also 
to get a check on the engine performance 
under taxiing conditions to indicate the cool- 
ing of the engine in this climate. The air- 
craft was taxied at various speeds across the 
different surfaces to be found close to camp. 
No difficulty was experienced with turning 
either right or left, upwind, downwind, or 
acrosswind. The ease with which the air- 
plane turned is attributable primarily to the 
steerable tail ski which is a great asset on a 
small plane, especially where it is required 
to do precise maneuvering to miss some holes 
blown in the surface of the snow and other 
obstacles which result from the maze of 
equipment deposited during blizzards. 
11 Feb No passengers. No landings. No time. 
The object of this operation was again to 
test the ability of the airplane to taxi, 
113 especially at speeds approaching take-off and 
in crosswinds. These tests indicated that the 
aircraft was thoroughly ready for flight. 
During these tests no difficulty was found in 
starting the engine or in controlling the en- 
gine, everything being in good working order. 
During the tests on the first two days, the 
engine was very easily started by the applica- 
tion of heat from a Herman-Nelson engine 
heater until the oil temperature registered in 
the normal operating range of approximately 
50° C. The heater brought the engine to 
this temperature in approximately 10 to 15 
minutes, depending upon the wind conditions 
more than upon the air temperature. 
12 Feb No passengers. 1 landing. 0.25 hours. 
The purpose of this flight was to test fly 
the aircraft and to ascertain, in flight, the 
characteristics of the control section action. 
12 Feb No passengers. 3 landings. 1.50 hours. 
The purpose of this flight was to test air- 
plane during ski landings and to familiarize 
the pilot with the characteristics of the land- 
ing area and the aircraft in its use upon that 
area. The first landing was made directly 
into the wind, as was the second landing. 
The third landing was made slightly cross- 
wind. The landing area was just a large 
open space away from camp with no marked 
runways or specially prepared landing area 
of any nature. The normal radio of the air- 
craft was properly functioning during this 
and the remainder of the flight tests. 
13 Feb No passengers. 2 landings. 1.45 hours. 
These flights were made to test the aircraft 
and to become familiar with emergency pro- 
cedures, especially in regard to emergency 
landings, and to test the difference between 
landing with partial flaps, full flaps, and with 
no aileron droop and complete aileron droop. 
The take-offs were also made to test the 
difference between partial flaps and two 
turns of the aileron droop in comparison with 
no flaps and no aileron droop. The effect of 
flaps and aileron droop was determined to 
be quite significant, reducing the take-off 
run very appreciably and giving a take-off 
speed quite low in relation to that of no flaps 
and no droop on the ailerons, particularly in 
contrast to other light airplanes. The aileron 
droop feature was determined to be desirable. 
13 Feb No passengers. 1 landing. 1.45 hours. 
This flight was made for trim test and for 
practice in turns close to the ground and at 
altitude. The airplane was found to trim 
very nicely and to maintain straight flight, 
indicating that the rigging of the wings and 
the tail empennage had been properly 
accomplished. 
13 Feb No passengers. 1 landing. 1.50 hours. 
This flight was made to familiarize the 
pilot with the area immediately surrounding 
the camp area to give an idea of the area to 
head for in case of power failure on take-off 
or upon landing approach to gain a compre- 
hensive idea of that area immediately sur- 
rounding camp so that in case of bad weather 
the barrier could be found and followed until 
recognizable marks approaching the camp 
and the Bay of Whales could be recognized. 
14 Feb Navy photographer. 1 landing. 1.45 hours. 
Flight was made to allow an official Navy 
photographer to make a historical record of 
the camp and the ice structure immediately 
surrounding the camp. 
14 Feb Lt. Roscoe. 1 landing. 1.60 hours. 
U. S. M. C. Lieutenant Roscoe was official 
geographer for the expedition. This flight 
was to give him an opportunity of observing 
the ice structure and ice conditions surround- 
ing the camp area within a radius of 50 miles. 
This flight explored the Bay of Whales, the 
camp, and the crack structure running from 
the Bay of Whales toward Roosevelt Island, 
giving especial attention to Roosevelt Island 
and to the area immediately surrounding the 
area known as Seal Creek. 
114 14 Feb Stem. 1 landing. 1.70 hours. 
The purpose of this flight was to take color 
movies of the R4D JATO take-off. A steeply 
banked turn was maintained beyond the end 
of the take-off runway. At the time the R4D 
started its take-off run the L-5 was dived out 
of its turn to come down parallel to the take- 
off runway. This was anticipated to bring 
the L-5 alongside the R4D during the time 
the R4D had its JATO burning. The first 
attempt resulted in the L—5’s running away 
from the R4D during the R4D’s take-off run. 
The second attempt resulted in the L-5’s 
maintaining fairly close proximity during the 
take-off. The third attempt was also suc- 
cessful. 
14 Feb Cosco. 1 landing. 0.45 hours. 
Navy Captain Cosco was the senior Navy 
officer in charge of the scientific program. 
The purpose of this flight was to allow 
Captain Cosco to observe seal life and seal 
actions in the neighborhood of Seal Creek 
in which approximately 250 seals, adult 
seals, were sunning themselves. In addition 
the route for an expedition to Seal Canyon 
was shown to Captain Cosco and the parti- 
cular points of danger along that route were 
pointed out. Also indicated was an area 
upon which the L-5 could be landed at 
Seal Canyon. 
15 Feb No passengers. 1 landing. 2.10 hours. 
The purpose of this flight was to examine 
the Little America area and to further 
examine the Seal Canyon area and to make 
reconnaissance of the ice in the intervening 
area. Practice approach landings and ski 
touchdowns were made in the area of Seal 
Canyon. 
15 Feb Navy photographer. 1 landing. 2.60 hours. 
The purpose of this flight was to allow the 
Navy photographer to make historical records 
of Little America tent camp and of the ice 
and activities in the area surrounding the 
camp. The flight continued past Seal Can- 
yon toward Amundson Arm. The photo- 
grapher expressed his satisfaction with the 
ability of the L-5 to fly either low or high 
and to be maneuvered into the most desirable 
position for the taking of air records close 
to the desired object. 
16 Feb Siple. 1 landing. 3.50 hours. 
This flight was made to enable Dr. Siple 
to examine the ice structure, the Bay of 
Whales, and the surrounding area. The 
flight went from the take-off area to Seal 
Canyon, continued up the rough ice struc- 
ture to the bottom end of Roosevelt Island, 
flying west down one of the long ice valleys 
then turning and flying east up across 
Amundson Arm until a high cloud bank was 
encountered. Motion pictures were made 
during this flight with a Cine Kodak Special 
16-mm camera. “Stills” were also made 
using 35-mm Kodachrome and Ansco color 
film. The visual observations made on this 
flight by Dr. Siple resulted in a very complete 
story of the directions of motion of the ice 
and of possible pivot points of the ice in its 
flow. Upon landing, Dr. Siple said that 
this flight in itself had amply repaid the 
effort of bringing this particular aircraft to 
the Antarctic. He pointed out that the 
ability of the airplane to be flown safely at 
close range to objects under study was one of 
the valuable assests of this particular air- 
craft. Dr. Siple was the senior War Depart- 
ment observer and consultant to Admiral 
Byrd on Antarctic and exploratory matters. 
The pilot made a rough study of cruise 
control and determined that 4 hours of 
flight was a safe duration with some reserve 
under the particular conditions of flight 
encountered on this mission. 
16 Feb 1 passenger. 1 landing. 3.60 hours. 
This flight was made primarily to allow 
the pilot to make aerial studies of the ice to 
determine the pattern and ascertain certain 
structures pointed out by Dr. Siple on the 
115 previous flight. In addition, it was thought 
desirable to make a further cruise control 
test using conditions varying from those in 
the first test. On this flight it was shown 
that at high cruising speeds, essentially those 
of approximately 100 to 105 miles an hour, 
the gasoline consumption increased materi- 
ally. This led to the conclusion that a 
good cruising speed with the particular 
engine and propeller on this aircraft and with 
the skis mounted would be in the order of 90 
to 92 miles an hour and the fuel consumption 
would allow then approximately a 450-mile 
range. It is noted here that the Aeromatic 
propeller gave this airplane good take-off 
performance without sacrificing good climb 
and airborne performance. During all of 
the flying done no difficulty of any nature 
was encountered with this propeller. 
17 Feb Navy photographer. 1 landing. 1.35 hours. 
This flight was again made to allow an 
official Navy photographer to photograph 
camp, changes that had occurred on the ice 
structure surrounding it, and to photograph 
the work being done at Little America Three, 
sometimes referred to as West Base. Here 
again the left window was opened many 
times to allow better photography and it was 
again demonstrated that good vertical pho- 
tography could be accomplished by flying 
the airplane in a nose high power slip, thus 
allowing the wing to be lowered (in this case 
the left wing), but also to get that wing far 
enough forward so that the photographer 
could take pictures vertically down aft of the 
wing. This particular tactic is especially 
desirable where vertical pictures down cracks 
are required. In this case flights were made 
directly over Seal Canyon taking pictures 
which would show both of the vertical walls 
and the entire bottom of the canyon. This 
particular technique was previously dis- 
played during several flights and found to be 
entirely satisfactory. The flight speed of the 
aircraft could be well maintained, thus mak- 
ing the maneuver an entirely safe one as long 
as the pilot is careful not to put the left wing 
into the ground or to run into an obstruction. 
17 Feb No passenger. 3 landings. 4.10 hours. 
This particular series of flights was made 
for fuel and load tests to determine how well 
the aircraft could fly with overload, how well 
it would take off, and how it would climb, 
especially in an overloaded condition. It 
was also desired to ascertain the fuel range of 
the aircraft where a series of landings would 
be made away from the base such as would 
be encountered in making a series of explor- 
atory landings up or down the barrier. The 
overload tests were made in anticipation of 
the installation of an air-borne magnetometer 
weighing in the neighborhood of 250 pounds. 
These tests showed that the airplane could 
fly under these conditions at least 4 hours and 
10 minutes and still maintain a safe fuel 
margin in good weather conditions. These 
flights were made using information gained 
as to cruise control conditions. 
17 Feb 1 passenger. 2 landings. 2.05 hours. 
The two flights were purely local in nature 
and were made to allow eager workers to see 
the results of their endeavors. 
18 Feb Stein. 1 landing. 1.20 hours. 
The air temperatures on the 16th of 
February had dropped as low as 28J below 
zero and some discomfort was felt, especially 
when the rear window was opened for photo- 
graphic purposes. On this trip of the 18th 
the ground temperature before and during 
take-off ran down to about 28° below 
zero. No difficulty was had in ground han- 
dling of the airplane or in starting it, the 
starting procedure still being to warm the 
engine with the Herman-Nelson and then 
to start the engine with the regular electrical 
starter. It should be noted that at no time 
during the stay did the battery freeze or was 
any difficulty experienced with the electrical 
system. This particular flight was made for 
116 the benefit of Navy Lt. Stein who was an 
official Navy photographer. The technique 
of a short as possible take-off was demon- 
strated to Lt. Stein on this day, the take-off 
being made into an approximately 15-knot 
wind directly across the main runway which 
was in the neighborhood of 200 feet wide. 
This runway had been dragged and had two 
ice ridges, one on either side. The take-off 
run was started from the ridge on the North 
side of the runway. The pilot warned Stein 
that there would be a considerable jolt as the 
ice ridge on the other side of the runway was 
struck. However, the L-5 was airborne 
before striking the second ridge, the skis 
never touching that ridge. Stein experienced 
quite a bit of discomfort due to the cold 
which went to about 30° below on this 
particular flight. The temperature was re- 
corded upon the centigrade indicator built 
in the roof of the cabin of the aircraft. It 
should be noted that Stein had the rear win- 
dow open the majority of the time. 
18 Feb Goby. 1 landing. 1.00 hour. 
Navy Chief Goby, one of the dog drivers 
and caretakers, desired to see the distribution 
of the seal, as they are starting to dive under 
the ice and it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for him to find seal meat for the dogs. 
Instead of the great number, approximately 
400 seals, to be found in the immediate area, 
only twelve were spotted this late afternoon. 
18 Feb Johnson. 1 landing. 1.00 hour. 
Johnson is Goby’s helper on the dog 
teams and the purpose of the flight was to 
allow him to map a safe route to the remain- 
ing seals and to make certain of the location 
so they could be easily found. 
18 Feb No passengers. 3 landings. 3.20 hours. 
This series of flights was made to deter- 
mine the feasibility of using a weight upon 
the end of a trailing cord to determine the 
roughness of the surface and to determine 
if this method could be used for judging 
surfaces before a landing upon those surfaces. 
The technique involved was to find a reason- 
able area, drop a marker, preferably a 
black soot marker at the beginning of the 
area that looked good, then to time the 
aircraft’s flight at a given speed until a 
reasonable landing distance had been estab- 
lished and then to drop the second marker. 
This would normally be done after full 
reconnaissance of the area by making five 
or six flights and taking into regard the 
direction of the wind. If smoke bombs or 
smoke flares could be dropped, that would 
be an advantage. After the area had been 
chosen a pass would be made across that 
area with the weight hanging on the end 
of the cord. The airplane would let down 
in the approach attitude at slightly above 
landing speed, making what would ordinarily 
appear to be a power-on landing approach. 
The airplane, however, would be flared out 
at an appropriate height above the ground 
and power maintained to keep the appro- 
priate speed across the area. The aircraft 
height would be lowered until the weight 
dragged on the surface, and by observing 
the action of the weight, the surface could 
be judged to determine its roughness. Sharp 
ridges or slowly rising ground would be 
indicated. While these tests were made 
without a passenger, it is recommended 
that this procedure be used with an observer 
to observe the action of the string and the 
weight while the pilot pays particular atten- 
tion to passing directly across the area upon 
which he intends to land and in maintaining 
his height correctly as indicated to him by 
the observer. These tests were not conclusive 
but were indicative, and the pilot expressed a 
desire to make more tests to determine the 
limitations and the abilities of this system. 
19 Feb Navy photographer. 1 landing. 1.00 hour. 
This was again an official flight to take 
pictures of the camp area, the bay ice, and 
the ice barrier surrounding camp. 
117 19 Feb Navy photographer. 1 landing. 1.50 hours. 
The object of this flight was to make official 
Navy photographs of the return of the trail 
party which consisted of the two LYT’s. 
The aircraft was flown out along the trail 
over which the LVT’s would return until 
the LVT’s were met, whereupon many circles 
and passes were made taking pictures of the 
LVT’s as they progressed toward camp. 
19 Feb Siple. 3 landings. 2.30 hours. 
This flight was made to transport Dr. Siple 
to various areas for the study of the motion 
of the ice. The first flight was made to East 
Gape where the markers there installed were 
cleared of snow. The amount of motion 
between these markers and the ones on West 
Cape was measured and observed. It was 
at this point that the interesting mirage of 
camp appeared and motion and still pictures 
were made of that. From here the aircraft 
was flown to the markers which had been 
laid beyond West Base. During the flight 
from East Cape to West Base a ground haze 
developed and the landing at West Base was 
made by a let-down through this ground 
haze. The approach and landing in the 
haze demonstrated the great difficulty with 
which things can be seen obliquely through 
a haze of this type even when they can be 
relatively easily seen vertically. It was noted 
that no horizon could be seen during the 
final stages of the landing and that a pilot’s 
ability to judge solely by visual means may 
be seriously impaired. 
19 Feb No passengers. 1 landing. 1.25 hours. 
This particular flight was made as an alti- 
tude test to test the rate of climb of the air- 
craft, the operations of the propeller at alti- 
tude at low temperature, and to determine 
the fuel consumption during a climb. It was 
determined that the aircraft climbed well to 
altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet. The fuel 
consumption control was lost during this 
test, so no conclusive data was obtained. 
The action of mixture control was tested and 
its operation with this particular propeller 
and carburetor was determined to be satis- 
factory. 
20 Feb Dustin. 6 landings. 2.10 hours. 
The first two landings were made without a 
passenger. Take-offs and landings were made 
from a pierced steel plank mat laid on an 
unprepared snow surface, that is, an un- 
packed snow surface. The particular section 
of mat in use was approximately 30 feet wide 
by 400 feet long. The wheels had been re- 
placed upon the aircraft. Following the 
second landing the passenger was picked up 
and the next landing made on wheels on the 
surface used by the R4D’s for take-off and 
landings (fig. 143). The action of the wheels 
under these conditions and under taxiing 
conditions was thoroughly recorded by of- 
ficial Navy photographs. The action of the 
mat and of the airplane was thoroughly 
recorded by Army engineers assigned to the 
Army observers’ group. Braking action of 
the wheels on the snow was demonstrated. 
These tests were all made to determine the 
feasibility of operations of larger aircraft on 
Figure 143. L-5 on wheels taking off from snow 
runway 
118 prepared surfaces. The action of the wheels 
was deemed satisfactory. 
20 Feb No passenger. 3 landings. 3.50 hours. 
The purpose of this series of flights was to 
make experimental landings away from base 
but within the immediate area of base. The 
landings were made on various kinds of sur- 
faces to determine the limitations and abilities 
of the ski on this particular aircraft. One of 
the landings was made on a surface so hard 
that only the keel of the ski left a mark. 
This particular landing was made on an area 
that had sastrugi of approximately 6 to 10 
inches’ height. The airplane was shaken 
but not damaged. While the landing felt 
rough and the take-oflf was relatively rough 
no difficulty with control of the aircraft was 
experienced at any time and the action of the 
skis was very satisfactory. From these land- 
ings and from the previous one of the trailing 
weight, the pilot concluded that great num- 
bers of areas could be safely landed upon for 
any needed purpose such as rescue, resupply, 
or exploration. In particular this test demon- 
strated that the concept of a towable small 
aircraft was a valuable concept. 
20 Feb No passenger. 4 landings. 3.10 hours. 
This flight was made for several purposes, 
one being an examination of the barrier on 
the ocean side, the other as a cruise control 
study. 
21 Feb Stein. 1 landing. 3.50 hours. 
This flight was made to allow an official 
Navy photographer, Ft. Stein, to take pic- 
tures with a large airborne camera of the ice 
structures, particularly those in the Amund- 
son Arm area. The flight was successful in 
spite of very cold temperatures encountered. 
The photo coverage, being the lowest level 
coverage yet obtained on a single flight, 
covered areas not previously photographed, 
especially those on the eastern side of Roose- 
velt Island. 
21 Feb No passenger. 1 landing. 0.80 hours. 
This was a local flight to test a classified 
concept. 
22 Feb 1 passenger. 1 landing. 3.10 hours. 
This flight was made in search for Em- 
peror Penguins to be returned to the United 
States. 
The total number of landings made during 
this series of flights was 47. The total num- 
ber of hours flown, 57.70. 
It is advisable to have good shoulder straps, 
of the standard Army type during this type 
of flying. Strict attention should also be 
paid to loose objects in the airplane, espe- 
cially when making landings and take-off’s 
away from the base airstrip so that in case of 
a broken ski or perhaps falling into a 
crevasse or any other reason that might 
result in a nosed up or turned over aircraft, 
the minimum amount of injury would result 
to the pilot or passenger unless of course an 
object is struck while in full flight, but during 
landing or take-off operations the safety of 
the occupants of the aircraft is relatively 
high if these precautions are taken. For this 
type of operation skis should be carefully 
rigged in addition to the rubber bungee 
snubbing cord. The cable limits should be 
carefully inspected and adjusted. This will 
prevent the stubbing of the toe of the ski or 
the inability to make an appropriate landing. 
The right rigging of the skis is especially im- 
portant in long range operations requiring 
the utmost efficiency. No concern was felt 
at any time about any inadequacies in the 
particular set of skis. Their structural 
strength was good, their keels were well 
designed and well placed, and no damage 
was encountered upon the skis even with 
some landings in very rough icy surfaces. 
Particular attention must be paid to any 
safety or survival equipment. If at any time 
it becomes moist it must be dried, inspected, 
and repacked. For instance, a parachute 
which was brought down by sea had become 
119 moist and this parachute failed to open after 
it had become cold. All of the above-men- 
tioned flights were made using 100-octane 
gasoline instead of the 70 to 80 normally 
recommended. No difficulty was apparent 
from the use of this gasoline. It should be 
added that no engine dilution was used at 
any time and all startings were made using 
the electric system. During landing opera- 
tions away from base a maximum of 1 hour 
was never exceeded without the engines 
being run up to maintain adequate heat in 
the engine for starting. On real cold days 
this time was reduced to one-half hour. 
SECTION V. Comments on Air Operations 
by U. S. N. Observer 
The following is a verbatim account of an 
informal discussion on Antarctic air opera- 
tions. Those participating in the discussion 
were the Army observers and Lt. Comdr. 
James C. McCoy, U. S. N., Base Air Opera- 
tions Officer, Central Group. 
Dr. Siple. 
This is in reference to Antarctic Air opera- 
tions. We have asked Lieutenant Com- 
mander McCoy, Base Air Operations Officer, 
to explain to us, in view of the fact that 
we did not have an air operations officer 
among our Army observers’ group, the lessons 
learned and performances carried out with 
the aircraft, also to recommend what he 
would advise if the Army were to come down 
and attempt an operation similar to opera- 
tion “Highjump,” Lieutenant Commander 
McCoy was Senior pilot with the United 
States Antarctic Expedition in 1939-41 and 
has therefore had broad experience in Antarc- 
tic aviation. 
Lt. Comdr. McCoy. 
The remarks I had in mind will be for the 
R4D type (Army C-47) aircraft, as that was 
the type used for our long exploration 
flights. To begin with, operating aircraft in 
the Antarctic presents certain problems 
which are not normally met with in more 
temperate climates. Preheating strikes me 
as being one of the items which must be 
prepared for and taken care of prior to any 
flight. On this particular operation the 
Herman-Nelson heater, with air ducts lead- 
ing to the nose section and through the 
accessory section for a period of time, based 
on the outside temperature and wind con- 
ditions, would give sufficient heat for the 
engine to be turned over and started success- 
fully. Very few failures were met with due 
to the engine’s being too cold. The Herman- 
Nelson heater was satisfactory while used 
around camp; however, other facilities had 
to be prepared in event an aircraft was 
forced down and heat had to be applied 
to enable it to restart its engines for the 
return flight. That was taken care of by an 
engine warming tent being placed aboard 
the plane and various types of heating units 
such as the fire pot or plumber’s blowtorch 
which was considered sufficient for such an 
emergency. Oil dilution was used at all 
times. The oil was well diluted after the 
engine had started to cool and the oil- 
dilution system was turned on anywhere 
from 1 to 2 minutes, which seemed to be 
sufficient. Speaking of instruments, there 
was a noticeable lag in the reading of both 
pressure and temperature instruments while 
the plane was being warmed up, where 
normally the oil pressure would become 
operating pressure within very few minutes 
after the engine started. In the Antarctic 
120 we found the lag sometimes would extend 
to 15 minutes or more. That we feel was 
due to congealed oil in the lines which had 
to be warmed sufficiently for the oil to cir- 
culate through the various instruments at 
the pliable temperature and pressure. That 
at first would hold many pilots back where 
take-off or taxi could be begun before the 
gage was sufficiently high; however, in time 
the pilots became wise to that and as long as 
instruments would record satisfactory per- 
formance, allowance was made for that lag. 
The ski-wheel combination used for the 
C-47, made by the Federal Ski Company 
of Minneapolis, was made more or less as a 
compromise due to the fact that the plane 
had to take off from the deck of a carrier. 
These skis were approximately 12 feet long 
by approximately 48 inches wide, a slot in 
the ski being sufficient for the wheel to 
extend beneath the surface of the ski and 
also the oil cooler which is mounted on the 
bottom of the engine nacelle to extend 
through the ski when in the retracted posi- 
tion. This resulted in a double ski effect 
with the wheel extending between the two. 
The pressure bearing of the skis was such 
that in soft snow they would sink down to 
where operation would be questionable with 
a heavy load. This was counteracted by 
removing the wheel and placing a plate in 
the wheel slot for softer snow operations. It 
was not an entirely satisfactory arrangement 
because the resistance caused by such a wide 
area had a tendency to retard the movement 
over the ice surface of the ski. The plates 
were discarded in some cases and we re- 
sorted to just the double runner ski, which 
I believe is the most efficient. I would 
recommend that if aircraft of this type were 
used again that a ski be designed along the 
same principle, but allowance be made for 
greater bearing surface, increasing the length 
of the ski more than increasing the width. 
Based on the principle of a large truck, it 
is more efficient with a double wheel than 
with one large wheel, causing more re- 
sistance. The sticking of the ski, or the 
plane being broken loose so it could taxi, 
presented quite a problem. Possibly re- 
search could be made in devising some 
method by which the ski could be broken 
loose from the surface—by a wire dragged 
under the surface of the ski or some means 
that could jar it loose. We conquered that 
problem to a great extent while operating 
from the base by having the planes taxi upon 
a large piece of plywood under which were 
some 2- by 6-inch planks. The plywood was 
covered with a coating of Diesel oil which 
made the sticking far less than on the normal 
ice surface. In addition to that, it is highly 
recommended that large wooden mauls or 
sledges be carried along to strike a ski and 
break them loose. These had been used 
on previous expeditions down here and I 
would recommend that they be carried as 
regular plane equipment. The mechanic 
or one of the members of the crew, at the 
last moment, can strike the skis with the 
maul and so break them loose. Once the 
ski was broken loose and the plane taxied, 
you had little or no trouble maintaining 
headway, and the take-off itself was no great 
problem. JATO was used and no doubt 
was a great help. However, take-offs could 
be made with loads exceeding 32,000 pounds 
in some cases without the aid of JATO, 
which presented a problem inasmuch as it 
was considered unsafe for use at 30° below 
zero, F. Our operations were never quite 
that low, but we were getting down to the 
point where its safety was questionable. 
Maintenance of planes presents a problem 
in Arctic and Antarctic conditions, inasmuch 
as the work is slow and uncomfortable. 
The efficiency of the men is slowed down, 
regardless of how willing workers they may 
be. A certain recommendation along that 
line could be considered: provide an engine 
765274—48 9 
121 work tent which could be placed over the 
entire engine, coming down and including 
the ski assembly, and hanging down over the 
wings. Heat applied either through a Her- 
man-Nelson or through various types of 
blow-pots or stoves, would make it a much 
more comfortable operation. The actual 
mechanics of maintenance checks present no 
real difficulty when the men are comfortable 
and when sufficient tools are available. In air 
operations navigation presents an entirely new 
problem. The inverse grid Magrader chart 
with the inverse grid computer was used suc- 
cessfully. The astral or sun compass was the 
final means of check. The question be- 
tween the astral and sun compass is still a 
moot question. There are several advan- 
tages to both types. The magnetic compass, 
although sluggish and slow to react in a 
great many cases, especially near the mag- 
netic pole, is nevertheless a valuable instru- 
ment. The variations are fairly well known 
in this area and by applying the best known 
variations, a fairly good course can be set. 
Sun sights were relatively accurate. A line 
of position could be varied greatly, but as a 
means of check, I would say it is definitely 
worth considering. The communications for 
our particular set-up were not as efficient as 
we would have liked them. Whether this 
was due to being based on the ice itself, I am 
not in a position to say. Possibly if the ships 
had been in the immediate vicinity we would 
have had a greater range for our communica- 
tions. CW work was fairly reliable; we 
could communicate by CW to a distance 
exceeding 600 miles. But for the homing 
and for voice communications the set-up at 
that time was not used very much, as we 
could not get the range desirable. 
It is highly recommended for future air 
operations that great care and planning be 
given to establishing radio range of sufficient 
strength of 200 to 300 miles. In addition 
to the radio range, the YR should be of 
sufficient power that the radio compass could 
pick up the stations 200 to 300 miles distant. 
The greater the range the better, and for let 
down a GCA or GPN, preferably GCA 
equipment should be installed and set up 
with sufficient range to allow for the phe- 
nomenal area of navigation coming back. 
The percent overcast days is great in the 
Antarctic and the GCA would be of the 
utmost value in bringing the pilots in. A 
GPN was installed at Little America and on 
numerous occasions proved of great value in 
bringing the planes in and orienting the pilots 
prior to sight contact of the landing area. 
In this connection some remarks should be 
recorded as well as some of the difficulties 
encountered in flight due to icing or mechan- 
ical difficulties and material failures. Icing 
was encountered when entering clouds or in 
icing conditions, snow crystals, moisture, etc. 
Even at extreme low temperatures when 
flying through clouds, icing would collect on 
the propeller. Incidentally there were few 
cases of wing icing except when over the 
water areas or when the temperature was 
such that moisture could form in the air. 
The props, however, did pick up some ice 
and ice formed on the inner and outer sur- 
faces of the windshield. The inner surfaces 
iced up due mainly to the pilot’s breath. 
This could be combatted if the defrosting 
unit had sufficient heat thrown against the 
surface to melt it away. In a great many 
cases this was not the case and we had to 
resort to chamois skins soaked in alcohol to 
wipe the ice away from the windshield. The 
carburetor heat was used wherever condi- 
tions indicated its necessity and no case of 
carburetor icing-up was recorded on this 
operation. We had certain instrument fail- 
ures due to lines carrying away, possibly 
caused by particles of ice forming and rup- 
turing the line; we had considerable trouble 
with the winter propellers, surging of the 
propellers, and in one case tendency to 
122 flatten out the pitch of the propeller, causing 
delayed force action. We had various mate- 
rial failures with the ski, mainly the ski 
stabilizer. The material used on the ski 
stabilizer and the arms supporting it was 
too thin a gage of metal, and in one case we 
had as many as five failures after landing. 
I say after landing, because the stabilizers 
dropped off after the landing on the run- 
way, either while completing the landing run 
or taxiing back. They completely broke or 
fell off. The failure of that type was foreseen 
and preventives were installed on the ski as 
a safety measure, which in this case proved 
a very wise precaution. 
In connection with flying, I would like to 
point out the desirability of having advanced 
weather stations 200 or 300 miles out if pos- 
sible, and if the scope of the operation would 
allow, have these weather stations equipped 
to act as rescue bases with sufficient food, 
clothing and a supply of fuel to enable a 
plane, if forced down in the vicinity, to be 
replenished with supplies, or at least rescue 
personnel. That comes under the scope of 
the operation plan. To make a successful 
weather station, communication facilities 
should include a portable range or facilities 
for the pilot’s finding the station and letting 
down, as the overcast is such that he may 
fly over it many, many times without actu- 
ally sighting it, and also facilities at this sta- 
tion for extended ground rescue operations. 
Another subject which possibly should be 
considered in planning an operation of this 
type is the spare tools and equipment to be 
carried. I will not go into detail about the 
spares or the equipment, but I would like to 
point out that such articles as starters, car- 
buretors, generators, etc., do fail when oper- 
ating under conditions such as this. The 
accessories should be readily assembled to 
replace an entire unit rather than to try to 
make field repairs. As an example, starters 
are under great strain when turning over an 
engine that is stiff. These spares should, of 
course, be kept in a cache near a shop ready 
for use when the occasion demands or 
available to send out to a plane if forced 
down, using aircraft or tractors and sleds 
if they are sufficient to haul out the necessary 
equipment. A word in marking supplies 
should be placed here. When unloading 
from a ship, the method of checking material, 
keeping track of it, protecting it from the 
elements, and placing it in position where it 
can readily be found, even though a blizzard 
should cause enough snowdrift to cover it 
over, are all questions which must be consid- 
ered and prepared for. Tools, for instance, 
are very easily lost; a tool laid carelessly 
alongside a plane where work is being 
carried on could easily be covered over with 
snow in a very short time if drift conditions 
occur, and once it is lost it is lost forever. 
The percent of tools and equipment lost 
under any condition in the Antarctic is 
extremely high. 
As executive officer of the base, one of the 
big problems I had to contend with was 
mustering the men and keeping track of their 
whereabouts. Mustering the men presented 
quite a difficulty. We had very poor com- 
munication facilities, and for any one person 
to call around to each tent individually was 
really a morning’s work. I would highly 
recommend that field communications be 
set up—telephones, walkie-talkies, or other 
sufficient means of communication. Trans- 
portation presented quite a problem, mainly 
from the aviation standpoint. Tractors and 
vehicles must be made available to haul 
supplies and equipment and to tow gasoline 
and oil to the aircraft. Many times, planes 
coming in for refueling or to be supplied 
would have to wait, men would have to be 
rounded up, tractors or vehicles made avail- 
able to take care of their wants. All in all, 
I believe a more efficient set-up for commu- 
nication and transportation could be devised. 
123 I believe there are great possibilities for 
gliders in the Antarctic. I am not prepared 
to go into the mechanics of glider operation; 
however, I do feel that for supplying advanced 
stations or assisting men from a wrecked 
plane, or in bringing in supplies to a stranded 
party, they have great possibilities, and 
I am firmly convinced that the glider has a 
place in Antarctic or Arctic operations and 
explorations. 
Army observer. 
In regard to the plane crew, what is your 
feeling concerning trained observers for 
exploratory flying? 
Lt. Comdr. McCoy. 
Trained observers are necessary. If you 
had planes which could possibly carry a 
crew of six, the ideal crew would include the 
pilot, co-pilot, navigator, observer (trained), 
radio operator, and photographer. How- 
ever, as we were handicapped by the limita- 
tions on the weight, we had to restrict our 
crew to five. Had the pilot or co-pilot, for 
instance, been a trained observer, a great 
many observations could be made and 
recorded in such a manner it would have 
been of far greater value to us than the 
recordings which we received, which in a 
great many cases were vague and unreliable. 
SECTION VI. Air Operations Logs—Central, Eastern, 
and Western Groups 
1. Air Operations Log, Central Group. 
Times and dates are G. c. t. 
Date 
(1947) 
Type 
Name 
Flight objective 
ID 
TA 
Remarks 
23 Jan 
A2 
Campbell - Shirley; 
Photo famil.... 
230735 
231135 
First flight from snow field at LA. 
McCoy-McGlas- 
sen. 
24 Jan 
A2 
Campbell- 
Famil 
240015 
240415 
Famil. 
McNally-Mini. 
24 Jan 
A2 
Quackenbush- 
Famil 
240600 
241030 
Famil. 
McCoy. 
25 Jan 
26 Jan 
A2 
Mini- A 11 isnn 
Fam i 1 
251930 
252330 
Fam i 1 
No flight—JA down for starter 
spring. 
27 Jan 
28 Jan 
29 Jan 
No operations due to weather. 
Do. 
Snow test hop by JA—McCoy. 
30 Jan 
VI 
Hawkes-Byrd 
Philippine Sea 
1013 
1639 
Routine. 
to Little 
America. 
30 Jan 
V2 
McIntyre 
.... do 
1013 
1639 
Do. 
30 Jan 
V3 
Linn 
.... do 
1835 
2329 
Do. 
30 Jan 
V5 
Anderson 
.... do 
1847 
2339 
Do. 
30 Jan 
V4 
.... do 
1917 
31/0045 
Do. 
30 Jan 
V6 
Weir 
....do 
1915 
31/0106 
Commo trouble. Cockpit fog. 
31 Jan 
1 Feb 
2 Feb 
3 Feb 
4 Feb 
No operations due to weather. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
124 Date 
(1947) 
5 Feb 
5 Feb 
Type 
A2 
VI 
Name 
Tanner-Allison.... 
McCoy-Flawkes... 
Various hops by 
Flight objective 
Photo famil.... 
Para jump 
ID 
050230 
TA 
050630 
Remarks 
Shot of Bay of Whales, etc. 
Jump by 1st Sgt. London. 
5 Feb 
VI 
Checking out. 
6 Feb 
VI 
crews. 
Check out and 
famil. hops. 
Check nut nnrl 
6 Feb 
V2 
Jump by C. B. M. Johnson. 
No hops—preparing all planes for 
flight. 
No operations—all planes ready for 
take-off. Test take-off JATO— 
1,200 gal. 
No operations. 
First operational flight out. 
Photo. 
Photo. 
Photo. 
No operations due to weather. 
Do. 
6 Feb 
7 Feb 
V3 
famil. hops. 
Para jump. 
Check out and 
famil. hops. 
8 Feb 
■ 
9 Feb 
10 Feb 
10 Feb 
11 Feb 
11 Feb 
1 2 Feb 
VI 
V2 
V3 
V5 
Photo 
Photo 
Photo 
Photo 
100050 
100050 
102150 
102150 
100455 
100510 
110300 
110300 
1 3 Feb 
1 4 Fc>b 
VI 
141205 
142115 
14 Feb 
V2 
141205 
141945 
1 4 Fc>b 
V3 
142253 
150710 
1 4 Fc>b 
V6 
142253 
150824 
15 Feb 
Vi 
1 5031 5 
1 51 321 
1 5 Feb 
V2 
, 
150315 
1 51321 
1 5 Feb 
V3 
151340 
152253 
1 5 Feb 
V5 
151340 
152253 
1 6 Feb 
VI 
161005 
162245 
So. Pole. 
1 6 Feb 
V6 
V3 
161005 
162245 
Do. 
1 7 Feb 
172150 
180801 
Ret. due weather. 
1 7 Feb 
V6 
172156 
180225 
Ret., eng. trouble. 
Photo Mt. Erebus. 
1 7 Feb 
V2 
172221 
180840 
1 8 Feb 
VI 
180014 
180620 
Ret., eng. trouble. 
Photo Discovery Inlet. 
No operations due to weather. 
Photo. 
Photo. 
Ret. due weather. 
1 8 Feb 
1 9 Feb 
V5 
Photo 
180850 
181243 
20 Feb 
20 Feb 
20 Feb 
99 Feb 
V3 
V5 
VI 
V2 
Photo 
Photo 
Made M. A. D. 
hop in area 
of Rockefeller 
Mountains. 
202236 
202335 
221600 
210924 
210924 
221930 
22 Feb 
V3 
221600 
221930 
Ret. due weather. 
2. Air Operations Log, Eastern Group. 
Times and dates are G. c. t. 
Date 
(1946) 
Type Name 
Flight objective 
ID 
TA 
Remarks 
25 Dec 
26 Dec 
27 Dec 
28 Dec 
29 Dec 
Rprnn 
Ice recon (Pine Is.) 252102. 68.3. 
252116. 
No flights due weather. 
Do. 
Do. 
G1 NR1 
Recon photo 
292135 
300555 
CTG 68.3 Observer. 
125 Date 
(1946) Type 
Name 
Flight objective 
TD 
TA 
Remarks 
30 Dec 
G2 
NR2 
Recon photo ... 
300136 
301231 
30 Dec 
Gl 
NR3 
do 
300048 
CO P. I. Observer. Overdue since 
1948. 
31 Dec 
Last est. posit, at 301 948-71-22S, 
99-30 W. No flights due wea. 
Overdue. Preparing for rescue 
flights. 
(1947) 
1 Jan 
No flights due weather. Assem- 
bling PBM—3G. Estimated time 
completion 051700Z. 
- 
2 Jan 
Preparing for flight. Hoisted out G2. 
Boat failed alongside ship, causing 
plane to strike ship, damaging 
part wing tip, part aileron, and 
part deicer. Estimate in commis- 
sion by 030900Z. 
6 Jan 
G3 
NRl 
Rescue 
060232 
060457 
Returned due to weather. 
6 Jan 
G3 
NRl 
Rescue 
061915 
070424 
68.3 on board. Negative Search 
and Rescue (68.3 070902) Ob- 
lique Photo. 
7 Jan 
7 Jan 
8 Jan 
G2 
G3 
G2 
. . Test 
072238 
Recalled due to weather. 
. ■ Test 
072238 
Do. 
Search 
082045 
082059 
No results, fog ceiling. 
9 Jan 
G2 
NR2 
. . Search 
091546 
091711 
Turned back—bad weather. 
10 Jan 
11 Jan 
No flights due weather. 
Ice recon. 
HO 
Ubiki 
Ice recon 
110025 
110126 
11 Jan 
G2 
NR2 
Search and res- 
111241 
120025 
Found Gl and 6 survivors 111729 
• 
cue. 
(DNR) at 71-03S, 98-47W. 3 
dead. Survival gear dropped by 
G2. Survivors 10 miles from open 
water. Trail marked by G2 to 
open water over survivors at 
120000. Landed 120207. 
Howell and Conger ashore in raft. 
Party 2 miles from beach. Fog 
set in at 0614Z. Thin ice necessi- 
tates shifting of plane occasion- 
ally. Fog between plane and 
beach. 1 21 257 commenced pick- 
ing up survivors. 121424 air- 
borne. 121643 landed at P. 1. 
11 Jan 
G3 
NRl 
Rescue 
112100 
120207 
12 Jan 
G3 
NRl 
Rescue 
121424 
121643 
1 3 Jan 
1 4 Jan 
1 5 Jan 
16 Jan 
17 Jan 
18 Jan 
19 Jan 
No flights due weather. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do 
Do 
Do. 
HO 
Sessums 
Ice rccon 
192002 
192057 
H03S-1 Bu No 57996 settled in 
water on approach due icing main 
rotor. No injury personnel. HO 
total loss. Crash boat rescued 
personnel within 1 minute. 
20 Jan 
21 Jan 
22 Jan 
23 Jan 
24 Jan 
No flights—due weather. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Desp 241145 met walker circled 
' 
G3 
1 
Photo 
240109 
240842 
1 5000 chart V30-107 coast south. 
126 Date 
(1947) 
24 Jan 
25 Jan 
26 Jan 
26 Jan 
27 Jan 
28 Jan 
29 Jan 
30 Jan 
31 Jan 
1 Fob 
Type 
G2 
2.. 
Name 
Flight objective 
Photo 
ID 
240142 
TA 
241000 
Remarks 
Desp 241 351 sighted Mt “X” range. 
No flights. 
Filling in gap between 11 0° W and 
Norville range. 
Do. 
No flights—maint and weather. 
No flights—weather. 
Do 
G2 
G3 
2.. 
1 . . 
Photo 
Photo 
261048 
261200 
261823 
261925 
Do 
Do 
Do. 
Do 
9 Fob 
3 Fob 
Do 
4 Fob 
Do 
5 Fob 
Do 
6 Fob 
Do 
7 Fob 
Do 
8 Feb 
G2 
G3 
2. . 
Photo 
. , Photo 
081410 
081730 
Photo hop to Charcot Is. 
Turned bnrk duo tn wonthor 
9 Feb 
9 Feb 
1 0 Fob 
G2 
G3 
2. . 
1 . . 
Photo 
Photo 
091344 
091523 
092120 
092122 
Photo—returned due to weather. 
Do. 
No flights—due weather. 
Do 
11 Feb 
1 9 Fob 
Do 
1 3 Feb 
Do. Moving to Marg Bay. 
3. Air Operations Log, Western Group. 
Times and dates are G. c. t. 
Date 
(1946) 
Type 
Name 
Flight objective 
TD 
TA 
Remarks 
24 Dec 
. . Rernn 
Limited recon: Test of comma, aerol- 
ogy, etc. Fueling drill. 
25 Dec 
(thru) 
No operations. 
31 Dec 
(1947) 
1 Jan 
Bl 
Burner 
Photo 
010535Z 
011009 
Recon of Blleny Grp. Weather 
prevented reaching Cont. 
Recon Oates Coast. Found moun- 
2 Jan 
2 Jan 
B1 
B2 
Krietzer 
Roger 
Recon 
Photo 
011930Z 
011930Z 
020130 
020130 
tains of 10,000-ft. Mountains 
between capes Cheetham and 
Williams 8,000 ft. Secured flight 
—both radio altimeters went out. 
3 Jan 
4 Jan 
4 Jan 
5 Jan 
No operations—weather. 
First mapping,- anoxia causes fatigue 
at 1 3,550 feet. 
B1 
B3 
. . Photo 
040225 
041045 
. . Photo 
040225 
041020 
B3 
Bunder 
Photo 
050410 
051226 
Capt Bond Observer—sec CTF 68.2 
051 340. 
6 Jan 
Bl 
Krietzer 
Photo 
060250 061010Z 
Capt Clark Observer. 
7 Jan 
Attempted flight. Operations to 
scout pack ahead of 68.1. No 
results due weather. FHoisted out 
3 times. 
9 Jan 
1 0 Jan 
I 0 Jan 
II Jan 
12 Jan 
No flights—weather. 
Ret due weather. No practical 
recon made. 
B3 
Bl 
. . 1 rc> rprnn 
101810 
. . !rc> rc>ron 
101840 
No flights. 
Eastern search to 74°S. 
Bl 
Krietzer 
Ice recon 
120009 
120630 
127 Date 
(1947) 
Type 
Name 
Flight objective 
TD 
TA 
Remarks 
1 2 Jan 
B3 
Rogers 
Ice recon 
120039 
120200 
Western search to 74°S. 
Nn Flights—dnc> wenther. 
1 4 Jnn 
Nn flights—due wenther. 
1 S Jnn 
Do 
Do 
1 7 Jnn 
Do 
Do 
1 Q Jnn 
Do 
20 Jan 
Flnisted out Nn operations due 
wea. 
21 Jan 
B1 
Bunger 
Photo . 
212012 
230138 
Mapped coast 1 36° to 1 29-30. 
21 Jan 
B3 
Rogers 
Photo 
211910 
230317 
Rugged nav. Burst rotor on FH03S 
during strong wind. 
99 Jnn 
Do 
24 Jan 
Do 
9S Jnn 
FHnisfed in—due wenther 
26 Jan 
B3 
Krictzer 
Photo 
260550 
261145 
No report on results. 
26 Jan 
B3 
Rogers 
Photo 
261900 
270054 
Dcsp 270256. Featureless plateau. 
26 Jan 
B1 
Bunger 
Photo 
262026 
270509 
Desp 270838/ object 68-1 8,142-40 
E. Ice cap 8,500. 
27 Jan 
Cilnrier vnl|eys etr Fet 19. 
28 Jan 
B3 
Rogers 
Photo coast.... 
280341 
281117 
Coastal mapping in area 111 -1 30 E. 
28 Jan 
B1 
Krietzer 
280445 
281130 
Coastal mapping in area 111-1 30 E. 
Desp 281 320. Fet 1 3. 
29 Jan 
30 Jan 
B3 
Bunger 
Photo 
300330 
301020 
Coastal and continental rccon. 
31 Jan 
B1 
Krietzer 
Photo 
312007 
312300 
1 Feb 
No flights 
2 Feb 
B3 
Rogers 
Photo 
020451 
021000 
Turned back—weather. 
3 Feb 
Nn flights—wenther 
4 Feb 
Do 
5 Feb 
Do 
6 Feb 
Do 
7 Feb 
Do 
8 Feb 
Do 
9 Feb 
Do 
1 0 Feb 
11 Feb 
B3 
Rogers 
Photo coast.... 
102315 
110800 
Coastal search 106° E. and 88° E. 
11 Feb 
B1 
Bunger 
do 
110010 
110800 
Cont search 97° E. and 101°. to 
depth of 68° S. 
12 Feb 
1 3 Feb 
B3 
Krietzer 
Photo coast. . . . 
122320 
130646 
Continental photo. 
1 3 Feb 
B1 
Bunger 
do 
130044 
131026 
Do. 
14 Feb 
No flights. 
(thru) 
21 Feb 
22 Feb 
B1 
Krietzer 
. . Map coast 
220410 
221435 
Princess Raghnild coast from 16° E. 
to 50° E. 
22 Feb 
B3 
Rogers 
do 
220625 
221500 
Do. 
23 Feb 
....... 
No flights. 
24 Feb 
Do 
25 Feb 
Do 
26 Feb 
B3 
Rogers 
Map coast 
260140 
260945 
56° E. to 70° E. coastal. 
27 Feb 
B1 
Bunger 
Map coast 
270841 
271422 
27 Feb 
B3 
Krietzer 
Photo coast.... 
270916 
271500 
69° to 71-30°. 
128 CHAPTER 6 
SEARCH AND RESCUE 
Since Army observers assigned to Task 
Force 68 included communications and trans- 
portation (Tank Corps) officers, this chapter 
will not go into details regarding these 
subjects relative to search and rescue opera- 
tions. Emergency communications and util- 
ization of ground vehicles available for 
rescue operations within Task Force 68 are 
well covered respectively by the observers 
mentioned above. 
In setting down a rescue plan for any future 
Army venture to the Antarctic similar in 
scope and nature to Task Force 68, this 
chapter does not go into the technical 
aspects or recommendations on both subjects 
mentioned above. This observer feels that 
these topics should be covered by those who 
have a better technical understanding of 
these subjects. 
SECTION I. Task Force 68 Search and Rescue Plan 
The plan for search and rescue operations 
outlined in this section is as given in Opera- 
tion Plan No. 2-46, Operation “HIGH- 
JUMP,” U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander 
Task Force SIXTY-EIGHT. 
1. Communication Plan. 
a. Rescue Frequencies. 
Primary Secondary Purpose 
3965 kc. 4125 kc. Rescue circuit. This 
frequency will be 
guarded by all 
ships, planes, Wea- 
sels, dog teams, 
boats, and the base 
when involved in 
rescue operations. 
8280 kc. 500 kc. Gibson Girl emer- 
gency transmis- 
sions. 
b. Rescue Communications and Aids. (1) All 
plane emergency kits will be equipped with 
Gibson Girl radio transmitters operating on 
500 and 8280 kc. All ships and planes 
engaged in rescue operations during the 
search period will maintain a watch on these 
frequencies as well as on the regular rescue 
circuit. 
(2) Plane emergency kits shall also carry a 
radar corner reflector so as to assist the search 
units in locating by radar any unit forced 
down. 
(3) In event rescue operations become 
necessary, four Weasels and two dog sleds 
are radio equipped for communication on 
the rescue circuit. A number of Walkie 
Talkie sets are also available as may be 
required for short range work. All planes 
and ships involved in rescue operations will 
put a watch on the rescue circuit. 
(4) Boats involved in rescue 
will carry Walkie Talkie equipment, as well 
as SCR-610 equipment, to enable them to 
communicate with planes in the immediate 
129 vicinity on the rescue circuit. In event long 
range operations are required of the boats, 
they must be equipped with field equipment 
as, for instance, a TBX equipment for com- 
munication outside the range of the SCR- 
610. 
c. Base Operations. Four Weasels will be 
radio equipped for construction, trail, and 
rescue operations. 
d. Radar. Air search radars will be manned 
by parent vessels whenever planes are air- 
borne. The senior ship expecting planes in 
their area, even though passing by, will have 
air search radars manned. Radar plots of all 
planes will be maintained insofar as possible. 
2. Rescue Plan for Eastern and Western 
Groups. 
Rescue of personnel shall be effected by the 
most appropriate of the following methods: 
a. In Water. (1) Employing DD using a 
rescue basket. 
(2) Employing ships’ boats. 
(3) Employing SOC or PBM aircraft if 
water landing area is available. 
b. On Sea Ice. (1) Employing ships’boats. 
(2) Employing helicopter landing on ice. 
(3) Landing a rescue party from boats. 
c. On Continent. PBM to locate downed 
plane, report its position, and make supply 
drops as necessary. Request assistance of 
ski-planes of Central Group and for dog 
teams if within 900 miles of Little America. 
Using parachute drops of extra gasoline 
from PBM, making use of H03S helicopter 
to evacuate forced-down personnel. 
3. Rescue Plan for Central Group. 
Rescue of personnel shall be effected by 
the most appropriate of the following 
methods: 
a. In Water. (1) Employing ships’ boats 
(fig. 144). 
(2) Employing J2F from Northwind (fig. 
145). 
b. On Ross Shelf Ice. (1) Employing trac- 
tors and/or dog teams (fig. 146). 
(2) Employing Norseman (JA) on skis 
(fig. 147). 
(3) Employing helicopters and J2F (figs. 
148 and 149). 
c. On Antarctic Continent. (1) Employing 
Norseman on skis. 
(2) Employing R4D on skis carrying dog 
teams and sled (fig. 150). 
(3) Employing H03S helicopter and fuel 
parachute drops from R4D. 
(4) The R4D’s and PBM’s will be equip- 
Figure 144. Personnel and cargo small boat from the 
U. S. S. "Mount Olympus." 
figure 145. Navy J2F type aircraft attached to 
U. S. C. G. "Northwind" (ice breaker). 
130 ped with sufficient survival gear and food 
so that in case of a forced landing on the 
Antarctic Continent the crew of the plane 
will be self-sufficient for at least 30 days. 
(5) It is planned to carry portable radio 
equipment on rescue boats, Weasels, and dog 
sleds, using 3965 kc. as primary rescue 
frequency and 4125 kc. as secondary com- 
munication between planes, sleds, and 
Weasels. 
(6) In case rescue operations become 
necessary, the Operations Duty Officer will 
notify the Task Force Commander, the Chief 
of Staff, and the Air Operations Officer and 
await instructions. 
4. Flight Safety Measures. 
a. Flight operations shall be conducted to 
pursue aggressively the exploration of the 
Antarctic Continent with minimum risk to 
personnel. 
b. It is planned to conduct most opera- 
tional flights with not more than five or less 
than two planes, in which case the following 
safety measures will apply: 
(1) Maintain half-hourly radio contact 
between adjacent planes. 
(2) As long as contact with adjacent plane 
is maintained continue flight plan even 
Figure 146. Dog team (nine dogs to team) showing 
cargo type sled with gee pole. 
Figure 147. Norseman (C-64) type aircraft. This 
was the only aircraft specifically designated for 
search and rescue operations. 
Figure 148. R-4 type helicopter scouting for leads in 
the ice pack to aid ship navigation through pack. 
Figure 149. R-5 type helicopter landing on flight deck 
of aircraft carrier U. S. S. “Philippine Sea." 
131 Figure 150. R4D (Army C-47) type aircraft on skis. 
though communication with CTG 68.1 is 
lost. 
(3) If plane-to-plane contact is lost both 
by direct communication and via relay 
through CTG 68.1, plane shall return to base. 
(4) In the case of a. single plane flight, 
half-hourly contact will be maintained with 
CTG 68.1. Should contact be lost but radio 
equipment be in good operating condition, 
flight should be continued along planned 
track. 
(5) If it becomes necessary for any plane 
to deviate from flight plan because of weather 
or terrain and his intentions cannot be com- 
municated to base, plane shall return to base 
via reverse track. 
(6) Rescue measures will be initiated by 
CTG 68.1 for any plane one-half hour over 
E. T. A., that is not in radio contact with 
CTG 68.1. 
c. Lost planes will be guided to base by 
use of appropriate equipment as indicated 
in paragraph 5. 
d. For all seaplane take-offs and landings, 
parent vessels will have a crash and rescue 
boat manned and standing by approximately 
132 halfway down and well clear of the landing 
or take-off run. Crash and rescue boats shall 
be equipped as follows: 
(1) Medical equipment and personnel as 
per CTF 68 instructions. 
(2) Two life rings and lines. 
(3) Rescue kit containing metal shears, 
bolt cutters, and snips for quick extraction 
of trapped personnel. 
(4) Radio equipment tuned to rescue 
frequency. 
5. Lost Plane and Low Visibility Pro- 
cedure. 
a. If a plane should become lost due to 
weather or other navigational difficulties, 
the following equipment will be available 
for homing by planes: 
(1) Two YR beacons at base (continuous 
MO’s) used in conjunction with plane ADF. 
(2) Beacon at base used in conjunction 
with plane radar. 
(3) ZB/YG on ships in Bay of Whales. 
(4) MO transmissions by ships in Bay of 
Whales (414/444 Kc). 
b. In case plane desires that ship take over 
homing the following equipment may be 
used as appropriate: 
(1) Plane send MO’s on 414/444 Kc. (Use 
trailing wire antenna.) 
(2) Ship conn planes in using SK or SP 
radar. 
c. In case the weather at base necessitates 
a low visibility approach, the GCA unit at 
the base will be given control by CTF 68 at 
an appropriate time and planes will be landed 
using standard GCA “Talk Down” pro- 
cedure. 
d. Voice communications will be used 
when possible, 
6. R4D Aircraft Emergency Equipment. 
a. Emergency equipment to be carried on 
flights when flight is to be made away from 
immediate vicinity of the base camp. 
Item Unit 
Sleeping bags 1 per man. 
Parachutes 1 per man. 
Skis and ski poles 1 pr. per man. 
Ski boots 1 pr. per man. 
Extra socks 2 pr. per man. 
Extra mitts and liners 2 pr. per man. 
Mountain tents 1 for every two 
men. 
Alpine or Manila rope, 8 oz. per 100 ft. 
ft. or 1 2 thread. 
Sled and man harness 1 set. 
Engine warming tent* 2, 
Engine warming stove* 2. 
Can, 5-gal. for oil drain* 16. 
Funnel and hose* 2 sets. 
Stoves, cooking 1 for every three 
men. 
Mess gear 1 set per man. 
Rations for 30 days 1 per man. 
Trail radio or Gibson Girl 1. 
Waterproof matches 1 carton. 
First aid kit 1 kit. 
Tool kit 1 kit. 
Shovels 2. 
Saws 2. 
Maul (wooden, circle)* 1. 
*ln case skis are not used, these items may be omitted. 
b. Survival gear to be carried in JA-1 
(Norseman, C-64) at all times. 
Quantity Item Weight 
1 Shovel 4 lbs. 
1 Saw 2 lbs. 
4 5-gal. oil cans 8 lbs. 
1 Funnel and hose 2 lbs. 
1 Engine tent and cover. ,. . 10 lbs. 
1 50‘ length Manila line. . . 7 lbs. 
1 Plumbers blow pot 10 lbs. 
1 2-gal. can clear gas 14 lbs. 
1 set Deadmen and lines 5 lbs. 
1 First aid kit 2 lbs. 
1 set Dye markers 3 lbs. 
1 Cook stove 6 lbs. 
1 box Waterproof matches 1 lb. 
1 set Tools 20 lbs. 
1 Mountain two-man tent. . 10 lbs. 
Total weight 104 lbs. 
For each person in plane (including pilots) 
the following survival gear will be provided: 
Weight 
(Pilot/passenger) 200 lbs. 
30-day ration 105 lbs. 
Sleeping bag 5 lbs. 
Skis and boots 15 lbs. 
Additional clothing 5 lbs. 
Total weight. 330 lbs. 
133 Weight 
Basic weight of plane, including 
NavGear 5,000 lbs. 
Permanent survival gear 104 lbs. 
Two pilots and gear 660 lbs. 
242 gal. gas and 20 gal. oil 1,602 lbs. 
Total weight 7,366 lbs. 
Gross weight permissible 7,400 lbs. 
Useful load remaining 44 lbs. 
With the above loading there would be 
insufficient pay load left to carry one 
passenger with attendant gear. Pay load 
must be obtained at the sacrifice of range 
(reduction of gas load). 
Rescue conditions will dictate variations 
in the above loading as deemed necessary 
by the officer conducting the mission. 
c. Emergency gear for ship-based planes. 
1 life raft. 
1 Gibson Girl.* 
1 emergency rations for 1 week for each passenger. 
1 set skis and boots for each passenger.* 
1 first aid kit. 
1 set dye markers. 
1 cook stove. 
1 box waterproof matches. 
1 set tools. 
1 shovel. 
1 mountain 2-man tent. 
*Need not be carried in HON/H03S or HOS unless flight to 
extend beyond line of sight distance. 
d. Radius of action for aircraft. 
R4D—As ordered. 
JA—300 miles. 
J2F—200 miles. 
HOS—Sight contact with parent vessel. 
H03S—50 miles. 
Emergency flights may require an exten- 
sion of above limitations if within safe fuel 
limitations. Helicopter must be accom- 
panied by planes equipped for polar naviga- 
tion if operated beyond above limitations. 
Helicopters will not be permitted to take 
off if weather is below standard contact 
minimums (3-mi. vis., 1,000-ft. ceiling). 
7. Instructions for Pilots Operating the 
1A-1 Aircraft (Rescue Aircraft). 
Presumably the first plane to be operated 
extensively by the Central Group will be 
the Noorduyn Norseman (JA-1) on skis. It 
is anticipated that familiarization flights, 
photo flights, reconnaissance flights, etc., 
will be requested soon after our arrival. 
After the arrival of the R4D’s and the com- 
mencement of normal photo missions, the 
Norseman will be primarily a rescue plane and 
all other flights by the JA will, of course, 
be secondary in importance. Therefore, the 
character of flight performed by the Norse- 
man may be broadly categoried as “routine” 
and “rescue” and the instructions pertaining 
thereto are as follows: 
a. Routine Flights. (1) Plane shall not leave 
on any flight other than a test flight without 
two pilots. 
(2) Test flights shall not exceed gliding 
distance of base landing area. 
(3) All flights, other than tests, shall be 
cleared with both ship and base operations. 
Base must clear all test flights and inform ship. 
(4) Senior pilot of plane shall submit 
detailed flight plans to both ship and base 
operations, including time of take-off, elapsed 
time, track, speed, hours of fuel, altitude, etc. 
(5) Senior pilot shall insure that plane 
radios are operative and tuned to assigned 
frequencies. 
(6) Survival gear indicated in the appendix 
hereto shall be carried as instructed therein. 
b. Emergency Rescue Flights. (1) After the 
commencement of flight operations with the 
R4D’s, the JA-1 may be used for routine 
flights only at the discretion of the officer in 
charge of the base camp. 
(2) Inasmuch as any rescue flight will 
present special problems, the loading of the 
Norseman will be as determined by the officer 
in charge of the base camp. 
(3) Pilots on all flights must constantly 
bear in mind the limited navigational gear 
available in the Norseman and plan their 
flights accordingly. There is no ADF, DF, 
or nonprecessing gyro in the Norseman: An 
astro compass provides the only dependable 
means of navigation, hence all flights will be 
restricted to CAVU weather. 
134 SECTION II. Aircraft Accidents 
1. Inasmuch as no aircraft accidents oc- 
curred within the phase of aircraft operations 
of the Central Group of Task Force 68 to 
which this observer was attached, it was not 
possible actually to witness and personally 
observe any search and rescue operations. 
However, three major aircraft accidents did 
occur within the Task Force. These are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
2. While on a photo reconnaissance mission, 
a PBM (Martin Mariner) type aircraft (fig. 
151) attached to the U. S, S. Pine Island 
(seaplane tender) of the Western Group of 
the Task Force crashed and burned, killing 
three of the nine crew members. Shortly 
after completion of the rescue operations, it 
was found necessary to amputate both lower 
legs of one of the survivors (Lt. LeBlanc, 
U. S. N.) at the site of election. The com- 
bined effects of freezing and fire resulted in 
a dry gangrene of sufficient magnitude to 
necessitate the operation. The following ac- 
count of the search and rescue operations is 
derived from messages received aboard the 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus of the Central Group, 
Flagship of the Task Force, located approxi- 
mately 1,800 miles west of the U. S. S. Pine 
Island at the time of the crash. 
Position of U. S. S. Pine Island at time of 
take-off of missing aircraft PBM-1: 
Latitude 66° 30' S. 
Longitude 98° 00' W. 
Take-off time: 301040Z (Dec 1946). 
ETA U. S. S. Pine Island: 302040Z 
Nine crew members aboard aircraft. 
Purpose of flight: Photo reconnaissance. 
Fuel supply: For 20 hours of flight. 
Estimated position 301225Z: Lat. 71° 22' S., 
long. 99° 20' W. 
Last msg. received from missing aircraft: 
TWO AND A HALF HOURS AFTER 
TAKE-OFF. TRUE COURSE 180 
DEGREES. 
GROUND SPEED 118 KNOTS. AIR- 
SPEED 130 KNOTS. ZERO DE- 
GREES DRIFT. 
600-1,000-FT. CEILING. WIND 
SOUTH 11-16 KNOTS. 
Code: 
All times in Zebra. 
PBM-1: crashed aircraft. 
PBM-2: search and rescue aircraft from 
U. S. S. Pine Island. 
PBM-3: search and rescue aircraft from 
U. S. S. Pine Island. 
Due to bad weather searching flights were 
not possible until 6 January 1947. On this 
Figure 151. Navy type PBM (Martin Mariner) 
aircraft. 
135 date one PBM took off from U. S. S. Pine 
Island on searching mission but results were 
negative. 
The second flight for this same purpose 
was made on the day the crashed aircraft 
and survivors were located as related in 
following account of rescue operations: 
January 1947: 
111300Z PBM-2 (departed U. S. S. Pine 
Island (seaplane tender) on search 
for missing aircraft. 
111729Z PBM-2 reports burned wreckage 
and alive men at 71° 03' S., 98° 
47' W. 
111732Z Five men alive. 
111745Z Dropping survival gear by para- 
chute. 
111748Z Lopez, Henderson, and Williams 
dead. Six alive and on feet. 
Plane disintegrated and burned. 
111823Z- PBM-3 ready for flight to join 
PBM-2. Plane contains extra set 
JATO bottles in electrically heat- 
ed jackets, large quantity dye 
markers and flags for marking 
trail, and additional aerial de- 
livery survival equipment. 
111858Z Crashed aircraft on edge of land 
10 miles from open water. Suit- 
able to land PBM in open water. 
111958Z PBM-3 departed U. S. S. Pine 
Island with two PhM/lc (Phar- 
macist Mate 1st class) on rescue 
mission. 
111959Z Survivors communicating with 
PBM-2 by visual signals. Sur- 
vivors advised that PBM-3 en- 
route and bringing adequate 
emergency radio equipment to be 
dropped by parachute. 
112159Z Survivors departed crashed air- 
craft and walking 10 miles toward 
open water where rescue will be 
effected. 
112342Z PBM-2 returning to U. S. S. 
Pine Island due shortage fuel. 
Permission granted PBM-3 to 
land in open water to effect rescue 
of survivors. 
120113Z PBM-2 returned to U, S. S. Pine 
Island. 
120149Z Following information derived 
from PBM-2 crew: PBM-1 
crashed and burned. Port engine 
15 feet ahead of fuselage. Star- 
board engine ahead of plane in 
snow. Wings off. Fuselage broken 
in two near forward bunk room. 
Fuselage 60 percent burned amid- 
ship. Tail section crumpled. 
Wing tip floats and struts scattered 
over 150-yard radius. Survivors 
apparently living in forward com- 
partment of fuselage using para- 
chute silk for additional tent ma- 
terial. Appearance of sled and 
paint indicates food was salvaged. 
Believe no radio equipment was 
salvaged. Six men first sighted 
standing around fire waving flags 
and rubber life raft. On star- 
board wing tip, “Lopez, Hender- 
son, Williams dead” in yellow 
paint noted. Survivors were in- 
formed open water adequate for 
landing PBM aircraft 8 miles north 
of their position. Further advised 
that trail leading to open water 
would be marked for them from 
airplane. Advised to join hands 
if this message was understood. 
Survivors joined hands and stood 
on their heads to indicate they 
understood. Five of survivors ob- 
served walking, one being dragged 
on sled. At 112220Z when PBM- 
2 departed survivors for U. S. S. 
Pine Island, survivors had made 
good one-quarter distance to coast 
and open water. 
136 120204Z Plane crashed on Barrier of Thurs- 
ton Peninsular at 1,000 feet alti- 
tude on course 130° true. 
Note. Following survival equipment para- 
chuted to survivors from PBM-2 prior to 
return of aircraft to U. S. S. Pine Island: 
FIRST CARTON 
Item Unit 
Coleman heater . . 1 
Cans safety fuel 2 
Pyrotechnic projector 
Dye marker 1 
Box matches 1 
Goggles, pairs 6 
Rations, emergency cans 74 
Ammunition, rounds 100 
Nestles, large box 12 
Cigarettes, carton 7 
Whiskey, quart 2 
Acid, ascorbic tablets 900 
Vitamin, tablets 500 
Sulfadiazine, tablets 300 
Compass, wrist 
Knife, sheath 
Cooker, pressure 
Aspirins, bottle 
Surgical kit 1 
Rifle 1 
SECOND CARTON 
Item Unit 
Rations, life raft and boat 1 can 
Blankets 4 
THIRD CARTON 
Item Unit 
Socks, heavy 9 pr. 
Masks, face 5 
Mittens, leather 9 pr. 
Mittens, wool 9 pr. 
Underwear, heavy 9 suits 
Books, pocket 8 
Toilet paper 4 rolls 
FOURTH CARTON 
Item Unit 
Gasoline 5 gal. 
FIFTH CARTON 
Item Unit 
Tent, two-man 1 
Tent, pup 1 
Shovels, snow 2 
Thread line, 15-pound 100 feet 
120207Z PBM-3 landed in vicinity of sur- 
vivors in open water mentioned in 
above dispatch from PBM-2. 
120227Z Two crew members departed from 
PBM-3 in life raft for shore. Air- 
craft standing by in calm water. 
Weather perfect. 
120437Z PBM-3 on water took six sun 
shots, reported PBM-1 crashed 
approximately 20 miles from last 
plotted position when radio failed. 
Barrier edge 10 feet high. Lined 
with inquisitive penguins. 
120552Z Survivors approximately 2 miles 
from coast. Slow progress due 
rough terrain. 
Note. Additional information derived from 
PBM-2 crew following return to U. S. S. 
Pine Island: 
111629Z Wreckage sighted. Survival gear 
dropped before ground route to 
water edge decided upon. Plane 
looked as though it had skidded 
approximately 100 yards in snow. 
PBM-2 plotted safe course to 
water’s edge for survivors by drop- 
ping eight flags and four dye 
markers to indicate northward 
course. Survivors told to take 
time and conserve energy while 
proceeding to open water. Sur- 
vivors set out at brisk pace with 
occasional stops for rest. Route 
to water edge mostly downhill. 
Survivors following trail perfectly 
until time PBM-2 had to leave 
scene due to fuel shortage. 
120454Z PBM-3 finds it necessary to taxi 
plane occasionally to prevent thin 
scum of ice forming around air- 
craft while awaiting survivors. 
120614Z Lt. Comdr. Howell and PhM/lc 
Conger waiting on beach for 
arrival of survivors. 
121250Z Survivors aboard PBM-3. 
121335Z Survivors and injuries as follows: 
Caldwell, fractured nose; LeBlanc, 
face, hands, legs badly burned; 
765274—48 10 
137 Kearns, fractured right humerus, 
McCarty, laceration of scalp; Rob- 
bins, O. K.; Warr, laceration of 
scalp. 
121424Z PBM-3 airborne with survivors 
and all hands aboard. 
121643Z PBM-3 landed alongside U. S. S. 
Pine Island. 
Note. Report of events leading up to crash 
(as told by Lt. (jg) Kearns, who was at 
controls at time of crash): 
Immediately after number 7 track report 
Cape Dart, sighted one point on port bow, 
distance about 12 miles. Radar unreliable. 
After sighting land, changed course from 
180° to 160°. Increased altitude from 600 
to 1,000 feet. At this time sighted land dead 
ahead on starboard bow, with ceiling on 
mountain tops. Numerous snow squalls. 
To avoid flying into mountain, change 
course to 090°. On east heading, no dis- 
tinguishable horizon. Snow blended into 
overcast. Appeared as though plane flying 
into clouds. Plane put into shallow left 
turn and suddenly struck snow ledge. Plane 
bounced into air and full power was applied 
to engines. Plane was then flying under 
control. Plane put into further left turn 
to set course for U. S. S. Pine Island when 
suddenly plane exploded in air. Time ele- 
ment between striking ridge and explosion 
about 3 seconds. Believe friction on bottom 
of hull tank exploded gas in hull tank. 
Plane disintegrated in air as follows: 
a. Both wings, connected together, were 
separated from fuselage in air following ex- 
plosion. 
b. Fuselage blown apart in air and sepa- 
rated aft of aft deck. Forward section 
headed north 40 feet west of aft section. 
c. Wings, still held together, landed 80 
feet west of aft fuselage in new direction. 
d. Port engine landed 16 feet ahead of aft 
section fuselage. 
e. Starboard engine landed 18 feet west 
of wings. Wing tip floats and struts scat- 
tered about wings. Various parts of plane 
scattered over 100-yard area. 
/. Gasoline fire around forward section 
burned for about an hour, wing tanks burned, 
bomb bay tanks scorched but not burned. 
About 600 gallons of gasoline in bomb bay 
tanks available and later used for cooking. 
Note. Position of men in plane and what 
happened to them when plane crashed is 
described as follows by Lts. (jg) Kearns and 
Warr: 
a. Capt. Caldwell, in bow, was thrown 
backward by impact and then thrown clear 
of plane. 
b. Lt. (jg) LeBlanc was strapped into seat 
and was rendered unconscious by striking 
head against throttles. He remained in 
burning cockpit until removed by Lts. Kearns, 
Robbins, and Warr. LeBlanc’s clothing was 
on fire at this time. Entire pilot’s cockpit 
was in flames. Kearns unfastened LeBlanc’s 
safety belt and Robbins and Warr brought 
LeBlanc from the burning plane. 
c. Lt. (jg) Kearns in co-pilot’s seat and in 
control of the aircraft did not have his safety 
belt secured and was thrown clear of the 
cockpit through the windshield. 
d. Robbins, ARM/2c (aviation radioman, 
second class) at his position by the radar 
screen was thrown clear of the plane. 
e. Ensign Lopez, at the navigator’s table, 
was killed instantly. 
/. Henderson, ARM/lc (aviation radio- 
man, first class) was at the radio panel and 
was killed instantly and thrown clear of the 
plane. 
g. Williams, AMM/lc (aviation machinist 
mate, first class), standing at flight engineer’s 
panel, was thrown clear of plane, but died 
from multiple injuries approximately 2 hours 
later. 
h. Warr, AMMAC/2c (aviation machinist 
mate, combat crewman) was at flight engi- 
138 neer’s control panel. His safety belt was not 
secured and he was thrown clear of the plane. 
i. McCarty, CPhoM (chief photographer’s 
mate), was at his station in tunnel of plane. 
Was rendered unconscious but recovered 
sufficiently to drag himself from tunnel to 
waist compartment after crash. Further 
questioning revealed that top of forward 
fuselage section was blown off. 
Note. Following information disclosed by 
Lt. Comdr. Howell, pilot of PBM-3 which 
returned survivors to U. S. S. Pine Island: 
PBM-2 was directed to return to the U. S. 
S. Pine Island before PBM-3 arrived over the 
survivors. This was due to fuel shortage of 
PBM-2. PBM-3 navigation problem to 
location of survivors made easy by informa- 
tion supplied by PBM-2 on position of crash. 
Arrived over survivors 35 minutes after 
PBM-2 had departed. Survivors first seen by 
PBM-3 one-quarter distance from crashed 
plane to open water. Five men were ob- 
served to be dragging sled. Several passes 
were made between survivors and evacuation 
point. Survival gear, along with “Walkie- 
Talkie” radio was parachuted along route. 
Thirty-five American flags on metal shafts 
and twenty-two dye markers were dropped 
along route to mark route. It was learned 
later that flags on staffs made good markers 
but only one dye marker was seen by 
the survivors. Survivors instructed, visually, 
to continue on marked course to water’s 
edge. PBM-3 then landed to conserve fuel. 
Comdr. Howell and Conger rowed ashore 
in a seven-man life raft with selected sur- 
vival gear and twenty-five additional flags 
for markers. Barrier edge at this point was 
1 to 25 feet high. Landing was easily effected 
on low barrier using alpine stocks as ice 
anchors. The sled and raft were then dragged 
to a safe distance on the ice. Survivors were 
sighted 4 miles inland on a high ledge or slope. 
Comdrs. Howell and Conger started toward 
the survivors, dragging the sled and equip- 
ment. They attracted the survivors’ atten- 
tion by shooting off Very pistols and 
shouting. Survivors had “Walkie-Talkie” 
radio but couldn’t use it. Upon arrival of all 
at water’s edge, plane could not be seen due to 
fog which had set in. Comdr, Howell at- 
tempted to send up balloon with antenna for 
Gibson Girl, but due to cold air, could not 
get sufficient gas into balloon. No wind for 
kite. Managed to get “Walkie-Talkie” work- 
ing just as plane came into sight. Three 
raft trips were necessary to evacuate survivors 
and survival gear from shore to aircraft. 
Note. Following stated by Capt. Caldwell 
(Commanding Officer U. S. S. Pine Island, 
and one of six survivors of crashed aircraft): 
Every part of the aircraft and everything 
else was utilized during our daily existence. 
The first 2 days the weather was very bad, 
with snow storms and high winds from the 
south. Visibility was zero-zero. We lived 
in the tunnel section of the aft fuselage sec- 
tion. This was the only protected compart- 
ment. All were injured or suffering from 
shock. All the men wanted to do was sleep 
and rest. No effort was made to break out 
the sleeping bags until the third day. No 
one ate anything for the first 1% days—just 
lay around in a dazed condition. Passage of 
time was not realized. The correct time and 
date was later realized by an 8-day clock on 
the pilot’s instrument panel. About 312100Z 
Robbins started moving around and aroused 
Warr. The two men headed for the galley 
in the forward section of the fuselage looking 
for something to eat. First food found was 
some canned apricots that were not frozen. 
This was opened and taken to the tunnel 
section where it was shared among all, each 
receiving two and one-half apricots. Rations 
were established at two meals per day. 
Nothing else was eaten that day or night. 
All rested and slept that night and until the 
following morning, which was New Year’s 
Day. On this day, each man had a cup of 
139 hot spinach soup. New Year’s day supper 
consisted of one cup of hot chicken soup, one 
slice of bread and peanut butter per man. 
Reduced rations continued. First 5 days 
were passed resting, sleeping, eating, and 
searching for more food that was scattered 
throughout the area. Ninety percent of the 
food that was aboard was found and was 
usable. During the 2 weeks of isolation the 
men subsisted entirely on canned goods, fresh 
meat, and bread that were carried in the 
plane. One hundred and eighty pounds of 
pemmican and 350 cans of life raft rations 
were held in reserve and used only experi- 
mentally. The men liked the pemmican 
when mixed as a hot soup. Meat, potatoes, 
and pemmican when mixed as a stew was 
pronounced excellent. Everything in the life 
raft rations was liked and enjoyed by all. 
Cigarettes and candy in personal bags were 
considered a treat. On the sixth day, two 
two-man tents were erected between two 
sections of the fuselage. Robbins and Warr 
shared one tent. Capt. Caldwell and Mc- 
Carty shared the other. Lt. Kearns and Lt. 
LeBlanc continued living in the tunnel, 
Kearns administering to needs of LeBlanc, 
who was not able to get about. The dead 
were buried under the south edge of the wing 
on the seventh day. An American flag was 
raised in their honor. Appropriate cere- 
monies were held with all present. Water 
was obtained by melting ice which had 
formed along the fuselage. Ice was melted 
only when meals were cooked. Cans of 
snow in the tents melted into water during the 
day. Efficiency of melting snow was much 
less than melting ice. No one suffered from 
lack of food or water. 
Note. Communications observations: 
Gibson Girl radio was put into operation 
within 1 hour after the crash. Antenna 
erected by using box kite. However, the 
kite was blown away during the first night 
by high winds. It was left flying largely due 
to inability of men to haul it in. A new 
antenna was fashioned and erected and 
stretched between the verticle stabilizer and 
the empennage section, to the IFF starboard 
antenna, on starboard wing and operation 
of the Gibson Girl continued. Two RAX 
type receivers were located in the crash area. 
Using parts from both, one was put into 
operating condition, but due to insufficient 
voltage from the aircraft storage batteries, 
this project failed. When the survivors had 
been located a quantity of flashlight batteries 
had been found and these were being pre- 
pared to add to the storage batteries for more 
power. All other radio and radar gear was 
destroyed in the crash and fire. The aux- 
iliary power unit was destroyed beyond re- 
pair. No communications, other than visual 
were ever established between the suvivors 
and search and rescue aircraft or any other 
agency. Visual signals from plane to sur- 
vivors were made with the use of an Aldis 
Lamp with a white light, which was efficient. 
A lamp using a red light was ineffective. 
Dropping messages also proved to be effec- 
tive. Communication was established by 
the aircraft’s sending a message requesting a 
“yes” or “no” answer performed by the ac- 
tions by the survivors. Radar reflectors were 
generously laid out and, coupled with the 
plane’s surface, gave high hope to the survi- 
vors of being picked up at a distance of 70 
miles. However, background of snow and 
land caused radar signal return negligible. 
Attention of searching aircraft was attracted 
by filling rubber life raft with paper, cartons, 
pieces of Manila rope, pieces of parachute, 
small pieces of wood, and gasoline and set- 
ting fire to all of this. This made an effec- 
tive pillar of smoke that, with no wind at the 
time, reached a height of 300 feet. The 
pilot of the searching aircraft PBM-2 which 
first sighted the survivors states that neither 
the survivors nor the crashed plane would 
have been seen if this smoke signal had not 
been made. 
140 Note. Medical observations: 
No medical supplies could be found at the 
time of the crash. Seven days later sulfadia- 
zine tablets and sulfanilamide crystals were 
found. LeBlanc was given one sulfadiazine 
tablet every 4 hours thereafter. McCarty 
and Warr were treated for their lacerations 
by applying sulfanilamide crystals to their 
wounds. No severe loss of blood was noted, 
as the blood coagulated rapidly due to the 
low temperatures. Enough food was avail- 
able to afford sufficient diet. The major 
part of the medical supplies was damaged in 
the fire. Normal amount of medical sup- 
plies and equipment carried in aircraft is con- 
sidered adequate. 
Note. Flora and fauna observations: 
Flora and fauna were found to be prac- 
tically nil. Five unidentified birds were seen 
by the survivors for a period of 3 days. On 
the coast, at the edge of the ice 20 Emperor 
Penguins were seen. Adelie Penguins were 
seen in the water and on ice floes. No 
vegetation was seen. Only exposed land 
seen was on mountain tops in the distance. 
3. The second aircraft accident, resulting in 
the total loss of a H03S-1 helicopter but 
with no injury to personnel, occurred in 
operations from the aircraft carrier U. S. S. 
Philippine Sea, attached to Task Group 68.4. 
The following is the official aircraft accident 
report: 
21/GTG/rf/al 
c/o Fleet Post Office, 
New York, N. Y. 
25 January 1947 
A9 
FIRST INDORSEMENT TO 
Aircraft Accident Report 
Serial 1-47 
From: Commander, Task Group 68.4 
To: Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. 
Via: Commander Task Force 68. 
Subject: U. S. S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) A.A.R. 1-47. 
1. Forwarded, concurring in the findings of the board. 
CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY: D. S. CORNWELL 
MURRAY A. WIENER, 
Capt., Air Corps 
f 
f 
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 
NavAer Form 339 (Rev. 11-45) 
U. S. S. PHILIPPINE SEA 
Serial 1-47 
Unit to which aircraft assigned: Base Group, Task Force 68. 
Operating from: U. S. S. Philippine Sea (CV-47). 
Time investigators arrived at crash: 1015, 22 Jan 47. 
141 Unit submitting report: U. S. S. Philippine Sea (CV-47). 
Aviation chain of command of unit to which aircraft assigned: CTF 68. 
Unit to which pilot attached: Base Group TF 68. 
Date of accident: 22 January 1947. 
Hour (Local Time): 1002. 
Location of accident: Latitude 59-33 S., Longitude 155-24 W. 
Purpose of flight; Ice reconnaissance. 
Pilot’s total time: 2,240 hours. 
Pilot’s total time this model; 20 hours. 
Hours preceding 3 months: Total—30; this model—20, 
Time in flight before accident: 0 hours, 4 minutes. 
Ceiling: 4,000 feet. 
Visibility; 15 miles. 
Crosswind: Right 22 degrees. 
Wind force across deck: 12 knots. 
Darkness: No. 
Weather at time of accident: Contact. 
Aircraft Model: H03S-1. 
Bureau Number: 57997. 
Did fire follow impact? No. 
Maneuver involved: Take-off. 
Altitude of maneuver (relative to water); 60 feet. 
Angle of impact: Vertical descent. 
Stopping distance: (0), 
Speed on impact: (0) knots. 
Personnel on board: Three, 
Injuries 
{class) 
Name Status Position 
TANNER, Charles S., Lt. Comdr., Pilot.. Cockpit.. D. 
U. S. N. 
NYBERG, Arthur D., AMM/lc, U. S. N. Crew . Cockpit. . D. 
KELSO, Charles E., S/lc, U. S. N Crew . Cockpit. . D. 
Is NAVAER Form 339B being submitted on the accident? No. 
Classification of accident: 
Nature: JT. 
Results Personnel: D. 
Results Material: A. 
Description and analysis of accident: 
Upon taking off the plane ascended slowly to a height of about 20 feet 
above the flight deck and hovered there for approximately 2 minutes. The 
plane then appeared to drift to the port side of the ship, and made a 150° 
turn. Upon completion of the turn the plane nosed down and gained 
forward motion. Just before reaching the water the plane appeared to level 
off and hover for about 10 seconds before splashing. 
142 In view of the fact that none of the members are familiar with heli- 
copter flight characteristics, the board does not consider itself qualified to 
make an analysis of the accident. 
Aircraft and engine data: 
Aircraft Engine 
Model H03S-1 R-985 
Bureau No 57997 24822 
Material damage: Strike; plane sank. 
Material factors involved in this accident: Unknown. 
Is an RUDM being submitted? No. 
Special equipment: Life jackets. 
Effectiveness of special equipment: Kept crew afloat. 
Disposition of material: None salvaged. 
Recommendations for local action: None. 
Recommendations of general interest: None. 
The above are true findings, based on a thorough investigation, mature 
deliberation, and thorough review of ACL 119-45. 
H. M. KEISTER 
A. JOHNSON 
J. M. WESOLOWSKI 
Enclosure: Pilot Statement. 
Distribution: Original—BUAER via (1) CTG 68.4 (2) GTE 68. 
4cc —BUAER direct. 
Icc —COMAIRLANT. 
Forwarded in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 11 of ACL 110-45. 
Local action and general recommendations: None. 
W. M. HAWKES, 
Comdr., U. S. N., 
Commander, Task Unit 68.5.1 
Pilot's Statement in Ditching and Loss of H03S-1, Bureau Number 57997 
The plane was loaded well within the C. G. limits. The load consisted 
of two passengers whose average weight was 150 pounds, one life raft that 
weighed approximately 30 pounds, and my weight of 150 pounds. A full 
gas load of 100 gallons was aboard. 
On turning up the engine, the mags checked satisfactorily and all 
engine instruments indicated normal engine operation. Prior to take-off 
I set my carburetor air heat to prevent ice. This can be done in a helicopter 
by turning up the engine to the maximum r.p.m., setting the carburetor 
air indicator to the desired temperature, and leaving the control in that 
143 position. By doing this you are assured of no ice on take-off plus the 
knowledge that the engine won’t detonate since the carburetor air heat is 
set while the engine is at take-off r.p.m. 
The plane was sitting just aft of No. 1 elevator headed forward. The 
relative wind was off the starboard bow at about 12 knots. 1 took off and 
hovered at about 10 feet above the deck to acquaint myself with the pitch 
of the ship and double check my engine. I then turned toward the port 
side of the ship with the intention of climbing and heading aft into the 
true wind. 
On leaving my ground cushion, by flying off the port side of the flight 
deck, I expected to lose a little lift which should have been compensated 
for by gaining speed and adding more pitch. However, after flying off 
the flight deck cushion the plane immediately dropped down to the water 
despite the fact that I had applied full pitch and had approximately 2,400 
r.p.m. All this time I had good directional control but the plane would 
not lift. It hovered over the water for a few seconds and then started to settle 
in. When I saw that it was going in, I ditched according to prescribed 
doctrine for this type of plane, i.e., “Ditch to starboard with passengers, to 
stop main rotor and use port hatch by passenger seat for escape.” Both 
passengers escaped easily. Due to the inrush of water through the door, I 
was unable to clear the plane until the cockpit was full. We were in the 
water hardly more than 10 minutes before the ship’s boat rescued us. 
G. S. TANNER, 
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. 
4. The third aircraft accident, resulting in 
the total loss of a second helicopter but with 
no injury to personnel, occurred in operations 
from the U. S. S. Pine Island (seaplane tender) 
attached to the Western Group. The fol- 
lowing report from the U. S. S. Pine Island 
to the Commander, Task Force 68, U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus, Central Group, was received 
by wireless: 
Subject: Aircraft Accident Report. (Re 
Helicopter attached to U. S. S. 
Pine Island, Eastern Group, Task 
Force 68.) (Report received by 
wireless from CTG 68.3 (U. S. S. 
Pine Island) to Commander Task 
Force 68, U. S. S. Mount Olympus, 
Central Group.) 
Date: January 1947. 
Position: Latitude 68° 10' S., longitude 105° 
32' W. 
192000Z: Helicopter took off on ice recon- 
naissance with good visibility and 
unlimited ceiling. 
192057Z: Helicopter made higher than 
normal approach for landing be- 
cause of suspected icing of main 
rotor blades. About 100 feet 
downwind from landing deck heli- 
copter began to settle. Pilot 
applied full power and main- 
tained forward speed, but settling 
continued. Helicopter turned 
away from ship in effort to regain 
speed and avoid hitting ship. 
Plane settled into water. No 
injuries to personnel. During 
period of flight weather deterio- 
rated to low clouds and fog, 
through which helicopter was 
forced to fly in order to return to 
144 ship. Excessive vibration indi- 
cated icing in view of fact blade 
test indicated perfect tracking 
prior to take-off. Helicopter to- 
tal loss. Pilot and passenger 
taken aboard crash boat within 1 
minute after helicopter hit the 
water. 
Note. This helicopter was rigged with wheels. 
SECTION III. Search and Rescue Equipment 
Since Army Observers were attached to 
the Central Group of Task Force 68, it was 
not possible to observe utilization of avail- 
able search and rescue equipment or other 
equipment available for these operations 
within the Eastern and Western Groups of 
the Task Force, However, a list of available 
search and rescue equipment for both these 
groups is listed below for the reader’s infor- 
mation. Detailed observations are herein 
described for the Central Group only. 
1. Ships. 
a. Eastern Group: 
U. S. S. Pine Island (AV-12), seaplane tender. 
U. S. S. Brownson (DD-868), destroyer. 
U. S. S. Canisteo (AO-99), tanker (fig. 152). 
b. Western Group: 
U. S. S. Currituck (AV-7), seaplane tender. 
U. S. S. Henderson (DD-868), destroyer. 
U. S. S. Cacapon (AO-52), tanker. 
c. Carrier Group: 
U. S. S. Philippine Sea (CV-47), aircraft 
carrier. 
d. Central Group: 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus (AGG-8), flagship, 
Task Force 68 (fig. 153). 
U. S. S. Tancey (AKA-93), supply ship. 
U. S. S. Merrick (AKA-97), supply ship. 
U. S. S. Burton Island (AG-88), ice breaker. 
U. S. C. G. Northwmd (WAG-282), ice 
breaker (fig. 154). 
U. S. S. Sennet (SS-408), submarine (fig. 
155). 
e. Since all exploratory flights (PBM 
Martin Mariner aircraft) of the Eastern and 
Western Groups originated north of the ice 
pack, from individual tenders, it was neces- 
sary for these aircraft to fly over water as well 
as sea ice en route to the Antarctic Continent; 
the operational area assigned to the entire 
Task Force. In accordance with these 
flight routes, each and every ship was at all 
times available for immediate emergency 
operations within the scope of their naviga- 
tional possibilities. However, since neither 
the Eastern nor Western Group had an ice 
breaker assigned to it, it is doubtful that the 
ships of these groups could have effected a 
rescue within or south of the ice pack without 
additional aid. Other than an open water 
Figure 152. U. S. S. Canisteo (tanker). 
145  north of the ice pack, both 
these groups had to depend entirely on their 
air operations for search and rescue emer- 
gencies. 
2. Aircraft. 
a. Eastern Group. 
3 ea. PBM (Martin Mariner). 
1 ea. H03-S (helicopter). 
1 ea. HOS (helicopter). 
1 ea. SOG (seaplane). 
The above listed aircraft were attached to 
and operated from the U. S. S. Pine Island. 
b. Western Group. 
3 ea. PBM (Martin Mariner). 
1 ea. H03-S (helicopter). 
1 ea. HOS (helicopter). 
1 ea. SOG (seaplane). 
The above listed aircraft were attached to and 
operated from the U. S. S. Currituck. 
c. Carrier Group. The Carrier Group con- 
sisted only of the aircraft carrier, U. S. S. 
Philippine Sea. The sole purpose of this ship 
within the phase of operations of the Task 
Force was to transport six R4D ski-wheel 
equipped aircraft to the northern edge of the 
Antarctic ice pack and from that position 
launch subject aircraft for flights to the base 
camp on the Ross Shelf Ice at Little America 
IV. These aircraft, upon completing this 
epoch-making flight, became a part of the 
Central Group (as shown below), based and 
operating from Little America IV, on the 
Ross Shelf Ice. In addition, at the time of 
the R4D launchings, two OY (Army L-5) 
type aircraft were transfered from the U. S. S. 
Philippine Sea to the U. S. C. G. Northwind 
(ice breaker) for further transportation 
through the ice pack to the site of the base 
camp of the Central Group. 
d. Central Group. 
6 ea. R4D (C-47), ski equipped. 
1 ea. JA (Army C-64 Norseman), ski 
equipped. 
Figure 153. U. S. S. Mount Olympus, flagship of Task 
Force 68, shown nosing into the bay ice in the Bay 
of Whales. 
2 ea. OY (Army L-5), ski equipped (fig. 
156). 
2 ea. HOS (helicopters). 
2 ea. J2F (seaplane). 
Note. The JA (Norseman) type aircraft 
was transported from the United States to 
the Ross Shelf Ice aboard the U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus (fig. 157). This aircraft was 
the only aircraft within the Task Force 
designated primarily for search and rescue 
operations. The two OY type aircraft were 
a last minute addition to the Task Force. 
Since this addition was made after writing 
and publication of the Task Force plan of 
operations, no mention of these aircraft will 
be found in the operation plan. Both air- 
craft were available for search and rescue 
operations and had been modified to carry 
one stretcher case within the fueslage. 
One each HOS (helicopter) and J2F 
(seaplane) were attached to and operated 
from the ice breakers U. S. S. Burton Island 
and U. S. C. G. Northwind. Although past 
utilization of helicopters in rescue operations 
has proven highly advantageous and success- 
ful within limited operations and conditions, 
these craft, as well as the J2F aircraft, were 
146 Figure 154. U. S. C. G. Northwind (ice breaker) opening leads for passage of larger supply ships. Note J2F 
aircraft and helicopter on landing deck aft. 
Figure 155. U. S. S. Sennet 
(submarine) taking refuge in 
open water deep inside the 
ice pack. The Sennet was 
compelled, due to heavy ice, 
to return north of the pack. 
147 Figure 156. Army L-5 aircraft on skis. This aircraft 
was modified to carry one stretcher patient within 
its fuselage and was available for search and resuce 
operations. 
Figure 157. Army type C-64 (Norseman) aircraft 
loaded on deck of U. S. S. “Mount Olympus” for 
transport from the United States to Antarctica. 
Little America IV. However, during the 
flight of the six R4D aircraft from the aircraft 
carrier U. S. S. Philippine Sea (fig. 158) to 
Little America, the U. S. C. G. Northwind 
stood by in the ice pack, along the flight 
route, sending weather information to the 
aircraft carrier and her aircraft, at all times 
available for immediate emergency opera- 
tions and should any of the flights make 
emergency landings on the sea ice or open 
water, short of their destination. 
3. Over-Snow Vehicles. 
a. Since neither the Eastern nor Western 
Groups maintained a base camp on the 
Antarctic Continent, ground or over-snow 
type vehicles were not included among 
their individual equipment. 
b. The following over-snow vehicles were 
available for emergency rescue operations at 
the base camp of the Central Group: 
7 ea. Army M-29C (Weasel) with 20-inch 
tracks (fig. 93). 
2 ea. LVT (landing vehicle, tracked) (fig. 
128). 
Figure 158. Navy R4D (Army C-47) type aircraft 
on flight deck of U. S. S. Philippine Sea (aircraft 
carrier) prior to take-off from ship to Little America. 
Note ski-wheel combination, necessary for take-off 
from flight deck and landing on snow surface at 
Little America, 
primarily used for scouting the ice pack for 
leads to insure successful navigation of the 
larger vessels, as well as the ice breakers. 
Due to unforeseen conditions, as mentioned 
elsewhere within this publication, it was not 
possible for either of the ice breakers with 
their assigned aircraft to remain in the 
vicinity of the Ross Shelf Ice during the 
entire period of aircraft operations from 
148 4. Dogs and Sleds. 
27 ea. dogs, sled (3 teams, 9 dogs each). 
4 ea. sled, dog, cargo, with gee pole. 
5. Emergency Drop Kits. 
There were no emergency aerial delivery 
kits other than rations which were carried in 
aircraft on operational missions (see par. 6) 
prepared and available for immediate use. 
6. Emergency Survival Equipment. 
a. Eastern Group. The following listed ra- 
tions and first aid and emergency survival 
equipment were carried on PBM (Martin 
Mariner) aircraft operational flights, with 
crew of nine: 
Item Amount 
Salt 2 lbs. 
Pepper 1 lb. 
Sugar 5 lbs. 
Coffee 5 lbs. 
Milk, powdered 2 lbs. 
Peanut butter 7 lbs. 
String beans 7 lbs. 
Potatoes 5 lbs. 
Beets 7 lbs. 
Bread 4 lbs. 
Butter 2 lbs. 
Apricots 7 lbs. 
Ham 11 lbs. 
Bacon 5 lbs. 
Beef 8 lbs. 
Jam 8 lbs. 
Soup. 14 lbs. 
Salad oil 1 gallon . 
Pickles 1 lb. 
Mustard 1 lb. 
Eggs 24 each. 
In addition to the food listed above, there 
were 150 pounds of pemmican and 1,050 
cans of tablet rations. 
Aircraft Emergency Survival Equipment 
Item Amount 
Reflector, cornor, radar 2 each 
Sled, man-haul, 2-man 1 each 
Tent, Arctic, 5-man 1 each 
Tent, Arctic, 2-man 4 each 
Kit, fishing 4 each 
Machete 1 each 
Shovel 1 each 
Stock, alpine 2 each 
Stove, Coleman 2 each 
Lampblack 4 lbs. 
Item Amount 
Line, 2-inch 200 feet 
Gloves 9 pairs 
Stockings, heavy 18 pairs 
Paint, orange 1 gallon 
Brush, paint, 4-inch 1 each 
Matches 1 carton 
Marker, dye 5 each 
Creepers, ice 9 pairs 
Shells, 1 2-gage 1 00 each 
Shells, .22 cal 200 each 
Life raft, Mark VII, complete 2 each 
Bag, sleeping 9 each 
Suit, exposure 9 each 
Kit, first aid 6 each 
Blanket, wool 3 each 
Harness, parachute 9 each 
Mae West 12 each 
Can, safety, 5-gallon 1 each 
Can, 1 -gallon 2 each 
Utensils, cooking 1 set 
Utensils, eating 1 set 
Water bag, plastic 28 each 
Headnets 27 each 
Cups, water, plastic 6 each 
Marker, dye 1 2 each 
Flashlight, w/batteries 9 each 
Radio, “Gibson Girl” 1 each 
Shotgun, 1 2-gage 1 each 
Rifle, .22 cal 1 each 
First Aid Equipment 
Scissors, 5K-inch 1 each 
Tourniquet, field 1 pkg. 
Tablets, sulfadiazine 8 each 
Ointment, boric acid, 1 oz 2 tubes 
Dressing, first aid, small 1 pkg. 
Dressing, bandage, comp., 4-inch 1 pkg. 
Dressing, eye 1 pkg. 
Adhesive strips 3 sets 
Butyn sulfate (plus 2%) and metaphen. ... 1 tube 
Iodine, mild tincture 10 minims 
Dressing, first aid, large, field type 2 each 
Sulfanilamide, 5 gr 2 pkgs. 
Eyepad, cotton, sterilized 33 each 
Ointment, boric acid, eye 2 tubes 
Tablet, halazone 100 each 
Handitape, sterilized, plane, 1 x33Tr.... 16 pieces 
Syrettes, morphine tartrate 2 tubes 
b. Western Group. The following listed ra- 
tions and first aid and emergency survival 
equipment were carried on PBM (Martin 
Mariner) aircraft operational flights, with 
crew of nine: 
Item Amount 
Pemmican 180 lbs. 
Ham, canned 1 2 lbs. 
Spam 7H lbs. 
Tablets, malted milk 2 lbs. 
Biscuits 8lbs. 
149 Item Amount 
Tea 20 lbs. 
Sugar 50 lbs. 
Salad oil 23 lbs. 
Beef, frozen 55 lbs. 
Vegetables, canned 45 lbs. 
Fruit, canned 48 lbs. 
Crackers, soda 12 lbs. 
Rice 50 lbs. 
Fruit, dried 18 lbs. 
Bouillon 12 lbs. 
D-ration chocolate 9 lbs. 
Peanut butter 14 lbs. 
Raisins 21 lbs. 
Soup, canned 24 cans 
Ration, aircraft, emergency tablets 350 cans 
Cheese, canned 12 lbs. 
Salt 5 lbs. 
Aircraft Emergency Survival Equipment 
Suit, immersion 12 each 
Bag, sleeping 12 each 
Gloves 12 pairs 
Stockings, wool 24 pairs 
Tent, 2-man 6 each 
Kit, fishing 1 each 
Raft, 7-man 2 each 
Machete 1 each 
Shovel 1 each 
Stock, alpine 2 each 
Stove, Coleman 4 each 
Lampblack 4 lbs. 
Line, 2-inch 200 feet 
Mae West 12 each 
Utensils, cooking 1 set 
Sled, man-haul, 2-man 1 each 
Paint, orange, w/brush 1 gallon 
Radio, “Gibson Girl". . . ; 1 each 
Matches 1 box 
Rifle, Springfield, .30 cal 1 each 
Shells, .30 cal 100 each 
Saw, ice 1 each 
Clothing, flight, extra set 1 per man 
Blankets, wool 3 each 
Harness and parachute 12 each 
Can, 1-gallon 2 each 
Implements, eating 1 set 
First Aid Equipment 
Stretcher, Stokes 1 each 
Blankets 5 each 
Splints 1 set 
In addition to the above first aid equip- 
ment, there were 4 each, kits, first aid, each 
kit containing the following items: 
Item Amount 
Bandage, compression, 2-inch 4 each 
Bandage, triangular, 40-inch 1 each 
Tube, ammonia 4 each 
Compress, bandage, 4-inch 1 each 
Ointment, burn 2 tubes 
Item Amount 
Application, iodine Beach 
Dressing, battle, small 1 each 
Tourniquet 1 each 
Two each life raft first aid kits contained 
the following; 
Item Amount 
Syrettes, morphine tartrate 1 tube 
Sulfadiazine 1 pkg. 
Ointment, boric acid 1 tube 
Iodine, tincture of 1 each 
One each emergency first aid box (sealed) 
contained: 
Item Amount 
Cotton, absorbent, roll 1 lb. 
Butyn sulfate and metaphen (eye ointment). 2 each 
Solution, boric acid 1 20 cc. 
Dressing, battle, small 5 each 
Gauze, plain 25 yards 
Syrettes, morphine, gr 5 each 
Sulfate, benzedrine 2 boxes 
Ointment, boric acid, 4-oz. tube 4 each 
Tourniquet, web 3 each 
Bandage 24 each 
Applications, iodine 3 each 
Tablet, Castrara 100 each 
Tag, emergency medical 1 book 
Pencil, skin, marking 1 each 
Bath, eye 1 each 
Dressing, battle, large 4 each 
Dressing, head 1 each 
Bandage, 2-inch 18 each 
Brandy, bottle, 2-oz 10 each 
Ointment, boric acid 1 lb. 
Adhesive tape, 2-inch 2 rolls 
Sulfanilamide 20 pks. 
Aspirins 1 box 
Inhalant, ammonia 20 each 
Stick, application 1 roll 
Splint, wire 1 each 
c. Central Group. (1) The following list of 
emergency equipment was carried on the 
R4D (C-47) flights (crew of five) from the 
aircraft carrier U. S. S. Philippine Sea to the 
base camp of the Central Group at Little 
America: 
Item Amount 
Life raft, 7-man 1 each 
Bag, sleeping, Arctic 5 each 
Suit, immersion 5 each 
Clothing, emergency, personal 5 each 
Mac West 5 each 
Radio, “Gibson Girl” 1 each 
Rations, K 10 days 
each man 
Note. Break-down of item, “Clothing, emergency, 
personal," is listed under (2) below. 
150 (2) The following listed rations and first 
aid and emergency survival equipment were 
carried on R4D (C-47) ski-equipped air- 
craft operational missions. 
(Crew of six) 
Total 
Weight No. 
Weight 
Item 
(pounds) Items 
(pounds) 
Compass, pocket. . . 
6 
1.5 
Glasses, sun 
6 pr. . 
1.0 
Saw, hand 
1.5 1 
1.5 
Rope, alpine, nyl 
feet. 
on, 120 5.5 1 
5.5 
Stock, alpine 
2.0 1 
2.0 
Mauls 
12.0 2 
24.0 
Liners, parka, wool. 
1.0 6 
6.0 
Flag, trail marker. . 
100.. 
10.0 
Pot, cooking 
1 
Knives, sheath 
Bowls, wood 
2 
6 
■ 20.0 
Cups, plastic 
6 
Spoons, wood 
8 
Cans, fuel, sterno . . 
6 
Total weight. 
593.0 
Rations 
(One man for 60 days) 
Amount 
Item 
(pounds) 
Pemmican 
.... 15 
Tea . 
Milk, powdered 
• 71/2 
Peanut butter 
.... 2 
Cocoa, powder 
.... 1 
Oatmeal» 
.... 2 
Cereal blocks 1 
.... 33/ 
Cocoa blocks 1 
.... 334 
Breakfast 2 
.... 30 
Supper2 
.... 30 
Sugar, bulk 
.... 2 
Cheese 
.... 334 
Bacon 
.... 5 
Biscuits 
61/2 
Butter 
.... 4 
Salt 
.... 1 
Choc blocks 1 
.... 23/ 
Sugar blocks 1 
.... 10 
Dinner 2 
1 From Army E ration. 
2 From Army K ration. 
.... 30 
In addition to the above list of emergency 
survival equipment, each crew member on 
each extended flight was required to carry 
the following list of personal emergency 
survival clothing: 
Item Amount 
Liners, shoe, felt 3 pairs 
Cap, knit, watch 1 each 
Glasses, sun 1 pair 
Mukluks, canvas (Army QM) 1 pair 
Booties, felt, mukluk 1 pair 
Mittens, leather 1 pair 
Socks, double sole, light weight 1 pair 
Socks, woo! (long top) 2 pairs 
Underwear, wool, heavy 2 pairs 
Jacket, field, pile lined 1 each 
Parka, Pile lined, inner 1 each 
Mask, face 1 each 
Mittens, wool, inner liners 2 pairs 
Boots, ski 1 pair 
Inner soles, mukluk 1 pair 
Scarf, silk 1 each 
Shirt, wool (Army O. D.) 1 each 
Socks, wool (short top) 2 pairs 
Tro users, woo I (Army QM) 1 pair 
Sweater, wool, turtle neck (Army QM)... . 1 each 
Parka, windbreaker 1 each 
First Aid Equipment 
Item Amount 
Band-aids, 1 inch x 3% inches 16 each 
Tourniquet 1 each 
Pad, eye, cotton 2 each 
Ointment, boric acid, % oz 2 tubes 
Ointment, boric acid, 1 oz 2 tubes 
Tablets, sulfadiazine Beach 
Scissors 1 pair 
Tablets, halazone 100 each 
Iodine, swabs 10 each 
Bandage compress, 4 inch 1 each 
Strip, adhesive 3 sets 
Ointment, ophthalmic, % oz 1 tube 
One each of the above rations was carried 
for each crew member on operational flights. 
Each individual ration was packed in an 
aerial delivery container, three of the con- 
tainers having attached a 24-foot cargo type 
parachute for aerial delivery in case of an 
emergency. 
Aircraft Emergency Survival Equipment 
(Crew of 
six) 
Total 
Weight 
No. 
Weight 
Item 
(pounds) 
Items 
(pounds) 
Bag, sleeping, Arctic 
14.0 
6 
84.0 
Tent, mountain, two-man. . . . 
30.0 
2 
60.0 
Sled, man-hauling 
34.0 
2 
68.0 
Harness, man-hauling 
3.5 
2 
7.0 
Sled, tank 
7.5 
2 
15.0 
Skis and bindings 
10.5 
6 pr.. . 
63.0 
Ski poles 
1.5 
6 pr... 
9.0 
Radio, Gibson Girl 
35.0 
1 
35.0 
Stove, Coleman, single burner 
Cans, 5-gal. Blitz, with gas for 
3.0 
2 
6.0 
43.0 
3 
129.0 
stoves. 
Suit, windproof 
2.4 
6 
14.4 
Shovel, short handle 
5.0 
1 
5.0 
Panel, signal 
2.5 
1 
2.5 
Shovels, trail 
2.0 
1 
2.0 
Hammer, geologist’s 
Crampons 
1.0 
1 
1.0 
3.0 
2 pr. . 
6.0 
Flares, smoke, orange, hand. . 
8 
2.0 
151 Item Amount 
Dressing, battle, small 1 each 
Dressing, battle, large 2 each 
Surettes, morphine, % gr 2 each 
In addition to the above list of first aid 
equipment the following kit, first aid, pilot, 
was added: 
Item Amount 
Bandage, gauze, roller, plain, 2 inches by 6 
yards 1 2 each 
Bandage, gauze, roll, 3 inches by 10 yards. 1 2 each 
Dressing, battle, large 4 each 
Aspirin, 5 grain 50 each 
Pamphlet, first aid 1 each 
Gauze, surgical, absorbent, 36 inches by 
25 yards 1 each 
Syrettes, morphine, 1/2 Sr- (5 in box) 2 boxes 
Tablet, sulfadiazine, iy% gr. (100 in bottle). 1 bottle 
Ointment, boric acid 1 lb. 
Note. Aircraft emergency equipment for ship-based aircraft, 
and the JA (Norseman) were as given in the operation plan 
(par 6b and c, sec. I). 
Since the operations of the OY (Army L-5) 
aircraft were limited in range to sight of the 
base camp, emergency equipment was not 
carried in this aircraft. 
7. Communications. 
a. Air-Ground Portable Sets. There were 
available for emergency use several SCR-536 
(Handy - Talky) radio sets. Occasional 
ground tests were made which showed 
shorter than normal distances operable. 
This was probably due to the fact that bat- 
teries available for this set were over-age, 
being dated 1944. No air-ground tests were, 
made nor were any of these sets equipped 
for aerial delivery. 
b. M29C {Weasel). Only one of the seven 
available M29C vehicles were radio equip- 
ped, the set being an SCR-610 which was not 
suitable for air-ground communications as 
aircraft did not carry radio equipment which 
operated on the same frequency. However 
there was available for installation M29C 
radio equipment (SCR-694) which could 
have been supplemented for air-ground 
emergency operations. 
c. LVT {Landing Vehicle, Tracked). The 
LVT type vehicles were equipped with Navy 
type TCS (1.6 to 12 megs) radios. This 
type set proved satisfactory for air-ground 
communications and on an aviation gas 
cache laying field trip over 100 miles from 
the base camp at Little America this set 
proved adequate for communications be- 
tween vehicles and the base camp. 
Note. For further detailed information and discus- 
sion on aircraft, vehicle, and ground radio equipment, 
refer to chapter 8. 
d. Additional Safety Precautions. (1) Since 
there were no personnel or equipment whose 
primary duty or function was for search and 
rescue operations, other than the JA (Norse- 
man) aircraft, all operational flight and 
ground units (Weasels, LVT’s, and dog 
teams) with their personnel would have im- 
mediately reverted to this status in case it 
became necessary to put emergency opera- 
tions into effect. 
(2) As an added safety, operational ex- 
ploratory flights into the interior of the Ant- 
arctic Continent were made with flights of 
two aircraft (crew of 6 each), each carrying 
out his own individual mission and at the 
same time covering the other aircraft for 
any emergency landing away from the air- 
strip at the base camp. 
(3) Still another precaution was taken in 
rigging three of the six 60-day individual 
emergency food rations (fig. 159) with 24- 
foot cargo parachutes for aerial delivery (par. 
6c). It was planned that if one of the two 
aircraft made a forced landing, the second 
aircraft of the flight would immediately 
assume a rescue status and as such would not 
only fix the position of the downed aircraft 
and relay this information to the base camp, 
but would, as well, drop the three parachute 
equipped rations of food to the downed 
personnel, giving them food for six men for a 
period of 90 days instead of the 60-day ration 
carried in the aircraft. Half of all aircraft 
emergency rations were so rigged. This, 
however, would leave the second aircraft 
152 a deep cut in the percentage of flying days 
into the interior. Although the decision of 
dropping half of one’s emergency rations 
puts quite a responsibility on the skipper of 
the aircraft toward his crew, in this case it is 
a necessary one, for Antarctic weather has 
been known to be bad for weeks at a time, 
weather that would hinder search and rescue 
operations. This has been found true 
throughout the Arctic. This observer knows 
from past experiences in the Antarctic (Byrd 
Expedition, 1939-41) that it is more true in 
these southern latitudes. 
(5) As air operations were to continue up 
until the actual date of evacuation of the 
ships and men from the base camp at Little 
America IV, such date being decided on by 
the condition of the ice pack and weather 
conditions in general, a winter party of 10 
officers and 25 enlisted men had been 
selected and were prepared to remain to 
continue any search and rescue operations 
which might have been necessary after the 
date necessary for the evacuation of the 
Central Group. 
Figure 159. Emergency rations and equipment being 
lashed down in C-47 prior to flight. Note corner 
of Tokyo tanks in foreground. 
with only a 30-day ration for six men instead 
of the full 60-day period. It must be as- 
sumed, however, that the captain of the 
rescue aircraft, prior to dropping the three 
food rations, had no reason to believe that 
his aircraft would develop any difficulties 
serious enough to necessitate his also making 
an emergency landing, prior to doing all 
possible toward the rescue of the stranded 
personnel and the safe return of his crew to 
the base camp. 
(4) This procedure might well seem an 
added hazard to the casual reader, and this 
observer will make no attempt to detract 
from that trend of thought. However, air 
operations, or air support to stranded per- 
sonnel in the Antarctic is difficult under the 
very best conditions. The lack of weather 
information from many stations along or 
adjacent to a flight route automatically takes 
Figure 160. Emergency camp built on top of Little 
America III (Byrd Expedition, 1939-41). Tops of 
buildings of old camp are below the surface. 
765274—48——11 
153 (6) Buildings, of Little America III, base 
camp of the United States Antarctic Service 
Expedition, 1939-41 located 2 miles south of 
the Central Group’s base camp, were re- 
enforced, food, medical, and radio supplies 
were moved in, and in general prepared for 
immediate occupation. Since rescue opera- 
tions were not necessary within the Central 
Group, it was not necessary to man this 
emergency winter camp. (See fig. 160.) 
SECTION IV. Observations 
1. Crash Team and Equipment. 
At the site of the airstrip, base camp, 
Central Group only one M29C was utilized 
as “crash equipment.” This unit comprised, 
in personnel, the Base Medical Officer and 
one pharmacist’s mate who took up a posi- 
tion halfway down the airstrip on all take- 
offs and landings. Crash equipment, other 
than medical supplies, carried on a 1-ton 
Army sled behind the Weasel consisted only 
of several emergency fire-fighting bottles 
(fig. 170). 
2. Dog Teams. 
Results of utilization of the dog teams 
were practically nil, due in great part to 
the lack of training and experience of both 
assigned dog drivers and the dogs themselves. 
Three enlisted Navy personnel received a 
short training period in dog driving and 
handling prior to departure of the Task 
Force from the United States. However, 
this training period was not sufficient due 
to circumstances beyond control. Frofi- 
ciency in the art of dog driving comes only 
with many months of training and actual 
trail experience. The dog teams were used, 
in some cases, for hauling cargo from the 
ships to the site of the base camp, a distance 
of about 2 miles. However, this simple task 
became a problem as lead dogs would not 
answer to commands nor stay to a trail. 
It was necessary at all times for one man to 
“break trail” and always remain in front 
of the dogs, leading and coaxing them on. 
3. Dog Sleds. 
Sleds were, in part, bolted together in* 
stead of lashed with the conventional raw- 
hide. This detracted greatly from the flexi- 
bility of the sleds throughout. Although 
damage to the dog sleds was not great, 
probably due to the fine surface conditions 
prevailing in the vicinity of Little America 
and the minimum use they received, it is 
felt by this observer, experienced in this sort 
of operation, that on an extended trail 
journey, these sleds would not have remained 
in one piece very long. 
4. Aerial Delivery Tests. 
a. At the request of this observer, Captain 
Murray A. Wiener, and with the acknowl- 
edged aid of Marvyn D. Sprake, Parachute 
Rigger, First Class, U. S. N., two aerial 
delivery cargo tests were made. 
b. The first test utilized a 24-foot Panatex 
Navy type Quick Attachable Chest Para- 
chute, rigged with a 15%-foot static line of 
1,400-pound tensile strength, attached to the 
pull handle by means of 5,000-pound tensile 
strength snaps. 
c. The drop-kit container, carrying two 5- 
gallon “Blitz” cans filled with 72-octane 
gasoline, was attached to the parachute in 
the conventional manner. The only padding 
used in the container was 12 inches of felt in 
the bottom. The drop was made from an 
R4D (G-47) aircraft, flying at an altitude of 
800 feet at a speed of 85 knots. 
154 material, because of the presence of the 
paint, tends to harden and become brittle 
when exposed to low temperatures such as 
was recorded at the time of this test, —10° F. 
In the case of this failure the container had 
become so hard and brittle that the bungee 
cords could not pull back the container flaps 
and free the pilot chute and main canopy. 
e. The second cargo parachute drop was 
made with an experimental 18-foot muslin 
“Baseball” type cargo parachute (fig. 162). 
(1) The canopy of this parachute was of 
unbleached natural colored muslin. The 
container was of a plastic box type and the 
static line actuated. 
(2) This drop was also made from an 
R4D (C-47) aircraft flying at an altitude of 
800 feet at a speed of 85 knots. There was 
a ground wind of 1 to 4 knots variable and 
the temperature 0° F. The cargo container 
was loaded with two 5-gallon “Blitz” cans 
filled with 72-octane gasoline, giving a gross 
weight of 95 pounds. 
Figure 161. Results of unsuccessful aerial delivery 
cargo test, utilizing 24-foot Panatex Navy type 
quick attachable parachute. Cargo container 
buried itself 3 feet into hard snow (neve) surface. 
Parachute canopy did not open until unit was 
approximately 40 feet from surface. 
d. The following observations were made 
concerning this test: 
(1) The static line performed its function 
correctly; however, the parachute failed to 
“stream” or “open” until approximately 40 
feet above the surface; it failed to function 
in any manner after the static line had pulled 
the rip cord. When the pilot chute finally 
worked itself clear, it was carried away while 
pulling the main canopy free. 
(2) The drop kit buried itself 3 feet in the 
hard snow (neve) surface (fig. 161). The 
“Blitz” cans were undamaged, except for a 
slight dent in one can. No fuel was lost. 
(3) The parachute failed to function be- 
cause the canopy container failed to open 
after the rip cord had been pulled. The 
canopy container was manufactured by 
Panatex, this being the commercial name of 
a paint-impregnated canvas used extensively 
by the Navy for all types of parachute 
containers as parachute protection against 
salt water spray and other damaging con- 
ditions evident in sea operations. This 
Figure 162. "Baseball” type parachute and cargo 
container. 
155 on this type parachute is secured to the skirt 
of the chute rather than the apex. Only one 
oscillation was observed after opening. 
(5) This parachute is delivered from the 
manufacturer in a ready-to-use waterproof 
container and may be stored for an indefinite 
period of time. 
5. Personnel Parachute Jump Tests. 
a. As this observer, S. A. London, 1st 
Sergeant, is an Army trained paratrooper, 
assigned to a search and rescue unit of the 
Army Air Forces, Air Transport Command, 
it was desired by him and Captain Murray 
A. Wiener, Army Air Forces, Air Transport 
Command, search and rescue observer, that 
personnel parachute jump tests be made. 
Permission for these tests was granted by the 
Commander, Task Force 68, at the request 
of Captain Wiener. 
b. Three test jumps were made. One 
jump was made by a nonqualified, non- 
service-trained Navy enlisted man whose 
observations are not included here since his 
observations were practically nil due to his 
inexperience in parachuting. Parachute 
Rigger 1c Marvyn D. Sprake, U. S. N., has 
contributed to this report by submitting to 
this observer all his personal observations 
of a jump made on 21 February 1947. A 
jump was made by this observer on 4 
February 1947. A full report follows. 
c. Observations and notations of parachute 
jump made by S. A. London, 1st Sergeant, 
United States Army Air Forces, Air Tran- 
sport Command, on 4 February 1947: 
(1) Heighth of jump: 2,500 feet above the 
Ice Shelf. This height was chosen so that 
extended observations could be made while 
in descent. 
(2) Type parachute used; T/5 assembly 
(28-foot main with 24-foot reserve parachute) 
(fig. 163). 
(3) Weight of parachutist: 160 pounds 
without field equipment or added weight of 
any nature. 
Figure 163. Sgt. S. A. London just prior to making 
parachute test jump. Note T/5 parachute assembly 
and static line. 
(3) Two and one-half seconds elapsed from 
the time the unit was kicked from the air- 
craft to complete opening of the canopy. 
Forty-four seconds elapsed from the time of 
full opening until the unit reached the sur- 
face, a total of 46% seconds. No damage was 
noted to cargo kit or parachute. The kit 
made an impression in the hard snow (neve) 
surface 2 inches deep at one end, tapering 
to 7 inches at the opposite end. The approx- 
imate drift was estimated to have been 390 
feet. 
(4) The opening of this parachute was 
slightly eccentric, as the parachute made 
what appeared to be a complete oscillation 
before it fully opened. At the moment of 
opening, the kit itself was about 20 feet above 
the chute. It was later discovered that this 
was caused by the static line. The static line 
156 (4) Type of aircraft: R4D (C-47). 
(5) Landing surface: wind-packed (neve) 
snow. 
(6) Time: 1,800 hours local time. Lati- 
tude 78° 32' S. Longitude 163° 50' W. 
(7) Wind: 25 miles per hour at 2,500 feet, 
7 miles per hour at snow surface. 
(8) Visibility: unlimited. 
(9) Ceiling: unlimited. 
(10) Temperature: — 1° at 2,500 feet;+5° 
on the surface. 
(11) Clothing worn: jacket, held, Ml943 
without liner; Army Air Force vest with hood; 
standard OD shirt and trousers; under- 
clothing, cotton; socks, wool, heavy; shoes, 
shoepak; glasses, sun—Air Force issue. 
(12) After take-off the jumper removed 
the parachute jump door located within the 
cargo door on the after port side of the 
fuselage. One dry run was made over the 
Bay of Whales and Little America to 
familiarize the parachutist with surrounding 
terrain into which he would jump. It was 
particularly noticeable that the crisp, light 
air over the continent, at 2,500 feet, had an 
invigorating effect upon one. Much more 
so than comparable heights over warmer 
areas. At approximately 1801 hours (local 
time) the jump signal was received from the 
pilot. The jumper immediately stepped out 
into the on-rush of the propeller wash. The 
opening was felt about 2% seconds after 
stepping from the door of the R4D (C-47). 
The 2 opening was determined by 
counting as taught by the Airborne School, 
Fort Benning, Georgia. A steady wind of 
approximately 25 miles per hour, north to 
south, was found to be drifting the jumper 
from front to rear with considerable oscilla- 
tion. By grasping the left forward riser and 
climbing it for approximately 10 feet a para- 
chute turn of 180° was accomplished, this 
putting the wind to the back of the jumper. 
Several attempts were made to check oscil- 
lation, all of which proved successful, but 
Figure 164. Sgt. S. A. London after parachute jump, 
showing depth of impact impression (approximately 
2 inches). 
oscillation soon started again. It was found 
that the parachute could be slipped in any 
direction with little difficulty. This factor, 
it is believed, can be attributed to the thin, 
light atmosphere. The rate of descent was 
slightly faster than normal, with this type 
chute, over warmer areas. However, land- 
ing body shock was found to be much less 
than normally encountered due to under- 
crust of snow and ice (fig. 164). Approxi- 
mately 2 minutes and 20 seconds elapsed from 
the time of exit to surface landing. The para- 
chute landing fall, as taught in the Airborne 
School, Fort Benning, Georgia, was used in 
the landing to determine the extent of shock 
absorption offered by the snow and ice sur- 
face. Body shock was nil in comparison to 
an earth landing. 
157 d. Observations and notations of parachute 
jump made by Marvyn D. Sprake, Parachute 
Rigger 1c, U. S. N., on 21 February 1947: 
(1) Height: 1,500 feet above sea ice. 
(2) Parachute type; T/5 assembly—28- 
foot main canopy with 24-foot reserve. 
(3) Weight of jumper: 148 pounds without 
additonal equipment. 
(4) Aircraft used: R4D (C-47). 
(5) Speed: 85 knots. 
(6) Landing surface: neve snow. 
(7) Time: 1400 hours Little America time. 
(8) Wind: 1,500 feet, 36 knots; on surface 
20 to 25 knots east to west. Aerology had 
reported prior to take-off, 10 knots at 1,000 
feet and 1 to 5 knots variable on surface. 
(9) Visibility: 12 miles. 
(10) Ceiling: 5,000 feet. 
(11) Temperature: —5° F. 
(12) Clothing: woolen underwear; OD 
shirt and trousers; field jacket, Ml943 with- 
out liner; two pairs ski socks and shoepaks; 
gloves, Navy intermediate flying; goggles, 
Navy N-2 modified by cutting additional 
vents to forestall fogging. 
(13) Immediately after taking off I as- 
sisted the crew chief in the removal of the 
jump hatch. A dry run was made to ac- 
quaint the pilots with the desired course and 
exit point. Neither the pilot nor co-pilot 
had ever dropped either cargo or personnel 
before; however, I had briefed both before 
leaving the ground as to altitude, direction, 
speed, etc. On the second run while stand- 
ing in the door I noticed that the tips of my 
fingers on both hands had become quite cold 
and were beginning to feel slightly numb. 
As we neared the exit point I received the 
signal to jump and did so. At the time I 
thought we were a bit short of the selected 
exit point. This later proved to be correct. 
However, I jumped on signal. Exit was 
made without difficulty and opening was 
completed in approximately 2% seconds. 
After the opening shock, I checked the 
canopy and then turned my attention to the 
oscillation which was now extreme. It was 
at this time I saw the drift was terrific and if 
no countermeasures were taken there was a 
possibility of drifting into the Bay of Whales. 
I climbed about 8 feet of the forward right 
hand riser and shrouds in an attempt to spin 
the chute to the right; however, because of 
the greatly accelerated wind, over the ex- 
pected maximum of 10 knots, this was 
impossible. I released the right hand riser 
and started spilling out on the left; this 
speeding my descent and moving somewhat 
away from the edge of the Bay ice in the 
event I was to drift that far. I soon saw that 
I was going in short of the edge of the 
Barrier, so prepared for landing. From the 
experience gained by First Sergeant S. A. 
London on a previous jump here, I had 
decided to land with feet spread about 6 
inches apart. I assumed this landing posi- 
tion. My back was into the wind so no body 
turn was necessary. Upon striking the sur- 
face, which proved to be much softer than 
normally encountered, I attempted to roll 
forward, but because of the high wind was 
dragged across the surface before I could 
roll. After being dragged about 40 feet I 
managed to spill the chute. After spilling 
out I started to get out of my harness. I 
experienced some difficulty in releasing the 
snaps of the reserve as well as the snaps on 
the harness itself. This was caused by the 
fact that my hands had become very cold 
and numb during the time spent in the door 
and the descent. Because of this it required 
about 1 minute to remove all jump gear. 
158 SECTION V. Recommendations 
1. Clothing and Individual Equipment. 
The following suggestions for equipment 
and clothing are recomniended for use by 
rescue paratroopers on the Antarctic Con- 
tinent, or other similar conditions which 
prevailed in this area at this time, both in the 
air and on snow and ice surface. The effi- 
ciency and comfort of parachute personnel, 
for rescue work, will be greatly increased. 
The clothing and equipment listed is believed 
to be adequate for an extended field opera- 
tion over Antarctic surfaces: 
Equipment Per individual 
Glasses, sun, with unbreakable lenses. . . 2 each 
Ski, cross-country, with poles 1 pair each 
Compass, lensatic 2 ea ground 
unit 
Watch, wrist, navigator 2 ea ground 
unit 
Knife, hunting, with sheath 1 each 
Knife, Scout 1 each 
Bag, musette, with harness 1 each 
Bag, sleeping, Arctic, with waterproof 
covering 1 each 
Clothing 
Trousers, woolen 1 pair 
Trousers, windproof 1 pair 
Shirt, woolen 1 each 
Jacket, field, Ml 943 with hood, with 
liner 1 each 
Parka, heavy, alpaca lined, type N-1, 
spec. No. Y-3267 1 each 
Jacket, windproof, light 1 each 
Cap, wool or fur 1 each 
Drawers, wool, medium weight 2 pairs 
Undershirt, wool, medium weight 2 each 
Socks, wool, ski 4 pairs 
Socks, cushion sole 4 pairs 
Boots, ski, mountain, modified (6-inch 
tops) 1 pair 
Mukluk, Air Corps 1 pair 
Gloves, shell, trigger finger, type II, with 
liners, wool 3 pairs 
Inner soles 4 pairs 
2. Parachutes. 
a. It is recommended that the Quick 
Release Harness be supplied for use by search 
and rescue parachutists. The importance 
of this may be noted in paragraph 5d (13), 
section IV. 
b. It is highly recommended that all 
parachute canopies, personnel or cargo, be 
orange in color instead of the conventional 
white which is so difficult to see against the 
solid white background of a snow surface. 
c. It is recommended that the “Baseball” 
type cargo delivery parachute as mentioned in 
paragraph 4e, section IV, be requisitioned 
for use by all Army Air Force search and 
rescue units. This chute will carry up to 
a 300-pound load. 
d. The use of Panatex (paint impregnated) 
parachute containers is not recommended 
in cold weather operations. 
3. Aircraft Equipment. 
a. The flooring around the para-exit should 
be of a sandpaper nature instead of the slick 
metal surface as found at present. The 
frigid temperatures tend to frost this metal 
thereby making uncertain footing for the 
jumper. 
b. It is recommended that C-47 type air- 
craft assigned for search and rescue operations 
be equipped with a power-operated belt 
conveyor cargo discharger, which requires 
no discharging crew. 
c. Recommend all search and rescue air- 
craft which would accommodate observing 
personnel on searching missions, i. e., C-47, 
C-64, be provided with observation “blis- 
ters,” fitting into the windows of the fuselage. 
This equipment was successfully used by the 
search and rescue section, Alaskan Division, 
A. T. C., during the war. Plans and blue 
prints for subject “blisters” are available in 
Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washing- 
ton, D. C. 
159 d. Considerable difficulty was encountered 
prior to take-off in breaking loose the aircraft 
skis, which would freeze to the snow surface. 
Studies and tests should be made to simplify 
this task. On this operation, the problem 
was taken care of by laying down 2-inch 
pieces of plywood covered over with Diesel 
oil on which the aircraft would taxi following 
a landing. Even with this precaution, it was 
necessary to “rev” up the engine and at 
the same time hit the skis with a wooden 
maul. A means of mechanically breaking 
the skis loose, from the cockpit, would be a 
tremendous aid. 
4. Emergency Clothing and Equipment. 
a. Emergency clothing and survival equip- 
ment should be packed in waterproof con- 
tainers for flights over water. 
b. Matches, waterproof or otherwise, as 
part of emergency kits should be packed in 
waterproof containers. 
c. Cooking stoves for emergency kits, such 
as the stove, cooking, one burner, should be 
modified to use 100-octane gasoline. For 
normal operation this stove requires white 
gas. This suggested modification would 
enable stranded personnel to use their air- 
craft fuel, providing aircraft did not burn on 
landing. 
5. Trail Flags. 
Tests should be made for the manufacture 
of a trail flag, 12 by 14 inches, orange in 
color, attached to a weighted staff which can 
be thrown from an aircraft, landing upright 
with the lower portion of the flag at least 3 
feet off the surface, acting as a trail marker. 
Where it is necessary for personnel to travel 
through crevassed areas it would be a 
relatively simple operation for an aircraft to 
drop these “trail” flags, marking a safe and 
easier route for the ground party. 
6. Pilot Training. ‘ 
Rated pilots assigned to search and rescue 
units should undergo training in the para- 
chuting of personnel and cargo; a superior 
degree of efficiency should be attained in 
placing cargo as close as possible to stranded 
personnel. Travel over snow is sometimes 
very difficult; to crashed personnel who may 
be suffering from shock, the retrieving of 
emergency supplies from any greater than 
normal distance may prove fatal. A mini- 
mum of 6 weeks’ training in aerial delivery 
and resupply is recommended. 
7. Crash Team Personnel. 
Recommend the crash team include, be- 
sides medical officer and aid, at least three 
enlisted men familiar with aircraft and neces- 
sary tools such as tin snips, wire cutters, bolt 
cutters, etc., for cutting into crashed aircraft. 
8. Gibson Girl Radio Equipment. 
Recommend the “Kytoon” replace the 
“balloon” and “kite” in the Gibson Girl 
radio. It is further suggested that the “Ky- 
toon” be painted with an orange metallic 
paint, which would render this unit visible, 
when aloft, for many miles and would reflect 
radar signals to searching aircraft. 
9. Vehicles. 
It is suggested that all M29 (Weasel) ve- 
hicles be fitted with a plywood protective 
top in lieu of the canvas cover, the plywood 
section to be fitted with Lucite windows. 
The cover should also be fitted with a trap 
window in the rear, large enough to pass a 
stretcher through and into the cab itself. 
160 SECTION VI. Plan and S.O.P. for Army Search and 
Rescue Unit in the Antarctic 
1. General. 
a. The plan outlined below for a search 
and rescue unit, with its Standard Operating 
Procedure, is hereby submitted for study by 
the War Department relative to any future 
Army operation, similiar in scope to Opera- 
tion “Highjump,” in the Antarctic. 
b. Search and rescue operations and the 
amount and type of equipment necessary 
for such a unit to successfully fulfill its 
mission depends entirely on the area of 
responsibility and terrain features. 
c. The plan as presented below is based on 
a single operating base such as that operated 
by the Central Group of Task Force 68. 
A more elaborate scheme would be necessary 
where two or more bases were set up, 
elaborating on the utilization of communi- 
cations and weather and rescue facilities, 
which would be evident with additional 
bases whether they were along the coast or 
in the interior. 
d. Since Antarctic conditions present an 
over-all problem far exceeding the limita- 
tions of experience and knowledge gained 
by personnel in other theaters of operation, 
it is first recommended that the War Depart- 
ment fully utilize personnel, whether they 
be Army, Navy, Marine, or civilian, who 
have had previous experience in these south- 
ern latitudes. Such personnel should be 
permitted to sit in on the planning of such 
an operation or expedition and later be 
retained in such status as to exercise some 
degree of authority in helping to make 
decisions relative to varied operations in 
the field. 
2. Primary Mission. 
The primary mission of a search and rescue 
unit is to render emergency assistance to 
distressed aircraft and vessels with eventual 
rescue of personnel as its objective. Included 
in this service is distress communication 
procedures, distress flight control, survival 
methods and equipment, and the briefing of 
personnel in these matters. 
3. Rescue Team. 
It is of paramount importance that certain 
equipment such as aircraft, ground vehicles, 
crash boats, equipment to make up rescue 
aerial delivery kits, and selected personnel 
be assigned to comprise a “rescue team.” 
This “unit” must be available for immediate 
operations when aircraft are “in flight” on 
operational missions over water, sea ice, or 
continental ice. The personnel should be 
thoroughly briefed in search and rescue 
operations which should include familiarity, 
if possible, with their area of responsibility 
(the farthest distance away from the base 
camp in any direction which can be flown 
safely by the longest range aircraft available). 
4. Minimum Unit. 
A minimum search and rescue unit is out- 
lined below: 
a. Rescue Operations Center. (1) To central- 
ize information. 
(2) To exercise emergency flight control 
when necessary. 
(3) To direct primary rescue facilities. 
(4) To coordinate secondary rescue facili- 
ties. 
65274—48 12 
161 b. Communication Net. (1) To receive and 
relay distress information. 
(2) To expedite and direct communica- 
tions for search and rescue operations at the 
direction of the base rescue officer. 
(3) To establish, if possible, position of 
unit in distress, utilizing all available com- 
munication facilities. 
c. Search and Rescue Equipment. (1) Two 
each C-47 or C-54 aircraft, (ski-equipped) 
with long range tanks, with crews, equipped 
for towing gliders and rigged for personnel 
“snatch” operations. 
(2) Two each Norseman aircraft, with 
crew, and equipped with skis. 
(3) Two each L-5 aircraft, with skis. 
(4) Two each glider, powered, ski- 
equipped, with crews and snatch equipment. 
(5) Six each sets, “snatch” equipment, for 
personnel. 
(6) Two each Weasels, with 20-inch tracks, 
with crews. 
(7) Four each dog teams, 2 drivers each 
team (11 dogs per team). 
(8) Two each crash boat, 42-foot with 
crew. 
(9) Two each helicopter, with crew. 
(10) Four each paratroopers. 
(11) Necessary emergency survival aerial 
delivery kits, to include communication 
equipment such as “Handy-Talky” radio 
sets (SCR-536) to be dropped to stranded 
personnel from searching aircraft so as to 
establish immediate air-ground communica- 
tion. 
d. Aircraft Emergency Kits. The emergency 
kit listed in par. 6 c, sec. Ill, including food, 
clothing, first aid and emergency survival 
equipment, is adequate for Antarctic air 
operations. Emergency kits for Army Ant- 
arctic operations should be similar in content 
to this kit. 
e. Emergency Rescue Drop Kits. (1) Emerg- 
ency rescue drop kits should be prepared and 
available in sufficient quantity to outfit all 
aircraft available for search and rescue 
operations. 
(2) Besides those drop kits similar in con- 
tent to the aircraft emergency kits (food, 
clothing, first aid, and implements) addi- 
tional kits should be prepared, such as; 
(a) Emergency crash kits (bolt cutters, 
wire and tin cutters, block and tackle, etc.E 
(b) Emergency communication equipment 
(Handy-Talky radio, hand generated trail 
sets, etc.). 
5. Training. 
Prior to departing on an operation of this 
magnitude, all • flight crews, operational as 
well as search and rescue, should be fully 
checked out in ski operations, if such gear is 
to be used. Through available Navy train- 
ing films, they should be briefed on existing 
surface conditions, which vary with the 
seasons, as well as Antarctic environment 
and topography in general. 
a. Paratroopers, who are indispensable to a 
rescue unit, whose area of responsibility in- 
cludes terrain such as found in the Antarctic 
(mountains, glaciers, crevassed areas, etc.) 
should be thoroughly checked out in first 
aid, mountain climbing, skiing, dog driving, 
and any other ground rescue function neces- 
sary toward a successful rescue in this region. 
b. Sledge dogs and sledging equipment 
should be equipped with parachutes and 
harness for aerial delivery, along with their 
drivers (which may be the trained para- 
troopers), to stranded personnel. The utili- 
zation of dogs and sleds in the Antarctic 
should not be minimized for any reasons. 
Crevassed areas are evident throughout these 
regions which would present almost impos- 
sible or even impossible obstacles for any 
present day ground vehicle other than dogs 
and their accompanying equipment. 
c. The utilization of gliders and personnel 
“snatch” equipment is an innovation in the 
field of aerial rescue. Where rescue opera- 
162 tions are necessary and rescue aircraft cannot 
safely land to evacuate stranded personnel, 
because of soft snow surfaces, crevassed areas, 
etc., it may be possible to set a glider down 
for this same purpose. As a last resort, per- 
sonnel “snatch” equipment could be utilized, 
where other means are not practicable. 
d. Crash boat and crews should “stand by” 
in open water alongside the ice, engine 
running, during aircraft take-offs and land- 
ings. Following a take-off, boat and crew 
may secure only after aircraft is airborne and 
out of sight. Boat crews report back on duty 
15 minutes prior to the return of an aircraft 
and secure only after aircraft has landed. 
It is assumed that air bases will be in close 
proximity to the edge of the ice and open 
water. 
e. Helicopters will be utilized in search and 
rescue operations at the discretion of the base 
rescue officer, 
/. Paratroopers should act as aerial observers, 
equally divided among searching aircraft, so 
that this service can be immediately utilized 
if necessary, upon locating survivors by 
searching aircraft. 
6. Responsibilities of Personnel. 
The responsibilities of search and rescue 
unit personnel are defined as follows (fig. 
165): 
a. Aircraft Maintenance Officer. To provide 
maintenance to search and rescue aircraft as 
necessary, so that such designated aircraft 
will be available at all times for immediate 
emergency operations. 
b. Supply Officer. To make available, at all 
times, equipment necessary for the successful 
completion of emergency flight, ground or 
sea operations. 
c. Communication Officer. (1) To place all 
available communication facilities at the 
disposal of the base rescue officer during 
emergency operations. To guard emergency 
frequencies from the time of take-off until 
return of each flight, local or otherwise. To 
report immediately to the base rescue officer 
and the flight operations officer failure to 
make contact with any flight at scheduled 
radio contact periods. 
(2) The rescue communications net, which 
will function in receiving and disseminating 
distress information, will be the responsi- 
bility of the communication officer. 
d. Personal Equipment Officer. To provide, 
through regular supply channels, emergency 
(standard and nonstandard) equipment for 
all aircraft, operational and those designated 
for search and rescue operations. To check 
aircraft emergency equipment for breakage, 
spoilage, or missing equipment prior to each 
flight and immediately following the return 
of each flight. Aircraft should not be cleared 
for flight, local or otherwise, by the flight 
operations officer until clearance is con- 
curred in by the personal equipment officer. 
The personal equipment officer will be 
responsible for the briefing of aircrews and 
passengers on utilization of emergency equip- 
ment and will work in close coordination with 
the base rescue officer, especially in regard to 
emergency survival kits rigged for aerial 
delivery. 
Note. It is suggested that all operational flight 
crews, as well as search and rescue crews, be familiar 
with the search and rescue plan and search and 
rescue equipment, so that these crews may be called 
on for immediate aid whenever necessary. 
e. Base Rescue Officer. Will be reponsible 
for all air, ground, and sea equipment 
designated as search and rescue equipment. 
He will see that all such equipment is avail- 
able for immediate emergency operations at 
all times. He will also be responsible for the 
training of all designated rescue personnel in 
search and rescue procedures and operations. 
The base rescue officer should, prior to each 
operational flight, familiarize himself with 
the flight plan as filed with the flight opera- 
tions officer. He should direct and control 
163 search and rescue operations and be author- 
ized to call on any available personnel and/or 
equipment to aid in fulfilling his mission. 
The base rescue officer will be responsible to 
the flight operations officer, but in case of 
emergency operations, will be authorized to 
communicate direct with any higher author- 
ity or any other office or officer so that his 
mission may be completed with the least 
loss of time. The base rescue officer should 
also be responsible to see that adequate 
emergency sustenance and survival aerial 
delivery kits are aboard search and rescue 
aircraft at all times, ready for immediate use. 
A “ground rescue officer” will be selected and 
appointed by the base rescue officer to aid 
in carrying out search and rescue responsi- 
bilities. The ground rescue officer, through 
the base rescue officer, will be responsible for 
all ground and sea search and rescue equip- 
ment as well as personnel assigned to these 
units. 
7. Search Operations. 
a. When a distress report is received, or 
scheduled radio contacts between base and 
aircraft have not been accomplished, or 
an aircraft is assumed to be in distress for 
any reason, the base rescue officer will first 
obtain all available information on the 
situation, so that he may properly plan a 
course of action. If search is necessary, the 
following minimum factors will influence 
his planning: 
(1) Best known or most probable location 
of incident. This can best be determined 
from last radio contact and knowledge of 
the flight plan. 
EXPEDITION BASE 
COMDG OFFICER 
FLIGHT OPN 
OFFICER 
AC FT MAINT 
OFFICER 
SUPPLY 
OFFICER 
BASE RESCUE 
OFFICER 
COMMUNICATION 
OFFICER 
PERSONAL | 
EQUIP OFFICER 
RESCUE TEAM 
AERIAL DEL 
EMERG EQUIP 
AIR 
CREWS 
AIRCRAFT 
HELICOPTER 
GLIDERS 
PARA- 
TROOPERS 
VEHICLES 
DOGS a 
SLEDS 
GND RESCUE 
PERSONNEL 
CRASH 
BOATS 
BOAT 
CREWS 
Figure 165. Organization of search and rescue unit. 
164 (2) Local weather conditions as given in 
the last radio contact by missing aircraft and 
weather forecast as shown in the flight plan. 
(3) Whether personnel in distressed air- 
craft parachuted from aircraft, made a 
forced landing, ditched, etc. 
(4) If aircraft ditched, determine, if pos- 
sible, force and direction of ocean current. 
(5) Survival and sustenance equipment 
aboard (check with personal equipment 
officer) and number of personnel aboard 
aircraft. 
b. If it is decided that aircraft landings 
in close proximity to the location of the 
stranded personnel are not feasible and other 
means of rescue will be necessary, the 
situation will be carefully studied as to 
which available means of rescue will be the 
fastest and safest for all concerned. (How- 
ever, great the problem, it is the opinion of 
this observer that rescue in the Antarctic 
can be successfully effected provided ade- 
quate equipment and competent personnel 
are available.) The problem may present 
a comparatively simple operation utilizing 
gliders. Small aircraft such as the C-64 
(Norseman) or L-5 type aircraft may find 
it possible to land and evacuate survivors 
where the larger and heavier type aircraft 
cannot do so. It may be that helicopters 
can be used or that it is necessary to utilize 
the ground units. Perhaps a joint operation 
of all afore-mentioned units will be necessary. 
Time is the greatest factor in accomplishing 
a successful rescue mission. Such an opera- 
tion usually requires weather conditions at 
their best. If possible, where ground rescue 
units are employed, leaders of these units 
should be flown over their projected routes 
so that they may study, from the air, existing 
ground conditions and the terrain they will 
have to traverse with their equipment, 
whether it be with vehicles or dogs. This 
may also be accomplished by a study of 
photographs of the route. 
c. The base rescue officer should, in all 
cases, assume direct control over rescue pro- 
ceedings and in conjunction with this, study 
all problems with special regard to speed and 
safety in evacuating the distressed personnel. 
A successful rescue in the Antarctic might 
easily entail ground and air support in laying 
down fuel caches for use of smaller aircraft or 
helicopters whose operating range is limited. 
d. In general, missing aircraft can be con- 
sidered to be down on a track between two 
points. These points may be the point of 
departure (terminal station) and point of 
destination, or the point of last reported 
position and destination. This does not 
include incidents in which distress messages 
have been received giving full details as to 
position of incident, etc. In the case of most 
operational flights, the points of departure 
and destination will be the same, namely the 
airstrip at the base camp. However, for all 
practicable purposes, it can be assumed that 
the point of destination will be the farthest 
distance away from the airstrip prior to the 
return of the aircraft to the base camp in 
accordance with the flight route as filed in the 
flight plan. 
e. Since the length of the flight track will 
usually be extensive, the most feasible man- 
ner of conducting the initial search flight is 
for two aircraft (C-47) to search on parallel 
courses, one on each side of the course of the 
missing aircraft and each separated from this 
course by the limit of visibility. Searching 
altitudes will, in all cases, be determined by 
the pilots in accordance with terrain, visi- 
bility, and weather conditions en route. 
Upon reaching the “destination” of the miss- 
ing aircraft, and provided nothing has been 
seen, each of the searching aircraft will return 
to the base camp along parallel routes on 
their particular side of the course of the miss- 
ing aircraft, except that the return flight will 
be made at a distance twice the limit of 
visibility of the course of the missing aircraft. 
165 If communication equipment available to the 
survivors of the missing aircraft includes a 
portable transmitter such as the “Gibson 
Girl”, the chances of locating them is greatly 
improved. Guarding of the distress fre- 
quencies by search planes is therefore manda- 
tory. It is suggested also that continual 
photographs be made from each side of 
each aircraft as it flies along its search route, 
both out-bound and in-bound. 
/. Searching aircraft, flying as a team, will 
keep in constant radio communication with 
each other and each of the searching aircraft 
will make radio contact with the base camp 
every half hour. 
g. If, however, this initial search does not 
reveal the missing aircraft, then areas of 
search will be laid out and an intense search 
instigated at the discretion of the base rescue 
officer. All available aircraft, personnel, and 
equipment should be utilized as considered 
necessary to locate the missing aircraft in the 
A - B • C • D — BOUNDARIES OF SEARCH AREA 
V=DISTANCE OF VISIBILITY 
Figure 167. Square search. 
shortest period of time. It is suggested that 
areas square in nature be assigned searching 
aircraft, these areas, designated by latitude 
and longitude, to be chosen in light of the 
last position report of the missing aircraft, 
heading of the aircraft, weather conditions, 
etc. Areas will usually be adjacent to and 
on each side of the flight route. It is sug- 
gested that the “parallel” or “square” search 
patterns be used, as shown in figures 166 and 
167. As in the initial search operation along 
the flight route, continuous photographs 
should be made from each side of each of the 
search aircraft. Upon return of the search 
aircraft, each searching crew member and 
observer will be interrogated by the base 
rescue officer on the operation of the flight. 
Particular note should be given by flight 
crews to noting any portion of the ground 
not seen due to overcast, etc. This area, 
even though very small in size, should be 
plotted so that it may be investigated on a 
later flight, keeping in mind that a “lost” 
aircraft can be down anywhere within the 
radius of its fuel supply. 
A - B • C • D=BOUNDARIES OF SEARCH AREA 
V=DISTANCE OF VISIBILITY 
Figure 166. Parallel search. 
166 h. Upon sighting survivors on continental 
ice, search aircraft will immediately drop to 
survivors a “Handy-Talky” radio set so as 
to establish immediate air-ground radio 
communication. At this same time definite 
“fixes” will be made of the location of the 
survivors and transmitted immediately to the 
base camp and other searching aircraft in 
the vicinity. Sustenance and survival equip- 
ment will then be dropped. If, after radio 
communications have been established, it is 
found that medical or other personnel aid is 
necessary, the pilots of the searching aircraft 
will study the situation as to feasibility of 
landing their own aircraft for evacuation 
and rescue of the distressed personnel. 
Prior to any landings of this nature, a report 
of conditions and the situation will first be 
made to the base camp and approval granted 
by the base rescue officer. If landings are 
not possible in the immediate vicinity of the 
distressed personnel, then the services of the 
paratroopers will be utilized at the discretion 
of pilot of the searching aircraft. 
i. If in rescue operations it is necessary to 
utilize any or all of the ground units, it is 
suggested that the ground units be given full 
and complete air support and coverage. 
Where ground units may have to pass 
through dangerous terrain, such as that 
covered over by crevass areas, aircraft may 
spot these areas and by means of air-ground 
communication “pick” the route best suited 
to the ground party. If possible, ground 
units will be transported by air to the safest 
landing area nearest the distressed personnel. 
Ground vehicles such as the M29 (Weasel) 
will not fit into a C-47. However, the air 
transport of dogs, sleds, and trail equipment 
in this aircraft is a safe and suggested opera- 
tion. Ground units, when on the trail, 
should make at least one radio contact with 
the base camp each day, reporting their 
position and local weather conditions, etc. 
If weather permits, aircraft will fly over and 
make contact with both the distressed per- 
sonnel and the ground rescue party at least 
once a day. This air support must continue 
until all personnel have returned to the base 
camp. 
167 CHAPTER 7 
MEDICAL* 
SECTION I. Plans, Objectives, and Policies 
1. Medical Section. 
The staff medical section of Task Force 68 
(Operation Flighjump) was located on the 
Flagship, the U. S. S. Mount Olympus. This 
section consisted of the Surgeon, Commander 
H. B. Eisberg (MC), U. S. N.; Assistant 
Surgeon, Lt. (jg) H. H. Richardson (MC), 
U. S. N. R., and two hospital corpsmen. 
The Assistant Surgeon and one of the corps- 
men were to set up and operate the base 
camp dispensary. The dental section con- 
sisted of one officer, Lt. Owens (DC), 
U. S. N., who was to operate the base camp 
dispensary. The U. S. S. Mount Olympus had 
its regular medical complement. The medi- 
cal sections of the three groups of the task 
force were set up to operate independently 
of each other but under the supervision of 
the Task Force Surgeon who was with the 
Central Group. Frequent radio contacts 
were made regarding over-all medical poli- 
cies and plans. 
2. Medical Plan. 
Prior to departure of the task force, the 
following medical plan was drawn up and 
distributed to all concerned as an annex to 
Task Force 68 Operation Plan No. 2-46: 
a. Medical Personnel, Supplies, Equipment, and Facilities.** 
Staff 
Medical 
off. 
2 
Dental 
off. 
1 
Hasp. 
corps 
3 
Sick 
berths 
X-ray 
units 
Oper. 
rooms 
Commissioning 
allowances 
Central group: 
U. S. S. Mt. Olympus 
1 
1 
5 
17 
1 
1 
1,000 man 
U. S. C. G. C. Northwind. . . . 
1 
0 
1 
4 
1 
1 
300 man. 
U. S. S. Sennet 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Special sub. 
U. S. S. Burton Island 
1 
0 
1 
4 
1 
1 
300 man. 
U. S. S. Yancey.... 
1 
0 
1 
8 
0 
0 
600 man. 
U. S. S. Merrick 
1 
0 
3 
8 
0 
0 
600 man. 
Eastern Group: 
U. S. S. Pine Island 
1 
1 
8 
21 
1 
1 
1 ;000 man. 
U. S. S. Brownson 
1 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
Special DD. 
U. S. S. Canisteo 
1 
0 
2 
6 
0 
0 
300 man. 
Western Group: 
U. S. S. Currituck 
1 
1 
8 
21 
1 
1 
1,000 man. 
U. S. S. Henderson 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
- 0 
Special DD. 
U. S. S. Cacapon 
1 
0 
2 
6 
0 
0 
200 man. 
Base camp 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
Special field. 
(Staff) 
(Staff) 
(Staff) 
*The Army Observers Medical Section was divided into two 
parts. Aeromedical and related subjects were the primary 
interest of Lt. Col. Robert C. Love, AAF Medical Observer. 
The general medical aspects of the operation were assigned to 
Major Dan Crazier, observer from The Surgeon General's Office. 
** There are sufficient medical supplies available to the Task 
Force for 12 months. Each unit of the Task Force has been 
equipped to operate independently during the operation. 
168 b. Sanitation. (1) The general provisions 
concerning sanitation as outlined in the Man- 
ual of the Medical Department, chapter 
5 (a), will be carried out. 
(2) Sea water will not be used in the prep- 
aration of food. All salt water connections 
to galley spaces will be closed off. 
c. Quarantine Procedures. (1) When leaving 
from a United States port or a foreign port, 
the ships of the Task Force will procure a 
Bill of Health from the proper authorities of 
that port (usually the U. S. Public Health 
Service Quarantine Officer.) When sailing 
from a foreign port, a United States Bill of 
Health must be obtained from a United State 
Consular officer. 
(2) The Manual of the Medical Depart- 
ment, chapter 501, Quarantine Procedures, 
and NavMed 126, Manual of Naval Hygiene, 
chapter XXIV, will be consulted for further 
information. 
d. Evacuation and Treatment of the Sick and 
Injured. (1) On vessels without medical of- 
ficers, the senior pharmacist’s mate aboard 
will immediately notify the Commanding 
Officer in the event that the condition of a 
patient necessitates consultation with a medi- 
cal officer. A medical officer will be avail- 
able in each of the task groups. Any ship 
on a temporarily isolated station will either 
rejoin the nearest task group, or, weather 
permitting, evacuation by air will be carried 
out. 
(2) Evacuation to the United States will 
not be possible. 
(3) The Commander Task Force Sixty- 
Eight will be notified immediately of cases 
placed on the critical or seriously ill lists, 
and in cases of death. 
e. Reports and Communications. Copies of all 
reports and communications required by the 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Fleet 
Medical Officers, and Hospital Corps Per- 
sonnel Sections of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Fleets, shall be sent to the Staff Medical 
Officer. 
/. Medical Problems Relevant to the Operation. 
(1) Operations in Latitude 40° JV. to 40° S. 
(a) Every attempt must be made to prevent 
venereal disease occurring while personnel 
are ashore on liberty on the outward, as well 
as the homeward bound voyage. 
(b) Heat cramps, heat exhaustion, and 
heat stroke should not occur unless personnel 
fail to heed the directives of the medical 
department of each ship concerning the use 
of salt, fluid intake, over-exposure to sun, or 
excessively warm spaces. 
(c) Lookouts should be equipped with sun 
glasses on bright days to prevent the harmful 
effect of solar radiation, particularly that of 
glare actinic conjunctivitis. 
(2) Operations at Sea in Latitudes 40° S. to 
the Antarctic, (a) The ships of the Task 
Force will face a gradual increase in wind 
velocity and a decrease in temperature 
leading to what is considered to be some of 
the worst weather in the world. A reference 
to the meteorological annex will give an 
accurate picture of what to expect. 
(b) Eyes of lookouts will have to be 
protected from the extreme winds. The 
present N-2 Navy Goggles are adequate, 
though fogging of the lenses is a constant 
source of annoyance. 
(c) The skin of topside personnel will have 
to be protected. Chapping, windburn, and 
Herpes Labialis will occur in a certain 
percentage of personnel despite all precau- 
tions, Frostbite of the face and of the ex- 
tremities may be prevented only if properly 
indoctrinated personnel use the clothing 
supplies in the correct manner. At times it 
may be necessary to furnish relief for exposed 
watch-standers in order that they may warm 
themselves. Watches as short as 1 hour may 
be necessary. Lookouts on the submarine 
during “Nanook” were relieved every 30 
minutes during certain phases of the opera- 
tion. 
(d) A loss of general over-all efficiency of 
169 topside personnel must be expected due to 
the effect of the wind and temperature. 
(e) Damage to the respiratory system may 
occur following continued and prolonged 
exposure to the low humidity aboard ship 
resulting from the use of the present heating 
systems. Maximum ventilation must be 
maintained at all times. 
(f) Insufficiency of drying and storage 
facilities for clothing will exist due to the 
increased issue of clothing and the inclement 
weather. 
(g) Inadequate provisions for the protec- 
tion of personnel forced to abandon ship 
must be realized and all possible precautions 
and preventive measures taken. 
(h) Temporary injury and possible death 
from immersion and exposure in water 
demands smart and effective rescue proce- 
dures for a man overboard. 
(3) Antarctica, Including the Off-Lying Islands 
South of Latitude 60° S. The following publi- 
cation is recommended for information: 
“Sailing Directions for Antarctica, 1943, 
H. O. No. 138, Including the Off-Lying 
Islands South of Latitude 60°”, pages 41-52 
entitled “Health and Living Conditions.” 
The following is quoted from that 
publication: 
General ... In spite of its rigors, the climate of 
Antarctica has been reported to be extremely health- 
ful; respiratory disease, for instance, is especially 
rare. Insect pests are unknown . . . adequate food, 
shelter, and equipment for transportation ashore 
must be provided in advance. The personnel must 
possess the degree of health, stamina, competence, 
and resourcefulness required in the most exacting of 
peacetime assignments. 
(4) Physical Requirements, Diet, Clothing, Etc. 
((a) Physical Requirements. The present naval 
standards governing physical fitness for over- 
sea duty are considered adequate in the 
selection of personnel for duty in Antarctica. 
(b) Diet. The standard Navy ration will 
be increased 25 percent during the period 
of the operation. This diet is expected to 
be adequate for all personnel provided that 
the ration is properly prepared, and that 
sufficient portions of each component are 
eaten. The need for supplementary vitamin 
preparations is not anticipated. The medi- 
cal department of each ship and each shore 
activity has a responsibility to make certain 
that personnel are aware of the value of in- 
telligent preparation and intelligent eating 
habits. Recommendations should be made 
immediately, to the commanding officer in 
the event that food discipline is relaxed. 
(r) Clothing. It is expected that the cloth- 
ing provided will be adequate to protect 
personnel during the period of the operation. 
Adequacy does not imply perfection, and 
members of the medical departments should 
be able to contribute suggestions for improve- 
ments. Clothing ashore will be based on 
the over-dress principle for personnel on ve- 
hicles, standing still, and doing light work, 
and the under-dress principle for dog-sled 
drivers, ski-parties, etc. 
(t/) All of the medical problems that may 
arise at sea in latitudes from 40° South to 
the Antarctic will be present to an increased 
degree. In addition the reflection from snow 
and ice will increase the potential damage 
due to solar radiation, and the possibility of 
carbon monoxide poisoning in tents must be 
guarded against by all personnel. 
(e) The success of this operation will de- 
pend on the proper indoctrination of normal 
individuals. Survival in the polar regions is 
a question of individual adaptation. Pro- 
tective measures for the group will not suffice 
to save a stupid or poorly indoctrinated 
individual. 
3. Directives. 
In addition to the medical plan certain 
staff directives were issued to supplement 
the plan and furnish more detailed guidance. 
a. Physical examinations were directed for 
all personnel. These examinations took the 
general form of an annual physical (now 
170 required by the Navy for enlisted men as 
well as officers) and included a routine roent- 
genologic examination of the chest. 
b. Immunizations prescribed were: ty- 
phoid booster, tetanus booster, and smallpox. 
c. A directive was issued requiring that all 
personnel using spectacles be provided with 
two pairs, one of which had to be the service 
issue, steel-rimmed, type. 
d. All shore parties landed from task force 
vessels were to obtain and carry first aid 
equipment. It was recommended by the 
Staff Medical Officer that the life raft emer- 
gency kit be used for this purpose. 
e. All small boat first aid kits were required 
to be checked once a month and a log kept 
to indicate compliance with the directive and 
the condition of the equipment inspected. 
This precaution was taken for much the same 
reasons as the AAF requires periodic checks 
of aircraft first aid kits. 
/. Each ship having a medical officer was 
required to have at least 4,000 units of 
insulin available for treatment of a possible 
coma of diabetic origin. (Insulin is not 
included in commissioning allowance up to 
and including 1,000 men.) 
g. The submission of a Special Sanitary 
Report by all ships at the completion of the 
project was required, and the form pre- 
scribed was that of the Navy Annual Sani- 
tary Report. The outline below is a brief 
of this report as prescribed in the Manual of 
the Medical Department, U. S. N., part 3, 
chapter 5, paragraph 12: 
Annual Sanitary Report, U. S. N. 
A, Basic Data. 
1. Ship: Type, size, etc. 
2. Berthing: Decks used, men per deck, 
cubic footage per man, etc. 
3. Heating, ventilating, and air condi- 
tioning. 
4. Toilet and bathing facilities. 
5. Prison cells. 
6. Barber shop. 
7. Lighting. 
B. Other Data on Ship and Its Personnel. 
1. Movements of ship during period of 
report. 
2. Average strength of ship’s comple- 
ment, officers and enlisted men. 
G. Immunization Data. 
1. Statistics on all immunizations done. 
2. Epidemiological situations encoun- 
tered. 
D. Data on Food and Water, 
1. Drinking water. 
2. Food storage, galleys, and messing 
facilities. 
3. Rations. 
E. Medical Department Facilities and Per- 
sonnel. 
1. Physical plant. 
2. Supplies. 
3. Hospital Corps: Adequacy, profici- 
ency, etc. 
4. Battle stations: Plans for care of 
wounded, etc. 
F. Clothing. 
G. Miscellaneous. 
1. Mechanical hazards. 
2. Industrial health exposures. 
3. Disabling injuries. 
H. Recommendations. 
I. Historical Data. 
h. Each ship and shore based unit was 
directed to take all action possible for pro- 
tection of personnel in general accordance 
with the section on protection of personnel 
in “Instructions for Cold Weather Opera- 
tions of Naval Aircraft,” pages 43, 44, and 45, 
Technical Note No. 84-45, AER-E-45- 
JED, F24-5 (1), as follows: 
(1) General. Personnel undertaking cold weather 
flight operations should exercise great care in pre- 
paring themselves for flight, ground activities, or 
work in exposed positions ashore or aboard ship. 
Failure to do this can result in great physical dis- 
comfort or serious injury. Upon arrival at a base or 
reporting aboard a ship from which you will operate, 
171 one of the first calls should be upon the supply officer 
to obtain the proper clothing and equipment. 
Aircraft carriers should have the proper equipment 
readily available for issue to flight deck or to other 
exposed personnel. 
In extemely low temperatures it is impracticable 
to carry sufficient equipment in carrier aircraft, 
either in life rafts or the emergency parachute packs, 
to sustain life indefinitely in case of a forced landing 
at sea. This emphasizes the need for constant dili- 
gence on the part of all personnel concerned to avoid 
water landings if possible. Rescue of personnel in 
the water must be effected within a few minutes 
under the worst conditions and in any event within 
a few hours to prevent serious injury from exposure. 
The following general precautions apply to all 
personnel, ashore or aboard ship, during very cold 
weather. 
(.a) Perspiration is dangerous in sub-zero tempera- 
tures. If the feet or other parts of the body perspire 
make certain that the clothing and the body are dry 
before exposure to severe cold. Ice will form in 
damp clothing and damp portions of the body will 
freeze quickly. 
(b) Suitable and adequate clothing must be worn 
at all times. Clean dry woolens should be worn 
next to the body. Shoes should be loose fitting and 
allow for one or two pairs of wool socks. Gloves, and 
if necessary, a face mask, and goggles should be worn 
in extremely cold temperatures. A parka, or a 
helmet with protection for the head and ears is essen- 
tial for working or watch standing. Above all, 
avoid tight fitting clothes which impair the circulation 
and wet clothes which may freeze. 
(c) In temperatures as low as —32° C. (—25° F.) 
there is danger of freezing the lungs from overexertion 
followed by deep breathing. If you inadvertently 
overexert and start breathing heavily put your head 
down and breathe warm air from inside your clothing 
until the deep breathing stops. 
(d) Light shelters or heated nose hangars should be 
used around aircraft ashore for maintenance crews to 
work efficiently. Most maintenance work aboard 
carriers must be done on the hangar deck. 
(e) Do not touch any metal parts of the airplane or 
any exposed metal without gloves. The moisture on 
the hands may freeze to the metal surface and result 
in painful tearing of the flesh. Metal tools may be 
insulated by wrapping the handles with tape or light 
line. 
if) Gasoline spilled on the hands or clothing in sub- 
zero weather will freeze flesh a few seconds after 
contact. This should be watched particularly when 
making the check for water in the gasoline. 
(g) In flights over land, where the combat loading 
permits, emergency equipment for each crew member 
should be carried as follows; 
Sleeping bag. 
Emergency rations, matches, and candles. 
Emergency clothing, such as parka, footgear, woolen 
underwear, and socks. 
Emergency kit with gun, ammunition, fishing gear, 
fire building materials, ax, etc. 
(h) In the event of forced landing do not bail out 
unless it is absolutely necessary; and— 
7. On Land. Remain in the vicinity of the airplane 
to conserve energy, to avoid exertion, and to simplify 
rescue. Do not travel unless you have adequate 
equipment, Arctic experience, and then only when 
you arc positive of your position and know that shelter 
and assistance are near, or you know that searchers 
probably cannot reach you. If you bail out, keep 
your eye on the airplane and try to get back to it. 
Save your parachute. 
2. At Sea. After exposure to sub-zero water death 
is “just around the corner.” The quick donning ex- 
posure suit described in Technical Note 7-45 or the 
constant wear exposure suit will help greatly to sustain 
life until rescue can be effected. Every possible effort 
should be made by all hands to prevent forced land- 
ings at sea in cold weather. In any event, if temper- 
atures are not too low you may survive for several 
days, even without food, if you relax, get plenty of 
sleep, avoid exhaustion, avoid panic, and conserve 
your energy. 
(i) Exposure to low temperatures, especially in a 
strong wind, carries risk of frostbite, the parts most 
susceptible to this being the cheeks, nose, ears, chin, 
forehead, wrists, hands, or feet. Frostbitten skin 
becomes whitish and stiff and the parts feel numb 
rather than painful. Personnel working in exposed 
positions should frequently return to a warm area or 
shelter to prevent frostbite. 
(;) Snow-blindness caused by glare of the snow is a 
common Arctic affliction and may occur not only on 
bright days but on days of fog or overcast. Colored 
goggles or sun glasses are as important for protection 
of the eyes in cold weather as in the tropics, particu- 
larly if assigned to a shore station. 
(k) If the nature of work about an airplane pre- 
cludes the use of heavy gloves, light ones should be 
worn if at all possible. This is necessary to prevent 
freezing to metals, to prevent frostbite, and to prevent 
cuts or nicks to the skin or flesh going unnoticed 
because of numb hands. 
(/) Frequent rest periods in heated enclosures with 
hot coffee and sandwiches are necessary for the 
greatest efficiency of personnel working in exposed 
positions. 
(2) Clothing and Equipment. (a) Flight Gear. Flight 
gear should be light and flexible in addition to pro- 
viding sufficient warmth to enable the combat flight 
crews efficiently to accomplish their missions in cold 
weather. The clothes must also be designed to 
facilitate cooling when overheated. In case of 
extreme overheating the clothing may be opened 
down to the underclothing to eliminate moisture. 
The correct body temperature can best be main- 
tained by means of the electrically heated flying suits 
being provided. These are recommended for use in 
preference to the shearling. The two types are 
described below: 
7. Unheated. Consists of shearling jacket and 
trousers, shearling boots, shearling helmet, and 
lambskin-lined gloves. This outfit will protect the 
wearer indefinitely at —12° C. (10° F.), for prolonged 
172 periods up to the duration of any flight at —18° C. 
(0° F.), for 6 hours at —23° C. (—10° F.), and for 3 
hours at —29° C. (—20° F.). This outfit is heavy 
and bulky and cannot be worn in the cockpit of some 
airplanes because of space restrictions. 
2. Heated. Consists of a one-piece suit, boots, and 
gloves wired to take current from 24-volt airplane 
circuit. Electric heat is not supplied to the helmet 
and standard winter shearling helmets are worn. 
This outfit will protect the wearer down to —29° C. 
(—20° F.) and at lower temperatures for shorter 
periods. Newer suits will include increased insulation 
and will protect at even lower temperatures. Pro- 
vision is made for attaching electrically heated oxygen 
and face masks and heated goggles. This type 
clothing is much lighter in weight than shearling. 
All items of flight gear together with recommended 
allowances are listed in appendix 4. 
(b) Clothing and Equipment for Ground Personnel. All 
items of cold weather clothing available from naval 
sources are listed in appendix 4, together with recom- 
mended allowances for aircraft carriers, air groups, 
and shore based aviation personnel. Additional de- 
tails, including allowances for other types of vessels 
and instructions for requisitioning these items are in- 
cluded in CNO letter OP-50-A, Serial 22950-A of 
21 December 1944, and in article 1149-0 BuSandA 
memo. 
The detailed descriptions and uses of these articles 
are beyond the scope of this Technical Note. 
Where Army supply sources are accessible articles 
of cold weather clothing and equipment are often 
available for emergency issue to naval activities. 
(3) Personal Care and Health. Most of the precau- 
tions necessary to prevent injury and to maintain 
personal health and comfort during cold weather 
operations have been covered in previous parts of 
this manual. It will suffice to add here that health, 
comfort, and morale can be maintained at a normal 
high level provided all hands are forewarned as to 
the hazards and difficulties peculiar to low tempera- 
tures and take the necessary precautions to prevent 
their occurrence. It is only necessary to remain 
constantly alert, take the necessary precautions, and 
wear at all times adequate and proper clothes for the 
type of weather or conditions encountered. 
It is beyond the scope of this note to cover all pos- 
sible contingencies or emergencies which may occur 
during cold weather operations. Other publications 
which cover personal problems in more detail are— 
(a) Instructions for Arctic Operations, Army T, O. 
No. 00-60B-1, dated 1 November 1944, or subsequent 
revisions thereto. 
(b) Arctic Sense, NAVAER 00-80-Q-13, issued by 
the Aviation Training Division, Office of CNO. 
(c) Aleutian Sense, issued also by the Aviation 
Training Division, Office of CNO. 
The above contain certain valuable information 
and should be read by all hands who expect to engage 
in any part of aircraft cold weather operations. 
These pamphlets have been previously distributed to 
the fleet and additional copies are being made avail- 
able to ComAirPac. 
i. A standard therapy of cold exposure 
cases was prescribed. The methods to be 
used were those set forth in the Air Sea 
Rescue Bulletin for April 1946, an extract ol 
which follows: 
Rapid rewarming of chilled survivors has long been 
considered dangerous. It now is believed, however, 
that in view of the results of the experience incident to 
World War II and the comments on them by out- 
standing American authorities, the treatment of 
survivors after exposure to low temperatures may be 
formulated as follows: 
If unconscious, but breathing (this situation is likely 
to occur if rectal temperature is below 80.6° F.) the 
individual rescued from cold water should be immedi- 
ately undressed and placed in a bath from 115° to 
120° F. for 10 minutes, than dried with a towel and 
placed in warm blankets. If the temperature does 
not rise at a rate of at least 2° F. every 10 minutes 
thereafter, immersion in warm water should be 
repeated until the rectal temperature reaches 93° F. 
There is considerable rise in temperature after removal 
from the warm water, and there is no advantage to 
be gained from rapid heating once this safe level has 
been regained. If a warm bath is not available, warm 
water should be poured into the sleeves, trouser legs 
and over the clothing and body, or the survivor 
should be carefully held under a warm shower. In 
any event, no time should be lost in applying treat- 
ment after rescue. 
If conscious, the survivor should be immersed in water 
from 105° to 110° F. for 10 minutes, after which time 
treatment may be carried out as for the unconscious 
person. Water heated to 115° F. is painful to a con- 
scious patient and may cause some scalding in chilled 
persons with rectal temperatures above 91° or 92° F. 
It appears likely that survivors who are conscious 
when rescued from cold water will often survive with- 
out the aid of the warm bath if they are merely dried 
and placed in light cradles or electric heating bags. 
Survivors exposed to moderately cold temperatures 
for long periods should be rewarmed much more 
slowly, preferably by the use of heated blankets, 
electric heating bags, or light cradles. 
Survivors exposed to dangerously low temperatures 
for long periods should be rapidly rewarmed, prefer- 
ably by a warm bath, until the rectal temperature 
begins to rise. More gradual rewarming is indicated 
as soon as the immediate danger from extremely low 
temperature has passed. 
Massaging is to be avoided under all circumstances. Drugs, 
such as strophanthin, digitalis, metragol, lobeline, coramine, 
and alcohol are of no value. In fact the results of experiences 
considered reliable show them to be harmful. 
Administration of 100 percent oxygen at atmos- 
pheric pressure should be advantageous by supplying 
dissolved oxygen not dependent upon hemoglobin 
dissociation. 
. . . the temperature should be taken immediately 
after rescue while the warm bath is being prepared. 
173 It is also urgently recommended that the tempera- 
ture of the sea water at the site of rescue shall be 
determined and recorded in the survivor report. 
To this therapy the Staff Medical Officer added, 
“Conscious survivors shall be given warm, nourishing 
drinks. Plasma will be given if survivors are unable 
to obtain adequate fluid by mouth.” 
j. A member of the medical department 
was required to be in attendance during 
flight operations in case of emergencies. 
First aid equipment to be carried on the boat 
acting as plane guard was prescribed. 
4. Evacuation Policies. 
a. During the voyage the various ships’ 
surgeons were authorized to retain and treat 
any type of case or to evacuate major 
diagnostic or surgical problems to the flagship 
at their discretion. 
b. While operating in the Bay of Whales 
area all patients of the ice party requiring 
bed rest or surgical treatment were to be 
evacuated to the ships in the bay. 
c. While no ships were in the bay, shore- 
based facilities were to be used entirely, 
there being no possibility of evacuating to 
any ship by air. 
5. Safety. 
On 15 January 1947, Staff Memorandum 
No. 2-47,''subject, “Safety Precautions, Rules 
in Observing When on Ice,” was published 
for the information and guidance of all hands. 
It contained many points having medical 
implications, as follows: 
There are many rules and safety precau- 
tions which must be observed and followed 
by all personnel of Task Force Sixty-Eight 
while on the ice in the Antarctic regions. 
a. Travel. Remain in the immediate vi- 
cinity of the ship or camp unless in company 
with other members of the party, and be 
equipped with safety line and sufficient wear- 
ing apparel. Always walk in single file, lead 
man to test surface. Stay on the marked 
trail or known area unless proper sounding 
and tests are made to determine the condi- 
tion of the surface. Do not take the risk of 
falling into an unmarked crevasse. Stay 
away from the edges of the shelf and bay 
ice; if you slip or the edge breaks off and you 
fall into the water you will probably die 
before help can reach you. If a sudden 
blizzard catches you out of sight of the camp 
do not wander aimlessly about; stay where 
you are and dig in for shelter. You will be 
safer and more easily found. Molesting or 
chasing seals or penguins will not be toler- 
ated. An inexperienced person would get a 
bad bite. If it is necessary to kill seals for 
dog food or collect specimens of any kind it 
will be done by authorized personnel. Do 
not eat snow. If necessary snow may be 
eaten only after melting it in the hand. 
b. General. Keep a watch for frostbitten 
skin on other men in the group; skin when 
frozen is milk white. Do not rub snow on 
the frostbitten part, instead place a warm 
hand over the frozen area or put the frost- 
bitten hand or foot against the warm skin of 
yourself or another to thaw it out. Use chap- 
stick or face grease on the lips. Chapped 
lips and cold sores are painful. Garry chap- 
sticks in your pocket. Drifting snow will 
soon cover any article of equipment, clothing, 
or tools left on the surface of the ice un- 
marked. Mark the location with trail mark- 
ers or other suitable upright stakes. Never 
remove any marker other than your own; it 
is placed there for some definite purpose. 
Skis and poles should not be left lying down 
when removed from the feet. Stick the skis 
into the snow in an upright position, pass 
the hand loops of the pole over the points 
of the skis, and stand them upright along- 
side. Don’t set up a cache or place any ob- 
ject in such a position that the drift formed 
by such an object will cover other articles of 
equipment. When cooking in a tent be sure 
you have plenty of ventilation for escapage 
of fumes given off from cooking stoves. Re- 
move snow from clothing with a whisk 
174 broom or other suitable brush before entering 
tent or other warm shelter; otherwise snow 
will melt and garments will become wet. 
Try to remain active when outside shelter, 
don’t stand around idle. A large area of 
snow upwind from the snow melter will be 
staked off and all personnel not engaged in 
obtaining snow to melt will stay clear of this 
area at all times, as drinking water will be 
obtained from this area of snow. Heads will 
be provided in the camp area and must be 
used except that urination is allowed just off 
the beaten tracks and trails. Carry a supply 
of toilet paper in your pocket at all times in 
case an emergency arises! 
c. Boating. Use caution when approaching 
ice of any type. Coxswain and engineer 
shall not leave tiller or engine unattended. 
When approaching the ice, be alert and in 
full control of the boat. The ice gives no 
warning when breaking away. Crews must 
be in readiness to make rapid change of 
movement. Do not jump or leave the 
boat until satisfied with conditions of the 
ice approached. When making a landing 
and the ice is higher than the boat, proceed 
with caution, slow speed head on. Keep 
engine slow ahead while nosed into ice. 
Rig ladder, while making approach, using 
bow and stern hook to hold ladder in place. 
Get personnel and equipment on or off the 
ice as rapidly as possible and back away. 
When running close to ice, have bow 
hook watch for partially submerged ice 
chunks or ice foot. Ice foot is usually 
found protruding from larger pieces of 
ice and submerged. Ice foot is solid, sharp, 
and can easily tear a hole in a boat. Engines 
will run colder in the Antarctic; watch 
circulation; use as little water as possible 
by cutting down suction. Drain engine block 
immediately whenever boat is hauled out. 
Do not allow water to remain in engine 
circulation system. Bypass glass-covered 
strainers if possible. Check fuel, oil, and 
boat equipment each time relieved or boat 
is hauled out. Before leaving the boat top 
off fuel tanks and have boat ready for 
instant use. Have all fire equipment in 
readiness. Use standing Navy fire regula- 
tions for ship’s boats. Keep bilges clean 
and check bilge pumps frequently. 
d. Mechanized Equipment. If preheating of 
engines is necessary, be careful not to play 
the flame of heating torches direct onto 
cast iron parts in concentrated areas. 
This is particularly true of cast iron crank- 
cases which may be easily cracked from 
concentrated heat application. Keep the 
fuel tanks as nearly full as possible at all 
times by refueling frequently in order to 
cut down condensation in the tanks. Ice 
in the fuel lines is a great hazard. Dis- 
assembly of the lines must be accomplished 
with the bare hands, and fuel spilled on 
the bare flesh is conducive to extremely 
severe frostbite. Barrels of fuel must never 
be pumped completely dry. To do so 
increases the chances of picking up water 
caused by condensation, which will lie on 
the bottom. It may be necessary to modify 
the fueling pumps in order that 2 or 3 
gallons will remain in the bottom. It is 
very important, and a “must”, that all fuel 
be filtered if at all practicable. Before 
opening a barrel of fuel, make certain that 
the snow is kept absolutely clear of the 
openings. In the case of the Cargo Carrier 
M29C (Weasel) caution must be exercised 
in starting the machine in motion too 
quickly after it has sat for a long period. 
The track bands of these machines are 
particularly vulnerable since they are of 
a steel-cable-rubberized-fabric construction. 
It may be necessary to roll the machine 
forward and back a few times to loosen up the 
stiff track bands. This vehicle may prove 
to be one of our most valuable, therefore, 
great care must be exercised in its proper 
operation. 
175 e. Emergency Signal. The continuous blow- 
ing of repeated blasts on the ship’s whistle will 
be a signal that it is necessary for the ship 
to leave the edge of the barrier. All hands 
will take necessary precautions. 
6. Projects. 
In the early stages of planning the following 
projects were recommended by the Bureau 
of Medicine and Surgery for special study 
during the operation. 
a. To determine the practicability of gar- 
ments for relatively inactive ships’ crew 
members on exposed stations. 
b. To test the protective value and practi- 
cability of cold weather gear of various num- 
ber of layers and insulating material. 
c. To determine the most practical and 
satisfactory diet for such type of operation 
and exploration of natural food sources. 
d. To determine effect of direct and reflect- 
ed sunlight and of wind on skin and eyes and 
evaluate methods of protection. 
e. To compare warm and relatively cool 
barrack temperatures in regard to the inci- 
dence of respiratory infections in men work- 
ing at cold outside temperatures. 
/.To determine the degree of acclimatiza- 
tion that takes place in personnel on an 
expedition of this duration and nature. 
g. To determine changes occurring in 
gingival and pulp tissue as a result of such 
type operation, together with a survey of 
the possibility of treatment of oral wounds, 
particularly of the battle variety in sub-zero 
temperatures. 
Due to the shortness of time to be spent at 
Little America it was subsequently decided 
to delete those projects from the program. 
SECTION II. Technical Observations 
1. Medical Support of Ice Party. 
a. Base Camp Dispensary. (1) The medical 
facilities within the base camp area were 
planned on the assumption that the ships of 
the central group would be tied up in the bay 
and the medical facilities of the ships would 
be available. However, it was realized that 
the ships might have to leave the ice at any 
time for short periods so that it would be 
necessary that the base camp dispensary be 
prepared to take care of any emergency. 
This actually did occur several times during 
the early stages of the ice operation when due 
to ice and wind conditions in the Bay of 
Whales it became necessary for the ships to 
leave the bay and lay to in the Ross Sea. 
These periods, the longest of which was 
approximately 48 hours, left the base camp 
without the facilities of the ships’ sick bays. 
Two weeks after setting up the base camp 
the ships departed from the Bay of Whales, 
leaving the camp without ship support for 
approximately 3 weeks, at the end of which 
time the U. S. S. Burton Island returned and 
evacuated the camp. The camp was ap- 
proximately 1 mile from the ships. 
(2) The dispensary was set up in a py- 
ramidal tent with plywood floor and tent 
stove in the vicinity of the air operations hut. 
(Figs. 168 and 169.) One Navy medical 
officer and one corpsman were assigned to 
operate the dispensary and lived in the 
dispensary tent. Before the dispensary could 
operate with any degree of efficiency it was 
essential that the tent be improved as 
described in paragraph 1 of section III. 
When these improvements were made it was 
possible to operate the dispensary with a 
176 reasonable degree of efficiency and with 
moderate comfort to the patient. No pro- 
visions were made for caring for bed patients. 
Sick call was held regularly each morning 
and emergencies were seen at any time 
during the day. In addition to the dispen- 
sary a medical corpsman was stationed at 
the foot of the barrier in the transportation 
tent during unloading operations. This was 
located approximately halfway between the 
ships and the camp and was the center of 
activity during this phase of the operation. 
He was equipped with a medical kit and was 
relieved every 4 hours. Personnel for this 
duty were drawn from the ships’ comple- 
ment, since the camp dispensary did not 
have sufficient personnel for this purpose. 
Additional medical equipment, including 
litters, splints, blankets, and a life raft 
medical kit, were kept at the mess tent at all 
times. Each vehicle operating on the ice 
was equipped with a life raft medical kit, 
which is very similar to the Army vehicle 
first aid kit, small. 
(3) The equipment provided for the camp 
dispensary was divided into two main cate- 
gories. The first of these included the equip- 
Figure 169. Base camp dispensary (exterior). 
ment that was required to operate an ordi- 
nary camp dispensary and was very similar 
to that found in an infantry battalion aid 
station. The second included equipment to 
carry out definite treatment of a major 
surgical and medical nature had it been 
required. This latter group included X-Ray 
equipment, surgical instrument sets, steriliz- 
ers, etc. No emergencies occurred necessi- 
tating the use of this latter equipment but 
it was kept sterilized and ready for use at all 
times. It was not intended that this type of 
treatment would be carried out on the ice as 
long as the ships were available. The follow- 
ing is the equipment list of the base camp 
dispensary: 
Navy stock 
Quan- 
number 
Description 
tity 
6-125-300 
Radiographic unit, portable, field, 
1 00-volt, 60-cycle 
1 
7-084-275 
Sterilizer, dressing, pressure, fuel 
heated, portable 
1 
7-864-635 
Pad, heat, chemical 
12 
7-864-640 
Refill for pad, heat, chemical. . . 
100 
9-105-125 
Blanket kit, canvas blankets, pack 
type 
1 
9-108-975 
Blanket and bedding kit, tent.... 
1 
9-114-125 
Can, safety, gasoline, 1 -gal 
1 
9-192-750 
Drug set A, Field Med. Unit No. 
26 
1 
9-193-125 
Drug set B, Field Med. Unit No. 
27 
1 
Figure 168. Base camp dispensary (interior). 
177 Navy stock 
Quan- 
number 
Description 
tity 
9-194-650 
Drug set C, Field Med. Unit No. 
28 
1 
9-199-650 
First aid kit, combat, pack type. . 
1 
9-217-125 
First aid kit, life raft, camof 
50 
9-527-125 
Splint, plaster fixation chest. . . . 
1 
9-590-225 
Surgical line and supply kit. . . . 
1 
9-113-825 
Book set 
1 
9-190-550 
Desk, field 
1 
9-195-175 
Embalming kit 
1 
9-305-125 
Medical outfit, aid, station and 
dispensary A, Field Med. Unit 
No. 5A 
1 
9-522-675 
Sick call kit, Field Med. Unit 
No. 11 
1 
9-552-575 
Sterilization and lighting outfit. . 
1 
9-576-375 
Surgical instrument kit, general 
surgery, Field Med, Unit No. 
36 
1 
7-098-1 50 
Operating table, folding 
1 
1-606-810 
Penicillin sodium, 200,000 units, 
10 in a box 
60 
1-582-010 
Albumin, serum (250 cc.) 
12 
1-607-104 
Plasma, normal human (500 cc.). 
12 
1-609-840 
Streptomycin (1 gram bottle). . . . 
500 
1-165-000 
Dextrose 5 percent, isotonic solu- 
tion sodium chloride (1,000-cc 
bottle) 
12 
1-494-000 
Whiskey (1 quart) 
3 
1-106-712 
Brandy, 2-oz. bottle 
60 
Chopsticks, camphorated 
500 
been encountered had major surgical pro- 
cedures been required. 
(3) Effect of Cold on Medical Supplies, (a) 
Medical supplies kept within the dispensary 
tent were not greatly affected by the cold. 
At the temperatures encountered and with 
the heating facilities available the tempera- 
ture within the tent was generally main- 
tained above freezing. However, close to 
the floor or when the stove was turned down 
at night the temperatures inside the tent did 
drop down to considerably below the freezing 
point. Supplies kept out-of-doors were gen- 
erally exposed to below freezing temperatures. 
(b) The water packaged with plasma sets 
remained frozen when stored out-of-doors 
and sometimes froze at night when kept in 
the dispensary. No breakage, however, oc- 
curred. Globulin froze solid but reconsti- 
tuted on heating without any noticeable 
change. 
(c) Ointments and other substances pack- 
aged in metal tube acted in a number of dif- 
ferent ways. Boric acid ointment was prac- 
tically useless because it was almost impos- 
sible to get it out of the tube. Morphine 
syrettes were not affected to any great extent. 
Yellow oxide of mercury also remained 
usable. A tube of ointment (not identified), 
taken from the medical supplies at Little 
America III, which had been frozen for 7 
years did not reconstitute upon warming. 
Green soap also froze but did not seem to be 
adversely affected. 
{d) Tinctures and other liquid medical 
supplies did not freeze in the dispensary tent. 
(e) An ampule of triple distilled water was 
placed outside the dispensary tent and ob- 
served during the operation. It did not 
freeze at —12° F. 
(f) There were no medical department 
electrical generators in operation on the ice, 
but a number of similar units were used. 
No particular problems were encountered 
b. Special Problems. (1) X-Ray Equipment 
and Supplies. The X-ray equipment set-up 
was the Army portable field X-ray unit. 
Unfortunately a mixture of parts was shipped 
that did not fit and the generator was not 
provided. However, generators were avail- 
able and it was felt that the apparatus could 
be made to work had it become necessary. 
Since the X-ray equipment aboard the ships 
was available whenever required, the camp 
equipment was never tried out. 
(2) Major Surgery. All major surgery was 
performed aboard the ships where the con- 
ditions were no different from those of the 
average operating room in the States. Dur- 
ing the time the ships were not tied up in the 
bay no surgery was required. However, the 
base dispensary had the equipment available 
and could have performed major surgery 
had it become necessary. Temperatures in 
the dispensary tent were such that it was not 
believed any major difficulties would have 
178 after ordinary winterizing procedures were 
carried out. 
c. Evacuation of Casualties. A Weasel was 
assigned to the Medical Department during 
most of the period on the ice. (Fig. 170.) 
This vehicle was equipped with a 1-ton sled 
and was also used as an ambulance. It was 
used as a crash vehicle and stood by at 
all aircraft landings and take-offs. It was 
equipped with a radio and contained splints, 
litters, blankets, plasma, and other medical 
supplies. Two litters could be rigged very 
quickly and easily on this vehicle, but at no 
time during the operation of the base camp 
was this necessary. 
d. Vehicle Operations Away From the Base 
Camp. (See eh. 4.) Only one trail trip was 
made in the Central Group during this oper- 
ation. This was made by seven Army, Navy, 
and Marine personnel in two LVT’s. One 
member of the crew was a medical officer. 
No accidents, injuries, or illnesses occurred 
during the 250-mile trip. Sufficient medical 
supplies were taken to handle ordinary cases. 
No major surgical equipment was carried. 
A well equipped kit was carried in the 
tractor but the larger equipment, including 
blankets, splints, litters, plasma, etc., was 
carried on one of the sleds. 
e. Care of the Dead. One accidental death 
occurred in the Central Group and the body 
was prepared for returnhojthe United States. 
The Navy Medical Department embalmed 
the corpse and the body was placed in a 
reefer aboard one of the cargo ships. The 
equipment used was a regular Navy Medical 
Department embalming kit which included 
essential apparatus and fluids. The pro- 
cedure was carried out by a chief phaxrna- 
cist’s mate. 
2. Dental Service. 
a. There were four Navy Dental Corps 
officers with the task force. Two of these 
were with the Central Group, one being 
assigned to the U. S. S. Mount Olympus and 
the other to the task force staff. The other 
two were assigned to the U. S. S. Pine Island 
and the U. S. S. Currituck, the seaplane tenders 
with the Eastern Group and the Western 
Group, respectively. The staff dental officer 
made the trip from the States to the Bay of 
Whales aboard the U. S. C. G. C. North- 
wind. This meant that there were two ships, 
a destroyer, and a tanker, with each of the 
wing groups that did not have a dental 
officer aboard. In the Central Group there 
were two cargo ships, an ice breaker, and a 
submarine that did not have a dental officer. 
However, each group worked as a unit so 
that dental service was available at all times. 
b. Aboard the ships dental service was 
carried out under conditions similar to those 
present in any Army camp in the States. 
There were no special problems. 
c. After erection of the tent camp on the 
ice the staff dental officer set up a dental 
clinic in a tent adjoining the base dispensary 
(Fig. 171.) He had one dental corpsman to 
assist him. The original plan was that a 
standard Navy held dental unit would be 
set up at the base camp and routine dental 
treatment carried out. It was felt that this 
Figure 170. Vehicle assigned to dispensary showing 
quartermaster sled used for transporting crash 
equipment. 
179 would bring to the surface the problems of 
dental service that might be encountered 
under circumstances similar to those prevail- 
ing in this area. However, upon starting 
to set up the dental clinic it was found that 
the equipment required had either not been 
sent or that it had been displaced. The only 
equipment available to this officer was of an 
emergency type similar to that found in the 
Army “Kit, Dental Officer.” He performed 
emergency dental treatment with this equip- 
ment and encountered no problems that 
could not be adequately handled. During 
this period the U. S. S. Mount Olympus was 
tied up in the bay about 2 miles away. 
When the U. S. S. Mount Olympus and the two 
cargo ships departed from the Bay of Whales, 
leaving the ice party ashore, the staff dental 
officer moved back aboard, leaving the base 
camp without a dental corps officer for ap- 
proximately 3 weeks. 
d. Prior to his departure aboard the U. S. 
S. Mount Olympus the dental officer examined 
all the personnel assigned to the winter party 
which was to remain on the ice over the 
winter in case it became necessary. Com- 
plete mouth X-rays were done and all in- 
dicated treatments were completed. 
e. The time spent on the ice was not long 
and the temperatures were not extremely 
(low —23° F. minimum with temperatures 
below zero only a few days). During this 
time there were a few complaints of cold air 
causing pain in certain restored teeth, which 
was considered to be due to lack of an in- 
sulating material beneath the amalgam. 
Other than this there were no conditions that 
could be considered as due to the area of 
temperature. 
3. Snow-blindness. 
a. Snow-blindness did not occur during 
this operation. Consequently, the prescribed 
form for medical data on these cases was not 
used. The absence of snow-blindness can 
be attributed to a combination of the follow- 
ing factors: 
(1) Frequent briefings and warnings, both 
verbal and written, made all hands thorough- 
ly aware of the seriousness of this problem. 
Consequently, sunglass discipline was good. 
(2) This was enhanced considerably by 
the habit factor. After the first week or so 
when carelessness might have been expected 
to increase, personnel at the base camp had 
become accustomed to wearing dark glasses 
and to go out without them was unpleasant. 
Thus, by the time the camp was evacuated 
it is believed that dark glass discipline was 
maintained more as a matter of habit and 
of seeking comfort from glare than through 
fear of snow-blindness. 
(3) Around the base camp there were 
plenty of dark objects such as tents, supply 
dumps, and vehicles to provide considerable 
“eye relief.” This factor is believed to be 
of some importance and may explain in large 
part the difference in viewpoint between 
those who have only lived in high latitudes 
and those who have spent much time on 
the trail in the same latitudes. 
(4) There were comparatively few real 
“snow-blind” days during the time the 
camp on the ice shelf was occupied. Shackle- 
Figure 171. Dental dispensary. 
180 ton (Heart of the Antarctic) describes these 
days well: “When the light is diffused by 
cloud or mist, it casts no shadows on the 
dead white surface, which consequently 
appears to the eye to be uniformly level. 
Small depressions would escape the eye 
altogether, and when we thought we were 
marching along on a level surface, we would 
suddenly step down 2 or 3 feet. The strain 
on the eyes under these conditions is very 
great, and it is when the sun is covered and 
the weather is thickish that snow-blindness 
is produced.” Prestrud, of the Amundsen 
Expedition, described them as follows: “To 
our eyes the land and sky all ran together 
in a white chaos, in which all lines of demar- 
cation were obliterated ... for the first 
time during the trip I had a touch of snow- 
blindness.” 
b. Dark Glasses. (1) Sun glasses worn for 
the most part transmitted no more than 15 
percent of the visual spectrum and thus were 
adequate for use around the base camp. 
Glasses used most were: Navy N-l goggles 
with polarizing, plastic lens inserts; Navy 
plastic sun glasses and Army Ml 944 sun 
glasses (identical items). 
(2) Many personnel wore goggles with the 
elastic band attached through loops provided 
for this purpose on the Navy foul weather 
cap. Others attached ordinary glasses to 
the caps by means of elastic bands fastened 
between the ends of the ear hooks of the 
glasses and running around the back of the 
head in the manner of goggles. In this way 
when headgear was put on, dark glasses 
automatically went with it and were not 
forgotten. 
(3) Goggles showed the usual tendency to 
fog up. The plastic glasses became scratched. 
Directions for cleaning them came in the 
cases, but under local conditions it is doubtful 
that they were cleaned in the prescribed 
manner very often. There were the usual 
reactions of a few whom one type or another 
did not fit. It is thought that the plastic 
glasses showed a greater tendency to break 
at the junction of the temples and the lens 
border than is acceptable in an item designed 
for held military use. No statistical data 
are available on this point. Those required 
to wear corrective lenses at all times expe- 
rienced the usual difficulties with clip-on 
dark lenses and with wearing dark glasses over 
the corrective pair. Personnel in this category 
should be provided with sun glasses having 
their correction ground into the dark lenses. 
c. On the journey southward many infor- 
mal discussions on the subject of snow- 
blindness took place. It was difficult to 
reconcile the past observations of personnel 
having considerable experience in high lati- 
tude trail operations with the data in refer- 
ence books available on the subject. Due to 
the rarity of retinal damage caused by infra- 
red radiations and the fact that snow absorbs 
most of the infrared while reflecting the ultra- 
violet wavelengths, it was generally conceded 
that infrared radiation could be eliminated 
as a contributory cause to snow-blindness. 
Medical textbooks generally describe it as 
an actinic conjunctivitis caused by the effect 
of the ultraviolet radiation in the sun’s rays. 
There is some reason to believe, however, 
that visual radiation may contribute to snow- 
blindness. In support of this view a very 
severe case of snow-blindness was described 
resulting from exposure to the sun when it 
was barely over the horizon at the termina- 
tion of the winter night at Little America. 
Yet when the sun’s elevation is less than 20 
degrees above the horizon the earth’s atmos- 
phere is supposed to be filtering out practi- 
cally all of the ultraviolet wavelengths having 
biologic effects. It is also asked why dark 
glasses are required when colorless glass 
filters most of the ultraviolet. There are 
many instances in which sun “glare” was 
kept reduced to a comfortable degree by 
moderately tinted lenses with severe snow- 
blindness still resulting. In fact the indi- 
vidual on this operation who had spent more 
181 time in the Antarctic than any other stated 
that he would place full confidence in a pair 
of dark glasses only if they transmitted no 
more than 10 percent of the visual spectrum. 
From the medical point of view the pain 
caused by snow-blindness does not fit too 
well into the clinical picture of a conjuncti- 
vitis. Although May (.Diseases of the Eye) 
states that the pain, photophobia, and lacri- 
mation may be greater than in the ordinary 
types of conjunctivitis, the pain of snow- 
blindness is repeatedly described by those who 
have had it and observed it as being “excru- 
ciating” and “unbearable.” The following 
quotation from Scott’s Voyage of the Discovery 
illustrates this point: “We were forced to 
camp early on account of it (Dr. Wilson’s 
snow-blindness) and during the whole after- 
noon he has been writhing in horrible agony. 
It is distressing enough to see, knowing that 
one can do nothing to help. Cocaine has 
only a very temporary effect. . . .” The 
photophobia also is absolute, that is, it is 
impossible with a severe case of snow-blind- 
ness to voluntarily open the eyes. It appears 
possible that the intensity of visual light may 
play a part in causing snow-blindness and 
that in this condition the eye may actu- 
ally be affected not only by conjunctivitis but 
at the same time by some other more deep- 
seated disturbance hitherto not well recog- 
nized. 
d. In summary it should be pointed out 
that the dangers of snow-blindness should not 
be discounted as a result of experience on 
this expedition. Troops out on patrol over 
similar terrain or air-crewmen making their 
way out from a forced landing on an ice cap 
would be likely to become casualties unless 
their training and eye protection are adequate 
for areas where there is nothing visible but 
white surface. 
4. Other Professional Problems. 
a. Respiratory Diseases. (1) Contrary to pre- 
vious experience, respiratory diseases were 
present throughout this entire operation. On 
former American expeditions, the personnel 
were few in number and were living more or 
less as one group. After living in intimate 
contact with each other for a certain length 
of time, upper respiratory diseases apparently 
disappeared entirely and did not reappear 
until outside contacts were again made. On 
this expedition the situation was entirely 
different. The personnel contingent was 
much larger, intimate contacts within a group 
of this size were impossible, and occasional 
contacts between various groups were re- 
peatedly occurring. These factors along 
with the shortness of the period over which 
operations on the ice took place did not allow 
a group immunity to develop, 
(2) Final figures on the actual incidence of 
upper respiratory diseases in the Central 
Group are not available at this time. How- 
ever, it is known that the incidence of respira- 
tory diseases decreased rapidly after leaving 
Panama, reaching a minimum upon arrival 
at the Bay of Whales. The rate for personnel 
remaining- on the ice was definitely lower 
than would be expected in the United States 
and remained so until arrival at New Zealand 
when the rate again rose. 
(3) The upper respiratory diseases that did 
occur were relatively mild in nature. They 
were mostly of the simple coryza type requir- 
ing little treatment, with occasional cases of 
tonsillitis, nasopharyngitis, etc. 
(4) Dryness of the mucus membranes of the 
nose and throat of personnel aboard the 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus gave rise to consider- 
able discomfort and comment during the 
ocean trip. It was generally too mild to 
cause the person to request treatment but was 
annoying and occasionally resulted in epi- 
staxis, particularly at night. It was consid- 
ered to be due entirely to the low humidity 
aboard ship. 
b. Shock. No cases of traumatic shock were 
encountered during operations of the Cen- 
tral Group. 
182 c. Accidents and Injuries. (1) There were no 
serious accidents or injuries that could be 
considered peculiar to the area or to the ice 
conditions except possibly for the case of a 
civilian scientist who fractured both malleoli 
of the left ankle in a ski accident. The most 
serious accident of the Central Group was 
the sudden death of a seaman when he fell 
into a sheepsfoot roller, resulting in a 
fracture of cervical vertebrae and a depressed 
fracture of the skull. He was riding on the 
roller and fell against it when the roller 
suddenly lurched. Another accident oc- 
curred when a hatch cover fell and ampu- 
tated two fingers of another seaman. A 
fourth accident occurred when an officer 
attempted to use his finger as a drift pin and 
incurred a partial amputation of that finger. 
These last three cases could occur anywhere 
in the States where unloading or mechanical 
operations were taking place. 
(2) In contrast to the above paragraph, 
the number of minor injuries, many of which 
did not require treatment and therefore were 
not recorded, was perhaps somewhat larger 
than would be expected for a group of 
similar size in the States. These consisted 
primarily of minor abrasions, contusions of 
fingers, and small lacerations due to awkward- 
ness in handling tools or equipment in cold 
weather. 
(3) This section does not include the 
airplane accident of the Eastern Group in 
which 3 men were killed and 5 of the 6 men 
remaining were injured. Information of this 
accident will be found in section IV of this 
chapter and in section II of chapter 6. 
d. Psychiatric. There were no psychiatric 
conditions that could be traced to the in- 
fluence of the local environment. The usual 
run of anxieties due to family difficulties or 
personal problems occurred but there were 
none that could be considered as peculiar to 
the area. The operations on the ice, how- 
ever, lasted over a period of only 5 weeks and 
living conditions in general were good. All 
of these living on the ice were busy through- 
out their entire stay. 
e. Sunburn, Chapping, and Frostbite. (1) Sun- 
burn. Sunburn was common during the 
first 10 days to 2 weeks on the ice. Forehead 
and cheeks were the principal areas affected. 
No severe cases were reported, and it is not 
felt that sunburn was a very great problem 
on this operation. Standard treatment was 
used. Prophylaxis by preventive creams 
was practiced very little. Further details 
are discussed in the report on Quartermaster 
clothing and equipment. 
(2) Chapping. Chapping from wind and 
general exposure was common. 
(a) The lips and adjacent areas were 
affected very little after the first 2 weeks 
ashore. For these areas chap sticks were 
used with good effect. Additional comments 
on this subject are contained in the section 
on Quartermaster clothing and equipment. 
(b) Hands were affected throughout the 
time spent on the ice. Hangnails developed 
commonly. Those who used their bare 
hands intermittently while doing work out- 
doors often complained of numbness, sore- 
ness, and interference with tactile sensation 
in the finger tips. As far as could be ascer- 
tained there was no history of frostbite in 
these cases. Chapping of the entire hand 
and wrist was not uncommon. 
(3) Frostbite. In February when tempera- 
tures down to —23° F were experienced 
there were quite a few minor cases of frost- 
bite. Cheeks, nose, and ears were affected 
chiefly. One case with the toes of both feet 
frozen reported to the dispensary. Treat- 
ment was conservative, including bed rest 
in quarters for the first few days, and the 
patient recovered without adverse effects. 
The patient was an airplane mechanic. 
Protection for such personnel is discussed 
below. Face masks are of great help in the 
prevention of frostbite of exposed areas, but 
the difficulties to be overcome in regard to 
moisture condensing and freezing need con- 
183 tinuing attention. No standard face mask 
meeting major objections has been developed 
as far as is known. 
(4) Others. In addition to the conditions 
mentioned above, there occurred the mis- 
cellaneous medical problems that might 
occur in any environment. These included 
appendicitis, a “tumor” of the testicle, a 
case of jaundice, etc. These problems were 
met and handled just as would have been 
done in the States. 
5. Medical Service at the Flying Line. 
The base medical dispensary was located 
in a tent next to flight operations. The base 
medical officer was notified by the duty 
officer in operations when a take-off or 
landing was to be made in order that the 
medical officer could stand by with the crash 
equipment. The vehicle used was the Car- 
rier, Cargo, M29G, track mounted, amphi- 
bious, or “Weasel.” To this was attached 
the Sled, Snow, 1-ton, M-l. The Weasel 
was started and warmed up thoroughly by 
running 10 or 15 minutes before take-off so 
that no difficulty would be experienced in 
starting a cold motor. During a temporary 
transportation shortage this was used as-a 
general purpose vehicle by base transporta- 
tion but was on call to the dispensary one- 
half hour before a take-off or landing was to 
be made. During this period the medical 
equipment and cargo sled with all crash gear 
were left at the dispensary. When the 
vehicle was called the medical equipment 
was loaded and the sled fastened on. This 
temporary expedient was not wholly satis- 
factory due to the uncertainty of take-off 
times and landings, unavoidable delays, etc. 
The crash and fire fighting equipment carried 
included shovels, axes, asbestos suits, and 
five large, hand, carbon dioxide fire ex- 
tinguishers, model 15-A. The medical 
equipment was as follows: 
2 Folding pole litters. 
1 Robinson type litter. 
2 Units of plasma. 
2 Units of albumin. 
4 Blankets. 
1 Thomas leg splint. 
4 Pounds white petrolatum. 
2 First aid kits, medical officer and corps- 
man, field (JAN #9-218-750). 
A larger fire fighting unit was originally 
planned to be made by using a cold weather 
oil heating unit mounted on a sledge and 
loaded with foamite. This apparatus was 
found to be too heavy to be drawn by the 
Weasel. There were no crash landings at 
the base. 
6. Winter Rescue Party Medical Support. 
The winter rescue party was set up and 
organized to be activated only if it became 
necessary. The operation plan for the ex- 
pedition called for airplane flights up to the 
time it became necessary to evacuate the 
base. In case a plane was forced down 
toward the end of this period and the per- 
sonnel could not be returned to the base camp 
before it was necessary for the ships to depart 
this winter rescue party of 10 officers and 25 
enlisted men would be activated and would 
remain in the Antarctic during the winter 
night to continue rescue operations. It was 
not activated. 
a. Personnel. With this winter rescue party 
there was to be one medical officer and one 
corpsman. 
b. Facilities and Equipment. This party was 
to be housed at the site of Little America III 
(1939-41 expedition). Some of the old 
buildings were to be used in addition to the 
double Quonset hut that was erected especi- 
ally for this group. Complete equipment and 
supplies were placed at the site ready for the 
personnel to move in if it became necessary. 
The medical equipment was based on that 
regularly authorized for a destroyer with the 
addition of certain special items. The equip- 
ment provided was sufficient for handling 
practically any emergency that might arise. 
184 Instrument sets, drugs, splints and litters, 
medical books, laboratory, pharmacy, and 
X-ray equipment, emergency dental equip- 
ment, operating room equipment, and other 
items necessary to provide a complete medi- 
cal-service were included. In addition, other 
items such as a BMR machine were provided 
in order that the medical officer might carry 
out certain research problems during the 
winter night. For list of medical equipment, 
see section VI. 
7. Care of Flying Personnel. 
a. General. The physical welfare of the 
aircrews was under the direct supervision 
of the chief of the base camp aviation sec- 
tion, who arrived with the R4D aircraft on 
30 January. A flight surgeon (Staff Medical 
Officer) was on duty ashore from this time 
until the ships left the bay on 6 January. 
Thereafter the base medical officer was avail- 
able as required, it having been previously 
decided that a flight surgeon would not be 
assigned for duty with the air echelon. 
Each crew was made up of pilot, co-pilot, 
navigator-pilot, radioman, and photogra- 
pher. Another crew member specializing in 
electronics and radar was originally planned 
on, but this position was eliminated by a 
change made before the aircraft left the 
carrier, 
b. Physical Examinations. No special physi- 
cal examinations for flying were prescribed 
for the aircrews either prior to or during the 
operation. Most of the personnel making 
flights had been on flying status previous to 
departure from the United States and their 
physical status was considered acceptable just 
as for any operation of continuing service in 
the zone of interior. However, the aircrews 
presumably underwent the same physical 
examinations prescribed for other personnel. 
c. Quarters, Environment, and Living Condi- 
tions. The aircrews were quartered ashore 
at the base camp. The details of these 
facilities are given below. They were ade- 
quate for the season and short duration of 
time the camp was occupied. It is believed 
that better acclimatization resulted than if 
they had been living aboard ship. This 
factor could be of some importance in ad- 
justing to conditions in case of a forced 
landing far from base. The environment 
was not observed to have any adverse effect 
on the flying fitness of the crews. For ex- 
ample, the incidence of upper respiratory 
infections was lower, if anything, than would 
be observed in the northern part of the 
United States in winter. In this connection 
it should be noted that the climate at Little 
America in summer (January and February) 
is roughly the same as that usually prevailing 
in northern Montana, North Dakota, and 
Minnesota during the same months. 
d. In-Flight Rations. Most exploration 
flights were of 8 to 12 hours’ duration. 
Rations for use aloft were not standardized 
but on various flights the following were 
used: E rations, sandwiches, candy bars, and 
coffee in thermos jugs. The R4D aircraft 
were equipped with electric “hot cup” 
heaters which operated on the plane curr ent. 
In addition it was found that the end of the 
hot air duct of the plane’s heating system 
would heat cans of food adequately. This 
duct had been modified by terminating it 
just behind the radio operator where a cur- 
tain separated the forward compartments 
from the cargo section. Some of the canned 
rations contained beans which resulted in 
abdominal distress at the altitudes attained. 
Hot food was made available in the general 
mess for all crews returning from flights at 
odd hours. 
e. Effects of Changing Barometric Pressure. 
There were no cases of aero-otitis or aero- 
sinusitis reported. 
f. Effects of Decreased Barometric Pressure. 
The only evidence of decompression sickness 
observed was the abdominal pains from 
trapped gases reported by some after beans 
had been consumed as part of the in-flight 
765274—48 13 
185 rations. There was no indication that evolve 
cases caused symptoms on any of the flights 
made. 
g. Effects of Temperature. There were no 
reported cases of frostbite occurring during 
flight. However, the position of the photog- 
rapher’s mates in the aircraft was such that 
considerable discomfort and probably some 
loss of efficiency resulted. They were placed 
in the cargo sections of the cabin aft of the 
auxiliary fuel tanks. This section was not 
heated and was closed off from the forward 
section by a curtain. Just forward of the 
cargo door ports were installed on either side 
of the aircraft for the portable aerial cameras. 
Each port was rigged with a canvas baffle to 
occlude the space between the camera and 
the edge of the port. This' was difficult to 
adjust at low temperatures, hands became 
very cold and stiff, and at times considerable 
wind blast came through the ports. Elec- 
trically heated flying suits were provided for 
the photographers but were not entirely 
satisfactory. A better method of preventing 
the wind blast should be sought. (See par. 13.) 
h. Operational Fatigue. No objective signs 
of strain or anxiety were observed and no 
symptoms reported. After the first extended 
flights the difficulties and dangers involved 
in a forced landing in the interior were ap- 
parent to all. The likelihood that a rescue 
operation in some areas might be delayed 
indefinitely due to weather or slow surface 
travel, etc., was recognized by most of the 
aircrew personnel. The duration of the 
operation was comparatively short, however, 
and the crews were confident and had good 
morale throughout. 
i. Noxious Gases. On flight 6A gasoline in 
the cabin tanks was spilled on take-off. The 
fumes were described as “very strong.” 
They persisted throughout most of the flight, 
which the crew believed was due to the gaso- 
line lying under the floorboards on which 
the auxiliary tanks were placed. On the 
return from this flight the pilot complained 
of a severe headache and felt “rocky.” He 
blamed it on the gas fumes. The co-pilot 
had a headache. The navigator had been 
nauseated at one time during the flight and 
felt “dopey” but had no headache. The 
radioman had a headache. The photog- 
rapher first noticed a headache when about 
an hour out from the base, and it was not 
relieved until he arose the following morning. 
He also noticed some nausea during the 
flight. In addition he reported having to 
check and re-check camera settings to be 
sure they were correct, being easily winded 
on exertion, and that he was extremely tired 
on return. On the next extended flight that 
each member of this crew made it was found 
that— 
(1) The pilot had almost as bad a head- 
ache and thought his glasses were at fault. 
(2) The co-pilot “felt fine all the way.” 
(3) The navigator had symptoms referable 
to decreased oxygen tension. 
(4) The radioman had no symptoms. 
(5) The photographer felt fine except for 
being tired. 
A correct evaluation of the effect the 
gasoline fumes had is difficult since some of 
the adverse effects noted could be due to the 
altitude attained. Headache was commonly 
complained of on other flights. The nausea 
can probably be connected directly with the 
fumes, however. Dizziness was not com- 
plained of. 
j. Effects of Decreased Oxygen Tension. (1) 
The R4D aircrews were given a thorough 
refresher briefing at the Naval Air Station, 
Norfolk, Virginia, on the oxygen system to 
be used, the use and care of regulators, 
oxygen masks, etc. This included explana- 
tions of the more common defects and 
causes of malfunction which might be en- 
countered. Flights in the altitude chamber 
were made, one of which was to 30,000 feet 
with oxygen. They were shown mockups 
of various parts of oxygen systems, many of 
186 which were defective in operation, and were 
required to diagnose the trouble and write 
down what, if anything, was indicated to 
adjust or repair them. Talks were given on 
altitude sickness and decompression sickness. 
(2) Subsequently, while en route to the 
Antarctic, it was decided to remove the 
oxygen systems from the aircraft in order to 
decrease the take-off load. JATO was to be 
used, but flying the R4D from a carrier deck 
had never been attempted and a safety 
margin as wide as possible was being sought. 
Replacement oxygen equipment was known 
to be available at the base camp. 
(3) On the first extended exploration 
flights symptoms of anoxia were reported by 
some of the crew members. A majority of 
those who experienced difficulty at the 
altitudes attained stated that they believed 
they were bothered more in this area than 
ever before in temperate and tropical lati- 
tudes. Several mentioned instances during 
the war when they had been at higher 
altitudes without oxygen and with less sub- 
jective difficulty than they were having at 
13,500 feet over Antarctica. There was a 
general impression among the aircrew per- 
sonnel that altitude flying was in some way 
different at high southern latitudes. The 
problem was investigated, insofar as possible 
with facilities available, by the following 
means; 
(a) All crew members were interrogated 
after each extended flight which exceeded 
10,000 feet in altitude and their statements 
recorded. 
(b) A test flight was made on 21 February 
to observe the effects of selected altitudes on 
six subjects, principally ground crew men 
on flying status. The test required each 
subject to copy a printed paragraph in his 
own handwritig (about 100 words) and to 
work 10 simple problems in arithmetic. It 
was given three times, with different material 
to copy and different problems each time. 
Immediately after take-off the first test was 
given to serve as a control; then a climb to 
10,000 feet was made and that altitude was 
maintained for 2 hours. At the end of this 
period the second test was given, and imme- 
diately thereafter a climb was made to 13,500 
feet. After 2 hours at this altitutde the final 
test was given followed by return to base. 
(r) On the return from Little America an 
altitude graph was made for each flight, 
plotting indicated (pressure) altitude against 
time. Data were obtained from navigators’ 
log sheets and from photographic records 
made by the “gremlin” recorder installed as 
part of the trimetrogon camera system. 
(4) Altitude graphs for many flights could 
not be completed with available data, and 
the number of flights involved was small. 
Therefore, no statistical analysis of the results 
was possible. However, the following gen- 
eral statements can be made: 
(a) Fourteen extended flights were made 
during which altitudes above 10,000 feet 
were attained and held for over 2 hours. 
Most of these flights reached altitudes be- 
tween 12,000 and 14,000 feet and were at 
these levels for at least 2 hours. The 
highest altitude reached was 14,700 feet. 
(All readings are indicated altitudes.) 
(b) The principal subjective symptom re- 
ported was shortness of breath, with headache 
a close second. Other symptoms, in approx- 
imate order of frequency were: Fatigue, 
inability to concentrate and calculate, per- 
sonality changes such as irritability and 
irresponsibility, decreased manual dexterity, 
and impairment of touch sensation. There 
was only one case of the last mentioned 
symptom, and that was in a radio operator 
who said that the key felt “velvety and slick.” 
(c) The crew positions, in order of the 
frequency with which anoxic symptoms were 
noted were: radio operator, navigator, co- 
pilot, pilot, and photographer. No logical 
explanation for this order was apparent. 
187 For example, while co-pilots were more 
active during flight than pilots and naviga- 
tors more active than radiomen, the photo- 
mates moved around more than any of the 
others and were apparently affected the least. 
{d) The first seven flights were made 
over a period of 3 days, and the second seven 
over a period of 6 days. Considerably more 
difficulty was reported on the first seven 
than the second. This may be attributed 
to a combination of several causes. First, 
many were unable to get adequate sleep 
during the first 3 days of good weather when 
the main flying operation began. The crews 
were keyed up and tense, and long alerts 
were common. This sitation improved pro- 
gressively. Second, the early flights de- 
parted Little America at 8,000 to 10,000 
feet altitude, while later more flights went 
out for 2 or 3 hours at 4,000 to 6,000 feet 
and gained altitude for mountains and 
plateaus only when they were reached. 
This was possible due to familiarity with the 
terrain gained from previous flights and desir- 
able from the point of view of delaying or 
preventing anoxic difficulties. Finally better 
acclimatization may have played a part. 
(e) The results of the test flight were about 
what would be found in temperate latitudes. 
A definite though moderate increase in mis- 
takes in copying occurred between tests No. 
2 and No. 3. No significant change was 
noted in the number of mistakes made in 
arithmetic. Handwriting itself was some- 
what more irregular on the third test in all 
cases. Nothing more significant than mild 
shortness of breath on moving around the 
aircraft was complained of by the subjects 
at the end of the 2-hour period at 13,500 feet. 
(f) Finally, factors such as lack of sleep, 
irregular hours, tenseness, changed environ- 
ment, and a certain amount of anxiety may 
have resulted in an increased susceptibility 
to anoxia. 
8. Personal Hygiene. 
a. Washing and Bathing. Like swimming, 
the first plunge was the hardest. During the 
first few days on the ice one noticed that as 
each day passed the evidence of lack of appli- 
cation of soap and water to hands and faces 
gradually increased. After these first few 
days the opposite occurred and after a week 
or so daily washing of the face and more 
frequent washing of the hands became the 
rule rather than the exception. This, it is 
believed, had a very logical basis. It was 
necessary that individuals in each tent pro- 
vide their own water by melting snow. This 
necessitated rounding up containers of vari- 
ous types for this purpose. After a few days 
each tent would accumulate a sufficient 
stock of No. 10 cans or whatever other type 
of containers they could procure, until they 
could have sufficient water on hand for wash- 
ing and drinking purposes. The first face 
washing was quite an event and probably in 
most cases, for novices on the ice, took the 
better part of an hour to accomplish. After 
this first one, the next one came easier until 
after a few more days it was just as much of 
a routine and practically as simple as washing 
at home. Some individuals never did get 
into the routine and seemed none the worse 
for it. However, they were in a very definite 
minority. Bathing was a little more compli- 
cated but none the less was done without too 
much difficulty. On days when the wind 
was not blowing the temperature of the tents 
could be raised until one could strip and take 
a sponge bath with little or no discomfort. 
By standing on a box and raising one’s self 
2 feet or so above the floor, it could be made 
even more comfortable. To those of a more 
delicate nature there was the piecemeal 
method in which one washed one part of the 
body at a time and then, covering that por- 
tion, proceeded with the remainder. 
b. Teeth. The purely mechanical difficul- 
ties of washing one’s teeth were the cause of 
188 delay in performing this function during the 
first day or so on the ice. As soon as water 
cans, cups (generally peanut cans), etc., were 
procured and arrangements completed for 
turning snow into water, the washing of 
teeth proceeded in a purely normal manner. 
However, if there was a tendency under nor- 
mal living conditions to neglect one’s teeth 
it was very easy under those circumstances to 
forget them entirely. In general, the care of 
the teeth was carried on fairly closely to one’s 
normal standards. 
c. Bowel Habits. The spector of an ice 
covered, snow filled, unheated tent latrine 
(or “head” as preferred by the Navy) was to 
practically everyone on the ice a herculean 
obstacle that sooner or later must be over- 
come. (Fig. 172.) One’s first encounter was 
generally made after procrastination had 
started running a poor second to the necessity 
of defecation. After arguing with one’s self 
and preparing for the worst the first venture 
was finally accomplished to the great physical 
and mental relief of the individual. After 
this first bout the individual bowel habits of 
all personnel more or less took over. The 
person who had developed and strictly 
followed a set bowel routine under more nor- 
mal circumstances was definitely favored. 
His routine was in most cases carried out with 
little difficulty or discomfort. The person 
who had not followed a definite bowel regime 
under ordinary circumstances encountered 
much more difficulty because of the psycho- 
logical obstacles which were ever present. 
(See sec. HI.) 
d. Shaving. There were three very definite 
schools of thought on shaving among person- 
nel of this expedition. The first was that 
one should keep himself clean shaven; the 
second, that he should let his beard grow; and 
third, that it didn’t make one particle of 
difference which he did. Among the person- 
nel on the ice there were staunch supporters 
of each school, and each boasted of devotees 
Figure 172. Interior view of latrine. This drifting 
occurred only during strong winds. 
among the old timers as well as among 
the rabble. The “tonsorial exhibitionists” 
claimed that their beards helped protect their 
face from the wind, while the clean shavers 
pointed out that one’s breath froze in the 
beard, which thereby must be colder besides 
being a nuisance. The third group let the 
others argue and shaved when the spirit 
moved them. Personally and from all the 
pros and cons that I could gather it all boils 
down to purely a matter of personal prefer- 
ence. However, the convenience of not hav- 
ing to shave is something that cannot be 
entirely overlooked. 
e. Laundry. The term “laundry” was prac- 
tically forgotten by the personnel living on 
the ice. The stay was so short that one’s 
supply of socks and underwear was generally 
sufficient to see him through. One quickly 
found that it wasn’t necessary to put on 
clean clothing as frequently as he did at 
home. This applied particularly to woolen 
underwear. To change underwear once a 
week was being fastidious; 2 weeks was 
about average. Socks were changed more 
frequently. Some laundry was done by 
individuals but generally speaking a lot of 
dirty clothes were either turned back to 
189 supply or brought aboard ship. No special 
facilities for laundry at the camp were 
available. 
9. General Condition and Efficiency of 
Troops. 
The following miscellaneous points were 
observed on this subject: 
a. Under conditions involving living in 
tents on snow surface, with temperatures of 
zero Fahrenheit plus or minus 20 degrees, 
working on snow surface, and no semi- 
permanent installations such as laundry, 
running water, or electricity, troops cannot 
do as much work as is normally the case. 
Keeping warm, eating, washing, mainten- 
ance of quarters, shoveling snow every other 
time something is done outdoors, and just 
daily living is much more time consuming. 
Everything is slowed up, and a work schedule 
which is normal for an average base cannot 
be accomplished, 
b. Windy weather on ice cap terrain 
almost always carries drift, and the efficiency 
of men working outdoors drops at these 
times even if temperatures are moderate. 
In this connection it is felt that as the wind 
chill factor increases a point is reached 
beyond which it becomes less and less profit- 
able to work troops out in the open. Ex- 
perience on this operation was hardly suf- 
ficient to provide good estimates of these 
levels. However, if attention is given to the 
problem in the future, it should be possible 
to ascertain what wind chill value defines 
the approximate limit beyond which it 
becomes increasingly profitable to rest troops 
rather than work them. 
c. Morale was excellent on this operation. 
However, it is believed that if the same type 
of operation were continued for several 
months, morale, eagerness, and contentment 
of the troops would require considerable 
effort to maintain. A few small luxuries and 
extra physical comforts would probably help. 
Just what could be provided for combat 
troops that would not prove too expensive 
logistically would require study. 
d. There was no evidence of psychological 
maladjustment observed. 
e. Due to the necessity for melting snow 
for all washing and drinking water, it is 
believed that most of the personnel did not 
have a really adequate fluid intake. Many 
personnel very seldom took fluids except for 
coffee and soup at the mess. 
/. It is doubtful that full acclimatization 
was attained even by members of the ice 
party. The summer season is short, and the 
transition to weather more severe than most 
have ever experienced is rapid in late Feb- 
ruary and early March. It is believed that 
had the party stayed on the ice through 
March evidences of lack of acclimatization 
would have become apparent. 
10. Air Evacuation. 
a. The only patients evacuated by air were 
the survivors of the wrecked PBM as de- 
scribed above. Nothing of note occurred in 
this connection except that the operation was 
successfully carried out. 
b. In general, air evacuation from ice cap 
terrain is entirely feasible. In fact the 
ability to land on skis in many areas without 
preparation of a landing strip should prove 
an advantage over air evacuation from 
ground terrain; JATO can be used where 
loads are heavy and/or distance for take-off 
is limited. It is believed that glider pickups 
could be made as easily as on ground terrain. 
c. Patient comfort could be assured by 
dependable cabin heating installations, and 
by providing sleeping bag type of bedding 
instead of blankets in case the heater fails or 
is insufficient under extreme conditions. 
11. Rations. 
a. Aboard - Ship. The ration aboard all 
ships of the task force was exactly comparable 
to that of any Army mess in the States. 
Frozen meats, vegetables, etc., were used to 
190 the limit of storage space aboard which 
varied from ship to ship. Fresh foods, in- 
cluding milk, were taken on where available 
also to the limit of storage space. No particu- 
lar problems were encountered. 
b. Base Camp. (See par. 2 of sec. III.) 
(1) The ration on the ice was the best that 
could be obtained and handled under the 
circumstances. The mess in all respects was 
excellent and was an enormous morale 
factor. The ration was the regular Navy 
ration with frozen meats, vegetables, butter, 
etc. The mess officer was instructed to 
provide a good mess and was given authority 
to use a 25 percent over ration if necessary. 
(2) Appetites on the ice were good. The 
weather combined with the excellent prepara- 
tion of the food required that a ration and a 
quarter to a ration and a half be provided. 
Wastage of food after being taken on a tray 
was noticeably small. Preferences for partic- 
ular foods were not noticeable, other than 
those present in any general mess, except 
that cold foods were not particularly desired. 
(3) Frozen meats and fowl were primarily 
used. There were sufficient choice cuts 
available so that stews and canned meats 
were seldom served. The frozen meats were 
moved from the lockers aboard ship to an 
ice house adjoining the mess hall. This ice 
house was constructed by digging a hole in 
the snow 30 by 15 by 4 feet. A frame of 
2- by 4-inch planks was placed on the snow 
floor to keep meat and other items out of the 
snow. The door was made of a single layer 
of wood. (Fig. 173.) Although the outside 
temperatures ranged from —23° to +34° 
Fahrenheit, the temperatures inside the ice 
house stayed fairly steadily around +15° 
Fahrenheit. It was necessary to remove the 
meat from the ice house and place it in the 
galley 48 hours prior to the anticipated time 
of use. This allowed just sufficient time for 
it to thaw and be cut. There was no 
spoilage. 
Figure 173. Construction of cold food storage room. 
(4) Bread and pastries were baked on the 
ships and moved to the base camp. While 
the ships were tied up to the ice this was done 
daily. Prior to departure of the ships from 
the bay (leaving an ice party of 200 men for a 
period of approximately 3 weeks) sufficient 
bread was baked and sent to the camp where 
it was stored in the ice house. This bread 
froze rather slowly but remained in perfect 
condition. It was removed from storage 
about 24 hours before using and even after 
3 weeks it was difficult to distinguish this 
bread from that which had been freshly 
baked. This arrangement was entirely satis- 
factory. 
(5) Canned goods were stored in the open 
just outside of the mess tent. This was 
stacked according to contents right on the 
snow and covered with a tarpaulin. The orig- 
inal pasteboard containers were used and stood 
up well. There was a storage tent immedi- 
ately adjoining the gallery in which the tem- 
perature was kept above freezing. A 2- to 3- 
day supply of canned goods was kept here in 
order to thaw it out before using. There were 
no noticeable changes in the character or 
quality of canned foods caused by the freezing 
and thawing except in the case of canned 
milk. This evaporated milk after freezing 
did not reconstitute well. 
191 (6) A number of men on this expedition 
had an opportunity to eat certain foods that 
had been left at Little America on previous 
expeditions. All were found to be in perfect 
condition and included chocolate bars 12 
years old, crackers, cookies, butter, coffee, 
tea, and dried milk, and other items that had 
been in the Antarctic for 8 years. These had 
been stored below the surface where the 
temperature probably never got more than 
2 or 3 degrees above zero. All of these items 
were just as fresh as if they had been purchased 
the day before. In one case a pound of but- 
ter that had been stored on the top of Mount 
Franklin in the Rockefellers for 7 years under 
only one layer of canvas was found to be 
perfectly fresh. 
(7) Breakage of food in glass containers 
from the cold weather was not a noticeable 
problem. On this expedition items in glass 
containers included jellies and jams, relishes, 
syrup, vinegar, etc. There was considerable 
breakage of these items from shipping and 
handling but there was none that could be 
attributed directly to the temperature. 
(8) Preparation of the ration (see par. 2 of 
sec. ni) was excellent. It was well cooked 
and served hot. There were no particular 
difficulties encountered in its preparation 
that could be attributed directly to the cold. 
c. Trail Rations. The only trail trip con- 
ducted on this expedition by the Central 
Group was one in which seven men in two 
“landing vehicles, tracked” (Alligators) went 
to the Rockefeller Mountains, a total dis- 
tance of 245 miles in 7 days. Since weight 
was not a particularly important factor on 
this trip, the Army E ration was used almost 
exclusively. Temperatures during this trip 
were practically all below zero and the ra- 
tions, except for the box being used, were 
kept out on the sled. No deterioration or 
change in character or quality of the E 
ration was noted that could be attributed to 
the temperature. The bread after thawing 
tasted excellent but all of the crackers were 
broken into tiny pieces. Whether this was 
due to the temperature or to handling is not 
known. 
12. Indoctrination and Training. 
a. Medical Briefing of All Personnel. (1) The 
Medical Department has a very real and 
very definite responsibility in the training of 
all personnel engaged in an operation of this 
type. This will include the training and 
indoctrination of commanders as well as of 
the troops. All personnel will learn quickly 
once they are forced into observing the rules, 
but major catastrophies will occur during 
this phase that can be decreased in number 
and severity by rigid training and strict 
discipline. 
(2) A much larger percentage of a man’s 
working day is occupied in self-preservation 
in high latitudes than in the climates with 
which we are more familiar. This must be 
recognized and the necessary allowances 
made. Therefore, every individual must 
understand the basic principles of the pro- 
duction and preservation of bodily heat. 
He must understand the value of insulation 
and the danger of perspiration. It is not 
sufficient to tell a man that he should wear 
three pairs of socks and that they should be 
kept dry. He will learn this after he has 
experienced a few days of cold temperatures, 
but the knowledge may come too late to be 
of any benefit. In this case it will be the 
responsibility of the Medical Department 
to impress the commanders with the neces- 
sity of seeing that it is done. Exactly the 
same basic principles of training apply here 
that were used throughout the Army during 
the war. The only difference will be the 
inclusion of a few additional subjects. 
(3) On this expedition a series of confer- 
ences were held aboard ship during the trip 
to the ice. This was the only formal briefing 
of personnel in the Central Group. These 
conferences included subjects of general 
192 interest presented by the geologists, natural- 
ists, and other scientific personnel and also a 
series of talks on clothing, frostbite, protec- 
tion of the eyes, sunburn, and mechanism of 
heat production. Also included were a 
number of training films on trench foot, first 
aid, shock, and so forth. These are the 
obvious necessities of training for high 
latitude operations. All training for cold 
weather operations should point toward 
getting the men in the field under cold 
conditions. 
b. Special Training for Medical Department 
Personnel. (1) Training of medical depart- 
ment units for high latitude operation will 
for the most part be based on the same 
training program as provided for all troops. 
This will cover most of the problems en- 
countered by medical units. Certain in- 
struction will be required in nursing care in 
cold weather and in the treatment of certain 
cold weather conditions. 
(2) For commissioned personnel instruc- 
tion in metabolism and the production and 
preservation of body heat should be given. 
Types of diets and caloric and vitamin 
contents of foods should be included. Pecu- 
liarities of medical service in cold weather 
as brought out in all of the various high 
latitude operations should be consolidated 
and presented in any training program. 
The etiology, pathology, and treatment of 
conditions found in these areas should be 
reviewed. In addition to these specific med- 
ical responsibilities, it is believed that every 
medical officer going into high latitudes 
should know the basic principles of naviga- 
tion and radio operation, including the 
ability to receive and send CW messages. 
It may happen that a medical officer may 
find himself the only officer present in a 
small isolated unit such as a trail party, a 
rescue party, etc., and a knowledge of these 
two subjects may mean the difference between 
life and death. 
(3) In the training of an Antarctic expedi- 
tion it is felt that the writings of such men 
as Scott, Amundsen, Mawson, Shackleton, 
and Byrd should be required reading. There 
is an enormous amount of information to 
be gathered from these writers, both from the 
things that they did well and the mistakes 
that they made. However, a large group 
of men with polar experience will be the 
greatest asset to a high latitude training 
program. 
13. Air Force Types of Clothing and Per- 
sonal Equipment—Central Group. 
a. Flying Equipment. (1) As noted above 
there were no oxygen systems installed in 
the aircraft. Neither were there walk around 
bottles. Consequently, no observations were 
made on oxygen masks, regulators, etc. 
(2) Aircrew personnel were equipped with 
polarized plastic lens sun glasses with plastic 
bows, which transmit about 15 percent of 
the light of the visible spectrum. The spare 
pair carried in the survival gear was of the 
same type. 
(3) Most flying was done in woolen under- 
wear, O. D. trousers and shirt, Navy issue 
winter flying boots, and the Navy leather 
flying jacket or pile lined field jacket. 
Flying helmets were not used to any great 
extent. When the heating system failed or 
was inadequate the crewmen could resort 
to their kit bag of spare clothing. 
(4) The Navy leather-covered, electrically 
heated flying suit and electrically heated 
gloves and shoes were available for wear by 
the photographer’s mates as mentioned pre- 
viously. They were found to be awkward 
at this position, especially when attempting 
to adjust the wind baffles at the camera 
ports, and the cameras themselves. The 
photographers also had to move back to the 
tail section to the trimetrogon camera in- 
stallation, which required disconnecting the 
current. Hot and cold spots in the suit 
765274—48 14 
193 were commonly reported, and a need was 
expressed for temperature regulation to the 
hands and feet. 
(5) Photographers and radio operators 
both saw a need for a fairly thin glove that 
would afford some degree of protection when 
they had to work without mittens at low 
cabin temperatures. 
(6) A few samples of the Army H-16/U 
headset were tried and found to be uncom- 
fortable as to fit at the ears. Otherwise 
they were apparently satisfactory. 
(7) Sanitary Devices. The standard R4D 
relief tube installation was modified by sub- 
stituting a larger tube (about the size of a 
garden hose) and locating it in the main 
fuselage section opposite the cargo door. 
A larger funnel also was used. While this 
modification was an improvement over the 
standard, still further development appears 
to be indicated for this type of operation. 
Even the large size tube became stopped up 
frequently, and there was considerable wet- 
ting of the aircraft and adjacent equipment. 
The tubes were installed in such a way that 
fluid stasis and freezing occurred in various 
parts of the tube. Some method involving a 
relatively straight gravity drop and at the 
same time precluding the possibility of the 
tube’s remaining bent when secured to the 
airplane would be desirable. Even with 
these specifications it is possible that with 
temperatures of —40° to —50° C. and eight 
men in the crew freezing would occur rapidly 
enough to stop the tube on a 12-hour flight. 
(On one flight outside temperatures below 
— 40° C. were recorded.) The inconven- 
ience under conditions encountered of pro- 
curing boiling water to clear the tubes after 
landing would be considerable. Possibly the 
solution lies in providing waterproof paper 
bags of suitable dimensions—each one to be 
disposed of after a single use. Paper sacks 
were provided for defecation but were 
seldom, if ever, used. 
Forced Landing. (1) Most items were ade- 
quate insofar as the services have been able 
to make them to date. Of course, in the 
more extreme Antarctic weather caribou 
clothing and sleeping bags would be better. 
On one extended flight a pilot had to resort 
to his sleeping bag to get warm when the 
heating system failed, and obviously the furs 
would become even more important in case 
of being forced down in the interior. Unless 
the season and temperatures are favorable, 
as was. the case when the PBM crew went 
down, electrically heated suits are not suit- 
able as to type or warmth. It is believed 
that for polar flying electrically heated gar- 
ments should be second choice or special 
purpose items, and clothing suitable for both 
flying and ground survival be selected for 
routing operations. This may involve com- 
promises at first and a certain amount of new 
development as a continuing policy to meet 
the demands of high latitude operations. 
(2) The immersion suit is required for 
emergency landings under certain condi- 
tions. (Fig. 174.) The operations of the 
Central Group did not require it. How- 
ever, the Underwater Demolition Team 
tested two immersion suits in the waters of 
the Bay of Whales (fig. 175). They did not 
have the flotation feature, as they were de- 
signed for underwater swimming. They 
were cut to conform closely to the contours 
of the body and had a valve for the release of 
air trapped within the suit. A design for 
sealing the free margin around the face was 
found to be effective. One type was one- 
piece rubber with a thin cloth lining. The 
other was two-piece and not lined. Gloves 
and feet were a part of each suit. Under the 
suits were worn two pairs of woolen socks, 
one suit of woolen underwear, and one pair 
of knitted gloves. Conditions at the time of 
the tests were: air temperature +26° F., 
water temperature +29° F., and the water 
covered with 2 inches of slush ice. Fifteen 
men swam for 20 minutes each during the 
b. Suitability of Clothing for Existence After 
194 test. There was no sudden sensation of cold 
and cooling was subjectively gradual through 
out. In 7 to 10 minutes discomfort in the 
extremities began to be felt, and by the end 
of the 20-minute period hands and feet were 
“very cold.” There were no subjects who 
shivered at any time. Respirations, pulse 
rate, blood pressure, and mouth and rectal 
temperatures were recorded before and after 
the test. Changes in these readings were in 
all cases within the limits expected after the 
amount of exercise involved, except the oral 
temperatures which dropped slightly—ap- 
parently due to direct contact with cold water. 
c. Ground Crew Problems. The principal 
problem in aircraft maintenance was keeping 
the mechanics warm. Shelters for the me- 
chanics were improvised but were not entirely 
satisfactory. (Fig. 176.) Various methods 
were discussed with personnel on the job. 
(1) The difficulty of handling nuts, bolts, 
and screws was emphasized by all. One 
suggestion made was to develop a light glove 
to insert to cover the hands and help to some 
extent when otherwise bare hands would 
have to be used. 
(2) For the same problem the development 
of a universal tool for putting on nuts and 
bolts was suggested. 
(3) Several mechanics who were shown a 
heat block evidenced considerable interest. 
This item is made by a mine safety appliance 
company. It is a metal block which is heated 
by discharging a cartridge inserted into a 
hole in its center. They thought it might 
contribute to overcoming heat loss to cold 
tool handles if screw drivers, etc., were bored 
and fitted for this cartridge. 
(4) A heated tool box or cabinet was sug- 
gested but most of the mechanics felt that an 
adequate nose hangar would solve most of 
their problems. 
(5) The consensus was that a nose hangar 
should be provided with the following points 
incorporated in its construction: 
(a) It should cover both ends of the engine. 
Figure 1 74. immersion suits 
Figure 175. Immersion suits being tested. Note slush 
ice on surface of water. 
Figure 1 76. Improvised nose hangars for protection of 
aircraft maintenance personnel. 
195 (b) It should have a catwalk over the wing 
if possible. 
(c) The canvas should be windproof. 
(d) For ease in moving it should be built 
on skis or skids or else adaptable to runners of 
some type. 
(e) Openings for Herman-Nelson heaters. 
(f) All four sides covered. 
(g) Windows on all sides to take advantage 
of 24 hours of sunlight when available. 
(,h) A means of anchoring to resist very 
strong winds. Estimates by crew chiefs, line 
mechanics, and engineering officers as to how 
much the above type shelter would raise 
efficiency of maintenance crews varied from 
50 to 90 percent. 
(6) One airplane mechanic froze his toes 
badly enough to require treatment in bed. 
Most of the mechanics wore boot packs— 
either the Quartermaster issue or similar 
type. This item should be adequate for 
ordinary temperatures down to zero degrees 
F. if heated engine hangars are available. 
However, under more severe conditions 
mukluks should be provided for those work- 
ing on aircraft. 
d. A AF Clothing Worn by Observers. Prior to 
departure the 12 War Department observers 
were supplied with several items of personal 
gear which were developed by the AAF. 
These were worn mostly on the ground in 
combination with Army Quartermaster and 
Navy clothing. Most items were furnished 
in only one, size, which resulted in less 
utilization of these garments than would have 
been possible otherwise. 
(1) Jacket, Mechanic's, Arctic, Type D-2 (fig. 
177). This jacket was worn only in the 
coldest weather. With the exception of fur 
parkas, and the Quartermaster Arctic parka, 
which are warmer, this was the warmest 
standard garment of jacket type in use. 
Since they were worn by observers who were 
in and out of shelter frequently on an average 
day, the slip-over type was not so well liked 
as the type which opens all the way down the 
front. Fastenings were adequate and func- 
tioned well. The fur along the border of the 
hood serves its purpose well. Two subjects 
thought that a draw string at waist level or 
slightly below would be an improvement in 
windy weather. The two who mentioned 
this point are of less than average weight for 
their height. The chest pocket was appreci- 
ated. 
(2) Jacket, Flying, Winter, TypeB-11. This 
jacket was worn more than the above—prob- 
ably because only on a few days were 
temperatures below —10° F. recorded. 
There were a few complaints that the hood 
“pressed down” on the head when in use, 
indicating that for these wearers the top of 
the hood to neck seam measurement was 
too short. Buttons and zipper worked well. 
The warmth of the jacket was increased by 
wearing a scarf, since the neck closure 
Figure 177. Jacket, mechanic’s, Arctic, type D-2. 
196 pairs of heavy woolen ski socks, winter 
flying boot. 
It was found that the heavy woolen sock 
on the right foot was perfectly dry at night. 
The outer sock on the left foot was very 
damp. Both light inner socks were mod- 
erately damp and to the same degree. 
Under the circumstances worn—walking 
and frequently going in and out of tents, 
huts, etc.—there seemed to be little differ- 
ence in the warmth of the above combina- 
tions. If there was any difference in warmth 
it favored the right foot. There is little 
doubt that if a person walked actively long 
enough to perspire freely and then stood 
around quietly for an hour in temperatures 
around +15° F., the evaporation from the 
damp woolen socks would make it much 
colder than the foot with the rubber sock. 
(b) The assembly first tried by the other 
observer was rubber stockings and winter 
Figure 178. Cold weather clothing: shoes, flying, 
winter, type A-6A; suit, flying, light, type L-1, 
gabardine,- goggle, assembly, flying, type B-8. 
Note parka, hood, heavy, alpaca lined, type N-1, 
underneath flying suit. 
admits wind. It was thought that the lower 
pockets would be better if deeper. 
(3) Shoes, Flying, Winter, Type A-6A (fig. 
178). This item was worn quite commonly 
by several observers. Although not designed 
for continuous use on the ground, it served 
well for wear around the camp. It is not 
well adapted to ground survival in its present 
form. This shoe was worn experimentally 
with impermeable rubber stockings by two 
observers. 
(a) The following assembly was worn by 
one observer: 
Right foot: Light weight inner stocking, 
rubber stocking, one pair heavy woolen 
ski socks, winter flying boot. 
Left foot: Light weight inner stocking, two 
Figure 179. Mask, face, cold weather, type D-1. 
197 flying boot only. This was comfortable until 
temperatures dropped below zero and the 
shearling lining became matted down on the 
sole. At this time he changed to light woolen 
socks next to the skin, rubber socks over that, 
felt duffel socks next, and the flying boot last. 
"T his assembly was comfortable under con- 
ditions of considerable outdoors activity and 
temperatures from zero to — 23° F. 
(r) It is believed that the principle involved 
in having an impermeable layer near the 
Figure 181. Parka, hood, heavy, alpaca lined, type 
N-1. This vest type garment is easily and com- 
fortably worn alone or under any type outer garment. 
Sun glasses are Quartermaster issue. 
skin and most of the insulation between it 
and the outer covering might be tried with 
benefit in the future development of footgear 
for flying. 
(4) Mukluks, Winter, Flying {Spec. No. T- 
3269). These boots were delivered without 
the inserts designed to be worn with them. 
However, locally available socks were used 
and were satisfactory. No complaints or 
suggestions for improvement were noted, and 
although the change to mukluks was a wel- 
come one when temperatures were below 
zero, it is not felt that the operation afforded 
the chance for a thorough test. 
(5) Mask, Face, Cold Weather, Type D-1 
(fig. 179). This item was worn on a few 
occasions and appeared to be very helpful. 
However, there was no opportunity to use it 
under extreme conditions and for long pe- 
riods of time. The usual difficulty in wearing 
dark glasses with a mask was experienced. 
Figure 180. Other types of cold weather clothing: 
boots, mountain, ski (QM); trousers, mountain, ski 
(QM); mitts, shell, trigger finger (QM)/ jacket, 
flying, intermediate, type B-1 5. Note parka, hood, 
heavy, alpaca lined, type N-1, underneath flying 
jacket. 
198 Work should be continued toward develop- 
ing improved face masks. 
(6) Intermediate Flying Jacket, Type B~75 
(fig. 180). This jacket was used a great deal, 
especially on shipboard between 45 and 65 
degrees S. latitude. It was also worn quite 
often around the base camp. Comments on 
it were uniformly favorable. 
(7) Parka Hood, Heavy, Alpaca Lined, Type 
N—1 (fig. 181). This item was also worn a 
great deal and was praised highly by all who 
tried it. It has been suggested that it would 
be useful as a head covering while in a 
sleeping bag, since it would “follow” more 
readily when the wearer turned over. A 
similar garment made by the Navy was worn 
by the aircrew personnel, but as far as is 
known no one had the opportunity to wear 
both lor comparison. No suggestions for 
improvement can be offered. 
(8) Glasses, Arctic, Sun, Type F-1. This 
glass was liked by all except one person, on 
whom the nose arch was uncomfortable. 
Horizon identification under adverse condi- 
tions was better than with others tried. 
These others were mostly Army Quarter- 
master or Navy issue with plastic lenses. 
The Navy neutral gray flying glasses were 
worn by only a few persons, and no compari- 
son was feasible. The lenses of the F-1 
glasses transmit about 15 percent of the light 
of the visible spectrum, and it is possible that 
if survivors of a crash were wearing them in 
areas completely covered with snow and ice, 
they might not surely prevent snow-blindness. 
On “milky” days when the sun is not visible 
and there are no shadows and no contrast 
between snow and sky, the light intensity 
and strain on the eyes are markedly in- 
creased. Under these conditions a lens 
transmitting no more than 10 percent of the 
light may be required. Of course, in an 
airplane the cockpit cuts out the light from 
quite large angles, both above and below the 
wearer, and the above would not apply. 
There is some difficulty in wearing the F-1 
sun glasses with heavy winter headgear. 
Their utility could be increased by modifying 
them to be worn either in the conventional 
manner or by an elastic retention band run- 
ning around the head outside of the headgear. 
SECTION III. Environmental Sanitation* 
1. Shelter and Housing. 
a. Shelter and housing was provided by 
a combination of tents, Quonset huts, Wan- 
nigan huts, and improvised shelters. Quon- 
set huts were provided for the emergency 
camp, and for air operations and communi- 
cations. Wannigan huts were provided for 
the four senior officers living on the ice and 
pyramidal tents for the remainder of the 
personnel. Improvised shelters made from 
two-by-four’s and canvas were erected for 
the vehicle maintenance shop and clothing 
supplies. Ward tents and storage tents were 
used where more space than that provided 
by pyramidal tents was required such as 
aviation maintenance shop, mess, etc. These 
housing facilities were adequate for the 
conditions that were encountered and for 
the length of time that they were used. 
However, a number of improvements could 
be made that would greatly increase their 
efficiency. 
b. The tents provided for personnel in 
the base camp were the standard Navy 
pyramidal 16 by 16 feet. They were erected 
in 5 rows of 10 tents each, the rows being 
*See chapter 3. 
199 Figure 182. Living quarters, showing base frame of 
two-by-four’s. 
Figure 183. Living quarters, showing wall of snow 
blocks around entire tent for insulation purposes. 
the camp to be spread out over a very large 
area, and it might be decreased to some 
extent without causing too much accumula- 
tion of drift. The rows ran in a northeast- 
southwest direction with the doors of the 
tents facing the northwest. The prevailing 
winds were from the south and east. The 
tents were erected on a flat ground frame 
of two-by-four’s on which was placed a 
plywood floor. (Fig. 182.) Extending out 
from this frame was an additional frame of 
timber to which the tent ropes were tied. 
Each tent was provided with an Army tent 
stove Ml 941 which burned Diesel fuel, 
standard Army cots and mattresses, and an 
Army sleeping bag Ml942 with inner and 
outer shell or a Navy sleeping bag with an 
outer shell and an inner pad. This was 
what one found upon moving into the tent. 
c. One could not live comfortably in a 
tent in this state for very long under the 
conditions that were encountered. The com- 
fort of the tent depended upon the time 
available, the energy expended, and the 
ingenuity shown. 
(1) The first improvement necessary was to 
build a two-by-four frame around the inside 
of the tent about 4 feet off the floor. This 
Figure 1 84. Entrance to living quarters (tent), showing 
door made of plywood and lumber scraps. 
200 feet apart and the tents within the rows 
40 feet apart. These distances were used 
because of the fire hazard and to decrease 
the accumulation of drifted snow. The 
distance between the rows of tents caused 
200 Figure 185. Hospital tent, showing entrance formed 
by snow blocks to break the wind. Plywood door 
on inside completes this entrance. 
Figure 186. Living quarters, showing oil drum 
connected to heating unit inside tent. 
was essential because of the wind and the 
accumulation of snow against the outside 
of the tent causing it to sag. In some tents 
where the personnel were fortunate enough 
to find sufficient plywood a wall was con- 
structed on this frame which was of great 
benefit. This frame was also useful as a 
clothes rack and for placing shelves. 
(2) The canvas flap door is entirely inade- 
quate for this region. A 12-inch snow drift 
could easily accumulate in one’s tent during 
a moderate wind if an improved entrance 
was not provided. These entrances showed 
great ingenuity and in some cases consider- 
able labor was involved. The best type was 
one in which a plywood frame was con- 
structed with the door almost horizontal and 
which led down 3 or 4 steps into a pit and 
then back up into the tent. Other types were 
made from plywood, snow blocks, packing 
cases, or combinations of all. Some had as 
many as three doors or flaps. All were 
intended to keep out the snow and wind and 
worked very satisfactorily. (Figs. 183, 184, 
185, and 186.) 
(3) Other measures for windproofing con- 
sisted of chinking the cracks in the plywood 
floor with canvas, cloth, paper, wood, or 
anything at hand. Snow walls around the 
outside of the tent built up to a height of 
about 4){ feet helped a great deal during 
strong winds. 
(4) During blizzards the metal cap, placed 
at the apex of the tent for the purpose of 
holding the stovepipe, allowed a great deal 
of wind and snow to enter the tent. This 
caused considerable discomfort and various 
means were taken to remedy it. One method 
was to place two of the regular canvas covers 
so as to cover the spaces between the tent and 
the metal cap. Another was to take the 
mosquito bars that came with the cots (since 
the mosquito bars were not needed for their 
intended purpose many other uses were 
found for them) and stuff them into the space 
between the metal cap and the tent. This 
worked fairly well but was dangerous because 
of the fire hazard. 
(5) Because so much of the heat from the 
stove was lost in the upper part of the tent, 
false ceilings were erected in a number of the 
tents. These were made of mosquito bars, 
mattress covers, lead foil covers of storage 
batteries, and tin foil radar reflectors. Some of 
201 these were very successful and made a notice- 
able difference in the temperature of the tent. 
d. When these improvements were com- 
pleted one could sit comfortably in these 
tents in temperatures down to zero degrees 
Fahrenheit with heavy underwear, wool 
shirt, and trousers, and possibly a sweater. 
The area up to about 12 inches above the 
floor, however, seldom got above 32 degrees 
Fahrenheit and the corners of the tent were 
generally fairly close to outside temperatures. 
But sitting up within 3 or 4 feet of the center 
of the tent it was generally sufficiently warm 
to read or write and live a fairly comfortable 
life. In colder weather or when there was a 
strong wind the side of one’s body away from 
the stove was generally cold unless addi- 
tional clothes were added. 
e. Because of the necessity of keeping the 
tent closed tightly it was necessary either to 
keep a lamp burning at all times while 
working in the tent or to provide some type 
of windows. The latter method was very 
highly desirable. This was accomplished by 
cutting holes in the tent and lacing lucite 
into the hole. Windows of various sizes 
from 6 inches square to 2 feet square were 
made in this manner and worked very satis- 
factorily. Because of the 24 hours of day- 
light it was necessary to provide means of 
covering these windows while sleeping. Gas- 
oline mantle lanterns were also used which 
worked well but considerable maintenance 
was required. 
/. The Army tent stove (Ml 941) con- 
verted for use with Diesel fuel worked satis- 
factorily. After the tents were “winterized” 
it was seldom necessary to run the stove at 
full heat. However, one side of one’s body 
was frequently cold while the side toward 
the stove was too hot. In many cases one 
might be fairly comfortable up close to the 
Figure 187. Interior view of living quarters, showing 
improvised furniture and plywood floor. 
Figure 188. View of mess tents from the southwest. 
Figure 189. ‘Chow line." 
202 stove while there was a quarter of an inch of 
frost on the inside wall of the tent. Numer- 
ous carbon monoxide determinations in the 
tents made at various levels, at different 
temperatures, etc., did not reveal a single 
positive reading. Only a few stoves re- 
quired maintenance during their 5 weeks of 
continuous use. The tent pole, however, in 
a few tents did require some maintenance. 
The way the stove pipe leaves the tent re- 
quires that the stove and the center pole be 
placed very close together. When the stove 
is turned on high it scorches the pole and in 
a few cases they were burned through. Due 
to the fact that it required some time to start 
these stoves, they were generally turned down 
low rather than turning them out at night. 
This also provided some heat in the tent 
during the night 
g. Other improvements which tended to 
make tent life more comfortable included: 
A broom and a whisk broom, if they could 
be obtained, for cleaning off snow; tin foil 
reflectors around the edge of the tent; water 
drains through the floor of the tent; furniture 
such as chairs, tables, shelves, etc., made 
from packing cases; and a clothes drying rack 
up high in the tent for drying socks, inner 
soles, and shoes. Many men also raised 
their cots off the floor by means of a 10- to 
12-inch platform. This provided a large 
amount of “off the floor” storage space under 
one’s cot. (Fig. 187.) 
h. The Army and Navy sleeping bags were 
both satisfactory for the temperatures and 
conditions encountered. 
2. Messing. 
a. Messing was accomplished in a combi- 
nation of tents joined together and con- 
structed on a wooden two-by-four frame 
with a plywood floor (see ch. 3). (Figs. 188 
and 189.) This unit was located at the 
southeast corner of the camp. 
b. Wooden doors were constructed for the 
mess tent in order to conserve heat to a point 
where one could eat comfortably. Heating 
was accomplished by the field ranges in the 
galley and three space, oil fired, radiant 
heaters. These heaters accomplished their 
purpose, although most people ate without 
removing their heavy clothing. (Fig. 190.) 
Electric lights were provided throughout the 
mess by means of a generator set up in a tent 
just outside the galley. Mess tables were of 
the standard field design made of two-by- 
four’s with a masonite top. The plywood 
floors became wet during the first few days, 
Figure 190. Mess tent, showing tent frame, mess 
table, metal trays, and other table equipment. 
Figure 191. Army field range in mess tent converted 
to burn Diesel oil. 
203 from the snow that was carried in on the 
shoes of the personnel, and did not dry during 
the entire stay on the ice. This caused a very 
difficult situation when the temperature 
dropped low enough to require that mukluks 
be worn. They became wet when worn on 
this floor and lost their usefulness. The mess 
was operated 24 hours a day throughout the 
entire period. During the first part when 
24-hour working parties were being used, a 
full hot meal was served at midnight. After 
the night shift was cut down to essential com- 
munications and maintenance personnel, 
only soup and fruit were served at this time. 
However, the mess was always open and 
coffee, bread, butter, and preserves were 
always available. 
c. The galley was equipped with six 
Army field ranges which were converted to 
burn Diesel fuel (fig. 191). These ranges 
performed well and no special cold weather 
problems were encountered. However, it 
was necessary to detail one and sometimes 
two men on each shift to devote their entire 
time to maintenance of these ranges and the 
three space heaters. The other equipment 
in the galley was the same as that found 
in any field mess (figs. 192 and 193). The 
only mechanical device used was a bread 
sheer. The actual mechanical process of 
preparing the food presented no special 
problems. 
d. The food was served direct from the 
field ranges to the individual trays (figs. 
194 and 195). The trays, which were of 
Figure 192. Messing gear in mess tent. Equipment 
was similar to that found in any field mess. 
Figure 193. The mess tent was scrubbed and cleaned 
following each meal. Working tables, eating tables, 
benches, etc., were made from plywood and odd 
lumber. 
Figure 194. Meals are served hot from the Army field 
ranges. Note men in mess line continuing to wear 
their heavy cold weather clothing. 
204 Figure 195. Hot food did not remain hot long when 
served on individual metal trays. Note man being 
served, retaining windproof suit for added comfort 
against cold of mess tent. 
Figure 196. Interior view of mess tent, showing 
accumulation of frost. 
the six-compartment, metal variety, were 
located just inside the door of the serving tent 
and the held ranges were at the junction of the 
serving tent with the galley. Although the 
food was served hot, it cooled very quickly on 
the metal trays. Generally, before one could 
finish eating, the food was cold. (Fig, 196.) 
e. Dishwashing was done partly by the 
individuals and partly by K. P.’s. This was 
done at the end of the enlisted men’s mess 
where two GI cans, one soapy and one 
clear, were kept hot by held range heating 
units. Individuals washed their own trays, 
but silver, bowls, and cups were washed 
by the K. P.’s. (Fig. 197.) All the kitchen 
equipment was also washed here. The prob- 
lem of providing sufficient water was a big 
one which made it necessary to use the same 
water for more personnel than was considered 
desirable. 
Figure 197. Dishwashing. 
/. Disposal of trash such as pasteboard 
cartons, large tin cans, etc., was done by 
burying. Since freezing occurs very quickly, 
no problem in sanitation is involved. All 
that is necessary is to dig a hole; drift will 
205 cover it over only too quickly. The disposal 
of garbage, wash water, cereal boxes, cream 
cans, and other small items cleared from the 
mess tables was accomplished by a method 
which is peculiar to the areas where this 
type of snow formation is found. (Figs. 198 
and 199.) At first only hot wash water was 
poured on the surface of the snow. This 
immediately produced a hole about 3 feet 
deep and a foot in diameter. After one day 
the bole was deep enough to pour in the 
garbage and other items. As time went on 
the hole became larger and larger until it 
seemed to strike an equilibrium. At this 
point the surface of the refuse was about 10 
to 15 feet below the surface of the snow. 
There then developed a tendency to throw 
pasteboard boxes, etc., into the hole and it 
started to fill up but when this was stopped 
the surface of the refuse gradually receded. 
If only wash water and liquid garbage were 
Figure 199. The disposal pit grew deeper as it was 
used. 
disposed of in this manner, it is believed that 
it could be continued indefinitely. 
3. Water Supply. (See ch. 3.) 
a. On the ice, water was obtained by 
melting snow exclusively. No regular snow 
melters were employed and the production 
of the amounts of water necessary for the 
mess was a long and arduous process. The 
heaters used for this purpose were located in 
an improvised open top shack about 100 feet 
east of the mess/hall. (Figs. 200 and 201.) 
This placed the source of the snow used in 
producing the water on the southeast corner 
of the camp. This was the ideal location. 
Since the prevailing winds are from the 
south and east, the debris from the camp 
was not blown into the area. The shacks 
were for protecting the personnel operating 
the heaters from the wind. 
b. The density of the snow increases as the 
depth below the surface increases. Just 
below the unpacked surface snow the density 
is from 0.2 to 0.3. At 6 feet this increases to 
0.4 and at 20 feet to 0.5. Therefore, the 
snow blocks that are cut close to the surface 
will produce 0.2 to 0.3 of a cubic foot of 
water for each cubic foot of snow. 
c. Two types of heaters were used. The 
most efficient one was an “Aeriol” steam 
Figure 198. Garbage and waste disposal. 
206 Figure 200, The snow melting plant, 
Figure 201. Interior view of snow melting plant. 
heater which burned kerosene and produced 
steam under 30 pounds of pressure. There 
were two of these units and they would each 
produce a 32-gallon G. I. can of water in 
about 15 minutes. However, considerable 
maintenance of these units was required, so 
the other type, which was the regular Army 
immersion heater converted to use Diesel 
fuel, was also used. Each of these units 
would produce a G. 1. can of water in ap- 
proximately 1 hour. These immersion heat- 
ers were also used to keep the water from 
freezing until it was needed in the mess tent. 
d. In individual tents water was produced 
for drinking and washing purposes by melt- 
ing snow in any type of container available. 
This was done on the top of the tent stove. 
The most efficient method of doing this is to 
have a small amount of hot water in the can 
and then add snow blocks. This will also 
prevent burning out the bottom of the can. 
A can of water, if placed on the floor and left 
overnight away from the stove, would freeze 
before morning. 
e. In providing for the water supply of a 
camp of this type it is important to choose 
the site on the windward side as soon as the 
camp site is chosen and, to mark off this area 
to prevent contamination. 
/. No bacteriological tests or tests for min- 
eral content were done and no purification 
measures were employed. 
4. Disposal of Human Waste. 
a. To the uninitiated the problem of defe- 
cation on the ice was one that was looked 
forward to with considerable concern. Ac- 
tually, however, after arrival on the ice it was 
found to be much simpler than anticipated. 
b. The sanitation problems in connection 
with the disposal of human waste, as we 
generally understand them, are practically 
nonexistent in the Antarctic. This is due to 
the fact that urine and feces freeze very soon 
after being deposited and there is no period 
of the year that thawing occurs. The tem- 
perature may rise above freezing for an hour 
or so on occasional days during January or 
February but the mean temperatures for 
these 2 months, which are the warmest of 
the year, are 21.5° Fahrenheit and 6.5° 
Fahrenheit, respectively. Because of this the 
problem of insect breeding, odors, etc., are 
absent. The problem of contamination of 
water supply is solved simply by preventing 
the deposit of urine and feces in the area from 
which snow for making water is being taken. 
c. Three latrines were constructed in the 
camp area with a fourth in the area occupied 
207 by the shops and air operations activities. 
(Fig. 202.) There was one latrine for 50 
officers and two latrines each serving 100 
enlisted personnel. These latrines were of 
the pit variety with 18 to 20 seats. The pits 
were approximately 5 feet deep and 3 feet 
wide and were covered with a box very 
similar to the standard quartermaster latrine 
box of the Army except that no lids were 
used. The latrine was covered with a 
standard 16- by 16-foot pyramidal tent in 
which was placed a plywood floor exactly 
like the ones in the living quarters. The 
seats were arranged around the edge. The 
rules for constructing pit latrines such as the 
spacing of supporting timbers, urine bafflle 
plates, etc., apply here as elsewhere. No 
urinals were provided. 
d. Odors were practically unnoticeable. 
Occasionally, in the morning after several 
people had used the latrine there was a slight 
odor which disappeared shortly afterward. 
e. No heat was provided in the latrines and 
no improvements made to the tents as there 
were in the living quarters. Snow quickly 
accumulated around the entrance and inside, 
at times covering practically all of the seats. 
Regular maintenance is required. 
/. Due to the rapidity with which feces 
freezes, it builds up in a stalagmite formation 
Fig ure 202. Outside view of latrine, showing snow 
drifted after blizzard and accumulation of snow on 
tent in which there was no heat. 
reaching considerable height very quickly. 
g. Urination was carried out wherever one 
desired. This was generally around the out- 
side of the individual tents. In some cases 
where a snow surface was available in the 
tunnel forming the entrance to the tent, a 
“urinal” was made simply by urinating in this 
snow. The heat of the urine quickly forms a 
hole of considerable size. On the outside 
of the tent the urine gives a definite yellow 
color to the snow that shows up as numerous 
colored spots on the surface. Occasionally, 
while getting snow for producing water in the 
individual tents one encounters one of these 
frozen urine deposits. Urinals for the indi- 
vidual tents should be provided. 
SECTION IV. Survival and Rescue 
1. Survival Planning and Equipment, Cen- 
tral Group. 
a. The medical equipment carried aboard 
the R4D aircraft consisted of— 
5 First aid kits, aeronautic. 
12 Gauze roller bandage, 2 inches by 6 yards. 
10 Two-ounce bottles of brandy. 
1 Bolt absorbent surgical gauze 1 by 25 yards. 
2 Boxes morphine tartrate surettes (5 per 
box), 
4 Large battle dressings. 
1 Bottle of 100 sulfadiazine tablets, gr. 7){ 
1 Bottle of 50 aspirin tablets, gr. 5. 
1 Pound boric acid ointment. 
1 First aid pamphlet. 
5 First aid kits, individual aviator (stored 
in aircraft, but not carried by the in- 
dividuals themselves). 
All of the above items except standard aero- 
nautic first aid kits were removed from aircraft 
and stored at the dispensary between flights. 
b. For aircraft emergency survival equip- 
208 ment carried on all R4D flights see para- 
graph 6c, section III, chapter 6. Also see 
figures 203 and 204. 
(1) The sleds were made especially for this 
operation for use as aircraft emergency sur- 
vival gear. They were fashioned after the 
Nansen type, which is very light. In com- 
parison to the Quartermaster man-hauling 
sledge they are longer, and at the same time 
somewhat lighter. In their length they had 
the advantage of being capable of carrying a 
man lying at full length. A similar sledge 
used on a previous expedition (Byrd—1940) 
was considered for this operation, but insuffi- 
cient time was available for its construction. 
(2) White gasoline was contained in the 
cans carried as survival equipment. Elimi- 
nating this weight and depending on the 100- 
octane fuel in the tanks was considered, but 
the performance of the Coleman stove on 
leaded gasoline was thought to be too uncer- 
tain. Primus stoves which operate well on 
100-octane gasoline are believed to be avail- 
able, and should be procured for polar 
flying operations if adequate Army equip- 
ment is not already available for this use. 
c. In addition to the above, each R4D 
crew member was responsible for loading 
extra items of personal clothing before each 
flight. (Fig. 205.) These were kept in 
parachute kit bags and stored between flights 
in the quarters of the individual crew mem- 
bers. (See fist below.) In this connection 
it was noted that on the flight in from the 
carrier at least one crew had a complete 
change of extra clothing packed in a water- 
proof bag so that they would have an imme- 
diate change available if they had to ditch 
and became wet in the process. 
Emergency Survival Clothing 
Item Number 
Shoe liners, felt 3 pairs 
Mask, face 1 
Cap, knit, watch 1 
Mittens, wool, inner liner 2 pairs 
Glasses, sun 1 
Mukluks, canvas 1 pair 
Item Number 
Inner soles, mukluk 1 pair 
Booties, felt, mukluk 1 pair 
Scarf, silk 1 
Mittens, outer 1 pair 
Shirt, wool (Army issue) 1 
Socks, double sole (light weight) 1 pair 
Socks, wool (short length top) 2 pairs 
Socks, woo! (long length top) 2 pairs 
Tro users, woo! (Army issue) 1 pair 
Underwear, wool, long length 2 pairs 
Sweater, wool (Army issue) 1 
Boots, ski 1 pair 
Parka, windbreaker 1 
Parka, inner 1 
Jacket, field, pile lined 1 
These items were the minimum required 
to be carried by each crew member on each 
extended flight. This list was in addition to 
a complete outfit being worn by each crew- 
man. Individual aircrew members often 
Figure 203. Interior view of R4D (C-47), showing 
stowage of portion of survival gear. 
Figure 204. Display of R4D emergency survival 
equipment. 
209 added small items to this list such as ciga- 
rettes, soap, extra socks, etc. 
d. The survival rations originally planned 
for the R4D aircraft were considered too 
heavy for their caloric content, and in some 
instances not practical for the conditions 
under which they were to be used. Accord- 
ingly, after consultation with personnel hav- 
ing experience in Antarctic sledging, flying, 
and tracked vehicle operations, the rations 
were revised. (Fig. 206.) Availability de- 
cided the choice of some items. The bacon 
was sliced to make it easier to handle when 
frozen, cheese was removed from the tin 
containers (as furnished in the K ration), 
bulk coffee was eliminated because of its 
weight, evaporated milk was dropped be- 
cause of being hard to handle when frozen, 
jam was eliminated because of high net and 
gross weight compared to its caloric content, 
and difficulty in handling frozen, etc. Oat- 
meal was packaged by utilizing large white 
windproof mittens as sacks. The revised 
Figure 206. Aircrews working on assembly of revised 
survival rations. 
ration represented a saving of 15 percent in 
gross weight and at the same time an 8 per- 
cent increase in caloric content. A detailed 
list and calculation of ration is given in table 
I. Each complete ration—the amount pro- 
viding 3,360 calories per day for one man 
for 60 days—was packed in an air resupply 
parachute drop kit. (Fig. 162.) The ad- 
vantages of this method were: First, the cal- 
culation and measuring of the amount to eat 
each day was much simpler; second, one or 
more complete and balanced rations could 
be dropped immediately to a crew down in 
the interior from the other plane in the flight 
or later from a rescue plane; and third, when 
an extra crew member or observer was mak- 
ing a flight survival rations for him could be 
added on short notice merely by putting 
aboard one or more drop kits. Directions 
for using the rations were prepared and a 
copy inserted in each drop kit to supplement 
the briefing given on this subject. The direc- 
tions were as follows: 
Figure 205. Officer loading personal survival clothing. 
210  
Original ration 
Revised ration 
Total 
caloric 
value 
Calo- 
‘‘Normal" daily 
Item 
Weight in pounds 
Met Tare Gross 
Total 
caloric 
value 
Unit 
Num- 
ber 
Weight in pounds 
Net Tare Gross 
ries 
per 
ounce 
ration for one man Source 0 
Amount Calories 'tem 
Pemmican 120 
2.5 
122.5 
312,000 
8-oz. pkg. 
30 
15 
1.87 
16.87 
40,080 
167 
y<2 of 8-oz 
668 
B 
pkg. 
C offpe 
40 
8.5 
48.5 
Tea 
Single bag 
32 
.18 
.1 
.28 
1 bag 
B 
Milk (evap.).... 
40 
1 3. 
53. 
24,960 
33,735 
Milk (pdr.) 
15 
2.1 
17.1 
7.5 lb. 
1 
7.5 
.87 
8.37 
16,800 
140 
2 oz. 
280 
B 
Bacon 
30 
30. 
87,840 
2 lb. bulk 
1 
2 
.06 
2.06 
5,856 
183 
.4 slice 
97 
B 
Ham. . 
40 
5 5 
45 5 
60,400 
33,000 
32,808 
14,560 
Ralston 
20 
1 
21. 
Beef and gravy . . 
Peanut butter.. . . 
38 
8. 
46. 
7 
1. 
8. 
2 lb. bulk 
1 
2. 
.12 
2.12 
4,160 
130 
.5 oz. 
68 
B 
Snrln rrnrkprs . . . 
30 
2.5 
32.5 
36,000 
Biscuits 
Large can 
1 
6.25 
1.5 
7.75 
12,000 
120 
1/eo can 
200 
B 
Cocoa (pdr.).... 
10 
O 
4-. 
12. 
1 5,000 
1 -lb. bag 
1 
1. 
.12 
1.12 
1,504 
94 
14 oz. 
25 
B 
Rice 
20 
.5 
20.5 
31,960 
32,320 
72,000 
Dried fruit 
20 
4. 
24. 
Butter 
20 
1. 
21. 
4-lb. pkg. 
1 
4. 
.1 
4.1 
14.400 
225 
1 oz. 
240 
B 
Oatmeal 
2-lb. mitt 
1 
2. 
.1 
2.1 
3,648 
114 
1/2 oz. 
60 
B 
Salt 
3 
5 
3.5 
1/2-oz. pkg. 
2-oz. pkg. 
11/2-oz. pkg. 
30 
93 ) 
r 
E 
Cereal blocks.... 
30 
3.75 
7,200 
7,168 
120 
V2 pkg. 
1/2 pkg. 
1 20 
F 
Chocolate blocks. 
30 
2.8 
.2 
21.43 
160 
120 
E 
Cocoa blocks. .. 
2-oz. pkg. 
22/3-oz. pkg 
30 
3.75 
8,700 
I 18,560 
145 
1/2 pkg. 
1 pkg. 
145 
E 
Sugar blocks ... 
60 
10. 
116 
304 
E 
Sugar (bulk) 
50 
1.5 
51.5 
90,350 
2-lb. sack 
1 
2. 
.1 
2.1 
3,712 
116 
.5 oz. 
62 
B 
Cheese 
14 
3. 
17. 
24,976 
4-oz. block 
15 
3.75 
3.75 
6,660 
111 
block 
111 
l< 
Jam 
24 
10.5 
34.5 
31,200 
1,525 
Lemon powder. . 
"Breakfast” 
1 
1. 
2. 
Pack 
30 
] 
17,400 
15,600 
1 
f V2 pkg. 
1/2 pkg. 
290 
K 
"Dinner” 
Pack 
30 
30. 
1.8 
31.8 
107 
260 
K 
u c *» 
oupper 
Pack 
30 
J 
18,600 
J 
l1/2 pkg- 
310 
K 
Extras 
E&K 
Total—1 man . . . 
96 91 
6.94 
103.85 
202,048 
(X5) 
3,360 
(X 5) 
(X5) 
(X5) 
Tntn—S mc>n . . . S49 
<58 1 
610.1 
934,634 
3,115. 
484 5 
84 7 
519.2 
1 010 940 
Calories per 1 man 
per day for 60 days: 
1 5 percent saving ir 
gross weight. 
*B— 
From bulk stores or original ration. 
Calories per pound 
gross weight 
1,532. 
8 percent increase in caloric content. 
K- 
■From K ration. 
Calories per 1 man 
per day for 60 days: 
3,367. 
(21 percent 
ess we 
ght for same number 
calories.) 
E— 
From E ration. 
Calories per pound 
gross weight; 1,946. 
Table I. Survival rations for R4D aircraft 
211 (1) The emergency rations in R4D air- 
craft are packed so that each drop kit con- 
tains a balanced ration for 5 men for 12 days 
(or one man for 60 days). Every plane will 
carry as many complete ration packs as there 
are men aboard so that there will always be 
60 days’ “normal” rations for each man 
making the flight. As explained below, how- 
ever, all men present eat from the same 
ration pack at any one time, regardless of 
the size of the party. 
(2) A break-down of the contents of each 
drop kit follows. Total amounts and caloric 
values are given in columns 2 and 3. One- 
sixtieth of the total amount, or the amount 
one man would eat per day, is given in 
columns 4 and 5 for each item of the list. 
Total ration 
Normal daily ration for one man 
T 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Item 
No. of units 
Calories 
Amount 
Calories 
1. 
Pemmican 
30 pkgs. (8-oz.) 
40,080 
14 pkg. 
668 
2 
Tea.... 
32 bags 
Vo bag 
3. 
Powdered milk . . . 
714 lbs. bulk 
16,800 
2 oz. 
280 
4. 
Bacon 
2 lbs. bulk 
5,856 
.4 slice 
97 
5. 
Peanut butter. . . 
2 lbs. (net) 
4,160 
.5 oz 
68 
6. 
Biscuits 
6.25-lb. can 
1 2,000 
%0 of No. 
200 
7. 
Cocoa powder . 
1 -lb. bag 
1,504 
14 oz. 
25 
8. 
Butter 
4-lb. pkg. 
14,400 
1 plus oz. 
240 
9. 
Oatmeal . 
2-lb. mitt 
3,648 
14 oz. plus 
60 
1 0 Snlt ... 
30 1/o-nr. pkgs. 
Vo pkg. 
11. 
Cereal blocks. . . 
30 2-oz. pkgs. 
7,200 
14 pkg. 
120 
12. 
Chocolate blocks 
30 1 Vg-oz. pkgs. 
7,168 
14 pkg. 
120 
13. 
Cocoa blocks. . . 
30 2-oz. pkgs. 
8,700 
14 pkg. 
145 
14. Sugar blocks. ... 
60 2%-oz. pkgs. 
18,560 
1 pkg. 
304 
15. 
Sugar, bulk 
2-lb. pkg. 
3,712 
14 oz. 
62 
16. 
Cheese 
15 4-oz. blocks 
6,660 
14 block 
111 
17. 
“Breakfast'1 
30 packages 
17,400 
14 pkg. 
290 
18. 
“Dinner” 
30 packages 
15,600 
14 pkg. 
260 
19. 
UC »» 
bupper 
30 packages 
18,600 
14 pkg. 
310 
20. 
Extras: cigarettes, 
etc. 
(3) Additional points on the makeup of this 
ration: 
(a) Only 32 tea bags (item No. 2) are 
included. However, each “Breakfast” pack 
(item No. 17) contains coffee powder suffi- 
cient for one cup. This will provide one cup 
of tea or coffee per day. 
(b) The amount of bacon (item No. 4) al- 
lowed per man per day is given as .4 slice. 
This is an artificial figure resulting from the 
fact that there are about 24 slices in the 2 
pounds included in the ration. Same applies 
to a few other items in column 4, such as 
“/2 tea bag.” 
(r) The biscuits (item No. 6) are packed in 
a large tin. The average number contained 
in the 6/ pounds of cookies is not known. 
When the can is first opened a count of all 
the biscuits can be made and one-sixtieth 
of the total will be the average number to 
allow per man per day. 
(d) Items 17, 18, and 19 can be recognized 
by their contents. The breakfast pack con- 
tains a fruit bar, biscuits, and a package of 
coffee powder. The dinner pack has a 
package of lemon powder and candy in 
addition to the biscuits. The supper pack 
contains a chocolate bar and bouillon pack 
besides the biscuits. 
(e) Item No. 20 includes cigarettes, wooden 
spoons, toilet paper, etc. An early check of 
the numbers of each included will give an 
estimate of how fast they can be used up. 
(f) The “normal” ration above totals about 
212 3,360 calories per man per day for a period of 
60 days. This assumes only moderate activ- 
ity. For heavy work the daily caloric intake 
should be increased. In this case, adding 
half again as much of each item to the 
“normal” daily ration will give about 5,000 
calories per man per day, and under these 
circumstances one complete drop kit will 
contain enough food for one man for about 
6 weeks. In case it appears necessary to 
reduce rations below normal in order to 
extend them, one-half of the standard ration 
can be used as a yardstick to assist in making 
the decision of how much to cut. Half of the 
standard ration, or 1,600 calories per man 
per day, will probably provide subsistence if 
a minimum of physical activity is engaged in 
and if protection from the cold is fairly ade- 
quate. The ration would extend to 4 months 
if consumption can be kept to this level. 
(4) Mem Preparation, (a) The amounts 
and caloric content of each item in the table 
above will serve as guides to assist in making 
the ration come out even. Of course, if one 
man were to attempt to eat from one ration 
kit for 60 days, he would have to estimate 
and measure very carefully in order to 
maintain an average consumption of one- 
sixtieth of the contents per day. However, 
in actual practice only one ration is opened and 
used at a time. Therefore, with an entire 
crew of five subsisting from one ration pack, 
it is finished in 12 days. As a result, portions 
of each item measured out daily are larger, 
making for easier accounting. Also an ac- 
curate check point is reached every 12 days 
when a ration is finished and a new one is to 
be opened. The rule of opening and eating 
from only one ration pack at a time applies 
regardless of the number of people in the 
party, i 
(b) All items do not have to be served 
every day. Some may be eaten every 
second, third, or fourth day. For example, 
the party may prefer to eat bacon only every 
other day so that a full slice is allowable, or 
every 4th day when there would be a credit 
of two slices. However, it is best to spread 
all items fairly evenly rather than eat pre- 
ferred foods up immediately or save them 
until the end of the period. 
(c) Sample menus for five men: 
BREAKFAST 
Oatmeal 5 oz. 
Milk (pwdr.) 10 oz. 
Biscuits 8 oz. 
Butter 5 oz. 
Sugar 21/2 oz. 
Tea 5 bags 
Bacon 5 slices 
(975 calories per man) 
“Breakfast” 5 pkgs. 
Coffee (from above pkg.) 
Cereal blocks 5 pkgs. 
Milk (pwdr.) 10 oz. 
(1,1 00 calories per man) 
DINNER 
Biscuits 8 oz. 
Chocolate blocks 5 blocks 
Cheese 21/£ blocks 
Sugar blocks 5 blocks 
(966 calorics per man) 
“Dinner” 5 packs 
Peanut butter 5 oz. 
Cocoa blocks 5 blocks 
Lemon (pwdr.) drink from dinner pack. . 5 portions 
(946 calories per man) 
SUPPER 
Pemmican 2ctns, 20 
oz. 
Cocoa (pwdr.) 21/£ oz. 
Biscuit 8 oz. 
Butter 5 oz. 
Milk (pwdr.) 10 oz. 
(1,428 calories per man) 
“Supper” 5 packs 
Bouillon (from above) 
Sugar blocks 5 blocks. 
Cheese 21/£ blocks 
Peanut butter 5 oz. 
(1,282 calories per man) 
(5) Cooking suggestions. Although some 
men are familiar with ordinary cooking 
methods, others have never prepared simple 
meals and to the latter these hints may prove 
of assistance. 
{a) Never throw away bacon fat. It is 
high in caloric content and can be mixed 
213 with something else and eaten. Tolerance 
and appreciation of fatty tasting foods usually 
comes with living in very cold climates, espe- 
cially when exposure to cold is continuous. 
(b) The monotony of biscuits can be re- 
lieved by spreading them with butter, peanut 
butter, or pemmican when it is prepared and 
ready for eating. 
(c) Try to use methods which consume less 
fuel or require the use of the stove for shorter 
periods, i. e., avoid methods which require 
reheating, etc. 
(d) Except when cooking something like 
bacon, have some water in the pan before 
putting food into it. Food burns very easily 
in the equipment supplied for emergency 
camp cooking. This applies to pemmican as 
well as oatmeal, etc. Stir frequently. 
(e) Variety can be obtained in cooking oat- 
meal by adding butter, pieces of fruit bar, or 
biscuit. Salt makes oatmeal more palatable 
for most people and should be added before 
cooking. The usual practice is to mix oat- 
meal, salt, milk powder, and sugar; add the 
water and cook. 
(7) Pemmican can be varied by the addi- 
tion of fruit bar or dried fruit, extra salt, 
crumpled cereal block or biscuit. Small 
pieces of bacon can be fried in the pan before 
adding water and pemmican. Pemmican 
should be shredded first and then cooked 
with water to the consistency of oatmeal. 
(g) Cocoa and milk powder can be mixed 
into one hot drink. 
(h) Lemon powder and sugar can also be 
conveniently used in the same drink. 
Note. A few of the ration packs contain 
dried fruit, white bread, and extra chocolate 
bars in place of the K-ration packs. The 
dried fruit can be figured at about 100 calo- 
ries per ounce and the chocolate at 160 
calories per ounce. The bread will have about 
50 calories per slice of average thickness. 
e. Briefing of R4D aircrews began on the 
Philippine Sea where Rear Admiral Byrd gave 
several talks on general living conditions, 
geography, weather, clothing, travel, sur- 
vival, etc., in the Antarctic. The principles 
of first aid, care of injured, and use of the 
medical equipment carried were thoroughly 
covered in discussions presented by the ship’s 
complement medical officer. Briefings were 
again resumed after the aircraft arrived at 
the base camp. They were given by person- 
nel with previous experience in the Antarctic, 
and were accompanied by demonstration of 
cooking pemmican, rigging a sail on a sledge, 
operating the cooking heater, and other prac- 
tical methods of doing things with the equip- 
ment at hand. No hard and fast rules were 
laid down as to what to do in case of a forced 
landing. However, crews were advised to 
remain with the plane as long as practical. 
Matters such as when to move, area to head 
for, equipment to carry, etc., were left up 
to the plane commander for final decision. 
This decision to be based upon the general 
rescue plan, and his estimate of the situation 
facing the party in general and locally. 
/. The Norseman (JA) airplane was oper- 
ated as a general utility plane for limited 
photographic flights, weather reconnaissance, 
and contacting the trail party. It was not 
equipped with a heater but had outlets for 
electrically heated clothing. It was also 
equipped with litter fastenings. It was sup- 
plied for emergencies as follows: 
(1) On all flights: 
One first aid kit, aeronautic. 
One first aid kit, life raft, camouflaged (JAN 
#9-217-125). 
One first aid kit, pneumatic life raft (JAN 
#9-227-875). 
(2) On all but local flights the crew chief 
was responsible for seeing that the following 
equipment was aboard: 
Shovel and saw. 
Four 5-gallon oil cans with funnel and 4 feet 
of hose. 
Engine tent and cover. 
214 50 feet of rope. 
Plumber’s blowtorch and pot. 
One 2-gallon can of clear gasoline. 
1 set of four “deadmen” and lines for mooring. 
1 set of dye markers. 
1 Coleman cook stove. 
Waterproof matches. 
One set of emergency tools. 
Corner reflector. 
One 2-man tent. 
(3) On all but local flights the pilot was 
responsible for seeing that each man aboard 
had the following: 
Sleeping bag. 
30 days’ E rations. 
Skis and ski shoes. 
Five pounds of additional clothing as desired 
by individual or required by pilot. 
2. Rescue Operation—Eastern Group. 
On 30 December one of the early flights 
made by a PBM of the Eastern Group 
struck a snow covered elevation in poor 
visibility, exploded in air, crashed and 
burned near the coast at approximately 
71° S. latitude and 99° W. longitude. 
They were found on 11 January less than 20 
miles from their last reported position and 
about 8 to 10 miles from a stretch of open 
water. Emergency supplies were dropped 
to the party of six survivors of a crew of nine 
men. Only visual signals were possible. 
Two PBM’s next flew in, one of which dropped 
trail markers between their position and the 
open water, and additional emergency sup- 
plies. The other landed on the stretch of 
open water and took the survivors off. A 
pharmacist’s mate was aboard each of the 
two PBM’s making the rescue. 
a. Casualties were: 
Navigator at his position killed instantly. 
Man at radio panel killed instantly and 
thrown clear of plane. 
Man at flight engineer’s panel thrown clear 
and died 2 hours later from multiple in- 
juries. 
Pilot had seat belt fastened and was rendered 
unconscious by striking bis head against 
throttles. Face, hands, and legs badly 
burned. Removed from burning cockpit 
by other members of crew. His condition 
was critical at this time. 
Co-pilot was in control of the airplane and 
did not have seat belt fastened. Thrown 
clear of plane through windshield. Dis- 
located and fractured right humerus. Con- 
dition serious. 
Plane commander, standing in bow was 
thrown clear of plane. Fractured nose. 
Man at flight engineer’s panel without 
safety belt fastened was thrown clear. 
Suffered laceration of scalp. 
Photographer in tunnel of plane was ren- 
dered semiconscious but escaped unaided 
with scalp laceration. 
Man at radar screen thrown clear and re- 
ceived only superficial bruises. 
b. When the plane crashed most of the 
medical supplies were burned. Seven days 
later sulfadiazine tablets and sulfanilamide 
powder were found. The pilot was then given 
sulfadiazine tablets every 4 hours. During 
the time the survivors stayed on the ice the 
pilot was kept in the fuselage. Sulfanilamide 
crystals were used on the lacerations. The 
pilot’s feet were severely frostbitten, and he 
was evacuated on a sledge pulled by the 
other crewmen. Later, aboard ship his 
burns were found to be grossly infected and 
his toes gangrenous. By 18 January his 
condition had improved somewhat and on 27 
January a report received indicated that 
most burned areas were healing well but 
that both feet were gangrenous up to 2 
to 4 inches above the ankles. Several trans- 
fusions were administered and both legs 
were amputated below the knee, one on 31 
January and the other on 4 February. 
Condition at this time was much improved 
and by 12 February wounds were reported 
to be healing well and he was removed from 
215 the serious list. Both amputations were 
done at sea. Skin grafting as required is 
to be done after return to the United States. 
c. Medical and other survival equipment 
carried aboard PBM aircraft and the extra 
equipment dropped to the survivors is listed 
below. The party was dazed for the first 2 
days and did little but rest. Thereafter 
they searched for food and clothing, erected 
two tents, and prepared to wait for rescue. 
The crew had been wearing electrically 
heated flying suits over heavy underwear 
and summer flying suit or sweater. Two 
pairs of heavy socks were worn, and in 
addition foul weather clothing and shoe 
packs which were carried in the plane. 
Winter flying helmets and dark sun glasses 
were worn. Face masks were available. 
Fortunately much of the food was thrown 
clear of the airplane and was gradually 
recovered, enough being found to supply 
their needs for more than the time spent at 
the site of the crash. Snow was melted on 
the Coleman stove and in the pressure cooker. 
Medical equipment carried aboard PBM aircraft 
1 Stokes litter. 
2 Sets splints. 
5 Blankets. 
4 Kits, First aid, aeronautic (JAN No. 9-196-650). 
2 Kits, first aid, life raft (JAN No. 9-217-675). 
3 Kits, first aid, aviator (JAN No. 9-197-675), one 
carried by each pilot, 
1 Emergency first aid box containing: 
1 Pound roll absorbent cotton. 
1 Skin marking pencil. 
2 Tubes butyn and metaphen eye ointment. 
1 Eye bath with 4 oz. boric solution, 
4 Large battle dressings. 
5 Small battle dressings. 
1 Head dressing. 
1 Roll plain gauze, 25 yards. 
18 Two-inch bandages. 
5 Morphine syrettes. 
10 Two. oz. bottles of brandy. 
2 Boxes of benzedrine sulfate. 
1 Pound boric ointment. 
4 Four oz. tubes of boric ointment. 
4 Rolls 2-inch adhesive tape. 
3 Tourniquets. 
20 Packages sulfanilamide. 
1 Box aspirin. 
3 Boxes iodine applicators. 
20 Ammonia inhalers. 
100 Cascara sagrada tablets. 
1 Package applicators. 
1 Book of EMT tags. 
1 Wire splint. 
Miscellaneous emergency gear carried on PBM aircraft 
12 Immersion suits. 
12 Sleeping bags. 
6 Two-man tents with accessories. 
1 Fishing kit. 
4 Coleman stoves. 
1 Machete. 
1 Shovel. 
2 Ice picks. 
4 Pounds powdered lamp black. 
3 Blankets. 
20 Feet of 2-inch line. 
12 Parachutes. 
1 Box matches. 
1 Rifle and ammo. 
1 Saw. 
1 Set extra flight clothing per man. 
2 Seven-man raftsor 3 four-man raftsand accessories 
1 2 Mae West jackets and dye markers. 
2 Empty cans for gasoline. 
1 Set of cooking utensils, 
1 Set plates and eating implements. 
1 Arctic two-man sled. 
12 Pairs extra gloves. 
24 Pairs extra wool socks. 
1 Gallons can orange paint and brush. 
1 Gibson Girl radio. 
360 Cans aircraft emergency tablet rations. 
6 Boxes pemmican. 
Food for 3 days for 1 2 persons. 
Gear dropped to survivors supplementing that found in wreckage 
1 Coleman heater. 
2 Cans of fuel. 
1 Pyrotechnic projector. 
1 Dye marker. 
1 Box matches. 
6 Pairs of goggles. 
74 Cans emergency rations. 
100 Rounds .30 cal. ammo. 
12 Boxes large chocolate bars. 
7 Cartons cigarettes. 
2 Quarts whisky. 
216 900 Vitamin C tablets. 
500 Multivitamin tablets. 
300 Sulfadiazine tablets. 
2 Wrist compasses. 
1 Sheath knife. 
1 Can emergency rations for life rafts and boats. 
1 Pressurer cooker. 
1 Bottle aspirin. 
1 Surgical kit. 
1 Rifle, .30 cal. 
4 Blankets. - 
9 Pairs heavy socks. 
5 Face masks. 
9 Pairs leather mittens. 
9 Pairs wool mittens. 
9 Suits heavy underwear. 
4 Rolls toilet paper. 
5 Gallons gasoline. 
1 Two-man tent. 
1 Pup tent. 
2 Shovels. 
100 Feet of line. 
d. Recommendations on PBM equipment 
and operations made by the Eastern Group 
to CTF 68 on the basis of this experience 
were the following: 
(1) Add two pairs of light inner socks each. 
(2) Add one shotgun, one .30 cal. carbine, 
and plane commander should have a .45 
cal. revolver. 
(3) Each man to carry individual aid kit. 
(4) Matches and lip chap sticks should be 
added to first aid kits. 
(5) Black smoke signal should be devised. 
(6) Skis should be in planes or available 
for rescue drops. 
(7) Briefing should stress the unreliability 
of a snow horizon and depth perception in 
this area. 
e. The operational plans for emergency 
rescue as they applied to the entire task force 
are discussed in section I of chapter 6. 
The medical support planned for the winter 
camp rescue party is given in paragraph 6, 
section II, above. 
SECTION V. Recommendations 
It should be emphasized that the recom- 
mendations made below are based upon the 
experience of Operation Highjump only. 
This operation was conducted under the 
following conditions. The area was 100 per- 
cent ice cap terrain as found on Greenland 
and Devon Island in the Northern Hemi- 
sphere. Temperatures ranged from freezing 
to 25 degrees below zero Fahrenheit with 
winds to approximately 45 knots. The shore- 
based activities involved about 200 men and 
officers in a temporary camp, almost all of 
which was sheltered under canvas. Flying 
was done from ice shelf surface on retractable 
ski landing gear. The operation was of short 
duration. Personnel were ashore for 5 weeks. 
1. Physical Qualifications and Conditions 
of Troops. 
a. Physical requirements for high latitude 
operations should be the same as present 
general service standards. Decisions on per- 
sonnel qualified for general service with 
waiver should be made on an individual 
basis. For flying personnel, qualifications 
on the standard 64 examination should 
suffice. The dental examination should in- 
clude bitewing X-rays and periapical views 
of non-vital teeth on all troops destined for 
isolated stations. 
b. Good physical condition should be main- 
tained by a physical fitness program prior to 
leaving the United States, with some program 
continued while en route to high latitudes 
if a lengthy sea voyage is involved. 
2. Dispensary and Medical Equipment. 
It is recommended— 
a. That prefabricated or Quonset type huts 
be used for housing medical facilities in 
temporary camps. The heating unit should 
765274—48——15 
217 be planned so that it is adequate for the 
performance of major surgery and safe if 
ether anesthesia should be used. 
b. That for medical support of troops in 
the field an inclosed, heated, tracked vehicle 
be developed to serve as a mobile aid station. 
c. That the medical facility at cold weather 
bases be permanently assigned a vehicle 
suitable for general ambulance and flight 
line crash service. 
d. That medical dispensaries be provided 
small carpenter’s tool chests, 
3. General Living. 
It is recommended— 
a. That common housekeeping items such as 
broom, whisk broom, shovel, pail for melting 
water, etc., be provided with each tent unit. 
b. That bathing and laundry units be 
developed and provided for use whenever 
possible in high latitude operations. 
c. That tent units be developed incorpora- 
ting the requirements for cold weather use, 
as discussed in paragraph 1, of section III, 
and as recommended by participants in 
other cold weather operations. 
4. Indoctrination and Training. 
It is recommended— 
a. That practical field exercises in cold 
weather survival be participated in by all 
personnel before exposure to extremely cold 
climates. 
b. That field exercises in the use of medical 
equipment and employment of medical de- 
partment units be stressed prior to commit- 
ment to high latitude operations. Such field 
exercises should be carried out in northern 
United States during winter months. 
c. That medical department officers’ cold 
weather training include basic instruction in 
navigation and emergency communications. 
5. Medical Supplies. 
It is recommended— 
a. That duplicate items of certain essential 
medical equipment be provided task forces 
destined for cold weather testing or opera- 
tions. This is applicable to items which are 
breakable and where improvising of sub- 
stitutes is not feasible. 
b. That ointments be packed in jars and 
tins instead of tubes. 
c. That extreme care be employed in 
packing equipment, marking it for identifi- 
cation, loading it, caching it, etc. 
6. Personal Clothing and Equipment. 
It is recommended—- 
a. That great care be taken to sizing and 
fitting of personal clothing and that issue 
of all items be made before departure from 
the zone of the interior. All garments 
should be tried on before issue. 
b. That personnel requiring continuous use 
of corrective lenses be provided with dark 
glasses ground to their prescriptions. 
7. Base Camp Messing. 
It is recommended— 
a. That 30 percent extra rations be pro- 
vided for cold weather field operations. 
b. That hot coffee, soup, etc., be made 
available at all times for personnel working 
under exposed conditions. 
c. That food containers other than those 
made of glass be utillized to the greatest 
extent possible. 
d. That mess and kitchens be located on 
the windward side of camps where snow 
used for making water will be less subject 
to contamination. The area used for a 
source of snow for water should be marked 
“off limits” to all personnel and vehicles. 
8. Medical Projects for Future Study. 
a. It is believed that studies of traumatic 
shock and its treatment under trail con- 
ditions such as might be experienced by 
isolated small patrol groups in cold weather 
should be undertaken. 
218 b. More data are needed on solar radi- 
ation intensities under various high latitude 
conditions with special reference to the 
incidence of snow-blindness. Such a project 
should seek more scientific and complete 
knowledge of the etiology, physiology, and 
pathology of this condition. These studies 
should be directed toward the development 
of better eye protection methods and equip- 
ment. 
c. Further studies in metabolism and 
caloric and vitamin requirements of troops 
operating in high latitudes should be carried 
out. 
d. Studies in the prevention of freezing 
of medicinal liquids at low temperatures 
are needed. Increasing the pressure under 
which liquids are carried in their containers 
(as in ampoules) might assist materially in 
this regard. 
9. Air Crew Personal Clothing and Equip- 
ment. 
a. The development of cold weather fly- 
ing clothing should be carried on with 
constant attention to suitability for ground 
survival, and types adapted to survival 
should generally be preferred to electrically 
heated clothing in its present form. 
b. The amount and importance of the 
personal equipment and survival gear re- 
quired in high latitude air operations de- 
mands that the most detailed and constant 
attention be given to its care. Only a 
personal equipment facility will fulfil this 
requirement. Or. temporary bases a Quon- 
set type hut or large, thoroughly insulated 
storage tent could be utilized. Where 
space is at a premium the same unit could 
serve as a briefing, interrogation, and air- 
crew ready room. A unit of this type will 
require a full time attendant who could be 
responsible for checking all survival gear, 
rations, oxygen systems, etc., as well as 
flying clothing. 
10. Survival and Rescue. 
It is recommended— 
a. That first aid training given aircrews 
and personnel assigned to rescue operations 
emphasize the emergency care and treat- 
ment of the most common types of injuries 
resulting from aircraft accidents. 
b. That a light, man-hauling sled be 
developed as an item of emergency survival 
gear for air operations. 
c. That a heating and cooking stove 
operating on any type of gasoline be de- 
veloped or procured for assemblies of air- 
craft survival equipment. 
d. That the survival training and indoc- 
trination of all aircrews making extended 
flights at high latitudes be set up to include 
much more than the usual “briefings” and 
inspections of equipment. Practical exer- 
cises should be required in actual living and 
traveling with only their survival gear. 
Aircrews might start with their equipment 
strewn about at random, pack it for carrying 
and/or hauling, travel for a day over 
adverse terrain, make camp, sleep, cook 
meals, eat, and return the next day. 
11. Air Evacuation. 
The development of glider tow, landing, 
and snatch procedures should be continued 
in high latitudes with a view to advancing the 
effectiveness of rescue, evacuation, and resup- 
ply operations. It is recommended that the 
techniques of air evacuation from ice cap or 
similar terrain be tested, including methods 
of handling evacues in extremely cold cli- 
mates, both aloft and in holding stations. 
The CA64 (Norseman) on skis appears to be 
better suited to evacuation from forward 
areas than most other standard service air- 
craft. The helicopter has been repeatedly 
suggested as the answer to the problems of 
rescue and evacuation. However, it is be- 
lieved that the limitations of standard models 
now available are considerable and that de- 
219 pendence upon helicopters should be guarded 
against at this time. Performance in high 
winds, range, and difficulties in instrument 
navigation leave much to be desired. Lifting 
capacity is another draw-back often over- 
looked by nonflying personnel. The latter 
consideration becomes extremely important 
in connection with the high altitude of some 
areas in Alaska and the Greenland ice cap. 
most of which is 7,000 to 9,000 feet high. 
SECTION VI. List of Medical Supplies Cached at 
"Little America III" 
The following is a list of medical supplies 
inventoried and cached in the Quonset hut 
at “Little America III.” The boxes of mis- 
cellaneous supplies were marked with yellow 
paint in Roman numerals. 
Box I 
2 Ether, can, 
1 Benedict’s Reagent, can q. s. 1,000 cc. 
12 Caffe ine sod. benzoate, 2-ccm. amp. (71/£ gr.) 
2 Camphorated tincture of opium, pt. 
12 Digalen, injectable, 2-cc. amp. 
1 Pamphlet (Sanborn waterless metabolism tester). 
1 Bag, hot water, rubber. 
1 Merthiolate, 500-cc. bottle. 
12 Serum albumin (100-cc. amp.). 
1 Blood transfusion set. 
1 Sheet wadding, cotton (32 in. by 6 yd.). 
1 Instrument tray, flat, stainless steel, large. 
1 Instrument tray, flat, stainless steel, small. 
1 Wash basin, stainless steel. 
1 Gauze container, stainless steel. 
Box II 
4 Sheet wadding, cotton (32 in. by 6 yd.). 
16 Benzoin, compound, tincture, bottle, 4-oz. 
2 Lanolin, can, 1 lb. 
1 Ammonium chloride, 1-lb. bottle. 
12 Quinine dihydrochloride, 10 cc. in amp. 
2 Gelatin capsules No. 1, 100 in box. 
1 Calamine, prepared, 1-!b. box. 
25 Liver extract, amp. Vg unit each. 
1 Bismuth subcarbonate, bottle. 
3 Cod-liver oil, Steam, pt. 
1 Benzyl benzoate, 500-cc. bottle. 
12 Normal human blood plasma, dri ed, unit. 
1 Quinine sulfate, 1,000-tablet bottle. 
3 Neosynephrin hydrochloride sol. 1 percent, 4 
fl. oz. 
1 Thiamine hydrochloride tablets, 50 bottles. 
2 Carbarsone, bottle, 20 tablets. 
12 Amyl nitrate, amp. 
1 Fluorescine, 1-oz. bottle. 
1 Ferrous sulfate, 0.325 gm., 100 in bottle. 
Box III 
Th is box contained streptomycin and was removed' 
from the cache and returned to the United States. 
Box IV 
Same as box 111; returned to the United States. 
Box V 
1 Pestle, small. 
1 Pestle, large. 
1 Mortar, large. 
1 Mortar, medium. 
1 Mortar, small. 
4 X-ray film, 8- by 10-inch, 12 sheets. 
5 Gauze, bandage 3-inch, 1 2 in box. 
13 Gauze, bandage 2-inch, 12 in box. 
1 5 Gauze, bandage, 3-inch, each. 
18 Battle dressings, large. 
19 Battle dressings, small. 
16 Bal ointment, tube (eyes). 
6 Compress bandage (head dressing). 
13 Cotton, absorbent, 1-lb. roll. 
1 Carbon monoxide detector, colormetric. 
5 Carbon monoxide detectors (10 in box). 
2 NBS indicating tubes (12 in box). 
Box VI 
1 Stand, tray, hospital, complete. 
1 Cotton, absorbent, 1-lb. roll. 
1 Sheet wadding, cotton 32 inches by 6 yards. 
Box VII 
12 Dextrose, 5 percent w/v in isotonic sol. sod. 
chloride, 1,000 cc. each. 
Box VIII 
12 Dextrose, 5 percent w/v in isotonic sol. sod. 
chloride, 1,000 cc. each. 
Box IX 
60 Penicillin, sodium, 200,000 units each, 10 in box. 
220 Box X 
2 Neoarsphenamine, 0.6 gm. each, 5 amp. in box. 
21 Oxophenarsine hydrochloride (Mapharsen) 0.6 
gm. each, 10 amp. in box. 
31 Sulfadiazine tablets, 2 gm.,2 in box. 
2 Sodium chloride tablets, 1,000 bottle. 
3 Cod-liver oil, 1 pt. bottle. 
1 Ferric citrochloride, tincture, 1 pt. 
2 Cascara sagrada, fluid extract, 1 pt. 
1 Gum tragacanth, 1-ib. bottle. 
5 Sulfathiazole, gr., 500 bottle. 
1 Sulfanilamide, 5 gr., 1,000 bottle. 
1 Sodium phosphate, 1-lb. bottle. 
2 Dextrose anhydrous, powder, 1-lb. bottle. 
1 Sul fosal icy I ic acid, bottle. 
1 Camphor, lb. bottle. 
3 Borax, 1 -lb. box. 
3 Sod ium bicarbonate, 1-lb. box. 
3 Boric acid powder, 1-lb. box. 
1 Talc, purified, 1-lb. box. 
2 Saline transfusion tablets, 100 in bottle. 
1 Caffeine, citrated, 1-oz. bottle. 
1 Graduate, pharmaceutical, 500 ml. 
14 Gelatin capsules, No. 0, 100 in box, 
7 Sulfadiazine, sodium, bottle, 5 gm. 
2 Silver protein, strong, 1-oz. bottle. 
2 Chalk, prepared, Vg-lb. box. 
1 Acid, salicylic, 1,4-lb. box. 
5 Tryparsamide, 3-gm. amp. 
23 Acetylsalicyclic acid powder, 1-oz. box. 
2 Pipettes, 5 ml. 
12 Suture, catgut, Type C, size one, tube. 
16 Suture, catgut, Type C, size two, tube. 
18 Acetophenetidin, 1-oz. box. 
1 Sulfadiazine, pwd. Yq lb. 
1 Mercurous chloride, mild, 100 tab. in bottle. 
1 Acid, glacial acetic, 1 pt. 
3 Test tubes. 
2 Rectal tubes. 
Box XI 
6 Oxygen, cylinder, 80 gal. each. 
Box XII 
1 Cabinet, vision test, complete. 
Box XIII 
12 Pad, heat, chemical. 
96 Refill, pad, heat, chemical. 
Box XIV 
72 Powder, developing, X-ray. 
Box XV 
8 Petrolatum, liquid, 1-qt. tin. 
2 Cottonseed oil, 1-qt, tin. 
3 Glycerin, 1 -qt. tin. 
6 Soft soap, 2-lb. jar. 
3 Dixie cup, carton. 
1 Sulfadiazine, gr. 71/2, 500 in bottle. 
1 Acetylsalicylic acid, grs. 5, 500 in bottle. 
9 Magnesium sulfate, 21 box. 
1 Acid, sulfuric, 1 pt. 
1 Bed pan, 
1 Tripod. 
1 Irrigating tin, 2-qt. 
1 Urinal. 
2 Gauze, sterile, 25 yds., surgical. 
2 Gauze, bandage, 3-inch, 1 2 in box. 
2 Applicator sticks, carton. 
4 Battle dressings, small, 10 in box. 
25 Sputum cups. 
Box XVI 
126 Battle dressings, small. 
93 Battle dressings, medium. 
11 Pad, heat, chemical. 
6 First aid kit, life raft. 
Box XVII 
2 Holder, X-ray film, 5 by 7, each. 
4 Hold er, X-ray film, 8 by 10, each. 
2 Holder, X-ray film, 1 4 by 17 each. 
5 Film, X-ray, 5 by 7, 12 in pkg. 
5 Film, X-ray, 8 by 10, 1 2 in pkg. 
3 Film, X-ray, 14 by 17, 12 in pkg. 
1 Grid, radiographic, 1 4 by 1 7 each. 
6 Aluminum hydroxide gel., 100-tablet bottle. 
6 Gauze, plain, 36 in. by 25 yd., pkg. 
1 Manometer, spinal, water type, each. 
6 Insulin, injection, protamine zinc, U-40, 10-cc. 
bottle. 
14 Insulin, injection, U~40, 10-cc. bottle. 
15 Heparin, injection, 1 percent 10-cc. bottle. 
5 Dicumarol, pulvulcs, 100 mgm., 100 bottle. 
8 Foot powder, USP, 4-oz. can. 
78 Hexavitamin capsules, 100 in bottle. 
Box XVIII 
1 Basal metabolism apparatus, 100-volt, 60-cycle, 
AC, each. 
6 Chart, basal metabolism, Sanborn, 8-mc., 1 00 pkg. 
1 0 Chart, basal metabolism, Sanborn, 9-mc., 1 00 pkg. 
1 Scales, prescription, each. 
1 Compressor, air, tankless, 100-volt, AC-DC, 
each. 
1 Inhaler, mask type, oxygen-helium outfit, each, 
6 Gauze, plain, 36 in. by 25 yd., pkg. 
1 Syringe and needle set, local anesthesia. 
221 SECTION VII. Comments on U. D. T. by U. S. N. Observer 
Lt. Iverson (U. S. N.) Commanding 
Officer of the Underwater Demolition Team 
(U. D. T.), made the following general 
remarks on the tests made on the cold-water 
swim suits: 
One activity of the underwater demolition 
team was to test a cold-water swim suit 
that was developed originally for the use of 
underwater demolition teams in the invasion 
of Japan. The suit was never used, and 
heretofore the underwater demolition teams 
were always stationed in more or less warm 
water ports like Southern California, along 
the Chesapeake, and in Florida. We had 15 
men don the suit and go into the water of the 
Bay of Whales. The temperature of the 
water was 29.1° and about 2 inches of slush 
ice was floating. The test was limited to 20 
minutes because we did not know exactly 
what the effects would be. The original 
plan was that if all the men survived the test 
with no ill effects, more exhaustive tests 
would be conducted at a later date, but 
unfortunately these, too, were never under- 
taken. Rectal temperatures, mouth tem- 
peratures, blood pressure, and respiratory 
rates of all the men were taken before they 
entered the water and after they came out 
and the results compared. There was a 
normal increase of internal temperature, 
blood pressure, and respiration due to exer- 
tion, The mouth temperature dropped 
slightly, but this of course was due to direct 
exposure to the cold water, as the face was 
not protected. None of the men had any 
ill effects whatsoever, the only complaint 
being that they failed to get circulation in 
their hands and feet and suffered a great 
deal of discomfort in these members. There 
was no sudden sensation of cold, consequently 
there was no shivering. The cooling process 
was very gradual, and it was 7 to 10 minutes 
before any of the men felt any sort of dis- 
comfort from cold. 
We tested two types of suits. One was a 
single piece suit which has a flap in the back 
for getting in and which in turn is clamped 
with a heavy metal clamp. The other type 
was a two-piece suit which depends on over- 
lapping flaps around the torso of the body 
to form a watertight seal. The suits contain 
a hood that comes over the head and exposes 
only the face. They have gloves and feet 
made as part of the suit. Under each suit 
the men wore one suit of warm underwear, 
wool knitted gloves, and two pairs of woolen 
socks. The first group to wear them wore 2 
suits of woolen underwear, but it was decided 
that this made the suit too tight and this was 
decreased to one so that the men might get 
increased circulation. The one-piece suit 
has a very thin felt wool lining in it, but the 
test was not long enough to differentiate 
between the two suits. Probably if the test 
had been carried on to the point of endurance 
it might have been found that the people 
who had on one type suit could stay in longer 
than the other—in 20 minutes we couldn’t 
tell. One difficulty encountered in the suits 
was the fact that it was impossible to main- 
tain a watertight seal in the face mask. 
The reason for this is that the suit cuts across 
the face below the lower lip while the face 
mask cuts across the upper lip, and the place 
where the two intercept forms an opening 
which allows water to come through. The 
air temperature at the time of the test was 
26° F. 
222 CHAPTER 8 
COMMUNICATIONS (SIGNAL CORPS) 
SECTION I. U. S. S. Mount Olympus 
1. General. 
The U. S. S. Mount Olympus, an Amphib- 
ious Command ship in wartime, controlled 
all operations, assigned frequencies and call 
letters, relayed traffic from the base and the 
Eastern and Western Groups to Washington, 
San Francisco, Honolulu, Samoa, and New 
Zealand, and guarded all planes in the air. 
2. Equipment. 
The U. S. S. Mount Olympus was equipped 
with its standard quota of electronics equip- 
ment in accordance with BuShips Bulletin 
P-0-2, as follows: 
a. A Communication Office where traffic 
despatching, decoding, and teletype facilities 
were located. 
b. Radio I, the central receiving room, 
which was equipped with 50 operating posi- 
tions each of which comprised an RBA 
(20-600 kc.) RPB (.6-4 me.), or an RBC 
(4-27 me.) receiver, a key-panel, and trans- 
mitter remote controls. Six 100-150 me. 
TDQ transmitters and means for patching 
any antenna or transmitter to any operating 
position were also included. (Figs. 207, 
and 208, 209, and 210. 
c. Radio II contained antenna selector 
panels for receivers, controls for transmitter 
and audio circuit patching, a control system 
for starting and stopping transmitters from 
Radio I, II, and III, modulators, a Western 
Electric ESA 850-cycle frequency shift keyer 
for teletype, an LR-1 Frequency Meter, two 
monitoring receivers (RBG HQ-129 and RBL 
15-600 kc.) and the following transmitters: 
(1) Two TBK’s, 2-18 me., 500-watt GW, 
250-watt AM voice with MO control, plus 
modulator units for both. 
(2) Two TBL-7’s, 175-600 kc. and 2-18.1 
me., 200-watt GW or 50-watt AM voice. 
(3) Three TDE’s, 300 kc.—18.1 me., 125- 
watt GW, 30-watt AM voice. 
(4) One TAJ-18, 175-600 kc., 500-watt 
GW, MO controlled. 
(5) One TAQ-9, 175-600 kc., 2-kw. GW 
only. 
Figure 207. Operator’s position on Mount Olympus. 
223 trolled, and powered with AG rectifiers on 
shipboard but with battery driven dyna- 
mo tors in boats, vehicles, and other mobile 
operation. 
d. Radio III contained transmitters and 
monitors to augment those in Radio II, 
including two TBS, 60-100 me., AM voice 
intership transmitters and a TBM-7, 2-18 
me., 350-watt CW or 250-AM voice which 
was used for HF broadcasts during the first 
weeks of the expedition. A normally land- 
based TDH-4, 2-18 me., 5-kw. CW, 2.5- 
kw. AM voice transmitter was installed 
here en route from Norfolk to the Antarctic 
to replace the TBM for broadcast work on 
longer hauls to New York and San Francisco. 
e. The radar central, designated the Com- 
bat Information Center, was equipped with 
an SG, S band surface search radar, an 
SK, P band large air search, an SP, S band 
large air search, a number of repeaters, 
plotting boards, ABK IFF controls, and 
another TBS. 
/. An Aerological Office incorporated 
radar repeaters from CIC for ballontracking 
and cloud observation in addition to Radio- 
sonde Recorder. 
g. The Flag Radio Room contained SCR- 
508’s and low power AM voice equipment 
and was further equipped to give high rank- 
ing flag officers instant control of many 
circuits during landing operations. An 
AN/TRG-1 was located on the flying bridge 
for multi-channel ship-to-ship operation when 
required but it was not used on this expedition. 
h. The ship was also equipped with a full 
complement of Naval RCM equipment 
covering all normally used radar and com- 
munication frequencies. 
3. Antennas. 
a. Each transmitter and receiver had its 
own vertical, L, or T, antenna, depending on 
its frequency, but folded dipoles were instal- 
led for the HF broadcast and long distance 
CW in two cases. Experiments with long- 
Figure 208, Decoding and teletype machine. 
Figure 209. Antenna system on Mount Olympus 
(6) One TBA-6, 2-26 me., 1-kw. CW 
only, used normally with the frequency 
shift keyer for RTTY at 900 watts. 
(7) Eight TCS’s, 2-12 me., 35-watt CW 
and 15-watt AM voice, MO or xtal con- 
224 Figure 210. Antenna lead-ins on Mount Olympus. 
Figure 211. Balloon antenna on Mount Olympus 
wire balloon lifted antennas (figs. 211 and 
212) on 185 kc. added little to signal strength 
received by the East Group from the ship’s 
folded flat-top cut for this frequency. 
b. A total of 149 separate antennas includ- 
ing radar were counted on the ship with 
many of the HF vertical wire transmitting 
and receiving antennas parallel and so close 
to each other that interference on nearby 
frequencies was not always avoidable and RF 
on lead-ins of transmitters adjacent to one 
transmitting could sometimes be read on 
antenna current meters. All officers agree 
that a better antenna system could have been 
utilized for the longer distances. 
4. Frequencies, Power, and Services 
(Ship-Ship, Ship-Plane, and Ship- 
States) 
Ship-States frequencies assigned in the 
operations plan were followed closely. On 
leaving the States standard 500 kc. and 
4, 6, 8, and 12 me. were used until distances 
Figure 212. Balloon antenna in position over Mount 
Olympus. 
involved required higher ones. Generally 
speaking, 200-900 watts GW on any avail- 
able transmitter, on frequencies between 
8-22 me. was employed to work Washington, 
San Francisco, Flonolulu, and Samoa, de- 
pending on distance and light conditions. 
765274—48 16 
225 Twenty-four hour CW contact with Wash- 
ington was possible throughout except for 
one full day and 8 hours of another when 
world-wide black-out was experienced. Then 
and on a few other occasions, it became 
necessary to use the TDH on about 3 kw. 
CW. There was an apparent dropping of 
signal strength from outside when the ship 
entered into areas near the barrier or tied 
up in the Bay of Whales. Steaming out to 
sea to avoid the temperature gradient at 
the ice edge seemed to improve signals, 
but this can be better determined when the 
official Navy propagation records have been 
compiled. Charts will be included which 
will give hourly “S” readings on several 
frequencies throughout the 65-day stay near 
and south of Scott Island (67° S.). Mag- 
netic storm and Heaviside layer reflection 
data were taken throughout the trip by the 
U. S. S. Canisteo and will also be included in 
the Navy report; usually, however, the re- 
ports on approaching magnetic conditions 
from the Canisteo after she joined the Eastern 
Group reached the Mount Olympus after the 
effect had been observed there. 
a. Planes flying 600 miles from the U. S. S. 
Philippine Sea to Little America were in con- 
tact with the Mount Olympus in the Bay all the 
way on 6430 kc. CW and 4125 kc. voice, and 
followed her 2 kw. 414 kc. homing signal 
continually with their RDF. On another 
occasion two PBM’s were similarly handled 
when they flew in to the ice-bound Mount 
Olympus in the pack ice south of Scott 
Island, a distance of 150 miles from their 
mother ship, the U. S. S. Currituck. On this 
occasion 100-150 me. VHF equipment was 
used to control operations of these aircraft 
to a range of 35 miles and the ship’s radar 
worked about the same distance (planes 
flying low). 
b. The 185-kc. frequency proved unsatis- 
afetory even with the balloon antenna, but 
414 kc., the stand-by frequency in case of 
HF black-out, was used for contact with 
both Eastern and Western Groups when 
their PBM’s were in the air, and contacts 
to Samoa were frequent. 
c. It is reported that low frequency (400 
kc.) signals transmitted across the magnetic 
pole from the Mount Olympus to the West 
Group were considerably stronger than those 
sent at right angles to the earth’s magnetic 
field to Samoa, an almost equal distance. 
This bears out previous findings on this 
subject. 
d. Radio teletype was transmittable an 
average of 12 or 13 hours per day to the 
States, where directional antennas gave 
good reception. On the other hand, GW 
signals being transmitted on frequencies 
close to those used for teletype, added to 
the poor antenna situation, made teletype 
reception on the ship more difficult. It is 
believed, however, that a medium power 
station could be erected in the Antarctic 
which would provide good two-way teletype 
service 24 hours a day. It should also be 
added that during the period the ship was 
near Little America the traffic load to the 
States, augmented by news reports from the 
eleven correspondents aboard, was many 
times that being received, so that only 
south to north teletype circuits were really 
necessary. 
e. Several broadcasts and almost daily 
meets were arranged with Press Wireless 
and RCA in New York and later San 
Francisco by the ABC, MBS, NBC, and CBS 
representatives aboard. The ship trans- 
mitted on assigned frequencies between 9 
and 19 me., using the 250-watt TBM in 
Radio III or the 2.5-kw. TDH and a 
folded dipole antenna, as conditions war- 
ranted. Cues were received on frequencies 
up to 24 me., but the most used both ways 
for longer distances were between 17 and 
22 me. On the return trip San Francisco 
was contacted several times on 9-19 me. 
226 but the last broadcast was at Wellington, 
N. Z. 
/. Acme radio photos (1,500-cycle shift) 
were transmitted on the 1 kw. TBA in 
Radio III an average of an hour a day 
throughout the trip. Washington handled 
this traffic at first, but it was later shifted 
to West Coast stations. Reception tests 
aboard the Mount Olympus were successful 
but no real traffic was received. 
g. Considerable intership traffic was con- 
ducted on 60-100 me. using TBS’s at short 
distances. 
h. East and West Groups maintained con- 
stant contact on frequencies between 12 and 
16 me. a maximum distance of 3,500 miles. 
Further information on this phase will be 
found in the official Navy report, since ship- 
board installations of vessels in these groups, 
the supporting oil tankers, the submarine 
U. S. S. Sennett, and the aircraft carrier 
U. S. S. Philippine Sea were normal, func- 
tioned well, and require no further comment 
here. 
5. Landing Operations and Ship-to-Base 
Contacts. 
During landing operations and while 
the ships U. S. S. Mount Olympus, U. S. S. 
Yancey, U. S. S. Merrick, U. S. S. Northwind, 
and U. S. S. Burton Island were tied up to the 
ice in the Bay of Whales low power 3265, 
3965, and 4125 kc. operation was more than 
adequate to the base camp. 
a. Shipboard SCR-608’s operating with 
SCR-610’s at the Transportation Center 
(the first tent camp on bay ice, distance 
mile from point where ships moored) and 
later the Airstrip Control and Emergency 
Base stations were heard well to 20 miles but 
could only receive the 610’s about 3. (Fig. 
213.) 
b. Longer ship-shore contacts were con- 
ducted from the Scott Island and McMurdo 
Sound areas (700 and 400 miles) using 100- 
500 watt GW on frequencies that varied from 
4 to 12 me., depending on whether all day- 
light or daylight to dark conditions prevailed. 
The aircraft frequency, 6430 kc., was used 
considerably for Mount Olympus—Emergency 
Base traffic when planes were not in the air. 
c. Several rapid departures from the moor- 
ings on the edge of the bay ice, made neces- 
sary by adverse weather or approaching ice, 
brought SCR-536’s into use between ships 
and line-handling crews on the ice with good 
results. Ships used standard equipment so 
that normal range was increased, and of 
course maintained contact with nearby Little 
America continually. 
6. Radar. 
Large icebergs were seen to distances of 
40,000 yards (see fig. 214) but small ones, 
especially when their tops were flat and 
slanted toward the ship, were seldom seen 
beyond 7,000 yards. Statements in the Ra- 
dar section of the Task Force Communication 
Plan were borne out and many small but 
dangerous chunks were unseen under 2,000 
yards. With fog such pieces were dangerous 
and radar gave little protection. All other 
radar functions of the ship were normal, and 
need no comment. 
7. Personnel. 
a. The officers and men employed to 
operate shipboard equipment were drawn 
from the ships’ complements, but those 
destined for work on the ice were part of 
the Staff. The Flag Radio Officer, trained 
in high power shore based stations, was 
assigned one chief electronics technician’s 
mate, approximately 7 radiomen, 3 elec- 
tronician’s mates, and 4 electronics tech- 
nician’s mates to move ashore everything 
needed for the Emergency Base Station, 
get it transported 3 miles over the ice to 
Little America III, direct the construction 
of its building, install the equipment, and 
227 who are well versed in code, procedure, 
operation, and the maintenance of indi- 
vidual radio equipments. However, special- 
ists completely familiar with noise elimi- 
nation methods, antenna fabrication and 
direction, and general shore station instal- 
lation and operation under varying con- 
ditions would be exceedingly valuable on an 
operation of this type. 
8. Briefing. 
Briefing lectures which covered everything 
from survival to elementary meteorology and 
geology were presented daily by experts 
between Panama and Antarctica. Clothing 
and how to wear it in cold weather, naviga- 
tion, nature study, self protection, foods, 
transportation methods, communications, and 
a number of other subjects helped prepare 
staff, ship’s officers, observers, and crew for 
the coming ordeal. It is impossible to tell 
how many accidents or mishaps this briefing 
avoided, but everyone voluntarily turned out 
for every lecture and no serious errors were 
forthcoming. It cannot be emphasized 
too strongly that any man who is to be a 
communication officer or even operator 
under cold weather conditions, whether out 
on some remote trail party or not, must be 
primarily versed in how to take care of him- 
self and his equipment under adverse weather 
conditions, and then secondly have a good 
knowledge of first aid, navigation, food prep- 
aration, and vehicles. In addition, even 
though an officer or man is not a communica- 
tion man, he must have a solid working 
knowledge of the radio equipment his party 
is using to protect his life. In combat, the 
knowledge necessary for fighting must supple- 
ment the above. 
Figure 213. First station on the ice—SCR-610’s. 
Figure 214. Typical Antarctic iceberg target. 
then operate and maintain it. The Flag 
Airborne Electronics Maintenance Officer, 
similarly, was given an equal number of 
aviation electricians, radiomen, and elec- 
tronics technician’s mates to build, operate, 
and maintain the Airstrip Control Station 
and all airborne equipment. Later, the 
radio personnel of the six R4D plane 
crews augmented this number. 
b. Standard policies for naval instruction 
produce trained operators and technicians 
228 SECTION II. Airstrip Control Station 
1. General. 
a. Installation of the operating room (fig. 
215), the repair facilities (figs. 216, 217, and 
218), and spare parts shelves (fig. 219) 
began as soon as walls and roof had been 
completed. 
b. The station itself went through three 
major phases. At first it was a radio supply 
dump and repair shop and utilized only 
SCR-610’s for intercamp and shore-to-ship 
contacts with other such units in the Trans- 
portation Center, Headquarters, two Weasels, 
and SCR-608’s on the ships. Then a group 
started operations at the Emergency Base 2 
miles to the south at Little America III, 
Figure 21 5. Operating position in base air operations tent at base airstrip. 
229 Fig ure 216. Repair facilities in base operations at 
airstrip. 
Figure 217. Alinement bench in base operations. 
Figure 218. Radar repair in base air operations. 
Figure 219. Spare parts section in Quonset hut. 
whereupon Transportation Traffic Control 
and Camp, ship, Emergency Base Command 
circuits became necessary. SCR-610’s were 
now augmented by SCR-694’s, SCR-536’s 
and low power MHF shipboard sets operat- 
ing on 4125 and 3965 kc. Later, as rapidly 
as equipment became available, higher power 
was installed so that by the time the R4D’s 
were ready to take off from the U. S. S. 
Philippine Sea on 30 January sets were in 
operation as described in the paragraphs 
which follow. 
Figure 220. Antennas. 
230 2. MHF Long Distance Transmitters, Re- 
ceivers, and Noise. 
a. Two ART-13’s (ATC) Collins 100 
watt, 0.2-1.5 and 2-18 me. airborne trans- 
mitters were powered by dynamotors driven 
by 24-volt storage batteries which floated 
across a charging line. One of these was 
tuned to 4125 kc., the primary aircraft 
frequency, except when, with its low fre- 
quency tuning unit, it was required for 414- 
kc. operation with ships or planes. The 
other remained tuned to 6430 kc., the 
secondary aircraft frequency, throughout the 
month on the ice. (Fig. 220.) 
(1) When flights began early in February 
the noise level at airstrip was so high that 
the expected long distance contacts on 4125 
and even 6430 kc. were difficult. Emergency 
Base therefore, with its higher power and 
better antennas, was required to handle long 
distance plane-to-ground traffic until the 
noise levels at airstrip had been somewhat 
relieved. Even then 6430 kc. remained in 
use as the long distance GW frequency, and 
4125 kc. was used largely on short distance 
voice circuits from that point on. 
(2) This second ART-13 worked well and 
continuously after the noise reduction and 
had little trouble with the farthest planes (800 
miles) or the ships when they proceeded to 
Scott Island in mid-February (600 miles). 
(3) It should also be pointed out that 
6430 kc. was seldom used for ship-shore 
traffic except when the planes were on the 
ground, although on some occasions traffic 
loads from Emergency Base to Airstrip 
became so large, because weather reports 
from all three groups of ships were being 
relayed through the Mount Olympus, that this 
set and frequency were used to reduce them. 
(Communications to the R4D’s flying in from 
the Philippine Sea were handled entirely by 
the Mount Olympus in the Bay as stated before.) 
(4) In summing up, it can be said that 
more power and carefully cut and directed 
antennas would have been welcome on many 
occasions, and the audible and electrical 
noise of the dynamotors of these transmitters 
was a distinct and continuing handicap to 
the operators of nearby receivers. 
b. Two BG-348 dynamotor-operated re- 
ceivers were first installed for use with the 
transmitters described above on 28 January, 
and on 1 February they were found so quiet 
with a short wire antenna laid on the snow 
that an operator was able to indentify 40 
R-9 14-megacycle amateur stations in the 
New York area in an hour. Several equip- 
ment changes were made in the next few 
days, however, including the erection of 
30-foot-high long wire antennas, and on 
5, 6, and 7 February noise levels were so 
high that only two stations could be heard 
in the entire amateur band. 
(1) The storage batteries driving the dyna- 
motors of both transmitters and receivers 
had been swung across a 28-volt DC gen- 
erator, automatic camera timing devices 
were being tested on the same circuit, and 
power units had been started nearby, in- 
cluding another battery-charging plant be- 
hind the Quonset. All of this was “ground- 
ed” to a common counterpoise consisting 
of the metal building, several radial wires 
under the snow, the two 160-foot wires of 
the TBW counterpoise system, and the 500- 
foot-long grid of the 400-watt 414-kc. YR 
homing device, with the ground posts of all 
receivers and transmitters in the station. 
Since this maze was isolated from the sea 
beneath by approximately 200 feet of per- 
fectly insulating snow it could only act as an 
antenna for additional noise pickup and a 
direct means of transferring all interference, 
normally grounded out by high capacity to 
ground, from all transmitters and noise 
generators in operation to the sensitive 
receiver antenna circuits. 
(2) In all events, the BG-348’s were 
suspected, although later proven innocent, 
231 and replaced by AC powered RBC-2’s and 
RBM-Ts. The slight decrease in noise 
level afforded by this change was believed 
by the writer to be due to a lack of sensi- 
tivity in the latter rather than from the 
elimination of noise generated by the well 
filtered dynamotor circuits in the BG-348’s, 
but this was never proven. 
(3) Adequate line noise filters were not 
available due to a lack of large condensers 
and heavy wire and only the installation of 
AC chargers in place of the DC generator 
on the battery power line reduced the noise 
level appreciably. It still remained high 
throughout. 
3. MHF Low Power. 
a. One TCS 30-watt CW 15-watt AM 
voice, 2-12 me. transmitter-receiver unit 
was installed beside and one slightly above 
the ART-13’s just described. These oper- 
ated from dynamotors driven by the same 
batteries and charging system as those 
above, and both transmitters and receivers 
had their ground posts tied into the same 
counterpoise network, as well as the shields 
of the 25-foot coaxial cables whose central 
wires fed their comparatively high-imped- 
ance whips (15 feet at 4 me.). Noise 
levels, caused by key clicks and dynamotor 
hash from the nearby and directly connected 
ART-13’s and other transmitters allowed 
only strong signals to be heard. 
b. These sets operated to the ships when 
in or just outside the Bay (15 miles maxi- 
mum), the Emergency Base (2 miles) for 
relaying large amounts of traffic when the 
Mount Olympus had gone to Scott Island, the 
GPN unit % mile distant for intercom on 
flight control, the FVT’s when they pro- 
ceeded eastward on their trail trip (see 
section V), the JA Norseman (60 miles 
maximum), the small OY (L~5) (15 miles 
with difficulty), and the R4D’s when in 
range (about 15 miles on voice). Voice 
was used in all cases until distances became 
too great, whereupon the ART-13’s were 
called upon to carry on with CW. 
c. A frequency of 3265 kc. was used for 
contact with the GPN and the Emergency 
Base relay circuit on one unit and 4125 
or 3965 kc. on the other to ships or planes, 
but these were alternated as need arose. 
d. Noise elimination and better antenna 
design would have greatly improved the 
behavior of this equipment, as shown by the 
perfect reception obtained by the 134-mile 
distant LVT where no noise was present and 
a carefully cut dipole was pointed at the air- 
strip. TCS’s are considered excellent for 
mobile use where some shelter from weather 
is available. 
4. VHF. 
a. An ARC-1, 100-150 me. VHF AM voice 
transmitter-receiver of about 15 watts’ out- 
put was operated mostly on 142.02 me. for 
airstrip control of planes. This was ineffec- 
tive to planes more than 30 miles distant 
because of its fabricated antenna, yet a 
similar unit at the GPN equipped with a 
quarter wave antenna with a 45° downward 
tilted ground plane worked satisfactorily an 
average of 40 miles. 
b. No further VHF propagation tests were 
made other than those between planes, 
described in section HI. 
5. L. F. 
A TBW 100-watt CW or AM voice, 0.2-18 
me. transmitter with its RBM-4 receivers 
was also installed at the airstrip for use on low 
frequencies as a homing station or on medium 
highs as an auxiliary. Its antenna for low 
frequencies consisted of two horizontal wires 
spaced 6 feet apart stretched 160 feet from 
the edge of the Quonset northwestward to a 
40-foot sectionalized steel mast. A single 
wire between these formed the MHF antenna. 
Below all three a two-wire counterpoise also 
spread 6 feet was hung between Quonset and 
mast about 6 feet above the snow and this 
232 was tied into the common counterpoise 
system described above. 
a. This unit was powered by a 110-220 
AC motor which drove a 12-volt DC-110- 
volt 400-cycle AC generator and this in turn 
fed the transformer of the transmitter. An 
auxiliary gas-engine-driven 12-volt DC-110- 
volt 400-cycle AC generator was also avail- 
able (see fig. 221). 
b. The unit was unheard on low frequen- 
cies when listened for by the ships at sea but 
on 414 and 538 kc. as an auxiliary to the YR 
homing stations it was heard by planes an 
average of 30 to 50 miles. It was always on 
standby for MHF but was never needed for 
this purpose. 
6. SCR-610's. 
All SCR-610’s were eventually removed 
from the airstrip station except one on 
38.4 me. which remained in operation 
with the first-aid Weasel or “crash truck”, the 
“ready” tent, and the Transportation Center 
until the camp was demobilized. The 
Weasel and the tent used standard whip 
antennas but the airstrip unit was equipped 
with a coupling unit, a 25-foot coaxial 
cable and a 4-section MP-48, MS-54, 53, 52 
whip erected 6 feet above the roof. Distance 
was approximately 3 miles maximum. 
a. These sets, and the SCR-536’s were 
the only ones ever used outdoors, but 
temperatures did not fall below —25° F. 
so little information can be added to that 
already published in S. C. E. L.’s “Operation 
of Signal Corps Equipment at Low Tem- 
peratures.” 
b. Altogether about 30 second-hand SCR- 
610’s were acquired by Task Force 68 and of 
these only about 15 were used. Storage 
batteries and vibrator packs were used 
exclusively and batteries resting on cold 
tent or building floors presented a constant 
charging and replacement problem. Volt- 
ages were usually low after but a few hours 
intermittent use, since until late February 
battery charging facilities and means of 
delivery from the central unit were limited. 
“C” batteries were dated 1944 and lost 
voltage rapidly even at +18° F., the average 
temperature encountered. No facilities for 
heating them were available. 
c. Units carefully lined up on the ship 
or in the Quonset with warm batteries, both 
storage and dry, were found off frequency 
and inoperable when installed in tents a 
few hours later with other storage batteries 
(low voltage, no doubt). Others which had 
cooled 50° outdoors since line-up were 
off because of bias changes. So many 
things had to be handled by a minimum of 
technicians, most of whom had had little 
previous experience with this type of equip- 
ment, but the set developed into a definite 
bottleneck. It was replaced by TCS’s on 
intercamp circuits by 10 February, but it 
nevertheless played a definite part in expe- 
dition communications. The units which oper- 
ated throughout the stay on the ice, namely 
those in the airstrip, Weasel, and “ready” 
tent, proved that this set could be made to 
work without frequent adjustment if fed 
with good batteries. Operators were in 
only a few cases technicians, so that when a 
set failed to get contact it was hours before 
Figure 221. TBW power supply. 
233 some normally easy battery charge or 
other adjustment could be made. 
d. It seems clear, from this experience and 
others in the past, that sets for widespread 
use in areas where variable ground and low 
temperature conditions exist must be de- 
signed so that the operator can easily bring 
or keep his equipment on frequency. Multi- 
stage units which shift frequency with battery 
voltage or temperature and then require 
accurate line-up by a skilled operator are 
definitely not for the use of harassed line 
officers or truck drivers at points remotely 
placed from a service station, and particu- 
larly so when batteries on tent floors remain 
at 0° F. or lower while sets 2 feet higher vary 
in temperature from 0° to 70° F. with nearby 
stove adjustments throughout the day. An- 
tennas pushed through drift-tight holes in 
tent roofs covered with melting snow to 
the floor are not conducive to optimum 
operation either. Some type of insulating 
or isolating sleeve should be devised for this 
purpose. 
e. It should also be stated here that ex- 
cellent results were obtained with quickly 
fabricated centerfed dipole antennas. Those 
used two of wire separated by 
an insulator in the center and were fed with 
standard 50-ohm coaxial cable of which the 
pigtailed braid and center wire were led to 
the outer ends of the insulator. The set 
end of the coax was connected to the antenna 
coupling unit in the normal way, and both 
ends were sealed against moisture. Three 
of these tipped at an 80-degree angle from 
the snow with their upper ends fastened to 
the metal Quonset hut roof with porcelain 
line spreads, loaded easily, gave a good 
degree of vertical polarization for the distant 
vertical whips, required no counterpoises, 
and so were free from direct interference, 
and provided favorable signal strength reports 
when compared to whips at the same location. 
Since omni-directional patterns in the vicin- 
ity of a station equipped with many masts, 
wires, and other metal objects are impossible 
to obtain, the effect of the feed cable coming 
off at one side was negligible. 
/. The transmitter-oscillator tube of SCR- 
610 required considerable replacement. 
7. SCR-536's. 
When several of the 30 SCR-536’s taken 
ashore at Little America had been put on 
frequency (3965, 4125, and 3265 kc.) and 
used for point-to-point and ice-to-ship com- 
munications, statements that, “Those won’t 
work a mile,” or, “My Handy-Talky’s no 
good, I can’t get 500 yards with it,” and 
many similar remarks were heard. Two 
new units were carefully lined up on 5500 
kc. with new batteries (all dated 1944) and 
an operational test was initiated as follows: 
Starting from a heated tent on the thick ice 
the writer skied away from it in a straight 
line, calling every hundred yards. One set 
was still warm in the tent and the temper- 
ature outside was —15° F. At 400 yards, 
with the wind blowing by the wearer’s wind- 
proof hood at 15 m. p. h., the signal was 
barely audible. With the hood off and the 
moistureproof cover removed from the ear- 
phone the signal could just be understood at 
500 yards. It was unheard at 600 until the 
lack of ground was remembered, whereupon 
by removing gloves and clasping the set with 
bare hands a faint signal could be dis- 
tinguished. However, after a delay of one- 
half hour to enable the batteries to cool, this 
signal disappeared; yet, on return, the tent 
set reported good signals all the way. The 
sets were warmed up and changed and the 
test made again with the same results. The 
sets were then warmed again and both taken 
outdoors, whereupon after one-half hour’s 
time communication across the level high 
barrier ice was just possible at 500 yards with 
sets in gloved hands. Glove removal to 
provide direct counterpoise helped some, but 
2 34 little, and frequency change to 3200 kc. 
brought no change. 
a. Both horizontal and vertical polariza- 
tions of antennas (both ends) were tried with 
vertical proving best, no doubt because of 
the general vertical characteristics of the 
operator’s “body counterpoise.” 
b. Several times throughout the stay on 
the ice attempts were made to contact the 
ships on 4125 kc. 1% miles distant with only 
one doubtful contact resulting. Batteries 
and line-up were good at all times, this 
frequency was carefully guarded, and the 
ship had much higher power and better 
antennas. (Fig. 222.) 
c. One fair contact y2 mile from the barrier 
top to the ship and several hours’ operation 
over the same distance but with the user 
standing on only 3-foot thick ice over sea- 
water were successful, but many attempts 
to call the SCR-694 at camp from the 
trail 2 miles out toward Emergency Base 
failed completely when the operator of the 
SCR-694 expected the call, but h-mile 
contacts to this set were common. 
d. To sum up, Radio Sets SCR-536 
equipped with outdated batteries, which 
nevertheless read 1.45 and 92 volts when 
warmed after use and 1.48 and 95 before, 
appear to be unsatisfactory for distances 
of more than 500 yards to each other over 
level thick snow (200 feet) when held in 
gloved hands. On the other hand, many 
days’ valuable usage was obtained from this 
set when used at % mile distances from a 
central SCR-694 or low power shipboard 
installation. The duration of any communi- 
cation will depend on temperatures and 
resultant battery voltages, as is already known. 
8. Radio Set SCR-694, Sleds, Antennas, 
and Hand Generators. 
Four SCR-694’s were taken on the expe- 
dition equipped with PE-237’s and Hand 
Generators GN-58. During the trip from 
Figure 222. Use of SCR-536 did not prove too success- 
ful for ship-to-shore or close-in communications, due 
to outdated batteries, etc. 
Norfolk to Panama cold weather operation 
of GN-58 was discussed and it was decided 
to procure GN-35’s from Panama and re- 
wire them to fit the cabling of the SCR-694’s. 
The writer1 obtained six of the last few 
units in the Panama depot, but the wiring 
was postponed until actual cold weather 
operation was required. This was never 
done, but the GN-58’s were winterized in 
advance. 
a. At sea in the South Pacific, dog-team 
drivers were briefed on this set and during 
a test call when using the hand generator a 
very satisfactory contact was made with 
another expedition ship 300 miles distant. 
The distant ship used regular ship’s gear. 
b. Upon arrival at the ice, and the first 
week thereafter, one set was the principal 
means of communication from camp to ships. 
It worked very well until, after 60 hours, 
the mercury vapor rectifier failed in the 
PE-257, causing intermittent transmission. 
All trouble disappeared with replacement 
and no other trouble developed. Since this 
set operated in warmed tents no cold weather 
1 Mr. Amory H. Waite. 
235 information can be added to that already 
known. 
c. A second unit was carried on the U. S. 
M. C. LVT trail trip as an emergency set. 
Placed on the forward end of the sled, army, 
1-ton, it traveled behind an LVT over rough 
sastrugi for 245 miles in its canvas cases, tied 
in among sundry other items. Upon return 
it was found that the canvas covers of the 
BG-1306 and the GN-58 had leaked and 
both were full of the fine powdery drift snow 
of the Antarctic. None had gotten inside 
the set whose metal cover had been left off, or 
the generator, however, and no real damage 
would have resulted from this since all 
personnel are trained to brush dry snow 
away from equipment before it can melt. 
The 1L4 in the receiver and the transmitter 
oscillator tube had been damaged by 
vibration and the set would have been found 
inoperative if it had been needed. Replace- 
ment of these made the set operate perfectly 
as it had before the trip started. 
d. This brings up a serious question 
relative to cold weather travel. All shock 
mounts have been designed for satisfactory 
operation when firmly fastened in place, but 
have no value if a set with its shock-mounted 
base plates can be banged around as in this 
case. Furthermore, study of all types of trac- 
tor drawn cargo sleds over a period of many 
years has shown that short sleds, such as the 
1-ton and similar ones used on hundreds of 
miles of trail trips in 1934-1935, always give 
their cargoes a terrific pounding on rough 
snow, and particularly that loaded on the 
nose. 
(1) It is also true that the heavier portions 
of a sled load must be carried well back over 
the strong bridges to keep the sled from break- 
ing up (400-lb. oil drums, etc.), thus pushing 
light elements forward. On high, wide 
reaches of thick snow (200 to 5,000 feet thick) 
wind ridges or sastrugi vary in height from one 
to several feet, in length from a few feet to 
hundreds of yards, and in spacing from 2 feet 
to several yards. 
(2) On long trips over this type of country, 
therefore, sled noses inevitably rise over, 
and pound down into, ridge after ridge for 
mile after mile. Gas cans break, box boards 
come loose, bags wear through and the 
items on the nose of the sled, and the nose 
itself, take the worst punishment. Each 
jerk from starting or stopping adds to this. 
The many sleds used around Little America 
on this expedition probably will be reported 
as showing few signs of wear and tear after 
their comparatively smooth trips from ships 
to camp over worn trails, since the only 
trips over wide open snow were the trail 
trip mentioned above and short 10-mile 
runs from camp to Little America II. But, 
the writer rode the sled on one of the latter 
and took a worse licking in 10 miles at 10 
m. p. h. behind a Weasel than he had in 
800 miles in 1934 behind a 1%-knot tractor. 
Therefore, it should be definitely stated 
that if personnel or fragile electronic gear 
is to be carried on long trips over rough 
snow behind comparatively high speed ve- 
hicles they must either ride on a longer 
or more smoothly riding sled than the Army, 
1-ton, and be cushioned adequately, or 
suffer considerable damage. (See hg. 223.) 
e. The SCR-694 referred to in this case 
was set up on its return, serviced, and oper- 
ated in a warm tent after a thorough warm- 
up. It was then taken outdoors at +10° F. 
for 3 hours and tried again. The GN-58, 
even with light oil, was prohibitively difficult 
to turn, yet in 1935 GN-35’s were used 
satisfactorily in temperatures of 60 and 70 
degrees below zero. Conditions in terrain 
of this type are such that even though two 
operators may be assigned to a radio set, 
one to crank and one to operate, only one 
may be available at times while the other 
sleeps or cares for other routine matters. 
Thus, the man on duty must crank and send 
236 simultaneously and to do this must have a 
hand generator which turns so easily while 
he is keying or talking that he does not need 
to concentrate on it. The writer did this on 
hundreds of contacts over a period of many 
years in both warm and cold weather with 
GN-35’s, though even that unit turns hard 
when loaded. This was attested by Admiral 
Byrd during his isolation in 1934 when 
operation of his set became impossible 
because of his weakened condition and con- 
tact was lost for days. Therefore, in view 
of the fact that sets such as the GRC-9 or 
SCR-694, which can provide communica- 
tion under severe temperature conditions, 
need a power source which is devoid of all 
batteries, dry or wet, in many circumstances, 
it is indicated that a hand generator capable 
of being easily turned with one hand is 
essential. 
/. When noise conditions at the Airstrip 
Control Station were very bad and explora- 
tory planes were being received with diffi- 
culty the writer drew a third SCR-694 from 
supply and connected it up in his tent for 
monitoring purposes. A half-wave antenna 
(for 6430 kc.) was then erected on 10-foot 
wooden poles and pointed for maximum 
signal from the trail party. (Laid on snow 
with equal results.) 
(1) During the next few days the trail 
party was heard S-5 on all monitored 
schedules when Airstrip reported him S-3. 
San Francisco broadcasts on 6 me. were 
heard all over the tent with earphones for 
hours every night and KFS (San Francisco) 
and WSL (New York) press were copied 
nightly with ease. The noise level was very 
low and augmented only intermittently by 
the ignition of a PE-214 some 30 feet away, 
and occasional unsuppressed caterpillars as 
they passed. 
(2) The antenna was then swung to get 
maximum signals from the ships 600 miles 
away and again S-5 signals were received. 
Figure 223. Weasel towing Army QM 1-ton sled. 
In fact the signal from the Mount Olympus was 
almost as loud as that from Airstrip 500 yards 
away. 
g. Planes were monitored throughout all 
the longer flights and on almost every oc- 
casion were loud and clear when operators at 
Airstrip failed to hear calls or were asking for 
repeats (because of noise conditions). 
h. Finally, permission was requested to 
transmit on the same frequency (6430 kc.) on 
an attempt to ask the U. S. S. Burton Island, 
which was approaching the Bay of Whales 
(about 70 miles away), for a signal strength 
report. This was granted and the call 
NLA-2 issued (Airstrip was NLA-1 and 
Emergency Base was NLA). At 1:00 a. m. 
on 22 February 1947, the writer, with his 
antenna pointed at New York, 80° away 
from the ships, waited till the net was clear 
and called T6L8 with the understanding 
that that call, which was Admiral Cruzen’s 
own, had moved from the Mount Olympus to 
the Burton Island when she started southward 
with him aboard. Immediate answer was 
received from a regulation call-up, i. e., 
UT6L8 T6L8 V NLA-2 INT QSA,” with a 
QSA-3 report, when Airstrip using 100 watts 
had been given QSA—4 but a few moments 
previously. After two more brief exchanges 
237 the writer signed off with NLA and NLA-1 
and stopped operation, but the next day it 
was discovered that T6L8 was still on the 
Mount Olympus 600 miles away. Reception 
was perfect. Thus, the experiences of earlier 
Byrd expedition radio engineers were borne 
out, namely, that a low power transmitter 
with a quiet receiver can communicate long 
distances in the quiet Polar regions (5 watts 
to two tube battery receiver daylight to 
daylight on 7 me, 500 miles constantly for 
2 months, except for short periods of snow 
static, in 1935). Nevertheless, it must be 
remembered, as was learned by experience 
and put to good use in 1935 and again in 
1939, that on high snow, counterpoises are 
not grounds but antennas completely iso- 
lated from ground. Completely individual 
antenna-counterpoise systems thus become 
necessary for each transmitter-receiver com- 
bination that is to operate satisfactorily in 
proximity to others and noise generators must 
not connect to any radiating system or 
counterpoise. 
9. Power Units 
No troubles were observed with any 
power unit used at Little America that 
might not have occurred in the Temperate 
Zone in winter. The following facts are 
listed. 
a. The DC supply of Airstrip Control 
consisted of an Onan gas-engine generator 
model JWC4-10S-3 which supplied 127/220- 
volt 60-cycle 3-phase current to a G. E. 
motor-generator which delivered as much 
as 200 amperes at 28 volts DC to the bat- 
teries and shop maintenance work. (See 
fig. 224.) the Onan generator had a capacity 
of 10 kw. at unity PF and the 3-phase 
motor of M-G set drew 29 amperes at 220 
volts. It was located in a separate shelter 
behind the Quonset. The DC power lines 
and generator radiated high level noise to 
receiver antenna systems as did the Onan 
generator. Later, this Onan generator was 
moved 150 feet away to the YR hut (to be 
described later) and connected to a 120- 
volt single-phase uliit which thenceforth 
supplied the entire Quonset with AG. Thus, 
the TCS’s could be put on AC directly, the 
ART’s on 28-volt batteries charged by AG 
driven chargers with the ARC-1, and AC 
receivers were used throughout. (The TBW 
described above caused a little noise but was 
seldom operated.) This change, coupled 
with the replacement of small gas engine 
driven battery chargers, which had also 
been near the station, with AC rectifiers 
for all battery charging, eliminated a lot 
of noise. 
(1) A week’s supply of fuel was always 
kept on hand in case blizzards made it 
hard to get to the fuel dump. Condensation 
in gas lines caused trouble as did spark 
plugs. At —20° F. the Onan ran erratically 
and stopped on two occasions. When plugs 
were cleaned it was heated with a Herman 
and started satisfactorily (perhaps moisture 
in gas line). 
(2) One man was kept busy continually 
changing oil every 24 hours and filling gas 
tanks. Larger tanks are essential and power 
units should be on skis or have runners 
available for their wheels for this terrain. 
The Onan was changed from 70- to 100- 
octane gas for the last week on the ice 
and failed 20 minutes before the camp was 
evacuated, cause unknown Oil was stand- 
ard SAE No. 10, and appeared very dirty 
after 24 hours’ running. All equipment was 
left behind except strictly classified items. 
b. PE-99 (one of two drawn from Panama 
when it was learned that PE-75’s were going 
to be used for 3 kw. loads, no PE-95’s 
available) which powered the YR homing 
station had to be heated to make it start at 
—25° F. Its oil gage had to be heated 
with a blowtorch in cold weather, and fuel 
strainers clogged frequently. This was due 
238 to sediment in the gasoline supply, and in- 
dicated a need for prefiltering as was always 
done in 1935. Otherwise this unit ran 
satisfactorily when needed (when planes 
were in the air within range of 70 miles) 
except for one broken brush-holder. 
Shelters are essential for all power units 
which are to operate in areas where fine 
snow is blown about in periods of high wind. 
c. A PE-75 supplied lighting and 120-volt 
60-cycle AC to the hut during the period 
before the Onan was connected to the AC 
generator. It used 70-octane gas, SAE No. 
10 oil, and ran satisfactorily throughout, as 
did all others observed. Nevertheless, both 
generator and ignition were sources of noise. 
d. Four re-built wartime Jeeps were 
equipped by the Navy prior to departure 
from Norfolk with 300-ampere 28-volt DC 
generators coupled to their transmissions. 
Two had 350-watt 110-volt 60-cycle gen- 
erators also but this function was not used; 
however, they were used to charge storage 
batteries rapidly in planes and other loca- 
tions. The generators were satisfactory 
throughout but the well-worn engines failed 
on several occasions. The generator-jeep’s 
greatest drawback was the fact that they 
had to be dragged by tractor through the 
deep snow and ruts around the planes 
which was undesirable. With new engines 
and with skis available for their wheels to 
permit mobility these units might prove 
valuable on an operation of this type. 
e. Two heavy duty power units alternately 
supplied the camp mess hall with light and 
power. One or the other of these ran contin- 
ually without trouble throughout the stay on 
the ice. (See fig. 225 and eh. 3 for details.) 
/. Two PE-214’s were brought to Little 
America by Mr. Taylor of NRL for powering 
his sound attenuation measuring equipment. 
One or the other of these was in operation 
from 8:00 a. m. to midnight every day for 
20 days without failure. They started easily 
Figure 224. Onan generator. 
Figure 225. Camp lighting supply. 
Figure 226. PE-214 in snow shed. 
239 at —20°F. but at temperatures below —10° 
F, were slightly erratic. They were taken 
out of service when a line from the mess hall 
generator became available because well 
regulated current was a necessity. Without 
grounds available they radiated consider- 
able noise (see fig. 226). 
g. When the 4 Jeeps mentioned in d above 
proved difficult to move, several Flomelight 
HRU-28-A gas-engine driven 28-volt DC 
generators were mounted on sleds and hand- 
pulled to planes and other locations for 
battery-charging. These proved to be ex- 
ceedingly handy devices. 
h. Storage batteries were a constant prob- 
lem in regard to charging, care, and delivery 
to the outlying radio sets in the camp. One 
of the 14-man teams at Airstrip, described in 
paragraph la, section I, did nothing but 
charge and replace run-down batteries. 
Following previous examples and informa- 
tion in SCEL’s, “Operation of SC Equip- 
ment at Low Temperatures”, gravity was 
raised above normal and only two units froze. 
These were in aircraft which on some of the 
longer flights had fuselage temperatures drop 
to —30° F, (See par. 5, sec. VII.) 
i. Dry cells acted as expected under all 
conditions. As stated above all batteries for 
SCR-610’s and SCR-536’s were outdated 
and lost output rapidly when exposed to cold. 
The BA-48’s (only six available for the 
operation) for the SCR-694’s worked exceed- 
ingly well. One operated the receiver in a 
tent for about 4 hours a day for a week and 
then when taken outdoors for 2 hours at 
+ 5° F. showed only slight decrease in signal 
strength. Warm (60° F.) voltage at the time 
was 86 and 1.45. Three were carefully 
packed for future observation, the one 
mentioned above, a new unused one and the 
one which was returned from the tractor 
trip. This had a broken case from the 
pounding it received but it had not lost volt- 
age. Both new ones were normal when left. 
10. Navigational Aids, YR Homing 
Beacon. 
The navigational aids to the exploratory 
planes consisted of the GPN, the YR homing 
device, the Meteorology and Aerology Group, 
and the auxiliary TBW in the Airstrip 
Quonset hut. A ground control approach 
system (GCA) was carried to the Antarctic 
with the understanding that it would be 
returned upon the expedition’s homecoming. 
It, therefore, was not put in operation since 
before being installed completely it had to be 
loaded aboard the ships which were sailing to 
safe locations beyond the menacing ice pack. 
The unit provided some interesting lessons in 
trans-snow transport, however. Figure 228 
shows how it required two caterpillar tractors 
to tow it in the soft snow with difficulty (one 
ski broke loose), the details of the ski used, 
and the drift that formed around it in a few 
days’ time. The heavy power unit also 
presented a serious problem when being 
pulled up the barrier slope. Obviously, good 
ski or sled equipment is needed for this unit 
when it is to be used in snow-covered areas. 
Both power unit engines were damaged 
by the freezing of cooling water which 
had remained in them since their last period 
of operation. This strongly dictates a policy 
of careful inspection of all water cooled 
engines before being shipped from the 
United States and again before being put 
ashore from a warm ship’s hold in cold 
weather. 
a. GPN. The GPN semimobile air search 
and ground control radar is covered in 
detail in the official Navy report. It was 
dragged into position at the edge of the 
airstrip about 500 yards east of Airstrip 
Control with considerable difficulty. It then 
was assembled rapidly, went into operation 
whenever a plane was in the air within 
range, and followed all planes successfully 
to its 30-mile limit. Its ARC-1, 100-150 
me. unit also worked well as stated above, 
240 as did its TCS. (Fig. 229 shows it in oper- 
ation.) The crew lived in a tent nearby, 
where another TCS and long wire antenna 
were installed so that they could be alerted 
from Airstrip Control when needed. 
b. UPJV/4. A distance test was made with 
Racon UPN/4 to determine its usefulness in 
the Antarctic. This unit is an X-band port- 
able radar beacon which is triggered by a 
distant plane when required. It operated 
satisfactorily for 1 hour on one flight to a 
distance of approximately 30 miles. It is 
understood this unit is classified and it was 
not used again. 
c. TR. The nondirectional Radio Tele- 
phone Beacon (type H) Navy Model YR 
is a 200-800 kc. crystal controlled 25-400 
watt homing device which automatically 
transmits a 1020 cycle identification signal 
of 1, 2, or 3 letters. It is normally equipped 
with a T type antenna at least 50 feet high 
in which the equal side portions of the T 
provide capacity top-loading and because 
they are equal do not affect the omni- 
directivity of the vertical wire. 
(1) This unit was installed in a shack 150 
feet behind the Quonset hut at Airstrip Con- 
trol. (SeeTsf. 230.) It was powered by one 
phase of the 3-phase PE-99 generator, 110 
volts, 60 cycles, 2.6 kva. Unfortunately, the 
only poles available raised its antenna less 
than 35 feet above the snow and thus 
reduced its range. With no ground avail- 
able, first a single wire counterpoise, then a 
grid and then a combination of all counter- 
poises at Airstrip Control were tried. Since 
the latter combination would seriously affect 
the circular signal pattern, with the steel 
Quonset tied in, the idea was not approved 
by all. Nevertheless, the MO signal on 414 
or 538 kc. was heard by planes to 100 miles 
on some occasions and used for homing an 
average of 60 miles on most flights. This 
signal caused considerable interference in the 
control station because of its proximity, lack 
of ground, and the directed connection to the 
common counterpoise. In future, all such 
units should be isolated as far as possible from 
communication receivers, be provided with a 
large balanced counterpoise of wire grid or 
perhaps Marston matting, and an antenna at 
least 50 feet high as specified. The 2kw 414 
RG signal from the Mount Olympus in the Bay 
was followed all the way from Scott Island 
(600 miles) to the Bay of Whales, but on the 
800-mile South Pole flight no homing signals 
were available except the YR, since the ships 
were at Scott Island. This was of com- 
paratively little value at more than 50 miles, 
and the auxiliary TBW less than that. 
(2) During the YR’s installation it was 
found that proper crystals were not available, 
so a 6SJ7 oscillator was constructed that 
worked adequately. All remote control units 
were in the YR shack since no 3-wire control 
cable was available for the 150-foot run to 
the operations control room. The MO 
signals were found to be too slow for the ADJ 
equipment in the planes to give a steady 
signal, requiring about 6 seconds for each 
complete MO. This was remedied by put- 
ting two MO signals on the code disc by 
filing down unused dots and using these for 
Figure 227. GCA front wheel runner. 
241 spaces between characters and groups. A 
continuous series of 2-second MO’s with 
intervals was thus achieved. Some 
trouble was had with contacts of relay K-303 
sticking, but cleaning relieved this and no 
further defect was noted. 
d. No other radar devices or electronic 
navigational aids were used but all pilots 
and navigators continually voiced a desire 
for radio ranges and homing devices with 
a range of at least 200 miles. One pilot 
stated that a YG would have been invalu- 
able on some of the 25 flights made, and 
others recommended that Loran stations 
should be installed as a definite aid to 
accuracy and aerial navigation. 
11. Meteorology. 
Constant weather information was re- 
layed to Little America from the ships and 
the East and West Groups to aid aerial 
navigation. The LVT trail party to the 
Rockefeller Mountains also helped in this 
Figure 228. GCA stuck again. 
Figure 229. GPN in operation located at edge of airstrip. 
242 respect, but reports from this group were 
usually so late because of radio schedule 
times that they were of little value. Planes 
hying inland in search of full weather infor- 
mation sometimes found weather in the 
interior suitable for long Rights when con- 
ditions on the coast were poor. Observa- 
tions from pilots of such Rights materially 
aided the aerology section established at the 
airstrip. (See hg. 231.) Full details of this 
subject will be found in chapter 11. No 
automatic weather stations were utilized, 
and no radar balloon-tracking was attempted 
on the ice. 
12. Camp Interphone System, Telephones. 
Surprisingly, no type of unit-to-unit, office- 
to-ofhce, or intercommunication system was 
used at Little America IV. The camp with 
its airheld facilities, transportation center, 
supply system, ready rooms, and staff tents 
was spread out over almost a square mile of 
territory. Walking from point to point or 
requisitioning a Weasel for a half mile 
run to obtain information from individuals 
wasted much time. Even SCR-536’s did 
not hll the bill. One or two 12-drop 
boards, a couple of dozen EE-8 telephones, 
Figure 231. Plotting the weather in meteorology tent. 
and a few miles of W-110-B wire would 
have been invaluable. Much travel, time, 
and radio transmission could also have 
been saved by laying a 2-mile line to 
Emergency Base. The writer has had 
considerable experience with held telephone 
systems and feels certain that the task of 
installing an adequate system could have 
been accomplished with ease. Wire could 
have been strung from tent to tent with 
few additional supports, entrenched under 
thorofares or laid on the snow on long 
runs easily and safely. Nothing was ob- 
served on this expedition or in 1935 that 
leads one to believe that held wire would not 
serve adequately and durably. 
13. Air-Sea Rescue, Casualties, Landing 
Operations. 
No rescue operations were required by 
the Central Group, fortunately, and those 
necessary when the PBM crashed and was 
lost for several days in the eastern area were 
conducted entirely from the air without 
help from radio in the hands of the downed 
hiers. It is reported that a small radio set 
was dropped to the group after they were 
sighted, but that it did not operate satis- 
factorily. Facts can be determined only 
Figure 230. YR installation from Quonset hut. Note 
power lines and supplies. 
243 when the report of the Eastern Group has 
been compiled. Nevertheless, much dis- 
cussion of what would happen in case one 
of the R4D’s at Little America was downed 
in a remote area, was heard. Depending on 
distance from base, planes, Weasels, and/or 
dog teams would have been used. Plane 
search radar was to be established by means 
of plane sets or SCR-694’s in Weasels or on 
dog teams. If feasible, SCR-536’s or SCR- 
694’s could also have been dropped had the 
communications of the crashed ship been 
put out of commission. 
a. Here again AN/GRG-9’s with easily 
turnable hand generators would have been 
ideal for crew and search parties alike, since 
such an operation would perhaps have taken 
weeks, depending on distance and accessi- 
bility of the location, and batteries for 
reliable, long period operation on the trail 
in cold weather are out of the question. 
Full details of proposed rescue plans are 
included in chapter 6. Nevertheless, it is 
felt that search radar in planes looking for 
lost groups, and an intercommunication 
system between ships, boats, planes, ground 
vehicles including dog teams, and the downed 
parties composed of installed equipment on 
ships and planes, and AN/GRG-9’s in boat 
and ground parties, would provide a usable 
system. Frequencies would, of course, be 
4-6 me. assigned aircraft frequencies, with 
the higher one favored for distances over 
25 or 30 miles in daylight if voice signals 
were to be used with whip antennas. All 
dog teams and vehicles should be equipped 
to spread % wave antennas on the snow 
when not in motion, and GW operators are 
a necessity. In addition, all search party 
receivers must be capable of short period 
standby operation (BA-48-BG-i306 when 
battery is kept warm or light multi-cell 
leak-proof storage-battery filled to 1360 sp. g.) 
and be able to receive 8 me. signals from 
Gibson Girl transmitters. Light, portable 
DF equipment would be essential if planes 
carrying that type of equipment were not 
available. 
b. In combat, obviously, all rescue com- 
munications and measures would depend 
on the strategic situation. The Weasel has 
proven itself beyond doubt a valuable tool 
on the Antarctic snow, but its durability is 
still in question. It is believed all officers 
of this expedition would agree that they 
would hesitate to use a single vehicle in its 
present design for trips of more than a few 
miles from any base. 
c. For removing casualties, the equipment 
described above would be adequate for longer 
distances, and that of the SCR-508, SCR- 
608 type for vehicles traveling short distances 
would be preferred, but again this would 
depend on the situation from a distance 
and frequency availability viewpoint. 
d. Landing operations in territories similar 
to the Antarctic could be carried out as they 
would anywhere else as long as adequate 
winterization and camouflage measures are 
observed. Equipment must be on tracks 
or skis and communication units must have 
their own vehicles at all times to maintain 
mobility. Furthermore, because of the ever 
present possibility of small separated groups 
being cut off from supply lines for days by 
blizzards, each such group must be self- 
supporting as to fuel, food, shelter, clothing, 
ammunition, and medical equipment. Fail- 
ure to observe this precaution will cost more 
lives than enemy bullets. 
244 SECTION III. Aircraft 
1. Airplanes Available. 
Task Force 68 used six R4D’s for major 
exploratory flights at Little America and 
PBM’s in the Eastern and Western Groups. 
These were augmented by SOC’s, HOS and 
H03S helicopters, a JA Norseman (C-64), 
and 2 OY’s (L-5). Each plane carried 
Navy standard equipment for its particular 
type which functioned satisfactorily, but since 
the writer was stationed at Little America 
only planes observed there will be discussed. 
It should be pointed out, however, that 
helicopters though somewhat limited in 
range served invaluably in making ice pack 
reconnaissances from ice breakers. No task 
or amphibious force should be without 
them in future when operating in high 
latitudes. The six R4D’s flew in from the 
U. S. S. Philippine Sea on 30 January. The 
JA was brought down and landed by the 
Mount Olympus. The 2 OY’s, one of which 
was never assembled, came down by means 
of the Philippine Sea and the U. S. S. North- 
wind (from Scott Island rendezvous). The 
electronic equipment used and results ob- 
tained are discussed in the following para- 
graphs. 
2. R4D Equipment, Frequencies, and Op- 
eration. 
The electronic equipment installation in 
the R4D’s (C-47’s) was standard. 
a. AN/ARG-1 transceivers, 10 channels 
VHP available, 142.02 used most, distance 
averaged from plane-to-airstrip 24 miles, 
plane-to-plane on voice up to 100 miles, 
command. 
b. AN/ARG-5 transmitters and receiv- 
ers, 15 watt MHF set, used between planes 
on command circuits on voice, distance 60 
miles, usual frequency 4125 kc. 
c. AN/ART-13 transmitter with BC-348 
receiver, 100 watts MHF and LF with 
special tuning unit, used for air-ground and 
plane-to-plane long distance work and kept 
on 6430 kc. throughout with rare excep- 
tions on 414 kc. for tests. Voice up to 150 
miles between planes, and sometimes up to 
500 to ground with 800 miles on GW. 
d. Each plane carried 2 AN/ARN-7 Ra- 
dio Compasses, an AN/ARR-2 Homing 
Adapter, and an AN/ARN-8 Marker Beacon 
Receiver. All functioned without defect 
when satisfactory signals were supplied from 
ground, ships, or planes. 
e. Each plane also utilized its AN/AIA- 
2A Interphone and Radio System and was 
equipped with a General Electric wire 
recorder (see section VII). 
/. Radio Altimeters AN/APN-1 and SCR- 
718B were carried and worked normally, 
as did the AN/APS-4 Aircraft Radar Search 
and AN/APX-2A Aircraft IFF Equipment. 
Unfortunately no radar mapping was done 
in the Central Group due to a lack of equip- 
ment and personnel but this subject is covered 
by Mr. Robert Davis of the Strategic Air 
Command whose specialty it was. 
g. The Operations Plan specified that the 
SCR-718 altimeter be photographed once 
each minute of flight. To this end, a Re- 
cording Camera, Type ABLE, was attached 
to each SCR-718 installation. All discus- 
sion of aerial trimetrogon photography and 
mapping will be included in the Navy 
report in detail. PBM’s of the Eastern and 
Western Groups are reported to have used 
radar for some mapping. 
h. Prior to departure from Norfolk, 
Virginia, it was foreseen that anti-precipita- 
tion antennas would be needed on the R4D’s 
to counteract the static developed by snow- 
storms and other similar disturbances. New 
compass sense, marker beacon, and flat-top 
antennas (for liaison and MHF command 
circuits) were constructed using parts of 
245 antenna assembly kit AS-211 /AR. All joints 
in antenna wire WS-S/U were taped with a 
special dielectric tape (Polythylene) manu- 
factured by the Minnesota Mining Company. 
All joints were painted daily with flake 
shellac mixed with grain alcohol to provide 
strength and further corona resistance all the 
time the U. S. S. Philippine Sea was underway. 
Each antenna was repeatedly tested and 
insulated to resist 40,000 volts generated by a 
high-frequency, high voltage megger. A 
total of of shellac thus accumulated 
on the joints by the time the planes were 
ready for take-off on the Antarctic flight and 
all antennas proved very satisfactory as 
regards static pick-up on all flights. Insula- 
tion removal was accomplished with a hot 
soldering iron instead of with a knife with 
excellent results. No wires were nicked and 
none broke later because of nicks. 
i. The aircraft installation was made 
further corona-resistant by installation of 
static dischargers AN/ASA-31. Twelve were 
used on each plane, 3 on the trailing edge of 
each wing, 2 on the trailing edge of each 
horizontal stabilizer, and 2 on the trailing 
edge of the vertical fin. Only one 4- or 5- 
hour period (on 6430 kc.) of heavy atmos- 
pheric noise was reported. 
3. JA (Norseman). 
The JA Norseman flew constantly on 
reconnaissance flights around Little America 
to distances of 70 miles and communication 
was always satisfactory. Equipment used 
was the standard installation of ARG-5 and 
TCS on the 4125 and 6430 kc. frequencies 
throughout. 
4. OY. 
The one OY assembled flew more often 
than any other plane and proved invaluable 
for short distance work, since it could land 
almost anywhere without a prepared landing 
field. It was equipped with an ARG-5 
which had considerable trouble maintaining 
contact with Airstrip Control more than 10 
miles on 3265 kc. voice. This was mostly 
due to the transmitting antenna on the 
TCS at Airstrip which was used to contact 
this plane and the prevalent noise level at 
the same point. The TCS at GPN proved 
more satisfactory, since it had both a better 
antenna and a quieter location. The short- 
ness of the plane’s antenna at the frequency 
used was also partly to blame, but since 
15 miles was the limit to which the plane 
was allowed to fly the communication 
available was adequate. 
5. Maintenance. 
A complete electronic maintenance and 
repair station was installed in the airstrip 
Quonset before flights began. This was 
well equipped with signal generators, wave 
guides, 20 different types of test sets, oscil- 
lators, analyzers, and frequency meters and, 
under the direct supervision of the airborne 
electronics maintenance officer, handled the 
minor problems presented efficiently at all 
times. 
6. Conclusions. 
To sum up, communications in all planes 
assigned to the Central Group were adequate, 
particularly when the noise had been some- 
what reduced at the ground station, per- 
sonnel were better trained and equipment 
was remarkably free from need for repairs 
other than routine checking and storage 
battery charging. No defect has been 
reported that was directly traceable to oper- 
ation in cold weather other than the two 
frozen storage batteries described above. 
246 SECTIONjlV. Emergency Base Station 
1. Site. 
A so-called “Emergency Base Station” was 
established in a double Quonset hut (assem- 
bled end to end) which was constructed above 
the 1939-1941 buildings of Little America 
III. (See fig. 160.) Its purpose was to 
provide adequate Antarctic and Stateside 
communication and shelter for a then un- 
determined force throughout the following 
winter had it become necessary to leave 
search parties behind to rescue some downed 
plane crew. Fortunately, no planes were 
forced down and the station was abandoned 
when the expedition sailed on 24 February. 
2. Equipment. 
After the Quonsets had been completed 
the station was well installed by the electron- 
ics officer and his staff. It contained a 
500-watt TBM 2-18.1 me., 350-watt MCW- 
V, with a special TBA tuning unit for match- 
ing rhombic antennas, a TBL 175 kc.-2 
me. and 2-18 me., 50-watt voice, 100-watt 
Figure 233. Quonset hut at Emergency Base (Little 
America III), showing radio operators at rear of 
hut. 
Figure 232. Quonset hut at Emergency Base (Little 
America III). Note transmitter unit in background. 
Figure 234. TBM and TBA tuning unit and modulator. 
247 MCW, 200-watt CW and TCS transmitters 
and a series of RBA, RBB, and RBC re- 
ceivers which covered all frequencies from 
175 kc. to 18 me. (See figs. 232, 233, 234 
and 235.) Here all transmitting facilities 
were segregated in one end of the building 
and remotely controlled from the receiving 
positions at the other end. All intercabling 
was done in cable troughs along the walls to 
keep noise at a minimum and the 3-phase 
AC power unit placed outside the transmitter 
end away from the receivers also aided in 
this respect. The Navy also had a new 
MAW, 100-156 me. portable set at this 
location though it was confidential and 
little used. One of its features was a small 
leak-proof storage battery which provided 
all power. 
3. Traffic Handled. 
Well constructed T and L type antennas 
with good counterpoises, coupled with higher 
power and lower existent noise level per- 
mitted this station to handle traffic with 
distant planes and ships with ease when the 
Airstrip Control Station was swamped in 
heavy noise. A major portion of Olympus- 
Base and Base-to-distant-plane traffic was 
therefore cleared by this station until the 
noise reduction was effected at Airstrip late 
in February. Relaying from Emergency 
Figure 235. Emergency Base (Little America III) 
receiving positions. 
Figure 236. GM 25-kva. power unit 
Figure 237. Antennas and lead-ins at Emergency 
Base (Little America III). 
248 Base to Airstrip was done by messenger or 
on TCS’s using voice on 3265 kc. or similar 
MHF frequencies. SCR-508’s for this 2- 
mile jump would have been helpful but 
were not available; SCR-610’s were not 
satisfactory as explained above. 
4. Power 
All power was obtained from a 25-kva, 
220-volt, 3-phase, 60-cycle Diesel engine- 
driven GM generator which was installed 
in a special ventilated shelter away from 
the main building (see fig. 236). This had 
all the transmitters connected on one phase, 
all receivers on another, and lighting and 
various auxiliary power on the third. A 3- 
phase motor-driven motor-generator set sup- 
plied 1000, 2000, and 3000 volts DC to the 
TBM as well as providing 300 volts of bias. 
5. Bonding 
All units were again bonded to a common 
counterpoise, as was the metal shell of the 
building, and RF on intercom leads was 
often evident. 
6. Antennas 
Two standard Army rhombic antennas 
350 feet long on each leg were erected 
on 40-foot telephone poles and pointed at 
Washington (78° 14'), side by side. One 
transmitted and one received. These, with 
the 500-watt CW TBM later permitted 2 
days of satisfactory testing with Washington 
on 4-12 me. frequencies, and it is believed 
24-hour contact with any oversea States’ 
station could easily have been established 
with this equipment (see fig. 237) with 
proper choice of frequencies. 
7. Storage Prior to Departure. 
When the time for departure arrived all but 
the classified electronic equipment at Little 
America was stored in the Quonset hut at 
Emergency Base with considerable supplies 
of food and clothing. Further information 
relative to the station’s operation are in- 
cluded in section I, since this unit tied in so 
closely with those of the U. S. S. Mount 
Olympus. 
SECTION V. Trail Party 
1. Equipment and Frequencies Used. 
The only radio equipped trail party con- 
sisted of two U. S. M. C. LVT’s and a crew 
of seven military personnel which traveled to 
a point 134 miles from Little America and 
stayed out only 7 days (see fig. 238). An 
LVT-4, the command vehicle, was equipped 
with an SCR-608 and a storage-battery 
powered TGS. The LVT-3 had only the 
SCR-608 for intercommunication. It was 
anticipated that the TCS 15-watt voice 
transmitter on 4125 kcs. would provide 
communications satisfactorily to the 300-mile 
distant objective originally planned for, but 
this signal proved unusable beyond 22 miles 
Figure 238. Radio and interior installations in LVT-4. 
765274—48 17 
249 with the normal vehicular whip antenna. A 
change to 6430 kc. 30-watt CW operation 
with a % wave dipole antenna (designed by 
the writer) spread ){ wave each side of the 
vehicle on short poles resulted in more than 
adequate signals throughout the trip. Com- 
plicated aircraft communication schedules at 
the Airstrip Station somewhat upset the 
trail party’s scheduled plans but the operator 
had little difficulty contacting the base on 
the aircraft frequency used (6430 kc.) when- 
ever required (when planes not in the air). 
Obviously, separate vehicular nets would be 
advisable on operations where more than a 
few vehicles are involved, but under the 
circumstances the vehicles were secondary to 
plane flights and necessary contact was 
maintained. Weather reports, which were 
one of the primary missions of the group, 
were delayed because schedules could be 
kept only at intervals, and thus lost much value. 
The party was called in for this reason and 
because the completion of all flights and the 
departure of the expedition were imminent. 
2. Performance of Equipment. 
The SCR-608’s, which operated satis- 
factorily when the group left camp, remained 
in operation for only the first few miles of 
the trip when one unit failed. These were 
not put back in operation throughout the 
trip since the vehicles had to remain close 
to each other because of the always present 
danger of crevasses, and thus were always 
in visual contact. Besides, conditions are 
such on a trip of this nature that all hands 
are continually occupied on matters which 
are vital to general operation and personal 
Figure 239. SCR-694 in living tent. 
Figure 241. SCR-694. 
Figure 240. GN-58. 
250 existence, to the point where even the time 
necessary for the radioman to locate and 
replace a defective vacuum tube cannot be 
spared unless the equipment involved is 
essential. In all events, this equipment was 
never repaired since the expedition departed 
shortly after the return of the trail trip and 
vehicles and sets were left behind. 
3. Range Tests. 
The writer had counted on obtaining 
considerable information pertinent to the 
distances obtainable with equipment in the 
frequency and power range of SCR-608’s 
over snow during the return trip of the trac- 
tors, when separation was possible because 
crevasse positions had been noted, but the 
rapid return ordered canceled the only 
opportunity. No SCR-608’s were available 
at Little America for tests on the outward 
journey. The SCR-694 carried on the nose 
of the 1-ton cargo sled as an emergency 
unit is discussed in paragraph 8, section IT 
(See figs. 239, 240, and 241.) 
SECTION VI. Clothing 
1. General. 
Clothing worn on the ice in the Antarctic 
generally consisted of combinations of Army 
winter uniforms and Navy foul weather gear. 
2. Conditions Encountered. 
No particular hardships were experienced 
by radio personnel on this expedition but had 
they been called upon to spend the winter 
at Little America on outdoor combat opera- 
tions the clothing and tentage available 
would have been inadequate. One interest- 
ing case of a radio operator in a plane suffer- 
ing from anoxia is described in paragraph 
7 j (4) (b) of section II, chapter 7. 
3. Gloves. 
A special glove must be designed which 
will allow an operator to manipulate dials 
and telegraph keys and splice wire in low 
temperatures, of such a nature that it can be 
worn under other warmer gloves or mittens 
for long period exposure. Silk gloves have 
been found satisfactory for some tasks but 
the inclination of the individual is to remove 
all gloves for brief repair or tuning jobs and 
in real cold this will result in flesh sticking 
to metal and hands freezing with a general 
slow-up of all operations concerned. 
4. Uniform. 
a. From considerable cold weather experi- 
ence the writer forms the definite opinion 
that temperatures in all shelters must be kept 
low except in dressing and eating quarters so 
that the individual can always choose his 
basic costume for the cold outside while not 
having to remove more than one heavy layer of 
snow- and wind-proof garment when entering 
buildings. He thus is not too warm inside or 
too cold outside with the extra layer. The 
writer was not uncomfortable at outside 
temperatures to —25° F. when wearing one 
suit of heavy underwear, a Byrd-cloth under- 
shirt, a woolen sweater, and standard GI 
uniforms except when tent temperatures were 
boosted well over 70° F. Two pairs of 
woolen socks and inner soles inside canvas 
mukluks were satisfactory for the feet as long 
as drying facilities were available at the end 
of the day. One or two pairs of woolen 
mittens covered with leather shells allowed 
the hands to remain warm. The standard 
Army ski cap needed a woolen helmet under 
251 it on the colder days but was adequate most 
of the time. 
b. Over the above costume a suit of thin 
plane-fabric windproof was worn on all 
snowy or wind-drifty days and this was 
bolstered with the alpaca liner in extreme 
cold. Obviously, on long, cold trips or con- 
tinuous exposure without occasional access to 
warm buildings, additional clothing must be 
worn. This subject is discussed more fully in 
the joint report. It will always be a hardship 
to line up accurately a piece of electronic 
equipment outdoors in cold weather. It 
takes longer and personnel become careless 
of their adjustments because of an eagerness 
to get gloves on again. Knobs for cold 
weather equipment should be kept as large as 
possible so that they can be adjusted with 
mittens and small gadgets requiring extra 
tools should be eliminated. 
SECTION VII. Observations 
1. An electronic magnetometer, AN/ASQ- 
3A, brought to the Antartic by geologist 
James Balsley of the U. S. Geological 
Survey for purposes of locating possible 
magnetic mineral deposits from aircraft 
proved highly satisfactory for also determin- 
ing the position and composition of sub- 
snow terrain. This device, given but a brief 
try-out on a few of the later flights, promises 
considerable aid to previously used mapping 
facilities and should be carefully studied by 
the Army if such action has not already 
been undertaken. The current instruction 
book is CO-AN-08—20-14 published by the 
Navy Department 1 June 1944. Figure 242 
shows the device set up for test prior to 
flight at Little America. 
a. A similar instrument was set up on the 
ground by representatives of NOL for the 
purpose of making measurements of the 
earth’s magnetic field in synchronization 
with a second station in Alaska, but results 
have so far not been correlated. 
b. The writer has been privately interested 
for many years in means of locating metals 
buried under ground, snow, and water, 
using home-made equipment. Also inter- 
ested in matters concerning the Antartic, he 
personally loaned his equipment to the 
United States Antarctic Service Expedition 
of 1939-1941 for locating buried air-bottles 
gas drums, vehicles, and other metallic 
objects left behind by previous expeditions. 
This proved exceedingly useful to depths of 
3 or 4 feet. Another such device was there- 
fore taken on Operation Highjump, after 
being modified to work at greater depths, to 
help in locating tractors and gasoline caches 
left behind in 1935 and 1939, respectively. 
Brief tests on bay ice indicated that the 
modified unit was an improvement, but 
unfortunately it was badly damaged by a 
Weasel before it could be put to use. Never- 
theless, discussion of metal-finding equip- 
ment with the magnetometer team revealed 
that a lightweight, portable magnetometer, 
which should find magnetic objects the 
size of a jeep to depths of 30 feet in snow, 
is now under development by the Navy. 
Such an item should prove valuable to any 
force operating in deep snow areas where 
semipermanent bases might remain occupied 
long enough to allow equipment to be 
drifted over. Many articles were lost in this 
way on Operation Highjump in spite of 
precautions taken to mark supply piles during 
blizzards, during one of which snow drifted 
4 feet deep in a single night. (See fig. 243.) 
252 where the wire was iron- or steel-cored 
“Copperweld”, may have been due to the 
high concentration of the earth’s flux so close 
to the magnetic pole. Ten-foot wires were 
audible at several feet, and poles supporting 
300-foot long rhombic antenna wires could 
be heard harmonizing at several yards. 
Singing wires may or may not be a hazard 
under combat conditions but it is believed 
the situation should be mentioned. The 
same phenomena was observed continually 
through the Antarctic winter of 1934 by the 
writer and several other persons, but no 
definite explanation has yet been achieved. 
3. NRL physicists were equipped with com- 
plete equipment for measuring the attenua- 
tion of sound waves through various types of 
Antarctic ice, and careful preparations for an 
extended series of measurements were made. 
Nevertheless, only a single evening was de- 
dicated to actually measuring samples. Sev- 
eral ice samples were cut from the walls of 
a 16-foot deep shaft in the snow, placed 
between the geophones (fig. 244) and sub- 
jected to a pulsed 30-kc. signal. The signal 
from the receiving geophone was then am- 
plified and passed to a scope which measured 
the elapsed time between transmission and 
Figure 242. The magnetometer being tested prior to 
flight. 
c. Another interesting fact relative to the 
lack of electrical grounds on thick neve 
or glacial ice was furnished by the NOL 
magnetometer team when they reported 
that sensitive galvanometers were always 
knocked off scale by operators’ touching 
insulated adjustment knobs on the equip- 
ment. Apparently static charges are picked 
up by human bodies in the cold, dry air 
and/or from the snow surface, and study 
of means for eliminating this type of static 
should be undertaken by anyone contemplat- 
ing careful electrical measurements under 
similar conditions. Bonding and the wearing 
of gloves helped but did not completely re- 
lieve this situation. 
2. A high degree of “singing” in tightly 
stretched wires was observed on several oc- 
casions when no wind was blowing. This 
phenomenon, which was only noticed in cases 
Figure 243. Metal locator. 
253 latitudes, as well as to resist radiation wave 
scorching by nuclear explosives as witnessed 
at Bikini. 
a. Forty-foot telephone poles erected in 
1934 still showed 18 feet of their length above 
the snow surface after 12 years of drift and 
only slight weathering was apparent. Insu- 
lators and steel guy cables were undamaged. 
b. Eight feet of the originally 30-foot long 
bamboo rhombic antenna poles erected at 
Little America III in 1939 were still visible 
above the surface. Some insulators, which 
had been taped to the pole tops, had blown 
away, but many were still in place with their 
attached wires. Long spans of wire (No. 14 
Copperweld) had sagged sufficiently to drift 
over in the middle portions during the 6-year 
period of inattention, but both wire and 
insulators could have been used again. 
5. No equipment which could have been 
classed as “electronic” was found at either 
Little America III or II, but a few frozen 
and burst storage batteries at Little America 
III, dry batteries at both camps, light bulbs, 
wiring and one radio tube were observed. 
It is unfortunate that the radio shack and 
battery room of the 1934-35 Byrd Expedition 
could not have been excavated, since storage 
batteries there had had their full charge 
gravity raised to 1360 and had been reported 
unbroken in 1939. It would have been 
interesting indeed to have compared these 
with the dozen or more found at Little 
America III whose gravity had been left at 
1300 in 1939. All of the latter had burst 
from freezing and electrolyte stains sur- 
rounded them on the floor. The writer 
wishes to add that after several years’ close 
contact with lead-acid batteries before 1934, 
he watched completely discharged batteries 
remain unfrozen on field trips in the winter of 
that year at temperatures down to 84° below 
zero F. throughout a 2-month period. Their 
gravity had been carefully raised to 1360 
before departure from the warm battery room 
at Little America II contrary to currently 
Figure 244. Sound attenuation measuring equipment. 
reception of the signal on an electronically 
calibrated base line. Results can be ob- 
tained from Mr. A. H. Taylor of NRL. 
who is preparing a paper on the subject. 
Strength, hardness, and compressibility meas- 
urements of ice and snow were made by 
Navy engineers in conjunction with Major 
J. H. Holcombe, Army Engineer Observer, 
and information obtained will be found in 
chapter 3. 
4. Fabricated galvanized steel masts in- 
stalled at Little America 1 in 1929 were still 
in excellent condition after 18 years, but 
although the three-bladed propeller of the 
Winch arger wind-driven generator on top of 
one of them was still turning, black-painted 
portions had rusted so badly from the melting 
caused by heat absorption that the rudder 
could not be engaged and electrical output 
measured. This may indicate that non-heat- 
absorbent paints will be necessary for Signal 
Corps equipment which is to be used in high 
254 existent instructions. This bears out in 
practice, with the further evidence of two 
frozen storage batteries seen during Operation 
Highjump where temperatures only fell 
below —25° F. in planes, the statements 
included in SCEL’s “Operation of SC 
Equipment in Low Temperatures.” 
6. Several samples of flashlight cells and 
higher voltage blocks found in both camps, 
which still gave normal voltage readings 
when thawed out, are being returned to 
SCEL for study. All have passed through at 
least six winters and summers where temper- 
atures varied from 0° to —70° F. and some 
are 15 years old. Forty-five volt blocks, 
left under the snow by the 1930 Byrd 
Expedition, were thawed out in 1934 and 
tested in comparison with new batteries of 
the same make and size. Slow discharge 
runs on several pairs showed the units 
which had been frozen for 4 years had 
considerable more milliampere-hour capac- 
ity than the new ones. Whether this was 
due to a decrease in quality of production 
throughout the intervening period has not 
been determined. 
7. General Electric Company Wire Re- 
corder and Reproducer, Model 51, and 
Recorder-Reproducer VRW-1, developed 
by Brush for the Navy Department, were 
used throughout the expedition to a sur- 
prising degree. So many conferences, verbal 
reports, orders, broadcast programs, and 
other on-the-spot information was retained 
for subsequent transcription, that these de- 
vices became an important factor in the 
task of recording many phases of Operation 
Highjump. Neither, in its present form, 
meets Signal Corps requirements for field 
use but either could be made to do so, if 
this has not already been done. 
8. Geomagnetic measurements were carried 
on by representatives of the U. S. Coast 
and Geodetic Survey for several weeks rela- 
tive to the frequency and magnitude of 
magnetic storms. All information obtained 
can be procured from that organization 
when it has been correlated. 
SECTION VIII. Recommendations 
1. General. 
a. Communications throughout the expe- 
dition were adequate and well handled, but 
certain problems arose which should be 
studied with a view toward complete recti- 
fication or elimination of difficulties for 
future cold weather operation. These are 
listed in the order of their importance as 
follows; 
(1) Lack of electrical grounds and the 
ineffectiveness of counterpoises on thick snow 
or ice. 
(2) Noise levels traceable to ungrounded 
noise producers such as DC generators, sup- 
pressed or unsuppressed vehicles and power 
units, and unfiltered electrical equipment. 
(3) A lack of personnel who had been 
trained in cold weather operation of shore 
stations, where antenna design, direction, 
and matching, and a knowledge of how to 
choose frequencies and powers are extremely 
helpful. 
(4) Too few or inadequate aids to aerial 
navigation, including homing devices, GCA, 
and radio ranges. 
b. After careful consideration of all infor- 
mation available from Operation High- 
jump and the 1933-1935 Second Byrd 
255 Antarctic Expedition the recommendations 
in the following paragraphs are made in 
the hope that they will aid in preparing for 
similar operations in future, and particularly 
so should such an effort be undertaken by 
the Army. 
2. Packaged Radio Sets. 
It is recommended that packaged AG 
powered radio sets (such as SCR-399 or 
MRG-2) be used for ground station instal- 
lations on thick snow or ice in which all 
components are ready for operation im- 
mediately upon reaching location. Such 
units with properly designed antennas should 
accomplish any communication necessary—- 
and can be easily transported and adequately 
heated. 
3. Antennas. 
a. Whenever ground stations are to be 
operated on thick snow or ice no more than 
one transmitter and one receiver should be 
connected to any one antenna and counter- 
poise system. Thus, additional antennas for 
other frequencies or directions can be 
switched at will, and additional transmitter- 
receiver units, if needed, can be added to 
provide more channels provided the antenna 
system of each is isolated by a few feet of 
snow or ice. 
b. All MHF portable or vehicular sets 
should be provided with center-fed 
(balanced) dipole antennas which can be 
quickly flung out on the snow or short poles 
Y4 wave either side of a vehicle when not in 
motion. 
c. Antennas should be placed on thick 
snow surfaces instead of on poles or masts 
whenever surface traffic and a multiplicity of 
antennas do not preclude this, since the snow 
appears to be an efficient insulator. 
d. The feasibility of drilling holes for con- 
ductors or sinking conductors in thick snow 
areas to permit the lower halves of vertical 
dipole antennas to be installed therein should 
be studied. Propagation of sets operating 
above 6 me. could be thus considerably im- 
proved since directors and reflectors could 
also be easily added and the wide resulting 
lobe be useful, particularly at airfields where 
one station or homing device is required to 
cover large sectors. 
4. Transmitting Facilities. 
All transmitting facilities, including homing 
devices and navigational aids, should be 
isolated from any receiving position in large 
multi-circuit stations in which more than 
three or four packaged units are required. 
5. Generators. 
a. All DC battery charging generators 
should be eliminated and replaced with AC 
generators and AG rectifiers. 
b. A hand generator should be semi- 
portable, designed for trail and rescue work 
in high latitudes with sets similar to SCR-694 
or AN/GRG-9 which can be easily turned 
with one hand when cold. (See par. 8, 
sec. II. 
c. It is recommended that a study be made 
of the need for procurement by the Signal 
Corps of the 300-ampere, 28-volt DC genera- 
tor-jeeps devised by the Navy. 
6. Noise Reduction. 
a. All power units and vehicles should be 
studied as to their noise producing character- 
istics when suspended more than 50 feet 
above the ground, both through radiation 
and conduction through power lines. 
b. All noise producing devices which are 
intended for use near a receiving station, on 
thick snow where even counterpoises are 
antennas, should be isolated as much as 
possible, bonded to a common point, and 
have filters made available for use in their 
output circuits to receivers, or batteries 
driving receivers, which are adequate. 
256 c. The fundamentals of noise elimination 
should be taught in Signal Corps schools if 
this is not already done. If it is, emphasis 
should be placed on it for personnel intended 
for service in cold weather and/or thick 
snow areas. 
7. Cold Weather Operation of Radio Sets. 
a. Any radio set for use outside a heated 
shelter, portable or otherwise, in areas where 
low temperatures prevail, should be designed 
in such a way that its operator can readily 
return it to optimum operation as regards 
frequency drift from voltage changes or 
temperature variation. 
b. All equipment for operation in cold 
weather should be installed in vehicles or 
shelters where heat is available except hand- 
carried short period sets such as SCR-536’s. 
If all radio sets can be installed in warmed 
vehicles, or shelters on vehicles, it is strongly 
believed the subsequent results will be 
greatly improved. Outdoor operation is 
not conducive to careful manipulation, key- 
ing, writing, or the stability and functioning 
of the apparatus itself. 
c. Hard to aline, multi-stage sets such as 
the SCR-610 which contain dry batteries 
should not be used in held operations in 
cold weather. 
8. Batteries. 
All lead-acid storage batteries should be 
filled with 1360 specific gravity electrolyte 
before being put ashore in cold areas, and 
again reduced to normal upon return to 
temperate zones. 
9. Propagation Tests. 
a. Extensive propagation tests should be 
carried out to determine the reflection, 
blocking, or damping effects of thick snow as 
a transmission medium and its characteris- 
tics at various depths should be determined 
from the viewpoint of designing adequate 
noise eliminating counterpoises through ca- 
pacity to lower ice strata, earth, or sea 
beneath. 
b. It is recommended that no effort be 
wasted in attempts to drill or otherwise form 
holes through thick snow for grounds or 
counterpoise capacities to sea water or earth 
beneath until propagation characteristics of 
the medium have been determined as recom- 
mended above. 
c. The official Navy report on Operation 
Highjump should be obtained upon its com- 
pletion so that propagation and Heaviside 
layer studies in the Antarctic may be made 
available to all concerned. 
10. Transportation of Equipment. 
a. Any electronic equipment which is to be 
transported long distances as cargo on sleds 
should be secured either on piles of resilient 
material in the middle of the sled or should be 
provided with shockproof and snowproof 
containers, particularly if short sleds such as 
Army, 1-ton, are to be used. 
b. A plan for properly unloading electronic 
equipment from ships, transporting it, and 
placing it in caches or supply dumps should 
be studied, and suitable instructions pre- 
pared for cold weather areas. 
11. Intracamp Communication. 
It is recommended that an intracamp tele- 
phone system be utilized. 
12. Power Units. 
All power units should be sheltered to pre- 
vent them from filling with fine snow during 
periods of drift, and this should also include 
the canvas covers of some sets which are not 
now snowproof. 
13. Grounds. 
The conception of the difficulties of opera- 
tion where grounds are not available should 
be taught to all potential Signal Corps 
operational personnel. 
765274—48 18 
257 14. Navigation Aids. 
It is recommended that high power homing 
devices, radio ranges, and similar equipment 
be provided for aerial navigation and that 
personnel be taught how to counteract 
difficulties in their operation brought about 
by operation on thick snow or ice or in low 
temperatures. 
15. Aircraft Communication. 
At all communication installations all 
traffic should be kept off aircraft frequencies 
except air-ground traffic itself. 
16. Training of Personnel. 
All personnel for subsequent service in 
cold weather areas should be given strong 
instruction in self-preservation first, and then 
secondarily in the pursuit of their specialties. 
Radio men should also know enough of 
antenna design, direction, and matching and 
of frequency selection to permit them to 
establish contacts in isolated spots by means 
of modifications to standard equipment in 
emergencies. 
17. Magnetometer. 
A study of metal-finding devices for use in 
locating snow buried ordnance, gas drums, 
vehicles, and similar items should be made. 
(See sec. VII.) 
18. Gloves. 
It is recommended that a study of suitable 
thin gloves or mittens be made so that per- 
sonnel can properly manipulate knobs, small 
tools, and wire splices without removing them. 
19. Water-Cooled Engines. 
All water-cooled engines should be emptied 
before departure from the United States and 
again checked before being unloaded from 
the warm holds of ships into low temperatures. 
20. Supply of Separate Groups. 
Because of the ever-present possibility of 
small, separated groups being cut off from 
supply lines for days by blizzards, each such 
group must be self-supporting as to fuel, 
food, shelter, clothing, ammunition, and medi- 
cal equipment. Failure to observe this precau- 
tion will cost more lives than enemv bullets. 
258 CHAPTER 9 
COMMUNICATIONS (ACS) 
SECTION I. Plans and Objectives 
1. Provide communications between ships of 
the task force and with other commands 
ashore and afloat. 
2. Provide communication with all planes, 
boats, and beach parties when away from 
parent vessels. 
3. Provide communication and electronic fa- 
cilities for air operations, construction parties, 
and trail parties ashore at temporary bases. 
4. Operate electronic equipment as neces- 
sary for safety of all operations. 
5. Provide communication and electronic 
facilities and aids to air navigation for all 
air operations over the Antartic Continent. 
6. Establishment of communication facilities 
at the emergency base camp for communi- 
cation with the United States. 
7. Provide communication facilities for press 
and broadcast. 
8. Obtain technical and scientific data using 
electronic equipment. 
SECTION II. Observations 
1. Communication Between Task Groups 
(Command Circuit). 
The Task Group Commander’s circuit 
operated on 12 and 16 megacycles using a 
500-watt transmitter (Navy type TBK) with 
a quarter wave vertical antenna and A-l 
emission. In general the distances covered 
were about 3,000 miles. Receiving equip- 
ment was the standard Navy RBG receiver 
with a vertical antenna. All equipment 
was mounted aboard ships and was there- 
fore not exposed to extreme climatic con- 
ditions. This circuit was used for weather, 
command, and administration and was en- 
tirely satisfactory. 
2. Ship to Shore and Shore to Ship. 
This circuit operated on 32.4, 28.4, and 
36.8 megacycles using Army SCR-610 equip- 
ment. These were set up in three nets with 
a master or relay station in each net. The 
distances covered were approximately 5 
miles using A-3 emission. The SCR-610 
are battery operated and only have a power 
of about 2 watts; therefore, this circuit 
could be used only when the ships were 
anchored to the Bay ice. The equipment 
was not new and a great number of equip- 
ment failures resulted. Chief among these 
were frequency shifts and instability. The 
“C” batteries were outdated and the ex- 
treme cold caused a noticeable voltage 
drop in the biasing circuit. (See Signal 
Corps Memo: Operation of Signal Equip- 
ment in Extreme Cold, published by SCEL, 
July 1946.) Added to this difficulty was 
lack of sufficient maintenance personnel. 
This phase of communications was, in 
general, considered unsatisfactory. 
259 3. Air Navigational Aids. 
a. Homing Beacon. The standard Navy YR 
Homing Beacon was used with a modified 
antenna instead of that normally supplied. 
The substitute antenna was an inverted L 
and was used in order to obtain greater 
range. The YR emits a modulated signal 
and is rated at 400 watts’ output and operated 
on a frequency of 538 kc. The greatest 
difficulty in installation was failure to obtain 
a proper ground, which resulted in low 
output, and the effective distance of this 
equipment was approximately 100 miles. 
This is not considered sufficient range for a 
homing beacon in the Antarctic when flights 
extend to distances of 700 miles. The beacon 
used, when the aircraft flew from the carrier 
U. S. S. Philippine Sea to Little America, was 
a 2 kw. transmitter with a flat-top antenna 
mounted on board the Mount Olympus. The 
aircraft were able to pick up this signal im- 
mediately after becoming airborne and 
“home” the entire distance of approximately 
600 miles. This was highly satisfactory. It 
was originally intended that the U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus remain in the Bay of Whales 
and act as a homing station and air-ground 
station, but due to heavy pack ice this ship 
was removed north to the vicinity of Scott 
Island and acted as a weather reporting 
station and general communication ship. 
b. Ground Control Approach. This equip- 
ment was unloaded and put in position, but 
due to the cargo ships’ being withdrawn 
early it was reloaded without ever having 
been used. During the time this piece of 
equipment was ashore a blizzard sprung up 
and it was interesting to note that the in- 
terior was filled with fine snow. The 
damage, if any, was not ascertained because 
the equipment was not operated. However, 
this should be corrected in all mobile types of 
equipment whether they are to be used in 
snow, sand, or dust. 
c. Search Radar. The standard Navy GPN 
radar, which is a self-contained unit com- 
plete with communication equipment, for 
communications with aircraft, was the only 
shore based, search radar, used. This is a 
band “X”, 360-degree sweep, and is effective 
up to about 30 miles. This unit operated 
continuously during all flying operations and 
was highly successful, except for its limited 
range. The noise level in the high and 
medium frequency receiving equipment was 
noticeably high. This was attributed to the 
inability to obtain a proper ground. 
4. Little America to U. S. A. (Washington, 
D. C., NSS). 
This circuit used a standard Navy TBM 
transmitter, with an output of 500 watts CW. 
The receiving equipment was the standard 
Navy RBB receiver. Rhombic antennas 
were used for both transmitting and receiv- 
ing, and tests were conducted on 3 and 6 mg. 
All equipment was located in heated build- 
ings and was not subjected to extremly low 
temperatures. This circuit was used for test 
purposes only and was considered to be satis- 
factory. The only installation problem was 
in obtaining a satisfactory ground. (For 
other use of this equipment see par. 7.) 
5. Press Broadcast. 
The transmitter used for this purpose was 
a standard Navy TDH (2%-kw. using a 
folded doublet antenna and operated on 
17 and 19 me.). The terminal or “pick-up” 
point was New York. Over 90 percent of 
these broadcasts were successful. This is 
considered a good percentage in view of 
the fact that all broadcast times were con- 
trolled by the broadcast company in the 
States and were mostly chosen for the con- 
venience of the company and not for the 
best operating time of the frequency period. 
All of the equipment was mounted on the 
Mount Olympus and was not subjected to 
extreme climatic conditions. The stand-by 
260 transmitter was a 500-watt TBM and was 
used successfully on several occasions, 
6. Radio Teletype Circuit from Central 
Group to U. S. A. 
The transmitter used for this purpose was 
a standard Navy TBA 1-kw. and operated 
on various frequencies from 12 to 21 me., 
using a vertical antenna. The receiving 
equipment was the standard Navy RBC 
receiver using a vertical antenna. This 
circuit was a duplex circuit and operated 
effectively about 12 hours a day. In addi- 
tion to the radio teletype circuit, provisions 
were available to use a manual GW back-up 
and it was found necessary to operate 
manual about half of the time. The United 
States terminal of this circuit used rhombic 
antennas for both transmitting and re- 
ceiving and therefore the percentage of 
RTTY reception was much greater on that 
end. The chief difficulty encountered on 
this circuit was lack of adequate space 
aboard ship to install proper type of antennas, 
and local interference from proximity of 
numerous other transmitting antennas to 
receiving antennas. In general this circuit 
was considered excellent. The traffic 
handled on this circuit was press releases, 
personal, and administrative. 
7. Air-Ground Communications. 
a. Portable Sets. (1) Handy-Talky. There 
were available for emergency use several 
SCR-536 (Handy-Talky) radio sets. Occa- 
sional ground tests were made and the 
distances covered were, in general, shorter 
than normal. This was attributed to the 
fact that available batteries were outdated, 
being dated 1944. No actual air-ground 
tests were made using this equipment. 
(2) M29C (Weasel Equipment). Only one 
of the seven available Weasels were radio 
equipped, the set being an SCR-610 which 
was not suitable for air-ground operations 
as the aircraft did not carry any equipment 
which operated on the same frequency 
range. 
(3) LVT (.Landing Vehicle, Tracked) Commu- 
nication Equipment. The LVT’s were equip- 
ped with Navy type TGS equipment which 
have a frequency range from 1.6 to 12 me. 
This equipment proved satisfactory for air- 
ground communications and also for trail 
party to base camp communications over a 
distance of 100 miles. The only difficulty 
was that some tubes were broken due to 
vibration of the vehicles. 
b. Fixed Station Equipment. (1) Originally 
it was planned to use the U. S. S. Mount 
Olympus anchored off the ice for this purpose, 
but due to unusual ice conditions it was 
necessary for this ship to be withdrawn early 
and a temporary set-up made at the base 
camp. This installation was made up in the 
main of airborne equipment consisting of 
two AN/ART-13 transmitters, one ARG/1 
transceiver, and two BG-348 receivers. 
(Later RBC receivers were substituted to 
reduce noise.) The power for this station 
was obtained from a General Electric 200- 
ampere motor generator. It required an 
input of 3-phase 60-cycle 220-volt AC 
drawing 29 amperes. As a source of 220- 
volt AC an Onan gasoline driven generator 
(Model JWC4-1 OS-3) was used. The rated 
output of the motor generator was 29 
amperes. This motor generator fulfilled the 
purpose except for one fault; it caused 
slight receiver noise. The maintenance of 
the Onan unit presented no problem and it 
was used continuously. It was stopped 
every 48 hours for an oil change and was 
refueled when necessary. It had a ten- 
dency to ice up but after erection of a canvas 
shelter this tendency vanished. SAE No. 10 
oil was used without dilution and the engine 
was still in good condition at the end of use. 
This arrangement for a ground station did 
not prove adequate due to low power of 
261 the AN/ART-13 transmitting equipment 
and the distances involved. To improve 
this condition the emergency station at 
Little America (approximately 2 miles away) 
was used as an alternate station and relay 
point. This station is described elsewhere 
in this report, the only alteration being 
that a vertical antenna was substituted for the 
rhombic. 
(2) Due to two reasons ground to air 
communications were not satisfactory. First 
the relay necessary between Little America 
and the actual base camp caused delays 
and used additional personnel, which, al- 
though undersirable, was in view of the 
circumstances, unavoidable. Second, traffic 
other than actual ground to air traffic was 
at times handled on the ground to air 
frequencies by operators in spite of previous 
instructions to the contrary. This is poor 
practice and hazardous to good air oper- 
ations. The inexperience of the operators 
was the cause. 
c. Airborne Equipment and Air to Ground 
Communications. (1) The equipment used was 
standard Army and Navy airborne equip- 
ment consisting of the following: Com- 
mand—AN/ARC-1 transceiver, AN/ARC-5 
transmitters and receivers; liaison—AN/ 
ART-13 transmitter and BG-348 receiver; 
altimeters—AN/APN-1 radio altimeter and 
SCR-718 radio altimeter; interphone equip- 
ment—AN/A1A-2A interphone and radio 
system; Radar—AN/APS-4 search radar 
and AN/APX-2A IFF equipment. 
(2) In view of the fact that flying in snow- 
storms was anticipated the need of anti- 
precipitation antenna was foreseen. During 
the preparation of the aircraft at N. A. S., 
Norfolk, new compass sense antenna, new 
marker beacon, and flat-top antennas for the 
liaison and MHF command equipment were 
constructed, utilizing parts of antenna assem- 
bly kit AS/211/AR. All joints in antenna 
wire WS-5/U were taped with a special 
dielectric tape. Before the antennas were 
installed on the aircraft they were tested for 
leaks at the joints with a high-frequency, 
high-voltage megger which generated 40,000 
volts. When the antennas were installed on 
the aircraft, the joints at the lead-in insula- 
tors, the junctions of the strain insula- 
tors, and the mounting shackles were taped 
with dielectric tape. After these taped joints 
had been found to have no leaks, they were 
painted with flake shellac mixed with grain 
alcohol. In addition to making the joints 
corona-resistant, the shellac gave the joints 
more mechanical strength in that it prevented 
the tape from working loose. The joints 
were painted daily on the voyage to Little 
America, and by the date for fly-away the 
joints were covered with approximately 
one-quarter inch of shellac. Extreme caution 
was used when making the T splices for the 
lead-ins. Care was also taken that the 
antenna wire WS/5U was not nicked when 
removing insulation. Twelve static dis- 
chargers were installed on each aircraft. 
Three were in the trailing edge of each wing, 
two on the trailing edge of each horizontal 
stabilizer, and two on the trailing edge of the 
vertical fin. These anti-precipitation meas- 
ures proved very effective during all the 
flying in the Antarctic. 
(3) All air ground communications were 
considered satisfactory except as outlined in 
preceding paragraphs. 
8. Power Supplies. 
a. Shop Lighting and Test Equipment Power 
Supply. Power supply for shop lighting and 
test equipment was a PE-75. This equip- 
ment was housed and not exposed to the 
elements, and its operation was found to be 
satisfactory. 
b. Aircraft Storage Batteries. Frequent pre- 
flight and installation checks of the aircraft 
262 storage batteries were necessary to prevent 
them from freezing. (All batteries freeze 
when subjected to low temperatures unless 
fully charged.) Power unit HRU-28-A, 
mounted on a small man-drawn sled that 
could be pulled easily from aircraft to air- 
craft, was used to keep batteries at full 
charge. 
9. Radio Photo Transmission. 
Photo transmissions were made to Wash- 
ington, San Francisco, and Honolulu, using 
a TEA 1 kw. transmitter and frequency shift 
transmission (8-13-19 me.). All transmis- 
sions were scheduled. Considered to be fair 
to good. 
10. Magnetic Effects and Wave Propaga- 
tion. 
All magnetic storm and Heaviside layer 
reflection data were taken throughout the trip 
by the U. S. S. Canisteo. This information is 
contained in the Navy report on this operation. 
11. Conclusions. 
Communication facilities and electronics 
implementation functioned sufficiently well 
to permit the operation to be run off success- 
fully, although some improvements in com- 
munication are considered desirable. How- 
ever, it is safe to state that communications 
and electronic systems as established will per- 
mit future successful Antarctic explorations 
SECTION III. Recommendations 
1. Personal. 
In any Army Air Force operation such as 
this, it is recommended that an adequate 
number of highly trained personnel be pro- 
vided to install, maintain, and operate 
communication and electronic facilities, 
thereby increasing the margin of safety in 
this type of operation. 
2. Radio Range. 
Original plans should call for installation 
of a radio range. 
3. SCR 610. 
SCR-610 radio sets should be deleted and 
later types of equipment of this same fre- 
quency range substituted. 
4. GCA. 
GCA equipment should be planned for 
and used. 
5. Gliders. 
Gliders with homing beacons, point to 
point radio facilities, and weather observers5 
equipment should be considered for estab- 
lishment of outlying, multiple purpose, sta- 
tions. All equipment, including living facil- 
ities for personnel should be installed prior 
to shipment from the United States. Per- 
sonnel for these stations should be capable 
of performing dual missions, i. e., weather 
observing and radio operating. Glider oper- 
ations are considered feasible. 
6. Ground. 
Ice drilling equipment should be incor- 
porated so that adequate grounds for all 
communication facilities may be obtained 
by drilling through the ice. 
Note. Elaborate counterpoise system will 
still be needed. 
7. Field Telephone System. 
Original plans should call for the estab- 
lishment of a field telephone system. The 
installation of field wire in this area presents 
very little problem. The moisture content 
of the snow surface is negligible, and the 
wire could be buried without danger of 
263 failure. The surface is such that trenching 
is relatively easy. The incorporation of a 
camp telephone system would save time, 
transportation, and human energies. 
8. Radio Teletype Circuits. 
Original plans should call for additional 
radio teletype circuits to the United States, 
and these should be installed ashore. (This 
is recommended to increase the available 
facilities for transmission of personal mes- 
sages, thereby increasing the morale of 
troops.) It is also recommended, in connec- 
tion with radio teletype operation, that 
additional rhombic antennas be installed 
for working Honolulu (Hickam Field) for 
relay to the States as an alternate routing 
of traffic when other circuits fail. 
264 CHAPTER 10 
PHOTOGRAPHY 
This chapter is a consolidation of reports 
written by two of the four Army photog- 
raphers assigned to Task Force 68 as 
motion picture cameramen. General ob- 
servations of photographic activities as seen 
by them throughout the expedition are given. 
The writers have purposefully avoided the 
inclusion of any technical material which was 
felt to be too comprehensive, since more 
detailed and specific reports may be found 
on this subject by referring to the photo- 
graphic reports of Lt. C. C. Shirley, U. S. N., 
and Lt. H. H. Anglin, U. S. M. G., photo- 
graphic officers for Task Force 68. This is 
especially true in regard to the trimetrogon 
survey which, according to the Operations 
Plan, was the primary photographic objec- 
tive. The writers of the reports set forth 
below were assigned specific duties as motion 
picture cameramen, and having had no 
opportunity to do any trimetrogon work, did 
not feel qualified to report on such. 
SECTION I. Task Force Plan 
1. Scope of Photographic Coverage. 
The primary photographic objective of 
Task Force 68 as listed in the Operations 
Plan was reconnaissance survey of all un- 
explored continental areas of the Antarctic 
with the trimetrogon aircraft camera in- 
stallations in the R4D (C-47) aircraft opera- 
ting from the Little America area and from 
the PBM-5 aircraft operating from the 
Eastern and Western Groups. Documen- 
tary, technical, historical, and in general, 
a complete pictorial record, to be obtained 
with motion pictures and stills in color and 
in black and white, was an important part 
of the photographic plan of the operation. 
The plan also stated that special efforts 
would be made to take newsworthy and 
human interest photographs, with a view 
toward press release through radiophoto 
and upon return to the United States 
(fig. 245). 
2. Photographic Projects. 
The following photographic projects were 
listed in the Operations Plan: 
a. To make continental and coastal survey. 
b. To obtain documentary film coverage 
of unloading, transportation, and construc- 
tion operations. 
c. To determine the photographic, working 
day. 
d. To record temperature and relative 
humidity. 
e. To determine the color temperature of 
daylight and exposure data for color film. 
/. To determine the types of film filters 
best suited for Antarctic photography. 
g. To test photronic cell type exposure 
meters for accurate values. 
h. To test effect of low temperatures on 
standard 4 by 5 film packs. 
i. To test special lubricants for use in ex- 
tremely low temperatures. 
265 j. To test effects of sub-zero temperatures 
on camera lenses coated with low reflecting 
film. 
k. To obtain motion and still picture cov- 
erage of the following: 
(1) Panoramic photographs from surface 
vessels of coast line, harbors, islands, and all 
aids and obstructions to navigation. 
(2) Helicopter installations, facilities, and 
LVT operations. 
(3) Various motor transportation. 
(4) Establishment of airfield on the ice. 
(5) Bearing power of field equipment on 
snow and ice. 
(6) Structural properties of field equip- 
ment. 
(7) Tests of various items of equipment 
and material to determine their feasibility 
for construction work under cold weather 
conditions. 
(8) General field experience of naval con- 
struction battalion personnel. 
(9) Unloading cargo. 
Figure 245. T/5 Shimberg broadcasting (on Mount 
Olympus) an account of expedition directed to 
France. T/5 Shimberg spoke in French. 
Figure 246. T/5 John Shimberg, U. S. Army movie 
photographer for Task Force 68 on Operation 
Highjump. 
Figure 247. Shooting movies of the bow of the U. S. S. 
Burton Island cutting her way through Ross Sea ice 
pack on the way home. 
266 (23) Special electronic installations. 
(24) Photographic equipment installed in 
FBM and R4D type aircraft. 
3. Coverage Obtained. 
a. The following general coverage was 
obtained both in color and black and 
white stills, with color stills at various 
times. In addition, many other subjects 
were photographed during the expedition. 
(1) Departure from Norfolk, Virginia. 
(2) Arrival in Panama (transit through 
canal). 
(3) Refueling at sea. 
(4) Crossing the Equator ceremony. 
(5) First iceberg. 
(6) Issue of cold weather gear (Army and 
Navy). 
(7) Rendezvous at Scott Island. 
(8) Transit through the ice pack (figs. 
246 and 247). 
(9) Flights of the helicopter and seaplane 
for reconnaissance work (figs. 248 and 249). 
(10) Arrival at barrier. 
(11) Entering Bay of Whales. 
(12) Mooring ships. 
(13) Unloading. 
(14) Building bridges over crevasses. 
Figure 248. Briefing pilot prior to helicopter flight for 
aerial photographs. 
(10) Tests of clothing. 
(11) Items applicable to Marine Corps. 
(12) Tests of temporary camp expedients. 
(13) Messing facilities. 
(14) Tests of lubricants, greases, oils, en- 
gine coolants, and hydraulic fluids. 
(15) Tests of engine heaters. 
(16) Rescue and survival operations, show- 
ing technique and procedure. 
(17) Measurement of time variations of 
earth’s magnetic field. 
(18) Airborne geological survey. 
(19) Radar scope recordings of interesting 
weather indications of various types. 
(20) Damaged or modified electronic 
equipment. 
(21) Base radio installations. 
(22) Eaunching and handling of “Kytoon’' 
balloon and related accessories. 
Figure 249. J2F aboard U.S.C.G. Northwind. 
267 (17) Life in a tent, blizzards, and snow 
life. 
(18) Revisit to Little America III by 
former members (1939-41 Expedition). 
(19) Life in camp Highjump. 
(20) Arrival of R4D’s with Admiral Byrd. 
(21) Departure of ships. 
(22) Photographic flights of R4D’s (fig. 
250). 
(23) Rendezvous at Scott Island of all 
men. 
(24) Leaving Antarctica. 
(25) New Zealand liberty. 
(26) Panama and arrival in Washington, 
D. C. 
h. The motion picture and still coverage 
was as good as could be expected in such a 
short period of time on the ice. All 30 
photographers worked hard to obtain the 
history of Task Force 68. Except for a few 
minor details, the photographic schedule of 
the expedition was completed as directed. 
Many of the handicaps were due to failure of 
equipment and not of the men. Cameras 
had no special protection from drifting snow 
and were not properly winterized. The 
equipment was not by any means the best of 
its kind. 
Figure 250. Installing trimctrogon cameras in R4D. 
(15) Transit of equipment over barrier, 
(16) Erecting tent camp, mess hall, food 
caches, motor pool, airstrip, and dog town. 
SECTION II. Personnel and Assignments 
1. Complement. 
Lt. C. C. Shirley, U. S. N., was the photo- 
graphic officer for all of Task Force 68 
(fig. 251). Lt. H. H. Anglin, U. S. M. C., 
was the motion picture officer for all of 
Task Force 68. These two staff officers were 
on the U.S.S. Mount Olympus, the Flagship, in 
the Central Group. In addition, personnel 
were distributed as follows, among the three 
groups: 
a. Central Group. 
1 Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N. 
I Warrant officer, U. S. C. G. 
4 Chief photographer’s mates, U. S. N. 
II Photographer’s mates, first class, U. S. N. 
3 Photographer’s mates, second class, U. S. N. 
4 Photographer’s mates, third class, U. S. N. 
1 Master sergeant, U. S. M. C. 
1 Sergeant, U. S. M. C. 
2 T/5, U. S. A. 
h. Western Group. 
1 Lieutenant (jg), U. S. N. 
4 Chief photographer’s mates, U. S. N. 
4 Photographer’s mates, first class, U. S. N. 
268 Figure 251. Photographer’s tent. 
Figure 252. Photographer in Antarctic foul weather 
clothing operating Mitchell camera. 
2 Photographer’s mates, second class, U. S. N. 
4 Photographer’s mates, third class, U. S. N. 
1 T/5, U. S. A. 
c. Eastern Group. 
3 Chief photographer’s mates, U. S. N. 
8 Photographer’s mates, first class, U. S. N. 
1 Photographer’s mates, second class, U. S. N. 
2 Photographer’s mates, third class, U. S. N. 
1 T/5, U. S. A. 
2. Work Schedule. 
a. With the extensive amount of coverage 
to be accomplished in such a brief time, 
photographic work throughout the operation 
was at a high pitch. All personnel worked 
to the best of their ability to obtain as 
complete a photographic coverage as possi- 
ble of every phase of task force activity. 
h. Photographic watches (figs. 252 and 
253) were maintained from the time the ships 
of the Central Group entered the Antarctic 
waters until they departed from them. 
Before entering the ice pack on 31 December, 
1946, Lt. Anglin, one Navy photographer, 
and the two Army photographers transferred 
with Admiral Cruzen and his staff to the 
U. S. C. G. Northwind for the transit through 
Figure 253. Photographer using K-18 aerial camera 
on flying bridge of U. S. S. Mount Olympus. 
the ice pack. All four photographers main- 
tained a daily working schedule from 0600 
until 2400, after which one was left on watch; 
but in the event that anything occurred 
which demanded special photographic cov- 
erage, the other photographers were called 
to assist (fig. 254). On 18 January unloading 
operations of the U. S. S. Yancey began in the 
Bay of Whales. A photographic party, con- 
sisting of two photographic officers, two chief 
269 Figure 254. Photographer leaning over rail of 
U. S. C. G. Northwind shooting movies of the ship’s 
bow breaking the ice. 
Figure 255. Lt. C. C. Shirley, U.S.N., and Lt. H. H. 
Anglin, U.S.M.C., photographic officers, discussing 
photographic problems in mess hall at base camp. 
photographer’s mates, six Navy photograph- 
er’s mates, and the two Army photographers 
went ashore immediately with the first un- 
loading and maintained a complete and 
comprehensive coverage of all operations 
until the last loading on 24 February 1947. 
A work schedule of 8 hours on and 8 hours 
off was maintained at first, but this was soon 
changed to 12 hours on and 12 off. These 
10 photographers worked in two shifts of one 
photographic officer and four men each. 
A 24-hour working schedule was possible 
due to the around the clock daylight. The 
12-hour working shift was maintained regu- 
larly except for special events, such as the 
arrival of the R4D airplanes at Little America, 
when both shifts of photographers were 
called out. In fact, during the trimetrogon 
aerial survey, one photographer put in a 
56-hour stretch. Thirty hours without rest 
was not unusual for some of the photograph- 
ers. The rest of the photographic unit was 
on the ship manning the photographic 
laboratory during this time, carrying through 
the developing and printing of film shot on 
the ice. The work schedule maintained 
aboard the U. S. S. Mount Olympus after 
Little America was evacuated, 24 February 
1947, until her arrival back in the States was 
that of two 12-hour shifts, night and day. 
All aerial film was developed and printed 
at this time, and 4- by 5-inch prints were 
turned out for official reports. 
3. Briefing. 
A certain amount of briefing was given by 
Lt. C. C. Shirley, U. S. N., veteran photog- 
rapher of the preceding expedition, during 
270 the trip down to Antarctica. It consisted of 
motion picture footage taken by him on the 
previous expedition, general information on 
Antarctic environment, photographic ex- 
posure, and a check list of the subjects to be 
covered on the ice. This type of briefing 
both before and after reaching the ice is 
invaluable. The more briefing, the better 
understanding a photographer has of what he 
is doing and is expected to do. Efficient 
supervision and a complete background 
through briefing are the two keys to success- 
ful photographic coverage in the Antarctic, 
since so few are thoroughly acquainted with 
its irregularities of nature (fig. 255). 
4. Type of Assignments. 
a. Complete documentary photographic 
coverage was given to every phase of the 
entire operation. An eye was always kept 
open for good public relations pictures 
(fig. 256). Several pictures were sent back to 
Washington, D. C., every night by radio- 
photo throughout the expedition’s opera- 
tions in the Antarctic. Similarly, motion 
picture material suitable for newsreels and a 
possible Hollywood featurette was obtained 
b. Assignments were varied and included 
such subjects as penguins, cargo sled tests, 
tent life, airstrip construction, life in a bliz- 
zard, feeding the dogs, digging out Little 
America III, Antarctic transportation, sci- 
entific activities, mess hall activities (fig. 257), 
cargo hauling up the barrier, and bridge 
construction over a crevasse (fig. 258). 
c. Double coverage was necessary on cer- 
tain important assignments, such as the 
arrival of the R4D (C-47) airplanes at Little 
America from the U. S. S. Philippine Sea on 
31 January 1947. The value of double 
coverage was illustrated on this occasion. 
All ten photographers on the ice were 
alerted. The equipment used was as follows: 
three Eyemos, two Mitchells, two Cine 
Specials, and three Speed Graphics. The 
temperature that morning was —1° F., and 
two Eyemos and one Speed Graphic failed 
because of freezing. All cameras had im- 
portant angles to cover, but without the 
double coverage, little might have been 
obtained because of camera failures caused 
by low temperatures. 
Figure 256. Sledge dog covered with snow. 
Figure 257. Mitchell and Cine Special Cameras in 
use on an indoor job covering mess tent activities. 
271 Figure 258, Three photographers tend line to another photographer who is shooting pictures from inside a crevasse 
272 SECTION III. Equipment 
1. Requirements. 
The amount of camera equipment required 
by the Task Force was affected of necessity 
by two things: (1) dual parts and (2) dual 
coverage. The hrst of these may be ex- 
plained by saying that in a far away conti- 
nent such as the Antarctic, a photographic 
unit must have parts or cameras in duplicate 
to allow for possible failures. Duplicate 
coverage means that on certain important 
assignments, it was necessary to have two 
cameras of each type operating so that if a 
camera blocked out completely, coverage by 
that type of camera was insured. 
2. Film Exposed. 
The total amount of him exposed, in 
round numbers, was as follows: 
Motion picture film: 165,000 feet (all types). 
Still him: 4,500 negatives. 
3. Types of Equipment. 
The amount of camera equipment (except 
trimetrogon) used for all three groups of 
Task Force 68 was— 
a. Motion Picture Cameras {Total). 
(1) 14 Bell and Howell Autoloads. 
(2) 36 G. S. A. P.’s 
(3) 12 Mitchells. 
(4) 14 Kodak Cine Specials. 
(5) 10 Eyemos. 
b. Still cameras. 
(1) 20 Speed Graphics. 
(2) 2 8- by 10-inch view cameras. 
(3) 12 K-20 aircraft cameras with focusing 
attachments. 
(4) 7 F-56 (8%-inch) aircraft cameras. 
SECTION IV. Operation of Equipment 
1. Obstacles. 
Operation of photographic equipment 
under sub-freezing temperatures is probably 
one of the most difficult tasks in the held of 
photography. (See hgs. 259 and 260.) The 
Antarctic with its sastrugi surface, its knihng 
wind, and its frigid temperatures presented 
many operational problems to the photog- 
rapher. Mobility in covering action and 
speed in changing him are two important 
points in good photographic coverage, partic- 
ularly in the held of motion pictures. Both 
were slowed down considerably in this 
operation due to many detracting factors of 
cold weather. 
2. Motion Picture Cameras, 16-mm and 
35-mm. 
The motion picture cameras used to film 
the expedition were Mitchells, Eyemos, Cine 
Specials, and Speedsters. 
a. Eyemo “Spider.” This camera (35-mm 
hand-wound, 100-foot rolls) was not worthy 
at all. It had very little winterization, col- 
lected emulsion at all temperatures, froze 
solid at 0° F. (inside Little America III), the 
lenses were not coated, and aperture plates 
were not beveled. In general, it worked 
poorly, but if it had worked properly, it 
would have been of great advantage. 
273 4- by 5-inch Graflexes, and 35-mm Kodaks. 
a. Speed Graphic. The 4- by 5-inch Speed 
Graphic worked properly down to —5° F. 
Some cameras had a little trouble with flash 
synchronization. Keeping lenses clean of 
snow and fogging was a big problem. 
Filmpack tabs froze in cameras in storms and 
were difficult to pull out, causing spoilage 
of some pictures. Range finders froze up, 
making focusing harder for the photographer. 
After a good day’s work, cameras had to be 
stripped and hung up to dry over the tent’s 
stove. This was due to the inability of re- 
moving all drifted snow before entering the 
tent. 
b. Graflex. The 4- by 5-inch Graflex 
worked down to temperatures of —25° F., 
and the comments made on the Speed 
Graphic in a above apply equally to the 
Graflex. 
4. Tripods. 
The Mitchell tripod and Pro-Junior were 
the two tripods used mostly on the ice; 
the Cine-Kodak tripod was used on the 
ship. 
a. The Mitchell proved satisfactory down 
to temperatures of —20° F., when the pan 
and tilt bearings became difficult to operate. 
Figure 259. Breath has frozen to beard and formed a 
mask of ice. 
b. Mitchells {Hi-Speed and Standard). These 
cameras ran almost always and were the 
standard cameras used on the ice. Batteries 
for these cameras were not adequate, being 
too heavy (40 lbs.), and too big (12-v., 
115-amp., motion picture batteries). 
c. Cine-Specials. These cameras (16-mm, 
hand-wound, 100-foot rolls) were very good 
down to temperatures of —25° F. The 
motors ran well and little is to be said on 
their condition, although much snow accu- 
mulated in the lenses, blown in by the wind 
when used outside. 
d. Speedsters. The Speedsters (16-mm, 50- 
foot magazine load, hand-wound) froze up 
at about —10° F., but worked fine in every 
way down to that temperature. 
3. Still Cameras. 
The still cameras mostly used on this ex- 
pedition were 4- by 5-inch Speed Graphics, 
Figure 260. Photographers covering ships of Task 
Force 68 getting underway in Bay of Whales for 
home (Cine Special, Mitchell, and F56 cameras 
being used,- Speed Graphic on the ice). 
274 b. The Pro-Junior also proved satisfactory 
down to temperatures of —10° F, 
5. Motors. 
The motors for the Mitchell cameras 
began slowing down intermittently at tem- 
peratures of +20° F., but operated effectively 
at -10° F. 
6. Film. 
a. Motion picture film, both 35-mm and 
16-mm, became quite brittle and broke 
often from temperatures of +10° F. down. 
This occurred mostly in threading spools; 
film was very sharp when cold, and several 
finger cuts resulted from this. Heavy gloves 
could not be worn during loading, making 
the operation difficult and longer. 
b. Still films were no trouble as far as is 
known except for film sticking to cut film 
holders, sweating when brought inside from 
the cold, and filmpack tabs breaking off 
halfway out, 
7. Exposure Meters. 
General Electric photographic exposure 
meters proved very useful when used prop- 
erly, and were of great assistance to all 
photographers. (See par. 15, sec. VI.) 
8. Film Cans. 
Adhesive tape on film cans froze up and 
lost its stickiness right at the freezing point 
(+32° F.), and therefore had to be heated 
to stick to cans. This proved to be a continu- 
ing inconvenience. 
9. Transportation, 
a. Since the photographic unit was not able 
to retain a Weasel of its own for the entire 
operation, immobility as previously men- 
tioned hindered activity. A photographer 
walking to an assignment, if it were any 
distance, found the sastrugi physically wear- 
ing and the wind often freezing, both of 
which placed him in poor condition to cover 
an assignment. There was also the possibil- 
ity of his camera being clogged with snow 
(whipped up by the wind in his transit) and 
also its being frozen by a penetrating wind. 
b. In addition, while covering a job, 
specifically in the case of the motion picture 
cameraman, changing camera angles and 
maintaining continuity is almost impossible, 
even with an Eyemo. With a Mitchell, it is 
more than a task. The tripod usually sinks 
at least a foot into the snow, never evenly, 
thus taking additional time to level the 
camera before shooting. To change camera 
position in order to maintain a variety of 
angles calls for pulling the tripod out of the 
snow, placing it on the shoulder hoping that 
the tilt will not unlock, floundering with the 
tripod legs over the semi-hard surfaced snow 
which breaks through every step or two due 
to the extra weight, and then going through 
the process of setting up the camera all over 
again. The 12-volt battery must then be 
dragged over and connected to the camera. 
The scene is then focused and photographed 
while it is hoped that there is still enough 
action. In cold weather it is usually too 
much to ask a person to re-enact or delay a 
certain action for the sake of taking pictures 
(figs. 261 and 262). 
c. Film magazines for the Mitchell were 
usually loaded in the photographic tent and 
taken out with the camera on assignments. 
Since the magazine case was cumbersome 
and fairly heavy, it was usually left in the 
photographic tent, Weasel, or some central 
spot near the action being photographed, 
rather than carry it with the camera at every 
angle change. Other motion picture cam- 
eras, such as the Eyemo and Kodak Cine 
Special, used the photographic Weasel when 
it was available as a semi-shelter for loading 
the cameras. Without some sort of shelter, 
loading time was practically tripled. The 
Weasel also prevented the undesirable situa- 
275 element in the operation of cameras in cold 
weather. 
b. The Mitchell had more mobility than 
the Eyemo in the sense that it took one- 
quarter of the time required by the Eyemo 
to change film. However, the actual thread- 
ing of the Mitchell was just as difficult and 
time-consuming as any other motion picture 
camera, other than the Speedster. The use 
of 1,000-foot magazines instead of 400-foot 
magazines would have cut film-loading time 
to one-tenth that of the Eyemo. 
c. The Kodak Cine Special offers the same 
film-loading problems as the Eyemo, except 
that two 100-foot magazines can be loaded 
before going out on an assignment. 
d. The Speed Graphic 4- by 5-inch him 
pack was definitely more desirable for cold 
weather usage than cut him. Time saved 
placed it beyond approach. One of the 
retarding factors in the use of him pack 
Figure 261. Photographer on skis carrying Cine Special 
and Graphic. 
tion of unloading a camera by placing it on 
the surface of the snow (hg. 263). 
10. Changing Film. 
The pros and cons for changing him in 
the cameras used are many and varied. 
a. The Eyemo, using 100-foot him rolls, 
gave a cameraman excellent mobility as it 
was operated hand-held and enabled the 
operator to move about and follow action free- 
ly. Changing him after every 66 seconds of 
action is enough to slow one down, but under 
cold temperatures and with freezing hands 
speed along these lines goes slowly indeed. 
It might be mentioned here that it was 
found to be impossible to change him in a 
motion picture camera while wearing gloves 
or mittens (hg. 264). This is an important 
Figure 262. Photographer moves equipment (Mitchell 
camera) to a new location while on an assignment. 
276 Figure 263. T/5 Waltersdorf loading Eyemo on a slate 
in the snow. 
Figure 264. T/5 Shimberg loading Mitchell magazine 
on ice. 
was that care and a steady pull were neces- 
sary in changing film from one negative 
number to another so as not to break the film, 
which was usually stiffened and made more 
brittle by the cold. Great care also had to 
be taken to avoid moisture from melted 
snow on the film packs while changing from 
one to another. 
e. The Speedster, being of the magazine or 
automatic load type camera, as well as a 
very light one, gave little or no difficulty in 
changing film. Several photographers re- 
ported minor difficulty in seating the maga- 
zines due to shrinkage of the metal casing. 
11. Sighting Cameras. 
a. General. (1) Except for the Mitchell with 
its detached view finder, great difficulty was 
encountered in sighting action with all 
types of cameras, the main difficulty being 
the close contact of the face with the cold 
metal surfaces of the camera. Sighting with 
sun glasses also promoted a problem as did 
view finder condensation from the camera- 
man’s breath. 
(2) Fogging of camera lenses, view finders, 
glasses, and range finders would slow up the 
work of the photographer considerably and 
at times make him miss important shots. 
b. Eyemo. The Eye mo caused this observer 
a great deal of difficulty with its view folder’s 
freezing over from breath condensation. Sun 
glasses made it very difficult to sight although 
it was possible to become adjusted to this way 
of sighting. One had to learn to push the 
camera against the glasses and in toward the 
eye as far as possible. The glasses did afford 
some protection for the face from the cold 
metallic surface of the camera. A face mask, 
when worn, also gave protection (fig. 265). 
An additional item in regard to this camera’s 
view finder, which was of a turret type, is 
that it did not seat properly when changing 
from one corrective to another, due to metal 
shrinkage. 
c. Mitchell. The Mitchell gave little 
trouble as to sighting, except when it had to 
be hand-cranked—no action could be fol- 
lowed or panned with the friction head 
tripod. 
d. Kodak Cine Special. The trouble with 
the Kodak Cine Special is that the method of 
holding the camera brings the face into con- 
tact with the cold metal surface. Condensa- 
tion was bothersome on the view finder as 
well as snow which collected on it very easily. 
e. Speed Graphic. Condensation and sun 
glasses presented no problem with the wire 
277 cases an ordinary changing bag was used 
for this purpose. If this was not done, lenses 
drifted with snow. 
b. When using any camera during a bliz- 
zard or on days when the wind is blowing a 
great deal of snow around, all lens shades 
should be removed. These shades act as a 
collecting agent and cause snow to go into 
the lens more than it would otherwise. In 
the Antarctic the snow is very dry and pow- 
dery and unless the camera lens is warm, 
snow will not collect on its surface, but will 
blow off readily. 
13. Actual Operation of Cameras. 
Difficulty was had with some of the cam- 
eras in actually shooting them. The main 
reason for this was that the gloves and 
mittens worn by the photographers were 
clumsy and caused trouble in pressing the 
camera starter. This was especially true of 
the Eyemo and Speedster. The Speed 
Graphic gave some trouble for this reason, 
when setting the shutter aperture. 
14. Clothing. 
a. General. Light but warm clothing would 
be of great advantage to all photographers 
since they do a great deal of walking with 
cameras and equipment. A very useful 
piece of clothing was the Navy issue of 
“windprooftop” with chest pocket where 
all sorts of little things could be easily 
carried (him, lenses, filters, notepad, etc.). 
One of the bad things about photography 
was the constant removing of gloves to 
reload, hx things, write data, or clean off 
the cameras. Hands would get too cold 
and numb to work and would have to be 
warmed up before operations could be con- 
tinued, 
b. Weight Versus Activity. Light, windproof 
snow suits were worn by most of the pho- 
tographers and proved most satisfactory. 
Photographers perform an active type of 
work in which ease and speed of movement 
Figure 265. T/5 Waltersdorf wearing face mask while 
shooting with Eyemo during a blizzard. 
view finder but did with the telescopic type 
view finder and particularly the range finder. 
Cold metal parts of the camera coming in 
contact with the photographer’s face did give 
some trouble. 
f. Speedster. Sun glasses, condensation, 
and cold metal promoted problems when 
sighting this camera, but no more than any 
other. 
12. Lenses Drifting with Snow. 
a. All cameras were susceptible to this 
problem since wind and snow are two major 
things encountered in the Antarctic. In 
regard to this, several things should be men- 
tioned of practical importance. Cameras 
like the Mitchell were quite often situated 
in strategic points as duty cameras with one 
shift of photographers relieving another. 
Occasionally, these cameras were not in use 
for short periods of time. When inactive 
it is necessary to cover the camera, particu- 
larly the lenses, from the wind. In some 
278 Figure 266. Photographer checking equipment prior 
to starting off on an assignment. 
Figure 267. T/5 Waltersdorf shooting the Mitchell 
camera while wearing windproof suit. 
are important. Camera equipment is usually 
cumbersome enough without the extra bur- 
den of heavy and bulky clothing. Un- 
fortunately, there were times when a photog- 
rapher had to stand around waiting for the 
action of a certain assignment to begin, and 
it was during these lulls that the photographer 
was coldest, especially his feet (fig! 266). 
On the whole the clothing used was light 
and warm enough for the type of work done 
(fig. 267). 
c. Pockets. The blouse of the windproof 
snow suit was also practical in that it had 
a huge Kangaroo pouch type pocket in the 
front. There are many photographic acces- 
sories, such as caption sheets, pencils, chalk, 
slates, orange sticks, in addition to camera 
cranks and film which a photographer must 
keep on his person for use on short notice. 
A musette bag is good for this purpose, 
although sometimes (depending on the as- 
signment) it is too large. The patch pocket 
Figure 268. Two photographers changing film in the 
Mitchell. (Note that one has removed gloves to 
increase dexterity.) 
279 on the windproof blouse was very practical 
and fulfilled a great need. 
d. Gloves. This item constituted one of the 
most important personal problems en- 
countered. Uncovering of at least one and 
usually two hands for changing him and 
shooting a camera was almost unavoidable. 
This observer wore a pair of knit woolen 
gloves inside a pair of shell leather mittens. 
In order to change motion picture him, it 
was necessary to remove both (hg. 268). 
This could be done only for short periods of 
time, depending on the wind and tempera- 
ture. The Eyemo motor button was hardest 
to push due to the thickness of the gloves and 
usually called for the removal of the right- 
hand glove and mitten until the end of the 
scene was completed. Sometimes it was 
possible to operate the button by removing 
the shell mitten only. 
SECTION V. Cold Weather Problems 
1. Mechanical. 
a. Eyemo, Spider. (1) The Eyemo on the 
whole proved unsatisfactory for cold weather 
motion picture photography. With a spring 
tension motor such as this camera uses, full 
motive power is lost at low temperatures due 
to the fact that the spring steel used in the 
motor loses its full tension. From temper- 
atures of 32° to 0° Fahrenheit this camera 
worked spasmodically, and below 0° Fahren- 
heit proved to be completely unreliable. 
Two important factors were evident: (1) age 
and (2) condition of the aperture plate. 
Most of the cameras used were old and had 
already lost some of their motor tension. As 
a result, they were more susceptible to a 
further loss at freezing temperatures. The 
condition of the aperture plate was very im- 
portant as is the case in using the Eyemo 
anywhere. Despite the fact that him shrinks 
at cold temperatures, the aperture plate still 
collects emulsion at the slightest scratch or 
abrasion. With less tension in the motor due 
to the cold the camera will practically stop 
at the slightest evidence of emulsion on the 
aperture plate. The cameras used did not 
have beveled aperture plates. 
(2) Another factor encountered in this 
camera’s “jamming”, in addition to the col- 
lection of emulsion on the aperture plate, was 
“loss of loop”. The film, having shrunk in 
the cold, had a tendency to slip through the 
lower sprocket and lose a hole or two if there 
was much pull from the take-up spool. As a 
result, the him would lose its correct 8-10 
loop, thus jamming the camera. This was 
counteracted somewhat by adding an extra 
sprocket hole or two, particularly to the bot- 
tom half of the loop. 
(3) It was also observed that the camera 
was slowed down if the back pressure plate 
was seated too close to the aperture plate. 
The reason for this was that the motor was 
not capable of bearing the slightest amount 
of extra tension. By pulling back the pressure 
plate a very slight amount, the camera ran 
much more smoothly (at temperatures down 
to 0° F.). It is not believed that “ghosts” 
resulted in the exposed him since him is 
much stiffer in cold temperatures and pulls 
through smoothly. 
(4) The 400-foot magazine when used 
with the Eyemo, the few times that it was, 
proved unsatisfactory. It was almost as 
cumbersome as the Mitchell and did not 
perform one-half as well mechanically. 
Another difficulty encountered was with 
the plunger at the back of the camera 
280 which opens the throats of the magazine. 
When the lid of the Eyemo was put on the 
camera after threading, it did not push the 
plunger in far enough to open the throats 
completely. As a result, the additional 
tension proved to be too great for the motor 
at times. 
b. Mitchell. Mechanically the Mitchell 
proved to be the most proficient motion 
picture camera for cold weather use. (The 
coldest temperature in which it was used 
was —29° F.) Three of the four Mitchell 
motors failed, which meant that all but 
one of the Mitchell cameras had to be 
hand-cranked. The one motor which per- 
formed successfully under Antarctic condi- 
tions was the smaller and older type motor. 
Since all four were regular 12-volt Mitchell 
motors, further investigation is recommended 
as to the reason for failure by the larger and 
newer type models. Old batteries caused 
some trouble. New 12-volt wet cell air- 
craft batteries were satisfactory in every 
respect (fig. 269). 
c. Kodak Cine Special. The efficiency of 
this camera proved to be very high and 
little trouble was had with its operation in 
temperatures down to 0° Fahrenheit. In 
temperatures down to —20° Fahrenheit 
it functioned properly except when kept in 
the cold for more than an hour or two. 
d. Speed Graphic. This camera worked suc- 
cessfully at all temperatures encountered 
down to —10° Fahrenheit when the camera 
had been winterized. Flash synchroniza- 
tion had a tendency to lag at temperatures 
below 0° Fahrenheit, mostly with slower 
shutter speeds. The flash gun batteries 
froze up in several instances at these low 
temperatures. 
e. Speedster. This camera was used on the 
aerial flights under temperatures of —30° 
Fahrenheit and worked successfully for short 
periods of time before freezing. The camera 
could then be heated in the pilot’s cabin 
and used again. However, in some cases 
it was inefficient in its performance on the 
ice at temperatures around 0° Fahrenheit. 
An explanation for this may be had in the 
fact that some of the cameras used were 
older than others. Another factor, as was 
the case in most of the cameras, was that on 
the ground there was more wind and not 
merely a still cold. As a result, with a stiff, 
cold wind a camera might freeze up sooner 
at 0° Fahrenheit than when used in a still 
cold of —20° or —30° Fahrenheit. 
2. Lubrication and Winterization of Cam- 
eras. 
a. Eyemo. These cameras were winterized. 
ANO-6A oil was put in all cameras but no 
grease was used other than the flake graphite 
already in the cameras. 
Figure 269. Photographers shooting movies from the 
photographic Weasel. The 12-volt wet cell 
aircraft type battery used with the Mitchell is in the 
foreground. 
765274—48 19 
281 h. Mitchell. These cameras were winter- 
ized. ANO-6A oil was put in the cameras 
and excess ANG-3A low temperature grease 
was removed. 
c. Kodak Cine Specials. These cameras were 
winterized or lubricated at the factory with 
special low temperature oil or grease (ANO- 
6A and ANG-3A). Their performance was 
very satisfactory. 
d. Speed Graphic. These cameras were 
winterized. All oil and grease were removed 
from the camera. Powdered graphite was 
used in lubricating all working parts. 
e. Speedster. These cameras were not win- 
terized . 
3. Exposure. 
Exposure was very tricky and an exposure 
meter had to be used. Readings were taken 
in the shade at all times for long and medium 
shots and for close-ups on the faces of subjects. 
On certain overcast days a reading at the sky 
would be lower than a reading taken of the 
ice or snow due to an apparent added light 
component caused by reflection from the 
clouds. 
a. Human Judgment. The fallacies of human 
judgment, it was found, are so great that 
one can rely only on a light meter for a true 
exposure in Antarctic photography. There 
are many reasons for this. With photog- 
raphy on ice, the problem of reflected light 
is greater than that of direct light. This 
is true not only on days of bright sunshine 
but also on overcast or “milky” days. 
Light meter readings taken on the ice 
showed a higher reading pointing downward 
toward the ice surface than upward to the 
sky. This excess of reflected light is mis- 
leading to one’s judgment and results in 
the tendency to overexpose in regard to 
details. The best procedure in fixing ex- 
posure is to take a light meter reading of 
the shadows. This is particularly true in 
the case of photographing people or things. 
For general icescapes an over-all reading 
is the better type. Photographs made by 
exposing for detail in the main subject 
produced the best results. General Electric 
light meters were used primarily and proved 
satisfactory. 
b. Additional Factors. Two additional fac- 
tors might be mentioned also in regard to 
Antarctic light exposure. 
(1) Although during the Antarctic summer, 
light is continuous 24 hours a day, its 
intensity and position change. The human 
eye, however, becomes accustomed to con- 
tinuous daylight and fails to notice any 
change of intensity. 
(2) Due to continuous daylight and so 
great an amount of reflected light from all 
angles, sun glasses or goggles are standard 
equipment and are worn continuously while 
working on the ice. As a result, reliance on 
the human eye for exposure usually fails to 
compensate for this reduction of light intensity. 
c. Color Exposure. The procedure for Koda- 
chrome, Kodacolor, and Ansco color photog- 
raphy on the ice was the same as for black 
and white photography. Exposure was made 
for detail by taking the light meter readings 
in the shadows. Photographs taken in this 
way on bright, sunshiny days produced some 
of the most beautiful pictures taken through- 
out the entire operation. 
d. Filters. Filters are of little use in the 
Antarctic. The atmosphere is clear and 
there are no dust impurities or haze to con- 
tend with such as are found in other sections 
of the world. Use of filters was in general 
restricted to two situations: 
(1) As an exposure control when a camera 
would not step down far enough for high- 
speed film (the black and white film used was 
speed group 100). 
(2) To correct for the high temperature 
sensitivity of color film by use of a color 
compensating filter. 
282 e. Test Strips. Test strips were made in the 
photographic laboratory aboard the U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus for 35-mm motion picture 
him in such cases where exposure was doubt- 
ful. In general the motion picture men 
relied on the results which the still photogra- 
phers were having with their pictures on the 
ice, using those exposures which produced 
the best results for them. 
4. Processing. 
All processing in the Antarctic was done in 
the photographic laboratory aboard the 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus (hg. 270). Still him 
was sent back to the ship for processing every 
day. No laboratory was set up on the ice at 
any time. All Kodachrome and motion 
picture him was mailed to the United States 
at the earliest opportunity, for processing. 
5. Materials. 
a. Metal Shrinkage. Metal shrinkage in the 
cameras due to below freezing temperatures 
was not noticeable since most of the cameras 
were winterized. The most noticeable case 
was in that of the motion picture camera 
tripods used, both the Mitchell tripod and 
the Professional Jr. These tripods have 
friction heads which are very troublesome 
under freezing temperatures. This was par- 
ticularly true in the case of the Mitchell tri- 
pod, which when used with the Mitchell 
camera caused no end of difficulty in locking 
the “pan” and “tilt”. The tripod legs also 
lost their necessary stiffness and played 
havoc with a cameraman when he attempted 
to change position. Carrying the Mitchell 
on one’s back was bad enough, particularly 
with the uneven and pitted terrain which a 
snow surface presents, but to have the tripod 
legs swinging loosely and the “pan” and 
“tilt” coming unlocked at the slightest 
pressure caused many irritable experiences. 
h. Film. The him, both motion picture 
and still, was affected by the subfreezing 
Figure 270. Sonne printers in operation in the 
darkroom aboard the U. S. S. Mount Olympus. 
temperatures. A stiffening and some shrink- 
age of the him was noticeable. It did have 
a certain amount of brittleness to it and 
cutting of the fingers as well as breaking of 
the him was observed in a few instances. 
On the whole, little difficulty was encount- 
ered with this. If care was taken when 
loading motion picture cameras and when 
pulling out a new exposure on a 4- by 5-inch 
him pack, little trouble was had with broken 
him due to its brittleness. As is to be ex- 
pected, any undue tension brought to bear 
resulted at times in him breakage, particu- 
larly at temperatures below 0° Fahrenheit. 
6. Condensation. 
Difficulty with condensation was encount- 
ered in the Antartic only when taking a 
camera from the cold outside into a warm 
tent. The reverse of this gave no noticeable 
condensation troubles. Lens tissues had to 
283 be carried at all times by the photographers 
so that if they entered a warm tent with their 
cameras after an assignment, they had some- 
thing with which to clean off the lens con- 
densation immediately. This was particu- 
larly true if the temperature change was 
large and sudden. Melting snow contributed 
to moisture on cameras which had just 
been brought in out of a blizzard, still 
covered with snow, which would melt caus- 
ing excess moisture. 
7. Storage of Equipment. 
Photographic equipment under cold 
weather conditions must be stored with two 
things in mind—availability, and a mini- 
mum of temperature change from storage 
to operation. During photographic activities 
at Camp Highjump atop the Ross Shelf Ice, 
three main points or places were used for 
this purpose: 
Photographic tent. 
Weasel. 
Tent quarters. 
a. Photographic Tent. The photographic 
tent was situated in the ‘‘operations” area 
alongside the airstrip. It was a 17- by 20- 
foot tent and the main part of the photo- 
graphic equipment was stored there. Crates 
and boxes were used in making shelves along 
one side of the tent for storage of film, data 
sheets, tape, and all types of photographic 
Figure 271. Photographers laying floor of 
photographic tent. 
Figure 272. Interrogation of night shift photographers 
while bringing photographic log up to date. 
Figure 273. Photographers moving heavy boxes of 
photographic equipment at base camp. Note 
photographic tent with window cut out in back- 
ground. 
284 Figure 274. Changing bag being used in reloading a 
400-foot Mitchell magazine in photographic tent. 
Film is stored on shelves in background. 
Figure 275. Mitchell movie cameras in operation on 
bow of "photo” Weasel. 
accessories. Along another side, a long 
work table was built out of crates and used 
for writing caption sheets, loading, repairing, 
and temporary storage of cameras. Camera 
cases were lined along the other sides, 
loaded and ready for use at all times. This 
tent was the headquarters for all photo- 
graphic activities. With an assigned Weasel, 
photographic coverage was possible any- 
where, anytime. The tent contained a 
small Diesel oil stove which managed to 
take the chill off the tent but did not warm 
the tent enough to worry about conden- 
sation. (See figs. 271, 272, 273, and 274.) 
b. Weasel. The photographic section was 
able to procure one of the Weasels for its 
exclusive use during the first part of the 
operation. During this period, the Weasel 
became a natural storage point. A Mitchell, 
Speed Graphic, Eyemo, Speedster, and F-56, 
all loaded with film, plus extra film, maga- 
zines, caption sheets, and additional acces- 
sories were always kept in this vehicle. It 
became a veritable camera truck, with the 
Mitchell mounted on the bow (fig. 275) 
ready to go out on assignment anywhere on a 
moment’s notice. This Weasel, equipped as 
it was, gave to the photographic unit a 
valuable mobilitv which is a prerequisite for 
good photographic coverage (figs. 276 and 
277). 
c. Tent Quarters. Tent quarters as a storage 
point became important after a motor pool 
was established and the photographic unit 
lost its personal Weasel. If a rush assign- 
ment presented itself, transportation became 
the bottleneck—both to alert personnel at 
their tent quarters, and to obtain the 
285 Figure 276. Photographic Weasel in use on an 
assignment. 
Figure 277. T/5 Waltersdorf shooting Mitchell, 
anchored to bow of Weasel, as the Mount Olympus 
hurriedly pulls out during an iceberg emergency. 
cameras at the photographic tent (about 
one-half mile distant), as well as to reach the 
place of assignment. Therefore, a Speed 
Graphic and a loaded Eyemo were usually 
kept in the tent quarters along with some 
extra film in case a rush assignment should 
occur. The temperature change involved 
was usually not great enough for condensa- 
tion to result, but as a precaution, cameras 
were placed on the floor near the wall 
(leeward) of the tent, thus maintaining a 
more even temperature. 
SECTION VI. Recommendations 
1. Eyemo Camera. 
a. An Eyemo with a beveled aperture 
plate should be used to avoid collection of 
emulsion. 
b. A 9 to 11 sprocket hole loop should be 
used in threading an Eyemo under cold 
weather conditions instead of an 8 to 10 
loop to avoid loss of loop and resultant 
camera “jam”. 
c. Eyemo “Spider” (turret, 3 lenses, 35-mm). 
The Army single lens combat Eyemo with 
beveled aperture plate would be more suc- 
cessful than the Navy “Spider”. If these 
cameras are to be used, they should all have 
neutral density filters for all lenses, since the 
stops on some lenses are not small enough 
for the terrific amount of light found in the 
Antarctic. The lenses should also be coated 
like the Army combat Eyemos. Beveled 
plates and proper winterization would make 
this type of camera very successful not 
only in the Antarctic but in any other 
climate. Ratchet cranks should be furnished 
with all Eyemos to make winding easier, 
2. Film. 
a. Motion picture film (black and white) 
should be mostly of the Speed 50 group for 
all outdoor shooting; for indoors, speed 100 
is recommended. 
286 b. Color film (movie) 16-mm should be 
shot only on sunny days, otherwise no color 
exists in the Antarctic except a dull gray. 
c. A better tape or substitute should be 
used for packing motion picture film in cold 
weather when currently used tape requires 
inconvenient heating. Normally, used Army 
movie film can labels are considered adequate 
for field use in the Antarctic. A type of seal 
lock for film cans (similar to those on shoe 
polish cans) should be devised. 
3. Tripods. 
a. A geared head tripod like the Akley 
should be used instead of the Mitchell friction 
head tripod for the Mitchell camera. 
b. Winterized “Ackley” tripods would 
probably have resisted colder temperatures 
than the Mitchell tripods. 
4. Transportation. 
In future expeditions, photographic units 
should have some means of motor transporta- 
tion available at all times in order to obtain 
good coverage. 
5. Mitchell Cameras. 
a. One thousand foot magazines should be 
used for the Mitchell to avoid changing film 
so often. 
b. Army photographers should be in- 
structed thoroughly in the best method and 
rhythm of hand-cranking the Mitchell in the 
event that they might be called upon to do so 
in an emergency. 
c. Mitchell winterized cameras should be 
used 100 percent in an operation like this 
according to TB SIG 189. Coated lenses 
would prevent glare. Covers for cameras 
which are not in use but outdoors should be 
made available, preventing snow on lenses, 
motors, magazines, and over-all equipment. 
Preferably it should be a light and non- 
stiffening and waterproof cover with a draw- 
string that could be tied on the tripods to be 
always ready for use. The Mitchell cameras 
both Hi-speed and Standard were not prop- 
erly winterized in accordance with TB 
SIG 189. 
6. View Finders. 
a. A new view finder should be designed 
for the Cine Special to aid in sighting that 
camera. The present one collects snow 
easily and gives a great deal of glare and 
reflection. 
b. The turret view finder on the Eyemo 
should be tightened in cold weather in 
order to seat properly and avoid “blind” 
view when shooting movies in a hurry. 
7. Cine Special. 
a. A Bolex, with its automatic threading 
mechansim, should be investigated for cold 
weather work as a possible replacement for 
the Cine Special. 
b. All lenses for the Cine Kodak Special 
(16-mm) should have neutral density filters, 
and 200-foot magazines might be usable if 
long periods of shooting are required. 
8. Protective Covers. 
a. Protection should be provided on the 
rear of certain cameras to keep a photog- 
rapher’s face from the metal of the camera. 
b. Proper protective coverings for cameras, 
such as the Mitchell, should be provided to 
prevent harm to the camera because of the 
wind and snow so prevalent in the Antarctic. 
This could be of very simple construction, 
made from flexible water repellent fabric 
with a drawstring at the bottom. 
c. Protective covers for Graphics and Gra- 
flexes are essential. They should be water- 
proof and windproof, protecting both the 
camera and the flash gun, 
9. Gloves. 
Some sort of silk or nylon inner gloves 
should be provided for all photographers’ 
287 hands for use in changing film and operating 
cameras at low temperatures. These, worn 
inside woolen mittens covered with their 
leather shells, should keep a photographer’s 
hands warm. 
10. Identification Plates. 
On all future joint expeditions, in which 
Army and Navy photographers participate, 
typical small Army motion picture scene 
identification plates should be furnished, 
since painted wood proved unsatisfactory on 
this operation (fig. 278). 
11. Coverage. 
Coverage was good. There should be one 
officer in charge of photography and no 
more. Each one seems to have a different 
aspect or view on subjects to be covered and 
this causes considerable confusion to the 
photographer, who finds himself in between 
shooting and not shooting a given subject. 
All coverage should be made available im- 
mediately for shipment back to the United 
States after shooting, thus making it more 
valuable for publicity purposes. 
12. Speedster Camera. 
The Speedster (16-mm, 50-foot autoload) 
is not recommended for an operation of this 
kind where a lot of shooting is done. This 
camera has a very short wind, making more 
work for the photographer than necessary. 
13. Motors. 
Motors should have protective covers 
against drifting snow and cold to prevent 
them from freezing or slowing down. 
Figure 278. Mitchell camera shooting identification 
plates. 
14. Batteries. 
Batteries should be as light as possible, 
preferably aircraft batteries, with good water- 
proof protective covers when near sea water 
and a damage-resistant case to protect against 
hard usage. The Army 12-volt aircraft 
battery is recommended. 
15. Exposure Meters. 
Precautions should be taken to assure 
accuracy of the meter, especially when used 
in intense sunlight, since photoelectric cells 
may go bad and give a faulty reading. 
288 SECTION VII. Comments by U.S.N. Observer 
The following are remarks made on various 
aspects of photography by Lt. Charles 
Shirley, U. S. N. R., task force photographic 
officer. 
1. R4D Camera Installations. 
We had considerable difficulty in the R4D 
camera installation because the camera 
ports were not sealed. While attempting to 
load aerial magazines in the air some of the 
photographers’ fingers became near frost- 
bitten. 
2. Handling of Film. 
Conditions in the Antarctic being relatively 
dry, there was no chance of moisture accumu- 
lating in containers. Therefore, at the Bay of 
Whales, color film was sealed in ordinary 
containers. There were no special problems 
in the transportation of photographic ma- 
terials or in processing. All processing in 
the Antarctic was done aboard the ships of 
the Task Force. 
3. Exposure. 
There was no trouble in exposure en- 
countered. Exposures were obtained by 
taking exposure meter readings in the shadow 
for black and white film. For color film the 
same method was used except that a close-up 
reading was made of the subject being 
photographed. 
4. Research. 
Tests were made to determine the color 
temperature of the light in the Antarctic, 
the results of which will not be known until 
a later date. 
5. Aerial Photographs. 
Aerial photographs can be made with any 
type of aerial camera at any time of day 
where there is sufficient light for proper 
exposure. Photographs were made on this 
expedition and the previous expedition with 
the sun appearing at the top of the photo- 
graph with good surface detail in the photo- 
graph, except for a little halation which is 
normal in any photograph of this type. 
Experience on this expedition and the last 
Antarctic expedition indicated that an average 
of about 10 days per month may be depended 
upon for good flying photographic days. 
6. Effects of Temperature. 
In general, the cameras on this expedition 
failed at much warmer temperatures than 
they did on previous Antarctic expeditions. 
It is believed this was caused by inferior 
workmanship. There were several failures 
of aerial cameras, believed due to new 
cameras’ being too tight. It was observed that 
all the old well worn cameras worked perfectly. 
All cameras were relubricated with several 
different low-temperature oils and lubricants. 
7C5274—48 20 
289 CHAPTER 17 
METEOROLOGY 
SECTION I. Meteorological Plan 
E Sources of Meteorological Information 
and Data. 
a. Weather Centrals. (1) The major me- 
teorological unit of each task group to act 
as weather central for that group after 
reaching the operational area, 55° south 
latitude. 
(2) Weather centrals to relay weather 
data from their group to the other groups 
and to the base camp, when established. 
(3) Weather centrals and the base camp 
to issue daily 24-hour forecasts and special 
route forecasts for all anticipated flights. 
b. Surface Observations. (1) The major me- 
teorological unit of each group to furnish 
3-hourly surface synoptic reports. The base 
camp, when established, and the automatic 
weather station, when operative, to furnish 
3-hourly surface synoptic reports. 
(2) One other meteorological unit of each 
group to furnish 3-hourly surface synoptic 
reports when not in company with units 
indicated in (1) above. 
(3) The remaining meteorological units 
of each group to furnish 6-hourly surface 
synoptic reports when not in company with 
units indicated in (1) and (2) above. 
c. Upper Air Observations. Certain meteoro- 
logical units from each group to furnish two 
each rawin, pibal, and raob observations 
daily. 
d. InflightjPostflight Reports. Weather cen- 
trals to interchange weather reports from 
flights made by reconnaissance planes. 
e. Weather Reports from Outside Sources. All 
available outside sources of weather date 
such as whalers and fixed stations in Tas- 
mania, Argentina, and Chile to be used. 
2. Distribution of Meteorological Per- 
sonnel. 
a. Meteorological personnel available, in- 
cluding staff and ship complements, to be 
distributed among the ships of the task force 
in accordance with the weather services to be 
furnished. 
b. The observers from the U. S. Weather 
Bureau and from the U. S. Army Air Forces, 
Air Weather Service, to remain on the U. S. 
S. Mount Olympus throughout the operation. 
3. Radar and Radio Meteorological Pro- 
gram. 
a. Photographs of any weather phenomena 
observed on the scopes of radar sets installed 
on the U. S. S. Mount Olympus and/or the 
U. S. C. G. C. Northwind to be taken at 
significant intervals. Each series of photo- 
graphs will indicate the time and date of 
occurrence with a brief description of the 
weather conditions existing. 
b. A daily program of low-level meteoro- 
logical soundings to be made by the meteoro- 
logical unit of the U. S. S. Currituck, 
and from aircraft when available for this 
project, in cooperation with the Naval 
Electronics Laboratory Radar and Radio 
Propagation Program. 
4. Transmission of Weather Reports. 
a. Normal weather reports to be given 
priority designations. 
290 b. Reports which indicate weather changes 
to adverse conditions to be given operational 
priority designations. 
5. Hand Punch Card Program. 
All surface, rawin, pibal, and raob weather 
observations to be entered on the WBAN 
punch cards with the hand punch machines. 
6. Equipment and Supplies. 
a. Equipment and supplies for a 4-month 
period of operation to be furnished each 
meteorological unit. 
b. Spare bulky supplies, such as helium 
and radio-sonde transmitters, to be carried 
aboard the tankers and the cargo ships and 
transferred to using ships as required. 
7. Amendments to Original Operational 
Plans. 
a. Due to unexpected ice conditions in the 
Ross Sea which indicated that the unpro- 
tected ships of the Central Group should be 
north of the ice pack prior to the middle 
of February, it was planned that the 
U. S, C. G. C. Northwind, assisted by the 
U. S. S. Burton island, would escort the 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus, U. S. S. Yancey, 
and U. S. S. Merrick through the ice pack 
and return to the base camp via McMurdo 
Sound. Until the base camp was evacuated, 
the U. S. S. Mount Olympus would forward 
surface synoptic weather reports from the 
vicinity of Scott Island, the U. S. S. Merrick 
from the vicinity of the Balleny Islands, and 
the U. S. S. Yancey from midway between 
Scott Island and the Balleny Islands. 
b. During the operation of the base camp, 
a trail party, to test various items of ma- 
teriel, was sent out to establish a temporary 
camp eastward of the base camp. This 
party was equipped and instructed to furnish 
surface weather observations as required. 
SECTION II. Technical Observations 
1. The Weather Station. 
The weather station ashore, Little America 
IV, was located near the northern corner 
of the base camp and was adjacent to the 
airstrip. It was in a pyramidal tent and, 
with the photographic, medical, and dental 
tents, the pilots’ ready room (tent), and the 
operations building (Quonset-type hut), 
formed the L-shaped area shown in the left 
center of figure 27. Figure 279 is another 
view of the pilots’ ready room. The weather 
station is shown in detail in figure 280 with 
a locally constructed doorway, an ice wall 
partially completed about the tent with the 
balloon inflation shelter and the helium 
bottles to the right. The instrument shelter, 
figure 282, and the anemometer, figure 281, 
were erected northeast of the station. 
2. Briefing of Pilots. 
Pilots were briefed and debriefed in the 
operations building, a Quonset-type hut 
located near the weather station. Figure 
283 illustrates a pilot being briefed on 
weather conditions expected en route; figure 
284, Admiral Byrd briefing an aircrew 
prior to an exploratory flight; and figure 
285, Admiral Byrd, Commander Hawkes, 
and Commander Campbell plotting new 
discoveries. 
3. Weather Centrals. 
a. The meterological units of the U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus, the U. S. S. Pine Island, the 
U. S. S. Currituck, and after departure of the 
Central Group from the vicinity of the base 
camp, the base camp acted as weather cen- 
291 trals for the Central Group, Eastern Group, 
Western Group and base camp, respectively. 
b. The weather centrals relayed the 
weather data of their groups to other groups 
and the weather central of the Central Group 
relayed weather data to the base camp. 
c. The weather centrals issued a daily 
24-hour forecast and special route forecasts 
for all anticipated flights. The U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus weather central also furnished 
daily operational forecasts for all groups to 
the Commander, Task Force Sixty-Eight, and 
additional special forecasts as required. 
4. Surface Observations. 
a. Three-hourly surface synoptic observa- 
tions were interchanged between the U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus, U. S. S. Pine Island, U. S. S. 
Currituck, and the base camp. Due to the 
lateness in arrival of the Central Group at the 
base camp and due to the unexpected Ross 
Sea ice conditions indicating an early depar- 
ture of the unprotected ships for safety, the 
project of establishing an automatic weather 
station at or near McMurdo Sound was 
abandoned. 
b. Three hourly surface synoptic obser- 
vations were furnished by the U. S. C. G. C. 
JVorthwind, the U. S. S. Brownson, and the 
U. S. S. Henderson when not in company with 
the U. S. S. Mount Olympus, the U. S. S. 
Pine Island, and/or the U. S. S. Currituck 
and when not in the vicinity of the base 
camp. The U. S. S. Phillipine Sea forwarded 
3-hourly surface synoptic observations to the 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus while within the 
operational range of the base camp. 
c. Six-hourly surface synoptic observations 
were furnished by the U. S. S. Burton Island 
after arrival within operational range of 
the base camp and when not in company 
with the Central Group; and by the U. S. S. 
Canisteo and the U. S. S. Cacapon when not 
in company with other ships of their group. 
The U. S. S. Sennet, after penetrating a short 
Figure 279. Admiral Byrd, Dr. Siple, and pilot 
entering pilots’ “ready room’’ for flight briefing. 
Figure 280. The weather station. Note balloon 
inflation shelter and helium bottles to the right. 
Figure 281. The anemometer. 
292 observations beginning 210600Z January 
1947 were taken from the U. S. S. Mount 
Olympus and continued until the ending of the 
operations at the base camp. Reports of the 
pibal observations, until reaching the opera- 
tional area, were forwarded to the weather 
services of Chile and Argentina as directed by 
the Chief of Naval Operations. Rawin ob- 
servations were not taken by the Central 
Group because the required radar set, 
installed on the U. S. S. Mount Olympus, 
was inoperative throughout the operation. 
h. Two daily raob observations were taken 
from the U. S. C. G. G. Northwind from entry 
into the operational area until this function 
was assumed by the meteorological unit of 
the U. S. S. Mount Olympus. 
c. Two each daily raob and pibal observa- 
tions were taken from the U. S. S. Pine 
Island and the U. S. S. Currituck as planned. 
d. Two daily rawin observations were 
taken from the U. S. S. Brownson and the 
U. S. S. Henderson as planned. 
6. Inf light /Postflight Reports. 
a. Reports from flights made by the base 
camp reconnaissance planes were forwarded 
to the Eastern and Western Groups from the 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus as available, as 
planned. 
Figure 282. The instrument shelter. 
distance into the ice pack, was escorted to 
Scott Island by the U. S. C. G. G. Northwind 
and furnished 6-hourly surface synoptic 
observations until no longer required for the 
operation of the Central Group. The U. S. S. 
Merrick and the U. S. S. Yancey remained in 
company with either the U. S. S. Mount 
Olympus or the U. S. C. G. C. Northwind 
while within operational range of the Central 
Group and did not furnish any weather 
observations. As directed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations, the meteorological unit 
of the U. S. S. Mount Olympus began 21 
December 1946 forwarding 6-hourly surface 
synoptic reports to the weather services of 
Chile and Argentina and continued until 
reaching the operational area. 
5. Upper Air Observations. 
a. Two daily pibal observations beginning 
210000Z December 1946 and two daily raob 
Figure 283. Briefing pilot on expected weather 
conditions. 
293 Figure 284. Admiral Byrd briefing aircrew prior to exploratory flight. 
b. Reports from flights made by the East- 
ern Group reconnaissance planes were for- 
warded to the other groups and to the 
base camp from the U. S. S. Pine Island as 
available, as planned. 
c. Reports from flights made by the West- 
ern Group reconnaissance planes were for- 
warded to the other groups and to the 
base camp from the U. S. S. Currituck as 
available, as planned. 
d. The inflight/postflight reports received 
by the Central Group were incomplete and 
indicated a lack of familiarity of the aircrew 
members with weather observing and with 
the encoding and the transmission of weather 
data. 
7. Weather Reports from Outside Sources. 
a. En route to the operational area, 
weather data was intercepted by the U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus as broadcast from Washing- 
ton, D. G., New Orleans, Louisiana, Coco 
Solo, C. Z., Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile. 
Within the operational area, except as 
indicated in b below, no weather reports 
were received by the Central Group from 
294 outside sources. En route to the United 
States via New Zealand from the operational 
area, weather data was intercepted by the 
U. S. G. G. C. Northwind from New Zealand, 
enabling that ship to avoid a storm center 
while towing the U. S. S. Merrick; weather 
data was intercepted by the U. S. S. Mount 
Olympus similar to that intercepted en route 
to the operational area. 
b. Beginning 26 December 1946, 6-hourly 
surface synoptic reports were received by the 
Western Group, and relayed to the other 
groups, from two Japanese whalers operating 
in the vicinity of 70° south latitude and 170° 
east longitude. The Western Group inter- 
cepted weather data as broadcast from New 
Zealand, Australia, and Africa but the 
Antarctic analyses included therein were not 
found to be satisfactory. 
c. The Eastern Group intercepted weather 
data as broadcast from South America and 
the Falkland Islands which included reports 
from two weather stations established by the 
British in the Palmer Peninsula. 
8. Personnel Assignments. 
a. Meteorological personnel available, in- 
cluding staff and ships’ complements, during 
most of the operating time and while in the 
operational area, were assigned as follows: 
(1) U. S. S. Mount Olympus. 1 CAerM, 1 
AerM2, 1 AerM3, 4 seamen(AerM). 
(2) U. S. C. G. C. Northwind. 1 Lt. 
Comdr., 1 CAerM, 1 AerM3, 2 seamen 
(AerM). 
(3) U. S. S. Sennet. None, the weather 
observations on this ship being taken by the 
ship’s quartermaster, an assistant to the 
navigator. 
(4) U. S. S. Yancey. Although it was 
originally planned that no meteorological 
personnel would be aboard this ship, during 
part of the operation (see par. la, sec. I), the 
following were assigned to the U. S. S. 
Yancey and were aboard that ship from the 
base camp until reaching Dunedin, New 
Zealand: 1 AerM3, 2 seamen(AerM). 
(5) U. S. S. Merrick. Although it was orig- 
inally planned that no meteorological per- 
sonnel would be aboard this ship, during 
part of the operation (see par. 7«, sec. I), 
the following were assigned to the U. S. S. 
Merrick and were aboard that ship from the 
base camp to Scott Island and there trans- 
ferred to the U. S. C. G. C. Northwind to 
continue to Dunedin, New Zealand. 1 Aer- 
M3, 2 seamen (AerM). 
(6) U. S. S. Burton Island. 1 AerM2. 
(7) U. S. S. Pine Island. 1 Lt. Comdr., 
1 Lt. (jg), 1 CAerM, 1 AerMl, 2 AerM2, 
4 seamen (AerM). 
(8) U. S. S. Brownson. 1 AerMl, 1 sea- 
man (AerM). 
(9) U. S. S. Canisteo. 1 CAerM, 1 seaman 
(AerM). 
(10) U. S. S. Currituck. 2 Lieut., 1 CAerM, 
2 AerMl, 1 AerM2, 4 seamen (AerM). 
(11) U. S. S. Henderson. 1 AerMl, 1 sea- 
man (AerM). 
(12) U. S. S. Cacapon. 1 AerM2. 
(13) Base Camp. 1 Captain, 1 CAerM, 
3 AerM2, 1 AerM3. 
Figure 285. Admiral Byrd, Commander Hawkes, and 
Commander Campbell plotting new discoveries. 
295 b. The two non-Navy meteorological ob- 
servers were assigned as follows; 
(1) U. S. Weather Bureau Observer. From 
Norfolk, Virginia, to Little America IV, 
aboard the U. S. 8. Mount Olympus. Ashore 
Little America IV until the base camp was 
evacuated. From Little America IV to 
West Coast, U. S. A., aboard the U. S. S. 
Burton Island. 
(2) U. S. A. A. F., Air Weather Service 
Observer. From Norfolk, Virginia, to Little 
America IV, aboard the U. S. S. Mount 
Olympus. Ashore Little America IV until 
departure of Central Group ships. From 
Little America IV to Scott Island, aboard the 
U. S. S. Merrick. From Scott Island to 
Dunedin, New Zealand, aboard the U. S. 
C. G. C. Northwind. While at Dunedin, 
New Zealand, aboard U. S. S. Yancey. From 
Dunedin to Wellington, New Zealand, 
aboard the U. S. S. Burton Island. From 
Wellington, New Zealand, to Washington, 
D. C., aboard the U. S. S. Mount Olympus. 
9. Radar and Radio Meteorological Pro- 
gram. 
a. SK-2, SG-IC, SB, and SQ Radar. (1) En 
route to the operational area, no photographs 
of weather phenomena observed on the 
scopes of the radar sets listed above, installed 
on the U. S. S. Mount Olympus, were made as 
the radar camera was not received until 
reaching Panama and was not installed 
before reaching the South Temperate Zone. 
Therefore, it was unavailable for photo- 
graphing the shower activity encountered in 
the tropical regions. 
(2) Within the operational area no weather 
phenomena were observed on these scopes. 
(3) Returning to the United States, photo- 
graphs were made of the scopes showing 
isolated showers and the line of shower 
activity along the Intra-Tropical Front. 
b. “Cindy” {CXJG) Radar. (1) En route 
to the operational area, photographs of the 
scope of the “Cindy” (CXJG) radar set, 
installed on the U. S. C. G. C. Northwind, 
showing a fog bank and others showing 
isolated showers were made. 
(2) Within the operational area no weather 
phenomena were observed on this radar set. 
c. Low-Level Sounding. A low-level meteoro- 
logical sounding program, using standard 
radiosonde equipment and supplies, was 
made from the U. S. S. Currituck as planned. 
The balloons were held captive by a nylon 
one-eighth inch thick cord mounted on a 
hand reel. The soundings were satisfac- 
torily conducted to heights of 1,000 feet 
when the ship was not in motion. Airplane 
observations were also made using a heli- 
copter and a standard aerograph. 
10. Transmission of Weather Reports. 
a. Normal weather reports were given 
priority designations and, except as indicated 
in d below, were transmitted in clear text. 
b. Reports indicating weather changes to 
adverse conditions were given operational 
priority designations and, except as indicated 
in d below, were transmitted in clear text. 
c. All weather reports were interchanged 
as “non-scheduled” messages and were de- 
livered, in most cases, in ample time to be 
used. 
d. Weather reports were transmitted using 
the standard codes outlined in “Radio 
Weather Aids”, H. O. 206. All reports 
from the Central Group were in clear text 
but those from the Eastern and the Western 
Groups omitted all indications of position, 
such locations being obtained from other, 
confidential, messages. Thus the locations 
of the Eastern and the Western Groups were 
kept classified as directed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 
11. Hand Punch Card Program. 
a. All surface, rawin, pibal and raob 
weather observations were entered on the 
296 WBAN punch cards with hand punch ma- 
chines as soon as practicable after each ob- 
servation was made. 
b. The WBAN punch cards were assem- 
bled at Task Force Sixty-Eight Fleadquarters, 
Washington, D. C., and forwarded for 
tabulation and filing to the WBAN Punch 
Card Library, New Orleans, Louisiana. 
12. Equipment and Supplies. 
a. A 4-month period of equipment and 
supplies was furnished to each meteorological 
unit, the meteorological officer or senior 
enlisted man being responsible for checking 
the materiel received and obtaining any 
additional equipment and/or supplies needed 
from an aerological supply pool prior to 
departure from the United States. Except 
as indicated immediately below, the equip- 
ment and supplies, all standard items, were 
apparently satisfactory. 
(1) No mercurial barometers were supplied 
to the meteorological units of the Central 
Group. However, all aneroid barometers 
used were adjusted to show similar values. 
(2) Some equipment and supplies were 
lost in a crevasse during the unloading 
operations but were replaced from surplus 
items from meteorological units of the Cen- 
tral Group ships. 
(3) The Thermo Screen (USAAF nomen- 
clature-instrument Shelter) mounted on 
the U. S. S. Mount Olympus was found to be 
defective. The lock on the door, probably 
due to the swelling of incompletely cured 
wood used in the original construction, 
protruded to such an extent that the door 
would not shut tightly. Figure 286 shows 
the lock in normal position in relation to 
the edge of the door (A) and how the lock 
of this shelter protruded (B), 
b. Spare bulky supplies such as helium and 
radiosonde transmitters were carried aboard 
the tankers and the cargo ships and then 
Fig ure 287. Logging data in weather station. Note 
improvised furniture and “false roof" of radar 
balloon targets. 
Figure 286. Normal (A) and defective (B) positions 
of lock on instrument shelter door. 
Figure 288. Checking weather direction charts. 
Note improvised furniture and “false roof.” 
297 easily be lost in a snowstorm unless properly 
marked with sticks that will stick up out of 
drifting snow.' The drifts shown in figure 29 
were formed in approximately 2 hours during 
a period of falling and drifting snow, and 
completely covered at least one box which 
was 3 by 3 by 5 feet. 
13. Amendments to Original Operational 
Plans. 
a. The plan to establish the U. S. S. 
Mount Olympus, the U. S. S. Tancey, and the 
U. S. S. Merrick as semi-fixed weather 
reporting stations north of the ice pack was 
abandoned when the rudder of the U. S. S. 
Merrick was carried away while traversing 
the ice pack. The U. S. S. Mount Olympus 
remained in the vicinity of Scott Island, 
forwarding surface weather reports to the 
base camp, until the base camp was evacu- 
ated. The U. S. C. G. C. Northwind, in 
company with the U. S. S. Tancey, towed 
the U. S. S. Merrick to Dunedin, New 
Zealand, for repairs. The U. S. S. Burton 
Island returned to the base camp to evacuate 
those personnel remaining there. 
b. A temporary camp was established 
by a trail party at a point approximately 
120 miles, bearing 80° true from Little 
America IV. Surface weather observations 
were made and reports forwarded to the 
base camp. The following items of meteoro- 
logical equipment and supplies were fur- 
nished the trail party for making the 
weather observations: 
(1) Portable anemometer. 
(2) Sling psychrometer with wooden case. 
(3) U. S. W. B. Circular S, Cloud Forms. 
(4) U. S. W. B. Circular 235, Psychro- 
metric Tables. 
Figure 289. Spray ice, as found in the North Atlantic 
Ocean during winter months, formed on the U. S. S. 
Burton Island during a storm while the ship was en 
route to Little America IV. 
transferred to the using ships as required. 
The helium bottle used by the U. S. Navy is 
similar to the hydrogen tank used by the 
U. S. Army Air Forces and is just as heavy 
and as awkward to handle. 
c. All furniture for the base camp was 
built by using personnel from used packing 
boxes and plywood stock. Figures 287 and 
288 show some of the furniture constructed 
for the weather station ashore and also show 
the “false roof” made of radar balloon 
targets which kept the heat in the lower half 
of the tent. Standard instrument shelter and 
anemometer supports are not easily adaptable 
to installation on an ice surface and special 
supports were improvised. 
d. Much equipment and many supplies can 
298 SECTION III. Weather Processes Encountered 
1. Observations Available. 
During this operation, the observations of 
the following groups were available to the 
meteorological sections: 
a. The Central Group operating in the 
vicinity of the Bay of Whales, Scott Island, 
and in the Ross Sea. 
b. The Eastern Group operating around 
the Antarctic eastward from the Ross Sea. 
c. The Western Group operating around 
the Antarctic westward from the Ross Sea. 
d. The base camp established ashore at 
Little America IV. 
e. Weather data intercepted from Jap- 
anese whalers operating in the vicinity of 
Balleny Islands and from southern Tasmania 
and New Zealand. 
2. Synoptic Charts. 
Using the weather reports obtained as 
indicated above, at least two surface synoptic 
charts were constructed daily which con- 
tained more weather data than any others 
previously constructed. Three series of these 
synoptic charts, showing typical situations 
encountered during this operation, are shown 
in figures 290 through 311. 
3. Frontal Systems. 
Similarity between the frontal systems en- 
countered, as shown on the inclosed charts, 
and those existing in northern latitudes was 
noticed. Most differences were attributed 
to the differences existing in land-water 
area relationships. The Ross Sea is a large 
water area bounded on the north by the ice 
pack, on the east by the high mountains of 
Marie Byrd Land, on the south by the flat 
Ross Sea Ice Shelf, and on the west by the 
high mountains of Victoria Land. The Ross 
Sea, this season, seemed to be a smaller area 
than normally encountered, the ice pack 
being thicker and extending farther south 
than has previously been reported. 
4. Pressure Cells. 
Current day textbooks, using only the 
meager reports that have previously been 
available, indicate a simple high pressure 
cell located at the surface of the Antarctic 
covering most of the continent and a pro- 
cession of cyclonic activity remaining in 
about the same latitude moving eastward 
about the Antarctic Continent. The charts 
enclosed indicate a persistency of high 
pressure ridges along the 120° east and the 
120° west meridians which may be— 
a. Protrusions from a high pressure cell 
located over the south polar area with a 
similar extension at 0° longitude, or— 
b. Two distinct cells, a third at 0° longi- 
tude with a col or low over the polar area, or— 
c. An unusual circumstance of the polar 
cap of high pressure extending farther north- 
ward. 
5. Antarctic Polar Front. 
A primary frontal system, the Antarctic 
Polar Front, extended along 60° south 
latitude, the boundary between the cold, 
dry air of the polar cap and the cool, moist 
air from the water areas. Wave disturb- 
ances occurred along this front as along the 
Arctic Polar Front. Many of these waves 
became unstable and developed long oc- 
cluded systems, the low at the tip moving 
southeastward while the front moved east- 
ward toward areas where frontolysis occurred 
against the high cells mentioned in paragraph 
4. The speeds of fronts and the wave 
lengths were very similar to those encountered 
on the Arctic Polar Front, 
299 SECTION IV. Recommendations 
1. Weather Centrals. 
The basic plan for the establishment of a 
weather central for each operational group 
and/or section is satisfactory. 
2. Surface Observations. 
a. It is recommended that “6-hourly sur- 
face synoptic observations”, such as shown in 
the basic plan as outlined in paragraph 
lb (3) of section I, be reduced so that the 
longest period of time between observations 
submitted by any unit is 3 hours, so that a 
more complete, up-to-date picture of existing 
weather conditions is available. Further, 
provisions should be made for the filing of 
“special” weather observations when ad- 
verse weather conditions occur between 
routine observations. 
b. It is recommended that automatic 
weather stations be established en route to 
the operational area rather than subsequent 
to arrival so that adverse conditions, such 
as the ice pack in this operation, might 
not modify and/or cause the abandonment 
of the project. 
3. Upper Air Observations. 
The basic plan for making upper air 
observations plus a project to set up a raw- 
insonde section ashore as soon as practicable 
after arrival at the base camp is satisfactory. 
This additional project will permit continu- 
ous observations at the base camp even 
though adverse ice conditions force the 
supporting ships some distance off shore. 
4. Inflight /Postflight Reports. 
a. The basic plan for exchanging 
inflight/postflight weather reports from each 
reconnaissance plane is satisfactory. 
b. It is recommended that all aircraft used 
by the USAAF in an operation similar to 
this contain the following weather personnel 
and equipment at the minimum: 
(1) A weather officer as crew member on 
each flight other than local. 
(2) A radio altimeter for determining con- 
stant pressure data over water areas. 
(3) An airborne psychrometer for deter- 
mining moisture data in the air. 
c. Good, detailed aircraft weather reports, 
in areas similar to the Antarctic where 
normal fixed weather reporting installations 
are not available are absolutely required for 
efficient and safe aircraft operation. 
5. Weather Reports from Outside Sources. 
The basic plan for obtaining weather 
reports from outside sources is satisfactory. 
6. Distribution of Meteorological Person- 
nel. 
a. The basic plan for the distribution of 
meteorological personnel is satisfactory. 
b. A similar plan for the USAAF, Air 
Weather Service, would set up types of 
stations and/or sections for each installation. 
7. Radar and Radio Meteorological Pro- 
gram. 
The basic plan for the radar and radio 
meteorological program is satisfactory, 
8. Transmission of Weather Reports. 
It is believed that the USAAF, Airways 
and Air Communications Service’s handling 
of weather reports as “scheduled transmis- 
sions” and using the operational priority desig- 
nation for “special” weather reports make for 
a more efficient weather reports collection. 
300 9. Hand Punch Card Program. 
The basic plan for entering all weather 
observations on the WBAN punch cards as 
soon as practicable after each observation is 
satisfactory. 
10. Equipment and Supplies. 
a. The basic plan to furnish, automati- 
cally, sufficient equipment and supplies for the 
expected period of operation is satisfactory. 
b. It is recommended that all equipment 
be checked prior to departure from the 
United States so that all programs, such as 
the taking of rawin observations as set 
forth in paragraph 1c of section I, wifi not 
be interrupted, as indicated in paragraph 3. 
c. It is recommended that items such as 
office furniture be prefabricated and packed 
for assembly prior to departure from the 
United States. 
d. It is recommended that special sup- 
ports for the installation of weather equip- 
ment on an ice surface be developed and 
provided prior to departure from the United 
States. 
e. Meteorological equipment and supplies 
to be used by trail parties in making surface 
observations should be assembled and packed 
prior to leaving the United States. The 
packages should be as compact and as light 
as practicable and should contain full instruc- 
tions to the observers. 
/. Except as indicated above, standard 
meteorological equipment and supplies as 
issued by the Signal Corps and as used by 
the Air Weather Service in Arctic areas are 
satisfactory in an operation of this type. 
11. Amendments to Original Operational 
Plans. 
a. In an operation of this type, it would be 
expected that amendments to the original 
operational plan would be necessary, but 
these should be kept to a minimum. 
b. The using of cargo ships, after unload- 
ing operations are completed, as semi-fixed 
weather observing stations making surface 
and upper air observations should be con- 
sidered in the original plan. 
301 Figure 290. Synoptic chart, 2 January 1947, 1200Z. 
302 AZIMUTHAL ftOlWSTAHT HKXIICTIOM 
Figure 291. Synoptic chart, 3 January 1947, 0000Z. 
303 Figure 292. Synoptic chart, 3 January 1947, 1200Z. 
304 Figure 293. Synoptic chart, 4 January 1947, 0000Z. 
305 Figure 294. Synoptic chart, 4 January 1947, 1 200Z. 
306 Figure 295. Synoptic chart, 5 January 1947, 0000Z. 
307 Figure 296. Synoptic chart, 5 January 1947, 1 200Z. 
308 Figure 297. Synoptic chart, 6 January 1947, 0000Z. 
309 Figure 298. Synoptic chart, 6 January 1947, 1200Z. 
310 Figure 299. Synoptic chart, 7 January 1947, 0000Z. 
311 Figure 300. Synoptic chart, 25 January 1947, 0000Z. 
312 Figure 301. Synopfic chart, 25 January 1947, 1200Z. 
765274—48 21 
313 Figure 302. Synoptic chart, 26 January 1947, 0000Z. 
314 A/IMUTHM. /OOIO**TM«T WOJICTIO* 
Figure 303. Synoptic chart, 26 January 1947, 1200Z. 
315 Figure 304. Synoptic chart, 27 January 1947, 0000Z. 
316 Figure 305. Synoptic chart, 27 January 1947, 1200Z. 
317 «iiw/TMM. sqihmtmt moj tenon 
Figure 306. Synoptic chart, 28 January 1947, 0000Z. 
318 AZIMUTHAL iQUIOtSTAMT PAO-ICCTKJ* 
Fisure 307. Synoptic chart, 9 February 1947, 1200Z, 
319 Figure 308. Synoptic chart, 10 February 1947, 0000Z. 
320 MIMUTHAl fQOlWlTAHT WOJICTKJ* 
Figure 309. Synoptic chart, 10 February 1947, 1200Z. 
765274—48 22 
321 11 February 1947 
Time 0000 Z / 
• xMiVele rut-lo. 
Figure 310. Synoptic chart, 11 February 1947, 0000Z. 
322 Figure 311. Synoptic chart, 11 February 1947, 1200Z. 
323 CHAPTER 12 
ANTARCTIC PLAN FOR SCIENTIFIC 
EXPLORATION 
SECTION I. Approaches to the Antarctic 
1. Abstract. 
This chapter reviews the importance of the 
Antarctic as a modern scientific laboratory 
and points out that the answers hidden in the 
mysteries to be solved here are important to 
our present society and to our future military 
endeavors. During the recent Operation 
Highjump, and while returning from it by 
way of New Zealand and Australia, the 
realization that the Antarctic was important 
was transposed into three plans for more com- 
plete scientific utilization of this finest of 
natural scientific laboratories. 
2. Origin of Plans. 
Several new concepts 1 were formulated by 
the authors during their participation in the 
operations of project Highjump.2 One of 
the most prominent of these was that the era 
has been reached in which it is time to cease 
the classical or adventurous exploration 
which taught the character and extent of 
Antarctica and to begin the scientific ex- 
ploitation of the Continent and its surround- 
ing waters. It is appreciated that this change 
is due primarily to the advent of the new 
methods and tools that modern science and 
engineering have made available and to the 
requirements of science, engineering, and 
society. Operation Highjump conclusively 
demonstrated this change in aspect. Every 
endeavor pointed to the fact that good work 
could be accomplished, and that the results 
were here to be obtained if the proper organ- 
ization, equipment, methods, and analyses 
were to be had. The great majority of the 
things needed are available. They need 
only to be gathered, organized, and directed, 
not necessarily by explorers, but by modern 
science. 
Another concept of prominence that grew 
during the operations was that aircraft, 
ice breakers, and vehicles were now existent 
for the rapid, systematic, scientific recon- 
naissance of the Antarctic. As an example 
of this, it is pointed out that a few flights 
by appropriately equipped and manned 
VLR reconnaissance aircraft based in either 
New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, or 
South America could accomplish more in 
scientific reconnaissance and mapping than 
all of the previous Antarctic expeditions. In 
fact, these aircraft could fly from Australia, 
1 The opinions expressed and the plans formulated in this 
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent 
those of the Army, the AAF, the United States Navy, or any 
agency of the United States Government. 
2 Dr. Paul A. Siple. WDGS, R&D. Dr. Siple is one of the 
world’s recognized foremost experts on the Antarctic, having 
participated in the three previous Byrd Antarctic expeditions. 
Dr. Siple was specifically requested by Admiral Byrd to be his 
advisor on polar matters for this expedition. He was desig- 
nated senior War Department Observer on Operation 
Highjump. 
Robert N. Davis, Operations Analyst, Strategic Air Com- 
mand. Widely experienced through the war in airborne radar 
and in the utilization of scientific equipment for military opera- 
tions. Requested by Admiral Byrd to be his scientific aide 
during this expedition. 
324 map the interior of the continent never 
before seen by man, and return to Australia. 
Use of the flight strip on Maquarie Island 
presently being installed by the Australian 
Government would bring the entire Antarc- 
tic Plateau within the range of currently 
flying B-29 photo reconnaissance aircraft. 
It is pointed out that newly created 
United States tools, i. e., ice breakers, 
VLR aircraft, small reliable aircraft, tracked 
vehicles, and “know-how” can take the 
isolation away from the Antarctic. The 
very long range aircraft can take into, and 
return from, the heretofore remote bases, 
first rate scientists, the value of whose time 
is so great as to preclude their remaining in 
isolation for long periods. The men and 
equipment can be taken in throughout the 
entire year, not just during a few frantically 
rushed summer months. The ability to 
communicate readily from base to base and 
from the bases to the “outside” world 
creates the possibility of “round table” 
radio coordination for the more complete 
utilization of ideas and equipment, and for 
rapid reporting and planning. Coordinated 
effort between large, long range aircraft and 
small aircraft makes feasible the rapid ex- 
ploration of areas previously unexplorable or 
approachable only through the most tedious 
and hazardous ground methods. Small air- 
craft (Army L-5 and L-l 3 types) have dem- 
onstrated their rugged ability to operate 
from very small areas of rough ice and snow 
surfaces. And while they have limited range, 
they can be air-stowed and supplies can be 
parachuted to them. The combination of 
large and small aircraft gives great range 
with the small operating area advantage. 
Ground control techniques and mapping 
methods are now available for the systematic 
documentation of the features of Antarctic 
by combined air-ground surveys. This is 
very important to the tabulation of the 
mineral wealth and its availability. 
A third important concept developed 
through a series of discussions with the 
scientists and statesmen of New Zealand and 
Australia.3 Prominent among these men 
and agencies were Dr. Marsden, CSIR, and 
Prime Minister Peter Frazer of New Zealand, 
Sir Douglas Mawson, Drs. White, Brown, 
Hooke, and Cotton, and the NRC and 
DSIR, of Australia. This third concept 
was that the scientific answers to be gleaned 
from the Antarctic belonged to the world, 
and further that these answers could best be 
obtained by the scientists of the world work- 
ing together. A good example of the joint 
effort needed is that of aircraft. The United 
States has the aircraft; New Zealand and 
Australia have the bases from which to fly 
them. New Zealand and Australia have 
men vitally interested and wise in the ways 
of the Antarctic; the United States has ice 
breakers, instruments, and scientific know- 
how. Real science is an international part 
of mankind, not the exploitations by any 
one group of men. 
At the time that the before-mentioned 
discussions were taking place, Great Britain 
had four bases established in the Falkland 
Island Dependency. New Zealand was ac- 
tively planning an expedition to the South 
Magnetic Polar area to establish magnetic 
and cosmic ray stations to be maintained 
through one sunspot cycle (approximately 
11 years). Australia was developing equip- 
ment and techniques for an expedition to 
3 Dr. Siple and Mr. Davis left Little America with the base 
group aboard the U. S. G. G. G. Burton Island to traverse the 
ice pack, then transferred to the U. S. S. Mount Olympus to 
travel to Wellington, New Zealand. Air travel from New 
Zealand to United States by way of Australia was directed by 
the War Department. 
Several days were spent in Wellington and Auckland con- 
ferring with government officials and scientists. The trip from 
Auckland to Sydney, Australia, was via BOAG flying boats. 
Approximately 2 weeks were spent in Sydney, Adelaide, and 
Melbourne conferring with the Australian scientists, engineers, 
and government officials. Flight from Sydney to Washington, 
D. C., was by ANA DG-4 to Fiji, Canton Island, and Hawaii; 
then by ATG C-54 to San Francisco and Washington, D. C. 
325 establish semi-permanent bases within the 
South Magnetic Polar area for atmospheric 
electricity, weather, and magnetic studies. 
South Africa also was planning Antarctic 
scientific studies. A joint British, Norwegian, 
Swedish expedition was being planned, as 
well as Argentinian and Chilean efforts 
toward expeditions and encampments in 
the Antarctic. The systematic planning of 
the scientific studies of importance to be 
gained in the Antarctic, and the fitting of 
various nations’ scientific efforts into this 
plan, could result in an integrated series of 
stations that could cooperate with the already 
established studies of modern science to 
determine the basic phenomena and the 
anomalies occurring within these phenom- 
ena. In contrast to this, the establishment 
of a single station does not necessarily 
separate the basic phenomena from the 
anomalies. 
It was early recognized that one of the 
chief obstacles that must be overcome was the 
situation surrounding the claiming of terri- 
tory with the resultant chaos that is sure to 
result if no definite understandings or agree- 
ments are made before joint endeavors are 
undertaken. It was repeatedly suggested 
that the United Nations Organization might 
be the ultimate answer to this problem; that 
any natural resources could be administered 
by the U. N., that the preservation and utili- 
zation of fish, animals, and natural life, be 
controlled by that organization. A second, 
though less desirable alternative was sug- 
gested—that the nations entering into joint 
scientific endeavors should not use any of the 
aspects of those endeavors as claims in the 
future against the other members partici- 
pating in those same endeavors, and that all 
results obtained by any member would be 
freely disseminated among all participating 
members. 
The military implications of Antarctic re- 
search were recognized, but are not to be 
discussed in this paper because of the obvious 
classification. Many of the aspects of mili- 
tary importance and planning were pre- 
sented after return of the authors to the War 
Department through WDGS, R&DD, Office 
of the Secretary of War, the JRDB, Deputy 
Chief of Air Staff, R&D, and to the 
Commanding General, Strategic Air Com- 
mand. 
SECTION II. The International Scientific Plan 
A joint International Scientific Plan for 
the exploration of the scientific aspects of the 
Antarctic has been proposed.4 Under this 
plan, those nations able and interested in 
taking an active part in the program would 
submit their abilities and their desires to the 
central planning agency which would then 
outline a general program. Each partici- 
pating nation would then join in a conference 
of the delegates to determine the best ap- 
proach and to outline a detailed plan which 
would place the responsibility of accomp- 
lishment of the individual phases upon those 
agencies best able to accomplish it. It is 
suggested that a series of stations be estab- 
lished, one or more stations to be manned and 
managed by each participant with exchange 
members from other stations, or from scien- 
tific establishments, rotated for better analy- 
sis and coordination. Transportation of 
men, equipment, and supplies would best be 
supplied through a central planning pool to 
prevent overlap of effort and to assure the 
fullest possible support of all installations. 
4 The complete plan with the details, principles, and values 
to civilian and military agencies has been deleted from this 
report because of its military classification. 
326 The following are some of the projects 
anticipated. 
1. Radar reconnaissance of the entire 
Antarctic Continent could give the locations 
and general features of all land changes that 
give irregularities or discontinuities in the 
surface. This would allow a very early geo- 
morphological study of the Antarctic Conti- 
nent and indicate those areas in which ex- 
ploration and visual mapping would be most 
valuable. 
2. Airborne magnetometry, in conjunction 
with the radar survey, would contribute a 
great deal to geological studies and would 
further indicate those areas requiring special- 
ized or immediate exploration, photography, 
and mapping. 
3. Systematic aerial reconnaissance and 
mapping of the areas of immediate interest 
would supply the required information for 
the formation of exploratory efforts. 
4. Establishment of stations at critical 
points, such as a South Magnetic Polar sta- 
tion for the basic study of cosmic ray atmos- 
pheric electricity and magnetic phenomena; 
Polar plateau stations to study climatology, 
glaciology, weather, astronomy, physiology, 
biology, and medicine; peripheral stations to 
study biology, glaciology, seismology, min- 
eralogy, physiography, physiology, oceanog- 
raphy, meteorology, climatology, and hy- 
drobiology, in addition to atmosphere, gravi- 
tation, magnetism, atmospheric electricity, 
and medicine. Each of the stations would 
also be able to act as a base for radiating 
parties for emergency rescue, or for studies 
requiring ground contact. 
5. Establishment of a program for the co- 
ordination of mobile studies to determine if 
and where any natural resources may be. 
Some of the new travel equipment that will 
make these endeavors much superior to pre- 
vious expeditions are the new type ice break- 
ers, the long range aircraft for aerial supply, 
the abilities of gliders to land and be snatched 
from many areas, the utilization of small air 
towable aircraft for great mobility at long 
ranges, and some of the newly developed 
tracked type vehicle equipment. 
The current interest of so many nations in 
the same or similar types of studies stresses 
the need for international cooperation and 
joint effort, especially when it is realized 
that the Antarctic contains six million square 
miles of continental mysteries, of which essen- 
tially only a fringe has even been seen by man 
in his hundred years of Antarctic exploration. 
Ideally, the joint international scientific 
exploration would be administered by the 
United Nations Organization, but since that 
organization is not yet ready to function in 
this manner, it is proposed that an English 
speaking condominium be established to 
organize and administer such a plan. 
SECTION! III. Joint Aerial Exploratory Program 
If neither of the before-mentioned pro- 
grams materialize, it is proposed that an 
American airborne program be established 
to make a few trans-Antarctic flights to 
explore and demonstrate the following: 
1. A trans-Antarctic flight from South 
America to New Zealand or Australia would 
demonstrate the ability of United States 
aircraft to fly anywhere. 
2. Some of the greatest geological mys- 
teries of the world lie hidden in the vastness 
of interior Antarctic. Good radar, visual, 
and magnetometric surveys might solve 
these mvsteries. 
327 3. This flight or these flights would demon- 
strate that a route primarily above land from 
the Americas to our friends “down under” 
exists in actuality, and a friendship aspect 
can be demonstrated. 
4. If one of these flights continued on 
around the world, completing the first 
north-south trans-world flight, the strategic 
abilities of American aircraft and techniques 
would be demonstrated as superior to any 
other nation’s. This has important impli- 
cations in prolonging the peace. 
SECTION IV. The Antarctic Is Different 
It is pointed out that the Antarctic is 
greatly different from any other section of 
the earth. This results from the fact that it 
is a great continent with some very great 
heights and perhaps includes the largest 
high level plateau from which the world’s 
coldest weather comes. In the North there 
is the Arctic Ocean which stores the summer 
heat. This summer heat is released in the 
winter months, thus preventing extremely 
low temperatures. In the South air tempera- 
tures high enough to cause melting are a 
rarity even on the hottest days of mid- 
summer. 
SECTION V. Conclusion 
This chapter does not pretend to give a 
complete plan of action, nor does it attempt 
to make complete tabulation of the sciences 
and their aspects that can best be exploited 
in the Antarctic. It endeavors to suggest 
that certain courses are now open to scientific 
exploration, and that the results of appro- 
priate exploration are of prime importance. 
The evaluation of the benefits to be obtained 
can be complete and authoritative only 
when made by consultations with the men 
who are the scientific leaders in their fields. 
328 CHAPTER 13 
COMBINED OBSERVERS' LOG 
This is the combined log of the Army 
observers1 who were assigned to the United 
States Navy’s Task Force 68, Operation 
Highjump, Naval Antarctic Project. The 
Army observers sailed from Norfolk, Vir- 
ginia, on 2 December, 1946 aboard the 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus, Flagship of the 
Task Force, with Rear Admiral Richard H. 
Cruzen in command. 
The personnel serving as War Depart- 
ment observers on this operation, together 
with the agencies they represented, were as 
folows: 
Dr. Paul A. Siple, Research and Develop- 
ment Division, War Department General 
Staff, who also served as assistant and advisor 
to Admiral Richard E. Byrd, in charge of 
the Antarctic project on polar, scientific, 
and technical matters. Doctor Siple joined 
the Mount Olympus in Panama. 
Ft. Col. John N. Davis, Infantry, from the 
Infantry School. 
Ft. Col. Willis S. Johns, Air Corps, AAF 
Communications Services. 
Ft. Col. Robert C. Fove, Medical Corps, 
Office of the Air Surgeon, Headquarters 
Army Air Forces. 
Major James H. Holcombe, Corps of 
Engineers, Office of the Air Engineer, AAF. 
Major Dan Crozier, Medical Corps, Brooke 
Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston. 
Captain Charles H. Harrison, Air Corps, 
Army Air Forces, Air Weather Service. 
Captain Murray A. Wiener, Air Corps, 
AAF Rescue Service, Army Air Forces. 
Chief Warrant Officer, A. J. Morency, 
Corps of Amphibious Engineers. 
Mr. Amory H. Waite, Signal Corps, Fort 
Monmouth, N. J. 
First Sergeant S. A. Fondon, AAF Rescue 
Service, Army Air Forces. 
Mr. Robert N. Davis, Operation Analyst, 
Strategic Air Command, Army Air Forces, 
who served as special radar and scientific 
advisor to Admiral Byrd. 
In addition to the above, four United 
States Army photographers were on the ex- 
pedition as active participants under Navy 
direction. Two of the four photographers 
were attached to the Central Group. These 
were T/5 John Shimberg and T/5 J. Walters- 
dorf. The other two were T/5 E. Zinberg, 
with the Eastern Group, and T/5 H. C. 
Foster, with the Western Group. 
The U. S. S. Mount Olympus arrived at the 
Panama Canal Zone on 7 December and 
departed on 10 December. While in the 
Zone it made rendezvous with ships from 
the Eastern and Western Groups. Doctor 
Siple joined the Mount Olympus at this point 
on the 9 th. The equator was crossed on 12 
December. On 13 December, while at sea, 
the Army Group had its first official meeting 
to discuss plans for War Department obser- 
1 On the return voyage the Army Observers brought together 
their individual logs and each contributed to the master entries. 
The first portion was summarized by Dr. Siple; however, after 
reaching the ice the contributions are preceded by the name of 
the individual from whose log the notes were taken. This 
combined log as well as the Appendix III Quartermaster Question- 
naire For Navy Task Force 68 were recorded by voice during 
conference onto a magnetic wire recorder loaned by the General 
Electric Company for the purpose. Col. Davis and Capt. 
Harrison were aboard the Yancey and therefore contributed to 
the log only by final checking. The first draft was transcribed 
in Sydney Australia through the courtesy of Mr. Hooke in order 
to expedite editing of the material during the return journey. 
329 vations. During the crossing of the Pacific 
Ocean, daily lectures were held in the ward- 
room for all Task Force officers and observ- 
ers on various plans and objectives of the 
expedition and conditions to be encountered. 
These were attended by all of the Army 
personnel. Several meetings a week were 
held by the Army observers to plan their 
program for observations. This was sum- 
marized before reaching the ice pack so 
that each participant would have a complete 
picture of the observation plan. 
On 21 December the U. S, S. Mount 
Olympus refueled at sea from the U. S. S. 
Canisteo which was accompanying the Mount 
Olympus enroute to the Antarctic. Also ac- 
companying the U. S. S. Mount Olympus was 
the submarine U. S. S. Sennett. On 30 De- 
cember the U. S. S. Mount Olympus reached 
Scott Island. On the same date word was 
received of the loss of a PBM from the 
U. S. S. Pine Island of the Eastern Group. 
At Scott Island a rendezvous was made with 
the U. S. S. Merrick and U. S. S. Yancey. 
The ice pack was entered at 1400 on 31 
December near latitude 68°30' south and 
on the 180th meridian. Before entering the 
ice pack a reconnaissance of ice conditions 
was made by the ice breaker U. S. C. G. 
Northwind and a helicopter flying from that 
ship. Admiral Cruzen transferred to the 
Northwind, which preceded the group into 
the ice pack. Army photographers Walters- 
dorf and Shimberg were transferred to the 
Northwind to photograph the pack ice while 
going through it. By early morning on 1 
January, it was apparent that the ice pack 
was much heavier than had been anticipated. 
The cargo ships Tancey and Merrick and the 
Mount Olympus had all begun to suffer minor 
damages. The Mount Olympus had 11 frames 
on her starboard bow crushed and was 
leaking through minor holes. At this point 
we reached what was later called Frustration 
Lagoon and remained in that vicinity for 
several days because of a propeller that was 
badly bent, necessitating a reduction in 
speed. 
On 2 January an attempt was made to 
move out between several large icebergs and 
large pieces of bay ice. The large ships got 
through fairly well, but the submarine 
Sennett became jammed. On 3 January the 
Northwind had to go back and rescue the 
Sennett and take it back to Scott Island. 
On 4 January the positions of the Tancey, 
Merrick and Mount Olympus became danger- 
ous due to bad visibility and uncontrollable 
drift of the ships in the pack toward large 
icebergs. The Northwind was called back 
to remove these ships to a safe distance from 
the icebergs. On 4 January, while the 
Northwind was still too far away from the 
three ships in danger, the skippers began to 
plan relief methods of their own. There 
was a quantity of explosives on the Merrick 
and Tancey and an effort was made to see 
whether or not these explosives could be 
transferred to the Mount Olympus. Capt. 
Boyd, U. S. M. C., Mr. Perkins, and Dr, 
Siple skied out halfway between the ships 
over the sea ice to prove that this could be 
done. However, the Northwind returned be- 
fore danger became imminent. 
Mr. Waite: 
On 5 January the Northwind returned to 
take the Sennet to Scott Island. At 0200 on 
6 January the Northwind returned to the three 
ships and started on southward through 
heavy pack to a wide open lead 10 miles 
long. We got to 70°36' south, but were 
forced to stop by heavy ice on the south side 
of a lagoon. We then returned to 70°32' 
south, where we remained the rest of the 6th. 
Maj. Crazier: 
A J2F Grumman Duck from the Northwind 
took off on an ice reconnaissance flight to the 
south. 
T/5 Shimberg: 
During this 24-hour period Admiral Cruzen 
330 made six helicopter scouting flights over the 
pack ice. On the 8th we had drifted back 
in the lagoon to a position of 70° 16' south, 
178° 18' west. Dr. H. H. Richardson, Jack 
Perkins, and Dr. Siple skied out onto the bay 
ice where they killed a crab-eater seal for a 
biological specimen and dog food. Choice 
cuts were served as a novelty at the mess. 
Also captured was an oddly marked imma- 
ture Adelie penguin. Dr. H. H. Howe ac- 
companied this party to make dip circle 
measurements of the magnetic field on the 
ice pack away from the disturbing anomalies 
of the ships. Geologists and others also made 
short excursions out onto the pack ice. 
Capt. Wiener: 
On 8 January the J2F Grumman from the 
Northwind made a 150-mile flight south, re- 
porting a solid ice pack for approximately 
40 miles, then loose pack ice. No open water 
was sighted. To date, the Mount Olympus has 
had 17 frames bent in and is taking in quite a 
bit of water. 
Dr. Siple: 
On 9 January the Northwind made an effort 
to scout the pack ice for possible leads to 
take the ships on farther to the south. The 
ships stayed in the same vicinity all day 
drifting nearly 6 miles northward. On this 
date the U. S. S. Philippine Sea, the aircraft 
carrier bringing the R4D planes to the 
Antarctic, left Panama. 
Maj. Crozier: 
On 10 January we got under way at 0900 
and steamed south to southwest for almost 2 
hours until we came to another large lake. 
The PBMs from the Western Group flew 
over but because of poor visibility were able 
to give us practically no pack ice mforma- 
tion. We remained at this lake until visi- 
bility improved and ice conditions changed. 
Dr. Siple: 
Because of the heavy pack ice conditions, 
which were more severe than had ever been 
noted in this vicinity before at this time of 
the year, the PBMs of the Western Group 
were called to the Ross Sea area for recon- 
naissance, from which area they explored 
along the Antarctic Coast south of Australia. 
They arrived in the 10 th and made their 
first flight, but poor visibility prevented 
their observing anything worth while to 
make navigation easier for the ships. 
Capt. Wiener: 
On 10 January we were about 600 miles 
from the Bay of Whales. We sailed approxi- 
mately 30 miles, mostly in circles, making 
good about 6 miles to the southwest. 
Capt. Wiener: 
On 11 January we received good news— 
the missing aircraft was found. The PBM 
was located about 7 o’clock this morning at 
latitude 71°03' south, longitude 98°47' 
west, approximately 10 miles from open 
water. The plane was reported crashed 
and burned with six of nine personnel aboard 
the crashed aircraft still alive. The rescue 
PBM from the Pine Island landed in water 
near the edge of ice. Five survivors walked 
to open water, pulling, on a small sled the 
sixth survivor, whose legs had been burned 
and frozen. Later his legs had to be amputated. 
Mr. Waite: 
At 1100 on the 11 January additional word 
was received that Lt. James Ball from the 
Pine Island in another Martin Mariner PBM 
aircraft had also sighted the lost PBM about 
8 miles in from the edge of the ice, and 35 
miles north of Cape Dart on the tip of 
Thurston Peninsula. Details gathered of the 
crash disclosed that the PBM had entered 
clouds, reducing visibility to zero. The land, 
being only roughly charted, was farther 
north than was indicated on the crew’s map. 
Without warning their wing tip had grazed 
a snow-covered slope and the careening 
plane apparently exploded in midair under 
full power only a few feet off the surface. 
Most of the surviving members of the crew 
were thrown clear of the flame-engulfed 
331 plane about 20 miles from where it had sent 
its last position report on 30 December. 
Tj5 Shimberg: 
We began our journey southward on the 
11th, at 0600. The U. S. S. Mount Olympus 
was stuck 12 times in the first 24 hours. By 
1800 that afternoon we had traveled 20 miles. 
Mr. Waite: 
About 1200 on the 11th two Martin 
Mariners took off from the mother ship 
Currituck about 50 miles north of our position 
to assist us. They were guided to us by our 
radio instructions and by radar observations 
and flew over us at 3:20 p. m. local standard 
time. The planes were identified as B1 and 
B3. One of them flew on each side of the 
course we were following for about 10 miles 
east and west and explored the ice ahead. 
They found loose pack ice at 71°45' south, 
60 miles away, and apparently open water 
150 miles south of that. 
T15 Shimberg: 
By 1200 on 12 January we have traveled 
80 miles in 24 hours at the rate of 6)i knots; 
latitude is 71°46' south. 
Capt. Wiener: 
On 13 January we sailed south all day at 
approximately 6 to 8 knots, through very 
loose pack ice, mostly open water. 
Tj5 Shimberg: 
We are now about 250 miles from the Bay 
of Whales. 
Maj. Crogier: 
It seems that the pack extends farther 
north this year than ever before recorded. 
The previous record was 74°50' south. 
Mr. Waite: 
We bucked through ice during the 13th 
and 14th until 10 p. m.—we had 24-hour 
daylight, of course—when the radar screen 
showed the ice barrier ahead of us at last. 
Capt. Wiener: 
On the 14th we were sailing south of 
the ice pack in fairly open water, pro- 
ceeding through only one small stretch of old 
bay ice. It was reported that we officially 
broke out of the ice pack at 1300 hours today 
at latitude 76°53' south, longitude 179° west. 
T(5 Shim berg: 
The Flag (Adm, Cruzen) was transferred 
today back to the Mount Olympus at 1330. 
Huge icebergs 100 feet high were sighted. 
Mr. Waite: 
Just prior to midnight on the 14th, the out- 
line of the northwestern promontory of the 
Discovery Bay Peninsula was sighted on the 
southern horizon. 
Dr. Siple: 
The tip of Discovery Inlet could be seen 
about 15 miles from the ship. It was first 
picked up by radar and believed to be an 
iceberg. Considerable discussion transpired 
on this point, until proof could be made 
that it was the tip of Discovery Inlet. How- 
ever, to many accustomed to observing the 
sky, the outline of Discovery Inlet was un- 
mistakable as were the shadows of the water 
on the clouds (water sky). This was also 
shown in photographs which were taken at 
this time. 
Observation of the peninsula was confusing 
to most people, for even the radar did not 
pick up the far southern edge of the barrier 
itself until we had steamed some 10 or 15 
miles farther south. We went around the 
tip of the Peninsula until we could see into 
the inlet and discovered that it was filled 
with bay ice and was casting white shadows 
onto the barrier walls. This affected the 
light in the vicinity and made it very diffi- 
cult to see forms. 
Mr. Waite: 
Early on the morning of the 15 th we sailed 
toward the mouth of Discovery Inlet on a 
course of 140° until we could see the barrier 
stretching westward toward South Victoria 
Land. Then we turned back eastward 
around the tip of the peninsula and headed 
toward the Bay of Whales. Forty-eight 
miles to the east we passed Lindberg Inlet, 
taking photographs all the way. The Inlet 
was full of bay ice. We then proceeded to 
332 the Bay of Whales, 85 miles east of Dis- 
covery Inlet. When we arrived at the Bay 
of Whales the larger ships stood by outside 
while the Northwind proceeded into the Bay. 
Official arrival time was 0835 on the 15th. 
When the Northwind had proceeded into the 
Bay and broken ice for approximately 1 
mile to the southwest, Dr. Siple, Com- 
mander McCoy, and Commander Campbell, 
Base Commander, skied up onto the shelf ice 
and sighted the west base (Little America 
III), built by the 1939-41 expedition, and 
then returned to the ship. Their mission 
was to locate a place suitable for unloading 
and to pick a site for the base camp and 
landing field. However, due to overcast 
conditions, visibility was so poor they de- 
sired to repeat the reconnaissance before 
definitely picking the sites. Despite the 
overcast conditions all three had sunburned 
faces when they returned. 
Dr. Siple: 
The Capes of the Bay of Whales were 
nearly closed—only some 600 or 700 feet 
wide. The bay ice covered the entire area 
of the inner lagoon portion of the Bay and 
the Northwind had to break out the ice from 
the very entrance at the capes. This bay 
ice was only 4 or 5 feet thick at the start, but 
as we advanced inward, the ice became 
thicker and apparently much older. Before 
the final work of breaking up the bay ice, the 
Northwind was attacking ice from 12 to 20 
feet thick. This is remarkable in view of the 
fact that this was a much different form of 
ice breaking than out in the pack where the 
ice moves away from the side of the ship. 
The Northwind actually would rise up on top 
of the ice and break it down. The cakes 
would stand up on edge. The bay soon 
filled up with ice, but with the aid of a gentle 
southwest wind most of the ice was carried 
out. When the wind shifted, the ice jammed 
up in the bay so that it made it difficult to 
bring the bigger ships in until there was 
another favorable change in wind direction. 
The Northwind continued breaking up the 
bay ice in the Bay of Whales all during the 
day and night of the 15 th and 16th. 
On the 16th a second party was sent ashore 
as on the first day visibility had been so poor 
that the character of the proposed airstrip 
was indistinct in the white light. 
On this day the shore parties traveled to 
West Base and actually entered the buildings 
and found everything in good condition, 
although they were snowed over up to the 
height of the ventilators and smokestacks. 
On 17 January the Northwind continued to 
break ice. Due to a shift of wind the ice 
stayed in the Bay and made it difficult to 
bring in the other ships. 
At 2300 on the 17th, the Yancey sailed into 
the Bay of Whales, and after considerable 
difficulty was brought up alongside the solid 
bay ice where the Northwind had laid dead- 
men (i. e., anchor in the snow) for her. 
At about 4 a. m. the ship was securely 
anchored and the first shore parties started 
off to reconnoiter passages for vehicles 
through the pressure ice, across cracks, and 
for a suitable slope up the barrier onto the 
shelf ice. A second party under Commander 
Reinhart went up on top of the shelf ice to 
layout the airstrip in a southeasterly direction. 
Captain Boyd and Dr. Siple reconnoitered 
the full length of the first pressure ridge and 
found the best location for a possible crossing. 
Immediately after the first vehicles were 
unloaded, the first bulldozer came over and 
leveled off the area through the pressure ice 
to permit crossings at this point. The second 
crack of a shear type, which had been noted 
to be moving very rapidly, had to be bridged 
in order to get the vehicles across it. 
T/5 Waltersdorf: 
The bridge over the first part of the pres- 
sure ice ridge was completed at approxi- 
mately 1300 in the afternoon of the 18th. 
At that time the first of the vehicles started 
to cross the first ridge. 
333 Dr. Siple: 
Unloading from the Tancey proceeded at 
full pace. The first vehicles put over the 
side were mainly 6-wheel trucks and jeeps 
which could not operate on the snow surface 
and later had to be dragged away by tractors 
to clear the side of the ship. The Weasels 
and tractors worked successfully over the ice 
but were not able to take the initial loads past 
the shear crack until it was bridged. 
T/5 Waltersdorf: 
Before most of the tractors were able to 
cross the first bridge, Captain Boyd super- 
vised the installation of extensions to the 
tractor tracks. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
It was evident at this time that certain 
curtailments of the operation would be ne- 
cessary due to the condition of the icepack 
and the necessity of removing the thin 
hulled ships before it got too heavy. The 
date of retreat was set for approximately 
5 February. 
Dr. Siple: 
On 18 January Dr. Siple had an oppor- 
tunity to take a helicopter flight over the 
Bay of Whales area to reconnoiter the ice 
conditions. It was apparent that the West 
Cape had actually closed against the east 
wall of the Bay and had broken a large 
portion off West Cape land gouged out a 
portion of the eastern wall of the barrier. 
Tremendous pressure closed the central 
portion of the Bay and many new rifts were 
visible. The flight went far enough south- 
ward so that the site of old Little America 
I and II was visible. The radio towers 
were still sticking some 15 to 18 feet out of 
the snow, leaning over perceptibly, and the 
wind generator on one of the towers could 
be seen still turning over. 
Unloading continued as rapidly as possible 
on the 18th and 19th. However, supplies 
began to pile up alongside the ship, as the 
vehicles which were available to handle the 
supplies from the side of the ship were limited. 
This was due primarily to difficult snow con- 
ditions in the vicinity of the first pressure 
ridge and the considerable new bridging 
that had to be made. The second crack 
created quite a problem which was not 
solved until an adequate bridge was put across. 
The first tractors that tried to go up the 
barrier slope were unable to make it except 
for the D~6 tractors which had wooden 
extensions on them. The bulldozers, and 
other vehicles without wooden extensions, 
could not crawl up the side of the barrier, 
Also, at this time it was impossible to bring 
any sleds up the barrier, even with the D-6 
tractors with wooden extensions, with the 
exception of the 1-ton Army sleds. The 
Go-devil sleds could not be hauled on the 
surface at this time because the snow was 
quite soft and sticky. Although there was 
a glazed top on the surface, which made 
skiing very easy for the men, the sleds dug 
through this level and heavy loads could 
not be handled on this soft surface. 
The temperature at this time was about 
27° F. During the first stages of the un- 
loading, the only Army observers present 
were T/5 Waltersdorf and T/5 Shimberg, the 
photographers who stayed with the North- 
wind., and Dr. Siple who was billeted aboard 
the Tancey during this period. The Mount 
Olympus and Merrick were still at sea outside 
the Bay of Whales. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
The 19th Major Holcombe also came into 
the Bay and was billeted aboard the Tancey 
and the actual erection of the tent camp 
started on the night of the 19th. 
Mr. Waite: 
On the 19th a group of observers from the 
Mount Olympus made a trip to Little America 
III with Captain Quackenbush and Captain 
Kosko for the official opening of the old base. 
Those present were Dr. Howard, Mr. James 
334 Balsley, Dr. Siple, Captain Boyd of the 
Marine Corps, Captain Murray Wiener of 
the Air Corps, Lieut. Richardson, Lt. Com- 
mander McCoy, Lt. Commander Dustin, 
Mr. Jack Perkins, and Mr. Waite. This was 
called the official opening in view of the 
fact that photographers were not present on 
the 16th. Pictures were taken of the old 
buildings visited, tunnels were opened up, 
and so forth. By this time the bay had been 
broken out to a depth of 2 miles by the 
Northwind. 
We traveled approximately 3 miles from 
the ship to the camp. On the trip to West 
Base Capt. Wiener, Mr. Waite, and Mr. 
Perkins skied behind the Weasel at a rather 
rapid rate of speed. During this period Jack 
Perkins fell and, although it was not known 
until later, broke his ankle. The snow was 
found to be between 15 and 20 feet deep 
over the buildings at Little America: the 
temperature was — 1° F. inside the building. 
Capt. Wiener: 
Word was received from the U. S. S. 
Pine Island, of the Eastern Group, that they 
had lost their helicopter. Apparently the 
rotor blades iced up and the plane came 
down in the water alongside the ship. There 
were no casualties. 
T/5 Walter sdorj: 
At midnight on the night of the 19th, the 
sun became obscured and the building of the 
tent camp was somewhat hindered by a 
strong wind and drifting snow. 
Map. Crazier: 
The mail closed at midnight on the night 
of 19 January, 
Capt. Wiener: 
Early on the morning of 20 January, the 
U. S. S. Merrick entered the Bay of Whales 
and tied up to the bay ice between the 
Yancey and the west side of the Bay. 
Dr. Siple: 
Both of the ships had their noses pointed 
toward the west side of the Bay and were 
consequently in a difficult position when ice 
later crowded into that corner of the Bay. 
About 1630 the Northwind sailed north to a 
rendezvous with the Philippine Sea, which is 
taking the outgoing mail with her. 
Map. Crazier: 
A seaman named Wordell, 17 years old, 
was accidentally killed on a “sheepsfoof’ 
roller during unloading operations. 
Lt. Col. Love: 
This accident was of the type that might 
have happened on any construction job in 
temperate zones. 
T/5 Waltersdorj: 
On the evening of the 20th about 18 of the 
pyramidal tents were up. An ice box (built 
of snow blocks) 30 by 15 by 7 feet was under 
construction at the base camp. 
Mr. Waite: 
On this date a world-wide radio black-out, 
caused by natural phenomena, cut off com- 
munications with the United States for a 
period of 24 hours. 
Capt. Wiener: 
On 21 January Dr. Howe and Lt. Richard 
Byrd, Jr., located the old absolute magnetic 
house at west base, covered over with 7 feet 
of snow. They decided it would not be 
advisable to utilize this building for the pur- 
poses of making magnetic observations. 
Lt. Col. Love: 
Today it was announced that, beginning 
tomorrow, regular shuttle boats will operate, 
and all who desire can go ashore. Depar- 
ture will be at 8 a. m. and return will be at 
4:30 p. m. 
Capt. Wiener: 
Captain Murray Wiener was ordered 
ashore today to work with Commander 
Reinhart and the Seabee personnel setting 
up the base camp. 
Sgt. London: 
Approximately 0930 hours on this date, 
Sergeant London moved ashore with the 
sled dogs and all sled equipment. Several 
335 hours were spent in harnessing the dogs to 
the sleds and moving to the top of the bar- 
rier ice. Twenty-seven adult sled dogs were 
moved to the base camp. The area picked 
to tether the dogs was about one-fourth 
mile west of the base camp. We had four 
small puppies along with this group, ap- 
proximately four cargo sleds, and one man- 
hauling sled. 
Mr. Waite: 
Dr. Siple, Dr. Howard, and Mr. Waite, on 
skiis, accompanied by Lt. Ellis and Cor- 
respondent Sparks, on foot, proceeded to 
the 1929 Byrd Expedition marker on top 
of Haycock Point, on the south cape of 
Floyd Bennet Inlet. From there they con- 
tinued approximately 2 miles farther to the 
mouth of Seal Canyon where 200 seals were 
examined for brand marks made by the 
biologist of the 1934 Byrd Expedition. 
Dr. Siple: 
Near this point there was a large rift in 
the west side of the barrier wall of the Bay 
of Whales, It was named Seal Canyon 
because of the great concentration of seals 
in this area. From the air it had been 
observed that nearly 50 percent of all the 
seals in the Bay were concentrated in that 
region in a position that might be very 
difficult for them to get out of. This rift 
had sheer walls starting at 25 to 50 feet 
high, running to over 100 feet high, running 
back into the shelf ice about three-fourths 
of a mile. 
Capt. Wiener: 
The second accident in the unloading 
operations occurred today, resulting in a 
finger amputation of a sailor from the U. S. S. 
Merrick. 
Sgt. London: 
The killing of Weddell seals for dog food 
began on the 21st. Each day, for 1 week 
thereafter, a seal was killed; later we began 
feeding one seal every third day. 
Tj5 Walter sdorf: 
At 1432 on 21 January the Mount Olympus 
threw ashore its first mooring lines to the 
Bay ice. Unloading of the JA-1 Norseman air- 
plane, coal, and supplies began immediately. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On this date a sea leopard was seen and 
killed by Captain Kosco, It is very unusual 
to discover a sea leopard in this area, as it is 
far from its natural habitat, which is normally 
out in the ice pack. 
Dr. Siple: 
Animal life in the Bay of Whales was quite 
conspicuous by its absence. Very few whales 
were seen in the Bay. Only one or two were 
reported during the entire time we were in 
that vicinity. Skua gulls were present at all 
times. The Snowy Petrel and Antarctic 
Petrel were extremely scarce in the Bay of 
Whales in comparison to their almost con- 
stant presence in former years. Wilson 
Petrels and Southern Fulmars were absent 
entirely. Penguins were also very scarce. 
Five Emperors were found molting in the 
Bay upon arrival, and these were about the 
only Emperors that were seen during the 
entire stay. A few Adelie penguins were 
found but they also were very scarce. Ap- 
parently the narrowness of the entrance to 
the Bay made it much less attractive to ani- 
mal life, but the Weddell seals were there in 
full concentration because that is their per- 
manent home. Crab-eater seals usually 
found at the mouth of the Bay were also 
almost entirely absent. 
Li. Col. Love: 
A few of the Army observers who had not 
previously been ashore on special missions 
were given permission to go ashore in the 
shuttle boat on this date, 22 January. The 
day was spent ashore in looking over the 
base camp and becoming oriented. They 
returned to the Mount Olympus, which in the 
meantime had entered the Bay and was tied 
336 up to the ice by the end of the day. The 
observers found that the plans had been 
changed and starting with the next day the 
Army observers were authorized to move 
ashore and quarter at the base camp. 
Alaj. Holcombe: 
On the 22d, the last of the tents for the 
200-man tent camp was erected. Later on 
a few more odd tents were erected around 
base operations. 
Tf5 Shimburg: 
The Norseman (JA) took off on its initial 
flight, equipped with skis. Lt. Comdr. 
McCoy was pilot, Comdr. Campbell, C. O. 
Base Camp, was co-pilot. 
Capt. Wiener: 
The first of the emergency equipment for 
the emergency camp was moved to the West 
Base (Little America III). Also on this date 
the flag route was laid between the base 
camp and the WestBase (site of the emergency 
camp). Prior to moving the first load of 
emergency equipment to the West Base, Dr. 
Siple, Capt. Boyd of the Marine Corps, and 
Capt. Wiener went out to establish the most 
suitable site for the twin Quonset huts which 
were to house a portion of the emergency 
camp. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
On the 23d the erection of the Quonset 
hut at base operations was started. Most of 
the supplies which were unloaded this day 
went to the “airdale” cache at base opera- 
tions and to the Seabee cache in the main 
camp. By this time the “Go-devil” sleds 
were hauling all supplies, being pulled from 
the ship’s side to the bottom of the barrier 
by D-6 tractors without track extensions. 
They were then winched to the top of the 
barrier and from there were pulled by D-6 
tractors with track extensions to the proper 
cache. 
Capt. Wiener: 
Information has been received that a sec- 
ond helicopter has been lost, this accident 
taking place alongside the Philippine Sea (air- 
craft carrier), yesterday. 
Mr. Davis: 
The Sikorsky R5 (Navy designated HL3F) 
helicopter that went into the water from the 
Philippine Sea made a normal take-off after 
proper warm up with full engine power and 
complete control. The helicopter hovered 
above the foredeck of the Philippine Sea for 
several minutes checking stability and con- 
trol. Slowly it turned toward the “island” 
(aircraft carrier’s superstructure) and then 
started a run across the deck toward No. 2 
elevator. The helicopter was under good 
control at that time and flying on the air 
layer trapped between the rotors and the 
deck. Upon approaching the side of the 
carrier it ran into a down draft that was 
coming from the starboard side of the deck, 
sweeping across the deck and going down 
the port side. With this down draft and 
loss of lift, due to the loss of the ground or 
deck layer of air, the helicopter dropped 
rapidly until its wheels were submerged in 
the water. The helicopter rose a few feet 
above the water. This time the pilot decided 
that it was appropriate to ditch the heli- 
copter, which he did by breaking the blades 
through tipping. The three men escaped 
very rapidly with no resultant casualties. 
The men were in the water for about 17 
minutes, one of them becoming very badly 
chilled and requiring medical aid to revive 
him after he was received aboard the Philip- 
pine Sea. The accident happened while the 
Philippine Sea was under normal cruising con- 
ditions. 
Mr. Waite: 
The Northwind en route to rendezvous 
with the Philippine Sea, reported that 350 
miles of open water lay between the Bay of 
Whales and the southern edge of the ice pack. 
Tj5 Waltersdorf: 
On the second flight of the Norseman by 
Lt. Gomdr. McCoy, an iceberg was seen 
337 floating toward the mouth of the Bay of 
Whales. 
Mr. Waite: 
As this berg proceeded toward the mouth 
of the Bay of Whales, it was decided that it 
would be necessary to remove the three 
ships, since there might be possible danger. 
The Mount Olympus immediately sounded a 
warning whistle and let go its mooring 
lines, leaving the edge of the Bay ice at 
approximately 11:45 p. m, on the 23rd, 
followed shortly afterward by the Tancey. 
The Merrick was the last ship to break its 
moorings at 0330 hours. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
The iceberg eventually drifted into the 
spot previously occupied by the Merrick, 
which showed that the evacuation of the 
ships was wise. 
Dr. Siple: 
This iceberg was of particular interest in 
view of the fact that it was a section of shelf 
ice foot, because of its shape of one high side 
and one low side. The berg appeared 
ominous and much larger than it really was 
because it advanced into the Bay with its 
high side toward the ships, and appeared to 
occupy nearly half the width of the opening. 
It was also peculiar in the sense that it had a 
different color than any of the typical Ross 
Shelf icebergs. It was much more of a 
blue-green color and appeared to be com- 
posed of extremely dense ice, although no 
samples could be taken. 
Maj. Crazier: 
The first meal at the base camp mess hall 
was served on the evening of 23 January. 
This involved the beginning of ice melting 
operations which were carried on in an im- 
provised shelter adjoining the mess hall. On 
this date the Army observation group were 
located as follows: Lt. Col. Love, Mr. Waite, 
Maj. Crozier, T/5 Shimberg, T/5 Walters- 
dorf, Capt. Harrison, and Sgt. London were 
located on the ice. Dr. Siple, Major Hoi- 
combe, and Capt. Wiener were on the 
Tancey. Lt. Col. Davis was on the Merrick 
and Lt. Col. Johns on the Mount Olympus. 
Mr, Davis was on the Philippine Sea and 
G. W. O. Morency on the Cacapon, which 
was headed for rendezvous with the Philip- 
pine Sea. When the Mount Olympus, Tancey, 
and Merrick left the ice late on the evening 
of 23 January and early on the morning of 
the 24th, due to ice conditions, Capt. 
Wiener and Major Holcombe were caught 
on the ice along with a large number of 
other people, but everyone was taken care of 
without difficulty, 
Mr. Waite: 
As the order was given for the Mount 
Olympus to leave the Bay ice, all lines but one 
were cast free. Finally she pushed against 
the bow line to swing her stern out away 
from the ice and when her stern was swung 
far enough to give her a chance to move 
backward, her bow line was let go. She 
then backed out until she was in the clear 
water of the Bay and then swung her bow 
around and stood by pointing northward. 
A few minutes later the second ship, Tancey, 
cast loose all of its lines but one and at- 
tempted the same maneuver, but found her- 
self unable to move because of the pieces of 
Bay ice that were floating around her. 
Eventually she attempted to get a line 
around over the Bay ice to join to another 
line that was brought ashore from the 
Mount Olympus with the idea in mind of 
being towed to sea that way. But that line 
eventually parted and was hauled back to 
both ships in two separate pieces. Eventu- 
ally, the LCM heavy duty landing craft 
maneuvered into position through the Bay 
ice and by first pushing aside the ice and 
then pushing the stern of the ship away from 
the Bay ice managed to maneuver her into 
a position from which she could back freely 
into open water. The Merrick was freed in 
a similar manner. 
338 Capt. Wiener: 
On 24 January there was a south wind 
blowing all day long which eventually 
cleared the Bay of all the loose ice. This 
afternoon the Mount Olympus, Tancey, and 
Merrick returned to their berths alongside 
the ice in the Bay of Whales. 
Mr. Waite: 
On 24 January the temperature was +18° 
F. The wind was 10 miles an hour from the 
south. It was warm all day. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
On the night shift of the 24th the Seabees 
started laying pierced steel planks on a test 
strip 150 feet wide and by morning they had 
laid 75 linear feet on undisturbed snow. 
Mr. Waite: 
That night at about 10 p. m. Dr. Siple, 
Lt. Roscoe, Correspondent Sullivan, and 
Mr, Waite checked a base line from West 
Base (Little America III) toward Little 
America II, traveling approximately 1% 
miles due south, putting down flags every 
200 yards; whereupon a 1-mile long line of 
closely spaced flag was laid due westward 
to the pressure ice in the bay in an attempt 
to find an old bamboo marker left by the 
1939-41 Expedition. When that proved 
impossible the group returned to the 1 %-mile 
point south of West Base and proceeded on a 
southwest course in an attempt to find mark- 
ers near the old camp of Little America II. 
They eventually found the marker at a high 
point on the shelf surface half a mile north 
of the depression in which Little America 
I and II were located. 
Dr. Siple: 
This was a high point of the entire barrier 
area, and from this point West Base camp, the 
tent camp, and the ships in the bay could 
also be seen. We went down to the old 
Little America site and visited the remnants 
which protruded from the snow, but did not 
make an attempt to dig into an entrance. 
In addition to the rotating wind generator, 
two other observations were of particular 
interest. Several Skua Gulls were sitting 
patiently on a little knoll like sentinels 
awaiting our arrival. The other was the 
fact that we arrived on the very last day 
before the final disappearance of the last 
visible indications on the surface of the 
Science Building of Little America II. The 
rim of the smokestack was exactly flush with 
the snow surface with a 3-inch depression 
like a golf cup down into the snow-filled 
stack. (The next blizzard covered this com- 
pletely.) During this trip on the night of the 
24th the temperature reached a new low of 
+ 10° F. A strong breeze from the south- 
east made conditions extremely uncomfort- 
able. The breeze was strong enough to 
drift snow lightly over the surface but did 
not restrict visibility. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
On the 25th, 75 more linear feet of the 
150-foot test strip was laid. This time the 
pierced steel plank was laid on burlap which 
had been laid directly on undisturbed snow. 
Mr. Davis: 
Late on the afternoon of the 25th the load- 
ing of the Northwind by the Philippine Sea was 
going ahead fairly well under rough weather 
conditions and bad roll. Later that night 
the destroyer Bronson came alongside to dis- 
charge mail and a patient. 
(Throughout the preparation of this log, 
C. W. O. Morency, who had kept a good log 
of his adventures on the Cacapon, was eagerly 
awaiting the time when his log could be 
integrated with that of the chronological 
story of the main group of Army observers. 
He started to relate the following story 
slightly ahead of schedule. It was so color- 
fully told that it was recorded unbeknown 
to him.) 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
This area looks like the Tropics. We got 
into the Captain’s gig and went over to the 
“Airdale”. I talked to the Admiral (Byrd) 
339 for a few minutes and then went back down 
again. Our gig failed. The Northwind sent 
over their gig and we went back on our ship 
again. While we were fueling the Sennett, 
the Northwind was taking 80 tons of equip- 
ment from the Philippine Sea. 
The morning of the 26th at 0200—beauti- 
ful scene-—no ice around at all. [“Was that 
the day you transferred?” asked Dr. Siple.] 
No, that was not the day I transferred. I 
transferred the next day. The Captain 
wanted a bridge player and he didn’t want 
to let me go that day. About 1600 in the 
afternoon the wind started to come up and 
there was a 30-knot wind, and the old 
Northwind was doing hand springs. It hit 
the Cacapon three or four times and the 
Captain told the Captain of the Northwind 
that if he did not keep a straight course that 
he would refuse to refuel her, which he did. 
They refueled the next day and that was 
when I went over in a bucket. It was 
rough, I tell you. They said if I did not keep 
still they would duck me in that water a 
couple of times. I finally got on the North- 
wind and by the time I got to the Northwind 
they were transferring mail from the Philip- 
pine Sea to the Cacapon. Incidentally, my 
mail went to the States and I came over 
here. [“Was there a fog?” asked Mr. Waite.] 
No, there was no fog. The Northwind went 
out as soon as they got hold of those two 
planes they ducked in the water, and scouted 
the ice pack and then they came back 
again out of the ice pack. 
Mr. Davis (Mr. Davis continues the de- 
scription of activity aboard the Philippine 
Sea.): 
On the morning of the 24th the R4D’s 
were ready to go but the weather and the 
position of the Philippine Sea were such 
that the planes could not be launched. 
Early the morning of the 26th, survivors 
from the PBM came aboard from the 
Bronson. The weather that day was so 
rough that no more transfers could be made 
from the Philippine Sea to the Northwind. 
On the following day, which was the 27th, 
the two OY’s were transferred. These OY’s 
had been stripped of their wings and empen- 
nage, which were crated, and the fuselages 
were left as they were. During the transfer 
of the OY’s one of them was first slightly 
dunked and then very badly immersed 
when the Northwind rolled violently toward 
the Philippine Sea. Some of the movie film 
was lost during the transfer but very little 
baggage was lost. Several items of baggage 
were badly dunked, however. The remain- 
der of the cargo was transferred early on the 
27th, the Philippine Sea then taking on fuel 
from the Cacapon until late that night. The 
position of the Philippine Sea during this time 
was maintained mostly by radar around 
three big characteristic icebergs. There was 
an absolute calm on the 28th with a heavy 
fog most of the day. In the evening a 
strange, weird beauty was lent to the scenery 
as the bergs turned to a deep blue-green 
color in the placid brown water. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
At this time Chief Warrant Officer 
Morency is on board the Northwind en route 
to Little America. 
Tj5 Shimberg: 
On 25 January, at Little America, a new 
crevasse was found on the top of the barrier 
along the tractor trail where the transfer of 
a big generator for the G. P. N. (radar), 
was being accomplished. 
T{5 Waltersdorf: 
At the rendezvous point the Sennett has 
completed refueling. She will return home 
by way of Wellington, New Zealand, and 
Tahiti. Admiral Cruzen has given up hope 
of taking her into the pack ice again. 
Maj. Crogier: 
The temperature on 25 January was 
-|-130 F. with a 22- to 24-knot wind. 
340 Mr. Waite: 
During the afternoon of the 26th Dr. 
Howard and Mr, Waite went out to the 
pressure ice looking for ice samples. During 
this 4 mile trip on skis the temperature was 
15° above zero F., and the wind was 15 
miles an hour. Very cold. 
Maj. Crozier: 
Today at 1500 the first formal church 
service ever held on the Antarctic Continent 
was conducted at the base camp mess hall 
by Chaplain Menster. 
Dr. Siple: 
On the 26th, Dr. Siple moved ashore and 
during the period of the unloading one of his 
activities was to measure the ice movement 
in the Bay of Whales. On the sheer crack 
where the second bridge was located, there 
was considerable movement east and west. 
One side remained still in relation to the 
east side of the barrier, while the other side 
of the bay ice moved at a steady pace of 
approximately 4.4 feet per day. One inter- 
esting feature of this crack was that as it 
sheared, all the loose debris was thrown up 
onto the surface to form a type of pressure 
ridge. This is really a false type of pressure 
ridge because it is not formed by typical 
pressure that would form anticlines and 
synclines. The motion is longitudinal slip- 
page along a crack which throws brash ice 
up onto the surface, forming a ridge over the 
crack. This ridge can be shoveled clear, 
exposing the active crack below. There is 
no form of this ice, as far as is known, thrown 
down under due to the shearing action. 
Capt. Wiener: 
At 1800 hours on 26 January supplies 
started moving out in bulk toward the 
emergency camp at West Base. Great quan- 
tities of Quonset hut materials, food, Diesel 
oil, and radio parts were moved out between 
1800 on 26 January and 0600 on 27 January. 
It was during this time that a “blizzard” was 
blowing and it was necessary to form a cara- 
van of 4 cats, 2 Weasels, and approximately 
15 men who had waited at Little America 
for 2 hours to let the blizzard blow over a 
little, until it was possible to pick our way 
back from Little America to the base camp 
from flag to flag along the route laid several 
days previously. 
On 27 January at 0700 the Yancey, Merrick, 
and Mount Olympus went out to sea due to 
flow ice’s moving into the bay and because 
of the strong wind that was blowing at the 
time. Practically all activity around the 
base camp and on the ice was curtailed, due 
to the fact that most of the working personnel 
who were standing shifts on the ice had gone 
out to sea with the three ships. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
On the 28th the wind was still high and 
the ships remained outside. At 2145, 33 ad- 
ditional Seabees were taken ashore as a 
work party. The Quonset hut at the air- 
strip is now complete. 
On 29 January work was started on the 
double Quonset hut at Little America. 
Lt. Col. Love: 
By evening of the 29th the weather had 
become clear and cold, and at this time the 
decision was made to give the planes on the 
aircraft carrier their call to fly to the base. 
Gomdr. Campbell sent this message at about 
2000 in the evening. 
Mr. Davis: 
The first R4D take-off ever to be made 
from a carrier was accomplished by Comdr. 
Hawks at 2214 on the night of 29 January. 
The greatest surprise of this take-off was the 
performance of the aircraft, which came out 
so exactly to the figures set forth by the 
Bureau of Aeronautics that no one could 
believe it at first. The take-off looked very 
good and led to a great deal of confidence in 
the next take-off. The second airplane fol- 
lowed the first one almost immediately. The 
other four aircraft started their take-offs early 
on the morning of the 30th, No. 6 getting off 
341 of the deck about 0730. All of the take-offs 
were made with Jato. None of the planes 
would have needed the Jato. Several of 
the pilots used the Jato primarily as a safety 
aid in case of engine failure during the take- 
off run. Some of the pilots, however, turned 
their Jato on during standstill. One of the 
aircraft, having left his brakes in position, 
caused a great deal of excitement as his 
Jato burned away and no motion of the 
airplane resulted. Upon release of the brakes 
the airplane appeared to jump into the air. 
There was a relatively good wind especially 
for the early take-off, the wind running to 
approximately 30 knots. The relative wind 
over the deck was approximately 42 to 45 
knots for the first take-off. The landings at 
the base were made with little trouble 
except for No. 5 airplane, whose pilot al- 
lowed his plane to stop before he started his 
turn back to the base at which time the 
skis froze to the surface and could not be 
moved. 
No. 6 airplane had navigation difficulty 
involving some radio failure and turned in 
the wrong direction upon reaching the 
barrier. No. 5 airplane stayed in the air 
approximately 2 hours searching up and 
down the barrier trying to make radio con- 
tact and locate airplane No. 6. Except for 
that, the mission was an unqualified success. 
During the time that No. 6 was trying 
to maintain radio communication and pro- 
claimed a state of emergency to exist, the 
“Gibson Girl” was broken out and Lt. 
Stine operated it while taking pictures of 
the pack. This emergency procedure al- 
lowed the Northwind to get into contact with 
that airplane and help them to orient 
themselves, flying more directly toward the 
ice barrier than they otherwise would have 
done. 
No. 5 aircraft landed within half an hour 
of its fuel exhaustion point. No. 6 aircraft, 
in the meantime, had located itself, being 
west of Discovery Inlet, and had turned and 
come up the barrier until it reached the Bay of 
Whales, at which time it landed immediately. 
Bob Davis came ashore from the Philippine 
Sea with No. 5 R4D. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On the morning of 30 January, the weather 
having cleared, the U. S. S. Merrick returned 
and tied up to the ice, followed by the Mount 
Olympus, which was unable to moor to the 
ice as the break-off of the bay ice had floated 
away the deadmen that were previously 
used. These would have to be replaced. As 
a result, all personnel desiring to go ashore 
were put over the side and taken ashore in 
small boats. 
Capt. Wiener: 
The arrival of the first R4D from the 
U. S. S. Philippine Sea occurred at 0515 hours 
30 January, this airplane having on board 
Adm. Byrd with Comdr. Hawkes as pilot. 
The temperature at this time, the lowest 
recorded to date, was —1° F., with a slight 
breeze. 
The actual landing of the first two aircraft 
was within a very few minutes of their 
E. T. A. as given on their departure. 
Mop. Holcombe: 
The planes that came in had a combination 
ski and wheel landing gear which required 
35 to 40 inches of mercury to keep moving. 
One of the planes stopped and was unable 
to start moving under its own power. 
Mr. Davis: 
The R4D’s “homed” into the Mount 
Olympus very soon after take-off from the 
Philippine Sea, with the exception of No. 6 
aircraft, which had radio trouble. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
The second flight of R4D’s arrived in 
Little America at approximately 1220 on 30 
January. Approximately 45 minutes later 
the first airplane of the third flight appeared 
on the horizon, but due to the trouble en- 
countered by his flying mates in airplane 
No. 6, he turned and made a reconnaissance 
342 flight of approximately 2 hours to try to help 
the other airplane in. Therefore, the third 
flight of R4D’s did not land until approxi- 
mately 1440. 
About 2000 on this same date the Mount 
Olympus again pulled out of the Bay of 
Whales. 
Lt. Col. Love: 
It was on this day that the bay froze over 
for the first time, forming a thin sheet of ice 
that was not hard to penetrate. 
T/5 Waltersdorf: 
It may be noted here that the weather was 
closing in as the last plane flight was landing. 
Mr. Davis: 
The landing of the last two aircraft was 
materially aided by smoke smudges from 
barrels of Diesel oil and burlap. 
The weather conditions were closing at 
that time, leading to a bad condition of 
white-grey sky which gave little or no con- 
trast to the ground. Depth perception was 
very poor except where man-made objects 
were on the snow surface. The fact that 
the smoke from the pots blew directly across 
the surface gave not only a good indication of 
wind, but an effect of a horizon outlining the 
runway, by which a pilot could easily land. 
Mr. Waite: 
The G. P. N. operators reported that they 
had picked up the lost plane a distance of 
approximately 25 miles from Little America. 
Dr. Siple: 
Operators were also able to follow the 
plane from the radar equipment on the 
Mount Olympus and aided in the direction of 
the plane, to get the pilot headed back into 
the Bay of Whales. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
On the Cacapon, on 2 December, I sailed 
down toward Little America, but it seemed 
to me that we had to refuel the Merrick, 
Tancey, Henderson, Philippine Sea, Northwind, 
and the Bronson, also the Senneit. Having 
refueled all these ships here, there, and 
everywhere, we also held station 400 miles 
from the Currituck and finally I was trans- 
ferred to the Northwind and on my way to 
Little America. 
We went through the pack and it was 
thick all the way; in fact, it was so thick that 
an hour after the first two planes flew over 
us toward Little America, we were jammed 
into this ice pack to the point where we had 
to dynamite our way through. 
On 31 January at 0800 we came out of the 
ice pack. At 1300 of the same date we 
sighted the Ross Ice Barrier. 
Dr. Siple: 
This brought Chief Warrant Officer Mor- 
ency to the Bay of Whales, the last of the 
Army Observation Group to be collected at 
this point, with the exception of the two 
Army photographers located with the East- 
ern and Western Groups. 
At the request of Comdr. Reinhart and 
Comdr. Campbell, Dr. Siple assembled a 
group of observers to help dig out the en- 
trances of West Base. The group that 
worked on this project included Lt. Col. 
Love, Maj. Crozier, Mr. Davis, Lt. Comdr. 
Dustin, and two photographers. We dug 
the main entrance out where the hatch had 
been at West Base. This required digging a 
hole approximately 8 to 10 feet deep, which 
was very difficult to locate from the top side. 
When we went out we were furnished with 
40 men, 20 from the Tancey and 20 from the 
Merrick, but because of bad weather condi- 
tions upon arrival at West Base, the 20 men 
from the Tancey were called back imme- 
diately, and before the shovels were in the 
hands of the men of the Merrick they also 
were called back, leaving only the observa- 
tion group to dig. While digging the main 
hole, we started a second entrance, which 
would be a ramp leading down into the 
main cache at West Base; however, it soon 
343 appeared to be a herculean task for so 
small a group to dig this hole, for it had to 
be dug approximately 100 feet long by 10 
feet wide, one end going down 15 feet into 
the snow. A good start was made, but the 
weather began to get bad and at the close 
of the day we reported that a larger work- 
ing force would be required if that hole was 
to be finished in time. 
At 2000 the wind began to blow much 
harder from the south and soon reached 
blizzard velocities. 
At 1500 the Mount Olympus came into the 
Bay, but did not tie up to the ice. 
A conference was called of the skippers of 
all the ships, as well as members of the base 
group, to discuss the plans for the base 
camp. At this time a list was made up of 
all the personnel to remain on the ice. The 
original list included practically none of the 
Army personnel, with the exception of Mr. 
Waite, Mr. Davis, Col. Love and Dr. Siple, 
who were on the original assignment list, 
to stay with the Ice Party. The general plan 
was that the Mount Olympus, the Yancey, and 
Merrick would leave the bay on approxi- 
mately 6 February, returning through the 
ice pack in convoy with the Northwind. The 
Northwind would then return to the Bay of 
Whales with the Burton Island and pick up 
the Ice Party. The Ice Party had to be 
drastically limited because of personnel space 
on the evacuating ships. It was at this 
meeting that Lt. Wagner was appointed 
Base Commander of the 35-man emergency 
camp and took charge of activities at West 
Base planning this operation. All during 
the late evening of the 31st the Northwind 
unloaded her cargo and mail. 
Mr. Waite: 
About 20 Seabees went to West Base to 
continue shoveling operations on the new 
tunnel early the morning of 1 February and 
were forced to quit operations at noon be- 
cause of the poor weather conditions. In the 
afternoon, however, a group of 12 carpenters 
did return to West Base to continue their work 
on the Quonset hut and so forth, and when 
6 o’clock came and time for their return to 
Little America arrived, Weasel drivers were 
unable to find their way along the southern 
trail to the camp. After several attempts, 
a radio call for help was received and two 
Weasels under Lt. Comdr. Dustin and Mr. 
Waite proceeded to lay an emergency trail. 
Observers rode on the outside of the vehicle 
so that they might see tractor marks in the 
snow that had been left by previous vehicles, 
and one flag was put down every few yards 
so that a very straight and very well marked 
trail was laid all the way to the camp. The 
men were picked up cold and hungry, but 
somewhat comfortable in a pyramidal tent, 
and brought back to their supper at the 
tent camp at approximately 2000. 
Tj5 Shimberg: 
That night at suppertime the mail from 
the Northwind came to the tent camp. It 
tied in very nicely with a blizzard that had 
started about the same time and gave all 
the men plenty of time to read their mail. 
T/5 Waltersdorf: 
It was on the evening of 1 February, during 
the blizzard, that new evidences of cracks, 
near the previous crevasse mentioned at the 
edge of the barrier, were noticed developing. 
During this night Comdr. Reinhart, while 
taking a Weasel (M29G) from the ships, 
onto the bay ice, up to the tent camp, 
crawled on his stomach every 10 or 15 feet 
checking the ice surface to make sure that 
the Weasel was not running any danger of 
falling into a crevasse. 
Maj. Crozier: 
The wind velocity at the camp was meas- 
ured at 40 knots, and at the site of the ships 
as high as 50 knots. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
On 2 February, early in the morning, Mr. 
Sparks, a newspaper correspondent, became 
344 lost while walking from base operations to 
the mess tent (about one quarter mile). 
Fortunately, after half an hour or so he 
bumped into two more men beyond Dog 
Town who were also lost. The three of 
them finally found their way to the mess 
tent. 
Mr. Waite: 
Just prior to the time that Sparks started 
from the radio shack to make his way to 
the mess hall, Chief Saylor and eight radio- 
men went up for their midnight chow and 
also became lost. They wandered way around 
the dog kennels and had gone 100 yards 
beyond them down toward the pressure 
ice when they suddenly heard a dog bark or 
howl, and that gave them their direction 
and they went back, finding the dogs and 
eventually making their way back to the 
mess hall. 
Dr. Siple: 
This is the first blizzard condition that 
really affected the expedition, and many men 
for the first time became serious regarding 
what a blizzard might mean. Many of the 
caches began to cover over, and from this 
time on greater care was exercised in the con- 
struction of caches and the marking of sup- 
plies. Also, because of the number of men 
who lost their way, great care was taken in 
placing flags and trying to prevent inter- 
ference with trails that were marked. It 
was interesting to note that the trail between 
the tent camp and west base, which was 
originally marked by Capt. Wiener with 
flags 100 yards apart, was marked after the 
blizzard at 50-foot intervals with flags of 
black, orange, and red. It was also interest- 
ing to note that this blizzard, bringing the 
snow in mainly from the southeast and east, 
produced tremendous drifts, particularly 
along the “A” row of tents, which were on 
the windward side. This showed that a 
snow fence system of some type might help 
in the construction of a camp, for there was 
much less drifting down on the other row of 
tents and among some of the caches. The 
wind velocity dropped and visibility became 
better during the morning. Mr. Davis, 
aided by Capt. Wiener, was able to put on 
the wings of his OY plane, and by 1500 the 
Seabees were back at work again. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
When the Seabees went back to work on 
the afternoon of the 2nd, instead of the 
party’s going out and continuing work on 
the double function hut at Little America, 
they went down and started repairing the 
damaged Quonset hut at the airstrip. This 
damage was caused by snow drifting in 
around the bulkhead, melting and refreezing 
between the inner and outer walls. 
775 Waltersdorf: 
It was the afternoon of 2 February that 
the U. D. T. held its first explosive test in 
the southern part of the bay ice. The ex- 
plosive used was C2 demolition blocks. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
I reported on this date to the Mount Olym- 
pus from the Northwind and went ashore the 
next day. 
T/5 Walter sdorf: 
It was on the afternoon of 2 February that 
a crevasse was located, developing during 
the previous night at the top edge of the 
barrier. It was in Y shape and approxi- 
mately 6 inches in width. 
Dr. Siple: 
There was considerable question as to 
whether this crevasse was caused in any part 
by the demolition activity. The demolition 
team had placed its charges beyond a pres- 
sure ridge between that and the barrier, but 
it seemed to be quite coincidental that the 
cracks opened up about the time that the 
first charges were set off. These cracks 
opened up very wide ail along the edge of 
the entire ice foot. It may have been due 
to the continuous piling on of new snow by 
the blizzard at the foot of the cliff. 
765274—48 23 
345 T/5 Shimberg: 
On the night of the 2nd Waltersdorf and 
Shimberg were ordered back to the Mount 
Olympus. 
Maj. Crozier: 
This is 3 February. Maj. Crozier received 
orders to remain with the ice party for the 
purpose of accompanying the trail party to 
King Edward VII Land aboard LVT’s. 
T/5 Shimberg: 
Today (3 February) the men began re- 
moving the wheels from the ski-wheel landing 
gear on the R4D’s and adding the extra 
area plate in place of the wheels. 
Dr. Siple: 
No. 5 plane was still stuck out on the 
landing field and could not be moved in 
with the aid of tractors. This blizzard that 
we’ve had made the first remarkable change 
in the surface of the snow. Prior to this 
date, the snow had had a glazed surface 
and there was a great deal of sticky snow. 
After this date, this type of snow was entirely 
gone and the blizzard had packed the surface 
with considerable sastrugi, making the land- 
ing field rougher but much harder. 
Mr. Waite: 
About 9 a. m. on 3 February Admiral 
Byrd, accompanied by photographers, Dr. 
Siple, Lt. Comdr. Dustin, correspondents 
Quigg, Sullivan, Nichols, and Blakely, Mr. 
Waite, and one or two tractor drivers, 
proceeded to Little America II to open 
up the old buildings. The first entrance 
was made in the tunnel just north of the old 
science laboratory. The galley, several tun- 
nels, and Admiral Byrd’s old home “Dog 
Heim” were found in fairly good condition. 
The mess hall roof had caved in and the 
science building roof had caved in, but food 
of various types was found intact. Peanut 
butter, cheese, shredded wheat, grape nuts, 
ovaltine, malted milk, and apples frozen 12 
years were still edible but slightly soft when 
thawed. Cigarettes, tobacco, and candy 
were still intact and enjoyed by all present. 
Many photographs were taken, as is normal 
on an expedition of this type, and late in the 
afternoon the buildings were closed down and 
the group returned to the tent camp for supper. 
Dr. Siple: 
Lt. Dick Byrd, Jr., also joined this party. 
Admiral Byrd was particularly interested 
in this trip, as he wanted to observe the 
conditions of the Little America I and II. 
T/5 Waltersdorf: 
Experiments were held the morning of 3 
February with the LVT-3. It entered the 
Bay of Whales, performing successfully, and 
then made an attempt to climb up onto the 
bay ice. However, the edge of the bay ice 
was too abrupt, not giving enough traction 
and as a result the LVT had to be pulled out. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
On 3 February work details from the ships 
started extending the experimental mat strip. 
Mr. Waite: 
On 1 February, the first ducking of an 
LVT took place. One machine was driven 
into the water and back onto the ice success- 
fully, which resulted in a report to Lt. 
Shirley that brought about the arrival of 
photographers for the second more official 
submersion. 
Mr. Davis: 
On the morning of the 3rd, the hangar for 
the OY was commenced. This was felt 
necessary as the wings had been filled full 
of snow by the previous blizzard. It also 
gave a much finer working area than out in 
the direct blast of the wind. 
Sgt. London: 
At approximately 1700 on 4 February a 
parachute jump was made by Sgt. London 
from an R4D type aircraft. This jump was 
made from 2,200 feet, wind speed approxi- 
mately 4 knots. Little can be said about 
346 this jump, it differed very little from jumps 
made in any other part of the world. The 
landing surface differed some from landing 
on an earth surface and certain clothing 
aspects should be taken into consideration 
there. The parachute used on this jump was 
Army standard assembly. 
Tj5 Shimberg: 
On the 4th the U. D. T. finished all the 
experiments in blasting and exploded linear 
charges back on the pressure ice. They also 
made a swim in the bay with special water 
clothing. They stayed in the water 20 
minutes. 
Capt. Wiener: 
It is interesting to note at this time that 
all of the U. D. T. boys who made the swim 
test in the cold water alongside the Mount 
Olympus reported, after coming out of the 
water, that their hands and feet had been 
cold for approximately 10 or 12 minutes 
prior to coming out of the water. 
Dr. Siple: 
The snow ramp down into west base from 
the Quonset hut was completed on this 
date, and food was moved in alongside the 
old mess hall in the space originally occu- 
pied by part of the coal cache. During this 
period, Lt. Comdr. Dustin, Capt. Boyd, 
and Dr. Siple rehabilitated the main bunk 
house of west base. Fires were started in 
two stoves and the stacks were found to 
be still clear, although the ventilators were 
packed with snow. The buildings were 
cleaned up completely. This state, however, 
did not last long, for within 24 hours visitors 
who came into the building continued to 
pull out all sorts of souvenirs from odd places 
and the building became ramshackle in a 
very short time. Also, unofficial opening 
was made of the “snow cruiser” and it was 
badly vandalised. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
On 4 February Capt. Wiener and Major 
Holcombe were informed that they were 
to stay on the ice when the ships pulled out. 
During these last days quite a bit of equip- 
ment was loaded back aboard the ships. 
Three D-6 tractors with extensions, one 
with a bulldozer, and two forklifts were left. 
They also unloaded the remainder of the 
pierced steel plank that was to be laid on 
the test strip and finished getting the fuel 
into the proper caches. All Weasels remained 
on the ice as well as the two LVT’s and 
four Jeeps. The purpose of leaving the four 
Jeeps was to make use of their 24-volt genera- 
tors and 110-volt AG generators which were 
used to charge batteries. 
Mr. Waite: 
Using Jeeps for this purpose was a brand 
new development by the United States 
Navy and these four were the first ones 
ever built. The Navy got them for this 
operation and they worked out very satis- 
factorily electrically, but as they had to be 
dragged around by tractor in the deep 
snow, their over-all value is questionable. 
Maj. Crazier: 
At this time preparations were going on 
for the trail party. C. W. O. Morency and 
Major Crozier were in the process of making 
trail flags, gathering equipment, medical 
supplies, and so forth. The remainder of 
the party was busily engaged in preparing 
the LVT’s and alining the compasses. 
Mr. Davis: 
All taxi tests by the R4D’s were completed 
on the 3rd. First official flight was made on 
the 4th at which time Sgt. London jumped. 
The first take-off was made with approxi- 
mately 55 inches of manifold pressure with 
Jato boost. The Jato was used again for 
protection during the last part of the take-off 
in case of engine failure. The skis, with the 
wheels removed, proved to be better for 
ground operations when the increased area 
was also removed. The snow piled in front 
of the little toe of the added area and made 
taxiing very difficult but with that area re- 
347 moved, taxiing on those skis improved and 
was deemed satisfactoryforfurther operations. 
Dr. Siple: 
It was believed that with a light load the 
planes might be able to take off without the 
use of Jato. However, it was still felt that 
with the type of surface condition, rough- 
ened by the recent blizzard, that Jato would 
be necessary with heavy weights of fuel for 
long exploration flights. On the 4th and 
5th practically all the planes available made 
flights at frequent intervals. Short local 
flights were made along the bay, including 
some by the helicopter from the Northwind 
and the Norseman. 
Sgt. London: 
On 5 February Admiral Cruzen decided 
that it would be a good idea to check some 
of the Naval personnel out in parachuting 
for practice in the rescue of downed fliers. 
Chief Boatswain Johnson was selected and 
was given instructions by Sgt. London. On 
the afternoon of 5 February Chief Johnson 
made his first parachute jump from an alti- 
tude of 2,000 feet. He had approximately a 
7-mile-per-hour wind speed. 
Dr. Siple: 
Because of conditions between nations a 
careful security check was kept on the flying 
activities, particularly of the Eastern and 
Western Groups. Dp to this date no com- 
ment was made to Expedition members, 
with a few exceptions, in regard to the dis- 
coveries made by these flights. The Army 
group was informed primarily through Dr. 
Siple as to the geographical accomplishments 
at this time. However, Admiral Byrd con- 
tacted Admiral Nimitz for permission to 
break security and bring the outside world 
up to date on the discoveries made at this 
point. Following is a summary of discoveries 
announced by the reporters on this date. 
T/5 Shimberg: 
Accomplishments of the expedition up to 
date were as follows: Four good sized bays 
have been discovered, one by the Eastern 
Group along Walgreen Coast 180 nautical 
miles north and south, and 120 nautical 
miles east and west; 20 small islands dis- 
covered, constituting 126,000 square nautical 
miles of territory unknown until now; 75,000 
square miles of ocean flown over and ob- 
served; eight new mountain ranges with a 
height from 1,500 to 15,000 feet; and four 
mountain groups and three peninsulas dis- 
covered, two by the Western Group and one 
by the Eastern Group. 
Mr. Davis: 
During the day four of the R4D’s took to 
the air for experimental and test flights. 
Three of these aircraft were in the air simul- 
taneously for photographic purposes. 
Dr. Siple: 
On 6 February, for the first time since the 
outset of the expedition, all of the Army 
observers detailed to the Central Group were 
brought together at one point. This was at 
the side of the ships where an official photo- 
graph was taken of the Group. At this 
time we might summarize the location of 
the members of the observation group. The 
following members were left at the base 
camp: Major Crozier, Mr. Waite, Dr. Siple, 
Major Holcombe, Capt. Wiener, Col. Love, 
G. W. O. Morency, and Mr. Davis. Col. 
Johns, Sgt. London, T/5 Waltersdorf and 
T/5 Shimberg all sailed on board the Mount 
Olympus. Col. Davis and Capt. Harrison 
sailed aboard the Merrick. Capt. Harrison 
was detailed for weather studies aboard that 
ship. During this day the final preparations 
for leaving the ice party ashore went for- 
ward. Admiral Byrd moved ashore and 
Admiral Cruzen moved over to the North- 
wind. At 1930 the Mount Olympus broke her 
moorings and sailed out of the Bay of Whales, 
followed by the Northwind, Yancey, and Mer- 
rick. On this date visibility was very poor, the 
ceiling was low, and it was snowing. The tent 
camp had a population at this time of 197 men. 
348 Maj. Holcombe: 
By the end of the day a total of 350 linear 
feet of mat had been laid, and a double 
Quonset hut with four antenna poles had 
been completed at Little America. Forty- 
six Seabee personnel were left on the ice, all 
were galley personnel with the exception of 
12 who were left to operate and repair 
equipment, maintain tent camp, complete 
connecting tunnels at Little America HI, 
and conduct experiments. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
On 7 February the weather was overcast. 
It was 18° above zero F. and snowing with 
increasing winds. 
Dr. Siple: 
On the morning of the 7th, Lt. Dick 
Byrd, Jr., and Dr. Siple made a Weasel trip out 
to the barrier opposite the West Cape, and put 
in the first of two beacon markers, one being 
placed 100 feet back from the edge and the 
second one a measured distance of 300 feet 
back, headed at right angles to the west 
barrier wall of the Cape. These markers 
were to be placed for measurements of the 
movement of the cape. That evening a dog 
team party, including the three dog drivers 
under Boatswain Johnson and with Mr. 
Sparks and Mr. Sullivan, went across the 
bay, traveled to West Cape, and put in two 
additional markers in line with the ones on 
the east side, also 300 feet apart. 
A conference was held in the evening to 
discuss the LVT trip to the southeast. 
This conference came to the conclusion 
that it would not be necessary to consider 
this as a gas cache primarily but rather as a 
weather station. It was hoped that the 
LVT’s would be able to get out approxi- 
mately 300 miles. 
Mr. Waite: 
It is now 8 February. The first major 
plane flight took place today. An R4D 
flew approximately 140 miles to the east and 
another flew approximately 240 miles to 
the southwest to check weather conditions. 
This second plane was turned back by bad 
weather but the one that went east said 
the weather was O. K. in that direction 
inland, although it was still overcast at 
Little America. 
Dr. Siple: 
The flying conditions at the camp were not 
considered to be exceptionally good. How- 
ever, the planes took off and landed suc- 
cessfully. This was a new era in types of 
flying in the Antarctic. On previous expedi- 
tions we had never dared risk taking planes 
off without CAVU weather in the vicinity. 
Admiral Byrd was introducing a new con- 
cept for flying which he said was “going 
after the weather,” that is, to fly out with 
the planes in an effort to ascertain in what 
direction flights might be made. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
Capt. Boyd of the Marine Corps was still 
calibrating the compasses on both LVT-3 
and LVT-4. We had to take five barrels 
of gas off the LVT-3 and seven barrels of 
gas off the LVT-4 in order to lighten up the 
sleds (original fuel load was 1,000 gallons). 
Maj. Holcombe: 
Comdr. Reinhart and Major Holcombe 
started making tests on the density and sup- 
porting power of the snow, the first one being 
on the roadway leading up to the mess hall. 
Maj. Crozier: 
Major Weir, U. S. M. C., took off in one 
of the R4D’s with a total load of 30,000 
pounds, using Jato. He was on only a short 
hop and upon his return had to circle quite 
a while in order to lighten his load before 
landing. 
T/5 Shimberg: 
T/5 Shimberg and T/5 Waltersdorf on the 
Mount Olympus reported that the Burton 
Island had left the Mount Olympus at 1015. 
349 They saw their first sunset in 7 weeks at 
2330. 
Mr. Davis: 
On 8 February Captain Wiener and Mr. 
Davis spent the day assembling the last wing 
on the OY. At this time a Herman-Nelson 
heater was obtained and the snow was 
melted from the fuselage and the wings. 
Several gallons of water came out of the 
right wing, almost a gallon out of the left 
wing, and enough water out of the fuselage 
to leave deep drip holes in the snow 
underneath. 
Dr. Siple: 
At the request of Admiral Byrd, Dr. Siple 
removed all of the emergency gear from one 
of the R4D’s taken at random, examined 
the character and quality of the emergency 
gear, and weighed each item in order to 
get a complete list. It was discovered at 
this time that the food was very unsatis- 
factory in weight and quality, and changes 
were made to remedy this situation. 
On 9 February the first aircraft took off 
for exploratory purposes. They headed 
south, starting at 1330. Admiral Byrd was 
aboard one of these planes. However, both 
planes had to turn back because of difficulties 
encountered. The plane in which Admiral 
Byrd was riding had a fuel leak at the main 
gas line when they changed tanks. The 
other plane got a vapor lock when the pilot 
attempted to change tanks. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
The weather at Little America for 9 
February was overcast 1,200 feet, visibility 
12 miles, surface winds east-southeast 10 
knots, temperature 14° F., barometer rising 
slowly. 
Capt. Wiener: 
The two aircraft that took off on the opera- 
tional flight today had a gross weight of 
31,000 pounds, which included 1,200 gal- 
lons of fuel. Upon completion of the flight 
Admiral Byrd predicted that the planes 
would be able to get off with the use of Jato 
carrying a load of 1,600 gallons. Dr. Siple 
and Captain Wiener spent a good part of 
this day working over lists of the emergency 
food to be carried on aircraft on operational 
flights. As a result of this Capt. Wiener 
made a trip out to Little America for purpose 
of going through the old food caches at that 
base to secure additional amounts of pem- 
mican, tea, and biscuits for the new emer- 
gency food rations. 
Dr. Siple: 
During the evening Dr. Siple and Captain 
Homey prepared the first emergency ration 
combined from the E ration, taking out what 
parts could be used and getting rid of all 
excess weights such as evaporated milk, 
coffee, prepared prunes, etc. 
Tj5 Shim berg: 
At 0030 this morning the Burton Island 
transferred the mail over to the Mount 
Olympus, the Merrick, the Tancey, and the 
Northwind. On 9 February the sun came out, 
shining brightly over a perfectly beautiful 
scene for the first time since the R4D’s arrived. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
The Little America weather report for 
0600 on 10 February was overcast of nimbo- 
stratus, continuous light snow, ceiling 900 
feet, visibility 2 miles, surface winds north 
at 10 knots. Temperature 24° F., dew 
point 16° F., barometer falling. Outlook 
little changed in the next 12 hours. Flying 
conditions undesirable. 
Map. Crogier: 
Today we had all kinds of weather. It 
was clear this morning, developed into quite 
a blizzard this afternoon, and then cleared 
up again in the evening. The wind changed 
direction completely several times during 
the day. 
Mr. Davis: 
This day the O Y was moved from the hangar 
and the engine started up. The engine 
350 operation was very satisfactory, starting 
directly from the battery with no difficulty 
at all. The engine started on the third 
turn-over. Taxi tests were made and found 
to be very good, but the steerable tail ski 
will be a tremendous advantage in taxiing. 
The snow was soft, the skis cutting in well, 
giving complete control of the aircraft at all 
times. Permission to fly, however, was 
denied by air operations. 
Mr. Waite: 
Installation of all radio equipment in the 
Quonset hut was completed on this day. 
Mr. Waite, in company with Lt. Nichols, 
U. S. N., the Airborne Electronics Officer 
of the camp, made a complete inspection of 
that station and then traveled to West Base, 
where another inspection was carried out. 
Capt. Wiener: 
On this date a flight of 2 C-47 aircraft took 
off on an exploratory flight to the southwest. 
Both planes flew southward approximately 
240 miles until one of the aircraft developed 
engine trouble, necessitating the return of 
both planes to the base camp. The entire 
flight was made over an overcast and no 
ground whatsoever was seen. On the return 
to the base camp weather conditions were 
quite bad as a heavy wind was blowing, 
causing much drift. This necessitated several 
passes over the field by both aircraft before 
they finally made safe landings. Both air- 
craft managed to get in during a lull in the 
wind and very shortly after the landings the 
weather closed in tight, 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 11 February 1947 at Little America at 
0700 the weather was as follows: Overcast, 
low clouds at 1,000 feet. Visibility 2 miles. 
Moderate snow. Wind S. E. 12 knots. 
Temperature 10° F. Barometer falling. 
Forecast—continued overcast and light snow, 
with increasing S. E. winds. Flying conditions 
undesirable, becoming bad late in the period. 
Mr. Waite: 
The Navy Type TR homing device was 
installed this day. 
Mr. Davis: 
No flying activity this day, due to the 
changeable weather and unfavorable pre- 
dictions. 
T/5 Waltersdorj: 
Late the night of the 11th, as the ships of 
the Central Group were approaching the 
northern limits of the ice pack, the Burton 
Island knocked an ice flow into the Merrick 
and smashed her rudder stock—a solid 
piece of steel more than 12 inches thick. 
Later, the rudder fell off entirely. In order 
to repair her, it will be necessary to tow her 
to Wellington, New Zealand, 1,500 miles 
away. 
Dr. Siple: 
It became apparent that Captain Homey 
and Dr. Siple would need a great deal of help 
making up single emergency rations for the 
planes, because of the large quantities 
needed. Therefore, all of the flying per- 
sonnel were called in to help prepare ap- 
proximately 22 emergency rations. Two of 
these had been prepared before by Captain 
Homey, Dr. Siple, Capt. Wiener, and others. 
During this day materials were assembled. 
All of the E and K ration that could be 
located in the camp were brought to the 
mess hall. Capt. Wiener went out to West 
Base and brought back all of the biscuits and 
crackers that he could find that were suitable 
for trail rations. He recovered some dried 
foods and other substitute items for the 
ration. After the mess hall was cleared in 
the evening a group of approximately 35 
flight, staff, and interested volunteers, in- 
cluding several Army observers, assembled 
in the mess hall. The E rations were opened 
and the desired cans of concentrated foods 
removed, opened, and the contents sep- 
arated. At the same time, another group 
351 opened K rations and took out all the biscuit 
combinations keeping them intact in their 
cellophane wrapper. Another group worked 
on weighing out rations, such as butter, 
cocoa, bacon, milk, etc. A final group 
assembled the supplies and packed them into 
parachute drop containers. The group 
worked with good efficiency and finished up 
the complete 20 rations at 1 a. m. The 
Army observer group had an active part in 
this operation. The work was carried out 
under the supervision of Dr. Siple. Ft. Col. 
Fove assisted with weighing rations and cal- 
culated the caloric values. Captain Wiener, 
as previously mentioned, played an active 
part in assembling supplies. 
Lt. Col. Love: 
As finally prepared, the new survival ration 
was a 60-day ration instead of the 30-day 
type previously planned. The new ration 
represented a saving of 15 percent in gross 
weight and at the same time had an increase 
in caloric content of 8 percent. 
The content of the ration was such that it 
was sufficient for subsistence for 1 man for 
60 days, under conditions of only moderate 
activity. If conditions were such that heavy 
physical work had to be undertaken, such as 
moving on the trail, the rations were cal- 
culated to last one man for about 6 weeks. 
In case the ration had to be reduced 
drastically in order to make it last longer, it 
was estimated to be sufficient for one man 
for 120 days. 
Dr. Siple: 
In each of the R4D planes one ration of 
this type was placed for each man aboard 
the plane. Three of these in each aircraft 
were fitted with parachutes so that they 
might be dropped to another plane in case 
of emergency. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
The weather report for Tittle America on 
12 February 1947 at 0100 was as follows: 
X-ray weather. Overcast at 1,500 feet, 
continued slight to moderate snow. Visibil- 
ity 1 mile. Surface wind, E.N.E. 8 knots. 
Temperature 24° F. Dew point 23° F. 
Barometer falling. Forecast—continued 
snow, with ceiling lowering 500 to 600 feet. 
Visibility % to 1 mile. Surface winds, vary- 
ing to the east, 11-15 knots, increasing during 
the afternoon. Flying conditions undesirable. 
Map. Crozier: 
At 1110 this date the mechanized trail 
party got under way. This party consisted 
of Captain Boyd and 1st Ft. Thompson of 
the Marine Corps, C. W. O. Morency and 
Major Crozier of the U. S. Army, Gunnery 
Sergeants Thomas and Bigelow of the Marine 
Corps, and Aviation Radioman Second Class 
McGovern of the Navy. 
The party started out on a course of 84.5° 
true in a light snowfall. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
We were using an LVT-3 and FVT-4. 
Behind the FVT-4 we were dragging one 
Go-devil sled and an Army 1-ton sled with 
a two-sledge meter in the back to give us 
our mileage. 
C. W. O. Morency was designated as one of 
the drivers of the FVT-4 and Major Crozier 
as medical officer and weather observer. 
Mr. Davis: 
This day marked the test flight of the OY. 
The first test consisted of 25 minutes with 
one landing. The aircraft was in good flying 
shape for further operations. 
Three further ski landings were made in 
the evening. 
It should be noted that for a civilian to 
fly military aircraft in a naval operating 
area the orders covering that civilian must 
have written into them proper jurisdictional 
meaning allowing flight of military aircraft. 
Mr. Waite: 
On the first evening of the trail trip, 
during the 2200 radio schedule, the operator 
352 of the LVT tractor party tried to contact 
Little America using voice and a whip 
antenna on his TCS unit. This unit is a 
35-watt unit on C. W. and 15 watts on 
voice. He was unable to contact Little 
America, though a careful watch was kept. 
The next morning he attempted again, 
using voice, and that time was heard for a 
short period of time and faded out after 
having given three messages. He then 
shifted to C. W. and tried again but was 
unheard. Later that afternoon he was heard 
to be 5 kilocycles off frequency at both 
NLA1 (base camp) and NLA, (Little Amer- 
ica No. Ill) with fair signal strength. From 
that point on, it became necessary for him to 
use a horizontal long wire antennae and a 
6430 kc. frequency instead of the ship and 
4125 kc. antennae, and his communications 
remained very good until the return of the 
tractor party. 
Tj5 Waltersdorj: 
Led by the Burton Island, the ships of the 
Central Group went steadily northward 
through the ice pack and then through 
“bergy bits” until they reached fairly clear 
water about noon. 
Then they lay to at approximately latitude 
67°54' south, long. 177°51' east. This is 
about 75 miles west-southwest of Scott 
Island. 
Ships of the Central Group expect to stay 
in this area for about 3 weeks, until the 
Burton Island evacuates the men from Little 
America. 
After laying to in this area, Admiral 
Cruzen transferred to the Burton Island and 
several correspondents and scientists came 
back to the Mount Olympus from the North- 
wind. Admiral Cruzen will go on the Burton 
Island back to Little America. On 13 Feb- 
ruary 1947, when the first freezing in the 
bay was observed from the air, seven whales 
were playing in one hole in the ice. Their 
motion apparently kept the ice from closing 
the hole. It will be necessary to evacuate 
the base with one ice breaker instead of two 
as previously planned. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 13 February the Little America 
weather report at 0700 was as follows: 
Overcast at 2,000 feet. Visibility 6 miles 
and light snow. Winds easterly 8 to 12 knots. 
Temperature 18° F. Dew point 17°. Ba- 
rometer unsteady. Continued unfavorable 
flying conditions due to snow and low ceiling. 
Maj. Crozier: 
The tractor party continued its outward 
trip at 1145 this morning and covered a 
total of 44 miles during the day. This 
placed them at a point 66 miles east of the 
base camp. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
On the 13th, construction was started on 
ski runway No. 1. This was accomplished 
by tractors pulling drags running over an 
area about 100 feet wide, by approximately 
4,500 feet long. During this time, density 
and Proctor needle tests were conducted to 
determine the characteristics of the snow. 
At this time it looks as though the combina- 
tion of vibration and weight of the tractors 
do the larger part of the compaction. Sleds 
and drags apparently do not do as much as 
was previously thought. Rollers are also 
less effective than expected. 
Dr. Siple: 
In the morning, Captain Kosko called 
together the members of the scientific staff 
for a conference to describe their various 
activities to Admiral Byrd. Admiral Byrd 
became very much interested in the various 
projects and gave his assurance that he 
would do everything he possibly could to 
help them out with their program. He 
promised to give an opportunity for the 
airborne magnetometer to be taken on 
flights and to assist any of the groups that he 
possibly could. 
705274—48 24 
353 Mr. Davis: 
The science meeting fully discussed the 
obtaining of supersonic measurements and 
ice velocities, especially with regard to the 
ice samples that might be obtained from 
Seal Canyon. 
The possibility of an expedition there was 
confirmed and agreed upon. 
T15 Shimberg: 
The Northwind left the Mount Olympus at 
Scott Island today, towing the Merrick and 
accompanied by the Tancey at a speed of 8 
knots. The Burton Island was to go to 
McMurdo Sound for scientific photographs 
and other observations. Scott Island was 
sighted at 2009. 
The Mount Olympus is standing by at 
latitude 67° 24' south longitude 179° 55' 
west. Our last trip to the ice pack improved 
the condition of the propeller of the Mount 
Olympus. The tips of two blades had been 
previously bent in opposite directions. This 
time the ice straightened one and broke off 
the other. 
T/5 Waltersdorj: 
The Burton Island, which is sailing to 
McMurdo Sound, will be unable to make 
any of the special observations that the 
Northwind had planned to make because the 
equipment is not aboard her. 
Dr. Siple: 
It is necessary to cancel the trip of the 
personnel of the scientific staff and the ob- 
servers who were to board the Burton Island 
and Northwind to McMurdo Sound. This 
is necessary because of the fact that all 
available space on board the Burton Island 
had to be reserved for the evacuation of the 
ice party. 
Mr. Davis: 
It was revealed on this day that no Geiger 
counter was available on the base for the 
anticipated special flights of the OY (Army 
L-5). 
The OY. today made a total of four land- 
ings, two of them being on the newly dragged 
runway. 
The snow surface of the repaired landing 
surface was at this time smoother than the 
landing surface. 
The surface is getting harder progressively 
as the weather gets colder. 
Capt. Wiener: 
A flight of 2 R4D aircraft took off on the 
afternoon of the 13th in a southerly direc- 
tion. The first of the two aircraft reached 
87°20' south, 155° west. The second air- 
craft reached latitude 87° south and longi- 
tude 90° west, discovering a new range of 
mountains running northeast between lati- 
tudes 87° and 88°, about 15,000 feet high. 
Dr. Siple: 
Because of the complexity of reporting the 
R4D flights, which took off at various times 
of the day and overlapping various days, and 
many planes in the air at the same time, 
there will be no effort to keep these straight- 
ened out in this log. It will be appended as 
a separate log for all flight activities. Also, 
we are not attempting to report the activities 
and flying conditions of the Eastern and 
Western Groups for the same reason. 
All the technical information is also de- 
leted from this report for the most part and 
will be found in separate reports under 
subject headings. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 14 February 1947 in Little America at 
0100 the weather report was as follows: 
X-ray weather. Broken clouds at 5,000 feet. 
Visibility 30 miles. Surface winds east- 
southeast at 10 knots. Temperature —1° F. 
Dew point —2° F. Barometer rising. Con- 
tinued good flying conditions for this period. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
At 1430 this day the Norseman plane, with 
Dr. Siple and Commanders McCoy and 
Dustin came over, landed, and had coffee 
354 with us. Dr. Siple had a conference with 
Captain Boyd of the Marine Corps and dis- 
cussed a few things concerning this LVT trip 
to the Rockefeller Mountain. 
Dr. Siple: 
Surface conditions in this vicinity were ex- 
tremely soft, with fluffy snow on the surface, 
causing one to sink down halfway to his 
knees in the snow. 
The plane landed on what appeared to be 
very smooth surface but encountered this 
deep snow. 
We particularly wanted to describe to the 
tractor party the conditions of crevasses 
directly ahead of them and to check with 
them on what needs they might have, in 
view of the fact that radio communications 
with the party had not been too good up to 
this time. This was at the 66-mile camp. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
Two planes took off early in the morning, 
one at 0015 and the second at approximately 
0100. They used the ski runway prepared 
on the evening before. 
Mr. Davis: 
The OY made four flights this day, total- 
ing 5.20 hours. The first flight .was the 
Navy photographers’ flight for official pic- 
tures of the camp. Lt. Roscoe (U. S. M. C.) 
was flown for ice reconnaissance, especially 
in the Seal Canyon area. Lt. Stein 
(U. S. N.) was flown for official pictures of 
the R4D take-off, and Capt. Kosko (U. S. N.) 
was flown for a Seal Canyon reconnaissance. 
Mr. Waite: 
Several long exploratory flights were made 
on 14 February. They will be recorded 
later in the official flight log. 
Dr. Siple: 
The pjanes had some difficulty in taking 
off. The first plane got off successfully, but 
the second one took so much longer to take 
off that it was separated in flight from the 
first one. The reason for this was the fact 
that it was frozen tight to the snow and 
timbers had to be worked under it. Because 
of this difficulty a new plan was devised, 
using plywood greased with Diesel oil, al- 
lowing the planes to break loose easily from 
that time on. 
Mr. Davis: 
During this same period the loading on 
the OY skis was such that there was no 
difficulty in taxiing and the airplane could 
be pulled loose by the engine with proper 
use of the rotor at any time desired. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
On the trail party trip, Major Crozicr 
and C. W. O. Morency were selected to put 
the trail flags along the trail as they went 
along. Once when Morency was on the 
flag shift and was sticking a trail flag into 
the snow, the box, Morency, and trail flags 
all tumbled off the sled and the tractor con- 
tinued on its way. Captain Boyd was busy 
looking at the compass, and looking forward. 
So about 3 or 4 miles down the trail they 
looked back and saw that they did not have 
trail flags, Morency, or a box. It was a good 
thing for Morency there was another tractor 
following behind to pick him up and take 
him over to the LVT-4. 
Capt. Wiener: 
At the request of Captain Wiener, aerial 
delivery tests were made for supplying 
stranded personnel with emergency equip- 
ment. A test today was made dropping 
two 5-gallon blitz cans with fuel for cooking 
stoves. 
Mr. Waite: 
The inspection of the radio equipment at 
West Base, the so-called emergency base, 
which was given some moments back in 
this record, should be changed to include a 
test transmission to Navy radio Washington. 
This was very satisfactory. Four different 
transmissions were made on frequencies 
between 4 and 20 megacycles using only 
500 watts power at the Little America end. 
355 Sgt. London: 
A party tried to land on Scott Island 
today, Friday the 14th, but could not do 
so, due to violent heavy seas. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 15 February 1947 at 0700 the Little 
America weather report was as follows: 
X-ray weather. High, scattered clouds,'ceil- 
ing unlimited. Visibility 10 miles, surface 
winds south-southwest, 10 knots, temperature 
— 7° F. Dew point —18° F. Barometer 
steady. Forecast—increasing high clouds, 
with ceiling lowering by end of period to 
3,000 to 5,000 feet. Visibility 8 to 10 miles. 
Surface wind south 12 knots. Flying con- 
ditions average. 
Maj. Crozier: 
This is a continuation of the report on the 
LVT trail party. We got under way at 
1845 on the 14th and continued until 1300 
on the 15th, after having made a total run 
of 108.2 miles. This is the total mileage 
from the base camp. The temperature at 
0200 this morning was —25° F. 
Mr. Davis: 
On this day the first major exploratory 
flight in which Army observers were present 
took off at 0215. Dr. Siple was in R4D 
No. 238 acting as navigator and Mr. Davis 
served as observer in aircraft No. 197. Each 
plane was loaded with 1,600 gallons of fuel 
to give a gross weight of 32,000 pounds. 
The flight headed eastward past the Edsel 
Ford Ranges and Executive Committee 
Range, and from there on, out into the un- 
known. 
Dr. Siple: 
The flight went over the Rockefeller 
Mountains, past Mt. Grace McKinley, and 
over Mt. Darling. These gave excellent 
ground fixes for the flight track and also cuts 
were made on Mt. Hal Flood. Dr. Siple 
served more or less as a pinch-hit navigator; 
because there had been so much flying there 
were no navigators who had sufficient rest to 
go out with this particular plane, of which 
Commander McCoy was senior pilot. Dr. 
Siple was handicapped by not having been 
furnished a full supply of navigation equip- 
ment. He did not have a sextant or many 
of the usual navigating tools and had to use 
dead reckoning with a sun compass. How- 
ever, Dr. Siple was fortunate in knowing the 
land, having had a responsible part in previ- 
ous mapping of this area and was therefore 
able to identify the ground fixes without 
question. This phase is important in view 
of the fact that the planes traveled beyond 
the Executive Committee Range trying to 
reach the new embayment previously located 
by the Eastern Group. Beyond Mt. Ruth 
Siple, it was all new territory to Dr. Siple, 
with many new mountain peaks visible on 
to the eastward. 
Upon returning, there was a question be- 
tween the navigators of the two planes as to 
the exact location of some of the mountain 
positions. Both planes agreed reasonably 
well in the longitude of the turning point but 
differed by nearly a degree of latitude. In 
order to check their position Dr. Siple and 
Comdr. McCoy flew on a return course 
which permitted tying into old ground con- 
trol stations. 
Of particular interest was one mountain 
peak which has a rough elevation measure- 
ment of 20,000 feet. This mountain was 
conical in shape and looked very much as 
though it were volcanic in origin. 
Mr. Davis: 
As radar observer on this flight, Mr. Davis 
suggests that a complete log should be kept 
on flights in the future of the 718 altimeter, 
gyro precession rate, and navigational in- 
formation as well as magnetic compass 
information. 
It was indeed unfortunate that radar re- 
cording and radar navigation could not be 
exploited on this flight, as the planes could 
356 have continued into unknown territory, 
which was lying under a low overcast. 
The two aircraft returned to base after 
flights that ranged to approximately 10 to 
10% hours. 
Mr. Waite: 
During the first few long exploratory 
flights, plane-to-ground communication was 
attempted from the airstrip station on 4125 
kilocycles and found so difficult that the 
frequency was changed to 6430 kilocycles. 
NLA1 at the new tent camp, the so-called 
Little America IV, was usually out of con- 
tact with the plane at any distance over 300 
miles using a 100-watt A. T. C. transmitter. 
NLA, the west base or Little America III 
transmitter used 500 watts on the same fre- 
quencies with special antennae system, and 
had no trouble at all contacting the planes. 
The planes also used the air force type ATC 
100-watt transmitter. This A. T. C. trans- 
mitter is the Army type ART-13. Noise 
levels at Little America IV, NLA1, were so 
high ordinarily, due to local generators, 
battery chargers, and lack of a ground con- 
nection, that it was impossible for this 
station to hear weak signals. The signals 
from the plane, even when 75 miles south 
of the pole, were heard well on the ship 700 
miles out from the Bay of Whales, however. 
This noise situation at Little America became 
so bad that an SCR 694 was set up in a camp 
300 yards from the nearest generator to 
check it but it was found there that the air 
was comparatively quiet so that from a pair 
of earphones connected to a battery operated 
receiver loud signals were heard all over the 
tent from all plane flights, from the ships 
700 miles at sea, and several 6-MG. broad- 
cast and code stations in the United States. 
Lt. Col. Love: 
It was at this period that the incidence of 
upper respiratory infection was noticed to be 
higher than previously experienced on expe- 
ditions to northern and southern high lati- 
tudes. The explanation for this situation is 
not entirely clear. However, it is believed 
that the size of the party had something to do 
with it. Also the distribution of personnel, 
which involved some people living on the 
ships all or most of the time, while others 
were up on the ice shelf for most of the time. 
Contacts between these two groups were 
occurring sporadically and possibly this de- 
layed the development of a group immunity. 
Dr. Siple: 
The following is a personal note from Dr. 
Siple in regard to his colds experiences. On 
the first three Byrd expeditions, colds were 
virtually unknown; only one or two men 
ever claimed that they had signs of one. 
However, on this expedition, Dr. Siple had 
a cold at the time the ship sailed, of moder- 
ate intensity, and did not actually get rid of 
it the entire time he was on the ice 
He believes that this greater increase in 
numbers of personnel as described by Dr. 
Love is a very important factor, as well as 
the continuous opening of supplies. 
There was no opportunity in the short 
time on the ice probably to establish what 
could be considered group immunity. 
Maj. Crazier: 
Another factor in connection with the 
upper respiratory infections: a large number 
of personnel on the ice complained of dryness 
of the mucous membranes of the nose and 
throat, particularly in the morning. This 
gave rise to a feeling that one had a cold 
when actually it seemed to be more of an 
irritation of these mucous membranes. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
Construction of ski runway numbers 2 and 
3 were started on this day. 
Dr. Siple: 
At 2315, two planes took off for the South 
Pole. Admiral Byrd was aboard one of 
these planes; Comdr. Campbell was aboard 
the other one. 
357 Lt. Col. Johns: 
It was on this date that Captain Dufek re- 
ceived his second dunking, when sudden and 
opposite rolls of the Bronson and the Philip- 
pine Sea parted the line supporting the boat- 
swain’s chair in which he was crossing from 
the Philippine Sea to the Bronson. Fie was 
readily rescued after approximately 8 min- 
utes in the water. His first dunking was on 
the loss of the Pine Island helicopter. 
Two PBM aircraft from the Western Group 
set down in the Shangri-la Lake water, 
which is a warm phosphate lake 200 feet 
above sea level, 5 miles from the coast, about 20 
miles from the shelf barrier and 110 miles from 
the open sea. There were three large lakes 
and innumerable small lakes in this group. 
Dr. Siple: 
This area is located close to the Shackleton 
Shelf Ice not far from the exploratory routes 
of Frank Wild of the Mawson expedition. 
It is interesting that the descriptions of this 
region of a large area free of snow are similar 
to the one described by Griffith Taylor in 
the dry glacial valley named after him not 
far from McMurdo Sound, much farther to 
the south. 
A great deal of discussion went on for 
days concerning this new discovery as a 
possible thermal region. However, there is 
no positive evidence to date that this region 
is thermal, other than that it is heated by 
the sun, causing the snow to be melted off. 
The lakes had a concentration of salt and 
other minerals. The temperature, however, 
was not beyond the range that could have 
been heated up by the sun itself. Had the 
region been volcanic there would probably 
have been very dense fog and steam in the 
region which would have made it more ob- 
scure, but such was not the case. 
The area is quite extensive (20 by 30 miles), 
and would prove of tremendous interest if 
geologists could get in and examine the rock 
in the vicinity. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 16 February 1947 in Little America at 
0700 the weather report was as follows: 
X-ray weather—heavy fog, visibility 2 to 3 
miles. Surface winds easterly. Tempera- 
ture — 16° F. Barometer falling. Little 
change with fog during the afternoon. 
Dr. Siple: 
At 1130 in the morning, the polar planes 
arrived back in the base. There was quite a 
bit of excitement at the time the first plane 
landed because the airfoil on the rear end of 
one of the skis became loose. They made 
several passes and the airfoil actually broke 
off. This airfoil is a wing section type struc- 
ture at the tail end of the ski to keep the ski 
level, particularly during the period when 
it is raised from its landing position and re- 
tracted to the plane. There was no control 
over the up and down wobbling of the ski on 
this point, and therefore to prevent damage 
to the ski or plane it had to be stabilized. 
This stabilization airfoil, however, broke off 
at the time of the actual landing. The air- 
craft routes went up the Wade Glacier to the 
Pole, continued on for a degree past the 
Pole, and returned via the head of the 
Beardmore Glacier. 
The heating arrangements inside the cabins 
of both planes were faulty and the men ex- 
perienced a great deal of cold and some 
apparent anoxia. The temperature went 
down to approximately —40° in the planes 
at times. 
Chief Boatswain’s Mate Johnson and his 
dog drivers took a Weasel down to the bay 
ice during the evening to get seals for dog 
food. They attempted to cross the crack 
which has been described previously as a 
sheer crack where the second bridge was 
located. 
When the sealers in the Weasel got to the 
location of the sheer crack where the middle 
bridge was located, they found the bridge 
completely disintegrated and strung along 
358 the crack for a distance of approximately 
75 feet. (This was due to the grinding action 
of the ice since the ships left.) They could 
not get across the crack at the point where 
the bridge had been and selected a new site. 
However, upon trying to cross it, they found 
that the ice would not support them in the 
middle of the crack and the Weasel went 
down into water. They did not have the 
plugs in the Weasel, which was the type that 
normally could travel in water, and it filled 
with water and sank. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
It was on this day that the cable which the 
Northwind was using to tow the Merrick to 
New Zealand snapped in an 80-knot gale, 
leaving the Merrick at the mercy of the 
storm for several hours. 
Map. Crozier: 
Continuation of trail party report: 
Got up at 12 o’clock today after sleeping 
for 20 hours. This sleep was badly needed 
by all on the trip. We washed our faces 
today for the first time since we left camp and 
spent the remainder of the day in reorgani- 
zation, which consisted of building bunks 
and so forth in the tractors. Temperatures 
today ranged from —11° to —20° F. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
Today we tightened up all packing glands 
around the push rod housing trying to stop 
the bad leak on the continental engine 
which had used up to 40 gallons of oil in a 
distance of approximately 100 miles. 
Mr. Waite: 
Today, coded press from San Francisco 
8,000 miles away was copied continuously 
for 2 hours without any noise background or 
other interference, on 6 megacycles, using 
a small battery-operated SCR-694 receiver. 
Also, several checks were made today on the 
5-megacycle time signal from WWV in 
Washington with excellent results. These 
signals were unheard at the receiving station 
at Little America IV. 
Mr. Davis: 
Today the OY flew for approximately 3 
hours and 30 minutes on one continuous 
flight to take Dr. Siple for reconnaissance 
over the ice around Roosevelt Island. The 
flight then continued down the coast to 
Lindberg Inlet, looking at the new cracks 
and the type of structure found there. The 
temperature ran as low as—28°C.at approx- 
imately 2,000 feet. 
Dr. Siple: 
This flight was of particular glaciological 
importance. The Bay of Whales area has 
been studied for over 100 years, but only 
within the past few years has the real mean- 
ing of all the tremendous cracks, pressure 
ridges, and valleys begun to be understood. 
Much of this has been done by photographs 
back in the United States, especially in 
studies by the National Research Council 
Committee on Deformation of the Ross 
Shelf Ice. The OY plane was particularly 
useful for ice studies because it could be 
jockeyed into position and returned over the 
top of places where special observations were 
needed. We found that practically every- 
thing fitted into the general picture of the 
tearing and ripping of the shelf ice as it 
passes on either side of Roosevelt Island. 
We visited the canyon country on the west 
side of Roosevelt Island, discovered unques- 
tionably the location of the small island that 
was causing the ripping and tearing on the 
west side of the bay, found many new can- 
yons and cracks that had formed in the 
Amundsen Pressure Arm, and went up over 
a portion of Roosevelt Island. On our trip 
out to Lindberg Inlet we found one crack 
that was running between 30 and 40 miles 
in length from the Bay of Whales out past 
the southern end of Lindberg Inlet. 
Capt. Wiener: 
The Burton Island is approaching the vi- 
cinity of McMurdo Sound. 
359 Lt. Col. Johns: 
Weather for 17 February at 1300 was as 
follows: X-ray weather. High overcast, 
lower broken clouds, visibility 10 miles. 
Surface wind southerly, 10 knots. Tempera- 
ture — 3° F. Dew point —3° F. Barometer 
steady. Increasing low clouds with snow and 
fog by morning. Surface wind southeast at 
15 to 18 knots. Flying conditions undesirable. 
Mr. Waite: 
Early in the morning of the 17th, tempera- 
ture at Little America was recorded at —22°. 
Lt. Col. Lcve: 
Information explaining the survival ration 
and its use under various conditions was 
gathered under the direction of Dr. Siple 
and prepared by Lt. Col. Love. It included 
suggestions made by various Army and Navy 
personnel who had had experience in the 
Antarctic in exploration by air, dog team, 
and motorized vehicles. This information, 
on three typewritten sheets, was turned over 
to Commander Hawkes, Chief of the base 
Aviation Section, who had it reproduced and 
copies inserted in the ration packs. 
Tj5 Waltersdorf: 
The Burton Island has now reached Mc- 
Murdo Sound and the U. S. S. Sennett is en 
route from Wellington to Tahiti. The heli- 
copter from the Burton Island flew over Mount 
Erebus, which is an active volcano in the 
Antarctic. 
Capt. Wiener: 
Although it has been one month and several 
days since arriving in the vicinity of Little 
America and the start of putting up the base 
camp, the American flag was first raised 
over the camp today in appropriate cere- 
monies, with Admiral Byrd directing the 
ceremony. 
Dr. Siple: 
On one of the survey lines laid down by 
the 1939-1941 expedition, a pole was located 
which was believed to be on the base line, 
but positive identification was desired. At 
the same time, by digging down to the canvas 
strips which had been laid in the snow, a 
good record of the amount of snowfall accu- 
mulation over the 6-year period since the 
strips had been laid could be obtained. 
Captain Wiener dug the hole down in the 
snow to a depth of approximately 8 feet. A 
similar pole was located at the other end of 
the base line which was very close to the 
edge. The sweep of the snow flowing over 
the edge of the barrier had prevented any 
accumulation on this point, and the canvas 
strips 6 years old were still lying practically 
on the surface with considerable melting 
around them. 
Map. Holcombe: 
In this same hole that went down to ap- 
proximately 8 feet, snow samples were taken 
approximately every 6 inches on the morn- 
ing of Saturday 22nd. The last compaction 
work in dragging the three snow runways 
was completed about this date. 
Mr. Davis: 
The OY flew a total of 7.5 hours today. 
One of the flights was 4 hours and 10 min- 
utes long, going to about 10,000 feet twice. 
This was to demonstrate the ability of the 
OY to stay in air for long enough period to 
fly 400 miles with a safety reserve. The 
snow surface is getting harder and ski opera- 
tion is becoming rough on the newly etched 
surfaces. The snow surface is becoming 
hard enough in places that the OY ski keels 
only make marks. The flat surface bottoms 
on the skis quite often do not leave a trace 
of the airplane over the surface. The main 
drag runway is now considerably smoother 
than the average of the surface surrounding it. 
Mr. Waite: 
Two R4D (C-47) aircraft took off for long 
exploratory flight at 1050 and 1056, re- 
spectively. A third aircraft took off at 1121; 
a fourth took off at approximately 1315. 
360 A fifth C-47 took off at 2100 and flew west- 
ward along the barrier. Lt. Commander 
McCoy, Lt. Roscoe, and Dr. Siple landed 
at 0143 on the 18th. 
Dr. Siple: 
This last flight was made at the request of 
Commander Hawkes who flew over the 
Queen Alexandria Ranges and had run out 
of film before reaching the embayment areas 
near the 180th meridian. The mapping 
flight started from Discovery Inlet going on 
out to just past the 180th meridian at ap- 
proximately longitude 179° east. There were 
some evidences of increased activity in the 
bays. Between two groups of tension bays 
beyond Discovery Inlet, two valleys approx- 
imately 45 miles long running parallel to 
the barrier front were observed and photo- 
graphed. On the return flight from Dis- 
covery Inlet to the Bay of Whales the aerial 
mapping cameras were turned on again, 
completing the central portion of the survey 
of the front of the shelf ice. A circle was 
made over the capes to tie in the photography 
that had been carried out early in the day, 
while the planes had to circle until the gas 
load was reduced to a safe landing amount. 
This was the fourth aerial survey made of the 
Bay of Whales area since 1928 and is of 
great importance for glaciological studies. 
Mr. Waite: 
One interesting point in the communica- 
tion picture, between plane and ground, 
occurred when the fourth aircraft had 
trouble with one of its engines and was mak- 
ing a return flight to Little America. It 
was necessary to operate their ART-13 
transmitter on 6430 kilocycles Although they 
were requested by Little America to listen 
and operate on 414 kilocycles, they found 
themselves unable to do so because they 
had no extra transmitter. 
Maj. Crozier: 
Continuation of trail party report: Re- 
ceived message at 0430 this morning direct- 
ing us to discontinue operations and return 
to base. Requested information as to 
whether or not cache should be established 
in this area. Later in the day we were 
directed to establish a cache at the foot of 
Mount Helen Washington in the Rocke- 
feller Mountains. At 2245 started out on a 
course almost due north toward the Rocke- 
fellers over a course reconnoitered by Maj. 
Crozier and Gapt. Boyd the previous day 
on skis. This was considered necessary be- 
cause we were in a crevassed area. 
Mr. Waite: 
On several occasions it became necessary 
for some of the Army group to assist Jack 
Perkins, of the Game and Wild Life Service, 
in trying to locate seals which had been 
branded by numbers in 1935. On February 
17th two of these seals, branded 12 years 
earlier, were discovered, numbers 183 and 
11, down in the pressure ice miles south- 
west of Little America IV. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
The weather report for 18 February, 
Little America, at 0100, was as follows: 
X-rgy weather, low broken clouds at 900 
feet, visibility 10 miles, surface wind south 
at 10 knots, temperature —14° F. Dew 
point — 15° F. Barometer is still falling rapidly. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
It was the desire of Admiral Byrd to ex- 
tend the landing mat-test strip still farther. 
On this date the mat was extended 180 feet 
farther, i. e., 40 feet wide only. This was 
tied onto the end of the 350-linear-foot 
strip, which was 150 feet wide. The mat- 
laying party was supposed to be volunteers, 
but due to the extreme cold and high wind 
there were only three volunteers available— 
Maj. Holcombe, Capt. Wiener, and Lt. 
Richardson (U. S. N.). The working party 
was composed of Seabee personnel. 
Maj. Crozier: 
The LVT tractor trail party continued 
west along a ridge south of the Rockefellers 
361 to a point opposite Mount Helen Washing- 
ton. Here they turned north toward Mount 
Helen Washington. This took them by the 
wrecked Fokker plane of the 1928-29 Byrd 
expedition. After a short stop here the party 
continued on toward Mount Helen Wash- 
ington to a point about a quarter of a mile 
south of this peak. Here a cache of 72- 
octane aviation gasoline, E rations, kerosene, 
and trail flags was laid and marked by a 
large red flag on an 18-foot pole. 
Following the laying of the cache the 
sleds from the No. 3 tractor were unhitched 
and all the personnel got into this tractor. 
This vehicle then proceeded up the glacier 
to the east of Mount Helen Washington, 
coming around in behind to a point on the 
saddle between Mount Helen Washington 
and Mount Franklin. Just before arriving 
at the top of this saddle a 10-foot crevasse 
was crossed. This crevasse was not seen prior 
to taking the tractor across, but while cross- 
ing over, the crust broke through and the 
crevasse could be seen below. A large num- 
ber of rock samples were gathered from 
Mount Helen Washington. Boarding the 
tractor again, we proceeded up to the loca- 
tion of the camp of the seismographic sta- 
tion of the 1939-41 Byrd expedition and 
gathered rock samples from Mount Frank- 
lin. The seismographic station was also visit- 
ed. The tractor had no difficulty in reaching 
this point. After visiting this site, we went 
back down to the point of the cache, picked 
up the other tractor, and proceeded back 
to the 88-mile beacon en route to the base 
camp. The food cache at the camp of the 
seismographic station was intact. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
Two marble slabs were retrieved from the 
old seismographic station by Captain Boyd 
of the Marine Corps to take back to the 
United States for a memorial to Captain 
Roy Fitzsimmons, who was killed during the 
war. At the top of a 10-foot 4- by 6-inch 
timber, a flag was attached and a can was 
nailed to this board in which was placed a 
card with the names of all members of this 
trail party. 
Mr. Waite: 
Today the tests previously reported were 
made with MSS in Washington from the 
emergency base camp transmitter upon 
completion of two rhombic antennas, each of 
which was several hundred feet long per 
leg, one being used for transmitting and 
receiving and the two working together. 
Sgt. London: 
Two 50-caliber machine guns were broken 
out aboard the Mount Olympus today and 
several rounds were fired at flowing ice- 
bergs. This test was conducted so as to 
note the effects of the 50-caliber bullets 
upon iceberg ice. Sergeant London as- 
sisted the naval personnel in firing these two 
machine guns. The Philippine Sea has now 
arrived at Balboa, Canal Zone, en route to 
the United States. 
Mr. Dams: 
Today the OY flew 6.40 hours. First 
take-off was made with Lt. Stein for camp 
photographic scenes, taking off across the 
main drag snow runway, barely 100 feet 
wide, i. e., Davis made his OY take-off 
across rather than along the runway. Two 
ridges have formed along the sides of this 
runway; take-off was started atop the first 
ridge, and the plane was airborne before it 
could hit the second ridge. There was an 
approximately 20-knot head wind during 
this time with very lightly drifting snow. 
Two of the flights in the evening indicated 
that the seals were going underneath the 
ice in great numbers, less than 12 seals 
being definitely -counted. Three landings 
were made in the rough neve away from 
camp to determine the ability of this type of 
ski to make landings on this type of surface 
in case rescue was needed. Landing aid 
362 was established by using swing bomb tech- 
nique with a heavy fishing weight on the 
end of the line, this line dragging on the 
ground before landing to indicate the rough- 
ness of the surface and to give an indication 
of the approach to the surface during lighting 
conditions which do not permit a pilot 
normally to see the ground. The air tem- 
perature at this time was about —22° C., 
the temperature during the evening falling 
as low as —28° C. It is interesting to note 
that the skin on the end of Bob Davis’ 
previously frozen fingers is coming off in 
patches now and the new skin is cracking 
badly. 
Dr. Siple: 
The good weather of the past few days has 
kept the R4D planes in the air much of the 
time. They have flown until the main- 
tenance problem has become a bottleneck. 
Low temperatures have prevented the men 
from working efficiently, and it has taken 
them many more hours to do simple jobs 
than it would normally. Some casualties 
have occurred. One man had to be sent to 
the sick bay because of frozen feet, not too 
serious, however. During this period Dr. 
Siple has been working closely with Admiral 
Byrd in regard to general problems of the 
exploratory flights and plans of expedition 
work. 
Mr. Davis: 
Maintenance within the experimental OY 
hangar has demonstrated that any sort of 
structure that stops the wind very materially 
aids maintenance in this cold weather period, 
maintenance being fairly easy to accomplish. 
It is also suggested that infrared heating of 
men working might be a very valuable aid, 
especially where the wind can be kept from 
those men. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 19 February 1947 the Little America 
weather report at 0100 was as follows: X-ray 
observation,* low scattered clouds, visibility 
30 miles, surface wind south 5 knots, tem- 
perature — 18° F., dew point —20° F., 
barometer falling. Forecast—continued 
good for the next 12 hours with little change 
in present conditions. 
Maj. Crazier: 
Trail party arrived back at camp at 1515 
today after covering 88 miles in one con- 
tinuous run. We started out at 2250 yester- 
day and covered this distance in 16.5 hours. 
The total speedometer reading for the trip 
was 245.1 miles. The trip back was rather 
uncomfortable due to the fact that the engine 
in tractor No. 4 was throwing a large amount 
of oil. The fumes were very bad in the 
tractor, necessitating the trap door be left 
open. It was a battle between the fumes and 
the wind. 
As far as medical service on this trip was 
concerned, it was practically nil, consisting 
of two band-aids and one iodine swab. 
There were two minor cases of frostbite which 
required no treatment. These were on the 
faces of Capt. Boyd and Sergeant Thomas 
and resulted only in very slight swelling. 
The rations used on the trip were the E 
rations. This ration worked out very well. 
However, it is entirely too heavy to be carried 
on anything other than a mechanized trail 
trip. Clothing in general was satisfactory. 
Temperatures ranged down to —25° F. 
and averaged around —15° F. The main 
difficulty was with the feet, the remainder 
of the body being comfortable most of the 
time. With the drivers it was particularly 
difficult to keep feet warm because of the wind 
coming in around their feet in the cabs and 
the necessity of sitting still in one place for 
long periods. The shoe pac and ski boots 
both allowed the men’s feet to get very cold. 
Also, there was considerable difficulty en- 
countered in keeping one’s knees warm. 
Several tricks were employed to overcome this. 
One was putting papers inside the windproofs. 
363 Additional warm trousers werfe also used. 
However, none of these worked very well. 
While putting out trail flags from the box on 
the 1-ton sled, considerable difficulty was 
encountered in keeping our knees warm be- 
cause our knees had to be drawn up tightly 
against us in order to sit in the box and still 
be able to place the flags. One means of 
combating this was to use the large fur parka 
which we had taken along primarily for use 
of the men putting out trail flags. Rather 
than wearing it we wrapped it around our 
knees. Morency used the fur gloves to 
put on his knees, holding the gloves down 
tightly against his knees, which helped some 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
On the night of 18 February, going into 
19 February, returning from the mountains, 
Morency relieved Gunnery Sergeant Thomas 
of the Marine Corps as LVT driver. The trail 
flags were very hard to see. In fact, there 
were a lot of trail flags blown down and the 
old trail, at times, was also obliterated. At 
one time Morency got off the course by 200 
yards and Captain Boyd of the Marine 
Corps happened to see a flag over to the 
starboard to which Morency immediately 
went and thus got back on course again. 
Sastrugi was in evidence and was holding 
the LVT-4 from getting up to higher gear; 
therefore, they had to drive from the 88-mile 
cache all the way back into camp in second 
gear, holding the LVT-3 down to a speed so 
that it would not run away from the LVT-4. 
While they returned from the 44-mile cache, 
they could see mirages of icebergs and the 
Ross Ice Barrier was as plain as if you had 
been standing out at sea and looking at it 
from the northerly to southerly direction. 
That was evident all day long. They got 
back to camp at 1515. Admiral Byrd was 
on hand to greet them. The LVT-4 had 
very bad oil leaks, and special tools with 
which to take care of such leaks were not 
available at that time. After returning to 
camp they all went over to the mess tent to 
eat. Morency said he wasn’t very hungry, 
but while sitting at the table he consumed a 
whole chicken. There were two different 
types of engines used on this trip, the LVT-3, 
using two V2 Cadillac engines at 110 hp. 
apiece, and a Continental with a 7-cylinder 
radial, air-cooled engine, giving 250 hp. 
The Continental engine had the bad oil 
leak. After the tractor party had returned, 
the radio equipment used was checked. 
Mr. Waite: 
It was found that the Navy type TGS 
transmitter was still in excellent operating 
condition. The SCR-694, however, that 
had been carried in canvas bags on the 
sledge roped down instead of mounted on 
shock mounts, as it normally would be in a 
vehicle, was found to have two broken tuber. 
The SCR-528 inside tractor No. 4 had one 
broken tube, which broke from the vibration 
of the vehicle only a few miles out, which 
necessitated cessation of all operations on 
that higher frequency throughout the re- 
mainder of the journey. 
Dr. St pie: 
On the morning of the 19th at the request 
of Commander Campbell, Dr. Siple joined 
Commander Campbell and Commander 
Dustin to make a trip down onto the bay ice 
to determine the thickness of the ice in the 
Bay of Whales, at the request of Admiral 
Cruzen. We found that the bridges at the 
sheer crack had completely gone and a new 
route had to be made through it. The 
bridge at the first pressure crack was still in 
fairly good condition and would be service- 
able. At the bay ice a hole was dug down 
through the ice by means of a geological 
hammer and right near the edge of the old 
ice a thickness of 15 inches was obtained. 
However, out approximately 150 yards from 
the edge, a hole showed that the average 
thickness over the bay was only 9 inches. 
We traveled back across the new bay ice to 
364 the edge of the barrier, where we were able 
to get samples of ice at the foot of the bar- 
rier at a safe point. Later, with the aid of 
Major Holcombe, this sample was found to 
have a density of about .65. 
Mr. Davis: 
The OY flew a total of 6.05 hours today, 
for Navy photographic purposes and to 
make contact with the tractor party return- 
ing to the base camp. Later an altitude test 
was made to see the altitude characteristics 
of the 100-octane gasoline used in a 72- 
octane rated engine. The test proved very 
satisfactory with relatively little loss of 
power due to the higher octane gasoline and 
the realization that the service ceiling of 
16,000 feet could have been reached. Dr. 
Siple was transported to East Cape and then 
later out beyond west base, where a landing 
in the ice haze was made. The landing was 
made by directions from Dr. Siple to Bob 
Davis, the flags being the only visible dis- 
tinguishable mark. Also, on this date, the 
effect of blowing snow and fence control for 
the clearing of the front of the hangar was 
made and gave interesting results which 
will be described in a technical report. 
Dr. Siple: 
On the OY flight out to East Cape, where 
we landed at the markers, measurements 
were taken of the displacement between 
East Cape and West Cape. The motion 
attributed to the northward movement of 
the west side of the bay was determined to 
be approximately 4.4 feet per day. This 
was interesting in view of the fact that it 
corresponded almost exactly with the same 
rate of motion east and west in the bay and 
also corresponded within a second decimal 
point of the same rate observed on the Ross 
Shelf Ice movement on the opposite side of 
Ross Sea, south of Scott’s old camp. At 
Station B, where the second landing was 
made, an attempt was made to dig a hole 
down to find canvas at that point. We dug 
a hole over 8 feet deep and still did not 
strike canvas. Unfortunately, conditions did 
not permit us to return and get a second 
measurement of snow accumulation. This 
pole was standing 7 feet at the surface when 
we first found it as contrasted to one pre- 
viously described which Capt. Wiener dug 
out where only 2 inches of pole was sticking 
out. We have no record of original height 
of the pole. One point of interest regarding 
mirages was observed by Mr. Davis and Dr, 
Siple while we were at East Cape. The 
tent camp which had been in complete view 
during the whole time we were there at a 
distance of only about 2% miles away, sud- 
denly had a degree of looming. The tent 
camp appeared to be extending up off the 
surface. We immediately picked up cam- 
eras to try to get a picture of it. The 
change had taken place when the sun had 
been suddenly obscured by clouds and a 
change in environmental temperature was 
apparent from where we were. By the 
time we had our cameras set up the loom- 
ing effect became less pronounced. We 
noticed when we got down on our knees 
that the looming became even more pro- 
nounced and so we tried taking pictures at 
a height of only 1 foot above surface of the 
snow, where we could see the looming quite 
well. We were amazed, however, when we 
stood up, to discover that the tent camp was 
no longer visible. That means that the 
reverse of the looming, or a depression, was 
actually putting a normally visible object 
out of sight, whereas observation from a 
lower level made the camp stand up at an 
abnormal height. 
Mr. Davis: 
High speed movies were taken of this 
phenomenon. The landing at the East Cape 
was on either very rough or neve or newly 
formed sastrugi. The keels of the skis were 
all that showed marks in the snow except 
during the primary landing upon the crest 
365 of a ridge. The airplane required about 480 
feet to come to rest, power completely off 
after the initial contact. The ski marks were 
continuous from point of contact to point of 
rest, showing that there was no ballooning 
effect. 
Capt. Wiener: 
A second aerial delivery test drop was made 
today, utilizing a type cargo parachute 
known as a “baseball” chute. This chute, 
an 18-foot cargo parachute, is unlike the 
standard type personnel or cargo chute inas- 
much as its canopy is of unbleached natural 
colored muslin instead of the usual silk, and 
on descent when in full blossom resembled a 
baseball in its fully rounded canopy rather 
than the umbrella effect of standard para- 
chutes. The drop was made from a C-47 
flying 85 knots at an altitude of 800 feet with 
a gross load of 95 pounds. Two and a half 
seconds elapsed from the time the kit and 
chute were kicked from the airplane until 
the complete opening of the canopy. Forty- 
four seconds elapsed from the time of the 
opening of the canopy until the kit itself 
reached the ground. The opening of this 
parachute was slightly eccentric, inasmuch 
as the parachute made what appeared to be 
a complete oscillation before it fully opened. 
At the moment of opening the drop kit was 
about 20 degrees above the chute. It was 
discovered that this was caused by the static 
line. The static line on this type of para- 
chute is secured to the skirt of the chute 
rather than the apex. After opening, only 
one oscillation was observed. It is recom- 
mended that the Army Air Forces investigate 
this chute, described in greater detail in 
chapter 6, and that it be utilized in the Air 
Forces rescue squadrons. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
Completed laying the pierced steel plank 
of the landing field test strip. Now a total 
of 455 feet of the 40-foot wide strip has been 
laid. This is tied onto the end of the 350- 
linear-foot strip which is 150 feet wide. The 
men working during the last 2 days laid 
approximately 125 square feet per hour per 
man. This excellent record (for Antarctica) 
was due mostly to the high morale and com- 
petition within the detail. One hundred 
and twenty-five square feet per man per 
hour is considered very good time, 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 20 February 1947 in Little America 
at 0700 the weather report was as follows: 
X-ray weather. Middle broken and lower 
broken clouds at 1,500 feet, visibility 10 
miles, surface winds east-northeast, at 5 
knots, temperature — 5° F. Dew point — 6° F. 
Barometer rising. Little change during this 
period. 
Today the Eastern Group is steaming 
around Palmer Peninsula and headed for 
Weddell Sea. 
A radio flash was received stating that the 
Chile and Argentine expeditions are carrying 
on surveys in Graham Land. 
Mr. Waite: 
On this day, V3 and V5 (C-47 aircraft) 
took off at approximately 1100 and landed 
at 1400. Communication was very good 
during this flight as indicated by the fact 
that code signals from England almost 
blocked communications at Little America. 
VI (C-47) took off at approximately 1700 
and landed at 2016 after a flight to the 
Rockefeller Mountains and Roosevelt Island 
for geologist Balsley’s first magnetometer test 
flight. 
Today it was reported that of the four 
generator Jeeps carrying 28-volt, 300-ampere 
DC generators for raising the voltage of 
storage batteries in airplanes on airfields, all 
but one were out of commission, due to 
the fact that the electrical generators had 
been installed in vehicles which had been 
rebuilt and did not stand the test of hard 
wear and uses over a period of 1 month on 
Little America. 
366 Dr. Siple: 
The advent of the airborne magnetometer 
has brought a new tool of exploration into 
the Antarctic area. This device measures 
the variations in the magnetic field as the 
instrument passes above it. It is extremely 
interesting because on this flight, unbeknown 
to Balsley, he established confirmation of an 
island which had previously been located by 
inference on Dr. Siple’s glaciological studies 
near Kainan Bay on the east side. His 
flight showed clearly when land was ap- 
proached. He also confirmed the fact that 
Mount La Gorce was sedimentary, which 
was previously observed from the air in 1940 
but never proven by actual contact. This 
new instrument will be extremely useful in 
future explorations to determine what lies 
beneath the snow mantel of the Antarctic 
continent. 
Mr. Davis: 
It is suggested that appropriate intercon- 
nection between the recording systems of 
radar and the magnetometer will give the 
most rapid way of surveying large areas and 
indicating the approximate type of structures 
and the relation of those structures to each 
other. It is further suggested that good 
navigational recording can make this a very 
rapid, complete method of survey of unknown 
continental areas. 
Mr. Waite: 
In connection with the magnetometer, 
discussion of the instrument with Mr. Balsley 
revealed that a small model is available 
which could be used for locating metallic 
objects under the snow at depths up to 50 
feet with good results. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
Today the OY (Army L-5) was taxied 
over to the pierced steel plank test strip. 
Several landings and take-offs were made by 
Mr. Davis and apparently no damage was 
done to the mat, although the prop did 
kick up a little loose snow. Later the plane 
was taken over to ski runway No. 1, several 
landings and take-offs being made there. 
The only damage noted was on one landing 
where the wheel seemed to burn the snow, 
leaving a mark the width of the tire, 2 inches 
deep, and approximately 10 feet long. This 
snow could be scraped out by hand. With 
the exception of this, the snow acted much 
the same as any normal soil-cement runway 
would have acted. Pictures were made by 
the Navy covering both of these experi- 
ments. Once, the plane was taxied while 
holding the brakes on one wheel to show 
the skidding effect. After the experiment 
the plane was taxied from the runway over 
the road leading to the plane’s normal 
parking area. These tests were made with 
wheels on the OY instead of skis. This 
snow runway was partially compacted with- 
out any mat as a wearing surface. 
Mr. Davis: 
Today the OY was flown a total of 8.70 
hours; 13 landings were made. Of primary 
interest were the operations from the pierced 
steel plank and then later from the snow air- 
strip. The take-offs from the steel mat were 
no different from ordinary take-offs and it 
was considered that a very strong cross-wind 
was in evidence. The mat, with the slight 
covering of snow that always splashes through 
the holes, had a feeling of being somewhat 
slippery, but the slipperiness was uniform 
and caused no pilot concern. The braking 
action on this mat was rather good during 
landings, with the exception that turn-arounds 
were difficult unless the tail wheel was 
steerable. The landings on the main strip 
were also easily made and in good order, 
giving no concern to the pilot. Turn- 
arounds were very good considering the 
fact that the steerable tail wheel was not 
operating. Braking action was good at high 
speeds, but tended to become slippery at 
slow speeds. No holes or evidence of bad 
367 irregularities that would cause concern were 
encountered. Continued operation from a 
strip of this kind is deemed entirely satis- 
factory. The tire pressure on the OY was 
measured after the flights and found to be 
approximately 13 pounds instead of the 
ordinarily carried 45 pounds for this type 
of wheel. This low pressure was not greatly 
in evidence in any of the taxiing tests and 
the tires did not seem to suffer any damage. 
During all but the first two flights the air- 
craft was relatively heavily loaded, carrying 
in addition to the pilot a passenger and some 
baggage as ballast. The normal gross load 
of this aircraft is not to exceed 2,300 pounds. 
The first of these two take-offs was made at 
something less than 2,000 pounds due to no 
passengers. The later take-offs were made 
somewhere between 2,000 and 2,200 pounds, 
an absolute check on the gasoline not 
being made at the time but having added 
tools as baggage. The first two landings on 
the snow strip were made from power pull- 
ins resulting in full power stalls and minimum 
speeds landing with full flaps extension and 
full aileron depression. 
Later, landings were made with wheel 
landings or not complete “power stall” 
landings. All landings were as would be 
expected on ordinary non-concrete surfaces. 
The landing gear of this particular airplane 
has a peculiar characteristic on concrete 
which is not in evidence on grass and was 
not in evidence here either. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
During the past 4 days the 50 tents which 
housed the personnel used 33 drums of Diesel 
fuel, which figures to be about 8.2 gallons 
per tent per day for their regular Quarter- 
master tent stoves. 
Dr. Siple: 
This is a comment on the survey activities 
in the Bay of Whales area: Commander 
Hidie located the site of the new magnetic 
station and ran a measured base line before 
the ship had sailed. He located the site 
of this tent close to the base camp, at latitude 
78°25T3", longitude 163°54'04". His base 
line is 972.36 meters long with an azimuth of 
166°16'33.5." Today Lt. Shoenie (U. S. 
C. & G. S.) and Capt. Wiener went over to 
Little America HI and located the 1940 
expedition’s Station A, which had pre- 
sumably moved due to glacial activity nearly 
a mile and a half westward since the date 
that it was put down 6 years ago. Its original 
location was at latitude 78°29'06.1", longi- 
tude 163°50T0.1" and the azimuth of the 
base line was 180° true. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
The helicopter flying from the Burton 
Island made a forced landing in the vicinity 
of Scott’s 1902 camp at McMurdo Sound 
and the crew used a sledge, found there, to 
get the spare parts required to repair the 
rear rudder of the helicopter. They also 
investigated Scott’s Cape Evans 1911-12 base 
and Shackleton’s 1915 base at Cape Nimrod, 
Dr. Siple: 
It is interesting to note that in the hut 
visited a calendar was found on the wall with 
a date of 1931. This possibly indicates that 
a visit was made by the crews of the Discovery 
II expedition. However, the occurrence of 
this is not quite understood. The group that 
landed went into the camp and also col- 
lected rock samples from the terraced slopes 
of Mount Erebus and Mount Terror. 
Capt. Wiener: 
At 7 p. m. on this day the Burton Island 
departed from McMurdo Sound for the Bay 
of Whales. It is interesting to note that 
although today is 20 February here in Little 
America, at McMurdo Sound, west of the 
180th meridian, it is 21 February. It is also 
interesting to note that McMurdo Sound is 
less than 400 miles from the Bay of Whales. 
Mr. Davis: 
On past OY flights for ice reconnaissance, 
the peculiar way in which cracks form next 
368 to large crevasses has been noticed. These 
cracks seem to run vertically across the 
bottoms of the crevasses and always main- 
tain a rectangular appearance. The side, 
when it breaks, instead of forming a V-shaped 
side maintains a side in a vertical plane. 
Today the OY was flown close to the water 
below the edge of the barrier in search of 
further evidences of this kind. It was re- 
vealed that this cracking structure occurs 
along the outside barrier, and accounts for 
the sheer vertical cliff that is encountered 
there. The cracks running into the barrier 
perpendicularly also reveal many of these 
same characteristics. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 21 February 1947 the Little America 
0100 X-ray weather observation was as fol- 
lows: Low broken clouds at 3,000 feet, 
visibility 12 miles, surface winds to east 10 
knots, temperature 8° F., dew point —2° F., 
barometer rising. Forecast—continued good 
for the next 12 hours. 
Dr. Siple: 
The sun last night dipped below the hori- 
zon to the south at midnight, local time. 
For the past few days it has been approaching 
the horizon, the lower limb disappearing 
behind Roosevelt Island. 
Mr. Davis: 
Today the OY was flown a total of 4.30 
hours. The primary flight was that of taking 
Lt. Stein (U. S. N.) up to the ice cracks, to 
Amundsen Arm, for a low level ice picture 
reconnaissance. It should be noted here 
that future aircraft of small dimensions 
coming down here should carry shoulder 
straps for safety in case~of forced landings 
among rough ice or crevasses. During the 
OY flights of the 20th and 21st, seals’were 
noted well back in the cracks several miles 
inland from Seal Canyon. 
Dr. Siple: 
Today Commander Reinhart, Major Hol- 
combe, and Dr. Siple made a trip down to 
the bay ice to reconnoiter a route for the 
tractor trail to the Burton Island when she 
arrives. The cracks at the top of the barrier 
had widened considerably, having an aver- 
age width of close to 2 feet. A place was 
located close to the old tractor trail where 
there was a double break with two cracks 
each averaging a foot wide. Some change in 
the bridging construction over this will be 
necessary. We went down to the sheer 
crack and had to locate a new passage over 
it which would require bridging, but at the 
first pressure ridge the old bridge was still in 
good condition despite the fact there were a 
few drifts over the top of it. There was no 
active pressure in the immediate vicinity, 
though 100 yards from it pressure was ex- 
tremely active and had made great changes 
since the bridge was first put in. The rest 
of the route out to where the ships will 
anchor was over bay ice with a few new 
cracks in it, but nothing of serious nature. 
A carefully laid flag trail was marked all the 
way back. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
These cracks were bridged later on during 
the evening. 
Lt. Col. Love: 
After several flights, aircrew members 
reported symptoms of acute anoxia at alti- 
tudes of 12 to 14 thousand feet and several 
stated that they had never experienced so 
much difficulty flying without oxygen at the 
same altitudes during the war. Today a 
flight was authorized and was made by Lt. 
Col. Love for the purpose of checking six 
subjects at 13,500 feet, indicated altitude. 
The results were within the limits of what 
would be anticipated in lower latitudes. 
Capt. Wiener: 
A third aerial delivery test drop was made 
today using a home-made well-padded con- 
tainer and a home-made 12-foot parachute. 
This unit was for the purpose of aerial deliv- 
369 ery of a handy-talky SCR-536 radio to sup- 
posedly stranded personnel for the purpose 
of establishing immediate air-ground com- 
munications. Upon throwing the unit out 
of the C-47 aircraft at an altitude of 800 
feet, the canopy caught on the tail ski of the 
plane, where it hung for about 30 seconds 
and then fell clear. The parachute did not 
blossom forth but rather streamed the entire 
800 feet. Upon retrieving the handy-talky 
set, tests were made for damage by calling 
the base operations radio. The first attempt 
of making contact failed, but contact was 
finally made at a distance of approxi- 
mately 45 feet. 
Mr. Waite: 
This bears out other tests made with this 
unit on the ice. At temperatures of 18° 
above zero checks were made at all distances 
from 200 yards to 800 yards. The batteries 
used in all of these sets carried by the Navy 
at this time were dated 1944 and voltages 
on all of them were low before they were 
subjected to cold weather operation. 
Capt. Wiener: 
For information purposes, the C-47 and 
R4D are one and the same type airplane, 
and for further information the R4D’s on 
this operation were of an old vintage and 
had been used considerably during the war 
period. 
Dr. Siple: 
Locally the weather was fairly good most 
of the day. There was some clear sky off 
to the southwest. However, the weather 
forecast did not bid well for extensive flying. 
The main flying on this day was by Lt. 
Warden (U. S. N.) who took Balsley south 
over Roosevelt Island with an aerial mag- 
netometer, taking one island off the map and 
confirming a doubtful island. 
Capt. Wiener: 
The third parachute jump on this opera- 
tion was made by a Navy parachute rigger, 
Marvin D. Sprake. Major Weir (U* S. M. C.), 
in an R4D plane, made an ice reconnais- 
sance approximately 180 miles northwest off 
the Bay of Whales for the Burton Island, 
which is en route to the Bay of Whales from 
McMurdo Sound. 
T/5 Shimberg: 
The Northwind, Merrick, and Yancey reached 
Dunedin, New Zealand, at 2200 today. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 22 February 1947 the Little America 
0100 weather report was as follows: X-ray 
weather. Broken clouds at 5,000 feet—low 
or scattered at 2,500 feet. Visibility 10 
miles. Surface winds 10 knots south. Tem- 
perature 10° F., barometer rising. 
Dr. Siple: 
At about 0500 this morning two R4D’s 
took off for the southeast. Dr. Siple was ob- 
server aboard one of these planes, and 
Captain Ftorney was observer aboard the 
other. The purpose of this flight was to 
travel toward the southeast to determine the 
exact trend of the Horlick Mountains of the 
Queen Maude Range. In previous flights, 
there was a discrepancy in two trends that 
were reported by other flights. One of 
these indicated the trend running toward 
Caird Coast and the other toward Palmer 
Peninsula. It is possible that these two may 
be separate mountain trends; however, the 
descriptions tallied so closely that a question 
of navigation was brought up. However, 
the flight was turned back by heavy weather 
to the east, southeast, and to the south. We 
reached latitude 85°30' near the mouth of 
Thorne Glacier and had to climb to over 
14,000 feet with bad weather still ahead. 
Due to anoxia condition of some of the pilots, 
radio operators and navigators, it was im- 
possible to proceed. On the return trip the 
plane in which Dr. Siple was riding turned 
east toward a clear area and a mapping 
reconnaissance was made of the southeast 
corner of Prestrud Inlet. As we arrived 
370 back at the base the plane carrying Balsley 
out to make a magnetometer survey of the 
Edsel Ford Range was reported in trouble. 
This plane had reached close to the vicinity 
of the Rockfeller Mountains about 100 
miles out from Little America. One of the 
engines cut off completely and they had 
difficulty trying to feather the prop. In the 
process of trying to feather it, and to prevent 
losing altitude, they began to lighten the 
load of the plane and threw out the aerial 
mapping camera. The crippled plane re- 
turned along the still visible tractor route. 
The plane in which Dr. Siple was riding 
went out to meet the other plane, getting 
sight contact near Kainan Bay. The crip- 
pled plane came in and landed without in- 
cident. The plane in which Dr. Siple rode 
made its landing after about 12 hours in the 
air. The landing of these two planes virtu- 
ally ended the entire flying program at the 
camp. The Burton Island had arrived in the 
bay, creating great excitement, and im- 
mediate evacuation was planned. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
The LVT-3 left the mess hall at 0800 with 
Admiral Byrd and the Base Commander, 
Commander Campbell, to go aboard the 
Burton Island. On the way to the ship the 
LVT-3, too wide to use the bridge at the 
sheer crack, tried to cross it at another point. 
This spot was very weak and the LVT-3 
broke through. It was afternoon before the 
LVT-3 could pull itself out by two 
cables tied to its own tracks and using a “cat” 
as a deadman. 
Mr. Davis: 
The 3.10-hour flight of the OY concluded 
the flying of the OY, a total of 58.40 hours 
having been flown. A final survey of the 
hangar showed that intelligent use of snow 
fences and snow blocks can make a hangar 
feasible, especially the entrance to the hangar 
can be kept in an inclined shape with rela- 
tively little or no shoveling. 
Mr. Waite: 
Due to considerable discussion regarding 
the change of signal strengths and various 
background noises in the communication 
set-up at Little America III and IV, it was 
believed that a properly designed antenna 
system with low power would accomplish 
the same degree of communication perfec- 
tion accomplished by the larger transmitters 
used with their imperfectly designed anten- 
nas. Permission to transmit to the Burton 
Island, a distance of 200 miles, was therefore 
obtained at midnight on 21 February, and an 
attempt to contact that ship at 0120 on the 
22nd with a 10-watt hand generator driven 
transmitter received a very good signal 
strength report. On investigating the log 
of the Burton Island, it was found that the 
U. S. S. Mount Olympus, which was using the 
same call, was the ship that had made the 
signal strength report at a distance of 700 
miles from Little America. 
Capt. Wiener: 
For a short period before midnight and 
shortly after midnight tonight, there was a 
very beautiful sunset, casting a pink light 
on the snow. 
Dr. Sipte: 
When the Burton Island came into the Bay 
of Whales through the new bay ice, it was 
interesting to see that she cut only a very 
narrow path just a little wider than the ship. 
The ice did not break up in the same fashion 
as when the Northwind attempted to empty 
the ice out of the Bay of Whales at the be- 
ginning of the operations. The ship rode 
onto this ice, which had a rubbery texture, 
and broke it down. The ice hardly impeded 
the ship as she came in or went out of the bay. 
Some time ago it was mentioned that on 
one of the bad weather days the seals had 
apparently disappeared from the bay. How- 
ever, this should not be considered as the 
final disappearance, because on the next 
good day many seals were out again. During 
371 the period in which our activity was trans- 
ferred down to the bay around the ships 
many seals were found out on the ice in new 
locations. Some of them were moving north- 
ward toward the newer cracks within a mile 
or two of the open water. 
Mr. Waite: 
While trying to rephotograph the numbers 
on the two branded seals which had been 
seen previously, we counted over 200 other 
seals on the bay ice during the last 3 days 
we were at Little America. 
T/5 Shimberg: 
The Northwind left Dunedin, New Zea- 
land, to go back to Little America to help 
the Burton Island evacuate Little America. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
The Currituck proceeded 1,500 miles west- 
ward and two flights were made over Prince 
Olaf Land and Princess Ragnhilde Land. 
It was interesting to note that tenders can 
service planes without the facilities of a 
sheltered harbor. 
Mr. Davis: 
During the process of cutting snow and ice 
for the supersonic test, it was noted that 
blocks in the order of 6 to 8 inches square 
and several feet long had a peculiar musical 
ringing note to them. These blocks changed 
their ringing characteristic very markedly 
upon changes in temperature and it is 
thought they changed with relation to time. 
On a cold day when you could hear your feet 
squeaking on the ice surface these blocks 
would have a different characteristic note 
than they would on ordinary days. The 
tone was markedly changed from when they 
were first cut. 
Very rapid chaotic measurements were 
made during the last few hours by other 
supersonic equipment for the measurement 
of attenuation. The results of these measure- 
ments may have significance; they should be 
noted in the Technical Naval Research Lab- 
oratory Report. 
Lt. Col. Johns: 
On 23 February in Little America the 
0100 weather report was as follows: X-ray 
weather. High scattered and low scattered 
clouds, ceiling unlimited, visibility 30 miles. 
Surface winds southwest, 5 knots. Temper- 
ature 3° F., dew point — 1° F. Barometer 
rising. 
Dr. Siple: 
This is the official evacuation day and 
although many programs are still being 
actively carried on, most of the activity is 
centered around packing up of individual 
equipment and getting everything sent 
aboard the ship as rapidly as possible. 
Because of the limited space and hold capac- 
ity very little equipment of heavy nature is 
being returned, and such items as the R4D 
planes, the OY, and much of the heavy 
scientific instruments and equipment is all 
being abandoned on the ice. An effort is 
being made to establish markers on the 
caches to locate these. Lt. Chaney has made 
an effort to tie in some of the areas to his 
base line and Commander Campbell made 
a flight with a JA late in the evening of the 
day before to photograph the area for a final 
time to locate where the different caches 
are left, so that if they are covered up they 
may still be available within the next 1 or 2 
years. 
Maj. Holcombe: 
An R4D on wheels weighing approximately 
20,000 pounds was used to test the pierced 
steel plank, the snow runway No. 1 and, 
thanks to Admiral Byrd, the roadway lead- 
ing to the mess hall. These tests started 
during the evening of the 22nd and lasted 
until the afternoon of the 23rd. The snow 
base beneath the pierced steel plank defi- 
nitely failed, leaving the mat bent up to 
about 2 inches. The snow runway seemed 
to be compacted slightly less than normal. 
The roadway definitely held the plane the 
same as any concrete runway and the only 
372 tracks remaining were those made by loose 
snow in the tire treads. These tests were well 
covered by still and moving pictures which 
should definitely prove to higher authorities 
that airfields can be built on this type of 
snow. 
C. W. 0. Morency: 
Today the LVT-3 and LVT-4 were 
driven over to the Quonset hut at the 
emergency base camp (Little America III). 
The oil was drained out of the crankcase of 
the LVT-3 and the radiators of the LVT-3 
were drained, but not the transmission. The 
LVT-4 was not drained for the reason that 
if anyone was to use the L\TT-4 later on he 
would have to put in a complete new engine. 
The two LVTs are located on the northwest 
corner of the Quonset hut and each of the 
LVTs has a flag tied to the antennas. The 
batteries were not disconnected. 
Capt. Wiener: 
Today the Mount Olympus left the vicinity 
of Scott Island for the purpose of scouting 
the northern edge of the ice pack to provide 
the Burton Island with latest information on 
ice conditions in this area. 
Dr. Siple: 
The Western Group is beginning to wind up 
its exploratory observations and hopes to 
make one more trip to the “Bunger Oasis.” 
The Eastern Group is heading for the 
Weddell Sea, still with hopes of making a 
final reconnaissance in that area. The 
weather has been so bad recently that the 
group has not had a chance to launch 
flights after reaching that area. 
Mr. Davis: 
The OY’s had their wings and tails re- 
moved today. Wings and empennage were 
removed to the Quonset hut for storage. 
The batteries were removed and put directly 
under the aircraft with the tools. One 
fuselage was left within the hangar structure, 
the other one being securely tied down 
and loaded with gas barrels immediately in 
front of the hangar. Markers about 20 
feet in length were placed beside both of 
them marked “OYL5G.2.” 
Mr. Waite: 
At 1800 on the 23rd, a last trip was made to 
Little America II. Ten men redug the 
tunnel and left the opening covered by a 
tarpaulin, marked by a 16-foot high plank 
on which is written identification. 
As the last heavy duty tractor pulled its 
sledge from the camp down to the Burton 
Island the sledge fell in the crevasse when 
the tractor did not go over the bridge di- 
rectly but tried to go to the right hand side 
of the bridge. The sledge stopped abruptly 
in the crevasse, the cables broke, and two 
men were thrown off, but eventually this 
sled was recovered with all of its baggage. 
Dr. Siple: 
In the late afternoon Admiral Byrd made 
his first and last official visit to West Base and 
the Quonset hut of Little America IV. He 
entered the building, although it had al- 
ready been secured, went down and visited 
all the various buildings beneath, and rese- 
cured the buildings. In the evening the 
final packing was completed and most of the 
personnel had evacuated from the base. 
Admiral Byrd with W. O. Morency, Dr. 
Siple, Lt. Comdr. Dustin, and Lt. Comdr. 
McCoy were among the last men to leave 
the base. 
Admiral Byrd left a note in his Wannigan 
hut and then proceeded to the flag pole, 
where he saluted the flag and then departed 
from the camp site for the ship. 
373 APPENDIX I 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBSERVERS 
OPERATION HIGHJUMP 
ANNEX K TO COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTY-EIGHT 
OPERATION PLAN NO. 2-46 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBSERVERS 
1. The Task Force Commander wishes to take this opportunity to welcome all 
observers aboard ships of the Task Force. Everything consistent with the 
primary mission and overall success of Operation Highjump will be done to 
afford all observers the opportunity to perform their special duties and to 
promote their health and comfort. 
2. All military and civilian observers participating in the Highjump operation 
will be ordered by the agency controlling their services to report to the Com- 
mander Task Force Sixty-Eight for duty. The Task Force Commander will 
assign each observer to a ship of the Task Force for transportation, quartering, 
and messing. At the completion of duty with Operation Highjump each observer 
will be ordered to return to his regular duty station or to carry out the uncom- 
pleted portion of his basic orders. 
3. The Task Force Commander will, through the Projects Coordinator and 
other appropriate members of his staff, exercise general supervision and co- 
ordinate projects as required to avoid duplication of effort and to take maximum 
advantage of available equipment and opportunities to collect scientific data 
and other information of value. Commanding Officers of each ship will super- 
vise and coordinate projects on individual ships as required. 
4. A complete and detailed report of this operation will be compiled upon its 
completion. This report will be given wide distribution and all agencies 
participating in Highjump will receive an appropriate number of copies. In 
order that the report will be as complete and comprehensive as possible, observers 
will submit their official reports to or via the Task Force Commander. If 
desired, observers may submit advance copies of their reports to interested 
addressees. The Task Force Commander will be informed of advance copies 
so distributed. 
5. Messing; 
(a) In general all passengers will subsist in the same mess as those with 
374 whom they berth. There may be some exceptions to this policy 
depending upon the facilities available. 
(b) All passengers messing in a wardroom mess will be required to pay a 
mess bill to the treasurer of the mess in which they eat. This bill 
will be the same as for other members of the mess. 
(c) Civilians may be authorized in writing to eat in a general mess at the 
temporary base by the individual commanding officers. In these 
cases, the civilians who eat in this general mess will be required to pay 
70 cents per day. This money will be paid to the commissary officer 
at the end of the trip, or at the end of each month as appropriate. 
(d) Army enlisted personnel will subsist in the general mess of the ship 
on which they are embarked. The commanding officer of each ship 
will authorize in writing the subsistence of Army personnel and the 
carrying of such personnel as supernumeraries. The Army officer or 
non-com in charge will be required to certify that subsistence was 
received. 
(e) The Marines embarked will subsist in the appropriate mess. No 
special conditions surround the messing of Marines. 
6. For some observers this operation will mark their first experience at sea. 
The following points are listed for information: 
(a) Personnel accommodations will be crowded on some of the ships. 
All available space will be utilized in order that there need be no 
limitation on number of personnel participating in the operation. It 
is hoped that observers will realize the necessity for crowded condi- 
tions, where existing, and will make the best of the situation. The 
individual assignment of quarters and messing will be made by the 
commanding officer of the ship to which the observer is assigned. 
(b) Conserve food and fresh water. The supply is ample, but wasie 
must be avoided. 
(c) Do not hesitate to call on personnel of the staff or vessels of the Task 
Force for information or to make suggestions for improving the con- 
duct of the operation. 
{d) It must be realized it will be necessary for commanding officers to 
impose certain restrictions to insure success of operations, for the 
safety of personnel and material, and for the general health and com- 
fort of all hands. 
7. It is expected that ships of this Task Force will visit foreign ports during 
the operation. Consequently civilian observers are advised to obtain passports 
prior to departure. Visas should be obtained as follows: 
375 Central Group—New Zealand. 
Panama. 
Eastern Group—Brazil. 
Panama. 
Western Group—Australia. 
New Zealand. 
8. All personal mail should be carefully addressed to the individual con 
cerned, giving the name of his ship in care of Fleet Post Office, New York. 
Example: 
Mr. JOHN ROBERT SMITH 
U. S. S. MOUNT OLYMPUS 
Care of Fleet Post Office 
New York, N. Y. 
376 APPENDIX II 
FACILITIES ASHORE AT LITTLE AMERICA 
COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTY-EIGHT 
CTF68/L24/pk U. S. S. MOUNT OLYMPUS (AGC-8) 
c/o Fleet Post Office 
New York, New York 
27 December 1946 
MEMORANDUM TO ALL OFFICIAL OBSERVERS: 
Subject: Facilities Ashore at Little America. 
1. The primary objective of the Central Group, Task Force 68, upon 
its arrival at the ice shelf is to construct in the shortest time an airstrip for the 
operation of aircraft on wheels. Therefore, all available subsistence facilities 
ashore will be required to accommodate personnel actually engaged in the con- 
struction of the airstrip and related facilities required for the operation of aircraft. 
2. Observers whose special qualifications can be utilized to expedite 
completion of the air facilities and who volunteer to become a working member 
of the organization under the Officer in Charge of the base in connection with 
the construction of these facilities will be assigned appropriate quarters ashore 
during this period. Observers desiring to avail themselves of their opportunity 
should make such arrangements with the Officer in Charge of Construction 
(Commander C. O. Reinhardt (CEC)). 
3. When aviation facilities have been completed, quarters, materials, 
and construction personnel will be employed to provide facilities and assist 
with other approved projects. Until the aviation facilities have been com- 
pleted, no individual or group will be authorized to procure or erect their own 
facilities and then only upon approval of the Officer in Charge of the base. 
4. Approved plans provide for utilizing the facilities established by 
the U. S. Antarctic Service in 1939-1941 to supplement the temporary tent 
camp if they are found serviceable and later to rehabilitate them to serve as 
the 35-man emergency camp. Until rehabilitated, personnel not engaged in 
the rehabilitation are prohibited from disturbing or entering the buildings of 
the former camp. 
5. As soon as the Northwind can be released, after arrival at the shelf 
ice, and if unloading of the AKA will permit access to the Automatic Weather 
705274—48 25 
377 Station, it will be set up in the Victoria Land Area, using the Northwind for 
this purpose subject to facilities being available. It is suggested that members 
of the following organizations accompany this trip, 
(a) U. S. Geological Survey. 
(b) U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 
(c) U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. 
(d) U. S. Hydrographic Office. 
(e) U. S. Weather Bureau. 
(/) Three correspondents. 
6. Personnel desiring to make this cruise should inform Captain G. F. 
Kosco. 
7. General. 
(a) Facilities for aerological observations will be erected along with 
other air operating facilities. Quarters for aerological personnel 
will be provided for five men and one officer. 
(b) If the magnetometer station can be located near the Quonset hut 
at the airstrip, one of the unassigned tents and 110-volt AC cur- 
rent can be made available. Unless a small gasoline driven elec- 
tric generator can be procured from existing electronic or 
BuAer equipment, it will be impossible to provide 110-volt AC 
current for this purpose at an isolated site. 
(c) Airborne magnetometers will be fitted and flown in R4D’s when 
opportunity permits. 
(d) Provisions will be made, upon the completion of the airstrip, 
for equipment, transportation, and living space for use of observers 
to make exploration trips, observations at airstrip, and other 
programs outlined in their memoranda to the Chief of Staff. It 
is estimated that these operations can commence about 1 Febru- 
ary 1947. In the meantime ample opportunity will be afforded 
all observers not actually engaged in operations as mentioned in 
paragraph 2 to visit shore activities, as tractor trains will be 
leaving and returning to the strip at frequent intervals. 
(e) Local flights for observers will be permitted dependent upon 
requirements, operating conditions, and work load. 
(/) Decisions regarding extended flights will be held in abeyance 
until the R4D’s arrive and conditions are evaluated at that time. 
8. It is earnestly believed that everyone will have ample opportunity to 
observe all conditions necessary to completing his mission and to carry out all 
programs as now anticipated. Some of these programs may be delayed until 
completion of the airstrip, so your patience is therefore requested. 
R. H. CRUZEN 
Rear Admiral, USN 
Commander Task Force 68 
378 APPENDIX III 
QUARTERMASTER QUESTIONNAIRE 
FOR NAVY TASK FORCE 68 
The following are answers to the QM 
questionnaire for Navy’s Task Force 68, 
Operation Highjump, Naval Antarctic De- 
velopment Project, which was presented to 
the Army observers by Col. Richard L. 
Lewis of QM Research and Development 
Branch. Answers to the questions listed 
below were supplied by the Army observers 
at a round table discussion conducted by 
Dr. Paul A. Siple, Senior War Department 
Observer, while the group was in the 
Antarctic regions. 
1. Cream, Sunburn, Preventative. 
a. Does it provide adequate protection 
against sunburn? 
The sunburn cream proved very effective 
in preventing sunburn. It was observed, 
however, that a need for the cream existed 
only during the initial period of tanning. 
b. Has there been any indication of skin 
irritation caused by use of this cream? 
There was no indication of any skin irrita- 
tion as a result of the use of the sunburn 
cream. 
c. Is its effectiveness materially reduced by 
perspiration? 
There were no observations made on the 
effectiveness of the sunburn cream during 
periods of perspiration. 
d. Does it rub off easily and soil the 
clothing adjacent to where it is used? 
There was no evidence of the cream rub- 
bing off and soiling adjacent clothing. 
e. Is its invisibility on the skin an asset, 
or would it be more desirable to have a 
colored cream so that its presence could be 
easily observable? 
The concensus among the Army observers 
was that the invisibility of the cream is a 
definite asset. 
/. What are the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of this cream compared to the 
sunburn preventative cream supplied by the 
Navy as regards performance, comfort, ac- 
ceptability, and packaging? 
Standard Navy sunburn preventative 
cream was not issued to members of the 
Task Force. The shore dispensary issued 
lanolin ointment to prevent sunburn during 
the first few days ashore, 
g. Is the cream difficult to remove after 
prolonged period of use? 
Adequate washing facilities were available 
and no difficulty was encountered in re- 
moving the sunburn cream. 
h. Does it cause the skin to become soiled 
more quickly? 
It is believed the cream tended to make 
the skin soil more quickly. 
Note. The Army sunburn preventative 
cream was used only by a limited number 
of Army personnel. 
2. Tray, Mess, Six-Compartment, Plastic. 
The plastic trays were not used by the 
Task Force. The shore party operating on 
the ice barrier were equipped with steel 
mess trays and used them throughout the 
entire period ashore. It was observed that 
the steel mess trays when used in the mess 
tent caused the food to cool rapidly, resulting 
379 in the last half of the meal being eaten cold. 
This deficiency was overcome somewhat by 
preheating the trays on top of a stove in the 
mess tent before the food was placed on it. 
3. Bag, Clothing, Waterproof. 
a. Does the bag become stiff enough at 
low temperatures to interfere with proper 
use and functioning? At what temperature 
does this stiffening occur? 
Temperatures encountered during the op- 
eration did not cause the bag to stiffen. 
b. Does the waterproof coating on the bag 
show any tendency to crack when flexed 
repeatedly at low temperatures or when 
folded, subjected to pressure, such as occurs 
during packing, and then unfolded at low 
temperatures? 
These difficulties were not present. 
c. When the bag has been wet and then 
frozen so that it is coated with ice, does 
flexing and folding cause the coating or 
fabric to crack, tear, or separate? 
No such difficulties were experienced. 
d. Does the bag remain waterproof under 
all conditions of service? Is there any 
tendency to leak at seams or closures? 
The waterproofness and the closures on 
the bag proved satisfactory for the uses to 
which the bag was subjected. 
e. In case failures occur other than those 
covered by the questions above, what are 
the contributory conditions and causes? 
Only a small quantity of these bags were 
used and no failures occurred. 
Note. It was generally agreed by the 
entire group that the bag, clothing, was 
essential for carrying extra clothing and 
equipment by plane crews when engaged 
in over water operations. 
4. Glasses, Sun, M-1944. 
a. Will item withstand normal blows at 
low temperatures, like dropping on a hard 
surface, or knocking glasses off on a door, etc.? 
No failure of lens occurred because of low 
temperatures; however, there were several 
instances of the lens cracking. 
b. How is shadow contrast on a bright 
snow terrain? A dull snow terrain? 
The Air Corps F-l sunglasses proved 
superior to the glasses, sun, M-1944 for 
shadow penetration and minimum color 
distortion. 
c. Are sunglasses sufficient protection from 
the cold at low temperatures, and can they 
be used if face masks of some kind are worn? 
No attempts were made to wear the sun- 
glasses with a face mask. For the most part 
face masks were not required. 
d. What relative preference between this 
item, goggles, M-1944, and other types of 
glasses used? 
The glasses, sun, M-1944 were preferred 
to the goggles, M-1944, because of the 
lighter weight and less bulk; however, the 
glasses, sun F-l (Air Corps) were preferred 
to both types because of clearer vision, 
greater penetration of shadows, and mini- 
mum color distortion. 
e. Other pertinent observations on glasses, 
sun, M-1944: 
(1) No snow-blindness occurred during 
the operation. This was due principally to 
the dark glass discipline that was followed 
by the members of the Task Force and to 
extended orientation aboard the ship en 
route to the Antarctic. 
(2) Directions for properly cleaning the 
sunglasses were seldom followed. The indi- 
vidual would clean the glasses using materials 
at hand. 
(3) Scratching of the lens was prevalent, 
but it did not impair the vision of the wearer. 
5. Lipstick, Antichap, Cold Climate. 
a. Does it adequately protect lips against 
chapping? 
The antichap lipstick proved adequate for 
protection of the lips against chapping. 
380 b. Does it heal lips which are chapped? 
The lipstick preparation was very good in 
relieving painfully chapped lips. It was also 
used to relieve pain caused by hangnails. 
c. Is it equally effective on other exposed 
skin of hands and face? 
Yes. 
d. Any comments regarding difficulty in 
pushing stock out of dispenser tube? 
Some difficulty was experienced in pushing 
the stock out of the container, but this was 
overcome by using a pencil or some other 
small object. It is suggested that the con- 
tainer be made larger in diameter so that 
the stock can be pushed out with the huger. 
e. Is the consistency of lipstick satisfactory 
at temperatures encountered? 
The consistency of the lipstick was satis- 
factory for the temperatures encountered. 
6. Matches, Ordinary, Water-Resistant. 
a. What is color of match head? 
Matches used had green colored heads. 
b. Did matches fail to ignite because of 
dampness? 
Several immersion tests were conducted to 
determine the adequacy of these matches 
and in all cases the matches proved adequate. 
In one instance matches carried in the parka 
pocket were covered with snow but they 
functioned satisfactorily upon striking. 
c. Any difficulty in striking matches due to 
breaking of match stick? 
There were some cases of match sticks 
breaking upon striking, but it was agreed 
that the matches are satisfactory. 
d. Are matches any more or less wind- 
resistant than ordinary book matches or 
wood safety matches? 
No observations were made on this point. 
7. Containers, Food, Insulated. 
The containers received little use for their 
intended purpose of transferring hot food 
from one location to another. The individ- 
ual containers contained in this unit were 
used as individual pots by different groups 
within their tents. In cases where the con- 
tainers were used for transporting hot liquids 
such as coffee, some heat loss occurred dur- 
ing the time the coffee was dispensed. 
8. Ropes (Climbing—Nylon and Manila). 
The ropes of this type were used primarily 
as standard emergency aircraft equipment, 
particularly the nylon climbing rope. As 
this material was kept inviolate for any other 
use, it was not made available for general 
use around the camp to get any observations. 
As handled it seemed to be standing up 
perfectly normally. 
9. Outfit, Cooking, One-Burner. 
This item was used as standard aircraft 
emergency equipment. There were just 
enough of them available for that purpose. 
They were kept in the planes and were not 
permitted to be used otherwise. One prob- 
lem, of a rather serious nature, regarding 
these stoves is the carrying of extra gasoline. 
The cans selected by the expedition origi- 
nally were 5-gallon type, which were too 
weak to stand up and were substituted for 
containers, gasoline, 5-gallon. There was 
a great deal of resistance on the part of plane 
crews to carry white gasoline when they 
knew their aircraft would probably have 
many gallons of 100-octane gas in it. The 
question is raised regarding the use of 100- 
octane leaded gasoline in these stoves and 
the length of time the stove can be operated 
with this fuel. 
10. Shoepacs, 12-Inch, M-1944. 
a. General. The shoepacs were available 
to all members of the expedition. A great 
many persons wore them on the ice. It is 
believed that, in general, when they were 
worn in temperatures of at least 15° above 
zero and in many cases down to zero or a 
Yes. 
381 little below, the shoepac when properly 
worn with the proper equipment inside was 
satisfactory. 
b. Socks and Insoles Worn Inside the Shoepac. 
It was observed that in many cases there 
was not adequate briefing given to the men 
when the shoepac was issued by the regular 
issuing personnel and as a consequence 
there was a great variation in sock combina- 
tions. In one instance an individual com- 
plained of cold feet. Upon questioning he 
claimed that he had used every combination 
he could think of, and after reviewing them 
it was discovered that he had used every 
combination except the authorized one. 
c. Sock Sizes. There was little briefing 
given and in many cases instead of using 
larger sizes over the smaller ones, some of the 
men tried to use the same sized socks. They 
also used Navy socks as substitutes for the 
regular ski socks. 
For the most part the shoepacs were used 
on the neve surface of the Ross Shelf ice 
and worn in a typical barracks type condi- 
tion in and out of the tents, where they would 
be covered by snow part of the time. 
d. Did the shoepac support the feet prop- 
erly? 
There is no adverse criticism in regard to this. 
e. Describe any resulting foot ailments 
and state probable causes. 
There were no foot ailments that could be 
attributed to wearing the shoepac. 
f. Describe any breaks in the rubber 
portion of the shoepac. 
It was noted on two occasions that the 
shoepac broke down on the toe crease. 
The rubber separated from its fabric base. 
This happened twice during temperatures 
down to about —10° F. 
11. Boots, Ski, Mountain, with Rubber 
Cleated Soles. 
a. General. These boots were issued pri- 
marily for skiing purposes; however, there 
were more boots available in general than 
skis, as the skis were delayed in arriving or 
kept as emergency gear in aircraft. Many 
individuals wore ski boots a large part of 
the time, as the warmth of these boots is 
comparable to that of the shoepac when 
wearing the proper sock combination. The 
individuals who wore the ski boots for the 
the first time as well as the shoepacs felt that 
their feet were warmer in the ski boots. 
Temperature at time of operation ranged 
from slightly above freezing to 25° below 
zero. The percentage of relative humidity 
at the time of test was extremely high; 
however, the absolute humidity was low. 
Environment at the time of the test for 
the most part was on neve or compacted 
snow, and on sea ice. A limited number of 
tests were made on bare rocks. The boots 
were worn in tents with wooden floors and on 
ships. In all cases the traction was adequate. 
b. Would the boots be more comfortable 
if lighter in weight? 
It was generally agreed that a lighter boot 
would be desirable. There was some com- 
plaint regarding the weight of the boots; 
however, when used as ski boots with the 
skis attached, the feeling of weight is reduced. 
c. Is the boot comfortable? 
The boots were very comfortable and were 
preferred to the shoepac by many members 
of the task force. 
d. Does the boot cause foot fatigue when 
worn only a short time? 
There is no evidence of the boots causing 
any more fatigue than other types of footgear. 
e. Is the ski boot generally satisfactory for 
skiing and mountain and rock climbing? 
Yes. 
/. Does the leather remain flexible in cold 
temperatures? 
The leather remained flexible down to 
approximately 0° F. 
g. Are the boots waterproof? 
The expedition was not troubled very 
382 much with conditions where there was any 
free water; consequently, the boots were ade- 
quate for the waterproofness. 
h. Is the attachment of the rubber-cleated 
sole to the midsole satisfactory? 
There were no cases of the soles on the 
boots tearing loose. 
i. Where do the boots fail? 
To the best knowledge of the group of ob- 
servers, there were no failures. 
12, Bag, Duffel. 
a. Is this item of suitable size and dimen- 
sions for shipboard requirement? 
The size of the bag is dependent upon the 
amount of gear the individual is required to 
carry. However, it is about the largest size 
that a man will want to carry; therefore, it is 
approximately correct. 
h. Are the handles and shoulder strap 
assemblies suitable? 
Those who drew Navy sea bags without 
the straps automatically looked for a strap 
or handle to grab hold of. The handle and 
shoulder strap on the duffel bag are suitable 
and very desirable. 
c. Is the closure preferred to that of the sea 
bag? 
The closure is quite satisfactory and defi- 
nitely preferred to the closure of the Navy 
sea bag. 
A general resume of the group of observers 
indicates the bag is an excellent item as it 
stands with a few exceptions. 
13. Suspenders, Trousers. 
Are suspenders preferable to waist belts? 
The problem of suspenders versus waist 
belts is largely dependent upon whether or 
not suspenders can be reached with ease 
when one has to attend to natural functions. 
Although a number of men wore suspenders, 
the majority of men preferred the waist belt 
because of the convenience of being able to 
get to the belt quickly. 
14. Tent, Mountain, Two-Man. 
Because of the limited number of these 
tents made available to the task force, only 
general comments can be made regarding 
the functionality of the tent. The now 
standard tent, mountain, treated with plastic 
sizing for waterproofness, stiffened consider- 
ably in temperatures slightly below freezing. 
The experimental mountain tent made spe- 
cifically for the expedition was used primarily 
as emergency equipment in the planes and 
received little use. However, one of these 
tents was erected for inspection and it was 
considered to be a great improvement over 
the standard item. While erected this tent 
was subjected, accidentally, to the full blast 
of an airplane’s propellers with the blast of 
air estimated to be 100 m. p. h. striking the 
tent. Even though one of the poles was 
broken and several of the tent pins pulled 
out of the snow, the tent withstood this blast 
without any severe damage. 
15. Tents, Lightweight, Pyramidal. 
These tents were used as emergency equip- 
ment on the aircraft and were not available 
for use or inspection by other personnel. 
Because of this there are no comments 
regarding the adequacy of this tent. 
16. Tentage and Paulins. 
a. During operations on the Ross Shelf ice 
the force was housed in pyramidal tents, 20 
by 16 feet. Wooden flooring was available 
for all tents and a framework was con- 
structed to hold each tent. In addition to 
the pyramidal tents, two hospital tents were 
used. No unusual problems were encoun- 
tered in erecting any of the tents. The 
tents offered little protection from winds 
since wind would enter through the laced 
corners, the top of the tent, and through 
the door. In most cases snow walls were 
constructed or liners were improvised to 
stop winds from blowing in the tents. 
383 h. Frosting and icing occurred in the 
tents, and during periods of high winds the 
heat loss of the tents was increased and 
noticeable. 
c. The tent poles and other accessories of 
the tent were considered adequate. It was 
noted that the wooden center pole, because 
of its proximity to the stovepipe, was fre- 
quently scorched, but the hazard of having 
the pole burn up was overcome by covering 
the area near the stove with asbestos. 
d. Occupants of nearly every tent made 
many alterations, the two most common were 
auxiliary entrances and plastic windows. 
e. Tents that are intended for use during the 
polar light season should have windows for 
light and observation, and for the sleeping 
comfort of the men, black-out facilities should 
be provided. 
17. Clothing, General. 
There were so many types of clothing 
issued that there was not a great deal of 
uniformity in the use of clothing, and few, if 
any, complete Army assemblies were ever 
used at any one time by any individual in 
order that true observations could be made 
of the Army’s clothing as it was intended. 
Part of this was due, at the start, to issuing 
windproofs which were felt to be of better 
design in many respects than the general 
Army windproofs. They were of a design 
primarily taken from an Antarctic type, 
made of the Army’s tackle twill and manu- 
factured by the Navy. These were used by 
many individuals; they were the outside 
item and covered up the inner one so that it 
was difficult to spot insulating items of Army 
clothing. 
18. Gloves, Shell, Leather, and Gloves, 
Wool, Insert; Mittens, Shell, Trigger 
Finger, and Wool Inserts. 
a. Are these assemblies warm enough for 
temperatures encountered? 
As for the gloves, shell, leather, and gloves, 
wool, OD, the temperatures are too low for 
continued use of these gloves in general 
below freezing temperatures, and in below 
zero temperatures they are absolutely in- 
adequate. The mittens, shell, trigger finger, 
were warm, in general, down to temperatures 
as low as they went, though had the Arctic 
mittens been available, they would have been 
worn by many of the people on the coldest 
days. 
b. Which assembly was preferred for 
warmth, dexterity, and comfort? 
The mittens, shell, trigger finger with wool 
insert were definitely preferred to the glove 
combination for warmth. A few photogra- 
phers requiring a high degree of dexterity 
wore the gloves. 
c. Is any appreciable amount of difficulty 
noticed caused by the slipperiness of the 
cloth trigger finger? 
A considerable amount of difficulty was 
caused by the slipperiness of the cloth trigger 
finger. 
d. Is the trigger finger of correct length 
and width to allow the best manipulation of 
the finger? 
Since the group was not armed with weap- 
ons there was little use of the trigger finger. 
e. Is the dexterity of the trigger finger satis- 
factory to the majority of tasks? 
The majority of the tasks in the Antarctic 
should be for the complete use of the hand; 
in other words, the best philosophy for de- 
signing equipment for polar work should be 
that it can be manipulated with mittens 
without taking them off. It is not, therefore, 
considered desirable to try to make the 
fingers do the work but to change the equip- 
ment whenever possible so that one can do it 
with mittens. You can’t change the man to 
fit the equipment; the equipment has to be 
built to fit the man. 
/. Is the gauntlet easy to adjust when put- 
ting on mittens? 
384 It requires a certain amount of accustomi- 
zation. After learned, they can be put on 
reasonably well. 
g. In general, what part of the hand gets 
cold first? 
The fingers. The palm of the hand is not 
nearly so sensitive. It is usually the tip of 
the index finger or the thumb that is notice- 
able first. 
h. Is the fit of the mittens satisfactory? 
The Army mittens’ fit was relatively satis- 
factory when used with the Army’s insert, but 
when the Navy’s insert was used it was not a 
satisfactory ht. (The Navy’s wool insert was 
too tight and continuously isolated the index 
finger from the other three.) 
19. Socks, Wool, Cushion Sole. 
a. Due to the unavailability of sizes when 
socks were issued, the sock combination 
consisted of both Army and Navy socks. 
Because of this, no comments on the ade- 
quacy of this combination will be attempted. 
b. Those individuals that received the 
socks, wool, cushion sole, were notably 
impressed with the comfort this sock afforded. 
20. Jacket, Field, M-4943; Jacket, Field, 
Pile, OD. 
Because of the preponderance of the per- 
sonnel who wore the Navy outer parka and 
trouser combination, not a great many of 
the jackets, field, M-1943, were worn. 
In view of this only limited information is 
available on these two items. The few 
people who did wear these jackets were 
favorably impressed with the insulation value 
of the combination and agreed that it pro- 
vided adequate comfort for the temperatures 
encountered. It was observed that the de- 
tachable hood on the jacket, held, M-1943, 
was not adequate in sub-zero temperatures 
and that wind-blown snow would enter the 
hood at the back of the neck. 
21. Shirts, Wool, Flannel, OD. 
A resume of the comments offered on this 
item by the Army observers indicates that 
the shirt was well liked by all personnel. 
22. Overcoat, Parka Type, with Detach- 
able Pile Lining. 
This item was not issued to personnel opera- 
ting on the ice barrier. The Navy parka 
type overcoat of similar design was issued 
to some personnel. It is generally considered 
that this item might be good for barracks 
wear such as leaving the tent and going over 
to the mess hall instead of the inconvenience 
of throwing on parkas over the head, but 
for general work purposes it is not considered 
a particularly good item. 
23. Trousers, Field, Wool Serge, 18-Ounce 
Special. 
The entire observer group agrees that this 
trouser is satisfactory. They were worn by 
nearly all personnel as the item over the 
wool underwear. There are no particular 
constructive suggestions or criticisms regard- 
ing the trousers. 
24. Cap, Field, Cotton, OD, with Visor. 
The cap, when properly fitted, proved 
satisfactory for the temperatures encountered 
on the operation. 
385 APPENDIX IV 
OPERATIONAL AND PLANNING 
DISCUSSION 
I. Hijump Operational Techniques. 
a. Each expedition of the past which has 
gone into the Antarctic regions has used new 
and improved techniques better to attack 
the problems of the unknown. This ad- 
vancement has been very rapid since the 
beginning of this century. Not always are 
the techniques better than the past and often 
an expedition fails to learn all the lessons it 
should from the past with a consequence that 
much independent rediscoveries are made 
both geographically and technique-wise. 
b. This appendix is not intended as a 
criticism of Operation Highjump but primar- 
ily as an analysis of the relative advance of 
this expedition over those of the past. From 
it may be seen the major contributions and 
the avenues for future improvement. 
c. By and large the Navy used new tech- 
niques which can be considered of great im- 
provement. It was by far the largest, swift- 
est, and most elaborate expedition to date. 
The major contributions to exploring tech- 
nique are listed briefly: 
(1) Mass attack with multiple operating 
bases. 
(2) Increase of manpower available by 
about 20 times any previous Antarctic 
expedition. 
(3) The use of ice breakers about 10 times 
as powerful as any used in the past. 
(4) The use of several types of aircraft more 
advanced than those available in the past. 
(5) The use of the airborne magnetometer. 
(6) The use of naval logistics as a basis. 
(7) Improved standards of living condi- 
tions with more reasonable working hours. 
(8) The availability of a network of me- 
teorological stations. 
(9) The facilities of the naval communica- 
tion system. 
(10) Widespread public relations (12 or 
more news correspondents and radio broad- 
cast representatives), 
(11) Maximum utility of the summer 
working season. 
(12) Superlative photographic coverage 
(60 in photographic staff). 
(13) Naval discipline and health facilities. 
d. A few of the above advances in tech- 
niques require further discussion and some of 
their limitations will be commented upon. 
2. Organization and Preparation. 
a. No past expedition even of much smaller 
size was ever outfitted so swiftly. Most past 
expeditions have been privately organized 
and required from 1 to 2 years’ preparation 
time. Task Force 68 was operating in the 
Arctic from July to October 1946 and little 
advanced planning was possible until it re- 
turned. This meant that the whole prepara- 
tion had to be achieved between October 
and December. The bulk was achieved 
during the single month of November. Only 
by the complete facilities and cooperation of 
the Navy Department and assistance by the 
War Department was the feat accomplished. 
The expedition was staged in several ports 
simultaneously. Shipments were expedited 
by rail and air from all parts of the country. 
The primary difficulty with this procedure 
lay in the fact that no one supply officer 
could be personally aware of the receipt of 
386 the shipments. Everything was on paper. 
Contents of all boxes could not be checked, 
adequately marked, or stowed in the most 
desirable sequence for unloading. 
b. The color and identification system, the 
inspection, repacking, and loading used, 
for example, by the United States Antarctic 
Service Expedition in 1939 made it possible 
to know for certain exactly where any item 
was at a given moment and the quality and 
quantity of the contents were always as- 
sured. Each box was identifiable at a dis- 
tance by color markings, large letters, and 
a specific number as to what department it 
belonged to and what it contained. The 
confusion of markings on the Navy’s packing 
cases often defied close examination as to 
whom it belonged or what its contents were. 
3. Recommendations. 
On a polar operation the Army should 
avoid unnecessary rushing of logistic and 
other planning where elements of the opera- 
tion procedures are not clearly known. 
Time should be taken to make certain that 
all possible advantage is taken of past ex- 
perience to avoid classical mistakes. Where 
field parties are expected to be self-sufficient 
all equipment should be checked by the 
supply officer to make certain that items are 
properly packed and that they are of the 
required quality, quantity, and size. Finally, 
a simple but effective marking system should 
be employed that will permit quick location 
of items. Contrasting colors used to stencil 
on bold letters 6 to 12 inches high should be 
prominently placed on all sides of each 
packing case. A box number in figures 2 
to 6 inches high should also be placed on all 
sides. The advantages of such a procedure 
are that, where cargo requires several stages 
of handling, boxes of similar color markings 
or letters can easily be identified and segre- 
gated. A stray box can be spotted out of 
place by even inexperienced hands and the 
series numbers gives a quick check for loca- 
tion of specific boxes. By having markings 
on all sides, boxes can be spotted quickly 
without unnecessary handling and frequently 
in areas of drifting snow boxes become partly 
drifted in so that searching becomes labor 
of digging beyond the wildest nightmare of a 
warehouse man. All caches laid down should 
be segregated, well stacked, and carefully 
marked with tall poles. In one “blizzard55 
it is possible to lose parts of badly stacked 
caches and individual boxes which are 
segregated by even a few feet. Drift snow 
will pack into all crates and badly closed 
boxes. Under periodic melting conditions 
materials may become damaged or at least 
iced up. 
4. Ice Navigational Instruments. 
a. The U. S. S. Northwind was a revelation 
to all the Antarctic veterans who saw her 
breaking into the ice pack. Areas and con- 
ditions previously thought to be unnavigable 
were easily penetrated. Her 12,000 horse- 
power found her still making a sizable im- 
pression in midsummer ice 18 to 20 feet 
thick in a bay where there was no opportu- 
nity for lateral displacement. 
b. Many areas considered inapproachable 
along Antarctic coasts could now be pene- 
trated. New base sites could be located. 
The Northwind and Burton Island are two of 
the best polar exploratory tools owned by 
the United States and should be used to 
investigate coastal areas of the Antarctic 
whenever they are not required for more 
useful investigation in the Arctic. 
c. The potentiality of the Navy’s ice 
breakers should be watched with keen in- 
terest by the Army for their ability may make 
available new tactics and base locations in 
the Arctic. These ice breakers are much 
newer experimentation for ourselves than 
for the U. S. S. R. for whom the first sister 
ships of the Northwind were constructed. It 
387 is considered possible to construct ships even 
more powerful which might open the Arctic 
Ocean for future transshipping of cargo 
between Eurasia and North America. Such 
shipping might not necessarily be confined 
to the summer season only. Although it 
can be expected that air transport over the 
Arctic will be a major means of travel it 
should not be overlooked that we have not 
yet by any means exhausted our possibilities 
of over water, under water, and over pack 
ice means of transport. The truth is we have 
not yet tried very hard to exploit those possi- 
bilities. The new ice breakers were built 
to do a job in pack ice and they do it. The 
Army has not yet tried to build a surface 
vehicle which could travel over pack ice. It 
can’t be an item modified from an existing 
tropical or temperate climate design; it will 
have to be an item built specifically to cope 
with the physical characteristics of polar and 
pack-ice conditions. 
5. Personnel. 
a. The Highjump operation was a test of 
routine equipment and personnel. This was 
of great operational significance and showed 
several contrasts with former expeditions. 
Men who volunteer and have ability to do 
their job are usually happy on Antarctic 
expeditions. They are there because they 
want to be, and the esprit de corps is high. 
They know what the job is and tackle it 
without complaint or with an eye on the 
clock. The esprit de corps would have been 
higher and the quality and quantity of work 
would probably have been greater on Opera- 
tion Highjump had all the men wanted to 
be there and known why they were carrying 
out the operation. As far as the ice party 
was concerned the best example of team- 
work and efficiency was probably the galley 
and mess force which prepared four meals a 
day around the clock and always on time. 
Their working conditions were difficult but 
their spirit was good. They had a clear-cut 
job to do and they did it. In other cases 
efficiency and spirit were largely dependent 
on the quality of leadership and a few out- 
standing men. The men who knew clearly 
their responsibilities were the natural leaders. 
There can be no real criticism of the men 
who did their best. Had they been hand- 
picked they might have done much more. 
b. Veterans quickly become obnoxious 
when they are in the minority. They speak 
boldly of conditions to be met and frequently 
in a changeable place like the Antarctic the 
unexpected usually happens. A veteran of 
more than one previous experience generally 
becomes more cautious for he realizes the 
times he has been wrong and may be embar- 
rassed by the braggadocio of one-time veter- 
ans. In short, new men resent being told 
what to expect and quickly lose faith when 
the predictions prove wrong or are inter- 
preted wrongly. Soon there builds up a 
disregard for the veterans and they may 
become almost ostracized. Neglect of warn- 
ings are sometimes unfortunate in con- 
sequence and even the innocent veteran is 
identified with false predictions which he 
did not make. But he is branded because 
he is a veteran. Veterans are important on 
an expedition as a link with the past as long 
as they are not tied to it. Extreme tolerance 
is required on both sides to prevent mis- 
understandings. The veteran is prone to 
step outside his field of personal knowledge 
and may make unusual circumstances of 
the past seem like the usual or common 
experience. Each man who goes on an 
expedition becomes a veteran and if he goes 
twice he may find his whole outlook changed 
and soon has to realize that he didn’t learn 
everything the first time. An expedition 
which fails, on the other hand, to heed some 
of the advice of its veterans has strong 
critics close at hand, a circumstance fre- 
quently justifiable. This comment is in- 
388 eluded here in place of a series of criticism 
of minor nature which would show how 
certain knowledge of the past had to be 
learned the hard way. On the other hand, 
an equally long list could be made in rebuttal 
of how new ingenuity and different circum- 
stances were improved in the face of veteran 
predictions. 
c. It behooves the Army to make careful 
study of any polar operations which it car- 
ries on in the future to try and make use of 
veteran knowledge without being held back by 
predictions of impossibility. Each new ex- 
perience will be different and only a portion 
of past experience will apply. 
d. Only a few broad observations could be 
made of new unpredictable problems en- 
countered by the massive naval attack on 
the Antarctic. These are offered not in 
criticism of the Navy but as a warning to 
the Army if it should try to carry out a 
similar operation. 
6. Base Communications and Transpor- 
tation. 
The larger a base camp the more difficult 
will be communications and transportation. 
The Navy’s base camp was spread out in 
excess of a half mile square. The lack of 
local field phone communications and avail- 
ability of transportation made search for an 
individual on foot very difficult. One would 
walk on skis laboriously across the width of 
the camp only to find the man he wanted 
had just gone back to the other side. Such 
circumstances slowed down progress to a 
large extent. The solution would be either 
a net of field telephones or adequate fast 
transportation. 
7. Scientific Observations and Discussion. 
a. This expedition was a naval operation 
in which scientific observation was second- 
ary. This was made clearly understood. 
However, the public relations approved by 
the Navy led the public to believe that it was 
a scientific enterprise fostered by the Navy. 
This was unfortunate in some respects, for 
it placed the expedition scientists in an 
awkward position. They had little support 
often in the field and had to explain why 
they didn’t do more by the agencies who 
sent them. 
b. An operation into a little known area 
cannot fail to be expected to return with 
new knowledge. There should be a more 
clear-cut relationship between operations 
and scientific work. The Navy showed 
great wisdom in giving a mapping, testing, 
and scientific project to an operating task 
force. It gave a morale incentive that the 
operation was worth while. It is question- 
able that as much would have been achieved 
by Task Force 68 had it not had the interest- 
ing and publicized project Highjump. 
When the ice became a hazard the ships 
could have pulled out had they not been 
faced with failure of the scientific part of 
their mission, which was vitally important 
to the public. 
c. Operation Highjump can be measured 
in three ways: what it did; what the public 
believes it did; and what it could have done. 
The first two are a matter of record, and in 
respect to lesser expeditions of the past the 
achievements are the greatest yet. It is only 
when we examine what it could have done 
that we see chances of improvement for the 
future. In view of the fact that a review of 
these points could only be regarded as 
criticism which would detract from the ex- 
cellent achievement by the Navy, the specific 
points are better left unlisted, for they are 
well understood or can be deduced by those 
concerned with map-making, radar, radia- 
tion studies, glaciology, navigation, geology, 
terrestrial magnetism, and other fields of 
science. 
d. The pertinent conclusion is that during 
opportunities for observations operations 
should serve, not direct, a research program. 
389 A project director or scientific director 
should coordinate research work and have 
the facilities of the operation staff to assist in 
carrying the work out. In Navy and Army 
channels an operations officer is considered 
always senior. His understanding of research 
requirements may be as far removed as ship 
operations would be to a geologist. 
e. It is broadly recognized that the scien- 
tist has and must still have a more important 
role in the Armed Forces. Task Force 68 
served to emphasize the distance we must go 
before the scientist and the military can work 
on an even footing. If the Army should 
attempt to carry out a similar scientific Task 
Force it is recommended that the attitude be 
taken that an appointed Scientific Director 
be responsible to coordinate and plan the 
field research and that operations be charged 
with the responsibility of carrying them out 
safely and successfully. The scientist needs 
the support of operations. It is folly to 
assume that operations can do the research 
planning by itself unless the operations 
officer is a qualified scientist himself—a most 
rare combination. 
390 APPENDIX V 
GLACIOLOGICAL STUDY OF BAY 
OF WHALES AREA 
The history and formation of the Bay 
of Whales has been of scientific interest since 
its discovery over a century ago by Sir 
James Clark Ross. Why is the bay persistent 
in its location and still constantly changing 
its appearance? The true nature of the bay 
could hardly be determined in a single visit, 
for the bay structure occupies an area close 
to 800 square miles and the changes in shape 
are slow. It was not until after the Byrd 
Antarctic Expeditions had occupied the area 
three times at intervals of about 5 years 
apart that the story began to unfold itself. 
Mapping and aerial photography was done 
on each trip and the relative direction of 
movements was established. The determina- 
tion of the direction and rate of movement 
of the sites of Little America I and II gave 
the first clue. 
There will be no attempt in this paper to 
give a whole discussion of the Bay of Whales, 
but those new facts and measurements made 
during Operation Highjump will be listed for 
record. A general background of facts will suf- 
fice to set the scene for these new observations. 
Essentially the Bay of Whales owes its 
existence to the presence of Roosevelt Island 
to the south, around which flows two great 
shelf ice systems. Roosevelt Island is com- 
pletely snow covered, rising to a maximum 
elevation of about 1,200 feet. The island is 
over 50 miles long and averages about 10 
miles across. Its exact size and shape can 
as yet only be estimated because of its snow 
cover; however, its reality has been proven by 
seismic soundings and on Highjump expe- 
dition by the airborne magnetometer. To 
the westward flows the central portion of the 
Ross Shelf ice. This shelf is part of a sheet of 
ice only occasionally deformed, measuring 
roughly 300 miles east to west and 400 miles 
north to south. (The far western portion 
of this shelf may later be proven to be an 
entity in itself.) Along the eastern side of 
Roosevelt Island flows another shelf ice ap- 
proximately 100 by 200 miles in area. This 
sheet has always been considered part of the 
Ross Shelf ice; however, it is both separated 
and of different origin. The name Borch- 
grevinck has been proposed for this portion 
of shelf to honor the first man to set foot on 
the shelf ice at the Bay of Whales in 1900. 
The Bay of Whales is the deformed area 
caused by the conflict of these two shelf ice 
systems as they clear the north end of Roose- 
velt Island and approach one another. The 
western shelf (Central Ross Shelf) is moving 
irresistably northward about one quarter of 
a mile a year into the Ross Sea. The 
Borchgrevinck Shelf, on which all of the bases 
in the Bay of Whales area have been estab- 
lished, is not moving directly northward 
toward the apparent path of least resistance, 
but has apparently struck a submerged ob- 
struction and the primary forward motion is 
westward. This means that the navigable 
portion of the Bay of Whales is constantly 
closing. As the two shelves meet, great 
pressure and splitting of the shelves occur 
and the seasonal bay ice is churned and 
collapsed into a tangle of ice which thickens 
to shelf ice proportions* 
391 On the basis of previous studies, the writer 
had a basis to predict that the navigable 
portion of the Bay of Whales would be closed 
in late 1946. This would have, of course, 
prevented the use of the Bay for the Central 
Group of Task Force 68. The prediction 
carried with it several unpredictable condi- 
tions, which were— 
1. The Bay would be closed or so jammed 
with ice that ships could not enter, 
2. Or that the meeting of the shelves would 
be slowed down by ice jammed in the jaws, 
3. Or that the great force would cause a 
breaking off of large masses of shelf ice that 
would cause an improved and enlarged bay, 
4. Or that the fragile end of West Cape 
which protruded out as a long arm would 
break off and leave a small but partly usable 
bay for the next 4 or 5 years. 
The mouth of the Bay of Whales was 
about 10 miles wide in 1911 when Amundsen 
wintered in the Bay. The entrance was 
much farther south and he was able to sail 
the Fram up to the shoals off Roosevelt Is- 
land. In 1929 the first Byrd Expedition 
found the bay mouth 5 miles wide; in 1934 
it had narrowed perceptibly; and in 1940 it 
was only about \}i miles wide. 
The arrival of the Central Group at the 
Bay of Whales in mid-January 1947 was a 
greatly anticipated event for the writer. 1 
The mouth of the Bay was not closed even 
though it was less than 1,000 feet wide. 
The Northwind found the bay ice intact but 
fearlessly entered and broke out a lagoon 
about 2 square miles of sufficient size to let 
the cargo ships enter within 24 to 48 hours. 
It was not until the writer had an opportun- 
ity, 2 or 3 days later, to fly over the bay in 
the helicopter observation plane that he 
could determine just what had happened. 
The bay mouth had closed a little ahead of 
anticipated schedule. About one-half mile 
of the tip of West Cape had broken off and 
a small dent had been broken out of the 
barrier wall of the contact point against the 
Borchgrevinck Shelf. 
While in the Bay of Whales during January 
and February 1947, the writer set up measur- 
ing points to determine the rate of flow of 
the shelves. Along one tension crack near 
the east side of the bay two check measure- 
ments were run until the deforming ice 
destroyed the markers. The rate was ex- 
tremely uniform and was found to be 4.37 
feet per day for the Borchgrevinck Shelf 
moving westward. Two sets of large markers 
were placed on the shelf ice at either side 
of the narrow entrance. These were photo- 
graphed periodically from the air, and meas- 
urements were taken by alinement. The 
markers were originally all in a straight line 
and the pairs on each side were placed ac- 
curately 300 feet apart. The displacement 
showed that the western shelf was moving 
northward at a rate of 4.4 feet per day. The 
surprisingly close agreement in the rate of 
movement of these independent shelves was 
still more amazing when it was checked 
against a previously measured movement of 
the Ross Shelf near McMurdo Sound. 
Here, too, the rate was approximately 4.4 
feet per day. Whether these closely agree- 
ing rates are just coincidental cannot yet be 
ascertained; however, it suggests that the 
character of ice thickness, snow accumula- 
tion, and climatic conditions are sufficiently 
uniform to give flat lying shelf a constant 
rate of flow no matter what its direction 
might be. 
The bay mouth closed about 170 feet 
while we were in the bay. The remaining 
distance to complete a second closure was 
calculated to be covered during the middle 
of the winter season in June or July 1947. 
From appearances the West Cape would 
again break, perhaps to an even greater 
extent. Within 4 or 5 years the navigable 
portion of the bay will be completely com- 
pressed and by that time a great cataclysm 
1 Dr. Paul A. Siple. 
392 will be close at hand which will cause much 
larger portions to be broken out under these 
irresistible forces’ meeting. The west side 
may continue to break for years to come, for 
it appears to be the more easily dislodged, 
but the east side will have to give also. The 
cycle of the Bay of Whales cannot be de- 
termined with certainty as yet but is probably 
about 50 years. When the great cataclysm 
occurs, the sites of Little America I, II, and 
III, as well as the more precarious tent camp 
of Operation Highjump will float out to 
sea. This sentimental loss will be made up 
for, however, by the realization that a new, 
enlarged Bay of Whales will be available, as 
a much better harbor than it is today, for 
the next 20 or 30 years. 
Additional work was done on the general 
study of the Bay of Whales area. Numerous 
areas were checked visually by the writer 
and Mr. Davis from the OY plane, piloted 
by the latter. The entire 800 square miles 
were studied carefully from all directions. 
The direction of all stress lines, tension cracks, 
and pressure ridges were checked carefully 
and found to fit all of the surmised condi- 
tions. 
Trimetrogon photographs were taken of the 
central bay area as the fourth of a series of 
aerial studies since 1929. The front of the 
shelf ice or barrier wall was mapped again 
for gross study of the whole shelf ice front. 
A base line was laid and tied into the survey 
line of 1940 to check the absolute movement 
of the Little America sites. 
Special studies of the ice structure were 
made by Arthur Howard, the geologist. 
These physical measurements should give a 
better understanding of the gross deformation. 
The survey made in the area by the air- 
borne magnetometer by Mr. Balsley located 
independently a rise in the ocean floor that 
ties the Borchgrevinck Shelf near Kainan 
Bay, The writer flew over this area many 
times in 1940 and 1947 to try to locate the 
specific area. He noted certain tension 
cracks which indicated the probable tied 
spot was on the east side of Kainan Bay 
and you can imagine his gratification when, 
quite by accident, Mr. Balsley announced 
the confirmation. 
The study of the Bay of Whales area has 
been taken up by the National Research 
Council under a committee entitled “De- 
formation of the Ross Shelf Ice” under the 
chairmanship of Dr. Walter Bucher. A 
number of structural geologists and glaciolo- 
gists have been interested in the study. A 
grant for research work was made by the 
Geological Society of America. The pri- 
mary reason for the interest in this area is 
that by better understanding the structure 
of the homogeneous ice deformation in the 
Bay of Whales a better understanding may 
be had of the crustal deformation of the 
earth’s surface. Here in miniature is a re- 
production of most of the earth’s crustal 
type of disturbances due to tension and 
pressure. 
765274—48 26 
393 APPENDIX VI 
MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
NEVE SNOW SURFACES 
The Army observers considered that one 
of their primary responsibilities while at the 
Bay of Whales was to collect engineering 
data regarding the mechanical characteris- 
tics of neve snow surfaces. A large portion 
of this collection of data was made in con- 
junction with Navy base engineering studies, 
most of which are discussed in the Navy’s 
official report and under chapter 3 of this 
volume. The following pages include a few 
additional observations made independently 
by Army personnel not reported elsewhere. 
The question of snow accumulation has 
long been a matter of question in the polar 
regions. Normal meteorological methods for 
recording snowfall have proved unreliable 
because of drifting snow. On the United 
States Antarctic Service expedition, 1940-41, 
Dr. F. A. Wade and his associates carried out 
a project to determine snow accumulation 
rate for 1 year in the vicinity of Little 
America III.1 In 1940 several aerial map- 
ping markers were placed on the face of the 
snow for ground control. These consisted 
of canvas strips laid on the surface in the 
form of a large cross and marked with a 
bamboo pole in the center. Upon the return 
to this area in January 1947 some of these 
markers were still visible and determinations 
of accumulation over a 6-year period of a 
distance of more than a mile from any sur- 
face structures were possible. 
One of the canvas strips was laid within 
approximately 20 feet of the eastern edge of 
the Bay of Whales directly west of Little 
America III. The canvas strips, after 6 
years, were still essentially on the surface. 
This would indicate that the barrier edge 
does not build up, but probably erodes under 
a constant flow of wind, which explains 
primarily the commonly observed fact that 
the forward edge of the shelf, or barrier as it 
is best known, is lower than the surface 
behind it. Generally there is a difference ol 
25 to 50 feet. The reason snow does not 
accumulate at this point is obviously due to 
the sweeping effect of the wind and the 
tendency for the colder air on the shelf sur- 
face to flow over the edge due to Katabotic 
forces. This flow of air causes an increase of 
wind velocity approaching the very edge and 
gives rise to the drifted ice foot below and 
the picturesque cornices and snowfall figures 
along barrier edges. 
At a distance of approximately 3,000 feet 
back from this edge the barrier surface had 
reached its characteristic level. At this point 
an old marker was still observable. Two 
inches of one of the bamboo poles still pro- 
jected above the surface. At Dr. Siple’s 
suggestion Captain Wiener dug down to the 
canvas strips below and found the total 
accumulation over the 6-year period to be 
97 inches. This could not, of course, be ap- 
portioned equally for each year because of 
the tendency toward compaction. Twenty- 
seven samples were taken to determine the 
approximate density of the cross section at 
all levels. The following table shows these 
observations: 
1 “Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,” 
page 168, volume 89, Number I, April 30, 1945. 
394 Computation Sheet 
Determination of In-Place Density of Snow 
Ross Sea Ice Shelf, Bay of Whales, Antarctica 
Date Observation: Feb. 22, 1947. Temperature: 11 0 F. Observers: Reinhardt, Holcombe. 
Sample Point; At old survey monument established 1941. 
Thickness 
Average 
cross section 
Volume (cu. 
Weight 
Density (lbs. 
Specific 
Dimensions of 
cross section 
Depth below surface (in.) 
(in.) 
area ($q. in.) 
in.) 
(lbs.) 
per cu. in.) 
gravity 
(in.) 
0-2% 
2.375 
59.766 
141.944 
1.72 
0.0121 
0.3352 
63/g x 93/8 
23/s~53A 
3.375 
58.594 
197.755 
2.72 
0.0138 
0.3823 
614 x 93/q 
534-8% 
2.375 
57.813 
137.306 
1.85 
0.01 35 
0.3740 
614 x 914 
evs-uvs 
3.375 
55.891 
188.632 
2.86 
0.0152 
0.4211 
6Vq x 9/s 
111/2-14% 
2.875 
54.750 
157.406 
2.40 
0.0152 
0.4211 
6 x 9 Yq 
1 43/8-1 5 
15-195/8 
No specimen. 
4.625 68.141 
315.152 
4.70 
0.0149 
0.4127 
6 Vs x 11 Yq 
195/8-21 
21-24% 
No specimen. 
3.875 65.000 
215.875 
3.48 
0.0161 
0.4460 
6 % x 10 
24/8-275/8 
2.750 
65.000 
178.750 
2.36 
0.0132 
0.3657 
6% x 10 
275/8-32 
4.375 
65.000 
284.375 
4.26 
0.0150 
0.4155 
6/2 x 10 
32-3534 
3.750 
61.875 
232.031 
3.29 
0.0142 
0.3934 
6/g x 9 
3534-33% 
3.125 
59.063 
184.572 
2.50 
0.0135 
0.3740 
634. x 834. 
38/8-4034 
1.875 
56.531 
105.996 
1.95 
0.0184 
0.5097 
634 x 83/q 
4034-45% 
4.500 
53.828 
242.226 
3.26 
0.0135 
0.3740 
6/g x 8 Vs 
4514-51 
5.750 
51.344 
295.228 
4.67 
0.0158 
0.4377 
6/g x 734. 
51-5414 
3.250 
66.656 
216.632 
3.07 
0.0142 
0.3934 
634 x 9/s 
5414-56% 
2.625 
64.594 
169.559 
2.65 
0.0156 
0.4321 
6% x 934 
56%-60% 
3.250 
63.375 
205.969 
3.28 
0.0159 
0.4404 
6/? x 93/\ 
60/8-645/8 
4.500 
64.186 
288.837 
3.93 
0.0136 
0.3767 
6/2 x 9/g 
645/8-6734 
3.125 
61.359 
191.747 
3.16 
0.0165 
0.4571 
63/g x 9/g 
6734-72% 
5.125 
88.375 
452.922 
5.80 
0.0128 
0.3546 
1 2% X 7 
72%-76% 
4.000 
86.625 
346.500 
4.76 
0.01 37 
0.3795 
12% x 7 
76/8-8034 
3.875 
87.281 
338.214 
4.47 
0.0132 
0.3656 
12% x 7% 
8034-845/g 
3.875 
86.391 
334.765 
4.32 
0.0129 
0.3573 
12/s x 7/e 
8 4/3-8 8% 
3.750 
87.000 
326.250 
4.03 
0.0124 
0.3435 
12 X 714 
383/8-92% 
3.750 
51.188 
191.955 
2.84 
0.0148 
0.4100 
5% X 93/ 
92/8-94% 
2.750 
51.844 
142.571 
2.10 
0.0147 
0.4072 
5% X 9% 
94/ 97% 
2.750 
53.078 
145.965 
1.86 
0.0127 
0.3518 
5 34 x 9/s 
Note. It will be noted that this cross section shows greater seasonal differences in density than changes due to depth. 
Another marker 1 mile south of Little 
America III was located (previously known 
as Station B) on the survey base line of 1940. 
The bamboo pole at this point projected 
7 feet at the surface when first visited in 
1947. An effort to dig down to this canvas 
was interrupted, however. The canvas was 
not struck at the depth of approximately 
8 feet, although it was considered certain 
that the canvas could not be much lower. 
Prodding with rods did not reveal its loca- 
tion and it is conceivable that the canvas 
had blown away or that the shaft dug down 
was not over it. It confirmed roughly the 
fact that the first measurement taken was a 
reasonably accurate measurement for the 
whole surface. Some other markers were 
located but most were completely drifted 
over. 
The only other long term snow accumula- 
tion record of this type was made by Ernest 
Joyce who in 1909 discovered Scott’s depot 
395 A after”" it had been abandoned 6% years 
previously. He reported the annual rate of 
accumulation to be 38 centimeters (reference 
see Wade above). These figures agree rea- 
sonably well with those found by this expe- 
dition. 
The accumulation rate of snow over Little 
America 1 and II appeared to be of the 
same order of magnitude, and on the first 
visit to this area the smokestack of the science 
building built in 1934 and well above the 
snow in 1940 was exactly flush with the sur- 
face in 1947. A slight depression in the top 
of the stack made it resemble a golf cup. 
A storm a day later was sufficient to erase 
once and for all the last surface indications 
of the position of this house. At Little 
America III the gables of the houses and 
the flat top of the snow cruiser, the highest 
objects in that area, were exactly flush with 
the surface, the highest point in that vicinity. 
The surface arched downward in all direc- 
tions. Only a few major directional drifts 
were apparent. 
A pit in the snow surface was dug beside 
the science building of Little America III 
in the Antarctic winter of 1940. This pit 
was originally approximately 23 feet deep. 
The depth of the pit as measured in 1947 
had shrunk to approximately 16 feet. This 
cannot be considered entirely due to normal 
weight, for in an area surrounding the point 
there was a surface accumulation of nearly 
15 feet, including the science building and 
the snow drifts around it. This weight 
added appreciably to the compression of 
the pit walls. Detailed investigation of the 
pit was made by Mr. Howard which will be 
described in the reports of the United 
States Geological Survey. 
The compression of the surface is probably 
a greater force causing destruction of buried 
buildings than lateral pressure. The effect 
on the buildings of Little America I and II 
was to cause the floor to come up, the roof 
down, and the walls to bulge inward. 
At the same time a snow room made in 1934 
about 15 feet below the surface appeared 
in 1940 unaltered except for slight diminish- 
ing in size. 
396 APPENDIX VII 
CLOTHING AND FOOTGEAR 
EXPERIMENTS 
1. General. 
Certain radical clothing experiments were 
carried out by the Dr. Siple while in the 
Antarctic regions. These experiments were 
a continuation of earlier research under 
OQMG during World War II. The primary 
studies included body clothing and footgear. 
2. Hand-Made Sponge Rubber Suit. 
a. It has proved difficult for industry to 
construct a suitable spacer to lie between the 
body surface and heavy clothing lying over 
it. The desirability of such a spacer is to 
serve as a ventilating space which will 
prevent any liquid body sweat from passing 
into the clothing to deteriorate its insulating 
properties. On the trip south several volun- 
teers, including Commander Watson, Cap- 
tain Wiener, Lt. Richard Byrd, Jr., and 
others, helped Dr. Siple to construct a 
special hand-made suit. The suit was made 
of three-eighth inch blocks of sponge rubber 
cross threaded on thin rubber bands with 
intervening spaces of one-quarter to half an 
inch. This fabric was formed into a slip-on 
shirt with a turtle neck, wrist length sleeves, 
and sufficient length to hang well below the 
hips. A corresponding pair of drawers to 
ankle length was started but never com- 
pleted. The suit was first tried out when the 
sleeves were only a few inches below the 
shoulders. The rubber suit was worn over 
the skin and covered by a close fitting Byrd 
cloth shirt. On top of this were worn 
regulation Army parka, pile and parka, 
cotton, O. D. on the outside. Other gar- 
ments were regulation Army winter combat 
type. The suit was used during a ski run 
across pack ice on a windy day with temper- 
atures about 25° F. The assembly was 
comfortable, although more than required 
for the temperature and exercise. Ventila- 
tion was achieved by leaving the parkas open 
at the waist, neck, and sleeves. 
b. At the completion of the trip when the 
outer parkas were removed, it was noted 
that the inner windproof Byrd cloth shirt 
was dry everywhere but on the lower arms 
where the spacer was lacking. Long sleeves 
were added before it was used again. 
c. The rubber spacer shirt was worn on 
many succeeding exposures with essentially 
the same results. Its advantages were— 
(1) Because of the good ventilating system, 
heavy clothing could be kept on inside tents 
and shelters without danger of sweating. 
(2) The sensation was one of quickly 
achieving acclimatization which normally 
requires 2 or 3 weeks. 
(3) The suit was comfortable and easily 
ventilated to regulate sweating without re- 
moval of excess clothing. 
(4) The suit did not noticeably irritate the 
skin and was slept in with comfort. There 
was no cutting in as compared with the 
Norwegian Brynji Vest. 
d. The disadvantages were— 
(1) The suit was crudely constructed and 
a bit difficult to put on. 
(2) The points of the rubber blocks left 
some marks on the skin. These would be 
eliminated if balls (as desired) were used. 
397 (3) Some moisture was retained in the 
sponge blocks. This could be eliminated by 
a dipped skin of rubber over each ball or block. 
(4) At temperatures well below zero Fahr- 
enheit, under conditions of strong wind, the 
control of ventilation of the outer clothing 
was insufficient to prevent chilling. This 
could be corrected by compatible designing, 
e. It was found that reasonable success 
could be achieved by wearing the double 
faced pile parka over the naked skin. The 
elimination of wool underwear and shirt was 
found to be desirable. This method of 
dressing at very low temperatures on windy 
days proved insufficient also because the 
ventilation could not be adequately reduced 
with the designs available. 
/. It is recommended that further experi- 
mentation be made with rubber ball spacers 
and that an impervious layer be used over 
the top to make positive prevention of body 
moistures getting into the insulating gar- 
ments. Body moisture would be bypassed 
out the neck and other openings by ventila- 
tion and vapor pressure differential. 
3. Footgear. 
a. During most of the stay on the ice, Dr. 
Siple wore experimental footgear. The 
favored design for the coldest conditions 
included the following, from foot outward: 
(1) Sock cushion sole. 
(2) Experimental rubber sock, knee length. 
(3) Socks, felt. 
(4) AAF flying boots, fleece lined. 
b. The advantages were— 
(1) Superior foot comfort. 
(2) Drying of footgear reduced to the 
cushion sole sock and interior of rubber sock. 
(3) Speed of dressing feet. 
c. The disadvantages were—- 
(1) Combinations being experimented 
with; all different in length. 
(2) Speed of dressing would have been 
greatly improved had the inner rubber 
lining been attached to the outer boot. 
d. The combination was used on long 
flights in unheated planes where the crews 
were subjected to little activity. The com- 
bination was found to be equal if not superior 
in comfort and protection to fur mukluks. 
e. It is recommended that OQMG con- 
tinue its development of the double vapor 
barrier boot to replace the shoepac in wet, 
cold, and very cold areas. The development 
will increase comfort and protection, elim- 
inate the heavy wool ski socks, and greatly 
reduce drying time. 
4. Mask, Type X. 
a. Both Mr. Davis and Dr. Siple tried out 
the Mask, Type X at temperatures below 30° 
F. in wind. The added efficiency was im- 
mediately apparent and added greatly to 
the protection of the whole clothing assem- 
bly. The effect was so pronounced that it 
was apparent to both that clothing previously 
felt inadequate could have been reduced for 
comfort. 
b. It is recommended that Mask, Type X 
be improved from the production design 
standpoint and standardized. Further, that 
sufficient amount be purchased to be placed 
in the Arctic stock pile. 
398 APPENDIX VIII 
MAPS U. S. NAVAL ANTARCTIC EXPEDITION 1946-47 
TASK\ FpRck 68 
v FLIGHT TRApfCs DURiNG TRI-^ETROG(W' 
PHOTOGRAPHIC Rtos 
AZIMUTHAL fOUKNSTANT AtKUfCTlOH v THE 1946 47\ 
INDICATED FLIGHT LINES 
ofNtlighKwnes is depende^upon coDeo/transmissioW 
of datXand resulting Brow inability^ 
TO\ ESTABLISH tWe THOUGHTS'7 
THEj\HJMBEBS INDICATE THE/TaSK GROLH? ANdXnDIVHXJAL' FLIGHT. 
\he coa$tline\)ntti1sxbase mapxis not accurate. see/\ 
MAXTOR COASTLINES ESTABLISHED BV.JASK/TORCE^. 
SUBMITTED 18 MARCH 1947 
AZIMUTHAL <OUIW»TANT PROJECTION lX§. NAVAL ANTARCTICEXPEDITION 1946 194^/ 
1. Two small islands, exposed rock, elevation 500 feet. 
2. Mount Ruth Siple relocated here, 15,000-foot elevation 
confirmed. 
3. Open water west and southwest of Mount Ruth Siple in- 
dicates George Getz shelf ice nonexistent in this locality. 
4. and 5. High mountain sighted here from distant aircraft. 
6. Two high mountains, approximately 16,000 feet. 
7. Mountain range 9,000 feet, plateau to south 8,000 feet. 
8. Large firm field inland from coast from 121° to 128° W., 
2.000 feet. 
9 Mountain, 35 miles inland, from 117°30' to 118°42' W., 
5.000 feet. 
10. Five mountains, elevation 3,000 feet, centered at 75°14' S. 
111°40'W. 
11. Mountain range, elevation 3,000 feet, extends along 
110° W. 
12. "X-Ray Mountain Range" elevation from 2,500 feet in 
west to 1 5,000-foot peak of Mount X-Ray at the eastern 
extremity. 
1 3. Mountain range, 35 exposed peaks, 85 miles long, elevation 
rises from 2,500 feet in the north to 5,000 feet in the south. 
14. Five mountain peaks, estimated elevation 6,000 feet. 
15. Five small islands, exposed land, 400 yards long, 700 feet 
high, 
16. This coast line is snow-covered with patches of brown land 
exposed. Open water along shore inside of pack ice. 
17. Islands and glaciers discovered here. North part of peninsula 
defined by open water, west coast difficult to locate. 
18. Two parallel mountain ranges extend approximately east- 
west across the peninsula. (Noville mountains relocated.) 
19. Several islands discovered in this area. 
20. Monique Peak sighted, estimated 3,000 feet, but top in 
clouds. 
21. Open water on north coasts of Alexander I and Charcot 
islands. 
22. Ice covers Wilkins Strait joining Alexander I and Charcot. 
23. Southern portion of Marguerite Bay accessible to ships. 
24 and 25. Sighted mountain here. 
26. Location of Douglas range and other mountains on Alex- 
ander I Island are correct as previously charted. 
27. Additional data secured via aerial photography concerning 
speed and direction of movement of sectors of Ross Shelf Ice. 
28. Kainan Bay formed by submerged island. 
29. Strong magnetometer irregularity indicates submerged island 
or volcanic dike under shelf ice at this point. 
30. Confirmed presence submerged island. 
31. Magnetometer confirms outline of submerged Roosevelt 
Island. 
32. Submerged island here (magnetometer). 
33. Submerged island thought to be here is either nonexistent 
or of sedimentary rock structure. 
34. East coast of Ross Sea discovered under ice cover. 
35. Distinctive snake-like belt of disturbed ice. 
36. Mountain group with plateau to south. 
37. High mountain range with foothills to north. 
38. Mountain range, elevation 9,000 feet, with saddle pass. 
39. Mountain range, elevation approximately 1 3,000 feet. 
40. Discovered glacier descending from polar plateau. 
41. Interior and upper reaches of Wade glacier explored. 
Mountains and tributaries to Wade glacier discovered. 
42. Explored mountains between Wade and Beardmore Glaciers. 
43. Small group of mountains approximately 10,000 feet 
44. Explored tributary glaciers and mountains of Beardmore 
area. 
45. Revisited the South Pole, exploring beyond it from Little 
America. 
46. Discovered changes in ice front, tension cracks, pressure, etc. 
47. Explored dry glaciers, ice lakes, streams and falls. Devil's 
Postpile, etc., here. 
48. Explored and mapped entire western and central portions 
of mountains bordering west coast of Ross Ice Shelf. Nothing 
but polar plateau visible west of mountains. 
49. Polar plateau level and featureless to extent of visibility. 
50. Buckle Island mapped, peak elevation 3,900 feet. 
51. Russell Peak on Sturge Island 8,500 feet; island mapped. 
52. Mountains 8,000 feet high between Capes Cheetham and 
Williams, higher mountains to the south and a very high 
rolling plateau inland. 
53. Rennick Bay extends inland to 71°30' S.,- both sides lined 
with mountains up to 8,000 feet. 
54. Scattered low mountains in the vicinity of Archer’s Point. 
55. Oates coast lined with mountains up to 10,000 feet in 
elevation 
56. Rolling ice plateau averaging 6,000 feet in elevation. 
57. Several new islands and glaciers found along this rugged 
terrain coastal area. 
58. South Magnetic Pole may have moved here (inexact 
aircraft compasses). 
59. Ice cap elevation 8,500 feet and featureless except for 
rolls and a few sharp rises. 
60. Featureless ice cap areas. 
61. Ice cap elevation 9,500 feet and absolutely featureless. 
62. Valley or glacier extends along 138°30' E., from beyond 
horizon to the sea. 
63. Loose pack, easy access to the coast with an ice breaker. 
64. Solid pack with no leads from Davis Bay to Cape De- 
couverte. 
65. Dense pack and occasional open bodies of water in solid 
pack. 
66. Close pack of small floes offshore, scattered collections of 
icebergs. 
67 Ice Lake 20 by 50 miles located here 
68. Porpoise Bay discovered to be much deeper than pre- 
viously known. 
69. Ice cap elevation 6,500 feet. No mountains or glaciers 
visible from here. 
70. Loose pack, navigable by ice breaker at any point. 
71. Open water along coast as far out as visibility (15 miles). 
72. Many small islands and many nunataks along coast; no 
mountains. 
73. Actual coast line, this area docs not agree with existing 
charts. 
74. Open water in Davis Sea from 92° E. to the shelf ice. 
75. Ice cap rises to a great elevation west of 11 5° E. 
76. Ice cap less than 1,000 feet in elevation in this area. 
77. Two large glaciers here. 
78. Ice cap forms dome at this point, rising to 5,000 feet. 
79. Ice cap elevation 2,700 feet. 
80. Outcrop of black earth (possibility of coal?). 
81. Deep embayment at 110° E. 
82. Glacier; rust-colored land outcrops discolor glacier and 
its bergs. 
83. Largest glacier in group, sheer drop of 1,000 feet. 
84. and 86. Glacier. 
85. Excellent landing field accessible to protected ships. 
87. Discovered narrow ice tongue. 
88. Several nunataks here. 
89. "Bunger's Oasis," 20-milc circle of ice-free hills 500 feet 
high and cone-shaped. 
90. Denman Glacier extends south to 67°35', rimmed by 
5,000-foot mountains. 
91. Ice cap elevation 6,000 feet. 
92. Mountains sighted here protruding several thousand feet 
over ice cap. 
93. Ice cap elevation 8,300 feet. 
94. Ice cap elevation 8,000 feet. 
95. Nunatak discovered here. 
96. Large group of mountains. 
97. Ice cap elevation about 8,000 feet. 
98. Prominent mountain range. 
99. Prominent mountain range. 
100. Sorsdal Glacier much longer than described. 
101. South coast of Mackenzie Sea is open water. 
102. Shelf ice 200 feet high. 
103. Mountain indicated here on existing charts does not exist. 
104. Ice cap elevation 20 miles in is 3,500 feet. Ascent 
continues. 
105. Edward VIII Gulf much larger than charted, has split 
glacier, 
106. Scott Range 6,000 + feet, top obscured. 
107. Mountain range. 
108. Large glacier discovered here. 
109. Maximum elevation along this line is 4,000 feet. 
110. Glacier and shelf ice to the north. 
111. Thorshammer Island is nonexistent. 
112. This peninsula actually is shelf ice. 
113. Sighted mountain range here. 
114. Lower and less well defined mountain range. 
115. Mountain range 1 3,000+ feet/ ice cap to north 5,000 feet. 
116. Payer group of mountains misplaced. The plane flew 
pearby in good weather but did not sight it. 
117. Location of ice tongue confirmed. 
118. Open water to ocean, except for very loose pack. 
119. Previously known coast line remapped and confirmed. 
About half of this coast has open water inside loose pack 
ice. 
120. Nunataks along edge of coast. 
121. Actual coast line here lies 30 to 45 miles south of that 
plotted on existing charts. The former coast line was 
actually the ice boundary as demonstrated by the aircraft 
radio altimeter. 
122. Consolidated pack off coast. Cloud cover from 0 to 
14,000 feet over the continent prevented exploration. 
123. Shelf ice extends north of coast to 69°55' S. between 3° 
and 4° E. 
124. Probable rock [garbled word], apparently of volcanic 
origin. 
125. Prominent mountain range sighted here. 
126. Mountain range sighted here. 
Note. The comments listed hereon are excerpts from coded 
dispatches, from interrogation of aircrewmen, or from casual 
examination of aerial photographic proofs (Task Group 68.5 
only). At this date the mapping photography has not been 
prepared or examined. 
This preliminary edition submitted 18 April 1947. 
John H. Roscoe, 1st Lt., U. S. M. C. R., 
Staff Photogrammetric Officer. 
"DISCOVERY ANO EXPLORATION 
A2IMUTHAI roUIOtSTAWT MtOJfCTtO* TASK GROUP 68 1 
Merrick -*—*—*— 
Yancey 
TASK C»KOUP 68.2 
\ / 
TASK 68 3 
Poland Z_/ 
Philippine Sea 
TRACK CHART 
TASK FORCE 68 
ROUTES ANTARCTICA 
PnbJUhed by Um Hydro*rmphic Office, Waebln«tOB, D. C., Hey 1MT 
under the authority of the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 
H.O. Wise. No. 11,956—3